18. 50th Anniversary of Korean War Issue

Military Review

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Prepared by

US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

VOLUME LXXXX - January-February 2000, NO 1

Professional Bulletin 100-99-5/6

CONTENTS

Editorial

2 Korean Conflict: A 50-Year Perspective

3 Task Force Smith Revisited by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph G.D. Babb, US Army, Retired

14 Harnessing Thunderbolts by Major Kelly C. Jordan, US Army

20 North Korea and the Bomb by Stanley Weintraub

28 Busting Through by Colonel John F. Antal, US Army

40 Planning for Major Theater Wars: Examining the Worst Case by Major Gregory A. Pickell, US Army

49 What We Haven't Learned by Captain Robert L. Bateman III, US Army

56 A New Form of Warfare by James J. Schneider

62 Leadership and Command

63 Army Values and a Rope with Three Cords by Major Jeffrey S. Wilson

69 Personality Styles of Effective Soldiers by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Russell, US Army

Managing and Motivating by Rewards (Side bar) by Lieutenant Colonel José M. Marrero, US Army

75 Insights

Idealistic Strategic Planning by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Bell, US Army, Retired

Green Fields beyond By Lieutenant Colonel Drew Bennett, US Marine Corps

80 Almanac

Army National Guard: Korean War Mobilization by Captain William M. Donnelly, US Army Reserve

Organic Tactical Air Transport, 1952-1965 by Edgar F. Raines Jr.

89 Review Essay

The Vietnam War—the Other Side by Colonel Griffin N. Dodge, US Army, Retired

90 Book Reviews contemporary readings for the professional

Cover

From the EditorMuch changed over the first five years after World War II. Japan, a former arch

enemy, had become a major posting for the US military. Our European focus hadshifted east from Germany to the Soviet Union. Worldwide, the 8.2 million menunder arms in 1945 had drawn down to a skeletal force. And here at home, the babyboom and GI bill were fueling tremendous social change.

Amid all these changes, in 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined theUS security interests around the world. He did not mention Korea. Two weeks later,the North Koreans swarmed across the 38th parallel.

If much changed in those five years after World War II, much has remained eerilysimilar in Korea for almost 50 years since that war�s armistice. North and South stillface off across the most world�s most heavily fortified border. The US militarymaintains a presence there to avoid another strategic miscommunication.International tensions are still high and peace talks still lead nowhere.

This issue of Military Review examines the aftermath of the Korean War�itseffect on nuclear policy, regional strategy, tactical doctrine, military leadership,readiness training and Army command and control. In his study about how theArmy should prepare in 2000, Joseph G.D. Babb revisits Task Force Smith in 1950.Kelly C. Jordan explains how lessons from that war affect the Army today.Acknowledging that restricted terrain characterizes the �Land of the Morning Calm,�John F. Antal nevertheless proposes concentrated armor operations in the defiles.At echelons above the hilltop warriors, policy makers pondered the use of nuclearweapons in Korea, as Stanley Weintraub chronicles. Greg A. Pickell warns us thatinstead of preparing for the last war, we should be ready for a re-eruption of the onea half a century ago. No one knows whether war in that theater will come, andtaking a different tack, Robert L. Bateman III traces lessons about cohesion from Koreain 1950 to Vietnam in 1965 to who knows where next.

In anticipation of the theory and doctrine discussions in the March-April issue,an article here posits a new form of warfare, on the same level as maneuver andannihilation but fundamentally different: cybershock. James J. Schneider arguesthat the ability to disrupt enemy command and control can produce defeat as readilyas isolating or destroying forces.

In the leadership and command section, Jeffrey S. Wilson expands the Armyvalues discussion to show how leaders should apply the principles to all facets oftheir soldiers�spirit, sinew, and significant others. Because personality styles differamong the general population, they are bound to differ among our soldiers, andMichael L. Russell explains how we manage the force in peacetime and war.Finally, Jose M. Marrero cautions leaders that rewarding soldiers may unwittinglyrecognize the wrong individuals and encourage undesired behaviors.

The Army enters the millennium well into its third century of service to thenation. Some things have changed little in the past 225 years. Others have changedsignificantly in a mere 50. And some aspects of our profession differ radically fromthe good old days 10 years ago. Military Review remains your forum to discussideas about tradition and revolution. So let us know what you are thinking�aboutthese articles and about our Army.

LJH

3MILITARY REVIEW l January-February 2000

�NO MORE Task Force Smiths.� FormerArmy Chief of Staff General Gordon R.

Sullivan outlined this battle cry for the Army of the1990s. The tiny, ill-prepared and badly equippedforce had put up a valiant but futile attempt to haltNorth Korean hordes in a war that broke out fol-lowing the biggest drawdown in US history.1

Ironically, the number of divisions in the activeArmy�10�was the same when Sullivan retiredas it was at the beginning of the Korean War in1950. The division that prepared and deployed TaskForce (TF) Smith, the 24th Infantry Division, wasreflagged in the early 1990s but is now being re-activated, along with the 7th Infantry Division, asthe Army adds two �cadre� divisions to the 10 ac-tive ones.2 As the Army enters the year 2000 withunits deployed in Bosnia and Kosovo, a decade af-ter the end of the Cold War, and 50 years after the�limited war� in Korea, a heated debate continuesover its proper organization, equipment, manningand role.

The traditional problems normally associated withmilitary readiness�personnel, training and equip-ment shortfalls�that led to the disaster in Korea in1950 seem to have been largely avoided today.While demands for further reductions in the budgetand manpower have receded, the requirement forchanges in the Army�s roles and missions and thereality that manpower costs must be trimmed to payfor modernization are not likely to go away anytimesoon. As General Eric K. Shinseki takes over theleadership of the Army, valuable lessons from TFSmith merit re-examination.3 The Army�s duties andmissions in Japan during the occupation have par-allels to today�s missions in Bosnia and Kosovo.

TF Smith is generally seen as a failure in tacticalpreparedness. However, for long-term US nationalsecurity, the occupation of Japan arguably was agreat success since Japan remains our key Asian ally

today. Army leaders face parallel situations andchoices today in building and maintaining the landcomponent of the world�s only superpower withnational interests around the world.

The Army must be prepared to �fight and win thenation�s wars,� but it also must be able to conductother missions in support of this nation�s nationalsecurity objectives.4 The real debate over the fu-ture role of the Army should not concern whetherto prepare for warfighting or for military operationsother than war (MOOTW) or stability and supportoperations (SASO) activities. The deliberations anddecisions must address how to man, train, equip,organize and plan all the missions assigned by theNational Command Authorities (NCA). In reevalu-ating TF Smith, this article briefly reviews not onlythe personnel, training and equipment elements ofreadiness, but also the strategic environment, theleadership and morale factors and the effects of thenontraditional missions conducted by the Army dur-ing the Occupation of Japan.

This evaluation must be done at all three levels�strategic (Washington, D.C.), operational (Tokyoand Seoul) and tactical (the occupation zone andbattlefield). The US Army in the post-Cold War,post-Desert Storm era, as it was in the aftermath ofWorld War II, is being required to conduct militaryduties in other than a war environment. The Army

Half a century ago the US ignored apotential threat that still opposes us today. TheKorean War is not over, and the United States isstill taking casualties. This was America�s firstmajor UN operation, and since the end of the

Cold War the number has increased many fold.An obvious question begs to be answered: Have

we learned anything in the past fifty years?


4 January-February 2000 l MILITARY REVIEW

has already been tasked to conduct or support uni-lateral, coalition and UN-led humanitarian, peace-enforcement, peacekeeping and peace-building op-erations in northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti,Bosnia and now Kosovo and East Timor.5 The sta-tus and results of these operations are mixed andcontroversial. However, the military�s role and per-formance in Japan and Korea after World War II

were no less controversial at the time. The fact thatthere has not been an outbreak of a major conflictin either Korea or Taiwan suggests that the price ofpeace is US presence and patience.

This article looks at the occupation of Japan inthe years preceding the Korean War, specificallyaddressing the strategic direction, military organi-zation and leadership that formed, tasked and de-ployed TF Smith to Korea for action against theNorth Korean People�s Army (NKPA). TF Smith,named for Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. (Brad)Smith, was the lead element of the 24th InfantryDivision, Eighth United States Army, the firstAmerican combat unit introduced by General Dou-glas MacArthur into the �police action� in July 1950.

Roy K. Flint states, �the tactical defeats enduredby the officers and men of the 24th Division wererooted in the failure of the Army�and not just thedivisions in Japan�to prepare itself during peace-time for battle.�6 This article outlines the missionsand duties of Army occupying units in Japan, dis-cusses their readiness for war, traces actions of TFSmith in the opening days of the Korean War andreviews the resulting lessons. Most important, thisarticle draws parallels between the Army of1945-1950 and the Army of 1995-2000 and pro-poses some considerations and conclusions usingsome of the lessons from the Occupation of Japanand the combat operations of TF Smith.

The Occupation of JapanOn 28 August 1945, the first American soldiers

deployed to the Japanese home islands to preparefor the arrival of occupation forces. MacArthur,designated Supreme Commander for the AlliedPowers (SCAP), arrived on the 30th to implementthe Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive.7 Thisdocument called for the same type of humanitarian,nation-building and security operations that theArmy is conducting today. The directive called onthe SCAP (also the wider term for the entire head-quarters) to demilitarize and democratize Japan.While a bit lengthy, the goals outlined in the textare most informative, especially when comparedwith UN mandates the Army has been asked toimplement in current and recent operations:

�The ultimate objective of the United Nationswith respect to Japan is to foster conditions whichwill give the greatest possible assurance that Japanwill not again become a menace to the peace andsecurity of the world and will permit her eventualadmission as a responsible and peaceful member ofthe family of nations. Certain measures considered

The virtually complete and peacefulcompliance with the terms of the surrender by

the Japanese soon moved security worries to thebackground. MacArthur and his staff were

quickly forced to make decisions that hadsignificant long-term ramifications for Japan�sfuture modernization and political development.The fate and future role of the emperor and thewar crimes tribunals were the most visible and

volatile topics, but issues related to caring for thebasic needs of the people were also important

in keeping Japan stable and peaceful.

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Emperor Hirohito pays an unprecedented visit toSupreme Allied Commander Douglas MacArthur atthe US Embassy in Tokyo, 27 September 1945.


to be essential for the achievement of this objectivehave been set forth in the Potsdam Declaration.These measures include, among others, the carry-ing out of the Cairo Declaration and the limiting ofJapanese sovereignty to the four main islands andsuch minor islands as the Allied Powers determine;the abolition of militarism and ultranationalism inall their forms; the disarmament and demilitariza-tion of Japan, with continuing control over Japan�scapacity to make war; the strengthening of demo-cratic tendencies and processes in governmental,economic, and social institutions and encouragementand support of liberal political tendencies in Japan.The United States desires that the Japanese Govern-ment conform as closely as may be to the principlesof democratic self-government but it is not the re-sponsibility of the occupation forces to impose onJapan any form of government not supported by thefreely expressed will of the people.�8

The guidelines and broad policies for the occu-pation of Europe and Japan had been agreed to bythe major allies at the Cairo Conference of 1943.Military planners in Washington had been keymembers of a team studying postwar issues fromthe earliest days of the war. Key State Departmentpersonnel, military planners and regional expertsbegan working on postwar planning in early 1942in a more or less ad hoc manner. However, in early1945, a State-War-Navy Coordination Committee(SWNCC) was formed and prepared interagencyanalysis and policy inputs for postwar Germany andJapan.9 Why should interagency planning and co-operation be a contentious issue and lead to a sepa-rate Presidential Decision Directive, PDD-56, in1998 when the historical precedents are obvious?

Despite the planning effort, at the time of the sur-render considerable and continuing political debateswirled in Washington about the fate of Japan andAmerica�s role in the postwar world. Amid turmoiland conflicting guidance, MacArthur, no stranger tothe politics of the Pacific, assumed wide latitude ininterpreting his mandate. He immediately began tomake his presence felt by implementing humanitar-ian relief efforts, caring for the thousands of Alliedprisoners of war, demobilizing the Japanese mili-tary, conducting war crimes tribunals and organiz-ing and putting into place a civil-military govern-ment. The task was immense, politically sensitiveand dynamic.10

With the official unconditional surrender in earlySeptember, SCAP became responsible for a totallydefeated nation that had suffered over 5 million ca-sualties, with its major cities in ruins and its agri-

cultural sector unable to feed the country. Japancontained a population of 74 million, many ofwhom needed housing and medical care. More than5 million Japanese army and navy personnel, mostoutside the home islands, needed to be brought

home. Additionally, more than one million Koreanand Chinese soldiers and forced laborers had to berepatriated.11

In addition, as the occupation began, MacArthurwas the commander of over a half-million deployedAmerican and Allied forces throughout the Far East.The reorganization, demobilization and orderly re-turn of the servicemen to home nations significantlycomplicated the task at hand in Japan. US Army per-sonnel, fresh from bloody, no-quarter-given com-bat against the Japanese were critical to providinghumanitarian support, ensuring a pacified Japan andpreparing to rebuild a nation. This was not a task theAmerican units had been prepared and trained to un-dertake, nor were many of these combat veteranseager to stay in Japan now that the war was over.

But while there those men oversaw not only aprogram for ensuring Japan�s military would notthreaten peace, but also a sweeping program to remakeJapan in America�s image�a new, democratic,political order.12 While the politicians in Washing-ton and other Allied capitals argued over Japan�sreparations, the fate of the Emperor and what Ja-pan should look like in the future, SCAP immedi-ately analyzed the task at hand and went to work.

SCAP endured conflicting messages from Washing-ton and the frustrating and counterproductive role ofthe Russians, some of whom were part of MacArthur�sAllied staff in Tokyo. The first phase of the occu-pation focused on security and demilitarization is-sues and the second on the political, economic andsocial changes mandated in broad goals by the Al-lies as interpreted by MacArthur and his staff.13

The traditional problems normallyassociated with military readiness � personnel,training and equipment shortfalls � that ledto the disaster in Korea in 1950 seem to have

been largely avoided today. While demands forfurther reductions in the budget and manpowerhave receded, the requirement for changes inthe Army�s roles and missions and the reality

that manpower costs must be trimmed to payfor modernization are not likely to go

away anytime soon.

KOREA


Actually, both phases occurred nearly simulta-neously, with humanitarian and demilitarizationtasks having initial primacy. However, the virtu-ally complete and peaceful compliance with the

terms of the surrender by the Japanese soon movedsecurity worries to the background. MacArthur andhis staff were quickly forced to make decisions thathad significant long-term ramifications for the fu-ture modernization and political development ofJapan. The fate and future role of the emperor andthe war crimes tribunals were the most visible andvolatile topics, but issues related to caring for thebasic needs of the people were also important inkeeping Japan stable and peaceful. Other decisionsabout implementing political and economic devel-opment policies, using the existing Japanese bureau-cracy and future governmental structures were noless vexing. The predominate planners, decisionmakers and implementers were military officers,using guidance from Washington that was neitherclear nor consistent.

Military staff officers played critical roles in in-terpreting policy and ensuring the implementationof directives for the postwar government. The de-mobilization of the Japanese army and navy, thedestruction of war industries and equipment, thedistribution of humanitarian supplies and repatria-tion of soldiers and workers were accomplished, forthe most part, by the Japanese under US militarydirection. In addition, US Army personnel were di-rectly involved in rewriting the constitution, insti-tuting police and education reforms and planning forsweeping political, social and economic changes,including land reform, purging military and indus-trial leaders and forming labor unions.

Army combat units were deployed throughout theislands, actively patrolling to thwart illicit military

training, arms caches, contraband and black-marketactivity. In addition, infantry units served as mili-tary police and constabulary to keep the peace andprovide an American presence throughout the coun-try.14 However, the Japanese fanaticism for work-ing with the Americans and implementing the peacemore than equaled their fanaticism for war. Thediscipline among the Japanese people and theAmerican soldiers has been widely characterized asmiraculous. The �miracle� was military leadership,planning and organization, coupled with a studiedunderstanding of the Japanese people and culture.

The initial occupation force of over 400,000 sol-diers in the Sixth and Eighth US armies was clearlyunnecessary given the attitude and actions of theJapanese people. In addition, the war-weary Ameri-can people demanded the rapid return of their ser-vice personnel. The pace of the US demobilizationquickly reduced the numbers of troops available forduty in the Far East. By early 1946, the Sixth Armywas gone and the Eighth Army (EUSA) numberedunder 200,000.15 A standing Army of over 8 mil-lion at the end of World War II was reduced to592,000 and 10 divisions by 1949. Four of thesedivisions, the 1st Cavalry, and the 7th, 24th and 25thInfantry divisions were part of the Occupation ofJapan.16 One of these occupation divisions, the 24th,would deploy the first American combat troops in-troduced into Korea.

The 24th Infantry Division�They had to be told that this was a police ac-

tion, and that they�d soon be home in Japan. It wasa happy thought�life in Japan was very good. Al-most every man had his own shoeshine boy and hisown musame; in a country where an American lieu-tenant made as much as a cabinet minister, even aPFC could make out. And the training wasn�tmuch.�17

In 1949, the 24th Infantry Division was conduct-ing its third year of occupation duties on the islandof Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan�s four mainislands. The division had completed its move to thisisland directly across the Tsushima (Korea) Straitfrom the southern ports of the Republic of Koreain May 1946. Kyushu held the major naval base atSasebo and the city of Nagasaki. There was littleextra room for ranges and virtually no maneuverareas. After short deployments by the 2d MarineDivision and the 32d Infantry Division, the 24thwould become responsible for the entire island andconduct the full range of occupation duties until theoutbreak of the Korean War.

It is also debated that the Army�s mostimportant shortcoming was the attitude of the

leadership, civilian and military, and even of thesoldiers, that war was not possible, especially a

ground war, in the Atomic Age. Withcommunist-inspired or supported insurgencies

in Greece, Vietnam and Malaya, the recentdefeat of the US-supported Nationalists in 1949in China, and the further Soviet consolidation of

Eastern Europe in the late l940s, the warningsigns appear, in hindsight, to have

been quite obvious.


The 24th had officially assumed occupation re-sponsibilities on the island on 16 June 1946 andhandled minor disturbances related to fraternizationand problems between the Japanese and not-yet re-patriated Korean workers. The division also ad-dressed easing food shortages among the Japanese,running military and civil courts and providing di-vision interpreters to support rebuilding and con-struction activities.

Training and operations continued. The divisionpatrolled extensively, conducted marksmanshiptraining, reconnoitered locations for artillery rangesand set up a division school. The division also as-sumed the responsibility for a repatriation center.Plans were well along for providing clubs, Red Crossfacilities, and improved recreation for the troops.18

Kyushu was to be the home for the 24th InfantryDivision for the foreseeable future.

SCAP Occupation Instruction Number 5, dated1 October 1949, tasked the EUSA, the senior head-quarters for all the Army divisions in Japan, withensuring Japanese compliance with orders and in-structions. These included encouraging the devel-opment of the economy to help feed and house theJapanese people, supervise the continuing repatria-tion effort and execute missions and directives relatedto Japan�s social, cultural and economic develop-ment. Significantly, the instructions stated:

�(6) Conduct occupation duties in such a man-ner that forces are prepared constantly:

(a) For combat.(b) To quell any incipient disorders, riots or

other disturbances or disputes.(c) In the event of disaster in Japan to:

1. Preserve order.2. Alleviate human suffering by provid-

ing emergency aid.3. Extend assistance to the Japanese Gov-

ernment as directed.4. Effect emergency rehabilitation of those

Japanese installations.�19

It is clear in communications from higher head-quarters, fully eight months before the outbreak ofhostilities on the Korean peninsula, that being pre-pared for combat was a stated mission subordinateunits had to be prepared to conduct. Having saidthat, it is also clear that it was not designated a prior-ity or singled out for special consideration. Howwas the 24th Infantry Division organized for the taskand how prepared for combat was the unit? Whatwas the status of the leadership and what was themorale of troops? One analyst asserts that �with-out exaggerating, it could be said that Eighth Army

units were bordering on being unready for war.�20

In early 1949, the 24th Infantry Division strengthwas about 10,700, well below the planned wartimestrength of 18,900. None of the three infantry regi-ments, the 19th, the 21st and the 34th, had its fullcomplement of three battalions. The 19th had onlyone battalion, a headquarters company and one com-pany of a second battalion. The 21st had only onebattalion and two headquarters companies. The 34thwas in the best shape, organizationally, with threebattalions less one company. The 52d Artillery wasalso understrength, and because of inadequate rangefacilities only fired once a year. Coupled with a high

Amid turmoil and conflicting guidance,MacArthur, no stranger to the politics of the

Pacific, assumed wide latitude in interpreting hismandate. He immediately began to make hispresence felt by implementing humanitarian

relief efforts, caring for the thousands of Alliedprisoners of war, demobilizing the Japanese

military, conducting war crimes tribunals andorganizing and putting into place a civil-militarygovernment. The task was immense, politically

sensitive and dynamic.

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Kenji Dohihara listensto his death sentence atthe Tokyo war crimes trials,12 November 1948. The for-mer general commanded theSpecial Services Section in Man-churia during the war.


1st Cavalry Divalerted

5 Julydeployed19 July

24th Infantry Divalerted

30 Junedeployed

1-5 July

7th Infantry DivCannibalizedJune-July

deployed18 Sep(Inch�on)

25th Infantry Divalerted

5 Julydeployed14 July

Port Arthur( China )

1Vladivostok

( Soviet Union )

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Korean War Deployments of

Japan-basedDivisions


turnover and continuing occupation duties that keptindividuals away from training, the personnel sta-tus was troubling.

Perhaps more important than the personnel pic-ture was the status of equipment. The units wereequipped with World War II weapons. In addition,ammunition stocks were low, with only �thirteenhigh-explosive, antitank (HEAT) artillery rounds tobe found in the division.�21 The crew-servedweapon and vehicle situation was much the same.What the soldiers had was old and worn out, andmaintenance was difficult with the shortage of parts.Critical for the upcoming battles in Korea, therewere virtually no operational armored units in Ja-pan and the available tanks were light, poorly main-tained M-24s.

When Lieutenant General Walton E. Walker tookover the Eighth Army in 1949, he emphasized train-ing and immediately instituted a new training pro-gram. This program was just starting to have a posi-

tive effect when the war broke out. Units had conductedindividual and crew training, but there were limitedfacilities for the firing of indirect-fire weapons, re-coilless rifles and antitank weapons. This lack oftank-killing capability was a key shortcoming in theupcoming battle with the North Koreans. Addition-ally, battalions and larger units had no opportunityto train together and develop the necessary inter -operability and combined arms expertise. Thiswould also be a telling shortcoming for TF Smith.

Even so, �the greatest weakness of the AmericanArmy was not its weapons and equipment, piti-ful as they were. The US Army, since 1945, hadbeen civilianized at the insistence of the public.They wore uniforms, but they were civilians atheart.�22 The lifestyle of the officers and men ofthe occupation force reinforced a relaxed �colonialarmy� atmosphere. However, this is a contentiouspoint; it does not appear that the Army�s day-to-day regime in Japan was any more relaxed than

Japanese fanaticism for working with the Americans and implementing the peace morethan equaled their fanaticism for war. The discipline among the Japanese people and the Americansoldiers has been widely characterized as miraculous. The �miracle� was military leadership,

planning and organization, coupled with a studied understanding of the Japanese.

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Japanese soldiers bringingweapons to a US Armycollection point in Yokohama.


for units in the Continental United States.Later actions by American troops no better trained

or prepared, and from a similar relaxed, civilianizedenvironment produced major victories in a few short

months. Many of the officers and noncommis-sioned officers (NCOs) were veterans of WorldWar II, and the United States still had a techni-cally superior Air Force and Navy. These fac-tors would help mitigate the initial shortfalls ofthe US Army on the peninsula. In the Gulf Warmany of the senior officers and NCOs were Viet-nam War veterans, and the US and allied air andnaval assets were again technically superior. Itmight be prudent to remember that after Inchon,it was not the North Korean Army that defeatedthe UN forces but a massive counteroffensive bya Chinese army.

It is also debated that the most important short-coming was the attitude of the leadership, civilianand military, and even of the soldiers, that war wasnot possible, especially a ground war, in the AtomicAge. With communist-inspired or supported in-surgencies in Greece, Vietnam and Malaya, the re-cent defeat of the US-supported Nationalists in 1949in China, and the further Soviet consolidation ofEastern Europe in the late l940s, the warning signsappear, in hindsight, to have been quite obvious.Not everyone overlooked the warnings; �the best ofthe leaders�Walker, Stephens, the RegimentalCommander and Smith�knew that war was pos-sible and fought against the obstacles.�23 The fail-ure was at the strategic level to get the Army�s fu-ture tactical requirements �about right.�

Task Force SmithA veteran of the 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl

Harbor and now commander of the 1st Battalion,21st Infantry Regiment�the Gimlets�of the 24th

Infantry Division, Smith had been catapulted intoanother war, a war he had not expected and one forwhich his unit was not fully prepared. Literally andsymbolically, Smith was leading the United Statesin war for the second time in ten years.24

In a letter in response to a US Army Commandand General Staff College student�s query in1992, retired Brigadier General Smith, for whomthe task force was named, endorses as �factual andaccurate� the accounts of Fehrenbach, Applemanand Eric Ludvigsen, who wrote an article publishedin ARMY magazine in February 1992.25 These threesources are used extensively in the following briefaccount of the activities of the unit in Japan andits actions in Korea in July of 1950.

On 25 June 1950, the NKPA initiated a large-scale offensive operation against the Republic ofKorea. Aside from some advisers serving in theKorean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), therewere few other American troops on the peninsula.The outgoing commander of KMAG, BrigadierGeneral William L. Roberts, who was on his wayback to the United States as the attack began, hadbeen recently quoted in Time magazine: �The SouthKoreans have the best damn army outside of theUnited States.�26 The eight divisions of the Armyof the Republic of Korea, without tanks and ad-equate artillery, and the US KMAG advisers werecompletely surprised by the attack and by 27 Juneresistance was breaking down everywhere. By the28th, �only a rabble held the south shores of theHan.�28 On 30 June, based on a personal �on theground� assessment by MacArthur followed by arequest to use military power, President Harry S.Truman authorized the deployment of two Armydivisions to Korea.29

Having been on alert since the 28th of June, �TaskForce Smith was born in the late evening of 30June.30 Lieutenant Colonel Smith, the battalioncommander of 1st of the 21st Infantry (1-21 Inf),the Gimlets, would lead the first US Army combatformation to Korea. Replacements were immedi-ately moved to the understrength units and a mixedinfantry-artillery task force of slightly more than 400men was cobbled together out of other regimentaland division assets. TF Smith prepared for move-ment to Korea to �stop the North Koreans as farfrom Pusan as possible.�30

On 5 July, only five days after notification in Ja-pan, TF Smith deployed in a delaying position southof Osan, Korea. With additional troops and volun-teers, the task force now numbered 540 soldiers.Shortly after 0800 artillery and antitank teams of TF

The senior US officers in the chainof command, including MacArthur and evensome of the troops themselves, had believed

that when the NKPA realized the Americanswere on the ground in Korea and moving in

additional forces, the invasion would stop.Overconfidence, hope, underestimating the

enemy and �arrogance� all appeared to play arole in the climate, morale and motivation

among the leaders and the led in TF Smith �and their superiors.


Smith fired on advancing Soviet-supplied T-34 Ko-rean tanks. However, the NKPA armored columnmoved through and Smith prepared his unit for thecoming infantry assault. Low ammunition supplies,dud rounds and inadequate weapons�not failures inbravery, unit cohesion or leadership�were prima-rily responsible for only six tanks being destroyedor damaged out of the more than 30 engaged.

A follow-on enemy infantry column was sightedabout an hour later and the task force took the en-emy under fire when they came into range. How-ever, by mid-afternoon the position was about to beflanked, and communications had been lost with theartillery unit to the rear. After repeated attempts tocontact the artillery and believing it had been de-stroyed by the enemy tanks, Smith finally ordereda withdrawal. It was during this withdrawal underfire, a very difficult maneuver, that the unit brokeup and took heavy casualties. Upon moving back,Smith found the artillery unit intact and togetherwith its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Perry, theguns were rendered useless and the withdrawal com-pleted. Even though North Koreans did not pursuethe retreating Americans, about 180 US soldierswere killed, wounded or missing from TF Smith

compared with 127 reported NKPA killed andwounded.31 Nevertheless, the unit had slowed theNorth Korean advance.

The senior US officers in the chain of command,including MacArthur and even some of the troopsthemselves, believed that when the NKPA realized theAmericans were on the ground in Korea and movingin additional forces, the invasion would stop.32 Over-confidence, hope, underestimating the enemy and�arrogance� all appeared to play a role in the cli-mate, morale and motivation among the leaders andthe led in TF Smith�and their superiors. However,given the task, the mission and the odds, TF Smithdeserves high marks for its performance.

While the TF might have done better, the othertwo regiments of the 24th Division were arguablymuch worse. However, the division continued todelay the NKPA, took significant losses (includingthe capture of its commander), and fought until re-lieved by the 1st Cavalry Division on 22 July.33 ThePusan perimeter held and a successful counterattackoccurred in early fall. The 24th Division, refittedand reinforced, distinguished itself in combat laterin the war. Smith continued to command 1-21 Infuntil November 1950.34

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Replacements were immediately moved to the understrength units and a mixedinfantry-artillery task force of slightly more than 400 men was cobbled together out of other

regimental and division assets. TF Smith prepared for movement to Korea to �stop the NorthKoreans as far from Pusan as possible.� On 5 July, only five days after notification in Japan,

TF Smith deployed in a delaying position south of Osan, Korea.

lTask Force Smithoffloading at Taejonon 2 July 1950.


ConsiderationsToday we have fallen heir to the problems and

responsibilities the Japanese had faced and borne inthe Korean-Manchurian area for nearly a half cen-tury, and there is a certain perverse justice in the painwe are suffering from a burden which, when it wasborne by others, we held is such low esteem. Whatis saddest of all is that the relationship between pastand present seems to be visible to so few people.For if we are not to learn from our own mistakes,where shall we learn at all.35

At every level of the defense establishment be-tween 1945 and 1950 errors of omission and com-mission led the DPRK to think it could attack anddefeat a military supported by US advisers and logis-tics. The DPRK thought it could win before the mightof the United States would or could be brought to bearagainst it. One obvious element in this equation wasthe need for MacArthur, his staff, the Eighth Armyand its subordinate units to carry on with the vitalstrategic task of demilitarizing and democratizing

Japan the, �most alien enemy the United States hadever fought in an all-out struggle.�36

Half a century ago the US ignored a potentialthreat that still opposes us today. The Korean Waris not over, and the United States is still taking ca-sualties. This was America�s first major UN opera-tion, and since the end of the Cold War the numberhas increased many fold. An obvious question begsto be answered: Have we learned anything in thepast fifty years?

The lessons from the occupation of Japan and ofthe tactical-level combat experience of TF Smith areoften seen only as �a study of unpreparedness.�More than that, this is a study in balancing thenation�s objectives with its capabilities and willing-ness to use them. It is a study in decisions and plansmade in ignorance of the history, the culture, thealien ideologies and the regional geopolitical situ-ation. It is a study in reliance on the wrong tech-nology or the right technology poorly integratedinto the total military instrument of power and thearrogance of the success of the last fight. It is astudy in how too many key leaders see the worldas they wish it were and not as it really is.

One author describes the familiar �New WorldLandscape� of the post-Cold War environment,�saying that trends suggest that conflict will be onthe rise. But he points toward a different worldin which nations are likely to be embattled fromwithin and without.37

The occupation of Japan and the fate of TFSmith suggest that in the post-Cold War era we arelooking in both the right and wrong places. Tech-nology is only a partial answer to the problems insecuring the nation�s objectives in the 21st century.Regional expertise and planning, a better-integratedjoint force, the ability to understand and evaluate thecapabilities of, and work with allies and friends, andformer enemies�these are also only partial solu-tions. The real solutions cannot be bought�theymust be studied, practiced and earned.

Senior military leaders in Washington must edu-cate executive, cabinet and legislative members andstaffs with little or no military experience on therisks and pitfalls of decisions involving the use ofmilitary force across an increasing complex andvaried spectrum. Our political leaders must fund thebest balance of personnel, equipment, training andforce structure to build the force and develop lead-ers who confidently and intelligently face the chal-lenges of the future.

At the operational level, the theater commandersin chief�the MacArthurs of today�must antici-pate, plan, balance and conduct military activitiesin war and operations other than war with the mostefficient and effective joint, multinational and inter-

When Lieutenant General Walton E.Walker took over the Eighth Army in 1949, heemphasized training and immediately instituteda new training program. This program was juststarting to have a positive effect when the war

broke out. Units had conducted individual andcrew training, but there were limited facilities for

the firing of indirect-fire weapons, recoillessrifles and antitank weapons. This lack of tank-killing capability was a key shortcoming in the

upcoming battle with the North Koreans.

General Walker (left) meets 24th Infantry DivisionCommander Major General William F. Dean atan advance airfield in Korea and informs him thathis division will soon be joined by the rest ofEighth Army, 7 July 1950. Dean was latercaptured during the defense of Taejon.

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NOTES1. Gordon R. Sullivan, �No More Task Force Smiths,� interview by L. James

Binder, ARMY (January 1992): 21.2. Jim Tice, �Anybody Home?� Army Times, 17 April 1995,21.3. Ibid., 2.4. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff,

National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: Gov-ernment Printing Office, February 1995), i.

5. Peace Building consists of postconflict actions, primarily diplomatic, thatstrengthen and rebuild civil infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a re-turn to conflict. Peace Enforcement is the application of military force or the threatof its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliancewith generally accepted resolutions and sanctions. Peacekeeping involves mili-tary or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all majorbelligerent parties. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-23 Peace Opera-tions (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 30 December 1994), 2-6.

6. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America�s First Battles: 1776-1965(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 266.

7. Walt Sheldon, The Honorable Conquerors: The Occupation of Japan1945-1952 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), 39.

8. Ibid., 40-41.9. Robert Wolfe, ed., American Proconsuls: United States Government in Ger-

many 1944-1952 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1994), 3-52.10. Kenneth B. Pyle, The Making of Modern Japan (Lexington, MA: Heath and

Company, 1978), 151-55.11. Sheldon, 40-41.12. Pyle, 151-55.13. Charles A. Willoughby and John Camberlain, MacArthur: 1941-1951 (New

York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), 300-328.14. Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division, �Occupation History of the 24th Infantry

Division: 1-21 January 1946,� Archives, Combined Arms Research Library, FortLeavenworth, Kansas.

15. Ibid., 151-55.

16. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington,DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), 49.

17. T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York:MacMillan Company, 1963: Reprint, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Com-mand and General Staff College, 1994), 100.

18. Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division, �The Occupation of Japan: A Unit Historyof the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division for May 1946� (Okayama, Honshu, Japan),Archives, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

19. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Occupation Instruction No. 5,APO 500 (Tokyo, Japan: 1 October 1949), Archives, Combined Arms ResearchLibrary, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 3.

20. Heller and Stofft, 269-75.21. Ibid., 274.22. Fehrenbach, 91.23. Heller and Stofft, 274-75.24. Ibid., 266.25. C. B. Smith, Arizona, to Kenneth W. Carrol, Missouri, 15 March 1992.26. Fehrenbach, 17.27. Ibid., 76.28. Ibid., 90.29. Eric C. Ludvigsen, �An Arrogant Display of Strength,� ARMY, January 1992,

36-45.30. Ibid.31. Appleman, 59-76.32. Ibid., 60, 70, 73.33. Fehrenbach, 124-47.34. Ludvigsen, 45.35. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950 (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press, 1951), 49.36. Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese

Culture (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1954), 1.37. �Looking in All the Wrong Places?� Armed Forces Journal, May 1995, 39.

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph G.D. Babb, US Army, Retired, is an instructor, Military OperationsOther Than War Division, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, US Army Command andGeneral Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from Bowdoin College, anM.P.A. from Clark University, an M.A. from the University of Kansas and is a CGSC graduate. He servedin a variety of staff and analyst positions in the Continental United States and Hawaii, including intelli-gence officer, 10th Special Forces (Airborne), Fort Devens, Massachusetts; analyst, Chinese ground forces,Defense Intelligence Agency, (DIA) Washington, D.C.; DIA liaison officer, National Military CommandCenter, Washington, D.C.; senior China analyst and deputy director of current intelligence, Headquarters,US Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii; Northeast Asia/Australia/New Zealand/United States(ANZUS) desk officer, office of the deputy chief of staff for Operations, US Army Pacific, Fort Shafter,Hawaii; and chief, Strategic Studies, DJCO. His article �Prairie Warrior 96: Special Operations�appeared in the July-August 1996 edition of Military Review.

The occupation of Japan and the fate ofTF Smith suggest that in the post-Cold War erawe are looking in both the right and the wrongplaces. Technology is only a partial answer

to the problems in securing the nation�sobjectives into the 21st century. . . .

If we are only prepared to provide our nationwith ad hoc SASO responses and settle for a lossor draw in situations like Rwanda, Somalia or

Haiti, we are failing the nation.

agency force mix, at the right time and place. Thisdoes not necessarily mean with overwhelming com-bat power, for what may seem most simple, in thelong term could become most costly. The tragedyof US Air Force and Naval aviation assets mistak-enly attacking US and ROK forces in the earlydays of the Korean conflict exacerbated the prob-lems faced by the 24th Division. It is more thantragic that today we are still shooting at each other,figuratively and literally, and still do not have a jointteam that can interoperate in truly seamless, ef-ficient, multiservice operations.

At the tactical, TF Smith level, we argue thata disciplined soldier trained for his warfightingmission can do any �other than war� task assigned,in part because we prioritize training dollars, hoursand facilities to practice for the fight-and-winmission. If that means we are only prepared toprovide our nation with ad hoc SASO responsesand settle for a loss or draw in situations likeRwanda, Somalia or Haiti, we are failing the nation.As for the Balkans, are we there to win the peaceor just protect ourselves until ordered out? Whatwould MacArthur do in Bosnia or Kosovo?

Luckily we did not lose Japan to save Korea.

However, it certainly would have been better to winboth the war and the peace�with fewer casualties.Building and keeping the peace, deterring war andif deterrence fails, winning the war are the demandsof the National Military Strategy. National securityrequires shaping the Army�s future leaders, forcestructure, equipment and training to meet all thosedemands. In the success of the Occupation of Japanand in the sacrifices of TF Smith there is much tobe studied and learned that is directly applicable�tactically, operationally and strategically�fortoday�s Army and the joint force. MR

KOREA


THE FIRST HALF of the 20th century taughtthe US Army that traditional faith in firepower

was appropriate for total wars and battles of anni-hilation. America had trusted its industrial base toprovide overwhelming amounts of materiel and ex-pected military leaders to transform those assets intotremendous combat power. Thus, the United Stateswas able to survive the first part of the 20th cen-tury with an incredibly small standing Army andemerge victorious from its two most significantwars. Not surprisingly, after spending approxi-mately 50 years learning how to maximize combatpower on the battlefield, US military leaders wereeager to incorporate their findings into doctrine andavoid the painful lessons that ground forces hadlearned in virtually every previous conflict.

Consequently, upon entering the Korean conflict,the country�s first limited war of the nuclear era, USArmy doctrine prescribed annihilating opponentsthrough the maximum application of firepower.However, for the first time the United States alsofaced the threat of nuclear retaliation from anothercountry. Many of the actions associated with totalwars proved unsuitable for operations in limitedwars, so America adjusted to the delicate Cold Warclimate and sought to avoid escalating conventionalconflicts, nuclear exchanges or even a Third Worldwar. This restraint prevented the Army from con-tinuing to rely on the approach to warfighting thathad worked so well in recent experience.

Still, US political and military leaders could ill-afford to surrender the enormous firepower advan-tage, especially when facing opponents who werefighting total wars and possessed substantial numeri-cal advantages in troops. As a result, one of themost important capabilities US ground forces devel-oped in the limited wars of the second half of the20th century was the ability to control the massiveamounts of available firepower.1 As events duringthe recent NATO actions in Yugoslavia have dem-onstrated, this very difficult objective is an ongoing

process. The Army began refining its ability to con-trol combat power during the Korean War, and manyof the lessons that the Army learned then resonate inour doctrine today.2

According to US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5,Operations, control is an inherent part of battle com-mand. Control is effective if �it allows the com-mander freedom to operate, delegate authority, leadfrom any critical point on the battlefield and syn-chronize actions across his entire [area of opera-tions].�3 Here I will argue that the US Army learnedvaluable lessons regarding ways to control its com-bat power on the battlefield during the KoreanWar�how to �harness its own thunderbolts.� Inparticular, the Army learned to better orchestrate itsdirect fires and synchronize its indirect fires to maxi-mize their battlefield effects. In addition, the Ko-rean War experience provided the impetus for re-solving the ambiguity surrounding control overtheater commanders in chief (CINCs) that had ex-isted since World War I.

Perhaps the greatest control leaders can exert inbattle is that which compels their soldiers to risk in-jury or death by firing their weapons in battle. Tra-ditional linear tactics oriented on maximizing thisaspect of battlefield control, but the more open tac-tics of the 20th century have forced commanders toinnovate to elicit soldiers� participation in combat,especially when they cannot even see one another.

The US could ill-afford to surrenderits enormous firepower advantage, especially

when facing opponents who were fighting totalwars and possessed substantial numerical

advantages in troops. As a result, one of themost important capabilities US ground forces

developed in the limited wars of the second halfof the 20th century was the ability to control the

massive amounts of available firepower.



To increase their level of battlefield control overdirect fires during the last half of the century, Armyleaders used three important techniques:l They added more automatic weapons to the

infantry rifle squad and platoon.l They improved the Army�s method of marks-

manship instruction.l They subdivided the infantry squad into two

fire teams.These efforts, largely results of the Army�s Korean Warexperience, improved commanders� control of theirforces and are still evident in today�s Army doctrine.

The infantry platoon of World War II and theKorean War contained 42 soldiers; discounting theplatoon headquarters element, each had an effectivestrength of 36 soldiers. Despite this apparent similar-ity, the infantry squad and platoon organizations ofthe Cold War era differed greatly from their WorldWar II predecessors. Unlike the 12-soldier squadof World War II, the Korean War infantry squadhad three fewer soldiers and an additional automaticrifle. It consisted of nine soldiers: a squad leader, anassistant squad leader, two Browning Automatic Rifleteams (each consisting of a rifleman and an assis-

tant gunner), two riflemen with M-1 Garand rifles,and one sniper with an M-1 Garand sniper rifle.4Similarly, while the World War II infantry platoon con-tained three squads of 12 soldiers each and a pla-toon headquarters element of six soldiers, the Ko-rean War infantry platoon consisted of three of thesenine-soldier squads and contained an additional weap-ons squad of nine soldiers and a platoon headquar-ters identical to that in the World War II platoon.The weapons squad consisted of a squad leader, a four-soldier bazooka team, and a four-soldier machinegunteam with the .30 caliber machinegun.5

These changes significantly increased the fire-power available to small-unit leaders by adding oneautomatic weapon to each infantry squad, for a to-tal of two, and five automatic weapons to each in-fantry platoon, for a total of eight. S.L.A. Marshallheld that men operating crew-served weapons al-most always fired their weapons in combat and thata unit�s rifle fire tended to build up strongly around itsautomatic weapons, so one would expect an increasein the �ratio of fire� from such a unit. This is infact what occurred. By Marshall�s own reckoning,which can be substantiated using information other

US

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Tests began in 1953, in response to the poor marksmanship skills demonstrated by manyKorean War-era soldiers. . . By improving soldiers� confidence in their ability to successfully engage

a variety of target at ranges from 50 to 300 meters, Army leaders also increased the tendency ofindividual soldiers to engage the enemy during firefights.

R

An infantryman returns fire with his M-14rifle during early operations in Vietnam.An infantryman returns fire with his M-14rifle during early operations in Vietnam.An infantryman returns fire with his M-14rifle during early operations in Vietnam.An infantryman returns fire with his M-14rifle during early operations in Vietnam.An infantryman returns fire with his M-14rifle during early operations in Vietnam.An infantryman returns fire with his M-14rifle during early operations in Vietnam.An infantryman returns fire with his M-14rifle during early operations in Vietnam.



than Marshall�s own somewhat suspicious data anda secret formula that died with him in 1977, theAmerican infantry platoon�s ratio of fire increasedfrom a high of 25 percent in World War II to approxi-mately 55 percent by the end of the Korean War.6

Another way that Army leaders significantly in-creased their control over direct fire on the battle-field came largely as a result of the development of

TRAINFIRE, a revolutionary system of marksman-ship training.7 TRAINFIRE provided more realistic riflemarksmanship training by using pop-up targets inrealistic target arrays to improve riflemen�s perfor-mance in combat. This system was also intendedto increase soldiers� confidence in their weapons,and induce them to fire more often in combat.8

Before adopting TRAINFIRE, the Army had useda system of basic marksmanship instruction basedon known-distance ranges. Soldiers fired from a se-ries of formal positions on a level firing line at�bull�s-eye� targets raised and lowered from pitsdug at specific and uniform distances. By contrast,TRAINFIRE ranges required soldiers to fire frompre-dug fighting positions and used �E�-type silhou-ettes mounted on pop-up devices, called �PunchyPetes,� as targets.9

Tests on the initial TRAINFIRE version began in1953, in response to the poor marksmanship skillsdemonstrated by many Korean War-era soldiers.After four years of testing, the Army formallyadopted TRAINFIRE as its basic rifle marksman-ship training method in the summer of 1957 andbegan implementing it throughout the force duringFiscal Year 1958.10 Once adopted, it took the Armythree years to construct the required number ofranges in America and overseas.11

By improving soldiers� confidence in their ability tosuccessfully engage a variety of target at ranges from50 to 300 meters, Army leaders also increased thetendency of individual soldiers to engage the enemyduring firefights. The increased participation ofriflemen provided leaders with greater amounts offirepower, and the soldiers� increased confidenceand lethality improved commanders� ability to maxi-mize and control their available combat power.

In addition, commanders realized that the greaternumber of automatic weapons in the Army�s smallunits and the increased combat participation of aunit�s soldiers required an organizational change toimprove combat leaders� ability to control their morelethal units. Recognizing the inherent galvanizingpower of automatic weapons, the Army reorganizedthe infantry squad in 1955, adding an additionalleader and rifleman to its existing nine-soldier unit.The new 11-soldier squad was also structured quitedifferently from its Korean War predecessor, noworganized into two five-soldier fire teams basedaround each of the unit�s automatic weapons.12

This change provided a manageable span of con-trol for all three leaders in a squad.13 With teamleaders responsible for controlling the actions of foursoldiers each, a squad leader�s span of control wasreduced significantly. This change also allowedmuch better observation and supervision of indi-vidual soldiers in combat. The greater number ofunit leaders could encourage even more participa-tion in battle because almost certainly, at least oneof the three leaders would be able to see and inter-act with every soldier in the squad.14

In the end, a combination of continued organiza-tional refinements to the infantry squad and platoon,helped raise the ratio of fire to between 90 and 95percent in Vietnam and maintain it at that level incontemporary times.15 Those improvements includesubsequent increases in the firepower allotted tothese elements, improved marksmanship training,the adoption of fire teams based around automaticweapons and an increased number of leaders. Thesechanges�and their impact�are still present intoday�s force.

Increasing control over direct fires has been dif-ficult enough, but direct fires often provide only asmall portion of commanders� available firepower.The majority of their combat power may come fromindirect fires. Since these assets are usually not or-ganic to a unit, synchronizing indirect fires requirescoordination and is perhaps more difficult than or-chestrating direct fires because of the distances andcommunication required to bring about the desiredeffect. Commanders can improve their control overindirect fires by ensuring that their subordinatesmake the best possible use of their available assetsand by having the most rapid possible response ofthese assets in combat. Given the inordinately im-portant role indirect fires played in the Korean War,especially during the conflict�s last two years, it is notsurprising that the Army learned valuable lessonsabout synchronizing artillery fires and close air sup-port which are now integral to warfighting doctrine.

The doctrinal change most directly attributable tothe Korean War is the standardization and inclusion

To increase their level of battlefieldcontrol over direct fires during the last half of

the century, Army leaders used three importanttechniques: They added more automatic

weapons to the infantry rifle squad and platoon;improved the Army�s method of marksmanship

instruction; and subdivided the infantrysquad into two fire teams.


of an artillery fire support annex into operations ordersat the regimental (brigade) and battalion levels. Inhis first training bulletin of 1953, Chief of ArmyField Forces General John R. Hodge noted that in-fantry commanders and units in Korea did not prop-erly plan for and employ indirect fires. As a correctivemeasure, Hodge directed that all �written regimen-tal and battalion orders must contain a fire supportannex to insure that all infantry supporting weap-ons are fully utilized through assignment of specificmissions.�16 Hodge also promised that the Army�sfuture infantry manuals (the 7-series) would addressfire support planning issues in greater detail and thatforthcoming training circulars would further empha-size these issues. He concluded by encouragingcommanders to integrate requirements to plan forand employ all available weapons systems into com-pany, battalion and regimental field problems.17

Adopted in 1953, Hodge�s directive to include firesupport annexes in operations orders down to thebattalion level became even more vital to theArmy�s success during the so-called Pentomic era(1955-1962). Because of the variety of missions as-signed to the Army during Dwight D. Eisenhower�spresidency, it became more important than ever tomaximize the firepower available to commanders.

The addition of aerial rocket artillery in Vietnamfurther increased the complexity of controlling in-direct fires for infantry commanders, as did the ar-rival of the Multiple Launched Rocket System(MLRS) in the 1980s. Essentially, Hodge�s 1953directive addressed a control issue infantry com-manders had faced since World War I and provideda solution by making ground commanders down tobattalion level explicitly responsible for planning,coordinating and employing artillery. Hodge real-ized that synchronization maximized the impact ofindirect fires on the battlefield, and today�s doctrinereflects his views 47 years ago.

Another area of significant doctrinal change re-sulting from the Korean War involved the responsetime to immediate close air support requests. Asthe Air Force became more responsive to Army re-quests for immediate close air support, ground com-manders increased their overall combat power andcontrol over the firepower assets themselves.

Despite public statements by several senior Armyleaders to the contrary, numerous ground command-ers of the period expressed repeated dissatisfactionwith the Air Force response time for immediate closeair support requests. Studies prepared by GeneralEdward M. Almond, the US X Corps commander

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The doctrinal change most directly attributable to the Korean War is the standardizationand inclusion of an artillery fire support annex into operations orders at the regimental (brigade)

and battalion levels. Chief of Army Field Forces General John R. Hodge directed that all �writtenregimental and battalion orders must contain a fire-support annex to insure that all infantry

supporting weapons are fully utilized through assignment of specific missions.�

Staff officers of the 27th RegimentalCombat Team and 8th Field Artilleryplan a move against North Koreanforces, 20 August 1950. The CP waslocated in a culvert near Taegu inthe Pusan Perimeter.








during the first year of the Korean War calculatedthe average response time for an immediate closeair support request as 58 minutes. Based on his WorldWar II experience as a division commander inItaly and the battlefield situation in Korea, Almondbelieved the battlefield situation demanded a re-sponse time of 30 minutes or less. Although per-haps correct, Almond�s standard was completely

unrealistic for the Fifth Air Force in the KoreanWar, given its available close air support assets, theexisting target request system and the period�s com-munications equipment.

Nevertheless, Almond�s criticism reflected the con-cerns of many other ground commanders, and the AirForce, hypersensitive to criticism as a newly indepen-dent service, was loath to accept any agreement thatwould cause them to lose control of any air assets. TheAir Force finally met Almond�s standard of a 30-minute response time for immediate close air supportrequests during the Vietnam War, thus improvingthe ability of ground commanders to control theiravailable combat power.18 This outcome is evenmore remarkable considering the Air Force�s ColdWar focus on its Strategic Air Command; the Armywas still able to persuade the Air Force to improveits Tactical Air Force capabilities.

Moving even further away from the battlefield,the Korean War had perhaps its greatest impact withrespect to the control of theater CINCs. Americanpractice during the First and Second World Warshad been to provide broad guidance to the secretaryof war and the chief of staff and then allow the CINCsto determine their own courses of action within theirrespective theaters largely unencumbered by guid-ance, advice or interference from Washington, D.C.After the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) struggled tocontrol the actions of the US and UN theater CINC,General Douglas MacArthur during the first year ofthe Korean War, Congress, with Eisenhower�s fullsupport, amended the National Security Act of 1947by passing the Reorganization Act of 1958. TheReorganization Act clearly established unques-tioned command authority for unified commandswith the secretary of defense and abolished thelargely ineffective system of assigning �executive

agents� to manage conflicts for the JCS.19 Thissystem, still in place today, requires theater CINCsto report directly to the secretary of defense, withthe JCS serving as the secretary of defense�s mili-tary advisers and providing staff support.

During the first 11 months of the Korean War,some of MacArthur�s actions as theater CINC re-quired President Harry S. Truman to relieve him ofhis commands in April 1951. This relief highlightedthe ambiguity of the system established by the Na-tional Security Act of 1947 (and its 1949 amend-ment) and provided the major impetus for increas-ing direct civilian control over military operations.While perhaps based on good intentions, this sys-tem of control was somewhat perverted during theVietnam War, with the president and the secretaryof defense designating specific bombing targets,but it proved very effective during OperationsJust Cause and Desert Storm. Thus, perhaps themost important issue of control, that over theaterCINCs, was resolved as a result of actions duringthe Korean War.

While many important doctrinal improvements ofthe past 50 years have their roots in the Korean War,surprisingly, neither the development of air mobil-ity nor the training revolution of the mid-1970s and1980s, perhaps the two most significant Army in-novations since World War II, were direct responsesto the Army�s experience in Korea. Since helicopterswere first used in Korea to move troops around thebattlefield and the rugged Korean terrain presentedground forces with significant mobility challenges,it seems logical to assume that the Army started de-veloping its airmobile capability during the KoreanWar. However, the Army�s air mobility doctrinedid not actually begin its development until severalyears after the Korean War during the Pentomic eraas a way to give combat units the ability to remaindispersed and then consolidate rapidly.20

Similarly, the Army�s training revolution was nota direct response to Task Force Smith�s perfor-mance.�21 Rather, it was mostly due to the influenceof General William E. DePuy during his tenure asthe Army�s first Training and Doctrine (TRADOC)commander in the mid-1970s and the determinedefforts of many committed officers and NCOs.22

The fact that neither the training revolution nor thedevelopment of air mobility has direct ties to the Ko-rean War experience suggests that the improvementsin controlling combat power on the battlefield wereperhaps the most important doctrinal legacies of theKorean War for the Army.

The significant lessons with respect to controllingcombat power that the US Army learned during theKorean War and implemented throughout the pasthalf-century are as relevant now as they were 50

The Korean War had perhaps itsgreatest impact with respect to the control oftheater CINCs. . . This system, still in place

today, requires theater CINCs to report directlyto the secretary of defense, with the JCS serving

as the secretary of defense�s military advisersand providing staff support.


NOTES

Major Kelly C. Jordan is attending the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leav-enworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the Virginia Military Institute and an M.A. and Ph.D.from Ohio State University. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Conti-nental United States, to include assistant professor of Military History, US Military Academy, WestPoint, New York; S3 and company commander, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York;and XO, battalion maintenance officer and adjutant, 2d Armor Division, Fort Hood, Texas.

1. By �control,� I mean the following: the ability to direct combat power, theability to synchronize (arrange activities in time and space to mass at the deci-sive point) combat power and the ability to orchestrate (coordinate ongoing ac-tivities to achieve a desired effect) combat power. FM 100-5, Operations (Wash-ington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), 2-8, 2-15. The defi-nition and description of the term �orchestration� are my own based upon a brief-ing I received from Colonel David Fastbend at the United States Military Acad-emy in spring 1997 on the status of the new FM 100-5.

2. I have addressed only those changes that I believe to be both legitimateand significant. To qualify as a legitimate change, it must have definite roots in theKorean War experience and not be merely an evolutionary modification that oc-curred coincidentally after the Korean War. A significant change must have survivedthe Pentomic era, the Reorganization of Army Divisions (ROAD) era, the VietnamWar, the Volunteer Army (VOLAR) era and the Army of Excellence (AOE) era andmust still be present and largely unchanged in today�s emerging Force XXI.

3. FM 100-5, Operations, 2-15.4. John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I: Regular Army, Army

Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1972),73. For information on the addition of the second BAR to the squad, see alsoCOL Robert B. Rigg, �Wither the Squad?� ARMY, February 1960, 39. The Armymade this authorized but informal practice during the Korean War official througha change to the standard Table of Organization and Equipment for the InfantryRifle Squad in 1953.

5. Mahon and Danysh, Infantry, 73.6. Marshall�s �ratio of fire� reflected the percentage of soldiers in contact who

claimed to have actually fired their weapons in an engagement. S.L.A. Marshall,Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (Washington,DC: The Infantry Journal Press, 1947; reprint ed., Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith), 5,9-10, 57 (hereafter cited as Marshall, Men Against Fire). See also S.L.A. Marshall,Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, Winter 1950-1951, (Chevy Chase, MD: The Johns Hopkins Operations Research Office, 1951;reprint ed., Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-6, Commen-tary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, Washington, DC: Head-quarters, United States Marine Corps, 1989), 4-5, 54-55 (hereafter cited asMarshall, Commentary on Infantry in Korea). The substance of my findings willappear in a forthcoming article in The Journal of Military History entitled, �Fillingthe Empty Battlefield: S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire in Korea.�

7. Marshall, Men Against Fire, 5, 9-10.8. Howard H. McFann et al., Trainfire I: A New Course in Basic Rifle Marks-

manship, Human Resources Research Office, Technical Report 22 (Washington,DC: George Washington University, Human Resources Research Office, Octo-ber 1955), 4-12; Colonel Nelson I. Fooks, �Shoot Fast and Straight,� Army Infor-mation Digest, June 1957, 35-38; �Trainfire: A New Approach to Rifle Marksman-ship,� Infantry School Quarterly, 46:1, January 1956, 47-54.

9. McFann et al., Trainfire I, 17-20, 26-32, 75-83, 100-103; Fooks, �Shoot Fastand Straight,� 35-38; �Trainfire: A New Approach to Rifle Marksmanship,� 47-54;�Trainfire I Adopted,� Infantry, 47:3, July 1957, 89.

10. �Trainfire I Adopted,� 89. McFann et al., Trainfire I, 9, 54-63; �Trainfire: ANew Approach to Rifle Marksmanship,� 47-48; Major F.D.G. Williams, SLAM: TheInfluence of S.L.A. Marshall on the United States Army, TRADOC Historical Mono-graph Series (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, United StatesArmy Training and doctrine Command, 1994), 74, fn 32.

11. McFann et al., Trainfire I, 17-20, 26-32, 75-83, 100-103; Fooks, �Shoot Fastand Straight,� 35-38; �Trainfire: A New Approach to Rifle Marksmanship,� 47-54;�Trainfire I Adopted,� 89.

12. Marvin L. Worley, Jr., New Developments in Army Weapons, Tactics, Organ-ization, and Equipment (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1959), 90, 97.

13. Most sociologists agree that the optimal span of control for the average in-dividual is between two and five elements.

14. For a more complete treatment of this phenomenon, see FM 100-5, Op-erations, 14-2.

15. Author Dave Grossman reports these figures based upon the works of some-one named Scott and R. W. Glenn. Glenn�s findings appear in �Men and Fire inVietnam,� ARMY, April 1989, 18-27. Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psycho-logical Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston: Little, Brown, andCompany, 1995), xv, 35.

16. GEN John R. Hodge, �Army Field Forces Training Bulletin Number 1,� (FortMonroe, Virginia: Chief of Army Field Forces Office, 20 march 1953), 2-3. From1948 to 1955, the chief of Army Field Forces was somewhat akin to our present-day TRADOC commander in that he was responsible supervising training anddeveloping doctrine for the field Army. Thus, a directive from this individual im-pacted the entire Army. James E. Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara: ArmyOrganization and Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington, DC: US Army Centerof Military History, 1975), 171, 217, 267.

17. Ibid., 3.18. Retired USAF GEN William W. Momyer contends that the creation of an

additional level of control for the corps-level ground commander in Vietnam largelysolved the Army�s air-ground operations control problems. This change gave the�corps commander some flexibility to change the importance of targets at any giventime or to support the ground unit which needed direct air support the most� andfinally brought the air-ground system in line with FM 31-35. See Momyer, Airpowerin Three Wars (WW II, Korea, Vietnam) (Washington, DC: Department of the AirForce, 1978), 261.

19. C.J. Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy: Its Devel-opment Since 1775 (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1961), 514-520.

20. In response to the emerging nuclear threat in combat zones, the doctrineof the Pentomic Army envisioned a �cellular� (as opposed to a linear) battlefieldand required its �battle groups� to spread out over wide areas to avoid present-ing an adversary with any lucrative targets. After absorbing an opponent�s nuclearattacks, the battle groups would quickly regroup and execute their assigned mis-sions. There is little historical evidence to suggest that the Army was interestedin developing an air-mobile capability after Korea (even under the leadership ofan innovative soldier and Korean War luminary like Matthew B. Ridgway, whohelped develop the Army�s airborne capability during World War II) until the ad-vent of the Pentomic era, when a desire to actively integrate new technology intothe force structure and a mission which required the Army to have a dual capa-bility of warfighting and a form of civic control and defense encouraged such de-velopments. See Christopher C.S. Cheng, Air Mobility: The Development of a Doc-trine (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994) for a more complete description of the devel-opment of the Army�s air mobility doctrine.

21. The Army owes much to author T.R. Fehrenbach for highlighting the its pitifulstate of readiness at the outbreak of the Korean War and popularizing the actionsof LTC Charles B. Smith�s ill-fated command. In fact, Army historical texts pub-lished before Fehrenbach�s work first appeared in 1963 do not even identify TaskForce Smith by name and only vaguely refer to its actions. Nevertheless, theKorean War experience had a profound impact on many future leaders. Two suchindividuals were David Hackworth and John K. Singlaub, both of whom would gainnotoriety in the 1970s for their rather spectacular exits from the Army. Despitetheir rather dramatic departures, they were acknowledged by their fellow officersto be superb trainers, and they each attribute their dedication to becoming greattrainers in part to the impact of the Korean War. I am indebted to my colleagueCPT Robert Bateman for highlighting the lack of attention paid to Task Force Smithby Army historical texts in the decade following the Korean War.

22. DePuy observed that the Vietnam War had destroyed the Army�s NCO corpsand believed that this loss had robbed the Army of its ability to rely on its NCOsto teach soldiers what they needed to know. These convictions led him to imple-ment a system of training that relied on Soldiers Manuals, Skill Qualification Tests(SQTs), and Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs)�a program whichbrought the Army to its incredible proficiency displayed so convincingly during the 1991Gulf War. See James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Bornof Vietnam Revolutionized American Style War (New York: Simon and Schuster,1995) for a more complete description of the Army�s training revolution.

years ago. At the beginning of the Cold War, Amer-ica had to learn how to �harness its thunderbolts,�meaning that the military had to learn how to maxi-mize combat power during limited war. The keyto this process was developing the ability to con-trol combat power, and this capability arose from avariety of innovations and changes that collectivelyhave had a significant influence on contemporaryArmy doctrine. Inspired by its Korean War expe-rience, the Army changed the organization of itssmallest infantry units, improved its marksmanshiptraining, added a fire support annex to all operationsorders down to battalion level, convinced the AirForce to improve its response time for immediateclose air support requests and clarified the chain ofcommand for theater CINCs. Each of these changes

was significant on its own, but taken together, theyallowed the Army and the nation to increase con-trol over available combat power dramatically.

Indeed, since the end of the Korean War, theArmy has made perhaps its most significant ad-vances in synchronizing and orchestrating combatpower. These changes followed a significant reduc-tion in force and limited war, came during a periodof tremendous global uncertainty and have increasedthe ability of commanders to delegate authority, syn-chronize battlefield actions and operate relativelyunfettered in combat. For the current Army, com-ing out of a recent period of downsizing and facingan uncertain and dangerous international situation,these same lessons are likely to remain valid wellinto the 21st century. MR

KOREA


O N 30 NOVEMBER 1950 at a press conferencein Washington, D.C., President Harry S.

Truman inadvertently suggested that General Dou-glas MacArthur as �military commander in the field�had the authority to unleash atomic bombs. Thatsame day, General George E. Stratemeyer in Tokyosent a cable to General Hoyt S. Vandenberg request-ing that the Strategic Air Command (SAC) shouldbe �prepared to dispatch without delay mediumbomb groups to the Far East. . . .This augmentationshould include atomic capabilities.�1 MacArthur�sstaff was clearly rattled about the possibility ofDunkirks in Korea, or a humiliating armistice.

At 8:30 a.m. the next day in Washington, ahigh-level meeting that included just about everypolicy maker but the president convened in the JointChiefs of Staff (JCS) conference room in the Pentagon.Chairman General Omar Bradley worried whetherMacArthur could hold at any point in North Korea, andwhether Chinese air power would have to be inter-dicted so that troops at worst might withdraw safely.�To do so might draw in the Soviet air [force]. Ifthis is true, we might have to defer striking.�

Army Chief of Staff Lawton Collins supportedBradley. �If we hit back, it is a strong provocationof the Chinese and may possibly bring in Soviet airand even submarines. The only chance then left tosave us � if that happened � is the use or the threatof use of the A-Bomb. We should therefore holdback from bombing in China even if that means thatour ground forces must take some punishment fromthe air.� He was beginning to think that Korea �wasnot worth a nickel.�

�If we do hit back,� Secretary of State DeanAcheson warned, �it may bring in Russian air sup-port of the Chinese and we would go from the fry-ing pan into the fire.�

�We would have to evacuate [Korea] and prob-ably would be engaged in war [with Russia],� Gen-

eral Bedell Smith, the new CIA chief, predicted. Atthat, Collins contended that the United States wouldhave to �consider the threat or the [actual] use ofthe A-Bomb. It would [otherwise] be very difficultto get our troops out.�2

Later in the day, Bernard Baruch, long a WhiteHouse adviser on military and atomic matters, vis-ited Defense Secretary George Marshall, who hadbeen at the JCS meeting, to press on him the feel-ing in the country, �in view of what is regarded asa very desperate situation�� the massive Chineseintervention ��for use of the atomic bomb.�Marshall observed that he didn�t think it would �doany good in the circumstances,� and questionedwhat it could be �dropped on.� The Chinese, heclaimed, �were totally unmoved by this threat. . . .Their propaganda against American aggression wasstepped up.� Marshall scoffed at the Nehru-Panikkarclaims of neutrality as an �Indian rope trick.�

While atomic talk was swirling about Washing-ton and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee wasflying to the United States to confront Truman, Gen-eral Curtis LeMay, SAC chief and former com-mander of the 20th Air Force, which had deployedthe bomb over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respondedto the message from Stratemeyer. The SAC under-standing, said LeMay, had been that nuclear weap-

Bernard Baruch, long a White Houseadviser on military and atomic matters, visitedGeorge Marshall to press on him the feeling inthe country, �in view of what is regarded as a

very desperate situation��the massive Chineseintervention��for use of the atomic bomb.�

He didn�t think it would �do any good in thecircumstances,� and questioned what it

could be �dropped on.�



ons, according to an earlier JCS advisory, wouldnot be used except during �an overall atomic cam-paign against China.� If the situation had actuallychanged, he wanted to be in on the deployment. Heand his men, he boasted, were the only ones withthe knowledge required to deliver atomic bombs.3

Preparing on 3 December for Attlee�s hurriedvisit, State Department officials reminded the JCSof �the rather widespread British distrust ofMacArthur and the fear of political decisions he maymake based on military necessity. Bearing on thisis the British belief in the [establishment of a] bufferarea and their stand against [UN] attacks across theYalu. Also involved is the fear of the effect on Asi-atics of use of the atomic bomb or even open con-sideration of its use.� British concerns, Achesonwent on, were �very sincere.� MacArthur had al-ready compiled a history of flouting orders.

Throughout the agonized preparatory State-Defense conference in the Pentagon�s JCS WarRoom, unaware that he would soon becomeMacArthur�s top general in Korea, Matthew Bun-ker Ridgway sat impatiently. During the review ofthe situation, he saw �no one apparently willing toissue a flat order to the Far East Commander to cor-rect a state of affairs that was rapidly going frombad to disastrous. Yet the responsibility and the au-thority clearly resided right there in the room.� Hespoke up, but Air Force Chief of Staff Vandenbergdismissed the idea of sending MacArthur further or-ders. �What good would that do? He wouldn�tobey the orders.�

Ridgway exploded, �You can relieve any com-mander who won�t obey orders, can�t you?� Themeeting ended with no decision about MacArthurexcept for sending Collins back to Tokyo to con-sult with him. The participants did agree thatTruman should make no commitment to Attlee oranyone else restricting American freedom of actionon using the Bomb. It might, in extreme circum-stances, have to be used. Yet Truman realized thatif under inauspicious tactical conditions for itsemployment in Korea it failed to produce decisiveresults, it would lose all credibility as a Cold Wardeterrent. He had already been in office � and hadthe ultimate authority to approve the deployment �when the Nagasaki bomb, the first and only pluto-nium bomb exploded upon an enemy, was deto-nated. The hills and valleys upon which Nagasakiwas situated had minimized the blast impact as wellas the secondary effects of the explosion. Thatbomb, the only uranium device in the Americanstockpile, had detonated over an alluvial plain,

though it packed more power than the earlierHiroshima bomb, neither case compared to therugged Korean terrain.

There was never any concern about depleting pre-cious fissionable material or stockpiled weapons,since the 292 bombs the US possessed in June werebeing supplemented weekly. The Soviets had at best

10 to 20 bombs by the end of 1950 � enough, nev-ertheless, to cause widespread panic in Washington.

Collins was then back in Tokyo, this time withAir Force intelligence chief General Charles Cabell,a vigorous proponent of atomic weapons. Theyfound MacArthur now optimistic that he could sta-bilize what he conceded was a poor situation. Heeven advised postponing any decisions on nucleardeployment until he knew whether the atomic op-tion would be needed to cover a total evacuationfrom Korea. Still, the combination of Cabell�s be-ing brought along to Japan, and Truman�s stone-walling Attlee about the bomb, now emboldenedMacArthur to ask for it. As a matter of prudence,since the atomic-configured aircraft sent to cover apossible withdrawal from Pusan had already re-turned to California, he requested on 9 Decemberthat the Pentagon grant him a field commander�sdiscretion to employ nuclear weapons as necessary.He wanted them stockpiled in Okinawa, within hisJapanese jurisdiction.4

Despite that, when queried by the Joint Chiefslater in the month about how he would respond toSoviet intervention or more massive Chinese inter-vention intended to drive reeling UN troops com-pletely from Korea, he again refused to consider us-ing the bomb. However, to prevent the ultimatefallback, and a Dunkirk, MacArthur would make anexception. The war might have to be widened, hesuggested, to forestall termination of his mission.

Even Truman agreed about the risk of loss of facein Asia, especially in Japan. With the Japanese re-percussions of defeat in mind as well as the ongo-ing retreat in Korea, MacArthur on 24 December

Truman realized that if under inauspicioustactical conditions for its employment in Korea itfailed to produce decisive results, it would loseall credibility as a Cold War deterrent. . . . Thehills and valleys upon which Nagasaki was

situated had minimized the blast impact as wellas the secondary effects, and Korean terrain

was far more rugged than Nagasaki�s.

KOREA



proposed to �blockade the coastof China, destroy through navalgunfire and air bombardmentChina�s industrial capacity towage war� and �release existingrestrictions upon the Formo-san garrison. . . possibly leading to counter-invasionagainst vulnerable areas of the Chinese mainland.�

Whether or not that would escalate the war � thesituation since the Chinese intervention remainedgrim � he sent the Pentagon a list of what he de-scribed as �retardation targets� for which he wanted34 atomic bombs. Of these, four were (in PaulNitze�s description) to drop on Chinese troopmasses and four were for �critical concentrations ofenemy air power.�5 Since no such airfields existed inKorea, the bombs had to be meant for Manchuria.6

Much later, in talking to General Dwight D.Eisenhower (17 December 1952) about ending the war,MacArthur (no longer in a position of responsibil-ity) explained where he thought nuclear bombswould have done the most good. �I would havedropped between 30 and 50 atomic bombs . . . strungacross the neck of Manchuria� and �spread behindus �from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea�a beltof radioactive cobalt. . . . For at least 60 years therecould have been no land invasion of Korea from thenorth.� The Russians, he claimed, would have beenintimidated into restraint by the boldness of the act.

Cobalt 60, from the reprocessing of plutonium,would have possessed such powerful radioactivityas to endanger populations remote from the dropzone. Yet MacArthur was not suggesting an ex postfacto science fiction fantasy. The Joint Chiefs ofStaff had already discussed a radioactive cordonsanitaire sown north of the Manchurian border, andit had even been proposed � if unrealistically � inCongress by Representative (later Senator) AlbertGore Sr. of Tennessee, a member of the Joint Com-mittee on Atomic Energy who had probably re-ceived the details from a physicist at the Oak Ridgeatomic facility in his home state. Since Korea had

become �a meat grinder ofAmerican manhood,� Gorefelt that it would be �morallyjustifiable under the circum-stances� to make any com-munist soldier who crossed

the radioactive �neutral zone� risk �certain death orslow deformity.�7 Ignored were the potential ill ef-fects on the soldiers or airmen who would have todeliver the �hot� waste, or that means might beemployed by the enemy to fly over the radioactiv-ity, or even to bridge it. The proposal, neverthe-less, remains linked to MacArthur, who had merelyborrowed it in frustration.

On the evening after Christmas, Truman con-vened a meeting at Blair House, where he was liv-ing while the White House was undergoing reno-vation, that included Acheson, Marshall, Bradleyand the State Department�s assistant secretary ofstate for Far Eastern affairs, Dean Rusk. He wanted todiscuss options in Korea � whether �we could holdour position there, what we should do if we couldnot.� Rusk ticked off the alternatives the first ofwhich he admitted was �beyond our capabilities� �to win a military victory and stabilize Korea byforce. The second involved making it in China�sinterest �to accept some stabilization� because itwould be too costly to the country otherwise. Thethird was �to get out in defeat voluntarily or underpressure.� He preferred the second possibility.

Acheson wondered whether Russia would try todeny the United States any middle course, whichbrought Rusk to observe that if the Soviets hadwanted �a general war,� they would have alreadycome in and blocked any withdrawal from NorthKorea, exacerbating the disaster. �We took the riskin June that entry into Korea would lead to generalwar.� The same sort of risk could arise, he thought,�at any time in Europe.�

In a worst-case scenario, Philip Jessup, ambas-sador at large for UN affairs, asked whether theUnited States had the �air capabilities of knocking

(Left to right) Generals Matthew B. Ridgway;Douglas MacArthur and J. Lawton Collins;Omar N. Bradley and Hoyt S. Vandenberg;(facing page) President Harry S. Truman andSecretary of Defense George C. Marshall;Secretary of State Dean Acheson; and Gen-eral Curtis LeMay.


out both Port Arthur and Vladivostock,� from whichthe Soviets would have to launch any attack to denyKorea to the United States.

�We did not, except by using the atom bomb,�admitted Rusk.

MacArthur would keep probing for �field� per-mission, in an emergency, to deploy the bomb whilerecognizing its futility � even when, concurrently andwithout his knowledge, Washington never ceasedbringing up the subject. On 6 January 1951, Ridgway,new to the Eighth Army after the death of GeneralWalton Walker in a jeep accident just before Christ-mas, asked MacArthur about employing chemicalweapons �as a last resort to cover the withdrawal andevacuation from a final beachhead.� MacArthur�sreply the next day suggested that similar conditionswould apply for nuclear weapons. �I do not believethere is any chance of using chemicals on the en-emy in case evacuation is ordered. As you know,US inhibitions on such use are complete and dras-tic and even if our own government should changethis attitude, it is most improbable that the member-ship of the United Nations would be in accord.�Later in January he informed Ridgway that he wasagainst forward deployment of atomic weapons.The likelihood of forced evacuation had faded,and Ridgway�s Eighth Army had firmed up itspositions.

South Korean president Syngman Rhee alsoasked, through American ambassador John Muccio,to have MacArthur authorized to use any weapon,including the atomic bomb. Ridgway, consulted byMuccio, confessed that he had no idea where thenearest A-Bomb was. In any case, no chance ex-isted for MacArthur to control a nuclear device.

Meanwhile, LeMay told Vandenberg confidently,if unrealistically, that with three days� preparationhis command could deploy 135 A-Bombs overKorea and China. In a memo to Truman, NationalSecurity Resources Board head Stuart Symington,later secretary of the Air Force, warned that thegrowing Soviet atomic stockpile would force the

United States to draw the line at established fron-tiers and to warn Russia that its aggression wouldmean atomic war. If the United States waited toolong for that deterrence it would have to fold itshand. Truman wrote �Not True� and �Bunk� in the

margins and added on the last page, �My dear Stu,this is [as] big a lot of Top Secret malarky as I�veever read. Your time is wasted on such bunk asthis[.] H.S.T.�8

Possibly the most ironic reference to the bombduring MacArthur�s tenure occurred in a top-secretreport prepared for the National Security Council(NSC) on �Recommended Policies and Actions inLight of the Grave World Situation.� Dated 11January 1951, the study again surveyed the possi-bilities of general war with the Soviets over Korea,Formosa, Japan or �from any of the sparks whichwill fly as the communists move further into South-east Asia. In Europe, the explosiveness of the situ-ation needs no spelling out.� It was a Cold Wardocument in all particulars.

�Above all,� the NSC study urged, �there shouldbe political utilization, on behalf of NATO and therest of the free world, of the [strong] current UnitedStates position resulting from possession of the atombomb, and ability to deliver it. Atomic bombing byitself cannot win a war against Soviet Russia, buttoday it is the most powerful military weapon. In

Atomic weapons decisions [in early April1951] could not be withheld from Congress�sJoint Committee on Atomic Energy. Eighteen

legislators, many of them leak-prone, wereinvolved, some of them also likely to be strongcritics of relieving MacArthur. Truman may

have even intended some leakage of his atomicintentions, as the show of forcefulness would

demonstrate that his shakeup in the Far Eastmeant no weakness in prosecuting the war.

(Photo credits,left to right )

War in Korea,Presidio Press

US Army

US Army

Airbridge to Berlin,Presidio Press

Jim Keith

Airbridge to Berlin,Presidio Press


this world of power politics, therefore, it should befurther utilized in political negotiation. Even thoughour atomic bombing capability is our prime militaryadvantage, should a war with Russia occur within

the next 18 months, United States long-range stra-tegic air power will be of limited strength becauseof obsolescence, lack of equipment and lack ofadvance warning.�

In sum, the NSC study suggested that rattling thebomb was worth the risk � and indeed its poten-tial would help end the war in 1953 after the cru-cial fact of Stalin�s death. With his paranoia nolonger a factor, it became possible for Eisenhowerto convey, via Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Ameri-can consideration of employing new tactical nuclearweapons to break the deadlock over an armistice.It was a gamble a minority president could not take;nor were the weapons yet ready to deploy in 1950.

Reacting to the Korean War and to assumed So-viet complicity in it, Congress had already increasedAEC appropriations. Beginning that January thenuclear testing program moved from the remote Pa-cific to desolate � but domestic�Nevada, whereradioactive clouds from above-ground detonationswould send messages to Moscow and radioactivecarbon 14 over the United States. According to theminutes of one meeting at Los Alamos, officialsplanning the tests secretly discussed �the probabil-ity that people [downwind from the explosions] willreceive perhaps a little more radiation than medicalauthorities say is absolutely safe.�

Early in April, exasperated by MacArthur�s con-tinued insubordination, which included talk of tak-ing the war into China, Truman began planning thesupreme commander�s dismissal. On 7 April heconsulted top advisers at Blair House, but postponedany action until the joint chiefs met. But the presi-dent, sensing Marshall�s continuing reluctance toface likely political repercussions from the Right,suggested that before they gathered on Monday fora final decision, he go through the cable traffic be-

tween MacArthur and Washington, at least since thebeginning of the war.

In the exchange of cables, most of them routine,was a MacArthur request to the Pentagon on 10March certainly encouraged by hawks in Washing-ton, asking for �atomic capability� to take outManchurian airfields if that became necessaryto retain air superiority north of the 38th parallel.The revived on-again, off-again nuclear messageswould continue as a paradoxical counterpoint to theagonized exchanges over relieving MacArthur �expanded war juxtaposed with realpolitik peace.Four days later, Vandenberg replied to Tokyo thatthe secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletterand the under secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovetthad gone along: �Finletter and Lovett alerted onatomic discussions. Believe everything is set.� On31 March Stratemeyer reported to MacArthur thatatomic bomb loading pits at the Kadena air base onOkinawa were operational and that unassembledMark IV bombs were on hand. The suggestedthreat to American domination in the air had ex-isted since late November, when Rusk informedthe British that the Russians had moved 200twin-engined TU-4 bombers to Manchurian bases.They remained cause for anxiety although Moscowhesitated risking its own pilots on Premier Kim IlSung�s behalf.

Now there was further concern from Tokyo thata �major attack� originating from Shantung prov-ince and Manchuria was pending to push UN forcesaway from the 38th parallel. Bradley hoped thenuclear threat would initiate the armistice negotia-tions that MacArthur�s political intrusions had ap-parently torpedoed, or at worst strike enemy con-centrations about to escalate the war. He hadbrought a JCS recommendation to the presidenton 6 April, dated the day before, authorizingMacArthur�despite the crisis atmosphere abouthim � to initiate a preemptive strike if an attack ap-peared to be materializing. Between the lines wasthe possibility that such a nuclear warning, certainto emerge via press leakage, might have the intendedpersuasive effect on Mao.

Truman telephoned AEC chairman Gordon Dean,who came immediately to the White House. Thebomb, Truman confided, might, if conditions becamedesperate, be employed beyond, rather than within,Korea, but he would reserve the decision for its useuntil he had consulted with the NSC�s special commit-tee on atomic energy. Dean telephoned Vandenbergfor the president, authorizing transfer of nine nuclearcores �from AEC to military custody.� The nextday, 7 April, as MacArthur was about to be fired,the 99th Medium Bomb[er] Wing in California wasordered to pick up the bombs for delivery to Guam,

Advocating devices that could be pin-pointed, Oppenheimer contended that nuclear

explosives �can only be used as adjuncts in amilitary campaign that has other components,

and whose purpose is a military victory.�Only when the atomic bomb became an �integralpart of military operations,� he thought, wouldit be �of much help in the fighting of a war.�If entirely a weapon of increasingly mass

destruction, mankind would ban it.


but not to proceed to Okinawa as originallyplanned for �possible action against retarda-tion targets� � Chinese or Soviet sites. Sincethe deployment was purely cautionary, thestrike force commander would remain in Ne-braska at SAC headquarters rather than flywith his B-29s to Japan.

Since MacArthur�s proconsulship wasabout to terminate, JCS chairman Bradley alsoheld up a directive to MacArthur, althoughauthorized by Truman and Acheson, that per-mitted, if necessary, retaliatory strikes on anapproved list of targets outside Korea. Latethat Sunday, 8 April, the joint chiefs had metagain to consider recalling MacArthur, andrecognized that during a transfer of command,orders with atomic potential were best held inabeyance.9 The personnel changes in Tokyo,which would inevitably and quickly remove acadre of MacArthur intimates, might improveprospects for a peaceful end to the war far morethan even suggesting the nuclear option.

Atomic weapons decisions could not bewithheld from Congress�s Joint Committee onAtomic Energy. Eighteen legislators, many ofthem leak-prone, were involved, some ofthem also likely to be strong critics of reliev-ing MacArthur. Truman may have even in-tended some leakage of his atomic intentions,as the show of forcefulness would demon-strate that his shakeup in the Far East meantno weakness in prosecuting the war. And hebegan preparing his radio speech to the na-tion explaining why he decided to replaceMacArthur, whose critics erroneously as-sumed that he, most of all, wanted to release thenuclear genie from the AEC bottle.

Although MacArthur did not know about it in To-kyo, the TX-5 (experimental tactical atomicweapon) program had been accelerated during thewartime summer of 1950, and a production direc-tive issued on 11 July. The AEC had high expec-tations for the M[AR]K-5 and other small fissionweapons. Housed in a lightweight casing with anoutside diameter of 45 inches, the MK-5 had a pre-dicted energy release of 60,000-70,000 tons of TNT,three or four times the explosive power of theNagasaki bomb. It could be carried by mediumbombers. Soon after came the TX-7, with an en-ergy yield of 15,000-20,000 tons of TNT, whichcould be carried by fighter aircraft. As that wastested early in 1951, a young physicist confessedbeing �hooked on tactical nuclear weapons� wasasked to go to Korea on a secret mission �to see if,in [his] opinion, there was any good way to use atomicbombs in that war.�10 The visit had to be guarded

US

Arm

y

�Above all,� the NSC study urged, �there shouldbe political utilization, on behalf of NATO and the restof the free world, of the [strong] current United Statesposition resulting from possession of the atom bomb,

and ability to deliver it. . . . In this world of powerpolitics, therefore, it should be further utilized in

political negotiation.�. . . With Stalin�s death in 1953,his paranoia was no longer a factor, and it became

possible for Eisenhower to convey American consider-ation of employing new tactical nuclear weapons

to break the deadlock in Korea.

even from Air Force headquarters, as, the physicistrecalled, it was �almost totally SAC-dominated (SAC,in those days, spelled LeMay),� and �locked in abitter battle with the US scientific community(which, in those days, spelled Oppenheimer) overthe issue of tactical nuclear weapons.

LeMay was uninterested in experimenting furtheron relatively portable low-yield bombs. His ultimaterequirement was for as much blast and heat as possible.He had told physicist Sam Cohen, �you guys developa bomb that could destroy all of Russia.� Small tacti-cal bombs would undermine SAC�s strategicH-bomb monopoly. Advocating devices that could bepinpointed, J. Robert Oppenheimer contended thatnuclear explosives �can only be used as adjuncts in amilitary campaign that has other components, andwhose purpose is a military victory.� They should be,he proposed, �weapons used to give combat forces helpthat they would otherwise lack� rather than �weaponsof totality or terror.� Only when the atomic bomb be-came an �integral part of military operations,� he

An early nuclear test inthe Nevada desert sendsa message to Moscow.


thought, would it be �of much help in the fighting of awar.� If it became entirely a weapon of increasinglymass destruction, mankind would ban it.

To mask his mission from the LeMay types,Cohen, who had dropped out of graduate school atBerkeley in the middle 1940s, was to go to Koreaon an �orientation tour,� to observe a war actuallybeing fought, keeping to himself until his return�any ideas I picked up about how atomic weaponsmight be used, for fear somebody might get the ideawe were seriously contemplating such use.� Inde-pendently, the Far East Air Force (FEAF) in Tokyoin a study coded ORO-R-3 and dated 1 February1951, estimated that had an air-burst atomic bombof 40-kiloton size (twice that of Nagasaki) been ex-ploded over Chinese military concentrations atTaechon, between Siniuju on the Yalu and Anju,north of Pyongyang, on 25 November 1950, possi-bly 15,000 of the 22,000 troops concentrated theremight have been destroyed. Six 40-kiloton bombs

dropped over the Pyongyang-Chorwon-Kumhwa�Iron Triangle� between 27 and 29 December mighthave eliminated half of nearly 100,000 of the en-emy. The survey went on to estimate other sce-narios which never happened into early January, butintelligence had not known then of dense assem-blages of enemy troops, and UN positions nearbymight have suffered substantially. That the bombwould have been impractical under the chaotic con-ditions then prevailing must have been clear toMacArthur, who never used the study as an excuseto request atomic weapons. Their use might haveboomeranged on his own forces.

Cohen�s instructions, looking ahead to more prac-tical weaponry, came in a meeting with Colonel(later General) Ben Schriever, who ran the AirForce�s �long-range planning shop.� Low-yield tac-tical weapons, Schriever thought, would waste �pre-cious little fissile material� and, if given an accel-erated production priority, could be used against the

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MacArthur later explained to Eisenhower where he thought nuclear bombs wouldhave done the most good. I would have dropped between 30 and 50 atomic bombs . . . strung across

the neck of Manchuria� and �spread behind us�from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea�a belt of radioactive cobal. . . . For at least 60 years there could have been no land invasion of Koreafrom the north.� The JCS had already discussed a radioactive cordon sanitaire, and it had evenbeen proposed�if unrealistically�in Congress by Albert Gore Sr. who had probably received

the details from a physicist at the Oak Ridge atomic facility in his home state.

A B-29 Superfortress takes off from Okinawa for a mission against communisttargets in Korea. On 7 April, as MacArthur was about to be fired, the 99th MediumBomb Wing in California was ordered to pick up the bombs for delivery to Guam,but not to proceed to Okinawa as originally planned.


Stanley Weintraub is an Evan Pugh Professor of Arts and Humanities at Pennsylvania State Univer-sity, University Park, Pennsylvania. He received a B.A. from West Chester University, an M.A. fromTemple University and a Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State. He served as a First Lieutenant with the EighthArmy in Korea from 1951 to 1953. He has numerous military history publications, to include: A Still-ness Heard Round the World; Long Day�s Journey Into War; and The Last Great Victory. His upcomingbook, Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero is scheduled for release in April 2000.

NOTESl. General George E. Stratemeyer to General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 30 Novem-

ber 1950, Vandenberg Papers, quoted in Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Ko-rean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1990), 915.

2. All conference transcripts, unless otherwise cited, are from Dennis Merrill,ed., �The Documentary History of the Truman Presidency,� University of Missouri,Kansas City, at <www.lexis-nexis,com/cispubs/brochures/truman_docs/truman.htm>.

3. General Curtis LeMay to Vandenberg, 2 and 6 December 1950, quoted inRoger Dingman, �Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,� International Secu-rity, Winter 1988-89, 66.

4. MacArthur Memorial and Archive, Richmond, Virginia.5. MacArthur Memorial and Archive. This request is described in many publi-

cations in various ways, including Cumings, 750.6. A secret study commissioned by the Army at the Operations Research Of-

fice, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, concluded that 34 bombswould be inadequate to impede the estimated 120 Chinese divisions the commu-nists could put in the field, and that 360 would be needed to inflict 30-percentcasualties. Since only 26 Chinese divisions were estimated to have crossed intoKorea by then, it was possible, according to the study, to stabilize a defensiveline of 75 miles with radiation effect using only 15 bombs, but no mention wasmade of the consequences on friendly troops.

7. Albert Gore Sr., mid-April 1951, adapted by General Douglas MacArthur inoff-the-record interviews with Washington Post columnists Jim Lucas and BobConsodine, quoted in William Manchester, American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur(New York: Little Brown and Company, 1978), 878.

8. Memoranda and communications, Documentary History and MacArthurArchive; Truman�s comments on Symington�s memo are from �Foreign Relationsof the United States, 1951,� as quoted in Timothy J. Botti, Ace in the Hole: Whythe United States Did Not Use Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War, 1945 to 1965(Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997), 37.

9. Memoranda on deploying nuclear bombs in March-April 1951 are from �TheDocumentary History, MacArthur Archive,� and other sources. See also StanleyWeintraub, MacArthur�s War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero (NewYork: Free Press, 2000), chapters 13 and 16.

10. The young non-Ph.D. physicist was Sam Cohen, who spoke with me abouthis Korean War experience on 23 Jan 1998. See also Cohen, The Truth Aboutthe Neutron Bomb. The Inventor of the Bomb Speaks Out (New York, Morrow andCompany, 1983), 28-37, 176-79. For further background on the tactical bombprogram, see Gordon Dean and Roger M. Anders, eds., Forging the Atomic Shield(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1987); Chuck Hansen, U.S. NuclearWeapons: The Secret History (New York: Orion Books, 1988), esp. 48-55,134-35, 191; Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (NewYork: Touchstone Books, 1995), 130-31.

Recently retaken but shattered, Seoullooked to Sam Cohen, the key figure in the

development of the neutronbomb, like photographs he hadseen of Hiroshima. Years laterhe recalled the vista as �like thesurface of the moon.� Seeing thevastness of the ruins increasedhis scepticism about using big

atom bombs on cities, for they added radio-activity to wholesale destruction and � asidefrom magnitude � accomplished no more

than conventional explosives.

communists. He would give the very young Cohen,a civilian, the assimilated rank of colonel and have himgo off unobserved by Tokyo and wander around thefront, talk to airmen and report back on where and how,if at all, nuclear weapons would be practical.

Cohen�s first flight outside the United States was ona troop-transport �jammed with infantrymen and theirweapons,� droning along �forever and a day� at 150mph. Crossing the Han on on a reinforced concretebridge that had taken numerous hits over the monthsby big conventional bombs and was often patched upby the enemy, he found a purpose for tactical A-Bombs,one of which would have dispatched the entire span intothe river. Recently retaken but shattered, Seoul lookedto him like photographs he had seen of Hiroshima af-ter the Bomb, and years later he recalled the vista as�like the surface of the moon.� Seeing the vastness ofthe ruins increased his skepticism about using big atombombs on cities, for they added radioactivity to whole-sale destruction and � aside from magnitude �accomplished no more than conventional explosives,he thought.

On �field trips� to air bases like K-13 (Suwon),K-14 (Kimpo) and K-6 (Pyongtaek), he talked tomiddle-level flying brass such as Colonel FrancisGabreski, an ace with World War II kills, and Colo-nel Frank Schmidt, who confided as the eveninglengthened into midnight that he was in favor of get-ting out of Korea as soon as possible, since politicsmade the war unwinnable. �These guys I�ll be send-ing up. I�ll lose some. For what?�

Returning to Washington, Cohen told Schriever,�Benjy, you win.� Cohen was convinced that itwould be far less costly to use efficient low-yieldtactical weapons on limited targets and that air burstswould not significantly en danger friendly troops ad-vancing into affected areas. Air Force thinking nev-

ertheless remained dominated by LeMay and fixedupon �total� weapons, while Cohen�s morally sen-sitive scientific colleagues �were aghast that any-one would consider using atomic weapons again inAsia. The only theater for nuclear use they couldthink of was Europe. It was my first exposure tothe �Hiroshima� syndrome.� Seeing Seoul devas-tated and useless after the enemy fought street-by-streetand house-by-house to defend it did not �put the neu-tron bomb bee in my bonnet,� Cohen claimed, but 10years later he would devise a never-to-be-deployedneutron weapon that could take out the enemy with ra-dioactivity while leaving much infrastructure intact.

The threat of nuclear thunderbolts would emanateless from MacArthur than from the Pentagon. Butpractical weapons for use in the field did not yet ex-ist, and world opinion might have kept even them fromKorea. Meanwhile, in the laboratory of Cohen�smind, the neutron bomb would develop from a Koreanimpulse he did not yet recognize. MR

KOREA


Without a doubt, the most dangerousplace in the world is the Korean Peninsula

� David Kay, former chief of the UN Nuclear Inspection Team in Iraq

CONSIDER THE UNTHINKABLE: Fearingimminent collapse of their political, social and

economic structures, the North Koreans launch asurprise attack on South Korea. The North Koreangoal is to execute a short-war campaign plan�tograb as much territory as possible, demand acease-fire and negotiate the withdrawal of US forcesfrom a position of strength. So far the fighting hasbeen conventional, but the North Koreans havethreatened to use chemical and biological weapons.Japanese cities are threatened by the North KoreanNo-Dong missile�and the Japanese are nervous.Facing possible devastation of Seoul and Tokyo bymissile-launched chemical attacks, few regionalleaders are willing to call the North Koreans� bluff.The United States desperately rushes all available airpower to the region�but it is having minimal effectin the bad weather, and most of the airfields are tem-porarily unusable after attacks by enemy commandoteams, aircraft and missiles. With a smaller army,and commitments all over the world, significant USground reinforcements will take weeks to arrive.

Time, however, is running out. The Republic ofKorea (ROK) and US forces are fighting staunchlybut the battle lines move closer to Seoul. Defenseis not enough�the enemy must be forced backquickly or Seoul will be engulfed in artillery fire.The weather remains abysmal, with thick fog reduc-ing visibility to a few hundred meters, and most air-craft and helicopters are grounded. US forces inKorea, reeling from hard blows struck by hundredsof North Korean special forces teams, have with-drawn out of artillery range. Somehow the tide ofbattle must be turned. The ROK/US coalition pre-pares to launch a ground attack, penetrate the

enemy�s defenses and knock out as much of his ar-tillery and air defense as possible. The 2d InfantryDivision, battered but combat capable, is ordered tospearhead the attack.

An unlikely scenario? For an Army whose think-ing is largely European-focused, many might agree.The threat of war in Korea, however, is very real.If war comes to Korea, the ability of US and ROKforces to launch timely ground counterattacks willbe decisive. Units earmarked to play a major rolein a conflict in Korean would find themselves coun-terattacking down narrow valleys with little roomfor traditional Desert Storm-like maneuver. Arewe prepared to use our technological and trainingovermatch to its maximum advantage in the rugged,mountainous terrain of Korea? What tactics, tech-niques and procedures (TTPs) do we apply fordecisive operations in restricted terrain?

Operation Desert Storm proved that the US Armyis the undisputed master of combined arms combatin open terrain.2 We train for combat in openterrain at the National Training Center (NTC), FortIrwin, California, the rolling hills of Texas or theopen canyons of Colorado. From unit conduct offire trainer (UCOFT) to combined arms live-fire ex-ercises (CALFEXs), our Abrams tank and Bradley

With three years of combat and 44 yearsof training experience in Korea, the US Army

should have mastered tactics for fighting inrestricted terrain. Unfortunately, this is not the

case. . . . Imagine a Blue Task Force attackthrough the NTC�s John Wayne Pass opposed

by a reinforced OPFOR company with infantry,tanks and massive artillery support. This is the

tactical situation faced by combat leaders inKorea should there be a war.



crews engage targets on relatively flat live-fireranges at distances of 900 to 2,000 meters. Our Armythinks of battle in open areas that permit us the free-dom to maneuver our devastating direct-fire weap-ons. Even the Army�s training literature; TTPs anddoctrinal manuals reflect this open-terrain bias. Nota single Center for Army Lesson Learned (CALL)pamphlet has been written on fighting in very restric-tive terrain. Even though we have fought more ma-jor wars in Asia this century than in any other placeon the globe (World War II, Korea and Vietnam), USArmy doctrine remains tilted toward a European-style conventional war, largely ignoring mountedcombat in other regions and in other terrain.3

Many potential battlefields, however, containmountainous terrain. In Korea virtually all the landis mountainous�although restricted terrain variesin ruggedness. With three years of combat and 44years of training experience in Korea, the US Armyshould have mastered tactics for fighting in restrictedterrain. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Offic-ers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers arrivein Korea well versed in open warfare but with littleunderstanding of how to fight in restricted terrain.Just imagine what would occur at an NTC rotationif the Blue Task Force was ordered to attack throughand secure an objective at the other end of JohnWayne Pass, opposed by a reinforced OPFOR com-pany with infantry, tanks and massive artillery sup-port. This is the tactical situation faced by combatleaders in Korea should there be a war.

This article addresses the use of combined armsraids against a North Korean hasty defense duringthe initial phase of a North Korean attack into SouthKorea. Although I address a Korean scenario, thisdiscussion applies to other cases of combat in veryrestricted terrain. This article is based on a studyof Korean War �tank raids� and my assessment af-ter six years of training and commanding units inKorea.4 This article should encourage discussionabout combined arms operations in restricted terrainand address the current doctrinal void.

Nature of Combat in Restricted TerrainWars should be fought in better country than this.5

� Martin Blumenson on combatin very restricted terrain

The first thing that enters most soldiers� mindswhen they think of mountainous terrain is its valuein defense. Defending, however, does not mean sit-ting still. To be successful the defender must main-tain the initiative through the use of firepower andmaneuver. Firepower without maneuver is like

fighting with one hand tied behind your back�itlooks heroic but isn�t very smart. Maneuver is �themovement of combat forces to gain positional advan-tage . . . is the means of positioning forces at deci-sive points . . . and is rarely effective without firepowerand protection.�6 Maneuver puts the firepowerwhere it will do the most damage. Nowhere is theargument for careful study of maneuver and depthmore important today than in the rugged hills ofKorea.

Korea exemplifies an area of mangrel operationsin restricted and very restricted terrain where depthis critical.7 The ROK/US coalition committed to for-ward defense in the restricted terrain north of Seouland along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) for a num-ber of significant political, economic and militaryreasons. Seoul, the commercial, administrative andpolitical center of South Korea, is only 40 km fromthe DMZ. With a population of almost 12 millionpeople, Seoul is the 10th largest city in the world.It has much more significance than during the Ko-rean War, when it changed hands four times andwas completely destroyed. The memory of that de-struction is not lost on the South Koreans, particu-larly since the North Korean Army (NKPA), thefourth largest in the world, is poised in near-attackstatus only 40 km away. A North Korean surpriseattack is a dangerous possibility. With such lim-ited geographic depth, the need for US maneuverin restricted terrain is obvious.

In general, the restricted terrain of South Koreafavors the tactical defense. Commanding hills andnarrow valleys prevent the attacker from massingcombat power to dominate large areas. The attackermoving down a narrow mountain or steep-walledvalley road faces the harrowing prospect of attack-ing into a trap, where well-sited defenders out-number his lead forces. An attacker can bringhis superior forces only gradually, and then not

The modern commander has threecounterattack options in restricted terrain:

seize the high ground with infantry, bomb theenemy into submission or penetrate the

valleys. . . . The second option, bombing theenemy into submission, usually produced

indecisive results. The third option, to take thevalleys, bypass the heights and maneuver to

secure or destroy decisive points succeeded inthe Korean War on several occasions with

dramatic results.

KOREA



completely, against the defender. Enemy flanks areoften not assailable except through narrow valleys.Each intervisibility line may hold an ambush. Ifattacks are made along several avenues of approach,each attack is likely to be isolated from the other.Although an urban explosion in South Korea has ex-

panded the road and highway network and dramati-cally increased the options for ground maneuver, ithas also added another form of restricted terrain tothe equation. Maneuver in Korea is hindered bythese urban centers as well as by the narrow val-leys, steep ridges and chokepoints that channelizeand constrict moving combat formations.

The defense in restricted terrain, however, alsohas vulnerable spots. Restricted terrain containsdominating ground that must be held and longvalleys that must be protected by the defender tosustain lines of communication and supply. The ter-rain makes it difficult to maintain the unity andcohesion of large-unit operations. Tidy lines andlinear fronts are often impossible. The rugged ter-rain forces defenders to disperse and rely on thestrength of their positions to buttress the defense.Large gaps between strongpoints are the norm andallow the attacker to pick a penetration point andattack the rear of fixed high-mountain positions.Maneuver in restricted terrain is possible if the at-tacker can concentrate combat power to force a pen-etration of the defender�s strongpoints.

The challenges of attacking in restrictive terrainare not new. Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese militaryphilosopher, stressed that armies on the attack shouldstay away from restrictive terrain: �In this type ofterrain, even if the enemy entices you, do not ad-vance. Instead, retreat, forcing him to follow.�8

Hundreds of years later an expert on mountain war-fare, Jean De Bourcet�whose writings signifi-cantly influenced Napoleon Bonaparte�declaredthat �in a mountain region, the all-important points

for military purposes are the defiles, and when these,as is frequently the case, are impregnable againstfrontal attacks, the general taking the offensive mustseek every possible means of turning them, andmust so arrange his troops as to fix the enemy�s at-tention on some point other than that of which it isintended to gain possession.�9

Baron Henri Jomini, in his book The Art of War,stressed the offensive in mountainous terrain. �[I]fa country covered with high mountains be favorablefor defense in a tactical point of view, it is differentin a strategic sense, because it necessitates a divi-sion of the troops. This can only be remedied bygiving them greater mobility and by passing oftento the offensive.�10 In similar fashion, Carl vonClausewitz emphasized that the advantage in moun-tainous terrain rests with the attacker, not the de-fender, particularly with regard to hasty defense.�[b]attle in the mountains does not confer all theadvantages on the defender . . . when one consid-ers the difficulties of taking up a favorable moun-tain position at the last moment . . . one will realizethat this is a totally unreliable method of defense.�11

The views of Jomini and Clausewitz suggest that anattacker with mobility and concentration of forcescan maneuver and defeat a purely positional defensein restricted terrain.

Military analysts of the 20th century concur withClausewitz. The German army gained vast moun-tain fighting experience during World War I. Thisexperience is reflected in the German Field ServiceRegulations of 1933, which state:

�In restricted terrain the attacker often needs onlya local and limited superiority in numbers and battlemeans. Apparently strong heights and rocky positionsas well as individual plateaus can be made to fall ifwe succeed in enveloping, or turning these positions,or by breaking through on a quite small front. Theeffect of such an attack as a rule is quicker and moredecisive in mountains than in the lowlands.�12

In a similar fashion, the Soviet army believed that�enveloping detachments play an important role inoffensives in mountainous terrain.�13 The Germansin World War II successfully demonstrated theirability to launch combined arms operations�in-cluding the use of tanks and mechanized infantry�in the mountains of Yugoslavia and Greece. Tak-ing a page from the German book, the British alsodemonstrated that armor could be used effectivelyin the very restrictive terrain of Burma. The Brit-ish used tanks in Burma to spearhead the famous300-mile drive on Rangoon, capturing the city inthree weeks of hard fighting.

We will seldom have enough infantry,nor can we afford the casualties, to clear the

high ground with rifles and grenades. Thepenetration force must have mobility, protectionand overwhelming firepower. This means thattanks must form the backbone of the combinedarms team that will bust through the enemy�s

defense. The common excuse that �thisis not good tank country� does not respond

to the problem.


Accordingly the modern commander has threecounterattack options in restricted terrain: seize thehigh ground with infantry, bomb the enemy into sub-mission or penetrate the valleys. The first optionwas tried unsuccessfully in the Korean War on toomany occasions�bloody infantry assaults up steep,well-defended hills. The second option, bombingthe enemy into submission, usually produced inde-cisive results. The third option, to take the valleys,bypass the heights and maneuver to secure or de-stroy decisive points succeeded in the Korean Waron several occasions with dramatic results.

Korean War Tank Raidsin Restricted Terrain

Bourcet�s belief that the defiles and valleys weresignificant and his words stressing the futility offrontal attacks should have been studied by Ameri-can commanders during the Korean War. Unfor-tunately, several US Army battle streamers from theKorean War carry the names of heroic�andbloody�frontal attacks. Most professional soldiersof that time, trained in the open warfare of World

War II, saw the situation in Korea as purely an in-fantry and artillery war. However, during the ini-tial phase of the battle of Heartbreak Ridge, for ex-ample, �artillery alone could not demolish the deepNKPA fortifications, though the 2d InfantryDivision�s artillery fired 229,724 rounds.�14 US in-fantry and artillery could not move the enemy offthe hills but took 3,700 casualties in the attempt.

The bias of that time was that tanks were not use-ful in restricted terrain. Some veteran soldiers, in-cluding Captain Sam Freedman of the famed 72dTank Battalion, believed that the solution lay in theuse of tanks as part of an integrated combined armsteam. Freedman remarked that �tanks can be em-ployed in many spectacular and highly effectualways . . . the ingenuity of planners who won�t take�no� for an answer has resulted in the discoveryof means to bring up tanks for swift and tellingstrokes that have broken the back of enemy re-sistance.�15 Freedman and other tankers believedthat mobility was partially a state of mind andlargely a matter of organization, training andcareful planning. The battles of Chipyong-ni and

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By using armor at Chipyong-ni and Heartbreak Ridge, the US Army found that �armorremained an indispensable part of ground combat, regardless of any limiting conditions under which

it had to operate.� Aggressive leaders found ways to maneuver tanks and employ combined arms.Despite the very restrictive terrain, they found that �tanks could move better in rugged mountainous

terrain than they might have expected. A key was skillful engineer support.�

A 24th infantry Division tank com-mander crouches behind his turretafter giving the order to fire, SongSil-li, Korea, 10 January 1952.

War in Korea, Presidio Press War in Korea, Presidio Press War in Korea, Presidio Press War in Korea, Presidio Press


Operation Touchdown proved Freedman right.The Battle of Chipyong-ni validated tank-

infantry-artillery-air power cooperation in mountain-ous terrain and was declared by General MatthewRidgway to be the most important combined armsbattle of the war. The tactical lessons learned atChipyong-ni, and the relief of the defensive perim-eter by Task Force Crombez, changed the nature ofthe fighting in Korea and ended the fear that UNforces would be pushed off the Korean Peninsula.16 Theeffect of the Task Force Crombez �tank raid� surprisedthe Chinese and, according to their own after-actionreports that were captured shortly after the battle, theywere �taught a lesson at the expense of bloodshed.�17

The value of tank raids was even more dramaticduring the last three days of the Battle of HeartbreakRidge in Operation Touchdown from 10-12 Octo-ber 1951. The 2d Infantry Division employed the72d Tank Battalion to penetrate the valley to thewest of Heartbreak, envelop the enemy defense andwin the battle. The accelerated movement of the 72dthrough the �impassable� Mundung-ni Valley sealedthe victory for the 2d Infantry Division by disruptingan entire Chinese infantry division. The 2d InfantryDivision attacked with three regiments abreast to fixthe defending NKPA as the 72d Armor attack sur-prised the enemy and dislocated his defense. Opera-tion Touchdown proved that a combined arms taskforce could be decisive even in restricted terrain.18

By using armor at Chipyong-ni and HeartbreakRidge, the US Army found that �armor remainedan indispensable part of ground combat, regardlessof any limiting conditions under which it had tooperate.�19 Aggressive leaders found ways to maneu-ver tanks and employ combined arms. Despite the veryrestrictive terrain, they found that �tanks could movebetter in rugged mountainous terrain than they mighthave expected. A key was skillful engineer support.�20

The Combined Arms RaidWith the rapid development of indirect-fire tech-

nology and precision munitions, there are many who

believe that victory on a restricted terrain battlefieldis merely a matter of firepower. However, until�brilliant munitions� mature, indirect firepoweralone will not win wars. The capability of theNKPA and Chinese forces to dig in and avoid de-feat from overwhelming US firepower is legendary. Noarmed force dares assume that superior firepowerguarantees victory. We must continue to developtactics and training that will maximize our techno-logical, organizational and operational advantages.

A successful defense in restricted terrain dependson the �effective simultaneous application of fireand forces to the entire depth of the enemy. . . . Therapid defeat of enemy groupings is impossible to-day without decisive, flexible and broad maneuverincluding . . . raiding detachments operating in theenemy rear.�21 In Korea, combined arms raidingforces, concentrated to bust through and exploit ahasty NKPA defense, can turn the tide of battle.Raids offer a means to create depth and regain theinitiative for the defender. In restricted terrain theyare �not only part of the defenses but are essentialin a maneuver defense. Defending commanderswith sufficient forces should plan raids in supportof their defense.�22

The principal function of a combined arms raidin restricted terrain is to ensure that maneuver domi-nates the battlefield throughout its depth. Success-ful raids can secure decisive points and set the con-ditions for a series of turning movements orenvelopments that would be impossible withoutmaneuver. The goal of maneuver should be �to in-capacitate by systemic disruption�whether the�system� is the command structure of the enemy�sforces, their mode of warfare and combat array, oreven an actual technical system.�23 Against theNKPA�an army without air support but with sig-nificant artillery and air defense capabilities�apowerful combined arms raid may offer the onlymethod to gain depth and retake the initiative.

Eventually an NKPA advance will pause, andwhen it does, the defender must be ready to strike.Combined-arms raids require a penetration of en-emy defenses and the exploitation of the raidingforce to secure or destroy an enemy decisive point.The raid should be planned to a tactical depth that islogistically sustainable� usually 10 to 15 kilome-ters. The mission of the raid force can be terrain orthe enemy force itself. A combined-arms raid inrestricted terrain will typically have three phases:l The initial rupture of the enemy positions and

the clearing of the enemy along the flanks of thedefile or valley to commit the follow-on force.

Although the helicopter permits aquantum leap in mobility in restricted terrain, itonly works when weather permits and there is a

thorough suppression of enemy air defenses.A combined-arms maneuver force remains the

only all-weather, 24-hour maneuver option for conducting raids into the tactical

depths of the enemy.


l The exploitation by a combined-arms raidingforce to secure or destroy a decisive point.l The defense and linkup or a sweeping attack

to return to friendly lines.

Penetrating Enemy Linesin Restricted Terrain

A penetration in the enemy�s lines must be madeto allow the raiding force to get behind enemy lines.A penetration is defined in FM 71-3, The Armoredand Mechanized Infantry Brigade, as an attack to�rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front and cre-ate both assailable flanks and access to the enemy�srear.�24 FM 100-5, Operations, states that the idealattack might resemble a torrent of water rushing for-ward and expanding its channels around major re-

sistance. It should move fast, follow reconnaissanceunits or successful probes through gaps in enemydefenses, then shift its strength quickly to widenpenetrations and reinforce successes, thereby car-rying the battle deep into the enemy�s rear.

A penetration attack in restricted terrain also re-sembles the water analogy: finding a relative weak-ness in the enemy defense and conducting a pen-etration attack along a valley or defile. In restrictedterrain the attacker must mass overwhelming com-bat power at the point of penetration or select a de-file or valley that is relatively unguarded in orderto catch the defender by surprise with rapid andviolent execution. If the direction of attack is wellguarded, overwhelming combat power at the pointof penetration must stun and suppress the defender

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During the initial phase of the battle of Heartbreak Ridge artillery alone could notdemolish the deep NKPA fortifications, though the 2d Infantry Division�s artillery fired 229,724

rounds. US infantry and artillery could not move the enemy off the hills but took 3,700 casualties inthe attempt. It was only during the last three days of the battle that the 2d Infantry Division employed

the 72d Tank Battalion to penetrate the �impassable� Mundung-ni Valley and seal thevictory by disrupting an entire Chinese infantry division.

Tanks of the 72d Tank Battalion, attached tothe 2d Infantry Division, move into position tosupport the ROK 8th Division, 19 August 1951.


and hinder any reserves from counterattacking intime. Other attacking forces must fix the defenderwith intense fires along the front.

On the Korean battlefield, the NKPA forces willbe dense. Almost every defile and valley will holdforces moving forward or poised in a hasty defense,waiting for supply or reinforcement. Only a verypowerful, swift attack force will be able to penetrate

an NKPA defense anchored to restrictive terrain.Because penetration is an attack into the strength ofthe defense, it could be costly in friendly casualties.

Today, a smart enemy will defend the defilesagainst an armored penetration by reinforcing hisdefense with the terrain. Keyhole positions, whichallow for single or multiple flank or rear shots atthe enemy during limited windows of opportunitywithout directly giving away the firing position, willanchor his defense along the fingers of the defilesand valleys. It is as if the enemy is firing at youthrough a keyhole as you pass down a hallway. Theattacker, therefore, must prioritize reconnaissanceand concentrate decisive combat power at the pointof penetration to win the close-range, direct-fire fightat the point of the attack.

To increase force density at the tip of the spear,attackers must put their best and most powerful unitsup front. The first requirement is the ability to pen-etrate defended defiles without having to scale ev-ery ridgeline and precipice with infantry. We willseldom have enough infantry, nor can we afford thecasualties, to clear the high ground with rifles andgrenades. The penetration force must have mobil-ity, protection and overwhelming firepower. Thismeans that tanks must form the backbone of thecombined arms team that will bust through theenemy�s defense.26 The common excuse that �thisis not good tank country� does not respond to theproblem. As mentioned earlier, this challenge wasmet during the Korean War when superb tankersdemonstrated �on numerous occasions that theycould operate effectively in terrain that doctrinally

was considered completely unsuitable for tanks.�27

Although a dismounted infiltration attack mightkick off the penetration battle for the first kilome-ter and air-assault forces could be used to seize de-cisive terrain, tanks must lead the rest of the waysince only tanks can provide the necessary devas-tating direct fire and employ mechanical breachingequipment (mine plows and rollers) to punchthrough hasty obstacle belts. Protection from coun-terattack and artillery attack is a major issue for air-assault forces, but if they are used, they will requirea quick linkup with heavy forces to survive. Al-though the helicopter permits a quantum leap in mo-bility in restricted terrain, it only works whenweather permits and there is a thorough suppressionof enemy air defenses.

A combined-arms maneuver force remains theonly all-weather, 24-hour maneuver option for con-ducting raids into the tactical depths of the enemy.The penetration force, therefore, should be a com-bined-arms task force with tanks, mechanized infan-try, engineers, armored air defense systems, artil-lery directed by observation helicopters, attackhelicopters and close air support. In good weatherthe combined combat power of ground-attackforces, artillery, attack aviation and close air sup-port can provide overwhelming and devastatingpower at the point of penetration.

With their mine-plows and rollers, tanks lead theway in the penetration battle. Mechanized infantryin Bradley Fighting Vehicles can provide a converg-ing attack force�or a security force if the terrainis not suitable for tanks or Bradleys. Combat engi-neers are critical to the continued movement of thepenetration, using explosives to destroy obstaclesand minefields that cannot be breached mechani-cally by tanks. When required, the infantry and en-gineers dismount to secure the next intervisibiltyline� not the next ridgeline or mountain top� andalways stay within the fire protection of the tanksand Bradleys.

Optimum combat power inthe lead platoon and combat team is vital.

The goal of the combined-arms effort must be tomaintain the momentum of the penetration andthe goal of the exploitation must be to destroy

or secure a decisive point. Capturing a decisivepoint is a key step in attacking an enemy�s

center of gravity.

PositionOnly


Massed indirect fires would set the conditions forsuccess in the valley by conducting a fire strike at thepenetration point and maneuvering the fires downalong the direction of attack. Elements advancingwithout cover must have fire support. While the leadtanks work forward, the trail tanks and Bradleys sup-press the enemy to both flanks of the defile. Di-rect-fire engagement procedures must be well drilledto identify targets in three dimensions. Mortar firemust suppress suspected keyhole positions directlyahead of the lead tanks while artillery fires hitfarther up the defile. Fires are shifted to suppressdefenders and obscure their view as the force ad-vances. Elements unable to advance seek cover andcall for smoke and mortar fire for protection. Gain-ing local fire superiority and maintaining a rapidadvance will avoid the enemy�s artillery fire traps.

Optimum combat power in the lead platoon andcombat team is vital. The goal of the combined-arms effort must be to maintain the momentum of thepenetration � to stun and suppress the enemy with ar-mor busting through the valley, mortar fire falling justin front of the tanks, artillery smashing farther upthe valley and suppressing likely keyhole positions,attack helicopters killing what is farther in front ofthe tanks (1,000 meters) and CAS fixing the enemyreserves. In restrictive terrain an armored combined-arms force is the weapon of choice for quick, deci-sive victory with minimum friendly casualties.

Exploiting the Penetrationwith a Combined-Arms Raid

Directed by information-age intelligence sourcesavailable to today�s divisions, the armored com-bined-arms force finds a gap or makes one, thendrives through the dazed defenders. In restrictedterrain the attacker is quickly isolated from friendly

forces to its rear and flanks. In such terrain the at-tacker cannot depend on continuous battle lines. Towait for other units to attack across the front,arm-in-arm, surrenders the value of the penetration.

After a powerful, mobile combined-arms force cre-ates a gap it should accelerate and exploit the pen-etration. The goal of the exploitation must be todestroy or secure a decisive point.28 Capturing adecisive point is a key step in attacking an enemy�scenter of gravity, for �decisive points are not cen-ters of gravity; they are the keys to getting at cen-ters of gravity.�29

North Korea�s center of gravity is the NKPA, theInmun Gun. All political power and legitimacy restson the survival and loyalty of the army to the po-litical structure. The primary decisive points of anattacking NKPA force that has fought its way southof the demilitarized zone are its brigade, division andcorps artillery groups.30 These artillery groups mustbe located within 10 to 18 kilometers of the frontto support the attack.31 NKPA tactics hinge on theability to maneuver using artillery firepower ormassed infantry infiltration in restricted terrain. Theartillery blows a hole and the armor follows. Whenthe armor is held up, the infantry attacks to awaitthe redeployment of the artillery and then the artil-lery blows a new hole in the defense. Penetratingwith massed artillery, then exploiting with armorand infantry is central to the NKPA way of conven-tional war. Although it has a large amount of long-range artillery in heavily protected bunkers along theDMZ, the NKPA�s mobile artillery is a decisivepoint whose destruction has operational conse-quences and is a target worthy of committing groundmaneuver forces behind enemy lines.

The combined-arms raiding force should be com-manded by a single ground force commander. Theforce should be task-organized based on importantcalculations: the combat power, quality and train-

The combined-arms raiding forceshould be commanded by a single ground force

commander. The force should be task-organized based on important calculations: thecombat power, quality and training of his forces

versus the enemy; the availability of combatmultipliers. The higher the quality of the

friendly forces and the less time the enemy hasbeen preparing his defenses, the smaller the

force can be and still achieve success.

KOREA


ing of his forces versus the enemy; the availabilityof combat multipliers (artillery, army aviation andclose air support needed to set the conditions for thecontinued movement along the direction of attack;and the length of time the enemy has been prepar-ing his hasty defense). The higher the quality of

the friendly forces and the less time the enemy hasbeen preparing his defenses, the smaller the forcecan be and still achieve success.

Once the enemy�s defenses are penetrated, artil-lery, attack helicopters and CAS fix or destroy anymobile reserves. The force that conducted the pen-etration either holds its ground and passes througha combined-arms raiding force or the penetrationforce continues the attack to a decisive point. Atthis point the combined-arms raiding force will finditself fighting asymmetrically against enemy ele-ments desperately trying to block its advance�asthe 72d Armor did at Heartbreak Ridge. The raid-ing force must then take a page from the combinedarms manuals of the Korean War and be trained toexpect to operate �deep in enemy territory; the pres-ence of the enemy to the front flanks and rear is acondition to be expected. All personnel must beconditioned to consider such conditions more nor-mal than otherwise.�32

While the corps, army and theater commandersfight a traditional deep battle against the enemy�soperational echelons, the division commander ef-fects the immediate close fight by attacking deepwith a combined-arms raiding force. The raid be-comes the division�s deep battle and its main effort.�Deep� is a relative term with regard to restrictiveterrain. In the desert, tactical moves of 20-30 kmin several hours can be normal. In very restrictiveterrain, an attack of 10 km can take days. The na-ture of the terrain compresses time and space for theattacker, making the �deep� raid shallow byopen-warfare standards. Considering that the dis-

tance from Seoul to the DMZ is less than 40 km, adeep attack of 10 km can be valuable to a divisioncommander.

Taking advantage of every possible mobility cor-ridor, the combined-arms raiding force concentratesagainst the enemy�s fragmentation. As the raidingforce approaches the artillery groups, the enemymust decide to keep them in place and block the ex-ploitation force or withdraw his artillery and con-duct a delay. If he does not move his artillery, theexploitation force must close with and engage theartillery groups. If the enemy does move his artil-lery, it is both unavailable for combat and can bedestroyed as it deploys on the march. The combi-nation of accelerated armored movement and artil-lery, helicopter and CAS firepower leaves the de-fending enemy with only disastrous options.

Once the decisive point is secured or destroyed,the raiding force can either defend and wait to linkup with follow-on forces or conduct a sweeping at-tack back toward friendly lines. A hasty defensewill depend on the success of the attack, the strengthof the enemy in the area and the time required forforces to link up with the raiding force. Dependingon the situation, this could be a high-risk operationif the combined-arms raiding force bypasses resis-tance and reaches the decisive point with minimaldelay. Unless linkup is achieved, the force will face ex-hausted fuel supplies and increased enemy counterattacks.

The most promising option is to return the com-bined-arms raiding force to friendly lines by con-ducting a �sweeping attack,� defined by the ROKas an attack by a mobile, armored force to destroyenemy forces along the direction of attack. Thesweeping attack penetrates enemy lines, destroys anenemy decisive point and continues the attack backtoward friendly lines along another avenue of attack.The sweeping attack places mobile, ground-combatpower in much the same role as attack helicoptersare used in an engagement forward of friendly lines.The sweeping attack cycles the combined-arms raid-ing force into enemy territory and back again. Asweeping attack in the restricted terrain of Koreawould usually extend the force only 12-18 km deepbefore returning to friendly lines.

The combined-arms raid is an important tool forshaping the battlefield in restricted terrain becauseit creates depth to gain positional advantage and grabthe initiative. �Raids into the enemy rear have be-come an important and indispensable part of mod-ern battle as demonstrated by the raid of a smallgroup of Israeli tanks into the rear of the ThirdEgyptian Field Army in October 1973. This raid

The combined-arms raid is an important tool for shaping the battlefield in

restricted terrain because it creates depth to gainpositional advantage and grab the initiative.The raid of a small group of Israeli tanks in

October 1973 unhinged and threatened to defeatthe entire Egyptian Third Army. An M1 tank

company appearing in the midst of an enemyarmy artillery group can be a powerful

force of decision.


unhinged and threatened to defeat the entire ThirdArmy.�33 An M1 tank company appearing in themidst of an enemy army artillery group can be apowerful force of decision.

Today, US battalions in Korea are vastly su-perior to similar North Korean units in technology,organization, operations and training. Future com-bat in restricted terrain should employ small, self-contained, mobile combined-arms forces of infan-try, tanks, engineers, artillery and combat aviation.Directed with information-age intelligence, they canrapidly penetrate a gap in the enemy�s defenses andexploit the penetration to attack a decisive point.The combined-arms raid in restricted terrain is adifficult option to execute but offers the possibilityof operational and strategic success in a placesuch as Korea. Against the NKPA, whose second-generation antitank weapons cannot penetrate thefront or flanks of the M1A1 tank, busting throughis an important option for US forces.

Training for the PenetrationAttack in Restricted Terrain

Such a minuet of destruction does not occur with-out practice. Historically, the most successfularmies have applied combined arms at the lowestpossible level. The greater the training and coordi-nation of the combined-arms force, and the betterits breaching capability, the faster the penetration.The faster the combined-arms force moves to itsobjective�an enemy decisive point�the greaterthe success and the smaller the friendly losses.34

Agile plans, excellent reconnaissance, concentrationat the tip of the spear and the complete integrationof combined-arms are critical for success of the pen-etration attack in restricted terrain. Winning in re-stricted terrain will require a high frequency of com-bined arms training and a thorough understandingof the terrain. Training in open warfare is notenough.35

First, the attacking force must be organized forsuccess. In restricted terrain, the battle is carried atthe point of the spear. This may be a platoon, sec-tion or at times a single vehicle. The lead unit mustbe organized with ample combat power and mobilityassets. In the defile, tank crews will be challenged todestroy an enemy defender who controls all the natu-ral advantages. The tactics of fighting in defiles andrestrictive terrain must be thoroughly understood. Ifthe lead tank is destroyed or disabled and the defileis blocked, an entire task force attack may be slowedor stopped. The defender will try to ambush theattacker in the valleys and defiles, at point-blank

ranges, from concealed positions. To defeat theambusher, the attacking tank and Bradley crewsmust wrest the initiative from the defender.

In this situation the fighting skills of tank andBradley crews make the difference between success

or halting, bloody failure. High-performing tank crewsmust steal that advantage away from the defenderand gain the initiative with techniques to acquire anddestroy targets in the close-range, direct-fire fight.Firing first is a decisive advantage to the attackingtank, section, platoon and company. Their battle-field situational understanding is critical to gainingthe �3 to 6 second advantage� over the defender.36

The mental agility of the company and task forcecommanders and that of the task force staff isequally important. Once a combined-arms columnof 235 armored and wheeled vehicles attacks� thesize of a typical four-battalion armored task force�enters a narrow defile, there are few opportunitiesto turn around or move away from an enemy firesack. Original plans may require modification asthe enemy situation changes or becomes clear. At-tacking forces, therefore, must be able to rapidlymodify their direction of attack. In restricted ter-rain, plans are a basis for changes, so every mis-sion needs a base plan with branches.

Excellence in combined-arms warfare in restrictedterrain is a product of frequent practice and trainedleaders.37 Commanders must learn to feel, ratherthan try to see, the battlefield. In a narrow valleythe commander may be restricted to the view of thevehicle in front of him. It is usually impossible tosee large portions of battlefield, as commanders aretrained to do in open-terrain fighting. In restrictedterrain the commander must anticipate battlefielddecisions and trust his trained subordinate leadersto command their elements according to his intent.

In short, combat in restrictive takes special training.Tactics in restricted terrain must be practiced andprecise�from rapid direct fire in three dimensions

KOREA

�Deep� is a relative term with regard torestrictive terrain. In the desert, tactical moves

of 20-30 km in several hours can be normal.Restrictive terrain compresses time and space

for the attacker, making the �deep� raid shallowby open-warfare standards. Considering that

the distance from Seoul to the DMZ is less than40 km, a deep attack of 10 km can be valuable

to a division commander.


NOTES

(forward, flanks, rear and up and down the hills),quick target acquisition skills, close-range, direct-fire accuracy, effective use of machineguns and thecomplete integration of all combined-arms fire-power. Providing combined-arms training and or-ganizing forces to penetrate and exploit the pen-etration in restricted terrain is a major training andresourcing challenge. Commanders should put thistraining together and practice often enough to mas-ter the techniques that win in restricted terrain.

A great army employs good weapons, excellenttraining and effective tactics appropriate to the ter-rain and enemy situation. Although the Army mustbe a full-spectrum force, ready to respond to theneeds of the nation, it is important to remember thatthe possibility of a short-notice, mid-intensity war in therugged hills of Korea still looms. A quick look at theglobe will show that many potential battlefields arelocated in areas with mountainous and restricted ter-rain. Many of our potential enemies, composed pri-marily �second-wave� military forces, will try toleverage the terrain to make up for their training andtechnological deficiencies.38 The sparse US Armydoctrine on fighting tank and mechanized forces inrestricted terrain is not encouraging.39

Although much has changed since 1950, the USArmy is still deployed in a near-wartime footing.40

It faces a dangerous, unpredictable and implacablefoe whose economy and political stability are crum-bling�a foe that also has a large conventionalmilitary force, an offensive arsenal of chemicalweapons and, very probably, rudimentary nuclearweapons. The volatile North Korean situationwill likely end in the next few years in either �ex-plosion or implosion.�41

The lessons of our history in restricted-terraincombat should not be forgotten. On 26 November1950, 485,000 Chinese attacked the better-equipped,highly trained and veteran UN force of 365,000troops. Without air cover, significant artillery sup-port or the vaunted three-to-one advantage, the Chi-nese surprised and decimated the UN units.Road-bound and imbued with a �tactical and psy-chological dependence on continuous battle lines,such as has been known in Europe,� the UN battal-

ions were cut off and chopped up in one bloodybattle after another.42 The linear view of tactics heldby US Army officers contributed to the debacle.Fearing encirclement, many units lost all sense ofcohesion and organization when they discoveredthe Chinese had blocked their lines of communica-tion to the south. The Chinese, on the other hand,were firepower-poor yet excelled at maneuver inrestricted terrain. The Chinese attacks forcedMacArthur�s UN troops back to the 38th parallel.

The lessons from the penetration battles insteep-walled valleys of Korea in 1951 apply to USforces today. We must be wary of a �firepowersolves all� mentality and develop tactics, techniquesand procedures to develop maneuver in restrictedterrain. A raid behind enemy lines is a high-riskoperation but offers dramatic operational results. Invery restricted terrain, against an enemy with a highdensity of forces, the combined-arms raid may bethe only alternative to a slow, grinding battle of at-trition. A well-trained combined-arms task force�using the mobility and firepower of obstacle-breaching M1 tanks, assisted by infantry protectedin Bradley Fighting Vehicles, supported by combatengineers, overwatched by Kiowa Warrior andApache helicopters, attacking an enemy stunned andneutralized by effective 120mm mortar suppression,devastating 155mm howitzer fires and accurateclose air support�is the decisive formation in re-stricted terrain.43

In restricted terrain a penetration of the enemydefenses without exploitation is wasted effort.American commanders need an instrument that cantransform a penetration into a decisive victory. Thecombined-arms raid is an important tool for achiev-ing depth in restricted terrain. The answer lies indeveloping our view on the art of war in restrictedterrain. We have the combined-arms instruments;we only need to arrange them in the proper pack-age to reap their maximum potential. If we expectto bust through in restricted terrain, we need topractice the art of penetration and exploitation.Maybe it is time we gave a brigade combat teamthe mission to fight through John Wayne pass atthe NTC. MR

1. David Kay, former Chief of the UN Nuclear Inspection team in Iraq, in anImpower America interview in the spring of 1994.

2. Combined arms warfare is the simultaneous application of combat, CS andCSS toward a common goal. Combined arms warfare produces effects that aregreater than the sum of the individual parts. The combined arms team strives to con-duct fully integrated operations in the dimensions of time, space, purpose and resourcesto confuse, demoralize and destroy the enemy with the coordinated impact ofcombat power. The goal of this sudden and devastating impact of combined armsis to paralyze the enemy�s response and force his destruction or defeat.

3. �Disturbingly, the US Army and the armor establishment in general seemedeager to discount much of the armor experience in each war [Korea and Vietnam]

as irrelevant to future conflicts once those wars ended� from David A.Niedringhaus, �US Army Armor in Limited War: Armor Employment Techniquesin Korea and Vietnam,� Masters Degree Thesis: Ohio State University: 1987, 146.

4.Tactical lessons learned in 1951�from the defensive battle of Chipyong-niand offensive battle Operation Touchdown that ended the battle of HeartbreakRidge�show that combined arms penetration attacks in restrictive terrain can bedecisive. The lessons of Chipyong-ni and Touchdown dramatically depict the valueof combined arms combat in restricted terrain. When combined arms was em-ployed, casualties were reduced and the opportunities for decisive victory en-hanced. The lessons learned offer a metaphor for combat in restricted terrainbased on J.F.C. Fuller�s combat functions�protecting and hitting. The metaphor


is that of a shield and sword. At Chipyong-ni the infantry acted as a shield, pin-ning the enemy to battle, while Task Force Crombez acted as the sword that has-tened the defeat of the enemy�s plan. A variation of the same method was em-ployed in Touchdown to win Heartbreak Ridge. The infantry battalions fixed thedefenders and the armored task force enveloped the position in the west.

5. Martin Blumenson, Saleno to Cassino, United States Army in World War II(Washington, D.C., 1969), 234, quoting MG John P. Lucas concerning combat inthe very restricted terrain.6. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Wash-ington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 14 June 1993), 2-5.

6. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Govern-ment Printing Offic3e[GPO], 14 June 1993, 2-5.

7. Restricted terrain slows movement by requiring zig-zagging or frequent de-tours. Restricted terrain for armored and mechanized forces typically consists ofmoderate to steep slopes or moderate to densely spaced obstacles such as trees,rocks, or buildings. . . . Severely Restricted terrain hinders or slows movement incombat formations unless some effort is made to enhance mobility. This couldtake the form of committing engineer assets to improving mobility or of deviatingform doctrinal tactics, such as moving in columns instead of line formations or atspeeds much lower than those preferred.� FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation ofthe Battlefield (Washington, DC: GPO, November 1993), 2-15.

8. Sun Tzu, adapted and illustrated by Tsai Chih Chung, translated by BrianBruya, Sunzi Speaks, The Art of War (New York: Anchor Books, 1994), 109.

9. Jean De Bourcet from his �Principles of Mountain Warfare,� in Sir BasilLiddell Hart, The Sword and Pen. Selections from the World�s Greatest MilitaryWritings (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1976), 93.

10. Antonne Henri Jomini, The Art of War, translated by Captain G.H. Mendell(Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, originally published by J.B. Lippincott & Co,Philadelphia, 1862), 151.

11. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard andPeter Peret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton university press, 1976), 537. Clausewitzgoes on to say that �in a decisive battle, mountainous terrain is of no help to thedefender; on the contrary, that it favors the attacker. This is in direct contradic-tion to the general opinion; but then, general opinion is usually in a state of con-fusion, and unable to distinguish between diverse aspects of a question. Peopleare so much impressed by the powerful resistance of a minor unit that they as-sume that all defensive mountain warfare possess extraordinary strength. Theyare surprised when the existence of such strength in the core of all resistance,the defensive battle, is denied. On the other hand, they are always ready to blamethe incredible mistake of cordon warfare for the loss of any defensive battle in themountains, completely ignoring the force of circumstances that are inevitably in-volved,� 423.

12. German Field Service Regulations, Truppenfuhrung [1933], 1989 transcriptof 1936 translation by LTC Milburn, US Army Command and General Staff Col-lege, Fort Leavenworth (Berlin: Reichswehr, 1933), 147.

13. MG V.G. Reznichenko, Tactics, translated at CIS Multilingual Section, Na-tional Defense headquarters, Ottawa, Canada, May 1985 (Moscow: VoyennoyeIzdatel�stvo, 1984), 130.

14. T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, A Study in Unpreparedness (New York:Macmillan Company, 1963), 521.

15. CPT Sam Freedman, �Tankers at Heartbreak,� Armor (Fort Knox, KY: USArmor Association, September-October 1952), 24.

16. The tank-infantry cooperation within Task Force Crombez was poor, largelydue to improper training and procedures. Nevertheless, the relief of Chipyong-niby a tank raid was a bold attempt to change the conditions of battle with maneuver.

17. Chinese Communist Forces, Headquarters XIX Army Group, �A collectionof Combat Experience� (29 March 1951 Critique of Tactics Employed in the FirstEncounter with the Enemy at Chipyong-ni, Annex Number 1 to Periodic IntelligenceReport Number 271, 2d Infantry Division, translated by ATIS, 29 June 1951), 2-4.The report goes on to say, �The enemy�s use of tanks surprised us and arrivedalmost at the door of the Regimental Command Post before they were discov-ered, seriously threatening the flanks and rear of the 2d Battalion (Chinese). TheRegiment immediately ordered the displacement of the 2d Battalion . . . we haveunderestimated the enemy,� 2-4. Communist casualties from the Battle of Heart-break Ridge were estimated at over 25,000.

18. The truce talks at Panmunjom, which were broken off on 22 August, re-sumed on 25 October, largely because the fighting at Heartbreak Ridge had soweakened the communist defenses in the area that they would sell their souls togain time. With the conclusion of the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge, the war of move-ment was over. Operation Touchdown was the last battle of maneuver fought inthe Korean War. From this point on, the war became a war of attrition and out-post skirmishes while the negotiations in Panmunjom dragged on. The KoreanWar finally ended on 27 July 1953. The United States had won time, but not vic-tory. As a result, the battles of the Korean War were largely ignored by history.

19. David A. Niedringhaus, �US Army Armor in Limited War: Armor EmploymentTechniques in Korea and Vietnam,� Masters Degree Thesis: Ohio State Univer-sity, 1987, 54.

20. Niedringhaus, 27. The relief of the 23d Regimental Combat Team atChipyong-ni and Operation Touchdown, the attack of the 72d Armor downMundung-ni Valley at the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge, provide insights to the mod-ern application of penetration attacks in restricted terrain. In both cases a tankheavy force was able to penetrate enemy lines and turn the enemy�s defenses�just as Bourcet had preached in is writings in the 18th century. The major prob-lem during the Korean War was that the Army was not as well trained or orga-nized to fight as combined arms teams as the situation demanded.

21. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy, The Logic of War and Peace (Harvard, MA:Belknap Press, 1987), 16.

22. Bogdan Swita, �The OMG in the Defense� in Military Review (Fort Leaven-worth: US Army Command and General Staff College, July 1992), 37.

23. Ibid.

24. Luttwak, 94.25. Department of the Army, FM 71-3 The Armored and Mechanized Infantry

Brigade (Washington, DC: GPO, 8 January 1996), 4-11. The forms of maneu-ver are envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration and frontal attack.The forms of maneuver are part of a commander�s art of war.

26. Our M1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles have a decisive role to play inrestricted terrain. Tanks and Bradleys provide the technology overmatch that pro-vides the greatest degree of protections and the highest volume of direct-fire. TheM1A1 and M1A2, with superior armor protection, provide a mobile, tough, battle-winning platform. The capabilities of the M1Al as compared to NKPA armor andantitank weapons is a decisive advantage. The armor protection of the M1A1cannot be defeated in the front or flanks by any known direct-fire NKPA tank orantitank weapon. The major killer of attacking tanks is mines, and hasty minefieldscan be penetrated with M1 tanks equipped with plows and mine-rollers, rocket-launched mine clearing charges [MICLICs] and combat engineers.

27. Niedringhaus, 27. �Initial assessments of armor performance and useful-ness in Korea concluded that armor remained an indispensable part of groundcombat, regardless of any limiting conditions under which it had to operate,� 54.

28. Decisive points are further explained in FM 100-5 as �Decisive points pro-vide commanders with a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influencethe outcome of an action. Decisive points are often geographical in nature, suchas a hill, a town, or a base of operations. . . . Decisive points help commandersgain or maintain the initiative. Controlling these points in the attack helps themgain freedom of operational maneuver, thus maintaining the momentum of theattack and sustaining the initiative. . . . Securing decisive points can give the op-erational commander the flexibility to select from more than one line of operationfor further advance.� FM 100-5, 6-6 through 6-7.

29. FM 100-5, explains that capturing the enemy�s decisive points is critical togaining and maintaining the initiative. �Normally, more decisive points will be in atheater than a commander can seize, retain or destroy with his available resources.Therefore planning for decisive point is critical,� 6-8.

30. Clausewitz, 619. Clausewitz determined that the first task in planning for awar is �to identify the enemy�s centers of gravity, and if possible trace them backto a single one. The second task is to ensure that the forces to be used againstthat point are concentrated for a main offensive.� The concept of decisive pointsis precisely what Clausewitz meant by �tracing centers of gravity back to asingle one.�

31. The NKPA has 4,500 self-propelled howitzers to support the advance of3,500 tanks and an active duty force of 1,200,000 men. The average range ofNKPA artillery is 11-25 km. To put only one-third of their range forward of thefront lines the artillery would have to be positioned within 16.5 km of friendly forces.

32. FM 17-32 Tank Platoon and Tank Company (Washington, DC: GPO, 8October 1952), 2-3.

33.Swita, 37.34. US and ROK forces must use to their advantage the decided technological

and training advantage they possess over the North Korean Army. Accurate ar-tillery, devastating Multiple Launched Rocket Systems, fast, heavily armored tanksand impressive thermal sights and night vision equipment � all of these techno-logical advantages will play a critical role in combat in the defiles. Technologyovermatch, although vital, is not the only decisive element of victory. US forcesoutmatched the North Koreans and Chinese in technology during the Korean War.Today the North Koreans believe that they can negate US and ROK technologywith primitive solutions�the use of hundreds of special forces teams; the employ-ment of underground facilities to protect armored formations ready to attack; hard-ened artillery sites protecting one of the largest artillery forces in the world fromaerial attack; and by conducting the attack with surprise and in bad weather.US forces outmatched the North Koreans and Chinese in almost every form oftechnology during the Korean War of 1950-1953, yet the UN forces were nearlydefeated.

35. Jomini, 149-151. �When a country whose whole extent is mountainous isthe principal theater of operations, the strategic combinations cannot be entirelybased upon maxims applicable in open country . . . if a country covered with highmountains be favorable for defense in a tactical point of view, it is different in astrategic sense, because it necessitates a division of the troops. This can only beremedied by giving them greater mobility and by passing often to the offensive.�

36. SSG Stephen Krivitsky, �The Three to Six Second Advantage; Tank Com-bat in Restricted Terrain,� in Armor (Fort Knox, Kentucky, May-June 1996), 18.

37. Robert D. Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, Md.:Naval Institute, 1966), 197. �In regard to mountain warfare in general, everythingdepends on the skill of our subordinate officers and still more on the morale ofour soldiers.� Clausewitz, Principles of War.

38. The concepts of Alvin and Heidi Toffler, as found in their book War andAnti-War. The First Wave occurred during the agricultural revolution character-ized by hand-to-hand combat; the Second Wave as the industrial revolution rep-resented by wars of mass destruction as in World War I and World War II; andthe Third Wave, the ongoing information revolution, is knowledge-based warfareas evidenced in Operation Desert Storm.

39. One of the few US Army field manuals that explains how to fight in moun-tains is FM 90-6, June 1980.

40. The 2d Infantry Division in Korea remains the only US Army division withan alert status measured in 3-6 hours and has all of its tanks, Bradleys and How-itzers uploaded with live, �go to war� ammunition at all times.

41. Comments made by GEN Gary Luck, Commander in Chief US Forces Ko-rea, at Camp Red Cloud, 3 July 1996.

42. Fehrenbach, 158.43. The M1 tank possesses the only form of armored protected mechanical

breaching in the US Army inventory. M1 tanks are equipped with tank plows andmine rollers � very effective against hasty minefields and obstacles laid by anattacker who has reversed roles to the hasty defense.

Colonel John F. Antal is the special assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy and the USArmy Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staffpositions, including battalion operations officer; G3 training officer; secretary of the gen-eral staff for the 1st Cavalry Division; brigade operations trainer, National Training Center(NTC), Fort Irwin, California; and executive officer, 1st Battalion, 63d Armor (OPFOR),NTC. He has written numerous books, including Combat Team: The Captains� War: AnInteractive Exercise in Company-Level Command in Battle and Infantry Combat: The RiflePlatoon: An Interactive Exercise in Small-Unit Tactics and Leadership.

KOREA


PERHAPS THE SINGLE MOST importantduty of US military leaders involves determin-

ing the military force required to safeguard the na-tion and its vital interests. The end of the Cold Warhas complicated the calculations of national defen-sive requirements. How, then, does one go aboutsuch a process? The answer is at once simple intheory, and exceedingly complex in practice. Sincethe beginning of the modern era, nations have baseddefense requirements upon the capabilities of theirmost likely adversary or adversaries. The UnitedStates designed and built a force capable of deal-ing with the Soviet Union, adhering to this time-hon-ored and inherently valid formula. Unfortunately,the fall of the Soviet Union has eliminated the rela-tively static requirements upon which US defensecapabilities were based. Forecasting military re-quirements will likely never be as simple again.

Now the United States conducts adversary-basedcalculus based on Major Theater Wars (MTWs).During the latter stages of the Cold War, the UnitedStates planned to fight 11/2 wars, meaning a largewar versus the Soviets in Central Europe and a sec-ondary regional conflict somewhere else.1 With theend of the Cold War, the emphasis shifted exclu-sively to �regional conflicts,� or Major RegionalContingencies (MRCs).2 What planners now callMajor Theater War (MTW) lies at the heart of thecontroversy surrounding US military requirements.The debate has centered on the required capabilityto fight and win one or two of these conflicts;whether the ability to win multiple MTWs shouldbe simultaneous; and whether the capability to ex-ecute �contingency operations� should be added tothe MTW requirement.3

The central difference between the current debateand the Cold War calculus is the precise delineation ofthe enemy. Whereas the Soviet Union and its satel-lites provided a clearly identifiable and largely staticcapability requirement, the rise of the MTW-based

strategy has thrown this aspect of the debate intoturmoil. Given that the definition of MTW drivesmajor force structure and resource calculations, thecontinual resolution of this detail is crucial.

Two factors�technology and force structure�have combined to cloud the precise definition of anMTW, so much so that the issue has become a debate

within a debate in many ways. Ironically, both of thesefactors stem from one event. The crushing victoryover the Iraqis in Operation Desert Storm providesthe contextual framework within which the MTWrequirements debate rages. On one side are the tech-nologists, who believe that the success enjoyed byhigh-tech weapon systems during the war will sig-nificantly reduce the requirement for conventionalcombat forces in future MTWs. On the other hand,military force structure advocates use the force struc-ture during Desert Storm as a benchmark againstwhich future MTW requirements can be measured.

The great irony is that both sides have missed theappropriate focus in such a debate: the enemy. Avalid discussion of military requirements must firstfocus upon likely opponents in future MTWs. Oncecompleted, the identification of likely opponentsmust be closely followed by an analysis of the riskposed to US interests generally or military assets inparticular by these opponents. Significantly, while bothIraq and North Korea show up as MTW candidatesand both MTWs affect US strategic interests, theIraqi MTW poses little immediate threat to US

The Desert Storm scenario representsthe war that, given a choice, our military wouldprefer to fight. . . . Unfortunately, Desert Stormrepresents the �best case,� not the �most likely

case� and, most important, is at the far end ofthe spectrum from the �worse case.�



military assets, while the threat on the Korean pen-insula is immediate and undeniable. Clouding theissue by naming different �most likely� and �worstcase� scenarios is not necessary. The risk posed toUS troops in South Korea transforms the KoreanMTW into a scenario that, while not necessarily themost likely MTW of the next 10 years, can certainlylay claim to �worst case.� A failure by US militaryplanners to orient on an MTW that is both entirelypossible and the most damaging should it occurmakes a repeat of the Korean War�s darkest daysnot only possible but a near certainty should NorthKorea attempt to unite the peninsula by force.

Given Korea�s standing as a potential worst casescenario, US military leaders� continued referenceto MTWs in terms of �Desert Storm Equivalents�is striking. Although there are several reasons forthis, it boils down to a central rationale�the DesertStorm scenario represents the war that, given achoice, our military would prefer to fight. DesertStorm was near perfect as wars go�a compliantenemy, ideal geography and climatic conditions, and ahost of allies willing to pitch in under US leadership.Unfortunately, Desert Storm represents the �bestcase,� not the �most likely case� and, most impor-tant, is at the far end of the spectrum from the �worsecase.� Korea is the military�s nightmare, and with goodreason�the United States is unprepared to engage ina Korean MTW, and the reasons are as numerous asthose that account for US success in Desert Storm.

Defining SuccessWhether the benchmark MTW is correct or not,

the next crucial issue in the requirements debate isdefining success for the chosen scenario�anotherreason why DOD planners favor Desert Storm. USmilitary leaders defined success in Desert Stormplanning as ejecting the Iraqi forces from Kuwaitand restoring its legitimate govermnent.4 Thissimple definition, coupled with the success enjoyedin its fulfillment, has since provided US militaryleaders with a relatively clear framework for MTWsuccess criteria.

Other less obvious reasons make the Gulf Warattractive to US military planners. The Desert Stormdata used to develop future requirements is empiri-cal rather than theoretical, and also easily integrateswith the most important issue of all: technology vali-dation. Desert Storm validated nearly every major USweapon technology. Technology lies at the heart of thecurrent US approach to war and validating the yearsof research and investment underlies much of theMTW requirements process. No other potential

MTW provides the validation potential that makesDesert Storm so attractive to US military planners.

Clearly, however, Desert Storm validation dataand success criteria improperly drive requirementsfor a significantly different MTW, especially a

Korean contingency. In this case, using DesertStorm data and criteria ignores unfavorable condi-tions that make it the worst case scenario.

US failures during a Korean MTW would havenumerous sources. This is not to say, however, thatthe United States would suffer decisive defeat onthe battlefield; US dominance in strategic air powerand other technologies would eventually so devas-tate North Korea that peace on relatively advanta-geous terms would be likely. Like the Tet offen-sive of the Vietnam War, however, the calculusweighing victory or defeat in a Korean MTW willencompass far more than possessing the battlefieldas the guns fall silent. In Tet the decisive factor wasnot the military defeat of the Vietcong, but US do-mestic opinion. Likewise, in Korea it would not bethe possession of the battered hills adjoining the 38thparallel. Instead, the deciding element would likelybe the casualty list, and, not surprisingly, we haveDesert Storm to thank for a benchmark that evenmilitary novices recognize as unlikely to be seenagain.5 Nonetheless, the media and the public wouldinevitably draw such comparisons.

In the event of a conflict with North Korea, thepublic would focus overwhelmingly on one unit�sperformance; the 2d Infantry Division (2ID). As thesole US ground combat formation in Korea, 2ID�scasualties during the first days of this conflict wouldbe the public�s key barometer of the Army�s per-formance. Casualties may seem at first to be an un-fair indicator. Public opinion is rarely concernedwith fairness, however, and the casualty measure islegitimate insofar as it reflects combat effectivenessin many ways. As a result, this indicator is vital be-cause all of the factors examined in this study play

Whereas the Soviet Union and itssatellites provided a clearly identifiable and

largely static capability requirement, the rise ofthe MTW-based strategy has thrown this aspectof the debate into turmoil. . . . Two factors �

technology and force structure � havecombined to cloud the precise definition of anMTW, so much so that the issue has become

a debate within a debate.



a role in 2ID�s effectiveness. Simply put, 2ID is aproduct of its less-than-ideal military environment.

Overall public assessment of a Korean MTWbased on casualties should not be confused withpublic support for US involvement in the openingdays of such a contingency, which is a fundamen-tal part of American military heritage. Such sup-port has been consistent in situations as varied asDesert Storm, Somalia and even early Vietnam.One can confidently assume that US support for 2IDtroops would likewise be strong during the initialphase of a Korean MTW. Later, public assessmentof military performance would be considerablymore equivocal, with potentially profound conse-quences for a military that depends upon public sup-port. The United States would likely prevail in mili-tary confrontation in Korea, but the cost in Americanlives would result in crippling political and militaryfallout once the guns fall silent.

Cold Starts, Tripwires and Rational ActorsBefore the Korean scenario can be effectively

studied, three key assumptions demand examination:l US forces will be given minimal warning time

to prepare for a North Korean attack.l US Forces in Korea represent a �tripwire� de-

signed to force US participation in the defense ofthe Korean peninsula.l The North Korean government is a largely ra-

tional actor.One of the key elements that makes the Korean

MTW a worst-case scenario is the limited warningof a North Korean attack. This �cold start� assump-tion simply extrapolates from the Korean army�snearly constant state of readiness to invade theSouth. North Korean forces have been reported ina state of war readiness almost continuously in pastyears.6 Reports noting NKPA exercises at a levelof intensity not seen in recent times clearly illustratethe problem facing US Forces in Korea.7 Given el-evated readiness of the NKPA, US forces can onlyguess at which NKPA moves are feints and whichare legitimate precursors to an invasion. US plan-ners must assume that reaction time to a NKPAbuildup and attack will be less than ideal even if wecalculate correctly. Therefore, any responsible studymust approach a Korean MTW from the perspec-tive of a cold start.

Given the relative size of the of US ground con-tingent in Korea, it is difficult to avoid the assump-tion that 2ID and its attachments constitute a tripwiredefense in the 1960s� NATO meaning. Two key ideascombine to invalidate this understanding. First, nostrategic policy document currently available sug-

gests that USFK constitutes a tripwire defense. Sec-ond, US planning fully integrates the US forces inKorea with our South Korean allies in what is hopedwould be an immediately successful defense againsta North Korean invasion. This political and strate-gic assumption of a successful defense ties in withan increasing belief in and out of military circles�that the United States must seize the initiative at theoutset of a struggle and never relinquish it.

In discussions involving a North Korean attackacross the 38th Parallel the most common objectionraised is motive. Many experts argue that the likelyoutcome of such an attack would be disastrous mili-tarily and politically for the North Koreans. Whilethe military outcome would likely be defeat for theNKPA, the conclusion that the NKPA would there-fore not attack is an exceedingly dangerous assump-tion. If published reports are any indicator, theNorth Korean government ranks among the most ir-rational in the world today.8 While it is possible topoint to the relative peace that has prevailed since1953 as evidence of North Korean rationality, theNorth Korean leadership that presided over thispeace has recently transitioned, leaving the rational-ity issue very much open to question. Military plan-ning based on a belief in rational-actor theory rep-resents an acceptable way of doing business onlywhen one�s opponent is clearly rational, and theNorth Korean government largely fails this test.

Assessing the Contributors to SuccessMiscalculations in significant areas could contribute

to ineffective US military performance should the NorthKoreans attempt to unite the peninsula by force.l Defensive Tactical Doctrine.l Weapon Systems Technology.l Air Power.l Forward Basing.l Information Warfare.l Training and Doctrine Development.l Unit Cohesion.US dominance in these areas contributed to suc-

cess in Desert Storm. However, this article dem-onstrates that factors contributing to success in thebest-case scenario may be of marginal or insignifi-cant value in a Korean contingency.

In some cases using prior US experience on theKorean peninsula serves as a meaningful benchmarkin evaluating the military capability to deal with theNorth Korea threat. A comparative analysis of thistype can be very illuminating and where such com-parisons are not relevant, the factors will be evalu-ated against the current and future threat scenariosto achieve an effective comparison.


US Defensive Tactical Doctrine in Focus�The2nd Infantry Division. The course of any KoreanMTW would hinge largely upon 2ID�s performancein adversity. The 2ID Area of Operation (AOR) setsastride the three primary invasion corridors from theborder to Seoul. Consequently, the division�s abil-ity to meet and delay or defeat a North Korean ad-vance will be critical to success in the first days ofany Korean MTW. It is fortunate, then, that the USpresence is much more than meets the eye. In ad-dition to the division�s six maneuver battalions,USFK boasts a Military Police brigade, a Combat

Aviation brigade, engineers and communicationunits, numerous support assets and other enhance-ments.9 In terms of material and manpower, the USposture in Korea is immeasurably more robust thanthe US posture prior to hostilities in 1950.10

Despite these improvements, 2ID will likely notperform well at the tactical level. The reasons forthis are manifold, and they include flawed defen-sive tactical doctrine and inappropriate weapon sys-tem technologies, both overshadowed by a refusalto recognize the unpleasant differences between theGulf War and a Korean MTW.11

US

Arm

y

The 2ID AOR sets astride the three primary invasion corridors from the border to Seoul.Consequently, the division�s ability to meet and delay or defeat a North Korean advance will be

critical to success in the first days of any Korean MTW. . . . Despite these improvements,2ID will likely not perform well at the tactical level.

R

Korea�s tranquil ChorwonValley below the DMZ.


Despite these differences between a Desert StormMTW and a Korean MTW, however, the Armyseems poised to fight the Korean MTW using tac-tics and equipment tailored to the Desert Storm sce-nario rather than the Korean MTW. The result can-not be reassuring.

Perhaps the greatest doctrinal disconnect regardsUS tactical defensive doctrine, which requires de-fense in depth coupled with a symmetric battlefield

approach. If the NKPA makes its long-awaitedmove south toward Seoul, it will choose one of the threeprimary avenues of approach noted earlier. Unfor-tunately for the defenders, the NKPA would notmeet a united 2ID in the chosen corridor. Instead,they would confront approximately 20-30 percentof the division�s combat power along any one route,the other 60-80 percent distributed along the othertwo avenues of approach.12 In addition, the portionof 2ID in the key corridor would then be further di-luted by the distribution of its combat assets alongthe length of this avenue as 2ID develops what isseen as defense in depth as illustrated above. Theodds in this flawed defensive arrangement greatlyfavor the attacker at every point of contact.13 Fur-ther, this imbalance would not be addressed throughthe rapid movement of reserves from the less threat-ened corridors to the point of maximum danger. USdefensive doctrine emphasizes mobility among as-sets such as artillery and attack helicopters.14 Thisdoctrinal methodology threatens defeat along theprimary invasion corridor while the other two-thirdsof the division�s combat power is rapidly outflankedand forced to withdraw.

If the division were to save its armored andmechanized assets for a mobile counterattack, itwould be even more vulnerable. In theory the di-vision is more suited to this role; 60 percent of itsassets are heavy formations designed with mobilityand shock effect in mind. Unfortunately, these unitswould begin hostilities in assembly areas withinrange of NKPA artillery.15 The NKPA ability totarget easily divined US assembly areas for coun-terattack forces with thousands of artillery piecesand multiple rocket launchers would almost cer-tainly cause catastrophic losses within the first hours

of an attack. Ironically, units dug in along the DMZ,stand a significantly better change of survival in theevent of a North Korean attack.

Weapon System Technologies. A second con-tributor to this inadequate tactical performance con-cerns tactically inappropriate weapon system tech-nologies and their employment by 2ID. DesertStorm validated a variety of US weapon systems,some of which are dangerously inappropriate in aKorean MTW. While many weapon systems pos-sess versatility that translates to effective perfor-mance in Korea, other critical technologies do not.An example of this inappropriateness is the premierUS antitank weapon, the TOW II antitank missilesystem, which performed well in Desert Storm,achieving kills in excess of 4,000 meters. Unfortu-nately, there are few, if any, 4,000 engagementranges in Korea, and the TOW II would be danger-ously ineffective in this radically different environ-ment.16 The anticipated fielding of the Line of SightAnti-Tank Weapon (LOSAT), with a l0-kilometer(km) engagement range, provides additional evi-dence of systems optimized for Desert Storm andentirely inappropriate in a Korean MTW.17

Tactical Air Power in Korea. One hallmark ofthe extremely successful Gulf War campaign wasthe dominant role played by US air power. The abil-ity to target and significantly degrade the tacticalcombat capabilities of the Iraqi ground forces ledto claims in some circles that Air Force battlefielddominance will be the decisive issue in any futurecampaign.18 Indeed, close air support (CAS) in par-ticular provides a potentially decisive differentiationbetween the ineffective Air Force role in the earlystages of the Korean War and air power�s role in afuture rematch. While US Air Force and Navy air-craft effectively interdicted North Korean commu-nications and supplies in 1950, Air Force and NavyCAS in the early stages of the Korean conflict wasnot effective. During the first days of the conflict,coordination between Air Force and Navy aircraftand ground personnel was extremely poor, andmany fratricide incidents were reported.19 Despitethese problems both Air Force and Navy aircraftvigorously executed CAS, though their effectivenesswas clearly open to debate.20

Current US CAS coordination is a far cry fromthe early days of Korea. Air-ground coordination,developed during the Vietnam War and further re-fined during Desert Storm, has largely eliminatedthe fratricide issue, and ground-attack aircraft suchas the A-10 have added a tremendous punch to theair support arsenal. Clearly, the development of thisinstrument of modem combat can provide defend-ing US forces in Korea a combat multiplier unavail-able to the members of the 24th Infantry Division

One of the key elements that makesthe Korean MTW a worst-case scenario is thelimited warning of a North Korean attack. . . .Given elevated readiness of the NKPA, US

forces can only guess at which NKPAmoves are feints and which are legitimate

precursors to an invasion.


in July 1950. Most important, US Army defensivetactical doctrine depends heavily on assets such asCAS, and this support is rightly seen as vital to2ID�s survival.21

Given the criticality of CAS to 2ID�s mission, itis unfortunate that the division would receive verylittle CAS during the opening hours and days of aKorean conflict. Several factors explain this seem-ing contradiction. First, as Edward Luttwak has ar-gued, North Korea, with over 18,000 air defenseweapons, presents an environment too lethal for USaircraft.22 DOD doctrine lends credence to this lineof reasoning, noting that suppression of enemy airdefense and air superiority must be achieved beforeCAS can be executed: still, suppressing 18,000NPKA weapons would be a time-consuming andperhaps impossible task.23 Finally, if one assumes thatthe US Air Force and Navy aircraft have been al-lotted the air superiority and battlefield air interdic-tion (BAI) missions, the CAS assignment falls by de-fault to the South Korean air force.24 Since most South

Korean aircraft are largely unsuited to the CAS role,the result is almost no CAS for the 2ID in the ini-tial days and perhaps weeks of the conflict.25

Forward Basing. Another MTW tenet toemerge from the Gulf War is the vital role of for-ward-based troops and equipment in US military re-sponse time. Forward basing allowed rapidly mov-ing troops from US Army Europe to Southwest Asiaand using pre-positioned supplies and equipmentfrom Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Both ofthese advantages enabled the United States to placefar more combat capability on the ground in South-west Asia than would otherwise have been possible.The successful use of forward-based troops, equip-ment and supplies during Desert Storm cementedthe concept in US strategic planning.

However, forward basing is not without risk.Dangers range from the loss of basing rights to pre-emptive strikes by the very enemy these assets aredesigned to deter. Forward-based forces must beplaced so that they are able to respond quickly in

Perhaps the greatest doctrinal disconnect regards US tactical defensive doctrine,which requires defense in depth coupled with a symmetric battlefield approach. If the NKPA makes

its long-awaited move south toward Seoul, it would not meet a united 2ID in the chosen corridor.Instead, they would confront approximately 20-30 percent of the division�s combat power along any

one route. . . . Moreover, the division would receive very little CAS during the openinghours and days of a Korean conflict.


an MTW, but not vulnerable to a preemptive strike.Unfortunately, 2ID violates this fundamental for-ward-basing tenet, placing its units within range ofNorth Korean 130mm and 170mm guns.

In this case, while basing 2ID seemingly repre-sents the ultimate in reaction capability, it wouldactually produce in heavy initial losses for thesetroops in an MTW. This setback would have po-litical as well as military dimensions; the publicmeasures victory or defeat in any MTW�s initial

stage by the number of casualties suffered. The2ID�s proximity to the North Korean border,coupled with its static defensive arrangement andthe NKPA�s knowledge of 2ID battle positions com-bine to virtually guarantee heavy US casualties inthe first hours of such a conflict. It is perhaps thegreatest irony that US Japan-based units in 1950were far more appropriately placed to respond to aKorean MTW than are present day formations.26 Inshort, forward basing that was effective in DesertStorm can be significantly less advantageous wheninappropriately applied in other MTW scenarios.

Information Warfare. Winning the informationwar is viewed by the US military as key to successon future battlefields.27 A significant portion of thisnew conventional wisdom stems from Desert Storm,where US dominance of Iraqi command and control(C2) information systems effectively paralyzed theenemy. This information dominance depends ontwo key ideas: degrading or eliminating the enemy�sC2 capability, and developing perfect or near-per-fect information regarding the enemy�s physical lo-cation and relative combat power. Unfortunately,neither of these factors will play an important, muchless vital, role in a North Korean scenario.

Information warfare assumes that any future ad-versary will use many of the modem high-techmeans of communication seen during the Gulf War.US dominance in high-tech C2 (and the ability tointerdict enemy C2 capabilities) will then act to para-lyze the enemy.28 Unfortunately, the NKPA reliesprimarily on simple, low-tech forms of C2, includ-ing antiquated field telephones (land lines) and bi-

KOREA

cycle or motorcycle couriers. In other words, veryfew of the forms of communication targeted by USinformation warfare doctrine exist to be interrupted.Secondly, US information warfare assumes that theenemy will attempt near real-time C2 of forces mov-ing into South Korea. Unfortunately, the scenariofaced by the North Koreans is one that they havefaced and planned for since the end of the KoreanWar. The planning for this simple, one-dimensionalscenario has been in place for nearly 45 years. Thus,it is safe to say that the communications that infor-mation warfare is designed to interdict were passedyears, even decades ago. Under these conditions,the current US emphasis upon information warfarein the C2 realm will play a limited or nonexistentrole in the opening stages of a Korean MTW.

The second tenet of information warfare, the pur-suit of perfect intelligence, also runs into difficultyin the Korean scenario. In Desert Storm, the abil-ity to develop high-fidelity information regarding theenemy strength and dispositions was instrumentalin destroying huge amounts of Iraqi equipment withlimited US losses. This tenet of information war-fare strategy implies that US targeting and deliverycapabilities will lead to the enemy�s defeat with littleor no loss of American lives.

Unfortunately, this concept overlooks an impor-tant component in a Korean MTW by assuming thatonce the necessary information is derived, the ca-pability will exist to act effectively upon the infor-mation. This is generally not the case in Korea. TheNorth Koreans have spent the decades since the1953 cease-fire digging in their combat assets to anextent not seen in world history (except in Switzer-land perhaps). Much of North Korea�s heavy artil-lery and most of its troops and equipment are notonly dug in, but revetted in mountain caves as well.29

Again, the ability to determine the exact location ofthe enemy is only useful if one retains the ability toact effectively on the information. US intelligencecapability can almost certainly point to the locationof every cave-reveted North Korean heavy artillerybattery that can range the 2ID. Unfortunately, noweapon in the US conventional inventory can ef-fectively attack these positions.30

A critical component in any military calculus isthe ability to field a military force with the capableof defeating the appropriate threat. The US mili-tary has determined that the threat will hopefullytake the form of a second Desert Storm enemy andhas tailored its training accordingly. The primarycomponents that make up the Army�s training sys-tem are the Combat Training Centers and the ArmyBattle Lab System.

Training and Doctrine Development. The threeCombat Training Centers (CTCs) represent the heartof the Army�s current battle training system. They in-

Normal US military tours of dutyrange from two to three years, and some military

experts feel that even this time interval isinadequate to develop long-term unit cohesion.

. . . In Korea, positional turnover � theturnover in terms of assigned responsibilities �

approaches 125 percent annually. . . .Ironically, the annual turnover of 43 percentamong Japan-based personnel in 1950 was

considered a �high� rate.


clude the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC)in Hohenfels, Germany, the Joint Readiness Train-ing Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, Louisiana, and theNational Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, Cali-fornia. These three training centers employstate-of-the-art instrumented ranges and MILESequipment to provide maneuver units the most re-alistic training ever seen short of actual combat.

Unfortunately, while these CTCs are perfectly tai-lored for combat in many cases, they are not focusedon the Korean scenario. One of the many reasonsstands out above the rest�lack of appropriatemountainous terrain. There is essentially no moun-tainous terrain in any of the three CTCs. Ironically,the only exception, the Tiefort Range at the NationalTraining Center, is off limits for training.31 This lackof effective terrain is a mundane but crucial part ofthe problem; as T.R. Fehrenbach noted, �The NKPAran through the valleys stolidly, and bounded up theridges like rabbits; they had been doing it all theirlives . . . again and again, officers were simply notable to organize attacks against the enfilading hillsto clear the way.�32

Further, although the CMTC possesses extensivequantities of rugged terrain (although the greatestelevation differential is approximately 200 meters),little attention is paid to moving through and fight-ing over this terrain. Instead, maneuver is conductedalmost exclusively in the limited clear areas that fil-ter through the terrain.33 The inherent assumptionis that no enemy would eschew the open terrain infavor of the hills. This lack of interest in mountainwarfare clearly manifests itself in the compositionof 2ID forces; with two light infantry battalions, lessthan 40 percent of 2ID is capable of fighting inmountainous terrain. By way of comparison, over80 percent of the NKPA is composed of light in-fantry.34 The general inapplicability of the CTCs tothe Korean environment largely nullifies their con-tribution to US training for the MTW most likelyto face US ground forces.

The Army Battle Lab System is the central com-ponent in the Army�s attempt to determine the fu-ture of modem warfare.35 This collection of labo-ratories has been charged with divining the futurenature of combat and developing and implement-ing appropriate doctrine. As a key facet in this de-velopment and implementation process, distributed,interactive and virtual simulations help to forecastand prepare for future conflict to a degree neverbefore envisioned.

Unfortunately, these laboratories suffer from alack of focus on specific MTW characteristics thatlargely prevent them from providing directed inno-vations that might enhance the performance of unitssuch as the 2ID in a specific contingency. As anexample, the Dismounted Battle Lab at the home

of the infantry, Fort Benning, Georgia, focuses onnight fighting, target acquisition, enhanced lethal-ity and improved survivability.36 Unfortunately,there is no direct, application-oriented link betweenthese focuses and potential MTW environments like

Korea. Thus, while the attempt to determine thefuture of warfare is vital, an approach that focusesoutwardly�on likely adversaries and likely oper-ating environments�is also essential.

Cohesion. Unit cohesion represents a vital as-pect of any army�s capability to perform effectivelyin combat. Cohesion most often directly reflects theamount of time that a unit works and trains togetherbefore entering combat. US military leaders rec-ognized this vital component in their decision tofreeze all personnel in place for the six months lead-ing up to the ground attack during the Gulf War.37

General Norman Schwartzkopf also understood thisrequirement, as shown when he rapidly dismantledhis staff�s plan for rotating individuals in time peri-ods as short as six months.38 Additionally, the di-sastrous personnel rotation policies during Vietnamremain in the Army�s collective memory.

Given this frame of reference, it is interesting tonote that nowhere in the US Army today are rota-tion times shorter than in Korea. Normal US mili-tary tours of duty range from two to three years, andsome military experts feel that even this time inter-val is inadequate to develop long-term unit cohe-sion.39 Current policy requires that virtually all per-sonnel rotate out of Korea after 12 months.40 Worse,positional turnover�the turnover in terms of as-signed responsibilities�approaches 125 percentannually.41 In contrast, US personnel serving in theUS Far East Command in 1950 served between oneand three years. Those US personnel accompaniedon their tours of duty were assigned for three years,and though exact data is lacking, personnel stationedin Japan during this time noted that many officersand senior noncommissioned officers opted for thelonger stay.42 Ironically, one source notes that an-nual turnover among Japan-based personnel in 1950was 43 percent�a �high� rate the author blamesfor the unit�s poor showing in the first days of theKorean conflict.43 Given that unit cohesion islargely a function of personnel working togetherover time, the much-maligned divisions stationed in

The rationality issue very much opento question. Military planning based on a beliefin rational-actor theory represents an acceptable

way of doing business only when one�s oppo-nent is clearly rational, and the North Korean

government largely fails this test.


NOTES

Major Gregory Pickell is serving as a writer for the Director�s Staff Group, Army National GuardReadiness Center, Alexandria, Virginia. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Acad-emy and an M.A. from Georgetown University. He has served in a variety of command and staffpositions in the Continental United States and Germany, including S2, 404th Civil Affairs Battalion,Fort Dix, New Jersey; PSYOP officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 11th Special ForcesGroup, Fort Meade, Maryland; and plans and training officer, 317th Rear Area Operations Center,III Corps Support Command, V Corps, Darmstadt, Germany.

1. Robert P. Haffa Jr., Rational Methods and Prudent Choices: Planning U.S.Forces (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), 41-44.

2. Department of Defense, A National Security Strategy of Engagement andEnlargement, DOD Public Affairs, February 1995, 9. Notably, this document de-scribes force �sufficient to help defeat aggression in two nearly simultaneous ma-jor regional conflicts.� It does not say that the US will win both MTWs simulta-neously, only that it will fight them.

3. DOD, Secretary Perry Address to the Mid-Winter Conference of the Ameri-can Legion, DOD Public Affairs News Release, 27 February 1995. Perry notedthat �threats � call for a force that can fight and win two major regional conflictsnearly simultaneously.�

4. Remarks by Colin Powell, 21 February 1995, Kennedy Center.5. Interview with Richard Fieldhouse, Defense LA, Senator Levin, 14 March

1995. Fieldhouse described testimony by senior military officials to the effect digthe Desert Storm casualty toll represented the now benchmark for future conflicts.He noted that he found this benchmark wholly unrealistic.

6. Barbara Opall, �South Korea Tries New Evacuation Plan,� Army Times, 10April 1995, 16.

7. Ibid.8. Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: The Foundations for Military

Strength, Washington D.C., (Unclassified) October 1991, 30.9. The 2d Infantry Division is a two-brigade division, consisting of six (two light

infantry, two mechanized infantry, and two armor) battalions rather than the nor-mal 10.

10. US Army Korea Liaison Office, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 27 Feb-ruary 1995.

11. Sources include, Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: The Foundationsfor Military Strength, Washington D.C., (Unclassified) October 1991, 42; Brassey�s, TheMilitary Balance, 1993-1994, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1993,44-145; Frank Chadwick, The Gulf War Fact Book, GDW, 1991, 68-69 and FrankChadwick, The Desert Storm Fact Book, Bloomington IL, GDW, 1990, 50-51.

12. This deployment takes into account the distribution of tactical reserves, whichwill also be symmetric in its approach. The requirement to symmetrically coverthree avenues of approach rules out the retention of an operational reserve un-der US tactical doctrine.

13. Gregory Pickell, �The Defeat of Task Force Smith, 20 October 1993,� Un-published manuscript.

14.Ibid.15. DIA, North Korea. Foundations for Military Strength, 63.16.See �The Anti-Armor Problem; a Case Study in Doctrinal Focus and Tech-

nology Acquisition,� Unpublished manuscript; and DOD, �Tank versus TOW En-gagement Ranges,� Graphic.

17. DOD, �U.S. Army Weapon Systems,� United States Government PrintingOffice, Washington, D.C. 1994, 183.

18. Jerome V. Martin, Victory from Above: Airpower Theory and the Conductof Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Maxwell AFB, AL, Air UniversityPress, 6.

19. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Office of theChief of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1961, 51.

20. Ibid.

21. Interview with COL Bratton, Chief of Plans, US Army Korea, 14 March 1995.Bratton noted that the 2ID was �like any other US division� in its CAS requirements,and that US Air Force planning at all levels in theater supported this requirement.

22. Interview with Dr. Edward Luttwak, 16 March 1995. Luttwak noted that theKorean threat environment made the employment of expensive, high technologyaircraft prohibitive.

23. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 1993.24. Interview with MAJ Paul Buhl, US Army Operations Concepts and Evalua-

tion Office, 16 March 1995.25. �Air Forces of the World 88/89,� Charles Miller, ed., Interavia, 450-455.26. In July 1950 four US infantry divisions were stationed in Japan; the 7th, the

24th, the 25th and the 1st Cavalry. The only US military personnel at risk in theopening days of the Korean conflict were advisors attached to the Korean Mili-tary Advisory Group (KMAG). �Lessons for Today in Desperate Stand 42 YearsAgo,� Army, February 1992, 9.

27. Office of the Secretary of the Army, �The Army Enterprise Strategy: TheVision,� Washington, D.C., 20 July 1993. Introductory remarks by Army Chief ofStaff GEN Gordon R. Sullivan.

28. Ibid., 26.29. North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength, 41.30. Bratton interview, 14 March 1995. Bratton noted that, �Current conventional

means would be largely ineffective in destroying these sites, although unconven-tional solutions may provide methods of neutralizing this threat.�

31. Defense Mapping Agency, 1085th Map Depot, Annapolis, MD.32. T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, A Study in Unpreparedness, New York:

Bantam Books, 1963, 134-135.33. �The Defeat of Task Force Smith,� 9.34. North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength, 4l.35. Army Battle Labs, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

Pamphlet, May 1994. Introductory remarks by LTG Frederick Franks, Commander,TRADOC.

36. Ibid., 15.37. Buhl Interview, 16 March 1995. Buhl participated in the detailed US opera-

tional concept planning for the Desert Storm MTW in 1990-1991.38. GEN H. Norman Schwartzkof, It Doesn�t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam

Books, 1992), 360-361.39. Dr. Steven L. Canby, Remarks during interview on 4 March 1995. Canby

believes that effective combat units must often train together for three to five yearsbefore achieving true cohesion.

40. Interview with LTC Melville, US Forces Korea Liaison Office, The Pentagon,Washington, D.C. Melville noted that some personnel extended their tours orbrought their families to Korea at their own expense. He noted that annual per-sonnel turn over ranged from 90-95 percent annually.

41. Buhl interview on 16 March 1995. Buhl was assigned to Korea for fouryears � none of them sequential.

42. Interview with COL Carl Bernard, US Army (Ret) and MG Michael LynchUS Army (Ret) on 13 March 1995.

43. �Lessons for Today in Desperate Stand 42 Years Ago,� Army, February1992, 10.

44. Buhl interview.

Japan in 1950 arguably retained greater cohesionthan 2ID does almost 50 years later.

While the US military�s failure to orient its ef-forts on the most likely MTW is lamentable as wellas potentially disastrous, it need not be a permanentcondition. The US military�s ability to adapt to arapidly changing environment is well established.The well-directed emphasis on realistic training andmodem equipment has produced an unrivaled mili-tary capability. If these facilities are provided properdirection, the existence of the Army�s Battle Labsystem can provide an unparalleled test bed devel-oping effective tactics and technologies. These fac-tors, coupled with the continuing efforts to avoid a�hollow� Army, mean that the current disconnectis eminently fixable.

Potential fixes particular to the Korean MTW arealso close at hand. Foremost among these is the muchneeded relocation of 2ID to a location south of Seoul.Surprisingly, the primary reason why this has not beendone already is financial rather than political. Sugges-

tions to effect this move in the early 1980s ran agroundover who would foot the massive costs.44 Were thisfix implemented, many problems associated with 2ID�svulnerability would be at least temporarily averted.Other potential solutions include a revision of USCAS planning, at least to the extent that USFK plan-ners recognize that CAS will not save 2ID, freeingplanners to examine other options. In short, a vari-ety of available fixes can provide USFK effectivedirection in its planning for the Korean MTW.

Proper direction will indeed be vital. The cur-rent orientation on the �preferred-case� MTW hasproduced a military establishment that displays littleinterest in a Korean scenario, which eschews manyof the technologies and concepts that make a DesertStorm II so attractive. In short, while the US mili-tary has changed considerably since the KoreanWar, without relevant, directed preparation for aKorean MTW, a repeat of July 1950 is not only pos-sible but highly probable, should North Korea at-tempt to unite the peninsula by force. MR

KOREA

49MILITARY REVIEW l January-February 2000 49MILITARY REVIEW l January-February 2000

EARLY SUMMER 1950 marked an unneces-sary nadir for the professionals of the US

Army. Following World War II, the United Statesonce again disarmed to a degree far below the levelof force that it expected to be able to project. TheArmy maintained 10 understrength divisions, fourin Japan, one in Germany and the remaining five inthe Continental United States (CONUS).1 Despitethe fact that this phenomenon had already occurredtwice in the past 50 years, Army doctrine did notacknowledge the realities of congressionally im-posed force structure.2

Doctrine is the core of a military institution, yetdoctrine is only half the solution. The US Army hasdemonstrated an incredible capacity to create doc-trine that it cannot execute. We develop complexdoctrine that requires trained and cohesive units, butwe have repeatedly failed our soldiers by commit-ting them to combat without one component or theother. We are all comfortable with our various defi-nitions of �trained.� Numerous Army regulationsand divisional training publications established stan-dards that individuals and units must meet to earnthe rating �trained.� The same cannot be said forthe term, or even the concept, of cohesion.

The capstone doctrinal manual of the Army, FieldManual (FM) 100-5, Operations, and the primaryleadership manual, FM 22-100, Army Leadership,do not even define the term cohesion or use it in thecontext of their historical examples. Should thisconcern professional leaders?

On 25 June 1950, eight divisions of the NorthKorean army rolled across the border at the 38thparallel, invading our allies and prompting theUnited States to intervene to contain communism.Among the US units that went ashore in the first

weeks of combat was the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalryof the 1st Cavalry Division. Its soldiers were un-prepared for combat.3 In this they were not alone.The dissolution of 2/7 Cavalry on their second nightin combat was a phenomenon repeated by numer-ous American units in the early days of the KoreanWar. Starting with the now-famous Task ForceSmith and ending, largely, with the �stand or die�order in the Pusan Perimeter along the Naktong,American units broke and ran more often than weare comfortable remembering today. What lessonshave we learned from this?

The Army has, for the past century, written doc-trine with the presupposition that the implementingunits are fully trained, manned and equipped. Per-sonnel policies, however, operated contrary to thedoctrine.4 Committing tactical units to combat atanything but full strength with a trained and cohe-sive leadership team at the helm is irresponsible anddangerous. As any professional would readily agree,there is no excuse for committing men unfamiliarwith one another to combat. Cohesion is a relativelynew term used to describe an ancient concept.5 Itis the cement that holds units together. Sendingmen into combat without this factor is negligence.The fault, however, often lies at many echelons, and

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do notpurport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army; the Depart-ment of Defense or any other government office or agency.�Editor

For the past century, doctrine hasbeen written with the presupposition that the

implementing units are fully trained, mannedand equipped. Personnel policies, however,

operated contrary to the doctrine. . . . The faultoften lies at many echelons, and because of this

the blame may be diffused. It is the Armyoverall, however, that is at fault for allowing

personnel policies that destroy cohesion andcommitting ad hoc units to combat.


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Combat is terrifying. Combat with strangers is even more nerve-wracking.Men transmit their messages, building upon one another�s fears even in the absence of visibleevidence suggesting the cause for fear is valid. Without some force to maintain the unit as a

viable combat element, it descends into chaos and suffers defeat.

Soldiers from the 3d Infantry Divisiontake refuge from Chinese mortar fire,13 February 1951.

because of this, the blame may be diffused. TheArmy overall, however, is at fault for allowing per-sonnel policies that destroy cohesion and commit-ting ad hoc units to combat.

This article addresses the interrelationship of doc-trine and Armywide personnel policies in the peri-ods before combat in both Korea and Vietnam. Thecentral thesis here is that the Army has twice failedto match its doctrinal assumptions with the realitiesof the military force that exists in peacetime. In thisdeveloping age of limited, come-as-you-are wars,we can no longer afford to ignore the effects thatArmywide manpower policies have on our units.Few dispute the claim that the luxury of the buildupand training period the United States and its allieshad prior to Desert Storm was an anomaly. Politi-cal and social pressures place greater and greaterpressures upon the military to execute perfect tacti-cal operations. We will not accomplish them in thenext war if we maintain the current trajectory. Inthe future we must have tactical units trained andprepared at the outset, not after they relearn the les-sons their grandfathers wrote in blood.

Lessons Written in BloodOne of the great dangers in using military history

to derive specific �lessons learned� is the potentialfor abuse. Samuel Clemens once said of statisticsthat there are �lies, damned lies, and statistics.�Much the same could be said of �military utilitar-

ian� military history.6 With sufficient research,nearly any proposition or position may be defendedor advanced with an appropriate example from his-tory. Good history tells the story and allows thefacts to speak for themselves.

These, then, are the facts.On 24 July 1950, the day that it arrived on the front

lines in Korea, the 7th Cavalry Regiment was more than30-percent understrength from its doctrinal Table ofOrganization. As in most regiments, there were onlytwo of the three authorized battalions actually onhand.7 On the night of 25 July 1950, the regimentwas ordered to begin a series of retrograde move-ments. The 2d Battalion was in contact at the timeand on the morning of 26 July 1950 reported onedead, six wounded and more than 199 missing.8

The narrative recorded by a participant in a post-war history of the regiment is characteristicallyvague about the events surrounding the first com-bat by the battalion.

�During the withdrawal that followed, the 2d Bat-talion was under continuous attack. The unit be-came scattered, and out of communications witheach other; many platoons did not receive the or-der to withdraw, and general chaos and confusionresulted as enemy tanks and �refugees� began fir-ing wildly from the road leading to the rear.�9

The next morning Captain Melvin Chandler, thecommander of H Company, assembled a provisional


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It is the crew-served weapons that seal the image. Six 60mm mortars and 14 machinegunswere abandoned, not by individuals, but by groups of men. If S.L.A. Marshall, for all his faults, ever

got anything straight, it was probably his observation that crew-served weapons tend to stand fastlongest and fight hardest because of the mutual psychological support of working in a small team

tends to allow crew-served weapons to withstand the battering effects of fear.

A .30 caliber machinegun crew keepsa wary eye for North Korean activityin the Ch�unch�on area.

force from the stragglers and established a defensefarther to the south. His efforts collected approxi-mately 300 soldiers moving to the rear. He then leda patrol north to recover what materiel they couldbetween the current US lines and the lines of theNorth Koreans.10

More facts: On the night of 26 July 1950, the 2dBattalion, 7th Cavalry lost the following equipment:One switchboard, one emergency lighting unit, 14machineguns, 9 radios, 120 M-1 rifles, 26 carbines, 7Browning Automatic Rifles, 6 60mm mortars.11

We now have two elements of fact to build a his-torical account. History is the product of men sit-ting in clean, safe offices, years after the facts oc-curred, attempting to fill in the gaps. Readingbetween the lines of these facts, it is not difficult todiscern that this was a rout. The evidence is avail-able in numerous personal accounts not cited here;for our purposes, allowing the facts to speak forthemselves is enough.

To begin with, we know that the battalion had notoccupied a defensive position for very long beforethe �bug out.� Switchboards and land-line commu-nications were therefore probably not yet in place

below the battalion level. Nor was it likely that lightsets were yet established in company positions. Thatthese items were lost suggests that all was not well evenat the battalion headquarters. That is bad enough,but at the company and platoon levels, nine radioswere lost. Only officers communicated by radio.However, even though the radios were carried byradio-telephone operators (RTO), that nine of themwere lost points to rather complete unit disintegra-tion. In effect, if the officers could not (or wouldnot) maintain discipline in their immediate per-sonal vicinity (RTOs in the infantry are never farfrom their officers), we begin to see a picture inwhich it was every man for himself in a desper-ate surge to the rear.

The image of desperation solidifies with the coldfact that 153 individual weapons�rifles, carbinesand Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs) were re-ported lost. These were discarded, almost cer-tainly, by men gripped with panic. It is the crew-served weapons, however, that seal the image. Six60mm mortars and 14 machineguns were aban-doned, not by individuals, but by groups of men.If S.L.A. Marshall, for all his faults, ever got any-


The bureaucratic Army system dictatedwhen individuals should command according to

the needs of the individual, and leaders werereplaced and switched according to personnel

regulations. We may take this as a given today:command rotations regardless of the situation

and high personnel turbulence in peacetime arenow standard American practices.

thing straight, it was probably his observation thatcrew-served weapons tend to stand fast longest andfight hardest. According to Marshall, and manywho have validated his initial observations sincethen, the mutual psychological support of workingin a small team tends to allow crew-served weap-

ons to withstand the battering effects of fear betterthan most.12 The lost weapons, the 300 men �col-lected� by Chandler and the lost communicationsgear all contribute to a panorama of disintegratingcontrol and small-unit cohesion. Poor communica-tions, the fact that some elements of the battalionwere in limited contact with the enemy and the ru-mors of defeat in other sectors combined to over-whelm the system of discipline and organization.

Any number of causes could be paraded forth, butthe facts suggest that on the night of 25 July 1950,the 7th Cavalry lost what little cohesion it had andturned into a mob. This mob then further brokedown into individuals who dispersed, escaping asbest they could toward friendly lines. What causedthe disintegration of 2/7 Cavalry?

The Loss of CohesionWhile the analogy may overreach somewhat, one

author recently suggested that fear is communicablein military units much as force is transmitted in theobscure field of granular physics: men react to oneanother�s emotions.13 Combat is terrifying. Combatwith strangers is even more nerve-wracking. Mentransmit their messages, building upon one another�sfears even in the absence of visible evidence sug-gesting the cause for fear is valid. Without someforce to maintain the unit as a viable combat ele-ment, it descends into chaos and suffers defeat.

Military historian and sociologist Bruce Watsonexplains how military units lose their cohesion in asomewhat more systematic way in his book WhenSoldiers Quit, Studies in Military Disintegration.Watson suggests that disintegration, from militaryunit to crowd, will occur when the following con-ditions exist. First, he suggests that there must be a

failure in leadership. Next, the soldiers� primarygroups collapse and become alienated from the in-stitutional objectives of the military. Finally, whenthe primary groups become desperate because theybelieve that there is no way to improve their condi-tion within the boundaries of the normal organiza-tional system, the situation is ripe for the loss of for-mal and approved cohesion.14

Watson is right. What happened to the 2d Bat-talion, 7th Cavalry, and indeed much of the 1st Cav-alry and 24th Infantry Divisions, during those firstdesperate days in Korea was something very similar.Despite the fact that several historians have begunthe process of �rehabilitating� the reputation of TaskForce Smith, the lead element of the 24th InfantryDivision, the fact remains that TF Smith, like theother battalions of the first divisions committed, dis-solved after it was ordered to withdraw.15

Our doctrine was not structured to support thereality of the conditions faced by our forces. Themost recent edition of the Army�s capstone doctrine,Field Service Regulation 1949, was generally justan update of the 1941 edition. It stressed infantryoperations at the core of Army operations and theimportance of combined arms in all situations, butit did not address the importance of unit cohesionor solidarity.16 Doctrine did not match the realityof understrength, undertrained units.

How do we ensure that our troops do not foldwhen placed in situations such as that faced in thesummer of 1950? Since it appears that we mayagain travel a similar trail, and we have not matchedour doctrine to our diminishing resources, have wereally demonstrated the capacity to learn, to developwisdom from our collective mistakes?

In 1963 T.R. Fehrenbach published his classicwork on the Korean War, This Kind of War. Thefirst several chapters read as a study in military un-preparedness. Fehrenbach was a retired Army of-ficer writing history with a purpose. He did not wantto see untrained and understrength American unitscommitted to combat again. In the summer of 1965,less than two years after the publication of This Kindof War, the United States sent large formations ofsoldiers in harm�s way again. The lead element forthe Army was, once again, the 1st Cavalry Division.One battalion in that division was decimated in its firstmajor engagement just a few months later. Once again,2-7 Cavalry would suffer the effects of the split betweenArmy doctrine and Army policy, this time in the tallgrass of a place known as LZ Albany.17

Things were generally better for the 1st Cavalrythat summer. They had recently completed exten-sive testing of the new air assault concept and most


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In the summer of 1965, less than two years after the publication of This Kind of War,the United States sent large formations of soldiers in harm�s way again. The lead element for theArmy was, once again, the 1st Cavalry Division. One battalion in that division was decimated in its

first major engagement. Once again, 2-7 Cavalry would suffer the effects of the split between Armydoctrine and Army policy, this time in the tall grass of a place known as LZ Albany.

R

battalions were highly trained as a result of this pro-cess. Unfortunately, one battalion was not. Dur-ing the course of the training and evaluation pro-cess, the unit that would be reflagged as the 2dBattalion, 7th Cavalry had been the opposing force(OPFOR) for the division during the experimentphase and manned at less than 50 percent in soldiersand leaders.18 Besides the OPFOR role, it also filledmany of the division guard and detail requirements.This battalion was not ready for combat. In orderto collect the requisite leadership, the battalion com-mander and command sergeant major ran a drag-net across Fort Benning, Georgia, for the 30 daysavailable between notification and deployment. Thebattalion deployed with approximately 70-75 per-cent of its authorized personnel and conducted onlyone �familiarization ride� in a helicopter. More than50 percent of the leaders had joined the unit in thepreceding 30 days.19 Added to this chaos were re-strictions on which soldiers were even eligible fordeployment based upon various factors of time inservice and the ends of their enlistment contracts.There was no �stop-loss� for the 7th Cavalry that

year�nor for entire the Army throughout the war.In November 1965 this same battalion partici-

pated in Operation Silver Bayonet in the Republicof South Vietnam. Deployed just three months ear-lier, this was its first major combat operation�justdays after the battalion had changed command.Now an untried unit, with most of the leadershipbarely familiar with the soldiers (who were oftennew to the battalion themselves), had new leader-ship at the top as well. The bureaucratic Army sys-tem dictated when individuals should command ac-cording to the needs of the individual, and leaderswere replaced and switched according to personnelregulations. We may take this as a given today:command rotations regardless of the situation andhigh personnel turbulence in peacetime are nowstandard American practices. But these practices arewrong and contradict our doctrinal objectives.

Although led by one Korean War veteran in adivision commanded by another, the 2d Battalion,7th Cavalry was in some areas just as unpreparedas it had been 15 years earlier and for some of thesame reasons.20 Numerous factors caused what later


We are, for various reasons, trainingless. Our battalions do not measure up, by mostany standard, to the criteria established by the

Army in its doctrine and are not performingwell at the National Training Center or JointReadiness Training Center. . . . Reorganizationalong traditional regimental lines may be part ofthe solution. It will only work, however, with a

personnel policy that fosters unit cohesionand true regimental affiliation.

happened at LZ Albany; this article only serves tocompare this one battalion�s experiences in the firstbattles of two different wars.

Foundations and DoctrineWhile acknowledging the danger of drawing any

hard and fast lessons from history, the followingfacts apply both to the era immediately prior to theKorean War and potentially to today.

Unit cohesion depends on stability and training.Performance in combat depends on cohesion andcompetence. These observations appear obvious.Unfortunately, we seem to ignore the implications,as evidenced by three further observations about themodern Army at the tactical level.l We are, for various reasons, training less. Our

battalions do not measure up, by most any standard,to the criteria established by the Army in its doc-trine. The evidence of this is regularly splashedacross the headlines of Army Times: The Army isnot performing well at the National Training Cen-ter or Joint Readiness Training Center.l Our personnel policies do not support cohesion

at the tactical unit level. In fact, the case is nearlythe opposite.l Our doctrine does not, at any echelon, sufficiently

acknowledge the importance of unit cohesion. If the spectrum of war is defined by self-imposed

limitations upon the combatants� means, objectives,geographic area and national support, then we areentering a new age of limited war. The limitationsplaced upon the new American way of war are evenmore restrictive. For the United States limited waris further constrained by a uniquely American is-sue, the requirement for perfection.

If we intend to fulfill our charter as a credibleforce for the implementation of �policy by othermeans,� we must regain lost ground. US militaryhistory further suggests that we cannot rely on ad-ditional funds or forces.21 We must therefore focus

upon that which we can change. American mili-tary power suffers continual trade-offs during fis-cal tightening. We cannot afford everything, andour options for dividing funds are simple. We mayspend money on training and manpower, equipmentmodernization, current missions or quality of life is-sues. Almost every item in the Army budget fits,albeit roughly, into one of these elements. As inthe interwar period of 1918-1941, we cannot fundeverything. There are, however, ways in which wemay use ideas and words to increase our combat ef-fectiveness without significant expenditures. Thereis room for improvement in our doctrine and thepolicies through which we �manage� our forces.

The actual tactical composition of the futureArmy, be it the �medium brigade� or somethingelse, is almost irrelevant to the issue. Regardlessof the name, we are leaning toward smaller units asour basic tactical building block. This trend sug-gests a possible solution with deep roots in Armyhistory. We may use human nature to help buildcohesion by bringing back the regiments.

Consider the British: �There was only one reli-gion in the regular army, the regiment; it seemed todraw out of them the best that was in them.� 22 Al-though addressing another army in another period,the factors apply to human beings generally. Divi-sions are, for the most part, too large to invoke emo-tional affiliation except when viewed in the pasttense. Regiments, true regiments such as the USArmy lost with the restructuring into the PentomicArmy of General Maxwell Taylor, may form thebasis for cohesion at the tactical level in the futureas they have in the past.23

We are facing a period of decreased personalcommitment to the military and a concurrent lossof professionalism characterized by a devotion toself over a devotion to the institution. While manyof the reasons for this are tied to the recent down-sizing of the military and the resultant uncertaintythat the survivors feel towards the Army as a body,the effects may well prove disastrous unlesschecked.24 Reorganization along traditional regi-mental lines may be part of the solution. It will onlywork, however, with a personnel policy that fostersunit cohesion and true regimental affiliation.

Without mincing words, we must overhaul theentire personnel system for tactical assignments ofenlisted soldiers and company grade officers. Wemust create a new process that acknowledges regi-mental affiliation in more than name. This has beentried, in half-measures, before. This time we needto go beyond the well-intentioned experiments of the


NOTES

Captain Robert L. Bateman III is assigned to the Department of History, Military History Division,US Military Academy, West Point, New York. He received a B.A. from University of Delaware, anM.A. from Ohio State University and is a doctoral candidate there. He has served in a various com-mand and staff positions in the Continental United States and Hawaii, including company commander,2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; and S3 (Air), 4th Battal-ion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. His book DigitalWar, A View from the Front Lines was published 1999. His article �Force XXI: Avoiding Informa-tion Overload� appeared in the July-August 1998 edition of Military Review.

1. Roy K. Flint, �Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and With-drawal, 5-19 July 1950,� in America�s First Battles, Charles E. Heller and WilliamA Stofft, ed. (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1986), 269. Also see EdwardDaily, Skirmish: Red, White and Blue, The History of the 7th U.S. Cavalry in Ko-rea 1945-1953 (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Company, 1992). Flint discussesthe general manning and material condition of the Far East Command circa 1950;Daily describes the specifics of the training and manning levels of the 7th Cav-alry at that time. Daily enlisted in the US Army in 1949 and was assigned to the7th Cavalry in Japan later that year. His postwar history of the 7th Cavalry is, inpart, biographical.

2. William O. Odom, After the Trenches, The Transformation of U.S. ArmyDoctrine 1918-1939 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999).Odom writes about the problems faced by the US Army following World War I,many of which were repeated after World War II.

3. Several histories of the US Army of Occupation stationed in Japan pointtowards the generally low level of training that many units had. This does notmean there was no training, only that what training occurred was considered in-adequate even at the time. Despite the fact that in the months immediately pre-ceding the North Korean invasion and US intervention there had been a push toincrease training, resources in time, material and training land constrained the di-visions stationed in Japan from conducting anything much beyond rudimentaryplatoon and company level training.

4. Donald Vandergriff, �The Culture Wars,� from Digital War: A View from theFront Lines, ed. Robert L. Bateman (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999), 229.

5. Roger A. Beaumont and William P. Snyder �Combat Effectiveness: Para-digms and Paradoxes� in Combat Effectiveness, Cohesion, Stress and the Vol-unteer Military, Sam C. Sarkesian, ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1980), 20-56and Sam C. Sarkesian, �Introduction� in the same volume. Sarkesian definescohesion as �the attitudes and commitment of individual soldiers to the integrityof the unit, the �will� to fight and the degree to which these are in accord with so-cietal values and expectations.� While this is a useful definition, some disagree-ment exists among military sociologists as to the nature of cohesion. Basicallythis is a chicken-or-egg question. Does cohesion cause higher military effective-ness, or is it the result or byproduct of military effectiveness which may or maynot serve to raise that effectiveness even higher? In any case, cohesion is theo-retically a sought after commodity.

6. Allan R. Millett, �American Military History: Clio and Mars as �Pards�,� inDavid A. Charters, Marc Milner, and J. Brent Wilson, ed., Military History andthe Military Profession (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992). Millett has written ex-tensively on the state-of-the-art (of military history) since the 1970s. Also see�American Military History: Over the Top,� in Herbert J. Bass, ed., The State ofAmerican History (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), 157-182, and his 1975 Inter-national Commission for Military History conference paper, �American MilitaryHistory: Struggling Through the Wire.�

7. Flint, �Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950,� 270.

Note also that T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (London: Brassey�s, 1963,1st Brassey�s ed. 1994) takes a slightly different tack in assigning blame. AlthoughFehrenbach devotes a scant few sentences to the initial withdrawals of the 25thID and the 1st Cav, he does note the understrength-by-design issue as it relatedto the 24th ID. Curiously, given his motives in writing the book, he focused moreupon what he sees as the �soft� nature of the American recruit of 1950 and lessupon organizational failings.

8. Daily, Skirmish: Red, White and Blue, The History of the 7th U.S. Cavalryin Korea 1945-1953, 28 and interviews by author with Daily, various dates, 1994-1997. Daily participated in these operations as a private in Hotel Company, 2/7Cavalry. He was later promoted via battlefield commission to 2LT, and subse-quently captured during a North Korean attack along the Naktong perimeter. Heescaped some 30 days later near the 38th parallel and evaded capture until hecould rejoin US forces. He fought through the summer of 1951 in 2/7 Cavalryuntil replaced as part of the new individual rotation policy.

9. Ibid., 29.10. Ibid.11. Ibid.

12. S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York: William Morrow & Company,1947). Marshall�s observations were taken at face value for a long time. Only inthe past 10-15 years have his statistics and claims been held up for rigorous ex-amination. Several were found wanting. See Roger Spiller, �S.L.A. Marshall andthe Ratio of Fire,� The RUSI Journal, 133/4 (Winter 1988), 63-69. Spiller notedin the 1989 article that the number of companies Marshall claimed to have inter-viewed varied widely. In addresses made at Fort Leavenworth in the early 1950sMarshall claimed 603 companies interviewed, while by 1957 the number haddropped back down to �something over 500.� In short, Marshall�s claims may havebeen baldly exaggerated. Moreover, it appears that Marshall produced his famous�25 percent fire their weapons� statistic out of whole cloth, since he apparentlynever actually asked that question in any of the many interviews that he did con-duct. Also see Fredric Smoler, �The Secret of the Soldiers Who Didn�t Shoot,�American Heritage, 40/2, (March 1989), 37-43.

13. Robert L. Bateman, �Shock and the Digital Battlefield.� Armor 107 (Janu-ary-February 1998), 14-19.

14. Bruce Allen Watson, When Soldiers Quit, Studies in Military Disintegration(Westport, CN: Prager, 1997), 156-163.

15. Flint, �Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19July 1950,� 281-282. Flint describes how light (relatively) the casualties of TF Smithhad been up until the order to withdraw. After reconsolidation following the with-drawal into Taejon, the TF reported 148 enlisted and 5 commissioned officers miss-ing. This was, in fact, far better than the estimated 250 that were missing in theimmediate period following the disintegration of TF Smith.

16. Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76,(Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1979). Doughty traces the evolu-tion throughout the period covered by this essay. Nowhere is it noted that theArmy has ever incorporated the lessons derived from the study of the military byseveral noted sociologists into its tactical doctrine. To be fair, at the outbreak ofthe Korean War the seminal study of the behavior of men in combat, Stouffer, etal., The American Soldier, had only just been completed.

17. LTG (Ret) Harold Moore, Mr. Joseph Galloway, Larry Gwin (XO, A Co, 2/7Cav), PVT Robert Towles (D Co, 2/7 Cav), interviews with author, 22-24 Novem-ber 1996, Ia Drang Reunion, Washington DC; and John Howard (Med Plt, HHC,2/7 Cav), interview with author on 17 March 1997, Harrisburg, Pa.

18. Harold Moore and Joseph Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once and Young(New York: Random House, 1992), 207-208. Moore and Galloway tell the storyof the battles of the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965. In their analysis of thedefeat suffered by 2/7 Cavalry near LZ Albany, they focus primarily upon the lead-ership changes in the battalion immediately before the battle. Given space limi-tations and their focus upon 1/7 Cavalry and the fight at LZ X-Ray, they do nottell the complete story of 2/7 Cavalry. There are other, more institutionallybased causes for what happened in the tall grass over the course of 24 hours inlate November 1965.

19. CSM (Ret.) James Scott, interview with author, 23 November 1996, Ia DrangReunion, Washington DC. CSM Scott was the battalion CSM for 2/7 Cavalrythrough this period and into the fight at LZ Albany. His account of the battle, butmore importantly the months before the battle, are detailed and explicit. In de-scribing how the battalion learned that it would be sent into combat CSM Scottrelates that the first he personally heard of the deployment was from television,when President Johnson announced that he was sending the �Air Cavalry.�

20. Moore and Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once and Young, 207-210. Thenew battalion commander of 2/7 Cavalry was LTC Robert McDade, a Korean Warveteran who had spent most of his career after that war in the personnel field.

21. Robert L. Bateman, �Without Malice, Without Sympathy: American Antipa-thy to the Military, 1607-Present,� ARMY ( January 1999), 36-47. Like Odom inAfter the Trenches, but over a longer timeframe, Bateman examines the near per-petual phenomena of American unreadiness that occurs as a result of the Ameri-can attitude towards military forces over the course of history.

22. Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 2nd ed. 1966 (Garden City Park, NewYork: Avery Publishing Group, 1987), 184.

23. Robert Bateman, �The Uses of History� ARMY (Summer 1999).24. David McCormick, The Downsized Warrior, America�s Army in Transition

(New York: New York University Press, 1997), 157-194.

KOREA

COHORT and regimental affiliation systems and re-design our personnel assignment and developmentprograms with one goal in mind: developing cohe-sion at the tactical level.

Finally, we cannot avoid the fact that training atthe tactical level has taken a severe hit in the pastseveral years. While acknowledging that we can-not afford to do everything we would like, given thelimited resources provided to us by Congress, wemust place this at the top of our priority list and hopefor the best in the other areas. This will be diffi-cult. It requires a firm decision at the highest lev-

els and a subsequent ironclad commitment to thatdecision. The pressures will come from within andoutside the Army. Congressmen cannot readilypoint toward an increase in training readiness fortheir constituents when the time comes for reelec-tion; it is subjective and not material. It is, there-fore, a hard sell when the budget is reviewed. Thisis especially true in light of the cuts necessary inother areas to pay the bill for training. Yet it is theprice leaders must pay to honor our martial ances-tors and protect those who follow us. It is the leastwe can do. MR


As horses and mechanizationrevolutionized maneuver and in-dustrialization geometrically ad-vanced firepower, informationtechnology is transforming com-munications, command andcontrol. James Schneider ar-gues that degrading an enemy�scommand and control paralyzesits military force as surely assuccessful maneuver exhausts itand a strategy of attrition aimsat annihilation. Schneider out-lines this third form of warfare,relates its historical roots, ex-plains its current applicationsand calls it cybershock.

ON 27 APRIL 1863, IN A HEAVY DOWNPOUR, four corps ofMajor General Joseph Hooker�s Federal Army of the Potomac be-

gan the first operational maneuver in military history. Thanks to theemployment of the Beardslee field telegraph, a large portion of his armymoved off the battlefield before Chancellorsville. General Robert E.Lee, past master of Napoleonic warfare, was �temporarily baffled� bythe strange Union maneuver.1 But five days later, at Lee�s direction,Thomas J. �Stonewall� Jackson thwarted it. Jackson�s blow to Hooker�sarmy was also unique in that it was perhaps the first instance in militaryhistory where a force was defeated by cybershock, the systemic paraly-sis of an army through its inability to direct and control itself effectively.

Understanding the concept of cybershock is important because it of-fers a conceptual structure to elevate the disparate notions of commandand control warfare (C2W) and information operations (IO) to the samelevel as maneuver and attrition. Indeed, this article argues thatcybershock is a new kind of defeat mechanism wholly analogous to,but distinct from, attrition and maneuver. Historically, cybershockevolved in the wake of the emergence of operational art. Only now withthe current emphasis on information operations has the Army begun toseriously consider the practical and revolutionary implications ofcybershock as a new form of offensive and defensive action.

Delbrück’s CutIn 1900 German military historian Hans Delbrück published the first

of four volumes in History of the Art of War within the Framework ofPolitical History.2 The project embraced the history of warfare fromthe Persian Wars around 500 B.C. to the end of the Napoleonic Warsin 1815. Toward the end of his study, Delbrück concluded that the wholehistory of warfare could be expressed by two patterns of defeat. Thefirst pattern he called a strategy of annihilation (Niederwerfungstrategie);



�Gradually, the units engagedare burned out,� said Clausewitz,�and when nothing is left butcinders, they are withdrawn . . .like burned-out cinders.� Onecan extend Clausewitz�s evocativemetaphor to gain insight into theessential physics of classical battle.Armies in battle burn, meltand vaporize.

the second, a strategy of exhaustion (Ermattungstrategie). Annihilationaimed at the destruction of the enemy�s army through a decisive battle.Here the dominant mechanism of defeat was attrition. Exhaustion, onthe other hand, sought the enemy�s moral and logistical collapse througha combination of battle and maneuver.3

Building on an initial insight from Carl von Clausewitz, Delbrücknoted that employing a particular strategy depended on the militarymeans available and the political purpose for which the war was beingwaged.4 A strategy of annihilation was appropriate for a war fought forunlimited aims with unlimited means; a strategy of exhaustion was awar fought for limited aims with limited means. Most often the selec-tion of war aims became a function of the perceived domination of oneside over another. A perceived deficit in military means, Delbrückbelieved, drove the weaker side to adopt exhaustion, the stronger sideto seek annihilation. The correlation of forces, furthermore, entailed aparticular force posture. A strategy of exhaustion, implying weakness,suggested a defensive posture since defense is the stronger form of war.A strategy of annihilation implied strength and suggested the weakerbut more decisive offensive posture.5

The Heat of BattleDelbrück�s framework enumerated the two defeat patterns that had

dominated military history until the Industrial Revolution. For thousandsof years annihilation found its tactical expression through attrition in thetechniques of the old armies based on physical shock. Beginning aroundthe 17th century, the increasing use of firearms required permanent basesof operations. The emerging logistical importance of the base of op-erations created a new geometric relationship in a theater of operationsamong the base of operations, lines of operations and objective point.This relationship for the first time gave rise to maneuver as a viable andsecond method of defeat.

Maneuver, movement to achieve or deny positional advantage overan opponent, exploited the new theater geometry and logistics of newfirepower-based armies, since positional advantage was most oftensought against the adversary�s line of operations. The ensuing maneu-ver and counter-maneuver led to a kind of danse macabre punctuatedwith mutual embraces of battle. The dynamics of maneuver and battleled inexorably to logistical exhaustion and suggested an underlyingphysical mechanism for annihilation and exhaustion in pre-industrialarmies.

In On War Clausewitz asks a fundamental question: �What usuallyhappens in a major battle today?� He replies, �the first thing to strikeone�s imagination, and indeed one�s intellect, is the melting away ofnumbers. . . . The battle slowly smolders away, like damp gunpowder. . . . Gradually, the units engaged are burned out, and when nothing isleft but cinders, they are withdrawn . . . like burned-out cinders.�6 Onecan extend Clausewitz�s evocative metaphor to gain insight into the es-sential physics of classical battle. Armies in battle burn, melt and va-porize. The heat of battle is calibrated in the temperature of casual-ties. Armies enter battle in a solid state of cohesion, like a block oflead. The heat and energy of combat attrition may be so great as tovaporize instantly the entire mass in a battle of annihilation and cause agreat disintegration of morale and will to fight. The combination of at-trition and maneuver may slow the process with an intervening �liquid�phase of logistic collapse before the army is swept away in a disinte-grated cloud of human ash and iron debris.

CYBERSHOCK


Cybershock in warfarecauses paralysis by attacking

the enemy�s nervous system inthe same way that maneuver

causes exhaustion by defeatingthe opponent�s metabolic

system � his logistics. . . .Cybernetic paralysis drives an

organized system into disorgan-ization by destroying the

coherence, connection and flowof information among the

component parts of acomplex system.

But by the end of the American Civil War, the essential physics ofwar would undergo a profound change and constitute the world�s sec-ond Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

The Industrial Revolution andthe Complexity of Warfare

The �complexification��to use John Casti�s term�of 19th-centuryarmies was ultimately the consequence of entirely new technologies.7

The armies of the pre-Industrial period evolved in train with the simplemachines invented during the Agricultural Revolution (8,000-3,000B.C.). These simple machines�the lever, wedge, wheel and axle, pulleyand screw�can be characterized as point technologies because of howthey focus or leverage mechanical force at a single point. Clausewitzmade a similar observation concerning Napoleonic warfare of his ownday. He wrote that in battle �all action is compressed into a single pointin space and time.�8 In contrast, technologies of the Industrial Revolu-tion were dominated by innovations in distributed technology. Thesteam engine, the railroad, the telegraph, the dynamo, nitro-based ex-plosives and the magazine rifle all changed the geometry of warfare fromaction compressed into a single point to action distributed in breadth anddepth. Fundamentally, this distribution transformed the simple armiesof Napoleon into modern armies of great complexity.

Complexity theory tells us that the pre-Industrial armies of physicalshock and fire action were rather simple, perhaps even complicated,military systems. On the other hand, a complex system such as themodern army that appeared in the wake of the Industrial Revolution isa �network of many �agents� acting in parallel. . . . The control of a com-plex adaptive [learning] system tends to be highly dispersed. . . . A com-plex adaptive system has many levels of organization . . . [which] areconstantly revising and rearranging their building blocks as they gainexperience. . . . All these processes of learning, evolution, and adapta-tion are the same. . . . All complex adaptive systems anticipate the fu-ture.�9 The various aspects of complexity all turn on the way a com-plex adaptive dynamic system uses information.

A modern complex military system uses information in five ways.The first is the manner in which it uses information to describe itself and itsenemy. The more information required to describe itself and an adver-sary, the more descriptively complex this relationship is. Second, a com-plex military system uses information to organize itself. Indeed, organiza-tion is a process that structures information. The increase in organizationalcomplexity itself creates more information. Third, after the IndustrialRevolution armies became algorithmically complex�the number oftasks or steps necessary to defeat an enemy increased dramatically. Thesize of planning staffs grew beginning in the Civil War and modern warbecame increasingly protracted. The emergence of operational art dur-ing this period was another consequence of the algorithmic complexityof modern armies. Wars could no longer be won with a few battles.Instead, commanders and staffs had to design and execute a whole com-plex mosaic of deep, extended operations to defeat an adversary.

Fourth, information acquisition became more complex. No longercould the commander sit upon his horse, gaze out on the battlefieldand simply apprehend all the information in one unfolding battle. Ev-erything became hidden: the commander and his staff actively had toseek out information on countless battlefields throughout the theaterof operations. Finally, complex military systems became cyberneti-cally complex: greater information was required to direct and con-trol the industrial armies. In this new environment messages had totravel faster than their messengers.


Hooker�s attempt toexploit this new communicationstechnology at Chancellorsvillequickly demonstrated that the newfreedom of complexity also createda new vulnerability to the dangerof paralysis. As complex militarysystems emerged, they created awhole new pattern of defeat,placing cybershock and paralysison par with attrition andannihilation and maneuverand exhaustion.

The Messenger and the Disembodied WordImagine if your body�a complex adaptive system�controlled it-

self using nerve impulses traveling at the speed of a galloping horse in-stead of the speed of an electron. Clearly your body would fail and die.Or imagine if the speed of mental activity that gives rise to rationalthought moved at the speed of a messenger instead of the speed of light.The simple armies of the pre-Industrial epoch controlled themselves injust such a fashion. Soon electrons replaced messengers on horseback.The invention of the telegraph solved the greatest command and con-trol question of military history: How could information flow faster thana messenger could travel? The solution was simple: detach the mes-sage from the messenger, encode it and send it along a copper wire atnear the speed of light. This disembodied message further enabled dis-tributed forces across a theater of operations.

Hooker�s attempt to exploit this new technology at Chancellorsvillequickly demonstrated that the new freedom of complexity also createda new vulnerability to the danger of paralysis. As complex military sys-tems emerged, they created a whole new pattern of defeat, placingcybershock and paralysis on par with attrition and annihilation and ma-neuver and exhaustion. The cybershock-paralysis defeat pattern doesnot replace or compete with the other two, however. Instead, cybershocksupplements and complements attrition and maneuver. Cybershock in-duces deep systemic paralysis throughout a complex military system,culminating the transformation in warfare first wrought by the Indus-trial Revolution more than 100 years ago.

How Cybershock WorksUnfortunately, today�s RMA debate trivializes the profound influence

of the Industrial Revolution, which spawned such complex systems asthe nation-state, free market economy, distributed armies and extendedsocieties�all held together by a velocity of information exchange

Nat

iona

l A

rchi

ves

Field telegraphers of the Military TelegraphCorps at an advanced position. The soldierin the background at right operates a hand-cranked generator mounted in a wagon.








The promises of informati-on technology demand vigilant

scrutiny, for military systemsare rarely destroyed by

paralysis alone.

unheard of before. The complexification of the world created a newkind of vulnerability that cybershock has since sought to exploit, a vul-nerability to systemic paralysis. The actions of all complex systems arecontrolled and modulated by the reliable free flow of information andenergy. Cybershock in warfare causes paralysis by attacking the enemy�snervous system in the same way that maneuver causes exhaustion bydefeating the opponent�s metabolic system�his logistics.

Cybershock creates paralysis in five ways. First, through the use ofoperations security (OPSEC), deception operations and psychologicaloperations (PSYOP), the enemy is denied complete information of bothhis adversary and himself.10 Second, active and intense reconnaissanceblinds the enemy and becomes the most critical element in the strugglefor information. Third, the shock of surprise places a tremendous bur-den on the enemy�s military nervous system as it creates a broad stateof panic. Fourth, today�s electronic warfare (EW) destroys the organi-zational coherence and cohesion of the target, essentially inducing a kindof epileptic seizure in the opponent�s nervous system. Finally, the ac-tiveness and rapidity of friendly operations induce a kind of cyberneticstupor in the enemy: his entire nervous systems goes into overload andgeneral dissonance sets in. Because he does not know what to do, theenemy does not act. Paralysis and disorganization are complete: theenemy�s army has been reduced to its component parts, an army onlyin name. New technology allows us to attack the enemy�s nervous sys-tem directly with electrons instead of bullets.

It would be a serious error to imagine that one could defeat an en-emy through paralysis alone. All three patterns of warfare are comple-mentary and mutually reinforcing. The synergism among them thuscreates an integrated system of attack and defense designed to destroya complex military system. Attrition, maneuver and cybershock togethercause disruption (see figure).

The final outcome in this relationship is disintegration and the destruc-tion of the will to fight. Failure to consider the modern patterns of warin their totality can only lead to defeat. In particular, the promises ofinformation technology demand vigilant scrutiny, for military systemsare rarely destroyed by paralysis alone. One of the remarkable quali-ties of complex military systems is that they are self-organizing.

Black Lights: the Paradox of Self-OrganizationThere is an interesting paradox in the realm of boxing. Sometimes a

boxer may receive a hard shot to the head that causes an immediateknockout. Some boxers report seeing �black lights� before sinking intooblivion; they see and become surrounded by a shimmering, glowingaura of darkness. Such boxers experience the paradox of being con-scious of their unconsciousness. Some boxers are able to recover andcontinue to fight after this interval of conscious unconsciousness becausehigher cognitive centers of the brain residing in the neocortex shut down,but the lower areas of the brain, called the limbic system, kick in andpreserve a primitive sense of awareness. A similar phenomenon oc-curs in modern armies and calls into question the ultimate utility of in-formation warfare.

Cybernetic paralysis drives an organized system into disorganizationby destroying the coherence, connection and flow of information amongthe component parts of a complex system. However, a complex sys-tem is one in which �a great many independent agents are interactingwith each other in a great many ways. . . . The very richness of theseinteractions allows the system as a whole to undergo spontaneous self-organization. . . . These complex, self-organizing systems are adaptive,


For biological systems likethe human body, paralysis is totalin the sense that a person with abroken neck does not experiencea sudden self-organization andcontrol of his limbs. An army,on the other hand, may suffercomplete cybernetic collapse �the analogue to a broken neck �but spontaneously reorganize atlower echelons of command andcontinue on with its mission.

in that they . . . actively try to turn whatever happens to their advantage.. . . Finally, every one of these complex, self-organizing, adaptive sys-tems possesses a kind of dynamism that makes them quantitatively dif-ferent from static objects. . . . Complex systems [like armies in battle]are more spontaneous, more disorderly, more alive.�11 Sun Tzu, theancient Chinese philosopher of war, noted the same phenomenon. Hewrote, �In the tumult and uproar the battle seems chaotic, but there isno disorder; the troops appear to be milling about in circles but cannotbe defeated. . . . Apparent confusion is a product of good order.�12 Else-where, Ralph Waldo Emerson writes, �War disorganizes, but it is toreorganize.�13

These writers have highlighted a fundamental characteristic of mod-ern war: that overall systemic paralysis and disorganization can be off-set, up to a certain point, by self-organization and reorganization atlower levels of command. The German notion of auftragstaktik, forexample, is based on the self-organizing ability of tactical units and lo-cal commanders. It is important, therefore, to note how military sys-tems and other self-organizing complex systems differ from biologicalsystems. For biological systems like the human body, paralysis is totalin the sense that a person with a broken neck does not experience a sud-den self-organization and control of his limbs. An army, on the otherhand, may suffer complete cybernetic collapse�the analogue to a bro-ken neck�but spontaneously reorganize at lower echelons of commandand continue on with its mission.

The implications of self-organization should be apparent: the finaldefeat of a disorganized enemy may depend ultimately on his physicaland protracted destruction in detail. If an enemy still has the will tofight, his fate will have to be decided with a simple bullet rather than acomplicated piece of hardware or an elaborate scheme of maneuver.Such campaigns as Iwo Jima and Okinawa should remind us how rare�and sweet�victories such as the Gulf War are. In the end there arefew shortcuts to victory, but there are many roads to defeat. A com-mander and planning staff exploring avenues to victory should remem-ber the three historical categories: the integrated annihilation, exhaus-tion and paralysis of the enemy. MR

James J. Schneider is a professor of military theory at the School ofAdvanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff Col-lege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. and an M.A. fromthe University of Wisconsin at Oshkosh and a Ph.D. from the Universityof Kansas. He served as a tank commander in Vietnam with the 1st In-fantry Division and as an operations research analyst with the US ArmyCombined Arms Operations Research Activity, Fort Leavenworth. Hisbook The Structure of Strategic Revolution was released in November 1994and he is a frequent contributor to Military Review.

1. Vincent J. Esposito, ed., The West Point Atlas of the American Wars (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1959),vol. I, map 84.

2. Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, 4 vols., translated byWalter J. Renfroe Jr. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975-1985).

3. Ibid., 3, 369-31, 421-44. Also see Arden Bucholtz, Hans Delbrück and the German Military Establish-ment (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1985), and Gordon A. Craig, �Delbrück: the Military historian,� inEdward Meade Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), 260-83.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1976), 69.

5. Ibid., 357-92, 484-519, 523-73.6. Ibid., 226, 231, 254.7. John L. Casti, Complexification (New York: HarperCollins, 1994). Also see M. Mitchell Waldrop, Com-

plexity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992).8. Clausewitz, 259, with Clausewitz�s emphasis.9. Waldrop, 145-47.

10. R. Dan Grymes, �Command and Control Warfare in Forced Entry Operations,� SAMS Student Monograph(Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 1995), 1-2.

11. Waldrop, 11-12.12. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University Press, 1963), 92.13. Ralph Waldo Emerson, as cited in R.H. Debs Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis,

MD: Naval Institute Press, 1966), 346. I am indebted to LTC Russ Glenn for this citation.

NOTES

CYBERSHOCK


That sir which serves and seeks for gain,and follows but for form, will pack when itbegin to rain, and leave thee in the storm.1

� The King�s Fool, King Lear

IT IS AXIOMATIC that leaders must put selfishinterests aside and take care of those whom they

lead. To allege otherwise would blatantly refute allthe military values and ethics we hold dear. Oncewe accept that, unlike Shakespeare�s fair-weatherfigure, good leaders internalize their obligation tocare for those they lead, the vexing issues are whattaking care of soldiers actually means and how do-ing so translates into battlefield success.

Most military leaders certainly understand whatthe phrase does not mean. It does not mean thatleaders should keep soldiers out of harm�s way atall costs; if it meant that, there would be little usein having an army in the first place. It clearly doesnot mean that leaders should provide soldiers thesame level of comfort that their fellow civilians en-joy or that soldiers should not work or train underhard physical and psychological conditions. A mili-tary organization taken care of this way would becoddled to its grave in battle. Despite centuries ofleadership principles and dogmas, it is still difficultto detail concisely what exactly it means to take careof one�s soldiers and exactly how that care facili-tates mission success.

By borrowing a phrase from the Old TestamentBook of Ecclesiastes, leaders can understand a soldieras a �rope of three cords.�2 I characterize these threecords of the soldier as spirit, sinew and significantothers and contend that leaders truly care for sol-diers by ministering to the needs of those cords.When parents allow their sons and daughters to jointhe American profession of arms, they repose thedeepest special trust and confidence in military lead-ers to develop and nurture the spirit, sinew and sig-

nificant others of their children. Further, the sevenArmy Values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless ser-vice, honor, integrity and personal courage provideleaders with the most effective rubric to use in con-structing soldier-care oriented command climates.

In terms of values, the US military establishmentis inherently dualistic. On the one hand, it preserves

and promotes Judeo-Christian values upon whichthe founding fathers based our national system ofgovernment. On the other hand, the military has,to an extent, molded itself to the times. To somedegree, the values of the military as a whole are thevalues of its parts; namely, the values of the womenand men who have elected to serve in the All-Volunteer Force. While these two sets of values arenot necessarily mutually exclusive, significant con-flicts cause an undercurrent of tension at all levels.In a way, this is a natural state for the US military.

Believing that any particular country �has the kindof [military] its total ethos, its institutions, resources,habits of peaceful life, make possible to it,� Britishjournalist and social philosopher D.W. Brogan char-acterizes the United States as a �country which islaw-respecting without being law-abiding.�3 Freeof the centuries-old cultural rigidity of European

Because humans wage war, victoryultimately rests with the side whose soldiers canbest perform the often-horrific tasks required

amid war�s physical chaos and psychologicaltrauma. . . . Keegan notes that �the study of

battle is therefore always a study of fear andusually of courage; always of leadership,

usually of obedience; always of compulsion,sometimes of insubordination. . . . It is necessarily

a social and psychological study.�



countries and thus free of European class segrega-tion, Americans view authority and authoritarianbureaucratic structures with healthy skepticism.

Thus, in the US military, there is �more give-and-take, more ignoring of unessentials, more confi-

dence that in the hour of battle human virtues andcommon sense will do as much as automatic disci-pline of the old eighteenth-century type.�4

Therefore, if the US military hopes to instill a setof values central to both organizational effectivenessand individual character development, then our mili-tary will have to work harder than similar organi-zations in more stratified and traditional nation-states. This work begins with understanding theunique needs of each cord that make up the soldier(spirit, sinew and significant others). When lead-ers know their soldiers under this rubric, they willbe able to apply Army Values directly and teach thesoldiers to apply the values themselves. In short,Army values are combat multipliers and must taketheir rightful place in leaders� kitbags.

Despite postmodern claims to the contrary, waris essentially a spiritual endeavor. Both morals andmorale are critical to unit success, but the cord ofthe soldier that I characterize as spirit encompassesand supercedes either of these individually. Becausehumans wage war, victory ultimately rests with theside whose soldiers can best perform the often-horrific tasks required amid war�s physical chaosand psychological trauma. John Keegan notes thatwar requires, �if it is to take place, a mutual and sus-tained act of will by the two contending parties, andif it is to result in a decision, the moral collapse ofone of them.�5 Keegan does not say that victorynecessitates the physical collapse of the opponent.Because battle is essentially moral or spiritual, �thestudy of battle is therefore always a study of fearand usually of courage; always of leadership, usu-ally of obedience; always of compulsion, sometimes

of insubordination . . . . It is necessarily a social andpsychological study.�6

If the study of battle is the study of morals, thenit is also a study of values and of how values areeither reinforced or defeated in combat. BrigadierGeneral S.L.A. Marshall said that of all the lessonshis innumerable interviews with combat veteranstaught him, the most valuable was �the falseness ofthe belief that wealth, material resources and indus-trial genius are the real source of a nation�s mili-tary power.�7 Marshall concluded that simple�courage is the real driving force in human affairs. . . and . . . every worthwhile action comes fromsomeone daring what others fear to attempt.�8 Thus,we see that a soldier�s spirit, the first of the threecords of the soldier, is of utmost importance to mili-tary leaders who hope to succeed under conditionsof great stress. Marshall notes that, to effectivelyminister to the soldier�s spirit, leaders must aban-don �slide rule� leadership and concentrate on�knowledge of the human heart.�9 Army Valuesprovide an effective, accessible rubric for under-standing the human heart. If internalized, these val-ues will enable soldiers to overcome significantphysical and psychological stresses and completetheir missions with honor.

On the battlefield, simultaneous forces can sig-nificantly diminish a soldier�s spirit. Enemy pro-paganda tries to convince our soldiers that our causeis unjust, our leaders corrupt and our chances of vic-tory slim. In an open society, even �friendly� ornonaligned media may make similar claims. Com-bat itself can diminish soldiers� ability to discrimi-nate between legitimate and illegitimate targets and evendiminish the value of life itself among war-weary sol-diers. Since ancient times war narratives have recounteddeployed soldiers� alienation from all that they valuedin the past and hoped for the future.10 Leaders cannotafford to argue that such issues are solely in thechaplain�s lane and dismiss them as �touchy-feely�concerns for which they have neither the time northe temperament. Rather, leaders have an obliga-tion to find ways to minister to their soldiers� spir-its, especially under conditions of hardship andstress. The Army values provide a way to do that.

By emphasizing loyalty and engaging soldiers inmeaningful discussions about its many dimensions,leaders can deflect soldiers� doubts about the jus-tice of a particular project. Leaders can acknowl-edge that private doubts about the moral legitimacyof legal orders are natural in stressful and life-threatening situations. However, the soldiers� oathupon entering the profession of arms is taken

On the battlefield, simultaneous forcescan significantly diminish a soldier�s spirit. . . .Leaders cannot afford to argue that such issues

are solely in the chaplain�s lane and dismissthem as �touchy-feely� concerns for which they

have neither the time nor the temperament.Rather, leaders have an obligation to find ways

to minister to their soldiers� spirits, especiallyunder conditions of hardship and stress. The

Army values provide a way to do that.


�freely, without mental reservation or purpose ofevasion.�11 If orders and ethics conflict, our onlyoptions are to disobey lawful orders and face thelegal consequences, or resign from the service at theearliest opportunity. While we remain in uniform,our primary loyalty is to the oath we took when wecame in, and leaders who remind soldiers of thisduring times of mental stress will enable them, de-spite fear and danger, to do what they already knowintuitively is right.

Leaders can use the Army values of duty, respectand selfless service to help soldiers address the po-tential devaluation of life that combat can cause. Ifwe understand duty as fulfilling our obligations, thenit becomes clear, that even under stress, we have anobligation to respect other people, treating them aswe want others to treat us.12 In relation to citizens ofan enemy country, this means that we earnestly dis-criminate between combatants and noncombatantswhen we use force. If we fail to do our duty to dem-

onstrate such respect for other lives, especially if wefail to do so in a quest to bring a greater measureof safety to ourselves, we violate the Army valueof selfless service. We cannot honestly say that weplace the welfare of the nation and the Army aboveour own individual welfare if we disgrace both bydoing unnecessary harm. Army values help preventsoldiers from sacrificing their integrity under stress.

The second of the three cords of the soldier issinew. By this term, I mean to describe the soldierphysically. The soldier has physical needs that lead-ers are obligated to meet. No matter how heartythe spirit, even highly trained, conditioned and dis-ciplined soldiers cannot fight long if not physicallysustained. Army values are not magic wands; theycannot provide rations to hungry soldiers, bullets toempty rifles or fuel to dry gas tanks. Whereas vir-tually all leaders understand their obligation to sus-tain their soldiers physically, and the US Army lo-gistics system is perhaps the best in the world,

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�Months after the new combat boots and jackets arrived in Italy many frontline soldiers stillwore soaked leggings and flimsy field jackets. The new clothing was being shortstopped by some . . .soldiers who wanted to look like the combat men they saw in the magazines. None of these short-

stoppers took the clothing with any direct intention of denying the stuff to guys at the front. I supposethese fellows in the rear just looked at the mountainous heap of warm combat jackets piled in a

supply dump and didn�t see anything wrong with swiping a couple for themselves. [However], theArmy had shipped over only enough of the new clothing to supply the men in the foxholes.�

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With temperatures in the low teens, a 2d InfantryDivision soldier on the Elsenborn Ridge, Belgium,chases wires without gloves or a winter parka,23 December 1944. The raised sleeve and whitewrist reveal the cold�s effect on his right hand.


history shows that soldiers unnecessarily sufferphysical hardships even in the midst of plenty. Pri-marily, such failures to provide for soldiers� sinewreflect a flawed value system of those charged with

the special duty of doing so. A story of such a lapsein values occurred in World War II.

�Months after the new combat boots and jacketsarrived in Italy many frontline soldiers still woresoaked leggings and flimsy field jackets. The newclothing was being shortstopped by some . . . soldierswho wanted to look like the combat men they sawin the magazines. None of these short-stoppers tookthe clothing with any direct intention of denying thestuff to guys at the front. I suppose these fellowsin the rear just looked at the mountainous heap ofwarm combat jackets piled in a supply dump anddidn�t see anything wrong with swiping a couple forthemselves. [However], the Army had shipped overonly enough of the new clothing to supply the menin the foxholes, [so] thousands of dogfaces at thefront shivered in the mud and the rain while [oth-ers] wore the combat clothes in warm offices.�13

Similarly, a surrounded infantry company in Viet-nam, low on ammunition, awaited resupply:

�An Army UH-1 helicopter hovered over thecompany to kick cases of ammunition out the sidedoor. The ammo was supposed to land within thecompany�s perimeter. The helicopter pilot radioeddown that the fire was so heavy he was going toleave without dropping all the ammunition on board.[A lieutenant on the ground] radioed back: �If wedon�t get it, you don�t leave.� The pilot could notbe sure whether the beleaguered lieutenant wouldmake good on his threat to shoot him down. Hestayed until all the ammunition was kicked out. Itwas an accurate drop.�14

In both cases, it is fairly easy to see how solidleadership could have refocused the soldiers� atten-tion on their core values and given them the moralarmor to accomplish their mission with honor. The

uniform example shows how easy it is for soldiersto become selfish and disrespect their comradeswhen they either think the offenses will not hurtanyone or simply do not care whom they hurt be-cause the victims are far removed. Logistics lead-ers need to exemplify and reinforce selfless service,loyalty and integrity, remembering that even the ap-pearance of impropriety can cause almost irrepa-rable damage to the relationship between combatand support units. The Vietnam example shows thatpersonal courage is a core value necessary for alldimensions of military life.

In a broader sense, senior leaders responsible forsoldier�s sinew must practice a core values-basedplanning process that will prevent the kind of sup-ply problems that almost halted the Allied advanceacross France in World War II. During the Normandycampaign, values failures among some senior logis-ticians almost spelled disaster.

�Surges of demand were well out of phase withsupply. Thus, the Army, after months of artilleryammunition shortages, ended the war with moreammunition in European storage than was fired dur-ing the entire eleven-month campaign . . . failuresof accountability and inspection contributed to short-falls as supply personnel could not locate neededitems. Perhaps more critically, many US senior of-ficers were indifferent toward supply matters. Al-though tolerating no insubordination in the conductof tactical matters, they often [were themselves per-sonally guilty of violating logistics orders and poli-cies set at theater level]. Beyond that, a �us versusthem� relationship between the combat and serviceforces hindered the supply efforts.�15

Leaders can only feed the sinew of the soldierwhen they selflessly place soldier welfare above in-teragency, interunit or interpersonal rivalries andcarry out the sustainment mission with integrity andhonor. Sometimes it takes personal courage to fightbureaucratic inertia or high-level ignorance of trueconditions to get the soldiers� needs to the line whenneeded. In fairness, combat soldiers themselves cancontribute (sometimes significantly) to their ownsupply problems. At least in the Normandy Cam-paign, �the American Army had weak supply dis-cipline . . . Wherever American troops traveled, theyleft a trail of discarded equipment in their wake.What they did not throw away they often sold orbartered for something useful such as food.�16 Ipersonally witnessed the same phenomenon duringthe after-operations phase of Operation DesertStorm. I saw dumpsters at the port of Ad Dammamfull of discarded serviceable field gear that soldiersevidently felt was too much trouble to pack and shiphome. The Army value of respect applies to Armyequipment, which American taxpayers have funded

No matter how hearty the spirit, evenhighly trained, conditioned and disciplinedsoldiers cannot fight long if not physically

sustained. Army values are not magic wands;they cannot provide rations to hungry soldiers,

bullets to empty rifles or fuel to dry gas tanks.Whereas virtually all leaders understand theirobligation to sustain their soldiers physically,and the US Army logistics system is perhaps

the best in the world, history shows that soldiersunnecessarily suffer physical hardships

even in the midst of plenty.


and for which soldiers have a duty to be responsiblestewards. Army values are essential tools as leaders takecare of soldiers� sinew, the second of the three cords.

The significant others who surround a soldierform the third cord. While the term seems perhapsa bit too �New Age� for a discussion of Army val-ues and leadership, it effectively describes how lead-ers must understand soldiers in terms of interper-sonal relationships that extend far beyond the unititself. These extended relationships directly affectsoldiers� ability to perform under stressful conditionsand leaders must understand their role in maintain-ing and strengthening their soldiers� relationshipsoutside the unit. Gone is the old attitude that theArmy would have issued you a family if it wantedyou to have one. Over half of the soldiers in theArmy are married, and many of those who are not areeither single parents or custodians of one or bothof their own parents. The Army now strives to helpsoldiers keep their family lives in order withchildcare facilities and classes on child rearing,checkbook management and marital stress. Pro-grams such as Army Emergency Relief offer resourcesin family crises. Family housing on most posts hasimproved steadily over the past few years, and unitfamily support group planning, organization andmanagement are taught at precommand courses.The Army has internalized its institutional respon-sibility to minister to soldiers� significant others.

Nevertheless, the Army faces significant chal-lenges in this area. Deployments are increasing inboth frequency and duration. Money shortages haveslowed infrastructure repair and constructionthroughout the Army. The transition to TRICAREhas thrown family health care in turmoil. Retire-ment benefits do not amount to as much as they usedto, and Army transition assistance programs areovertaxed with mid-career soldiers seeking to leavewhile they are still young enough to develop a fullsecond career in the civilian sector. All Army val-ues come into play as leaders assess their obliga-tion to their soldiers� significant others. Loyalty ex-tends to the families of soldiers as well as the soldiersthemselves. Families who support the unit in goodfaith ask only that unit leaders display that same kindof loyalty in passing out information and taking careof family concerns while the unit is deployed.

The Army has a duty to provide the families ofits soldiers the aforementioned facilities and servicesand must never succumb to the attitude that a qual-ity living environment is a nice to have extra thatwe must forsake in order to buy more weapons. TheArmy should take every opportunity to display re-spect for family members, promoting unit apprecia-tion awards, volunteer recognition ceremonies andsimilar programs. Army leaders must be as self-less as possible in the cases where a soldier�s fam-ily needs directly conflict with unit needs. Do you

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During the after-operations phase of Desert Storm, I saw dumpsters at Ad Dammamfull of discarded serviceable field gear that soldiers evidently felt was too much trouble to pack andship home. The Army value of respect applies to Army equipment, which American taxpayers have

funded and for which soldiers have a duty to be responsible stewards.

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A civilian contractor turns over the key to a factory-fresh M1A1 tank to the 2d Armored Division�sTiger Brigade in Saudi Arabia, fall 1990


NOTES

Major Jeffrey S. Wilson is serving as support operations officer, 302d Forward SupportBattalion, 2d Infantry Division, Camp Casey, South Korea. He received a B.A. from WesternIllinois University and an M.A. from University of Illinois at Urbana. He is a graduate ofthe US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He hasserved in a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States andKorea, including assistant professor, US Military Academy, West Point, New York; andcommander, Company D, 724th Support Battalion (Main), Fort Stewart, Georgia.

1. William Shakespeare, �The Tradegy of King Lear,� in An Oxford Anthologyof Shakespeare, Stanley Wells, ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987),2.2.251-54.

2. The Bible, Today�s English Version, Ecclesiastes 4:12, �A rope with threecords is hard to break.�

3. D.W. Brogan, The American Character (New York: Knopf, 1944), 162.4. Ibid.5. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), 301-302.6. Ibid., 303.7. S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Fu-

ture War (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978), 208.8. Ibid., 209.9. Ibid., 156.

10. I use the term alienation here to denote the feeling of being forcibly discon-nected from the things one thinks are valuable to a meaningful life by circum-stances beyond one�s control.

11. Lawrence P. Crocker, The Army Officer�s Guide, 42d Edition (Harrisburg,PA: Stackpole Books, 1983), 5.

12. The Army values card issued to every soldier defines respect as �treatingothers as they should be treated.� While one could take this a number of dif-ferent ways, I assume here that the authors of the card are inferring that allpeople should be treated with a certain level of dignity and respect, in accor-dance with the proverbial Golden Rule, which is a basic pillar of the Americanway of life.

13.Bill Mauldin, Up Front (New York: Award Books, 1968), 135-137.14. George C. Wilson, Mud Soldiers (New York: Scribners, 1989), 22.15. Steve Waddell, United States Army Logisitcs: The Normandy Campaign,

1994 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 164-165.16. Ibid., 165.17. Marshall, 155.18. Sir John W. Hackett, �The Military in the Service of the State,� The Harmon

Memorial Lectures in Military History, Number 12, (Colorado: United States AirForce Academy Press, 1970), 19. Hackett also offers the idea that this missionmay, in the long term, be more important that the more immediate and instrumentalmission of warfighting.

19. Ibid., 18.

Leaders, by personal example andthoughtful education of subordinates, can makea difference when it counts the most by simply

recognizing that, to a new soldier, that unitconstitutes the whole Army. The commander

becomes the soldier�s impression of whatcommanders in the Army essentially are. The

soldier makes similar judgements about the firstsergeant and other leaders.

really need the soldier bad enough to deny himemergency leave during an NTC rotation to attendhis grandmother�s funeral? Granting the leave may

well take personal courage on the part of the lead-ers, especially if the soldier is in a shortage job spe-cialty, but doing so would undoubtedly show sol-diers the integrity and honor of their seniors.

Conversely, leaders must take every opportunityto instill in soldiers the notion that they themselvesmust translate the seven core Army values into corefamily values as well. If the soldier fails to do so,no amount of outside help will keep his or her fam-ily together when the unit deploys. Thus, Army val-ues provide a rubric for understanding and minis-tering to soldiers� significant others, the third cord.�The relationships between seniors and subordinateswithin our Army should be based upon intimate un-derstanding. . . on self respect. . . and above all, ona close uniting comradeship.�17 This is not to saythat fraternization rules should relax or that every-one needs to like everything about everyone else in theunit. However, leaders, by personal example andthoughtful education of subordinates, can make adifference when it counts the most by simply rec-ognizing that, to a new soldier, that unit constitutes

the whole Army. The commander becomes thesoldier�s impression of what commanders in theArmy essentially are. The soldier makes similar judge-ments about the first sergeant and other leaders.

To the new soldier, everything from the standingoperating procedures regarding passes to the way theunit conducts motor stables reflects what the Armyas a whole is about. When it comes time to reen-list, the soldier makes a decision about a future inthe Army based upon his or her experiences in onesmall corner of it. That experience, in my view, ispositive only to the degree that the unit leadershave exemplified and promulgated the core Armyvalues.

Army values have an instrumental role in takingcare of the three cords of soldiers, but their impactextends beyond specific positive effects as a com-bat mutiplier. The values of loyalty, duty, respect, self-less service, honor, integrity and personal courage alsopossess intrinsic value, independent of any extrinsicgoods they might foster. Army values have deep,historic national roots. The day we renounce thesevalues we fundamentally alter our national identity.While the primary missions of the Army are to de-ter war through combat readiness and win war if itis forced upon us, the military also has another veryimportant mission. Because its members generallyinternalize the values they practice daily, a militaryserves as �a well from which to draw [moral] re-freshment for a body politic in need of it.�18 A per-son can be �selfish, cowardly, disloyal, false, fleet-ing, perjured and morally corrupt. . . and still beoutstandingly good [in many pursuits]. . . What thebad man cannot be is a good sailor, soldier or air-man. Military institutions thus form a repository ofmoral resource which should always be a source ofstrength within the state.�19 Army values shape thatrepository as they shape the force. MR


MANY OF THE MILITARY�S efforts are di-rected toward developing, refining and pro-

curing hardware. Less effort is being made, however,to profiling personality styles of the successful pro-fessional soldier. What makes a good �war asset�?This article asserts that the military is composed oftwo fundamentally different types of individuals,each with unique advantages and weaknesses. Bothtypes are always present in the military populationto a greater or lesser degree. Times of peace favorone style; conflict favors the other. Unfortunately,US military forces tend to enter conflict with an in-correct balance of these types, thus suffering greaterinitial losses than necessary, due as much to inad-equate leadership as to failed hardware. This trag-edy is both predictable and preventable.

Psychologists have labeled and developed testsfor many different personality characteristics. TheAmerican Psychiatric Association lists approxi-mately a dozen types of personality disorder, includ-ing proposed and established entities, in their Diag-nostic and Statistical Manual.1 A personalitydisorder is said to exist when the individual has onlya limited number of coping strategies, some ofwhich may be dysfunctional, and is diagnosed onlywhen the style causes �significant difficulty in so-cial or occupational functioning.�2 Individuals withpersonality disorders have difficulty prospering inthe military. Military life, with its frequent changesin job and locale, requires considerable flexibility,which the disordered individual usually lacks.

A consequence of having any sort of personal-ity, however, is having a personality style. Thesestyles mirror the traits that, in extreme forms, arelabeled disorders. Some of these traits are becom-ing popular terms, such as �narcissistic� and �his-trionic,� while others are less commonly used. Thelabels capture a certain style of being that colorshow people think, act and react � the decisions

they make and why they make them.To provide a nonpejorative label to these groups,

I will use an idea coined by the American Psychi-atric Association in their diagnostic manual, whichgroups these different styles into three major group-ings, or clusters.3 Cluster A comprises people whoare described as odd or unusual. Cluster B is a col-lection of styles of people prone to externalizing,who deal with psychological tension by directing itoutward toward the external world. Cluster C con-tains people prone to anxiety, who tend to internal-ize (worry, ruminate) about their conflicts. To ap-ply common labels, for example, most introverts arefound in cluster C and most extroverts are found incluster B, although this is only one aspect of theirstylistic difference.

On the whole, the military is composed of healthyand effective individuals. Many of the most dysfunc-tional styles are weeded out early. This includesnearly all of cluster A population. The styles seen inabundance among the career military, therefore, aremainly representatives from clusters B and C. Psy-chologists would tend to label cluster Bs as mildlyAntisocial or Narcissistic. Those individuals who arein cluster C are mainly variants of the Obsessive-Compulsive or Dependant Personality styles.

The military is composed of twofundamentally different types of individuals,

each with unique advantages and weaknesses.Both types are always present in the military

population to a greater or lesser degree. Timesof peace favor one style; conflict favors the

other. Unfortunately, US military forces tend toenter conflict with an incorrect balance of

these types, thus suffering greater initiallosses than necessary.



There are differences in how effectively individu-als employ a given personality style. Most trial law-yers, politicians, police officers and juvenile delin-quents, for example, all share the same basic stylebut differ in how effectively they employ it to meettheir needs. One noted psychologist, HarrisonGough, rates individuals not just by style but on howwell they have obtained the best qualities of thatstyle.4 Each person taking his �California Psycho-logical Inventory� is rated on a seven-point scale ofactualization as well as being classified as to type.A prison inmate may thus be a cluster B at level 1 �a successful politician may be a cluster B at level7. For purposes of comparison, I would like to con-

sider people of equal caliber: matched on intel-ligence and other measures of effectiveness butdiffering in fundamental personality style.

Type B Type CAdventuresome DependableImaginative ConscientiousInnovative Detail OrientedDaring PunctualDecisive Selfless

The table above lists the positive features of eachstyle. Their limitations are that they possess to alesser degree the features listed for the other style.A cluster C personality style is motivated mainly byharm avoidance. To dip briefly into psychologicalphraseology, he has a substantial superego, withmany internalized values, which drives him to dothings to avoid the anxiety that comes from threat.This threat may be either from their internal con-science or from fear of imagined external conse-quence. In contrast, his comrade with cluster Bdynamics is less disabled by anxiety and is moti-vated mainly by mastery and goal attainment. Toput it concisely, one style strives to obtain the posi-tive, the other strives to avoid the negative.

To apply this to the military, it has long been rec-ognized that a peacetime army differs in many waysfrom that of an army at war. This is intuitively ob-vious: destruction of personnel and equipment, evenenemy equipment and personnel, is somewhat an-tisocial. To plan the ultimate defeat of an entirearmy or nation on the battlefield requires at least adose of narcissism. Therefore, those personalityattributes that make for a war �hero� are primarilyfrom cluster B. These people do not function as wellin garrison � such individuals thrive on challengeand require constant stimulation.

By contrast, cluster C individuals do thrive ingarrison. Their reasons for joining the military aredifferent, as are their motivations for staying. Clus-ter B individuals are drawn by the potential for ex-citement and adventure. Cluster Cs are drawn tothe security of the military system, the guaranteedemployment and often by a sense of duty or obli-gation. For some, the attraction is not much differ-ent from that of any other civil service position.

The tension between wartime and peacetime per-sonalities is therefore unavoidable. The variablesat play in the peacetime Army tend to attract andmaintain cluster C individuals while repelling andpunishing cluster B personnel. There is often littleopportunity for rapid advancement or glory in ourpeacetime Army, and people seeking these thingswill move on to more promising employment. In

One of Patton�s early evaluations read:�This officer would be invaluable in time of warbut is a disturbing element in time of peace.�He failed to be selected for Command andGeneral Staff School, a prerequisite for

advancement, and languished as a major untilhe was 49. . . . Likewise, Dwight Eisenhower

began the war as a colonel with very littlechance of promotion to brigadier. When things

changed, they changed very swiftly.

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Major General George S.Patton Jr. training armoredforces in the southernCalifornia desert prior tothe invasion of NorthAfrica, summer 1942.


an era when one recorded slip, or one bad mark endsa career, only those who cautiously make no errorscan survive. In a zero-defects environment, harmavoidance rules.

As an extension of this observation, the longer amilitary is at peace, the more pronounced this ten-dency becomes, until a fully �peacetime army,� witha peacetime force structure, has developed. Thisdoes not appear to be a quick process. There is al-ways a fresh supply of both types of individuals atthe entry level, but as differential promotion takesplace, the mid and upper levels shift. In previouseras, it may have taken two decades to complete thistransition. Under today�s rules of promotion, it maytake less than a dozen years.

Is this shift undesirable? A military composedof largely cluster C individuals offers fewer disci-plinary problems and will score higher on mostmeasures of garrison function. Yet history has re-peatedly shown us what happens when a peacetimearmy goes to war. The phenomenon is so frequentas to be the rule rather than the exception.

Cluster C individuals often have great difficultywith two things�taking risks and making decisions.David Shapiro wrote eloquently of the problemsfacing an individual with one of the cluster C styleswhen asked to make a decision: �Among the ac-tivities of normal life, there is probably none forwhich this style is less suited. No amount of hardwork, driven activity or willpower will help in theslightest degree to make a decision. . . .What dis-tinguishes obsessional people in the face of a deci-sion is not their mixed feelings, but rather in the factthat these feelings are so marvelously and perfectlybalanced. In fact, it is easy to observe that just atthe moment when an obsessional person seems tobe approaching a decision, just when the balanceseems to be at last tipping decisively in one direc-tion, he will discover some new item that decisivelyreestablishes that perfect balance.�5

Sometimes a decision can be reduced to follow-ing a rule or a formula, which they will do quitewell. However, the ambiguity and �fog� of warmake such rules hard to follow. An army can beground to a standstill by layers of frozen, immobileindividuals afraid to make a mistake.

Doctrine, a sometimes-useful set of guidelines, isalso a prosthetic device for the decisionally im-paired. Doctrine will sometimes cover for the clus-ter C�s indecisive nature but excellent ability to fol-low rules. The peacetime proliferation of rules risesin frequency with the percentage of cluster C indi-viduals in power. Such over regulation usually

worsens the disaster to come: rules stifle innova-tion, �prepare for the last war,� and are usually moregeared to garrison management than battlefield lead-ership. On the eve of the Spanish American War,

retired General William T. Sherman, observing thewreckage of his once-proud army, wrote that �a gen-eral to be successful would have, as we did in 1861,to tear up his Army Regulations and go back to firstprinciples��which was what eventually happened.6E.K.G. Sixsmith, writing of Eisenhower, notes thatwherever he served, �he hated anything that savoredof war department rigidity or inflexibility.�7

General Ulysses S. Grant recognized precisely thedichotomy of men this paper addresses. He wrotein his memoirs, �It did seem to me, in my early armydays, that too many of the older officers, when theycame to command posts, made it a study to thinkwhat orders they could publish to annoy their sub-ordinates and render them uncomfortable. I noticed,however, a few years later, when the Mexican Warbroke out, that most of this class of officers discov-ered that they were possessed of disabilities whichentirely incapacitated them from active field service.They had the moral courage to proclaim it, too.They were right; but they did not always give theirdisease the right name.�8

Both the Civil War and World War II graphicallyillustrate the disaster of an initial lack of leadership.Many of the Union�s best officers deserted to theSouth, but during the war�s opening months, manyobservers thought the Army of the Potomac couldwin in �three months.� Instead, its fearful leaderswere paralyzed and humiliated. It fell to Grant, aman employed at the war�s conception as a clerk inhis father�s store, who had failed at farming, real es-tate and an attempt at elected office, to turn the warto the North�s advantage.9

Much the same happened during World War II.Within a year of the war�s initiation, the leaders ofthe 1930s were replaced with men, not necessarily

On the whole, the military is composedof healthy and effective individuals. Many of themost dysfunctional styles are weeded out early.

This includes nearly all of cluster A population.Psychologists would tend to label cluster Bs

as mildly Antisocial or Narcissistic.Those individuals who are in cluster C are

mainly variants of the Obsessive-Compulsive orDependant Personality styles.

LEADERSHIP


younger, but different, who had languished in thepeacetime Army. General George S. Patton Jr. is anotable example. He suffered adverse officer evalu-ation reports throughout the 1920s and 30s. Oneof Patton�s evaluations read: �This officer wouldbe invaluable in time of war but is a disturbing ele-ment in time of peace.�10 He failed to be selectedfor Command and General Staff School, a prereq-

uisite for advancement, and languished as a majorfrom 1917 until he was 49. In 1938, he was placedin a terminal position and expected to retire, start-ing the war as a lieutenant colonel. Likewise,Dwight Eisenhower began the war as a colonel withvery little chance of promotion to brigadier. Whenthings changed, they changed very swiftly.

It appears that the rapid promotion of successfulleaders in time of conflict will usually favor the clus-ter B types: whereas the cluster B sees potential forgreat victory on the battlefield, the cluster Cs arepreoccupied with thoughts of avoiding great defeat.

If this pattern is repeated so often, why is it al-lowed to continue? For one thing, cluster B indi-viduals are not without their flaws. They tend todemand immediate gratification and be less reliablefor the completion of mundane tasks than their clus-ter C counterparts. Their primary positive attributeto a military force is their sense of invulnerability,which spurs them to attempt deeds that the morerational people might not.

Managing and Motivating by RewardsLTC José M. Marrero, US Army

As military professionals, we all face leadership andmanagement challenges. Among these, we have the re-sponsibility of appropriately rewarding our subordinates.But whom do we really reward? And, equally impor-tant, what kind of behavior and specific traits do we re-ward? Don�t we reward in many cases:l Fast work instead of quality work?l Noisy joints instead of quietly effective behavior?l Complication instead of simplification?l Busy work instead of smart work?l Mindless conformity instead of creativity?l Short-term Band-Aids or quick fixes instead of

solid and long-lasting solutions?l Appearances instead of realities?l Subordinates who are strictly �loyal� to us instead

of those who are also loyal to their own subordinates?Those in the last two categories are out to impress

the boss exclusively without paying much attention tothe people under them. Additionally, many rely moreon cosmetics and their theatrical abilities instead of ef-ficient, solid and long-lasting products. Certainly, whenwe reward a subordinate, we also reward and promotehis behavior throughout the unit. In other words, we sendan implicit message to all others: �These are the traitswe want to see in this outfit.� Consequently, we rein-force whatever behavior pattern we are rewarding, socommanders must look beyond appearances and cos-metics. Those who do can identify actors as well as ef-ficient workers and reward them accordingly.

Consider this scenario. A captain receives a less thanoutstanding officer evaluation report (OER) and hastrouble understanding why. After all, during the rating

period, he made sure the battalion commander saw himin action and saw his battery in the best light. He chattedwith the colonel, impressed him with astute observationsand joked around with him all to foster a closer rela-tionship. He took pains to show he was in control of ev-erything. He always had his uniform pressed and hisboots shined. Who deserved a better rating than he did?

He complains to the colonel, �This is the first timein my military career that I have received anything, well,less than outstanding on an OER. No one can questionmy loyalty to you. Every time you have asked me todo something, I was there. I came through, whatever itwas. And every time you�ve needed me, you couldcount on me. I don�t . . . and I don�t. . . .�

The colonel looks out the window, evidently takinga second or two to organize his thoughts. The colonelknows the captain well, and has listened attentively whileexpressly keeping from interrupting him.

Lining up his thoughts like high-explosive rounds, thecolonel fires them off: �You�ve said it! You�ve alwaysbeen there for me. For me�not for your subordinates.�The senior officer pauses, then continues, �Captain, youmust be loyal in every respect.�

�But sir, I have been loyal . . . ��Loyal? To whom? A loyal leader doesn�t just serve

his superiors! You cannot be loyal to me if you are notloyal to your soldiers! Genuine leaders take care of theirpeople all the time, even when the boss is not there. Doyou think the boss has to be present to know how you�redoing? How do you think I pegged you? A good unitnot only should look good but must be good! Take careof your men, Captain. That�s all.�

A cluster C personality style is motivatedmainly by harm avoidance. In contrast, his

comrade with cluster B dynamics is less disabledby anxiety and is motivated mainly by masteryand goal attainment. To put it concisely, onestyle strives to obtain the positive, the other

strives to avoid the negative. To apply this to themilitary, it has long been recognized that a

peacetime army differs in many ways fromthat of an army at war.


The accumulated peacetime inertia makes themilitary less likely to need its skills and increasinglyrecalcitrant to commit to combat. The cluster Bleader who believes in his troop�s superiority andtheir ability to succeed is unquestionably more likelyto advocate military engagement than is a cluster Cleader who would fear their defeat.

Is it possible to find individuals with the strengthsof both styles but without the weaknesses of either?At higher levels of functioning, both styles acquirethe ability to assume qualities of the other�a ve-neer of compulsiveness for the cluster B, a gung-ho facade on the cluster C. But stress tends to stripaway these veneers. The father of American psychol-ogy, William James, wrote in 1898 that �The Char-acter (personality) is set in stone by age 18, a con-tinuing truism.�11 Essame, in his review of Patton,wrote �the qualities essential in a commander andthose in a good staff officer are poles apart.�12 Thestyle of an effective staff member, �tactful, patient,reticent and diplomatic,� are simply not those of the

We should ask ourselves whether we reward the righttraits. Are we more impressed by people who talk abouttheir accomplishments or by those who let their workspeak for itself? Do we reward long work hours insteadof efficiency? Do we appreciate it when our leaders in-sist on modest, economical products, or do we prefer tosee our budgets wasted on window dressing that makestheir products look more attractive? Do we reward quan-tity or quality? Effusiveness or efficiency?

Every human being, regardless of intellectual capac-ity, is motivated by the possible consequences of his ac-tions. He does his work best when he expects to be re-warded. If every leader, however junior, can find a wayto motivate each of his subordinates, he can significantlyincrease productivity.

Motivating through rewards is a part of leadership,and rewards need not be written. Rewarding peoplewhile a project is under way often produces better re-sults than waiting until the project is completed. Simi-larly, giving a soldier free time is often a better or fairerreward than a medal. Simply giving a subordinate a�Well done!� may also be appropriate.

What a leader does or fails to do also communicatessomething to his subordinates. �Silence means consent�in more instances than just tactical situations�when aleader, for example, fails to correct a soldier who is outof uniform, he is practically giving him permission todo so. Likewise, every time we ignore the apparent la-ziness of a few soldiers while making our way througha training area, we are rewarding negative behavior. Onthe other hand, when a leader fails to reward asubordinate�s good behavior, he diminishes the value of

that behavior in the eyes of the subordinate, and he alsodiminishes the likelihood that the behavior will contin-ued. The next time we are moved to reward someone,let�s stop and think: Are we about to reward appear-ance or substance? We might even ask whether we mayhave shared in molding the wrong kind of officers.Could it be that the captain above started out on the righttrack, only to notice that those who sought their ownreward were the ones who received it?

Guided by the professional, and moral definitions ofloyalty, many officers live it to the letter, whether theyare properly rewarded or not. They focus on their unitmissions. They know what moderation and balancemean. They are tactful. They work instead of talking aboutwork. And no matter how successful they may be, theydo not become arrogant, lest they lose the proper focus.

Let�s take a good look at our units and soldiers, thenask ourselves again: Whom do we really reward?

The answer should reveal the traits we value most inour subordinates.

Lieutenant Colonel José M. Marrero is currently serv-ing as the US Southern Command desk officer, War PlansDivision, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, The Pen-tagon, Washington, D.C. He received a B.S. from the Uni-versity of Puerto Rico and an M.A. from Vanderbilt Uni-versity. He is a graduate of the US Army Command andGeneral Staff College. He has served in a variety of com-mand and staff positions in the Continental United States,to include foreign language instructor, US Military Acad-emy, West Point, New York; XO and S3, 1st Battalion, 78thField Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

combat leader.13 As I have repeatedly observed menwho rise to positions of authority by longevity alone,it is simply not possible to completely change one�sstripes, even when called upon to do so.

The solution for the future is not as simple as re-taining effective cluster B individuals in a peacetime

Doctrine, a sometimes-useful set ofguidelines, is also a prosthetic device for the

decisionally impaired. Doctrine will sometimescover for the cluster C�s indecisive nature but

excellent ability to follow rules. The peacetimeproliferation of rules rises in frequency with thepercentage of cluster C individuals in power.Such over regulation usually worsens thedisaster to come: rules stifle innovation,

�prepare for the last war,� and are usually moregeared to garrison management than

battlefield leadership.

LEADERSHIP


NOTES1. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition-Revised,

American Psychiatric Association Press, Washington, DC, 1989.2. Ibid.3. Ibid.4. Harrison Gough, Manual for the California Psychological Inventory, Consult-

ing Psychologists Press, Inc., Standford, CT, 1987.5. David Shapiro, Neurotic Styles, Basic Books, New York, 1965.6. Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the

Spanish-American War, University of Missouri Press, 1971.7. E.K.G. Sixsmith, Eisenhower as a Military Commander, Stein and Day,

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Russell is the commander, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62d MedicalGroup, Fort Lewis, Washington. He received a B.S. from the University of Washington and an M.S.and Ph.D. from Washington State University. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and Gen-eral Staff College. He has served in a variety of medical positions, to include joint medical planner andchief, Mental Health, 62d Medical Group, Fort Lewis; director, Neuropsychology Fellowship, TriplerArmy Medical Center, Honolulu, Hawaii; chief, Psychology Service, Womack Army Medical Center,Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Neuropsychology Fellow, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washing-ton, D.C.; and division psychologist, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis.

military; cluster C has a legitimate role. Through-out it history America has fought major armed con-flicts every 20 to 30 years. In some of these majorconflicts (1812, 1846, 1865, 1898, 1917, 1941,1950, 1965, 1990), disasters also befell Americanforces because of an overabundance of cluster Bsoldiers. Cluster C individuals provide order essen-tial to effective support and logistic functions. Lack-ing a standing army, a call to arms for an impend-ing conflict will attract mainly cluster B individuals.Without a standing infrastructure of support person-nel to maintain it, there will be substantial problemswith logistics, which will hamstring an army as ef-fectively as a lack of will to fight.

The Spanish American War serves as a prime ex-ample of the worst of both worlds, when a tiny bu-reaucratized and micromanaged peacetime Armywas overwhelmed by volunteers. Major GeneralRufus Shafter, a Medal of Honor winner, certainlydid not lack for fighting spirit. Teddy Rooseveltoutshone Shafter, not so much by spirit, but by theability to supply and equip his forces with privateand personal funds outside the hopelessly over-whelmed military logistic chain.

What, then, can be done to maintain a properbalance of these forces? Many suggestions couldbe made to correct this situation, but five seemmost salient:l Recognize that �leadership� is not a synonym

for �management.� Peacetime initiatives will likelyseek to make systems more �quantifiable�; inevita-bly these quantities will measure management ratherthan leadership. In peace or war, the ability to in-spire, motivate and, perhaps above all, the moralcourage to make tough decisions should be cher-ished and rewarded.l It is important to maintain funds for training,

deployment and opportunities for advancement.

l In adolescence those who will eventually growup to be our best leaders resemble German Shep-herd pups�they chew up the furniture. To groweffective leaders, the personnel system should allowpeople to recover from mistakes if they are other-wise laudable. Some of the best sergeant majors Ihave served with decry the fact that �zero defects�standards do not allow soldiers today to make thesame mistakes that they themselves were permitted.l It would not be possible today for good war

assets to maintain themselves in uniform more thana few years. The �up or out� policy rapidly elimi-nates effective wartime leaders and would have re-tired Patton sometime in the 1920s. It may be timeto reconsider this policy.l People naturally prefer the company of their

own types. However, these different styles are bothvital for a successful military in peace and war. Thenext major conflict may not permit the �handover�time from peace to war mix. The best and most ef-fective teams contain elements from both camps�respect for the strengths that other styles bring to ateam is our best strategy for maintaining the forcestructure for victory. MR

The Spanish American War servesas a prime example of the worst of both worlds,when a tiny bureaucratized and micromanagedpeacetime Army was overwhelmed by volun-

teers. Major General Rufus Shafter, a Medal ofHonor winner, certainly did not lack for fighting

spirit. Teddy Roosevelt out shined Shafter,not so much by spirit, but by the ability to supplyand equip his forces with private and personal

funds outside the hopelessly overwhelmedmilitary logistic chain.

New York, 1973.8. U.S. Grant, (1894) Personal Memoirs, AMS Press, New York, 1972.9. Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, Random House, New York, 1974.

10. Martin Gilbert, The Second World War: A Complete History, Henry Holt, NewYork, 1989.

11. William James, The Principles of Psychology, Henry Holt and Company,Dover, NY, 1890. Unaltered reproduction, Henry Holt, 1950.

12. H. Essame, Patton: A Study in Command, Charles Scribners Sons, NewYork, 1974.

13. Gerard Patterson, Rebels from West Point, Doubleday, New York, 1987.


Strategic planning has becomeextremely important in governmentorganizations. Unfortunately, manydo not understand what strategicplanning really is, nor do they havean idea about how to begin. VicePresident Al Gore recently said, �Atthe beginning of fiscal 1998, afterlearning from the pilot programs, allfederal agencies must develop 5-year strategic plans linked . . . tomeasurable outcomes.�1

Returning recently from a meet-ing with an official from an activity atmy installation, I was struck with theconcept of how little understandingwe have of the process of strategicplanning. This particular meeting�spurpose was to respond to a re-quest for facilitation of a �strategicplanning� workshop. As I listenedto what the official had planned forhis organization�refining goals,objectives and tasks for the next oneto three years�I realized it was notstrategic planning but some form oflong-range planning.

I commend the organization fortaking the time to develop a plan, butit was not strategic planning. Stra-tegic planning consists of creating afuture for an organization by discov-ering organizational purpose (whydo we exist?), developing organiza-tional values, creating a vision forthe future and developing strategiesto achieve that future state.

My experience working with lead-ers of major organizations indicatesthere are several reasons for prefer-ring long-range rather than strategicplanning. First and foremost is the�make it happen on my watch� ori-entation. This creates a tendency toplan only for the tenure of the reign-ing senior leader. Whether his touris for two, three or more years, planswill only endure for the length of theleader�s tenure and will change asrapidly as do the leaders.

True strategic planning sessionsfocus on tomorrow and how things

could be better than the way theyare. We are comfortable with thedaily problems associated with workand gain much satisfaction from do-ing �things� daily. But how mucheffort is directed toward a futurestate 10 to 25 years hence?

Trying to create or describe a fu-ture state is often outside the �com-fort zone� and written off as unreal-istic or unachievable; thus, noattempts are made to plan for the fu-ture. Instead, the focus is on wherewe are today and how we shoulddeal with today�s problems. Solu-tions to today�s problems are stillfocused on the present state.

Long-range planning dependsheavily on our experience of the re-cent past and our sense of what isrealistic. This keeps us in a presentstate of mind. Strategic planning haslittle to do with past experiences ordaily tasks and problems. Long-range planning, sometimes calledoperations planning, is quite differ-

ent and begins with today�s re-sources, problems, demands, con-straints and opportunities. It uses aseries of extrapolations of pastevents modified by judgment andapparent necessity to create a pic-ture of what can be expected in thefuture.

Both kinds of planning mightcover the same time frame and in-volve strategy development. But,while long-range planning startswhere you are and works forward,strategic planning begins with thefuture and works backward. Bothperspectives are useful, althoughthey frequently result in differentand even contradictory views of thefuture.

Making the BestDecisions Today

Strategic planning presumes thefuture and is based on the assump-tion that we can create a future thatis desirable, one that is different from

InsightsRM

Idealistic Strategic Planningby Lieutenant Colonel Michael Bell, US Army, Retired


our present and one that is ideal.Unfortunately, traditionalists resisttrue strategic planning as a waste oftime and effort. They describe it as�pie in the sky� and unrealisticthinking. It would be nice to have atleast one structure to follow thatwould afford the organization theopportunity to create its future andwhich might transcend senior leadertenure and love of the present state.

Strategic planning is a normativeapproach to thinking about the fu-ture. You create a dream, then makeit happen. It is quite literally invent-ing the future by imagining it first,then working to bring the imaginedinto reality. Everything the organiza-tion does or does not do is based onthe dream and the plan to make ithappen.

Clearly, there are several ways oflooking at the future. One is to lookat what is real; another looks at whatis ideal. The transformation processorganizations might undertake to-ward creating the desired future isimbedded in the strategic planningprocess.

Realistic strategic planning be-gins with what one really wants tohappen, unencumbered by life tasks,problems or limitations. Organiza-tional members describe what thefuture will be with respect to purpose(why we exist), culture, environment,demands, constraints and opportu-nities. Organizational values are dis-cussed in terms of behaviors thatmust be demonstrated and which willfacilitate achieving the future. All ofthese culminate in a vision of the fu-ture. Mission clarification, in termsof what we should do and should notdo, is discussed. This process en-ables us to put our vision into ac-tion. All of our efforts, resources andenergies are then focused toward thevision.

From Vision to ActionThere are several steps in the Vi-

sion-to-Action Process. They in-clude determining organizational val-ues, purpose and vision; analyzingthe mission; and determining goals,objectives and tasks.2

Organizational values. To deter-mine the organization�s values, mem-bers must reach agreement on howthey will behave with and toward

one another and what it is theyvalue. The process requires theyfirst share personal values; for ex-ample, family, religion, security orhonesty. By sharing personal val-ues, they prepare themselves to dis-cover and define things they collec-tively value, such as successful,structured, powerful, caring andmeaningful work.

Because values tend to be ab-stract, members must reach agree-ment on some form of statement todescribe the behaviors associatedwith the values. These �normativestatements� lend clarity to the be-haviors we each expect and defineour actions in relation to the values.Without normative statements, wehave nothing more than �bumpersticker� statements.

Organizations that do not definetheir values leave much to misinter-pretation. Leaders and followersalike are accused of not �walking thetalk,� so to speak. Normative state-ments provide a behavior that is ob-servable.

Organizational purpose. Oncethe organization has created and de-fined those things it collectively val-ues, it must answer the question,�Why do we exist?� Purpose placeseverything into context for the orga-nization. A statement of organiza-tional purpose should quickly andclearly convey how the organizationfulfills its need. Purpose need onlybe meaningful and inspirational topeople inside the organization; itneed not be exciting to all outsiders.

We should not do anything inconflict with our purpose. All our

resources and efforts should sup-port our purpose. The purposeshould be unique and enduring. Itshould separate us from other orga-nizations. Also, it must be somethingmore than �We serve to perform ser-vice X to customer Y.�

Many confuse purpose with mis-sion. Missions have a finish line.Purpose defines �why�; mission de-fines �what.� The Civilian Leader-ship Training Division, part of theCenter for Army Leadership, definesits purpose as, �Cutting Edge Lead-ership Services for America.� Thestatement transcends the presentstate and focuses organizationalmembers to provide a culturalchange in the way leadership is pre-sented and how it is executed.

Organizational vision. A visionis a picture of the future we seek tocreate described in the present tenseas if it were happening now. A state-ment of �our vision� shows wherewe want to go and what we will belike when we get there. There aremany ways to create a vision. Theleader might provide the vision, ormembers might create one. Both willwork, but the latter provides moreownership by organizational mem-bers.

Why bother to create a vision?Many realists see this process as awaste of time and effort. What se-nior leaders really want is for theirorganizations to remain viable andproductive, and we cannot do itwithout the so-called �soft stuff.�People, what they value individuallyand collectively, as well as the visionis what energizes leaders. It is notjust the work.

Without a vision, we truly just re-act and are not in a place to be pro-active. So why bother? There areseveral reasons.l Because we want superior per-

formance. We talk of self-managedwork teams or empowering people,but no matter what words we use,they express the same fundamentalpurpose�getting the best perfor-mance out of each person.l To improve quality. Vision al-

lows members of an organization tocommit to providing total quality inall they do.l For our customers. If we can

genuinely satisfy customers and be

Lieutenant Colonel David M.Bell, US Army, Retired, works inthe Civilian Leadership TrainingDivision, Center for Army Leader-ship, US Army Command andGeneral Staff College. He receiveda B.A. from Texas A&I University.He served in a variety of commandand staff positions in the Continen-tal United States. Beyond facilitat-ing the Organizational Leadershipfor Executives Course, he alsoserves as a consultant to majorArmy commands in the develop-ment of vision and strategies fortheir organizations.


a real resource to them, we can allfeel great about the service we pro-vide.l For an energized, committed

organization. With drawdowns andreduced resources, it is important toprovide a clear vision to employeesthat will energize them and makethem willing to commit to the organi-zation. Without doing so, employ-ees cannot make the contributionsof which they are capable. Mostwant to contribute to the fullest ex-tent; the vision gives them some-thing to which they can contribute.l To lead the organization

through periods of change. If thereis one thing we face continuously, itis change. People with a vision re-act more quickly in a changing envi-ronment, because they can antici-pate what is going to occur�whichis different from trying to predict thefuture. Vision allows us to create thechanges we want to occur.l Because the times demand it.

Think back five years. What wereyou doing? Think back 10 years.Now think ahead 10 years. Can youdo it? You had better! By develop-ing your vision you will actually becreating what you want your futureto look like, instead of merely react-ing to it.l Because we want it. We each

bring our own level of commitmentand presence to this process. Butthe most compelling reason I cangive for developing a vision is be-cause of wanting to work in an orga-nization that has one.3

Leaders by themselves are neveron time or on budget. Managers bythemselves never do anything inno-vative like creating a vision. Organi-zational leaders should understandthere is a difference in their work andmanagement�s work. Leaders owethe organization a clear picture ofthe future it wants to create andclear strategies backed with logic to

enable their achievement. Manage-ment can then create specific steps,timetables and budgets to implementstrategies, clearly focusing on theoutcomes desired and the necessarybudget. Not allowing budget con-straints and daily problems to cloudplanning efforts is important.

Once the team creates a vision, itmust be put into action. All leaders�and managers� efforts should be fo-cused on the vision. If efforts do notsupport the vision and strategies,the initiative is not resourced. Priori-ties might change, but this shouldnot affect the purpose or vision. Ifthere is a clear purpose and vision,people will see the connection to thestatements and ideals. In the Army,civilians are key, because they holdthe organization�s institutionalknowledge. They provide the con-tinuity and connection to the vision.

Creating a vision that will with-stand changes in priority and leader-ship is important, as is educatingnew leaders as they come on board.The Vision to Action Model takesinto account all aspects that affectplanning and vision. It provides amethodology to move from �justwords� to a plan infused with actionand energy.

Mission analysis. Viewing theorganization from a systems per-spective, we see that the missionusually comes from the environ-ment; that is, the higher organization.We must take the time to analyze thethings we do that truly support thepurpose and vision and those thatdo not. �Shadow missions��things we do that consume all ourtime but which do not support themission�must be eliminated.

The mission, with the vision,helps us develop strategies to closethe gap between what we want andwhat we now have. We must look atthe organization�s culture and cli-mate to develop strategies. We must

first describe the problem. Culturepermeates all we do and is subtle initself. Climate is readily understood,while culture is misunderstood. Wemust describe both as we want themto be in the future and how we knowthey currently are.

Goals. Organizational leaders andthe organizations they lead shouldbe goal oriented. Most of us tend tobe task or daily routine oriented.Task orientation gives us great sat-isfaction of accomplishment, butgoals move us toward the future. Ifleaders are not goal focused, whowill be? Without idealistic goals, weare only living day to day. In the ab-sence of shared goals, people tendto create their own, which can becontrary to the organization�s.

Objectives and tasks. Almost alldivisions, branches, teams andgroups work on organizational goalsand create goals for themselves.These can also be classified as ob-jectives. Teams and groups createmeasurable objectives to support anorganization�s goals. These are thentaken to the organization and madepart of the strategic plan. This cre-ates a sense of ownership and com-mitment.

Finally, individuals work on tasksthat need to be accomplished in sup-port of stated objectives and goals.Employees should be allowed tocontribute at all levels. Their abilityto do so is a result of their compe-tence and commitment and will givethem a personal investment in theorganization. MR

1. Vice President Al Gore, quoted in �GovernmentPerformance Management Review Act from Red Tape toResults: Creating a Government That Works Better andCosts Less,� Report of the National Performance Review,7 September 1993, revised 10 September 1993, 73.

2. Developed by David M. Bell, Civilian LeadershipTraining Division, Center for Army Leadership, US ArmyCommand and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,Kansas, 1991.

3. MG Robert Orton, opening remarks, StrategicPlanning Conference, US Army Training and SupportCommand, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 1995.

Green Fields Beyondby Lieutenant Colonel Drew Bennett, US Marine Corps

We shall attack through the mudand blood of the trenches and tothe green fields beyond.

�British concept for tanksduring World War I1

The ongoing revolution in militaryaffairs assures us that tomorrow�sworld will be radically different fromthe world we know. To prevent ourmilitary from becoming obsolete,

Joint Vision 2010 describes a frame-work for dealing with the challengesof the future and provides a templatefor the evolution of our ArmedForces. The vision, based on

NOTES

INSIGHTS


emerging technology, prescribes in-formation superiority and uses fouroperational concepts: dominant ma-neuver, precision engagement, fo-cused logistics and full-dimensionalprotection. This vision foresees jointforces using technology to dominatean opponent across the range of mili-tary operations; that is, full-spectrumdominance.

While Joint Vision 2010 acknowl-edges the importance of qualityforces in terms of people, leader de-velopment, training and readinessand first-rate equipment, it does notaddress how that quality force willreact to the unexpected. In the rap-idly changing security environment,joint combat readiness depends onhow our forces solve problems. Un-fortunately, when it comes to solvingmilitary problems, many serving injoint billets spend too much time at-tempting to sell their services. Qual-ity forces must evolve beyond thismyopic thinking to maximize forcecapabilities in 2010. Joint forces arecertain to encounter the unexpected.Therefore, in addition to developingthe technologically advanced opera-tional capabilities outlined in JointVision 2010, they must develop a cer-tain ethos. The future will demandmore than just a high-tech military;the United States needs a joint forceof problem solvers.

The concept, development andemployment of British tanks to breakthe costly stalemate of trench war-fare during World War I is one ex-ample. The early history of the tankprovides useful insight into jointproblem solving. Lessons from thiscase study can enhance the humandimension of Joint Vision 2010 andincrease future combat readiness.

The Tank ConceptThroughout history many leaders

attempted to combine mobility, pro-tection and firepower. Examples in-clude Ramses III�s chariots,Hannibal�s elephants, Attila�s battlewagons and Leonardo Da Vinci�s ar-mored shell. Modern tanks becamefeasible with the development of thecombustion engine and improve-ments in steel plating, promptingseveral people to advocate the useof tanks. However, it took more thanjust concepts and technology to

move from feasibility to actuality.In 1914, events brought together

problem solvers who had the driveand vision to push beyond conceptto reality. British mining engineerHugh Marriott visualized the militarypotential of the Holt tracked vehicleafter seeing it demonstrated inAntwerp, Belgium. He passed hisobservations to British engineer of-ficer Lieutenant Colonel ErnestSwinton, who believed the Holtcould be converted into a trench-crossing machine that could be usedto break the deadlock on the West-ern Front. While on leave, he passedhis observations to Secretary of theCommittee of Imperial Defense Colo-nel Maurice Hankey. They agreedto forward the idea.

On 26 December 1914, Hankeywrote a memorandum summarizinghis idea. This document becameknown as the Boxing Day or Hankeymemorandum.2 Hankey suggestedusing armored vehicles to carrytroops, smash trenches and overrunmachinegun positions. First Lord ofthe Admiralty Winston Churchillread the Boxing Day memorandumand, on 5 January 1915, wrote toPrime Minister Herbert Asquith re-questing a committee be formed toresearch the idea. This request wasapproved, and the Admiralty Land-ships Committee was formed.3

During World War I, the militarywas searching for ways to movequickly beyond the stalemate in thetrenches to the �green fields be-yond.� This deadlock was not iden-tified until after the start of the war,and even then many senior militaryand political leaders believed thatcommitting another million menwould be the solution. This groupwas able to conceive only of top-down solutions that reinforced thecurrent paradigm.

The idea of the tank resulted froma different way of thinking. Theconcept was just as much abottom-up idea advocated by enthu-siasts seeking sponsors as it was atop-down idea from senior plannersand staff officers soliciting feasibil-ity input. More important, it was amajor shift from the contemporaryparadigm. Instead of using more in-fantry or more artillery to achievegreater attrition, the tank provided a

unique solution focused on mobility.

Tank DevelopmentInitial development of the tank fell

to the British Navy and Naval AirService until the Landships Commit-tee was formed. Even then, therewas little support from the War Of-fice. It was not until 1 July 1915 thatthe War Office submitted specifica-tions and requirements for the pro-posed tanks. On 30 July 1915, de-sign and production requests weresent to William Tritton, the managingdirector of the company that manu-factured the Foster-Daimier tractor.

In September, responsibility forthe tank project was turned over tothe Ministry of Munitions. The firstprototype, �Little Willie,� did notmeet requirements and experimentscontinued. The second prototype,�Mother,� was successfully demon-strated on 2 February 1916. Secre-tary of State for War Earl Kitchenerreportedly remarked that it was a�pretty toy.� The War Office or-dered 50. After a successful demon-stration to King George V, the orderwas increased to 100. The tank,now designated the Mark I, wouldundergo numerous modificationsbased on performance in the field,evolving into the Mark VIII beforethe end of the war.4

Lack of resources hamperedGermany�s tank production. Com-mitted earlier to building a blue-water fleet along with an armada ofsubmarines, German industry wasexhausted. The tightening Britishblockade aggravated this condition.Also, 8th Army Commander and later

Lieutenant Colonel Drew A.Bennett, US Marine Corps, is battal-ion commander, 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, 29 Palms, California. Hereceived a B.A. from Tulane Univer-sity, an M.S. from Golden Gate Uni-versity and a Ph.D. from TexasA&M University. He is a graduateof the US Marine Corps Commandand Staff College, the School of Ad-vanced Warfighting and the ArmedForces Staff College. He hasserved in a variety of command andstaff positions in the ContinentalUnited States, Lebanon and Kuwait.He is a frequent contributor to mili-tary journals.


Chief of the General Staff Paul vonHindenburg did not like the tankidea. Although the Germans did pro-duce about 20 tanks, they were moreinterested in using captured tanksand developing antitank weapons.5

Tank EmploymentDuring the war, many British offic-

ers wrote papers on tank employ-ment and advocated ideas such asusing large numbers of armored andmotorized �heavy rollers� or �de-stroyers� equipped with machine-guns in successive surprise attacks,supported by infantry, artillery andair, to breach wire, clear trenches, de-stroy machinegun positions, attackheadquarters and fight other tanks.6Unfortunately, their advice was ig-nored by the commander of the Brit-ish Expeditionary Force, Field Mar-shal General Douglas Haig, theGeneral Staff planners and localcommanders who executed the op-erations. Haig viewed the war inNapoleonic terms�a breakout fol-lowed by a horse-cavalry pursuit ofa defeated army.7

Similar to artillery or engineers,tanks were generally seen as auxil-iary support for infantry. Tank crewswere often rushed to the battlefieldwithout proper training, coordinationor maintenance. On 15 September1916, strategic surprise evaporated inan attack on the Somme when only49 tanks reached the starting point.A mobile reserve of tanks was neverformed; they were parceled out toinfantry units. Cavalry either outranthe tanks or were cut to pieces. In-fantry often failed to protect theirtanks, sending them to take and holdobjectives on their own.

The first major tank victory wasthe Battle of Cambrai on 20 Novem-ber 1917. Originally planned as araid, the Cambrai offensive em-ployed over 300 tanks. The attackwas a tactical surprise in that it didnot have the usual extensive artillerypreparation. Also, tanks and infan-try extensively trained before thebattle. At the end of the first day, thetanks had broken through the fourenemy trenches and penetrated 4miles into the enemy rear, unheard-ofsuccess at that time. Unfortunately,without a tank reserve and at thelimit of their operational reach, the

Allies were vulnerable to a counter-attack that recaptured most of theterrain. Drawing the wrong conclu-sion altogether, several senior com-manders blamed the tanks for theirfailure to hold the ground they haduncovered.

The most successful World War Itank attack was the Battle of Amienson 8 August 1918, which has beencredited with breaking the confi-dence and will of the German Su-preme command.8 Finally, some ofthe lessons learned and advice fromthe �problem solvers� were imple-mented. Over 400 heavy and me-dium tanks supported by supplytanks and gun carriers were used.The tanks had wireless radio setsand fought with air, artillery and in-fantry in a well-integrated combinedarms effort.

Why did the British have suchtrouble employing a weapon capableof ending the war? For one thing,the tank and tank corps were per-ceived to threaten the infantry�s ex-istence. This belief was com-pounded by the narrow view ofofficers who were trained for and re-mained in the same regiment andwho, therefore, had little experienceof anything outside their area of in-terest. While we tend to idolize thestability and cohesion of the �regi-mental tradition,� its sterility ofthinking and dogmatic adherence tostatus quo significantly hinderedtank evolution.

Another factor that retarded ac-ceptance of the tank was the failureto accept advice from below, articu-late it and apply it as doctrine. TheGermans did not have this problem.German Chief of Staff of the 8thArmy Lieutenant General ErichLudendorff�later the quartermastergeneral�often went to front-linetroops for solutions to problems.Under his direction, information fromhis visits and after-action reportswas used to create a new doctrinefor the defense.9

The British also believed that win-ning the war was always just aroundthe corner, one push away. Haigwas willing to give up the surprisecreated by using the few tanks avail-able because he believed those fewmight be all that were needed to fi-nally break through to defeat the ex-

hausted German army. However, aninflexible military system locked intradition found it difficult to incorpo-rate the new weapons or to changetactics. The result was that the Al-lies fought a costly war for one ormaybe even two years longer thannecessary.

Joint Forces Relevance toCombat Readiness

British attempts to use the tank inWorld War I illustrate the unex-pected problems an armed force canface when changing technologies,doctrine, tactics and force structurein a joint environment where thereare competing demands and limitedresources. At the strategic level, thetank�s concept and developmentmarked a victory of innovation overbureaucracy. At operational andtactical levels, it was often a failureof change to overcome tradition.Several lessons from this historicalexample apply to the joint forces� fu-ture combat readiness:l Most problems impact the en-

tire joint force, not just one service.l Problem identification and so-

lutions can come from anywhere.l The joint force must integrate

solutions throughout the entireforce.

Joint Vision 2010 says, �The na-ture of modern warfare demands thatwe fight as a joint team.� Rarely willa problem only affect one service.The more we synchronize joint ser-vice efforts to improve overall effec-tiveness, the more the services be-come dependent on, not independentof, one another. Even in World WarI, Germany�s priority of resources totheir navy and the British blockadeof German ports adversely affectedtheir tank development. The great-est British successes came with co-ordinated tank and air employment.Today�s symbiotic relationshipamong land, sea and air forces willincrease as the range, guidance andlethality of weapons increase.

Because military problems affectall services, joint forces must accessall available talent when confrontinga pressing issue. However, as thepace of operations increases, thetime available to identify and solve

INSIGHTS


problems decreases. Even so, thisprocess must be thorough�top-down, bottom-up and side-to-side. Service parochialism can befatal; as resources decline we mustfight the instinct to protect serviceturf. Instead, we must produce themost efficient and effective solutions.

Problems that affect the entireforce require solutions that apply tothe entire force. If future joint forcesare to be more effective and respon-sive due to significantly improvedcommand and control based onfused, all-source, real-time intelli-gence, greater interoperability andmore detailed synchronization, wemust have a system that integratesthese throughout the force. Solu-tions that are not fully developedand integrated will not resolve theproblem.

Relevance toJoint Vision 2010

Incorporating these lessons inpreparing for the future requires ajoint environment that encouragesproblem solving. Regardless of howmuch we increase joint operationalcapabilities, we will still encounterthe unexpected and need people

able to look beyond the �regimentaltradition� of service parochialism. Inthe race to keep up with emergingtechnologies, we must not forget thehuman dimension. More and moretechnology will not win the next war,just as more and more men did notwin World War I. The next conflictwill be won by innovative and deter-mined people who use technologyto overcome unexpected obstacles.

While Joint Vision 2010 providesa direction toward which the ser-vices can evolve, the services alsoneed direction for developing futureleaders and a joint ethos.10 Withoutdiluting service traditions or cohe-sion, joint force members must tran-scend past perspectives to reach themost effective, efficient and widelyapplicable solutions. To this end,Joint Vision 2010 should articulatethe joint ethos�the distinguishingcharacteristic of all joint servicemembers�of problem solving. Thatwould be the first step in orientingservice members and separate mili-tary services toward the attitude re-quired to achieve full-spectrum domi-nance.11

Developing a joint force able tothink out of the box, identify prob-lems, find solutions and integrate

them on the battlefield should be apart of the joint vision and wouldgreatly influence the future combatreadiness of joint forces. We knowwe must keep up with technologyand update tactics, techniques andprocedures to get to the green fieldsbeyond. When confronted with themud and blood of future warfare, theattitude of our force will determinewhether we reach our goal. MR

1. Attributed to LTC J.F.C. Fuller, this is the unoffi-cial motto of the Royal Tank Corps, whose colors andregimental tie contain brown, red and green to representthe �mud,� �blood� and �fields.�

2. In Great Britain, the day after Christmas is knownas Boxing Day because �boxes� or presents are given toerrand boys, mail carriers and other employees.

3. Guy Hartcup, The War of Invention: ScientificDevelopment, 1914-1918 (New York: Brassey�s, 1988),82-83.

4. Ibid., 85-86.5. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire-

power: British Army Weapons and Theory of War�1904-1945 (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1995),137; B.H. Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol 1 (New York:Praeger, 1959), 45; Hartcup, 91.

6. J.F.C. Fuller, �Plan 1919,� Toward Combined ArmsWarfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine,and Organization (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Stud-ies Institute, 1984), 321, 329-33; Liddell Hart, 24-25,57-59, 92-94.

7. Allan R. Millet, ed., Military Effectiveness, Vol IThe First World War (Boston: Unwin and Hyman, 1987),20.

8. Liddell Hart, 185.9. Timothy T. Lupfer, �The Dynamics of Doctrine: The

Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the FirstWorld War,� Leavenworth Papers, No 4, FortLeavenworth, 1981, 8-21.

10. Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, �Emer-gence of the Joint Officer,� Joint Force Quarterly, Au-tumn 1996, 57.

11. Liddell Hart, 13; Hartcup, 81-82; Richard M.Ogorkiewicz, Armor (New York: Praeger, 1960), 141.

Between 1950 and 1952, 138,600Guardsmen made up 43 percent ofthe Army force. The US ArmyNational Guard (ARNG), includingeight divisions, three regimentalcombat teams (RCTs), 98 battal-ions, 67 companies and 94 detach-ments, received mobilization or-ders in 1950.

Like the regular Army and theorganized reserve corps, theARNG was not ready for war; allhad serious problems with man-power, equipment and training.The performance of guard unitswas like that of regular and reserve

units�a few excelled, most weregood to adequate, and a few failed.And, like regulars and reserves, aguard unit�s performance rested onleadership, training and acceptanceof service.1

The 1950 Army NationalGuard

In June 1950, the best guard unitswere cadres that could quickly ex-pand into combat-ready units. Be-cause the Army had mobilized or de-leted every guard unit during WorldWar II and discharged all guardsmenafterward, the guard had to reorga-

nize and begin training every unit inthe new troop list. Congress andPresident Harry S. Truman providedenough funding to fill only 350,000of the 617,500 positions in the post-war ARNG, forcing the NationalGuard Bureau (NGB) to place unitson reduced tables of organization(TOs).

As with regulars, most guardunits did not have full complementsof required equipment, and whatthey did have was often obsolete orworn out. Army planning, based onWorld War II experience, assumedthere would be sufficient time for

Army National Guard: Korean War Mobilizationby Captain William M. Donnelly, US Army Reserve

NOTES

AlmanacRM


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mobilized guard units to receiveenough recalled reservists, traineddraftees and equipment to bringthem to full strength and to conductadequate predeployment training.2

In 1950, the quality of unit leader-ship was uneven. Most general andsenior field grade officers had ex-tensive guard or reserve service oractive-duty experience from one orboth world wars. Many had gradu-ated from special guard versions ofArmy post-commissioning school-ing. The majority of company gradeand some junior field grade officershad received commissions duringWorld War II, but often not in theirpostwar guard branches. Few hadattended the �associate� versions ofbasic and advanced courses, andthose lacking wartime service in theirbranch had experience only inweekly drills and two weeks of sum-mer field training.

Many units with links to the 1940troop list retained a cadre of provenofficers; units without such links of-ten had trouble finding trained, expe-rienced officers. In some units,World War II veterans dominatedsenior noncommissioned officer(NCO) ranks, and the majority of en-listed men were drawn from thosewho had been too young to partici-pate in World War II. These recruitsbrought great enthusiasm but alsocreated problems, especially person-nel turbulence.3

The young enlistees� greatest ef-fect was on unit training. The NGB�sthree-year training plan was keyed toa three-year enlistment tour and fo-cused on individual soldier skills.While some units held additionaldrills for staff training, the two-weeksummer field training was often theonly opportunity for staff and unitcollective training.

An Army Field Forces (AFF) re-port noted that with continuous per-sonnel turnover, �it is doubtful if thetraining and overall efficiency of theguard will ever reach its desired stan-dards.� Variations in competenceamong officers and NCOs, equip-ment shortages, inadequate armor-ies, few training areas, failure to fill allregular Army instructor billets andtime constraints further complicatedtraining management.4

Mobilization and theManpower Shortage

During July 1950, the Armystripped its general reserve in theContinental United States to provideEighth Army reinforcements and re-placements to be deployed to Korea.By early August, the cupboard wasnearly bare. The Army had to orderthousands of inactive and volunteerreservists to Korea. Planning hadallotted many of these reservists tomobilized guard units, so most units,except those slotted in autumn 1950for Korea, did not receive all the re-servists needed to fill junior officer,NCO and technical specialist posi-tions. Because the training basecould not expand fast enough toserve guard units as well as theEighth Army, almost all guard unitsreceived untrained draftees for en-listed fillers.5

Under an extension of the 30 June1950 Selective Service Act, guardunits could be ordered into federalservice for 21 months. Concernedabout economic and political reper-cussions, the Army staff worried thatan already overstretched Army couldnot supply the necessary equipment,fillers and training support. Somedoubted guard units could be readyin time to influence events in Korea.Another concern was that guardunits sent to Korea would be un-available for other contingencies.Because of the continuing bad newsfrom Korea, the need to rebuild thegeneral reserve and the need tobuild an antiaircraft artillery (AAA)defense of the zone of the interior(ZI) should the war expand intoWorld War III, Army leaders con-cluded they would need to use atleast a portion of the guard.6

The AAA units were predominatein the first two increments of alertedunits.7 Other nondivision units in-cluded field artillery, maintenance,truck, engineer, signal and severalother types of battalion and groupheadquarters companies and de-tachments. The period between alertand induction was three to fourweeks. The Army G3 earmarked anumber of non-AAA units duringAugust and September, but theArmy�s success at the battle ofInchon led planners to delay their

deployment.As the Eighth Army moved deeper

into North Korea, six guard truckcompanies and two truck battalionheadquarters received orders to de-ploy as reinforcements for the sag-ging logistic system. Chinese inter-vention emphasized the EighthArmy�s shortage of nondivisionunits, and in December 1950 andearly January 1951, nine field artillerybattalions, six combat engineer bat-talions, three bridge companies,three maintenance companies andthree headquarters detachmentsfrom the guard received orders forKorea.8

Many regulars doubted guard of-ficers could prepare and lead a divi-sion, and they feared political tur-moil would result if a guard divisionsuffered heavy casualties. The de-pleted general reserve overrodethese concerns, and on 31 July, Chiefof Staff General J. Lawton Collins or-dered four divisions and two RCTsinto federal service to cover base ar-eas such as Iceland and Alaska.Collins did not want to violate thedivisions� integrity�with the risk ofcausing a political storm�to pro-vide units for this mission whenseparate RCTs were available. Armyfield forces had recommended whichguard divisions to select, rankingthem on the basis of their personnelstatus, training status and theAFF�s evaluation of their leadership.However, only two of the four divi-sions were to come from the AFF list

Captain William M. Donnelly,US Army Reserve, works at the USArmy Center of Military History,Fort McNair, Washington, DC. Hereceived a B.A. and an M.A. fromthe University of Michigan and aPh.D. from Ohio State University.He has served in a variety of posi-tions in the Continental UnitedStates, including battery executiveofficer, assistant S3 and batterycommander, 3d Battalion, 92d FieldArtillery, Akron, Ohio; commander,660th Transportation Company,Cadiz, Ohio; and supply and ser-vices officer, 423d Corps SupportBattalion, Warren, Ohio. His activeduty service was with the 2d Infan-try Division and the 24th InfantryDivision (Mechanized).


because Collins and Secretary of theArmy Frank Pace Jr. believed spread-ing the burden equally across thenation was important.9

Young enlisted guardsmen lookedforward to the adventure and excite-ment of active duty. The manyWorld War II veterans, most onlythen hitting their stride as civilians,reacted with apprehension and res-ignation softened some by the com-fort of serving with friends andneighbors. Many guardsmen agreedwith 45th Infantry Division com-mander Major General James C.Styron: �There�s a rich heritage inthe Thunderbird history, and al-though it may be a dubious honor, itstill is an honor to be considered oneof the nation�s best outfits.�10 Se-nior guardsmen and supportive poli-ticians expressed traditional con-cerns over the use of the unitsbecause it would be necessary tobreak up guard divisions, replace se-nior guard officers with regulars andstrip guardsmen from their units, vio-lating the slogan that had becomethe guard�s major selling point: �GoWith Those You Know.�

Editorial opinion generally viewedpartial mobilization as a necessary, ifunwelcome, development and cel-ebrated the citizen-soldier tradition.Partial mobilization created problemsfor guardsmen not mobilized; someemployers would not hire those whomight soon be in federal service.11

Before induction, some units pro-moted officers and enlisted men orcommissioned NCOs as second lieu-tenants. Not all regulars thoughtthis helpful, believing it moved someguardsmen beyond their level ofcompetence.12 The alert notice au-thorized units to run recruiting cam-paigns. The success of these cam-paigns varied, but only a few unitsreached full TO strength. Lossesusually cancelled out gains. Theguard�s success in enlisting youngermen backfired. Army regulationsprohibited induction of soldiersyounger than 17. The 45th InfantryDivision had to discharge 1,218 sol-diers�16 percent of its enlistedstrength. The next most commonreason for discharge was failing theinduction physical.13

Other losses occurred because of

deferments and the extensive confu-sion about deferments. Units oftenlacked copies of appropriate Armyregulations and received conflictingguidance from higher echelons.Governors and adjutants generalusually tried to insulate the processby appointing a board of officers tohear requests. These measures didnot prevent appeals to politicians forassistance, but governors usuallydeclined to override a board�s deci-sion.14

Postmobilization Trainingand Turbulence

The AFF plan for units� postmob-ilization training had two phases.On arrival at a training site, unitswere to conduct basic training forjunior enlisted guardsmen, prepareofficers and NCOs as future trainers,integrate reservists and regular fill-ers, send guardsmen to variousArmy schools and receive draftee fill-ers. Nondivision units were then toconduct the Army Training Program(ATP); divisions were to follow theAFF Master Training Program(MTP). The ATP and MTP beganwith individual soldier skills andmoved through collective training ateach echelon, with progress measuredat each echelon using Army Train-ing Tests (ATTs). The MTP con-cluded with combined arms exercisesat RCT and division levels.15

Units encountered multiple sourcesof friction during postmobilizationtraining. Most locations lacked ad-equate buildings, supplies, staffsand ranges and were not prepared toact as training sites.16 Some staffssaw guard units as convenientsources of manpower. Fort Lewis,Washington, stripped 40 percent ofthe 300th Armored Field Artillery(FA) Battalion�s enlisted strength tofill units going to Korea�eventhough the 300th itself was also onorders for Korea�then backfilledthe 300th with soldiers stripped fromnon-FA units. Administrative con-cerns crippled other units. Becausethe corps artillery headquarters atCamp McCoy, Wisconsin, could nothandle the paperwork load for 10guard and reserve units, Fifth Armyplaced these units under the postcommander, an infantryman with nei-ther the experience nor staff to prop-

erly supervise artillery ATPs.17

Planning for postmobilizationtraining assumed there would be atotal mobilization as there had beenduring World War II. Thus, MTPand ATP results projected inad-equate levels of equipment and re-pair parts. Units submitted requisi-tions to fill these shortages, but smallstockpiles and Eighth Army�s needsmeant few units completed the train-ing program with a full set of equip-ment and supplies. This created sig-nificant difficulties for both individualand collective training and placedextra wear on available equipment.18

The greatest source of frictionwas personnel turbulence. Unitssent guard officers and NCOs toArmy schools, which was a goodlong-term investment, but doing soleft many units with a serious num-ber of vacancies in leadership andkey technical positions. Some unitshad to delay training until enlistedfillers trickled in. Some units begantraining without their fillers. Theunits would later have to establishad hoc basic training elements totrain and integrate new personnel.19

Because of the Army�s limited train-ing base and the demand for re-placements, many guard units be-came emergency supplements to itstraining system; after completingindividual training, recruits wereshipped overseas.

The relentless demand for re-placements led to levies. Units usu-ally tried to fill the levies with reserv-ists or with their first set of enlistedfillers. In February 1951, the 28th In-fantry Division lost 3,000 enlisted fill-ers to a levy; a month later it lost an-other 3,000. Sometimes a levy�srequirement, such as rank or skill,forced a unit to fill it with guardsmen,which created resentment.

Other turbulence came from withinas commanders sought to fill posi-tions with the best-qualified people.In some units, commanders shuffledsubordinate leaders to break uphometown connections. Some se-nior guard officers in divisions weretransferred to positions outside theunit, replaced either by promotedguardsmen or regulars. Divisioncommanders also relieved battalionand regimental commanders whoseunits failed ATTs�a painful but


necessary duty: �We dropped anumber in spite of our friendship be-cause we knew we had to have top-notch officers in every instance.�20

Concerned about the 28th and43d Infantry divisions� readiness todeploy to Germany as part of theNATO buildup, AFF ordered them toparticipate in Exercise SOUTHERNPINE, held at Camp MacKall, NorthCarolina. AFF observers praised theskill and discipline of individual sol-diers, higher level staff work and theability of both divisions to learn frommistakes. However, both divisionsreceived extensive criticism of unitperformance and of their combinedarms operations. Observers attrib-uted these problems to NCO and jun-ior officer inexperience and disrup-tions created by levies.

The AFF recommended that bothdivisions conduct intensive trainingat battalion level and lower beforedeploying. AFF chief General MarkW. Clark wrote: �Naturally, when wefollow our national military policy ofplacing our faith in our citizen units,we do not get the same results withcivilians as division commanders aswe do with carefully selected regu-lars. However, I am satisfied withboth of them. Both are playing thegame, working hard and, I believe,will do a good job. They have seenthe light and requested the relief ofcertain of their key subordinateswho could not measure up to theirresponsibilities.�21 Third Army com-mander Lieutenant General John R.Hodge wrote that both divisionswere �basically in far better shapethan were the divisions I saw in anyof the 1941 maneuvers, either Na-tional guard or regular� and that they�are reasonably ready to go.�22

Korea, Germany and the ZIFourteen percent of mobilized

guard units served in the Far East,11 percent deployed to Europe aspart of the NATO buildup and 73percent remained in the ZI. Those inthe ZI were assigned to either thegeneral reserve or to the Army Anti-aircraft Command.23

Guard officers held most seniorand many junior positions, and en-listed guardsmen usually leavenedthe greater number of draftee and re-servist fillers. The nondivision units

in Korea during early 1951 performedas well as their regular counterpartsand provided the Eighth Army withfield artillery, engineer and transpor-tation support critical to defeatingChina�s spring offensives.24

Commander of the Far East Com-mand General Matthew B. Ridgwayplanned to leave the 40th and 45thInfantry divisions in Japan andtransfer their soldiers into the EighthArmy as individual replacements.Collins, believing this plan wouldcreate a political storm by implyingthe Army did not trust its MTP toproduce combat-ready units, vetoedthe idea and directed the divisionsto replace two regular ones in Korea.Between December 1951 and Janu-ary 1952, guard divisions swappedlocations and equipment with the1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry divi-sions and remained guard in charac-ter until June 1952, when their lastguardsmen rotated home.

Despite regulars� doubts, guarddivisions performed as well as otherUS divisions in the frustrating war.The divisions were on two learningcurves: one for all units new to com-bat and one for conditions particu-lar to the war. Much of the latter�raiding, patrolling, field fortifications,high-angle indirect fire�had notbeen stressed in the MTP, but thedivisions responded. They estab-lished extensive training programs,formed special patrol groups, closelysupervised subordinate units andcirculated lessons learned.25

Guard units sent to Germanyjoined Seventh Army�s rigorousround of practice alerts; field train-ing; large-scale, multiunit exercises;and ATTs. Despite busy trainingschedules, many units, especiallyservice support units, had to battleagainst �garrison mentality� and�short-timer�s syndrome� as guards-men, reservists and draftees gotcloser to their release dates.26

By mid-1951, limited national mo-bilization, the rotation program inKorea and the NATO buildup cre-ated a severe manpower crisis.Guard units in Germany and Ko-rea�preparing for the loss of theirguardsmen, reservists and 1950 draft-ees�complained of the insufficientnumbers and low quality of replace-ments. To maintain their effective-

ness, divisions established internalschools, and all units created on-the-job training programs to enhancenecessary skills.27 Almost all regu-lar, reserve and guard units in the ZIattempted to remain combat effec-tive, but they were targeted as a richsource of trained manpower for over-seas units, useful additions to thestill-insufficient Army training sys-tem and convenient units in whichto �store� short-timers.28

The press of the manpower di-lemma was unrelenting. While onExercise LONG HORN, at FortHood, Texas, the 163d Military Po-lice (MP) Battalion lost seven offic-ers and 105 enlisted men. Its com-mander noted that these numbers�reflected approximately the samelosses the organization might havesuffered in combat without replace-ments.� Even the AAA Commandwas not exempt. During 1951, it hada 46-percent turnover.33 Morale suf-fered. In May 1951, a warrant officerwrote that those selected to fill lev-ies in his battalion were �not too en-thusiastic about going; however,they�re adopting what seems to bethe only attitude to take��What theHell�.�29

In 1950 and 1951, communities re-alized that mobilization of their unitswas an undesirable but necessarymeasure. Protests centered on per-ceived unfairness, which mainly con-cerned World War II veterans serv-ing again on active duty, and fearsthat regulars would mistreat guards-men. Among guardsmen, bitternessover this issue never approachedthe intensity found among involun-tarily recalled inactive reservists.But, it did increase, especially amongthose sent overseas after the warstalemated and college draft defer-ments began.

The fear that regulars would mis-treat guardsmen was a hardy peren-nial. Guardsmen and their support-ers were not shy about usingadjutants general or home-state poli-ticians to redress grievances. Collinsremained sensitive to political impli-cations of using Reserve Compo-nents, but clearly, on issues consid-ered crucial by regulars�whichunits to mobilize or deploy and thestripping of units�guardsmen andtheir advocates lost. For example,

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In 1951 Lieutenant LeonardKimmick Jr., of the 21st Infantry Regi-ment, had a dream. As the men ofhis regiment climbed the steep Ko-rean hills, burdened with weapons,ammunition, grenades, rations, bed-rolls, ponchos and shelter halfs, heenvisioned a better future�a futurewith whirling wings. Assign helicop-ters, he proposed, as an organic partof infantry battalions under the con-trol of the battalion motor officer. Ahelicopter could haul the men�s extraequipment to a captured objective,resupply ammunition and quicklytransport wounded back to the bat-talion aid station.1

Even in 1951, Kimmick�s dreamwas not fantasy. US Army groundforces had been using organic fixed-wing aircraft for some time. The fieldartillery had obtained its own aircraft,labeled air observation posts, inJune 1942. Each firing battalion offield artillery, division artillery andartillery group headquarters re-ceived two L-4s, militarized versions

of the popular Piper Cub. Eventu-ally, artillery sections at corps, fieldarmy, army group and theater alsoreceived aircraft.

Aircraft also proved valuable inroute reconnaissance, column con-trol, commander and staff transport,courier work, aerial survey, aerialphotography, radio relay, emergencywire laying, emergency medicalevacuation and emergency resup-ply.2 These successes led the WarDepartment to expand the programbeyond the field artillery with thebegrudging acquiescence of theArmy Air Forces.

By 1951 seven branches of theArmy had aircraft, but a lack of suit-able landing areas in Korea, the num-ber of aircraft in a division and theirincreasing performance led many di-vision commanders to establish pro-visional aircraft companies. In Janu-ary 1953, Eighth Army developedexperimental tables of organizationand equipment (TOE) for divisionalaviation companies, which func-

tioned as administrative rather thantactical units. They contained 26 air-craft.3

The introduction of helicoptersadded greater flexibility, complexityand controversy to a subject that of-ten struck sparks between the Armyand the Air Force.4 As early as De-cember 1943, Headquarters, ArmyGround Forces (HQAGF), expressedan interest in replacing L-4s withlight observation helicopters. Then,in early 1945, the Army GroundForces Equipment Board called foran extensive program of light, me-dium and transport helicopters aswell as observation and armed heli-copters. Although the War Depart-ment set aside these recommenda-tions, in 1946 the Army began testingthe Bell YH-13 helicopter as a po-tential replacement for fixed-wing, light observation aircraft.Added funds generated by the Ber-lin crisis allowed the Army to buy alimited number of production units in1948. They began reaching units in

Organic Tactical Air Transport, 1952-1965by Edgar F. Raines Jr.

when an Oklahoman protested or-ders sending his division to Japan,Styron pointed out that a guard unitin federal service was �under Armyorders and will go wherever it is as-signed.�30

Today�s ARNG differs in signifi-cant ways from that of 50 years ago.But, it remains the Army�s reserve ofcombat units and is an important linkbetween the Army and the Americanpeople. As the regular Army be-comes smaller, the guard�s impor-tance increases. Should the Army beengaged in war or suffer serious ca-sualties and reverses, we mightagain have to address the concernsCollins faced in Korea. MR

1. This article is based on William M. Donnelly, �Un-der Army Orders: The US Army National Guard Duringthe Korean War,� Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State Univer-sity, 1998; John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and theNational Guard (New York: Macmillan, 1983), 209; Na-tional Guard Bureau (NGB), �Induction and Release ofArmy National Guard Units, 1950-1956,� copy at the USCenter of Military History, Washington, DC.

2. Command Report, Record Group 407, NationalArchives, College Park, Maryland (RG 407, NA); JohnM. Kendall, An Inflexible Response: United States ArmyManpower Mobilization Policies, 1945-1957, Ph.D. dis-sertation, Duke University, 1982, 52-77, 116-31; Mahon,198-205.

3. Donnelly, Chapter 1.4. NGB, �Notes and Comments for Unit Command-

ers�The Three-Year Training Plan,� draft, Army Deci-mal File, Box 1102, Record Group 168, National Archives,College Park, Maryland (RG 168, NA); Inspection Re-port, �Report of Staff Visit to National Guard Units of Texasand Oklahoma,� 11 January 1950, Box 26 (RG 337, NA).

5. James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: TheFirst Year (Washington, DC: Center of Military History,1972, reprint 1992), 120-22; Kendall, 180-83, 206-10; Ri-chard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the Citi-zen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Re-serve, 1984), 94-100.

6. Schnabel, 122-23; Kendall, 172-73.7. NGB, �Induction and Release.� The AFF did not

maintain the integrity of AAA groups and brigades. In-stead it selected units based on unit readiness ratings.Most group and brigade headquarters arrived at train-ing sites to take command of units with which they hadnot worked.

8. NGB, �Induction and Release�; William Berebitsky,A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Ko-rea, 1950-1953 (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books,1996), 14-25, 268-69; Schnabel, 134-36.

9. Schnabel, 122-25. The Chief of Staff�s selectionsmeant that each of the six numbered armies in the ZI pro-vided either a division or an RCT. Two of the four divi-sions mobilized in 1951-52 came from the AFF list.

10. MG James C. Styron, quoted in �45th to Train atCamp Polk for Duty: Recruits Are Sought,� The DailyOklahoman, 2 August 1950.

11. Donnelly, Chapter 2; COL William B. Rose, �Train-ing the National Guard,� student thesis, US Army WarCollege, Carlisle, PA, 1954.

12. Donnelly, Chapter 2; Command Report, 1950, Sec-ond Army, Box 943 (RG 407, NA).

13. Memorandum from NGB Information Office forGEN Robert John Fleming Jr., 27 November 1950, �Re-port on Divisions and RCT�s Inducted into Federal Ser-vice,� File 325.452 General, National Guard BureauDecimal File 1949-1950, Box 1083 (RG 168, NA); UnitCommand Reports for 1950 (RG 407, NA).

14. Donnelly, Chapters 2 and 7.15. Unit Command Reports, 1950 and 1951 (RG 407,

NA); Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, �Master Train-ing Program for National Guard Divisions,� 15 October1950, NGB Decimal File 1949-1950, File 353 General,Box 1107 (RG 168, NA).

NOTES

16. Command Report, 1950, 28th Infantry Division (RG407, NA); Command Report, 1950, 45th Infantry Division(RG 407, NA); Command Reports, 1950, 703d, 705th,713th and 715th AAA Gun Battalions (RG 407, NA).

17. Ibid.18. COL James J. Winn to Chief, AFF, �Report of Visit

to Artillery Units, Fort Hood, Texas, Camp Carson, Colo-rado, and Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, memorandum, 17January 1951, Box 41, Inspection Reports (RG 337, NA);Command Reports, 1950 and 1951, 245th Tank Battalion(RG 407, NA); Command Reports, 1951, 703d, 705th,713th and 736th AAA Gun Battalions (RG 407, NA).

19. Donnelly, Chapter 6.20. Daniel B. Strickler, Memoirs of Lieutenant General

Daniel Bursk Strickler (Lancaster, PA: Forry and Hacker,1972), 168; Donnelly, Chapters 3 through 6.

21. GEN Mark W. Clark to LTGs Edward R. Brooksand Stephen J. Chamberlain, Letters, 23 August and 5September 1951, Box 34, Inspection Reports (RG 337,NA); GEN Mark W. Clark for GEN J. Lawton Collins,Subject: �Suitability of Major General Kenneth F. Cramerfor Continuation in Command of the 43d Infantry Division,�Memorandum, 1 October 1951, AFF Decimal File 1951-1952, Box 38 (RG 337, NA).

22. LTG John R. Hodge to GEN Mark W. Clark, Let-ter, 27 August 1951, Box 34, Inspection Reports (RG337, NA); �Army Games Show Many Deficiencies,� TheNew York Times, 29 August 1951.

23. The Adjutant General�s Office, �Directory and Sta-tion List of the United States Army, 4 September 1951,�copy in US Army Military History Institute; NGB, �Induc-tion and Release.�

24. Donnelly, Chapter 3.25. Donnelly, Chapter 4; Berebitsky, 135-75, 211-33.26. Donnelly, Chapter 5.27. Donnelly, Chapters 3 through 5.28. Kendall; monthly report �Readiness Dates of Ma-

jor Units in the U.S.,� File G3 322, Record Group 319,National Archives, College Park, Maryland (RG 319, NA);�Army Faces Wide Cuts,� The New York Times, 17 July1952; �TAC Units to Give Basic,� Army Times, 6 Sep-tember 1952.

29. Donnelly, Chapter 6; Berebitsky, 251-52; Wilfrid O.Boettiger, An Antiaircraft Artilleryman from 1939 to 1970(privately printed, 1990), 125.

30. Donnelly, Chapter 7. The quote is from �45th WillKeep Training, Grant Short Furlough,� The Daily Okla-homan, 25 February 1951.


the continental United States in1949.5

That same year, the Office of theChief of Army Field Forces, the suc-cessor to HQAGF, generated re-quirements for light-, medium- andheavy-lift helicopters. The ArmyStaff approved the creation of fiveexperimental transport helicoptercompanies in May 1950. However,intense opposition from the Air Staffdelayed procurement of these heli-copters until 1951.

There were no Army helicopters inthe Far East when the Korean Warbroke out, but US Air Force and Ma-rine Corps helicopter units soon ar-rived in theater. On a time-availablebasis, they evacuated wounded sol-diers and Marines from the frontlines. The first Army helicopters todeploy were part of a Medical Ser-vice Corps aviation detachment as-signed to support a mobile army sur-gical hospital.6

The increasing number of heli-copters assigned to Eighth Armymade it possible for the field army,corps and even division headquar-ters to receive one or more observa-tion helicopters. Commanders andtheir chiefs of staff used the helicop-ters to visit subordinate headquar-ters, survey the front lines and bet-ter understand the terrain immediatelyin front of their units. In 1952, theDepartment of the Army (DA) as-signed 10 observation helicopters toeach division, making helicoptersmore available for the liaison and re-connaissance missions they were al-ready flying. While observation heli-copters could provide emergencyresupply for front-line units, theircargo capacity was necessarily re-stricted.7 The Sikorsky H-19 Chick-asaw, a utility helicopter, with a pay-load roughly comparable to thefixed-wing Beaver, first reached unitsin the continental United States in1952.8

From the beginning, the Armyplanned to organize aircraft into fairlyhomogeneous Transportation Corpsaviation companies consisting oftwo observation and 21 transporthelicopters. Eventually, they wouldbe grouped into battalions and as-signed to field army headquarters forattachment to subordinate units dur-ing operations. DA programmed 12battalions, each consisting of three

companies, for activation over thenext five years.9

Because the small helicopter in-dustry used essentially handcraftproduction methods, the Army hadto spread its orders over a number ofcompanies and purchase a variety ofdifferent models to attain its goal.Within two years the Army acquireda second utility helicopter, thePiasecki H-25 Army Mule; two lightcargo helicopters, the Piasecki H-21Shawnee�irreverently referred to asthe �Flying Banana��and theSikorsky H-34 Choctaw; and a me-dium cargo helicopter, the SikorskyH-37 Mojave. However, some timepassed before they reached troopunits in any number.10

The helicopter�s chief advan-tages for the Army were its verticaltakeoff and landing capability, shortrange and relatively slow speeds.Helicopters could operate from nor-mal Army depot and troop areas andbe controlled directly by the user.Chief of transportation Major Gen-eral Frank A. Heileman, who was re-sponsible for maintenance and pro-curement of Army helicopters,recognized their tactical uses, but hefocused on their logistics impact.This emphasis reflected both his ad-ministrative responsibilities and theArmy�s limited experience with heli-copters.11

In the years immediately afterWorld War II, the Marine Corps hadpioneered the tactical employmentof helicopters. Marine CommandantGeneral Alexander A. Vandegriftformed a provisional helicoptersquadron at Quantico, Virginia, totest the idea of substituting helicop-ters for amphibious landing craft.Thus, when the Marine Corps en-tered the Korean War, it possessedthe outlines of a tactical doctrine andconsiderable practical experience inmass helicopter flights.12 The Armyhad monitored the Quantico experi-ments, but it did not gain experiencein using helicopters en masse until1952 when it formed the 6th and 13thTransportation Companies (Helicop-ter), equipped with H-19s.

Marine Corps helicopters mountedthe first helicopter-borne movementof troops in combat in OperationSummit on 21 September 1951 mov-ing 224 Marines from their marshal-ling area to the objective within

eight minutes. Although the Army�slogistic use of helicopters had ma-tured by war�s end, its tactical expe-rience with them, apart from aero-medical evacuation, remained slight.13

The Korean experience heavilyinfluenced helicopter operations inthe immediate postwar years. Am-bushes behind the lines, a restrictedroad net and broken terrain com-bined to encourage the Army to in-creasingly rely on both fixed- androtary-wing air transport in the com-bat zone, which normally was de-fined as from 50 to 100 miles indepth. Here Army aviation had fo-cused and would continue to focusits operations.14

Others during this period soughtto integrate helicopters into patrolwork. One author proposed makinga transport helicopter organic to theinfantry regiment�s intelligence andreconnaissance platoon. The USArmy Infantry School at Fort Ben-ning, Georgia, studied the use of he-licopters in raids, although it wasnot yet prepared to endorse theconcept.15

By early 1956, instructors at theUS Army Command and General StaffCollege (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth,Kansas, had developed tentativedoctrine for an infantry division tocommand and control offensive heli-copter operations. Because trans-port helicopters were grouped inbattalions under the direct control offield army headquarters, the divisionG3 contemplating a raid would haveto request helicopters for the raidingparty from higher headquarters.Then, the G3 would have to arrangethrough joint channels for fightercover in case the raiders ran intotrouble. Because the helicopterswere not armed, raiders could notconduct an assault landing into aprepared position; they would haveto land unopposed as close as pos-sible, then move over land.16 In ad-dition, without organic firepoweraboard helicopters, raids would haveto be conducted within division ar-tillery range to provide preparatoryfires and defensive fires if necessary.Thus, the raids would have to beshallow and entirely tactical inscope.

One way out of this dilemmawould be to use helicopters asweapon carriers. The US Army Field

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Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma,began experimenting with transport-ing 105-millimeter howitzers by heli-copter. The school quickly discov-ered that a 105-millimeter howitzercould be disassembled into threesling loads and transported by anH-19. However, it took nine H-19s tomove one gun, one gun crew andsufficient ammunition. With prac-tice, disassembly and re-assembly ofthe gun took 20 minutes on eachend of the trip. Although cumber-some, this technique made it pos-sible for a patrol to operate beyondthe divisional artillery zone and stillenjoy organic fire support.17

This early attempt at integratinghelicopters with minor infantry op-erations suffered from organiza-tional, doctrinal and equipment defi-ciencies. Successful raids andpatrols depend on being able to re-spond rapidly to an ever-changingsituation. The bureaucratic coordi-nation required to bring raiders, heli-copters and fighter aircraft togethersuggested that the response in com-bat would be anything but timely.Subsequent experience would showthe need for suppressive fire on thelanding zone between the lifting ofartillery fires or close air support andthe troops actually landing. Finally,the equipment was hardly ideal. Thefirst generation of transport helicop-ters was barely satisfactory. Lift ca-pacity was limited. Moreover, theywere vulnerable to ground fire andlacked self-sealing tanks and armor.Also, high levels of field mainte-nance support were required.

As the CGSC faculty refined em-ployment concepts, a technicalbreakthrough occurred in 1951 asthe Navy flight-tested a gas-turbine-powered helicopter. Subse-quently, the Army Staff contractedwith Bell Helicopter to develop a tur-bine-powered craft that eventuallybecame the UH-1, familiarly knownas the Huey. Bell flight-tested thefirst copy in November 1956, and theArmy received the first productionmodels in late 1959.18

The organizational problem wasresolved in 1953 when CGSC instruc-tor Lieutenant Colonel John M.Kinzer proposed that an infantry di-vision could make an air assault us-ing helicopters alone. The key, heargued, was developing an eight-

ton, heavy-lift helicopter, the size re-quired to move a 155-millimeter how-itzer. The gas-turbine engine madehis vision possible.19

Major General James M. Gavin,former chief of the Army�s WeaponsSystems Evaluation Group, usingstudies developed during the KoreanWar, argued that the Army needed toemploy a helicopter force in a cavalryrole. Troops mounted in helicopterswould possess the necessary speedand agility to perform reconnais-sance and screening missions.Gavin asserted that firepower andtactical mobility had competedthroughout history with first onethen the other in ascendance. Theatomic bomb had given firepower atremendous advantage over mobil-ity. The helicopter would redressthe balance for the Army. Thesethemes�the need for an air cavalryforce and the importance of mobil-ity�permeated the Army�s rationalefor employing fixed- and rotary-wingunits for the next 10 years.20

Gavin�s invocation of the atomicbomb reflected the doctrinal fermentgoing on in the Army. Even as theKorean War raged, Army exercises inthe United States postulated the im-pact of atomic weapons on organiza-tion, equipment and tactics. Thenext war would be an area war, not alinear one. Even if the enemy chosenot to use atomic warheads, thethreat of their use would keep de-fenders dispersed. Logistics instal-lations would also have to remainsmall and scattered to avoid attract-ing an atomic attack.21

This model of future war had vastimplications for Army aviation ingeneral and organic tactical airtransport in particular. With friendlyunits scattered, early detection ofenemy forces in the division areabecame a priority and made somekind of sky cavalry absolutely es-sential. Helicopter-borne infantrywould conduct ground reconnais-sance, set up blocking positions andharass enemy columns. Divisioncommanders also needed a quick re-action force to fix an enemy columnuntil mechanized and motorized re-serves could converge to destroy it.Helicopter-mounted infantry couldmeet both needs. The dispersion ofdepots meant a field army com-mander needed more light and me-

dium fixed-wing transports withgreater cargo capacity and withslightly improved range. The newaircraft needed the same unimproved,short-field landing and takeoff char-acteristics as the Beaver.22

The sky cavalry concept causedcontroversy with the Air Force andwithin the Army itself when the firstprovisional unit deployed during Ex-ercise SAGE BRUSH in 1955. Itsemployment violated the Pace-Finletter agreement that defined thebattle zone. The Armor communitywanted helicopters attached tomechanized cavalry regiments toferry the infantry troops needed forground reconnaissance. The intelli-gence community wanted aircraftequipped with radar and infrared de-tectors to passively collect intelli-gence. The US Army AviationSchool at Fort Rucker, Alabama, ad-vocated a mix of armed helicopters,troop carriers and electronic collec-tion aircraft. This use eventuallywon out in the early 1960s.23

In contrast to the disputes aboutthe tactical employment of helicop-ters, the development of fixed-wingtransports proceeded without contro-versy. In 1953, the Army tested theefficiency of fixed- versus rotary-wingcargo aircraft and discovered theformer was more efficient for anyflight of more than 40 miles. De-Haviland of Canada remained theArmy�s manufacturer of choice forcargo airplanes. Its single-engineU-1 Otter could carry nine combat-loaded soldiers or 3,000 pounds ofcargo. In 1959, the first CV-2 Cari-bou entered the inventory. The Cari-bou, with a capacity for three tons ofcargo or 32 combat-loaded soldiers,possessed excellent short-field take-off and landing characteristics andcould operate in extremely primitiveconditions. When the first Cariboudeployed to Vietnam in 1961 for fieldtesting, Army aviators discoveredthe aircraft could operate out of all130 military airstrips in country. AirForce C-47s and C-119s could useonly 30.24

In response to the expanded roleenvisioned for airplanes and helicop-ters on the atomic battlefield, bothCGSC and the US Army InfantrySchool had reorganized their air-borne departments to give the em-ployment of Army aviation equal


weight in the curriculum with air-borne assaults. Each also assumedresponsibility for preparing doctrinalpublications. The Airborne-ArmyAviation Department at the InfantrySchool is credited with having pio-neered the term �air mobility� to re-fer to helicopter-transported infantryassaults. The Department of Air-borne Operations and Army Avia-tion at CGSC introduced the phrase�airmobile operations.�25

In 1960, DA organized the ArmyAircraft Requirements Review Board,commonly known as the RogersBoard after chairman Lieutenant Gen-eral Gordon B. Rogers, the deputycommander of Continental ArmyCommand (CONARC). Charged withprojecting the Army�s aviation-equipment requirements for the next10 years, the board concluded thatthe Army should continue to exploitlow-speed, low-level flight and pro-cure only aircraft that could use aus-tere forward airstrips.26

Of more immediate concern wasthe Army�s decision to abolish thePentomic division. Chief of StaffGeneral George H. Decker came tooffice in 1960 convinced that thepentomic division was unsuited fora conventional war. Among itsshortcomings, the division lackedmobility. The Army reorganizedaround the Reorganization Objec-tives Army Division (ROAD) con-sisting of three brigades, each withthree infantry battalions, and con-taining roughly twice the number ofaircraft as the Pentomic division.Aircraft were organized into an avia-tion battalion (its airmobile companycould move one infantry company ina single lift), an air cavalry troop aspart of the divisional reconnaissancebattalion and direct support aviationsections in artillery and brigadeheadquarters. The air cavalry troopwas the Army Aviation School�s oldsky cavalry troop under anothername.27

The new division was simply themost visible manifestation of a shiftin emphasis as Army leaders sawthey needed the ability to deter orquickly fight and win �brushfire�wars that if unchecked could spreadinto a general nuclear war. Increas-ing the Army�s tactical proficiencyand mobility became the primary

justification for Army tactical airlift.28

ROAD was the first of a series oforganizational innovations to affectArmy aviation during the 1960s.During the late 1950s, the ArtillerySchool had continued to experimentwith moving 105-millimeter howitzersby air, but now artillerymen couldmove an entire battery plus fire-control equipment. However, theystill had to break individual howit-zers into two sling loads. In 1959,the Army began procuring the VertolCH-47 �Chinook.� Powered by twogas-turbine engines, Chinooks couldlift an entire 105-millimeter howitzerin a single load. The Army receivedthe first test aircraft in 1961. Its ad-vent removed the most serious tech-nological constraint to forming anairmobile division.29

In the late 1950s, Colonel Jay D.Vanderpool, the officer responsiblefor developing the armed helicopter,prepared plans for a helicoptermounted division, which he briefedto the then director of Army avia-tion, Major General Hamilton H.Howze. Nothing resulted from hisproposal. However, Howze was latera member of the Rogers Board andtried, without success, to persuadethe board to examine alternativeconcepts of organization and em-ployment of Army aviation in addi-tion to equipment needs. He did suc-ceed in attaching a short appendix on�The Requirement for Air FightingUnits.�30

In 1962, Secretary of DefenseRobert S. McNamara directed DA toestablish a board to study innova-tive methods of employing the heli-copter. He designated Howze as itshead. Working through the summerof 1962, the Howze Board, techni-cally the Tactical Requirements Mo-bility Board, recommended that theArmy immediately field three stan-dard �type� aviation units: an airassault division equipped withenough organic helicopters tomove one infantry brigade and sup-porting elements in a single lift, anair transport brigade capable of sus-taining an airmobile division exclu-sively through an air line-of-communications, and an air cavalrybrigade in which every member ofthe organization was helicoptermounted and all equipment was heli-

copter transportable.31

Faced with these radical propos-als, the Department of Defense(DOD) directed DA to further test theair assault division and air transportbrigade concepts. The Army acti-vated the 11th Air Assault Division(Test) and the 10th Air Transport Bri-gade, equipped with Caribous andChinooks, at Fort Benning in Febru-ary 1963. At the same time, the AirForce convinced DOD to establish aparallel test of a ROAD divisionbacked by the full panoply of mod-ern tactical air support. The AirForce was convinced that such aforce would be equally effective butless costly.32

Army Chief of Staff GeneralHarold K. Johnson viewed the twotests on successive weeks. Compar-ing one division to the other, hecommented, was like comparing �agazelle and an elephant,� but headded, the Army needed both. How-ever, DA opted to activate the air as-sault division but not the air trans-port brigade. The division deployedto Vietnam as the lst Cavalry Divi-sion (Airmobile) less than 90 daysafter its activation. The followingyear, the Caribou and the follow-onDeHaviland CV-7 Buffalo were trans-ferred to the Air Force.33

Late in World War II, some Armyofficers had recognized the heli-copter�s potential for tactically mov-ing troops. Korea, with its ruggedterrain and poor road network, rein-forced this perception. Betweenthe Korean and Vietnam Wars Army

Edgar F. Raines Jr., is a histo-rian with the US Army Center ofMilitary History, Fort Leavenworth.He received a B.A. and an M.A.from Southern Illinois Universityand a Ph.D. from the University ofWisconsin. He is the co-author, withMajor David R. Campbell, of TheArmy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff:Evolution of Army Ideas on Com-mand, Control and Coordination ofthe U.S. Armed Forces, 1942-1989,and the author of the forthcomingEyes of Artillery: The Origins ofModern U.S. Army Aviation duringWorld War II, as well as several ar-ticles. In 1994-1995, he spent a yearas a member of the Roles and Mis-sions directorate (ODCSOPS).

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officers had discussed airmobile op-erations in almost purely tacticalterms. Almost continuous frictionwith the Air Force contributed to thisfocus. Only a few public hints sug-gested that some Army officersmight be thinking in terms of grandtactics, what is now called the opera-tional level of war. The use of an airtransport brigade to support a fieldarmy, as recommended by theHowze Board, certainly suggested adepth of operations greater than thetactical; however, the overwhelmingbulk of the published writing wastactical.34

The intellectual deficiencies ofthe Army�s work with airmobileforces; that is, the failure to considertheir implications for the conduct ofwar on the operational level, antici-pated the difficulty the Army wouldhave between 1965 and 1973 in con-verting tactical successes into op-erational and strategic victories oreven articulating the linkages be-tween the three levels. In a sense,the Army�s work with airmobility inthe 1950s and early 1960s served asprologue for Colonel Harry Sum-mers� observation about Vietnam�that the Army had won all the battlesand lost the war.35

Since at least the 1880s the pro-fessional essence of the US Armyhas been tied up with the concept ofcombined arms�the idea that onlyby bringing to bear all the availableweapons and the capacities of itsvarious branches can a force prevailon the modern battlefield. In thismental construct, an airplane or a he-licopter became just another piece ofequipment, like a truck or an armoredpersonnel carrier (APC), to be inte-grated into existing units to increasetheir capabilities.

The evolving nature of war andthe technical capacities of the air-craft determined how they were or-ganized and employed by the Armyin the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover,since at least the latter stages of theAmerican Civil War, the Army hadconfronted the fact that infantrycould no longer carry prepared po-sitions by frontal assault without in-curring unacceptable losses. Overthe next century, the Army exploredalternatives�fire and movementsquad tactics, rapid-fire artillery, the

tank, the APC and airborne assaulttactics. The helicopter promised toallow the infantry to literally riseabove this dilemma. At the sametime, to the foot-slogging infantry inthe field, the helicopter was a won-derful, labor-saving device, which al-lowed them to reach their objectivewith less physical exertion and tohusband their energy for the assault.Afterward, the helicopter permittedample and timely resupply so infan-trymen who seized a position weremuch more likely to hold it againstcounterattacks. The Army conse-quently acquired an airmobile capa-bility much more quickly than thestate of its budget might have sug-gested was feasible.

Incomplete as it was, Army think-ing about the employment of lightinfantry forces underwent a revolu-tion in the 1950s. The era�s often-temperamental helicopters, with theirreciprocating engines and limited liftcapacity, may have soaked up main-tenance, but their performance justas surely showcased the potentialof �the rotary-wing revolution.�That potential involved restoring theinfantry�s battlefield agility wornaway by increased firepower andmechanization, products of the in-dustrial revolution.

In seeking to rapidly concentratewidely dispersed forces, Gavin advo-cated precisely coordinated andtimed movements only recently pos-sible. The modern concept of simul-taneity�attacking enemy front-lineand reserve forces in depth through-out the theater�is in many ways thereverse image of what he was at-tempting to attain, and it requires acommunications capability the re-formers of the 1950s lacked. By pro-posing that air cavalry continuouslymonitor and occasionally harass ad-vancing enemy columns, reformerssought to provide commanders withsufficient reliable information to ma-neuver around the dangers of theatomic battlefield. However, theworld was still one of analog com-munications, paper maps, acetateoverlays and grease pencils andsmall-unit commanders forced to de-termine their own positions by deadreckoning. �Enhanced situationalawareness� was still a computerrevolution away. Given these genu-

ine limitations, it is certainly ques-tionable how well the Army, even ifbuilt to Gavin�s specifications, couldhave coped with a real atomic battle-field.

However, the attempt to copewith that danger pushed Army doc-trine and equipment in fruitful direc-tions for waging conventional war.Similarly, logisticians such asHeileman discerned the need for adispersed, flexible and responsivesupply system and saw Army avia-tion as a key component in its cre-ation. Here, too, lay the germinal ofsome revolutionary ideas.

The legacy of the 1950s to the re-formers of the 1990s lies not in thesolutions proposed but in theopen-mindedness and energy withwhich those earlier leaders ad-dressed the problems of moderncombat in a very different techno-logical environment. MR

This essay is a slightly revised version of a paper theauthor presented at the 1997 Air Mobility Symposiumsponsored by the Air Force History Foundation, the AirForce History and Museums Program and the Air Mo-bility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. They gra-ciously permitted its publication in this forum.

1. LT Leonard Kimmick Jr., �Battalion Helicopter,�Combat Forces Journal, 2 (January 1952), 33.

2. See Kent Roberts Greenfield, Army GroundForces and the Air-Ground Battle Team Including OrganicLight Aviation, Army Ground Forces (AGF) HistoricalStudy 35 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Division, 1948);COL Andrew Ten Eyck, Jeeps in the Sky: The Story ofthe Light Plane (New York: Commonwealth Books, 1946);Richard Tierney and Fred Montgomery, The Army Avia-tion Story (Northport, AL: Colonial Press, 1963); KenWakefield, The Fighting Grasshoppers: US Liaison Air-craft Operations in Europe, 1942-45 (Stillwater, MN: Spe-cialty Press, 1990); Edgar F. Raines, Eyes of Artillery:The Origins of Modern Army Aviation During World WarII (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military His-tory (CMH), pending).

3. Department of the Army (DA), Tables of Organi-zation and Equipment (TOE) 7N, 7 July 1948, Infantry Di-vision, and TOE 7, DA, 15 May 1952, Infantry Division,both in Organizational History Branch Files, CMH,Washington, DC.

4. LTC Jack L. Marinelli, �Army Aviation Surveys theBattlefield,� Army Information Digest, 5 (April 1950),47-52.

5. MG G.R. Cook et al., Board of Officers Convenedto Study the Equipment of the Post War Army, 20 June1945, HQ, AGF, General Correspondence, 1942-1948,Annex I, Air Support Equipment, 334/2 (Equipment Re-view Board) (S), RG 337, National Archives andRecords Administration, Washington, DC; Weinert, 12;Tierney and Montgomery, 93-96.

6. Peter Dorland and James Nanney, Dust Off: ArmyAeromedical Evacuation in Vietnam (Washington, DC:CMH, 1982), 17-20; Albert E. Cowdrey, The Medic�sWar, US Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC:CMH, 1987), 163-67.

7. MAJ Robert Winkler, �Height of Battle,� InfantrySchool Quarterly, 45 (January 1945), 100; see also �ArmyHas Plans for Combat �Copter Battalions,� Army NavyAir Force (ANAF) Journal, 89 (30 August 1952), 1604;TOE 7, DA, 15 May 1952, Infantry Division.

8. �Copters in Eustis Problem,� ANAF Journal, 90(1 November 1952): 252; Weinert, 15-24.

9. BG Paul F. Yount, Acting Chief of Transportation,�Air Transportation and the Army,� National DefenseTransportation Journal, 9 (September-October 1953), 64.

10. COL Robert B. Neely, Assistant Chief of Trans-portation (Army Aviation), �Army Aviation,� ANAF Jour-nal, 92 (6 November 1992), 273, 302.

11. See �The All-Service Helicopter,� Army InformationDigest, 4 (June 1949), 13-18.

12. LTC Eugene W. Rawlins, Marines and Helicop-ters, 1946-1962 (Washington, DC: History and Muse-

NOTES


Most of the literature published inthe United States about the VietnamWar examines the American experi-ence. Tai Sung An, author of TheVietnam War (Fairleigh DickinsonUniversity Press, Cranbury, New Jer-sey, 1998, 347 pages), takes an alter-native approach: �The central focusof this book is on the various as-pects of the Vietnamese Commu-nists� political, military, diplomaticand other behaviors during the Viet-nam War [also known as the SecondIndochina War].�

An briefly sketches Vietnam�s3,000-year history, then quicklybrings Vietnam into the 20th century.He includes biographical informationon Ho Chi Minh, the dominant Viet-namese personality of the VietnamWar era. An characterizes Ho ChiMinh as an ardent Vietnamese na-tionalist completely dedicated tocommunist ideology who pos-sessed political cunning and, aboveall, cold-blooded ruthlessness. Ancontrasts this characterization withthe contrived public image of thekindly, �venerable Uncle Ho.�

Throughout the book, An citespublications on the US experience in

Review Essay

Vietnam as well as other recentlytranslated North Vietnamese docu-ments and publications. He alsoscrutinizes a variety of other sourcessuch as captured documents and ra-dio broadcasts. From his extensiveresearch, he creates an intriguingportrayal of North Vietnamese lead-ers during the �Second IndochinaWar.� An notes that of those in-volved in the Vietnamese CommunistParty during the early 1930s, manysurvived to witness the 1975 victoryof their revolutionary struggle. Itwas their �steely determination,� in-tense nationalism and clever politicalmaneuvering that sustained the lead-ers even after Ho Chi Minh�s deathin 1969. However, An suggests thatin light of the terrible losses and de-struction and the subsequent socialand economic failures North Viet-nam suffered, it was a Pyrrhic vic-tory.

The leaders, with the unwaveringobjective of expanding North Viet-namese communist control overSouth Vietnam and, incidentally,Laos and Cambodia, maintained atotalitarian communist state in NorthVietnam while conducting direct and

indirect warfare. An describes theinternal conflicts and intense externalpressures the leaders experienced.The reader cannot help but be im-pressed by the remarkable tenacityof those leaders and the profounddiscipline they demanded of them-selves and of the North Vietnamesepeople.

An�s descriptions of the politicalskills demonstrated by various lead-ers in their interactions with foreigngovernments are fascinating. Theirability to work their patrons, the So-viet Union and the People�s Repub-lic of China, against each other toNorth Vietnam�s benefit is little shortof amazing. Also remarkable are thedescriptions of their ability to recog-nize the constraints placed by theUnited States on its own operations.The North Vietnamese exploitedthose constraints in conjunctionwith their strategy of �fighting whiletalking.� Thus they forged ahead inthe drive toward their ultimate goalof dominance over all of Indochina.Their remarkable dedication and po-litical skills were apparently eitherunknown to or ignored by US lead-ers, who attempted to interact with

The Vietnam War�The Other Sideby Colonel Griffin N. Dodge, US Army, Retired

ums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1976),14-18.

13. Winkler, 99; MAJ Nelson A. Mahone Jr., �A Tac-tical Role for Helicopters,� Army Information Digest, 10(September 1955), 33-38; MAJ Archie J. Clapp, �TheirMission is Mobility,� Military Review, 33 (August 1953),10-18; Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky: The Storyof US Marine Combat Helicopters (New York: Harperand Brothers, 1954), 162-65.

14. Frank Pace Jr., Secretary of the Army; ThomasK. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force; GEN J. LawtonCollins, CSA; GEN Nathan F. Twining, VCSAF, 4 No-vember 1952, Memorandum of Understanding Relatingto Army Organic Aviation, in Richard I. Wolf, ed., TheUnited States Air Force Basic Documents on Roles andMissions, Air Staff Historical Study (Washington, DC:Office of Air Force History, 1988), 243-245.

15. MAJ George H. Reid, �Helicopter Patrol,� ArmyCombat Forces Journal, 5 (September 1954), 40-41;CPT Bickford E. Sawyer Jr., �Raid from the Sky!� In-fantry School Quarterly, 43 (October 1953), 34-41.

16. LTC Stuart M. Seaton, �The Helicopter in EarlyLink-Up Operations,� Military Review, 35 (January1956), 33-42.

17. �Artillery School Develops Method for �Air Mail-ing� 105-mm Howitzers,� ANAF Journal, 91 (27March 1954), 892.

18. �Turbine Powered Copter,� ANAF Journal, 89(22 December 1951), 495; �Turbo �Copter CompletesFlight,� ANAF Journal, 92 (25 December 1954), 506;�Army�s Turbine-Powered Bell XH-40 Helicopter,�ANAF Journal, 94 (10 November 1956), 3.

19. LTC John M. Kinzer, �Airborne Assault by an In-fantry Division,� Military Review, 33 (October 1953),45-53.

20. MG James M. Gavin, �Cavalry, and I Don�t MeanHorses,� Harper�s Magazine, 208 (April 1954), 54-60.

21. GEN Matthew B. Ridgway, Testimony before Sub-committee on Defense Appropriations, 7-8 February 1955,23; John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I:�Regular Army,� Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC:CMH, 1972), 88-93.

22. DA Field Manual (FM) 20-100, Army Aviation,February 1952 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1952), 1; COLWilliam B. Bunker, Transportation Corps, �Why the ArmyNeeds Wings,� Army, 6 (March 1956), 19-23. Change2, 27 July 1956, DA FM 100-5, Field Service Regula-tions: Operations, 27 September 1954 (Washington,DC: GPO, 1956), 7-8, provided the first detailed enu-meration of tactical helicopter missions in the Army�score doctrine publication.

23. �Army Looks to Sage Brush�s SkyCav Operation asBasis of Permanent Unit�, ANAF Journal, 93 (10 Decem-ber 1955), 1, 3.

24. LTC Frank G. Forrest, �Helicopters or FixedWing?� Army Combat Forces Journal, 5 (June 1955),46-47; LTG Dwight E. Beach, �Caribou in SoutheastAsia,� Army, 13 (December 1962), 36-39.

25. DA, FM 57-35, Army Transport Aviation CombatOperations, Draft. Later published as FM 57-35, Air-mobile Operations (Washington, DC: Government Print-ing Office, 1960).

26. Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board, Paper,29 February 1960, Army Aviation Development Plan, His-torical Research Branch Files, HRC 334 (Board�Air-craft Requirements Review Board), CMH; LTC John W.Oswalt, �Report on the �Rogers� Board,� US Army Avia-tion Digest, 7 (February 1961), 15-17; LTG John J.Tolson, �Airmobility, 1961-1971,� Vietnam Studies (Wash-ington, DC: DA, 1973), 8-10.

27. TOE 7E, DA, 15 July 1963, Infantry Division, Or-ganizational History Branch Files, CMH; LTC Morris G.Rawlings, �Army Aviation and the Reorganized Army

Division,� US Army Aviation Digest, 8 (February 1962),1-4.

28. COL Raymond L. Shoemaker Jr., LTC John K.Singlab and MAJ John H. Cushman, �Readiness for theLittle War: Optimum Integrated Strategy,� Military Re-view, 37 (April 1957), 14-26; GEN Clyde D. Eddleman,Vice CSA, �Mobility and Future Land Warfare,� Army In-formation Digest, 17 (May 1962), 26-31.

29. �From Horseflesh to Whirlybirds: The 4th Field(Mule Pack) Becomes 4th Field (Helicopter Pack),� Army,8 (July 1958), 70-71; MAJ John C. Geary, �The Chinook,Advanced Battlefield Mobility Vehicle,� US Army AviationDigest, 8 (August 1962), 3-8.

30. GEN Hamilton H. Howze, A Cavalryman�s Story:Memoirs of a Twentieth-Century Army General (Wash-ington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996),235-36.

31. Howze, President, Army Tactical Mobility Require-ments Board Report, 20 August 1962, Brief by the Presi-dent of the Board in Organizational History Branch Files,CMH; �Irwin School�s Summer Term,� Army, 13 (Sep-tember 1962), 74, 76, 78; Howze, �The Howze Board,�Army, 24 (February 1974), 8-14; (March 1974), 18-24;(April 1974), 18-24; Howze, A Cavalryman�s Story,233-57.

32. See Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine:Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1984,vol 2 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press,1989), 178-92.

33. MG Edward L. Rowny, �After the Air Mobile Test,�Army, 15 (May 1965), 36-41.

34. COL Robert B. Rigg, �Kinesthetic Warfare: Modefor the Future,� Military Review, 45 (September 1965),13-19.

35. COL Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Criti-cal Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: PresidioPress, 1983), 1.

RM


North Vietnamese leaders as if theywere rational and reasonable Ameri-cans.

An�s portrayals of SouthVietnam�s leaders are in clear contrastto their northern counterparts. Hestereotypes southern leaders as cor-rupt, isolated from the population atlarge and lacking strategic goals.An�s comments about provincechiefs�senior military officers ap-pointed to administer the prov-inces�are particularly harsh. Hisportrayals are consistent with the�conventional wisdom� of the periodand likely describe some individuals.However, the two province chiefswith whom I personally associatedfrom 1972 and into 1973 did not fitAn�s stereotype. They constantlyinteracted with the population andwere dedicated to improving localeconomic circumstances, enrichinglocal lifestyles and encouraging anenvironment in which local leaders

NEVER AT WAR: Why Democra-cies Will Not Fight One Another bySpencer R. Weart. 432 pages. YaleUniversity Press, New Haven, CT.1998. $35.00.

The United States and its allies re-cently witnessed the late SovietUnion�s democratization. We be-lieved the transformation of ourenemy�s domestic political institu-tions would transform its foreign andmilitary policies, making it far less athreat to world peace. Why did webelieve this, and were we right?

Are democratic nations reallyless likely to resort to war than autoc-racies or dictatorships�be they he-reditary, communist, fascist or fun-damentalist? Spencer R. Weart�sbook Never at War contains one ofthe most definitive discussions ofthis issue. After a panoramic inves-tigation of world history from antiq-uity to the present, Weart concludesthat, yes, democracies are inherentlypeaceful. In the last paragraph hesays that the most effective way to�attain universal peace [is] toachieve universal democracy.�

Weart�s exhaustive research con-

firms America�s seat-of-the-pants in-tuition. Exactly why democracy pro-motes peace is another issue�onethat does not attest to the inherentwisdom of our preconceptions. Tra-ditionally, Americans distrust gov-ernment and officialdom. We tend tobelieve democracies are more pacificthan dictatorships because they givemore power to �the people,� whohave vested interest in peace, and

less power to the government, whichhas a vested interest in expanding itsown powers through edicts and ex-penditures. Because war enhancesstate power, it is naturally attractiveto government. According to thislogic, if democracy is peaceful, it islargely because the people governand not the office-holding class.

Weart rejects arguments that em-phasize constitution limitations ongovernment power. He focuses onpolitical culture�what he calls �thecentral tendency of political leadersto deal with [their] foreign counter-parts as they deal with one anotherat home.�

Officials in democracies rise tohigh office by compromise, bargain-ing and consensus; officials in dic-tatorships get power by threat, fearand terror. The former are likely toseek compromise in international dis-putes; the latter will likely pursuedomination.

Contrary to populist prejudices,government might actually be toopeaceful, at least in a democracy.Weart attributes appeasement of

could be selected in free elections.On occasion, An wields his �field

marshal�s baton� and critiques UStactical operations. His commentsusually rehash earlier writings on thesame issues. He often cites �pacifi-cation� as attempts by South Viet-namese leaders to �win the heartsand minds� of the people. But, hefails to mention the Civil Operationsand Revolutionary�sometimes�Rural��Development Support(CORDS) program.

CORDS paralleled and supportedSouth Vietnam�s pacification pro-grams from mid-1967 to early 1973.While not unusually successful inwinning hearts and minds, CORDSand indigenous pacification effortsresulted in positive accomplish-ments. Those pacification effortswere even effective in enticing largesegments of the population awayfrom Vietcong influence.

The Vietnam War is not for the

casual reader, nor is it for the readerunfamiliar with the complexities ofthe Vietnam War. Its narrow focusknowingly disregards some aspectsof US involvement. The more than1,200 endnotes, many citing multiplesources, can be a distraction. In con-trast, the index is brief and inad-equate. However, for the student ofthe Vietnam War and for military pro-fessionals, the book provides aunique and valuable perspective. Itsinteresting conclusions and �les-sons� make it well worth reading. MR

Book Reviews

Colonel Griffin N. Dodge, USArmy, Retired, received a B.A. fromColorado State University and anM.A. from the University of NewMexico. He is a graduate of theUS Army War College. He servedin a variety of command and staffpositions in the Continental UnitedStates, Vietnam and Germany. Heis a frequent contributor of bookreviews for MR.

RM


dictators to democracies� noble butnaive presumption that dictatorsgain power through compromise andwill accept reasonable terms in re-solving an international problem.Often, those well-intentioned offi-cials only confirm that threats andterrors are as effective in interna-tional as in domestic politics.

Weart has a few words of warn-ing, particularly for populists. Someof the most democratic societies inworld history have been the mostwarlike. Those governments, moreanarchy than democracy, allowedtheir citizens so much freedom theycould steal and pillage virtually atwill. In the process, they provokedwar and retribution on a continualbasis. This sobering analysis ap-plies today when Eastern Europeandemocracy looks like a halfwayhouse between autocracy and anar-chy�the next real danger to worldpeace.

Michael Pearlman,Combat Studies Institute,

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

TOJO: The Last Banzai by CourtneyBrowne. 260 pages. Da Capo Press, NewYork. 1998. $14.95.

Tojo: The Last Banzai was origi-nally published in 1967. It is one ofonly two biographies of JapaneseGeneral Tojo written in English.Both are still in print. The other, Tojoand the Coming of the War (StanfordUniversity Press, 1961, $65.00), writ-ten by Robert J.C. Butow, examinesTojo�s life and place in the ImperialJapanese Army�s history.

Butow�s work is based on a widerange of Japanese and English lan-guage sources and is one of the stan-dard historical works in English onthe period. In contrast, Browne�sstudy is a much briefer, popularizedbiography. He interviewed thegeneral�s widow, gained her confi-dence and through this source givesspecial insight into the man. Bothtreatments are equally useful.

Tojo: The Last Banzai is emi-nently fair minded. In fact, somewould consider it overly understand-ing. Browne views Tojo as a conser-vative Japanese would�as an up-right government official determinednot to surrender to American eco-nomic blackmail over Japanese ex-

pansion in East and Southeast Asia,preferring war to surrendering na-tional goals. The portrait Brownepresents is interesting and compel-ling.

I unreservedly recommend thisbook to those interested in learningmore about Tojo, the way the Impe-rial Japanese Army viewed his life,the Pacific War from a Japanese per-spective or the insular and intellec-tual context of Japanese militarism.

Lewis Bernstein,Assistant Command Historian,

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

CIVIL WAR PRISONS: A Study inWar Psychology by William B.Hesseltine. 290 pages. Ohio State Uni-versity Press, Columbus, OH. 1998.$29.95.

William B. Hesseltine first pub-lished Civil War Prisons in 1930.The book grew out of his disserta-tion research at Ohio State Univer-sity and has long been the definitivework in its field.

Hesseltine�s controversial studyexamines a festered wound�the be-lief that the South bore the principalresponsibility for wartime atrocitiesin prison camps. Though figuresvary depending on sources, a con-servative estimate is that 26,436 of220,000 Southern prisoners died incaptivity compared to 22,576 North-erners who perished in Southerncamps.

What made the original edition ofthe book particularly controversialwas Hesseltine�s dismissal of thecharge that the Confederacy con-spired to kill Northern prisoners. Inhis view, Northern propaganda was

so effective during and immediatelyafter the war that it became easy toimagine Confederate atrocities. Thetrial and subsequent execution ofAndersonville prison�s commandantMajor Henry Wirz only fueled radi-cal Republicans� hatred of theirformer adversaries. The feeling grewas the accounts of atrocitiesemerged from Andersonville survi-vors.

If Hesseltine�s work has a short-coming, it is that it sheds no newlight on who was responsible forNorthern propaganda efforts that sodemonized the South. What re-sponsibility did President AbrahamLincoln bear? Hesseltine allegesthat Lincoln�s decision in 1863 toend the prisoner exchange led theSouth to continue to hold Northerncaptives even though they did nothave the resources to care for them.Moreover, despite Northern rhetoricconcerning the welfare of black sol-diers in Confederate prisons, Lincolnand his generals focused more ondepriving the South of manpowerthan on alleviating the plight of pris-oners. This indictment is reminis-cent of Confederate PresidentJefferson Davis�s assessment thatLincoln�s administration preferred le-gal trivialities and a war of extermi-nation over caring for its own sol-diers.

Though Hesseltine presents a farmore benevolent view of the South-ern perspective, he does not let theConfederacy completely off thehook. He considers Andersonville�shorrible conditions the exceptionrather than the rule but alleges thatsuch conditions were the result ofthe Davis administration�s haphaz-ard response to a sudden explosionof need. However, Hesseltine isharsher on Lincoln�s motives than heis on Davis�s.

William Blair�s foreword is particu-larly instructive in placing this edi-tion in the proper political perspec-tive. Nothwithstanding Hesseltine�spenchant for making controversialstatements to elicit an emotional re-action, Civil War Prisons has with-stood the test of time and remains avaluable contribution to Civil Warliterature.

COL Cole C. Kingseed,US Military Academy,West Point, New York

BOOK REVIEWS


ROMMEL�S GREATEST VIC-TORY: The Desert Fox and the Fallof Tobruk, Spring 1942, by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr. 243 pages. Presidio Press,Novato, CA. 1998. $27.95.

Field Marshal Erik Rommel�sAfrika Corps� successes in 1941 wonhim the reputation of battlefield in-vincibility and the nom de guerre�The Desert Fox.� His successeswere tactical in the grand scheme ofthings because although he had sur-prised and defeated the British 8thArmy in several fights, he could notdislodge Commonwealth forces andfailed to reach the Suez Canal. Hecould not achieve the strategic aimof conquering Egypt and denyingthe canal to Axis enemies.

In Rommel�s Greatest Victory,Samual W. Mitcham Jr. ably de-scribes events leading to the Tobrukgarrison�s capitulation on the morn-ing of 22 June 1942. The battle,which lasted 29 days, had begunwhen Rommel�s forces reached thefortresses� outer defenses on 10April 1941. Mitcham�s balancedtreatment of both combatants de-scribes a closely run battle for eachside.

As is frequently the case in mo-bile warfare, Rommel eventually pre-vailed because of skill, audacity andluck. In the case of Tobruk, indeci-siveness, incompetence and per-haps bad luck precipitated the Brit-ish loss, which stunned BritishPrime Minister Winston Churchilland the Commonwealth.

Rommel and his forces also erredduring the fight. Losses of seniorGerman officers captured, wounded

and killed were high as the fightingswirled from one strongpoint to an-other. Combat strength vacillatedwildly, but Herculean effort by tankrepair units enabled combatants tocontinue the fight. In the end, lead-ership, competence and aggressive-ness prevailed.

This is an extremely well written,readable book. Much effort was putinto the battle�s chronology, whichfollows success and failure amongindividual British and German units.Mitcham also includes an interestingepilogue, which details what hap-pened to battle participants duringthe remainder of the war and after itsend.

COL Robert A. Gimbert,USA, Retired,

Georgetown, Texas

ONE DAY TOO LONG: Top SecretSite 85 and the Bombing of NorthVietnam by Timothy N. Castle. 352pages. Columbia University Press, NewYork. 1999. $24.95.

Few secrets of US wartime opera-tions in Southeast Asia were moreclosely guarded than US Air ForceOperation Project Heavy Green.Operating near the crest of a remotemountain in northeastern Laos,scarcely 12 miles from the Laotia-North Vietnamese border, the top-secret radar bombing facility�s solepurpose was to guide Thailand-based strike aircraft against NorthVietnam�s most sensitive bases.

To the North Vietnamese, thehigh-tech facility posed a danger-ous, intolerable challenge. In No-vember 1967, barely four months af-ter the facility began operating, anelite North Vietnamese commandounit destroyed it in a bloody pre-dawn assault. Seven of the 19Americans escaped, three werekilled. The fate of the remainingnine remains a mystery.

The US government classified allmilitary and CIA operations in Laos,as in North Vietnam, because USpresence in the politically neutralcountry violated the 1962 GenevaAgreements that barred all foreignmilitary forces. But there were otherreasons for hiding the tragedy at Site85. As Timothy Castle reveals in thisexhaustively researched and re-sponsibly written expose, the event

was a scandal that soon led to aself-serving search for scapegoatsand reprehensible conduct by seniorAir Force officers in Southeast Asiaand the US ambassador to Laos.Castle notes: �[Q]uestions, recrimi-nations and cover-up began immedi-ately.�

Castle�s suspenseful writing styleand dogged tenacity penetrate thedecades-long US government ef-forts to hide this shameful event.This authoritative account is also arefreshing departure from theall-too-common practice of describ-ing dubious adventures withoutdocumenting sources. A curious ex-ception to this otherwise excellentdocumentation is the lack of an in-dex, which would prove a useful ad-dition to future editions.

COL Michael E. Haas,USAF, Retired,

Incline Village, Nevada

LIKE MEN OF WAR: Black Troopsin the Civil War, 1862-1865, by NoahAndrew Trudeau. 576 pages. LittleBrown and Company, New York, NY.1998. $18.00.

The British poet Lord GeorgeByron once complained about mak-ing heroes of every character withpassing notoriety: �Every week andmonth sends forth a new one,� helamented. The same might be said ofbooks on the American Civil War.With increasing regularity bookstoreshelves are filled with �new� analy-ses of major battles or �undiscov-ered� diaries, notebooks or battleplans that offer �fresh insight� intothe United States� most traumaticconflict. All but the most ardentdevotees must be wondering howmuch more can really be said.

The answer, in part, lies in NoahTrudeau�s new book, Like Men ofWar. This detailed and engagingstudy of African American soldiers�contributions to the Union�s war ef-fort will interest even the most jadedCivil War scholar. Using materialslong available in the public domainbut seldom, if ever, examined withsuch meticulous care, Trudeau re-veals how Blacks from the South,often with inadequate arms and vir-tually no training in the art of war,fought honorably under the Starsand Stripes. By the end of the war,


nearly 180,000 had enlisted. North-erners often did not appreciate theirservice, frequently looked on themas a temporary expedient to defeatthe Confederacy and had no realuse for them as people or respect fortheir loyalty and bravery under fire.Trudeau further describes the unsa-vory practices Union generals andpoliticians used to enlist slaves andfreedmen.

Tacticians will thrill to the ac-counts of hundreds of minor skir-mishes in which African Americanunits played a role. Chronicling thehour-by-hour movements of units assmall as companies and platoonsgives the book a sense of imme-diacy. Trudeau allows the historicalrecord to speak for itself, editorializ-ing rather sparingly, then only high-lighting his conclusions. As a con-sequence, this book does notpreach; it reveals the often untoldand under-appreciated story of Afri-can American soldiers who foughtfor their personal freedom and theConstitutional form of governmentthat protected the rights of everyonein America. Like Men of War traceshow our national ideals can inspiremen and women of all colors andethnic backgrounds.

LTC Laurence W. Mazzeno,USA, Retired,

Reading, Pennsylvania

MUSSOLINI AND THE BRITISHby Richard Lamb. 356 pages. JohnMurray, London. Distributed by TrafalgarSquare, North Pomfret, VT. 1998.$45.00.

Mussolini and the British is avaluable case study in diplomacy,foreign policy and strategy. RichardLamb completely recasts the com-mon interpretation of Anglo-Italianrelations� role in the origins of WorldWar II.

England and Italy were not inevi-table enemies. Lamb argues thatBritish attitudes toward Il Duce�Mussolini�were an unending seriesof missteps and misunderstandings.Successive British administrationsmissed several significant opportu-nities to prevent an alliance betweenFascist Italy and Nazi Germany.

That Mussolini and Adolf Hitlerwere anything but natural allies is

not surprising. Italy was never en-thusiastic about the Anschluss ofAustria to Germany. Mussolini hadworked hard to bring Austria underhis own sphere of influence. He waseven less excited about the thoughtof German domination in theBalkans or forging an iron-clad mili-tary alliance with Hitler.

Lamb�s research suggests that di-visions between Germany and Italywere not only wide but ripe for ex-ploitation. This remarkable and en-gaging study in balance of powerdiplomacy demonstrates thatMussolini tried to steer an indepen-dent, even at times anti-Hitler, for-eign policy and that the British per-sistently failed to take advantage ofthe situation.

Lamb makes no excuses forMussolini. He argues that the Ital-ian leader was not an �inhumanogre,� yet he has no trouble pointingout Mussolini�s brutal, amoral side.Lamb�s criticisms of British estrange-ment from Il Duce are therefore cu-rious; Mussolini proved time andagain a faithless ally. How could theBritish ever trust him?

This story is particularly relevanttoday. Currently, many world pow-ers possess both bright and darksides. Before Saddam Hussein be-came the �great Satan,� he was aquasi-American ally, a bulwarkagainst the expansion of Iranianrevolution. Today Iraq is out; Iran isin. Iranian leaders have signaledthey might be ready to reopen en-gagement with the United States.However, many people are uncom-fortable with the Islamic republic�sprogress in human rights andgeo-strategic designs for centralAsia.

Similar perplexing issues of whomto trust face the US in other regions.Since US national strategy places apremium on collective security andregional stability, these timeless is-sues are more important than ever.

Mussolini and the British pro-vides a well-researched, finely writ-ten, clearly organized study of thechallenges of dealing with nationsand leaders you just can�t trust. Istrongly recommend this book.

LTC James J. Carafano,USA, Washington, DC

SISTERHOOD OF SPIES: TheWomen of the OSS by Elizabeth P.MacIntosh. 304 pages. Naval InstitutePress, Annapolis, MD. 1998. $29.95.

World War II is �hot� again.However, the popular subject�s focusis still mainly on men�the block-buster movie, Saving Private Ryan(Dreamworks Home Entertainment,Universal City, CA, 1999, $24.99);Stephen Ambrose�s various historiesbased on extensive interviews ofWorld War II veterans; and severalother best sellers by nationally rec-ognized personalities, such as news-man Tom Brokaw, who highlightsthe accomplishments of theDepression-era generation in hisbook The Greatest Generation (Ran-dom House, New York, 1998, $24.95).

Sisterhood of Spies by ElizabethP. MacIntosh attempts to rectify thesituation, although it focuses pre-dominantly on civilian women withinthe Office of Strategic Services(OSS), not the smaller military contin-gent.

It is a is fascinating book. Mac-Intosh combines historical narrative,case studies and oral histories totrace both the development of theOSS and women�s expanding roleswithin the agency, ending with a de-scription of how that tradition hasaffected the missions women cur-rently perform in the CIA. Despite itstitle, the book does not take upwomen as operatives�spies�de-tailing German positions or blowingup bridges, although women did in-deed function in those roles.

MacIntosh, an OSS operative,served primarily in Asia. She usedthose experiences in her memoir

BOOK REVIEWS


Undercover Girl (published in 1947under the name Elizabeth P. Mac-Donald). Her association with theOSS and its follow-on, the CIA, ismuch more extensive.

During World War II, regardlessof professional background or exper-tise, women were shunted into ad-ministrative and support functionsthat allow any bureaucracy to func-tion. The brilliance of the one-leggedspy Virginia Hall was all the more im-pressive when compared to the vastmajority of women�such as JuliaMcWilliams Child, the future chef,who served with the OSS in China�who did research and analysis orwho managed the operational sup-port for field agents.

Regrettably, MacIntosh does notelaborate on the contributions of thesmall cadre of military women whoserved. Did their OSS service havea similar impact on their military ca-reers, or were they cast aside in thegreat post-war drawdown? Un-fortunatley, MacIntosh was not ableto borrow more extensively from herinterviews�in the style of Ambrose.The mundane bulk of the women�slabors produced different kinds ofmemories.

The book is highly readable andenjoyable. It truly makes me wish Icould personally meet MacIntosh.She is a great American and hasserved her country well in war andpeace. She sounds like a great lady,and judging from her book, she isnot the exception within the �sister-hood of spies.�

LTC Dianne Smith, AFCENT,Brunssum, Netherlands

INTO THE CRUCIBLE: MakingMarines for the 21st Century byJames B. Woulfe. 183 pages. PresidioPress, Novato, CA. 1998. $24.95.

Recruit training for all branches ofthe US military services had a rudeawakening in 1965 when several re-cruits died during rigorous trainingexercises. Congress demandedchange, and all branches respondedaccordingly. Each service paid moreattention to selection and training ofdrill instructors and the nature of therecruit curriculum. Into the Crucibledescribes how the US Marine Corpsis adapting its training to place re-cruits under maximum stress before

graduation. The exercise worthilyclimaxes the preparation to becomea Marine. The Corps terms thisshort stress test �the crucible.�

The crucible is a series of physi-cally demanding, simulated combatscenarios a platoon must completetogether. This phase of recruit train-ing emphasizes problem solving,team building and the Corps� specialelan by associating the course�sphysical challenges with the Corps�history.

Each test problem is named aftera Marine recipient of the Congres-sional Medal of Honor. The drill in-structor relates solutions to prob-lems with the exploits for which thatMarine demonstrated extraordinarybravery. The message is clear: thisis your role model. The leadershiprole in problem solving rotatesthroughout the platoon. Such tech-niques are also widely used in busi-ness and managerial training sincebeing introduced 50 years ago bythe Outward Bound Program.

The simulated combat scenariosuse walls, barrels, real barbed wireand overhead machinegun fire.However, strips of sawdust simulaterivers and other physical groundfeatures, for swamps and real riverscaused the deaths of recruits in thepast. The students carry full packs,endure long hikes, little food and analmost total lack of sleep. There is nodoubt the course is a maximum-stress operation.

James B. Woulfe�s remarkablynaïve writing style is irritating at firstbut effectively provides the

instruction�s flavor as well as thecontent. A hypothetical platoon ofethnically mixed recruits headed bya battle-wise Marine sergeant is thefocus of the contrived experience.The trainees possess a sensible mixof competence. Some are awkward,others agile, some bright, others lessso. The platoon achieves its goalwith most of the obstacles, fails in afew, and after-action reviews con-sider the reason for failures. Suchtechniques could almost be liftedfrom a Harvard Business Schoolmanagerial curriculum.

The experience is presented in theform of conversation between thedrill instructor and the recruits, but itis palpably contrived and clearly notintended to be realistic. The artificialnarrative merely demonstrates howdrill instructors should encouragedialogue.

It is appropriate for the MarineCorps to teach recruits its policiesconcerning drugs, honesty and dis-cipline. But it is a stretch to believethat Marine recruits engaged in amaximum-effort, 45-mile hike, inter-spersed with other physical chal-lenges will be receptive to lectureson family values, marriage, divorce,sexual harassment and ethnic dis-crimination. Unfortunately, the au-thor intersperses his narrative withsuch homilies. The most effectivevenue for such spiritual and politicaltraining is scarcely among a bunchof tired, wet, dirty, hungry Marinerecruits whose feet hurt and whoonly wish to complete the operationso they can relax in a hot shower.

The crucible experiment is uniquein its emphasis on problem solvingby every member of a recruit pla-toon. It presumes that even thosewho will primarily be followers willbenefit from understanding leaders�responsibilities. It prepares recruitsto meet the unexpected challengesthat occur in combat. If we are to be-lieve Woulfe, the exercise reinforcesthe ethos of the Marine Corps byrecalling its proud history�a themeconstantly repeated during previousweeks of boot camp.

It is fitting that the commandantof the Corps, Charles C. Krulak, whosponsored this variant in recruit


training, is the son of a previouscommandant, General Victor �Brute�Krulak. Recruit training under�Brute� was characterized by a Ma-rine drill instructor wearing a flat hatand thrusting his chin an inch or lessfrom the terrified eyes of a young re-cruit. It will be difficult to measurewhether the crucible is better train-ing for a combat Marine, but societyand the nature of future wars makeit logical to find better ways of train-ing recruits for future challenges.

RADM Benjamin Eiseman,USNR, Retired,

Denver, Colorado

CONFEDERATE TIDE RISING:Robert E. Lee and the Making ofSouthern Strategy, 1861-1862, by Jo-seph L. Harsh. 278 pages. Kent StateUniversity Press, Kent, OH. 1998.$35.00.

Scholars, historians and punditshave long been at odds overwhether the Confederacy ever had acogent strategy for winning the CivilWar. If it did, who was responsiblefor creating and articulating it as aSouthern national policy? Now,backed by superb research and keenanalysis, Joseph Harsh�s first book,Confederate Tide Rising, presents asharply focused study of theSouth�s strategy at the war�s begin-ning.

Harsh is a professor of history atVirginia�s George Mason Universityand the founding president of theNorthern Virginia Association ofHistorians. Initially, he was inter-ested in why Confederate GeneralRobert E. Lee took his army across

the Potomac River and invadedMaryland in 1862, a decidedly riskyand aggressive move that seemedcontrary to the South�s strategic cir-cumstances and limited resources.What Harsh found compelled him towrite this vivid study of Southernwar aims, policy and strategy and ofthe relationship between Confeder-ate President Jefferson Davis andLee.

At first, Davis favored an offen-sive defense to protect Southern in-dependence and territorial integritywhile embracing all slave stateswithin the Confederacy, especiallythe undeclared Border States. How-ever, given the South�s limited man-power and materiel, it soon becameclear that the South could not win awar of attrition while standing on aperimeter defense. The war aims farexceeded the resources available.

Although the South at firstachieved some significant suc-cesses, severe setbacks begged fora change in the South�s strategic vi-sion. Kentucky had been lost; Ten-nessee was almost lost; Unionforces had captured New Orleans,penetrated Mississippi and threat-ened Charleston; General GeorgeMcClellan�s huge Union army wasonly 25 miles from Richmond. Bylate May 1862, the South had nearlylost the war.

Davis has been criticized for hisstrategy of perimeter defense and formeddling with his field commanders.Harsh convincingly contends, how-ever, that while Davis was an excep-tionally strong war president, helargely confined himself to offeringgeneral guidance to his commandinggenerals. He expected them to cre-ate their own strategies within theframework of his guidance.

In 1862, when Lee assumed com-mand of the Army of Northern Vir-ginia, Davis found the right partnerfor developing a viable Southernstrategy. Davis, the statesman, andLee, the soldier, knew the South�schances for victory were slim. Theyrealized that coordination, concen-tration and aggressive operationswere key factors for any winningstrategy, and they were well awaretheir odds of winning would in-crease if the North failed to properlyuse all of its resources and energies.If the North grew weary of the war,it might abandon the effort as toocostly in money and blood.

Lee especially knew offense of-fered the only path to victory. De-fense would only prolong the inevi-tability of defeat. Only the offenseallows a force to seize and maintainthe initiative; choose the time, placeand manner of battle; inflict maxi-mum punishment on the enemy; andcreate a sense of invincibility andcontrol of events. Lee�s subsequentoffensive operations drove Mc-Clellan back and crushed GeneralJohn Pope�s army at the SecondBattle of Manassas. Harsh arguesthat the Maryland invasion was acalculated risk that fit nicely into theSouth�s overall strategy to take thewar to Northern territory.

Harsh�s crisp narrative of movesand countermoves contains excel-lent insights about translating strat-egy and policy into maneuver andtactics. His well-presented argu-ment and credible conclusion offer asound perspective on this often-mis-understood feature of the war.

COL William D. Bushnell,USMC, Retired,

Sebascodegan Island, Maine

CGSC Notes continued from back cover

seeks to identify and locate surviv-ing Korean War veterans to facilitatetheir participation in 50th-anniver-sary commemorative activities.Former Assistant Commandant ofthe Marine Corps General RaymondG. Davis, a Korean War Medal of

Honor recipient and foundation co-chairman, remarked: �We do notseek to commemorate the war, butrather the veterans thereof and thesacrifices they made to preserve de-mocracy on the Korean peninsulaalmost 50 years ago.�

BOOK REVIEWS


Military ReviewSUBSCRIBE TO

Additional information and regis-tration forms are available from thefoundation�s web site <www.uskorea2000.org>. Individuals mayalso request an information and reg-istration packet from US-Korea 2000Foundation, Inc., 4600 Duke Street,Suite 416, Alexandria, VA 22304-2517.Please include name and completemailing address. You may also con-tact the foundation by calling (703)212-8128, faxing (703) 684-0193 or E-

mailing <[email protected]>.The foundation is a private, pub-

licly supported, nonprofit organiza-tion serving the Korean War veterancommunity through individual andcorporate philanthropic outreach.For more information on helping fi-nancially or assisting in other ways,please contact Deputy Executive Di-rector Harry Mohr at the numberslisted above, or you can E-mail himat <[email protected]>.

Not THAT DullI read the article �Threat Conver-

gence� by LTC Bill Flynt (MR, Sep-tember-October 99) with interest.The picture of Bhagwan ShreeRajneesh reminded me of the salmo-nella poisoning incident that hit tooclose to home when I was a highschool freshman in The Dalles, Or-egon. No one in my family becameill due to the poisoning, but many ofmy friends did.

Korea Bound?American Forces Press Service

has established a website to show-case US Forces Korea (USFK). Thesite presents articles, photos, mapsand video clips on such topics asthe USFK mission, history of US in-volvement in Korea and an over-view of what service membersshould expect during a tour of dutyin Korea. The site is at <www.defenselink.mil/specials/korea/>.

When I first noticed that the au-thor spelled my hometown �TheDulles,� I felt slighted. Then I chuck-led and wondered whether the au-thor had actually been there. TheDalles is a small town of 12,000, anda visitor not interested in outdooractivities might indeed think that�The Dulles� is more appropriate.

CPT Heather Green,141st Support Battalion,

Oregon ARNG

Editor�s NoteSome MR readers objected to LTC

Bill Flynt�s discussion of cults in�Threat Convergence.� The term�cult� refers to a group�Christian,Jewish, Muslim, pagan or othersect�outside the religious main-stream. Title X of the US Code as-sures soldiers their constitutional re-ligious liberties, whether or not theirbeliefs are popular. MR

LettersRM

Blue PLATE (PMS 300)

CGSC Notes

Command and General Staff College

Transformation of theArmy

The Command and GeneralStaff College (CGSC) is activelyinvolved with the Chief of Staff�scampaign to transform the Army.CGSC has been working on twovery important missions forTRADOC in relation to thestand up of the initial mediumweight brigade at Fort Lewis,Washington. The first effortis being led by the Center for Army Tactics (CTAC) withsupport from the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate(CADD), the Directorate of Logistics and Resource Op-erations (DLRO), the Directorate of Joint and Multina-tional Operations (DJMO) and the Center for Army Lead-ership (CAL), to lead a team effort across TRADOCschools to write the Operational and Organizational Con-cept (O&O) for the Command and Control Combat Com-puter Information Surveillance Reconnaissance portion ofthe brigade. The O&O is written and will be approvedwithin the next month. CTAC will also be in support ofa couple of C4ISR rock drills and is the College lead forArmy Experiment 7 which will focus on brigade training.

The second effort is headed up by CADD to determinetasks associated with an ARFOR headquarters. Specifi-cally, CADD will be looking at the tasks of a divisionheadquarters and an ARFOR headquarters to determineaugmentation required if the division must be an ARFOR.This is groundbreaking work for the Army. The wayahead will be to help fulfill the mission given by the ArmyChief of Staff that every corps is capable of being a JointForce Land Component Command and/or a Joint TaskForce.

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is developing a his-tory of change in the Army as it has gone through orga-nizational change such as during the building and sub-sequent failure of the Pentomic Division.

CAL is heading a coordination effort along with TaskForce TLS (Training, Leader Development and SoldierSupport) to help coordinate and develop a campaign planto train brigade leaders. CAL will also be working a sub-sequent task to help define the institutional role in thetraining of subsequent members of brigades as the orga-nization becomes more common and the soldiers comethrough the institution enroute to those brigades. Lookfor a series of articles in the May-Jun edition for a morein-depth review of these efforts.

DJMO An interagency panel will visit CGSOC from 2-3 Feb-

ruary to address students in National Security Policy For-mulation (A512). This panel of action officers represent-

ing the Joint Staff, State Depart-ment, intelligence community andNational Security Council staffwill discuss how interagency co-ordination helps the Presidentmake national security deci-sions.

In early January, LincolnBenedicto, of the State Depart-ment, will join the Departmentof Joint and MultinationalOperations. He will teachA517, Diplomatic Instrument

of Power, and represent the State Department at on-postactivities. He will also facilitate State Department partici-pation in exercises conducted by BCTP such as PrairieWarrior, and advise all activities on State Department ca-pabilities and functions. He will be available to teachclasses or conduct professional development programsin his areas of expertise. POC is Bob Walz at 684-3979 orMAJ Bob Finn, Operations, 684-2536.

MR bids farewell to Production EditorProduction editor Phil Davis leaves Military Review

after 18 years. He began here in 1981 as the books andfeatures editor and German translator, assuming his cur-rent position in 1988. During his tenure he has seen wide-spread changes in Military Review and the military�srole�from the rise of electronic publishing to the fall ofthe Soviet Union. He was instrumental in the MR�s tran-sition from cut and paste techniques to cutting-edgetechnology. Having survived 10 editors in chief and sixmanaging editors, Phil leaves a legacy of professionaldedication and publishing excellence. He takes over aseditor of The Air Scoop (the USAFE safety publication),in Ramstein, Germany. Phil has been a keen eye, organi-zational stalwart and good friend. We will miss his talentand devotion but wish him and his wife, Becca, goodluck and Godspeed.

Korean War Veterans SoughtFiftieth anniversary activities to commemorate the Ko-

rea War will begin on 25 June 2000 and continue through27 July 2003. All Korean War veterans are encouragedto register with the US Korea 2000 Foundation. Thefoundation is looking for anyone who served in theArmed Forces, including the Coast Guard and MerchantMarine, for at least one day between 25 June 1950 and 27July 1953. Actual service in the Korean Theater of op-erations is not a requirement. Family members of de-ceased Korean War veterans are also encouraged to par-ticipate.

According to Department of Veterans� Affairs statis-tics, less than 20 percent of Korean War veterans belongto any national veterans� organization. The foundation

(Continued on page 95)

18. 50th Anniversary of Korean War Issue

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