Towards Just International Relations Theory

Hans Morgenthaus Classical Realism

and the Problem of Justice

Ian McMurtrie

1110338

Honours Thesis

May 7, 2007

Acknowledgements

I would like to offer my sincere thanks and appreciation to the following people for their

assistance with this project and throughout my undergraduate career.

My advisor and the members of the review board:

Professor James Muir

Professor Sandra Tomsons

Professor Samantha Arnold

My friends, family and colleagues:

Maria Cristina Laureano

John-Paul Knox

Melissa Dzwonek

Professor Jane Forsey

Professor Brian Keenan

Melanie Zurba

James, Adele and Heather McMurtrie

Len McMurtrie

Yes, it was ugly enough; but if you were man enough you would

admit to yourself that there was in you just the faintest trace of a

response to the terrible frankness of that noise, a dim suspicion of there

being a meaning in it which you -- you so remote from the night of first

ages -- could comprehend. And why not? The mind of man is capable of

anything -- because everything is in it, all the past as well as all the

future. What was there after all? Joy, fear, sorrow, devotion, valour,

rage -- who can tell? -- but truth -- truth stripped of its cloak of time.

Let the fool gape and shudder -- the man knows, and can look on

without a winkHe must meet that truth with his own true stuff --

with his own in-born strength. Principles won't do. Acquisitions,

clothes, pretty rags -- rags that would fly off at the first good shake. No;

you want a deliberate belief. An appeal to me in this fiendish row -- is

there? Very well; I hear; I admit, but I have a voice, too, and for good or

evil mine is the speech that cannot be silenced.

It is a difficult case. What do you think I ought to do -- resist? Eh?

I want no more than justice. . . . He wanted no more than justice -- no

more than justice.

- Joseph Conrad

Heart of Darkness

For the social world being but a projection of human nature onto the

collective plane, being but man writ large, man can understand and

maintain control of society no more than he can of himself. Thus the

very intimacy of his involvement impedes both understanding and

control.

- Hans Morgenthau

1

Introduction

Can there be justice in international affairs? This larger question cannot be

addressed here, so we turn to a question that is necessarily prior: can there be just

international relations theory? This thesis will seek to show that an understanding of

justice is necessary for a theory of international relations to be credible and effective. To

do this will require establishing criteria for a just theory, and subsequently to study the

major schools of international relations with respect to these criteria. The dominant

school of international relations today, realism, began anew in the twentieth century

with Hans Morgenthau. Due to the importance of realism, his theory will be the major

focus of this work.

Hans Morgenthaus theory of classical realism argues against shoehorning the

anarchic international condition into moral or legal theories; attempting to do this is

ultimately impossible and impractical. Realists claim that politics must be evaluated

solely in terms of interest defined as power; importing normative principles from

philosophy will only confuse political understanding and prevent peaceful coexistence.

This has become known as the realist challenge. 1 This challenge has been a potent foil to

international law, international morality, international relations, and the philosophical

search for justice.

1 AM Slaughter Burley has defined the realist challenge as: the defiant skepticism of political realists such

as George Kennan, [and] Hans Morgenthau....that international law could ever play more than an

epiphenomenal role in the ordering of international life. Much of the theoretical scholarship in both

international law and international relations can be understood as either a response to or a refinement of

this challenge. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A

Dual Agenda American Journal of International Law Vol. 87, No. 2 (Apr., 1993), p. 206.

2

Hans Morgenthau argues that there is an analogous relationship between human

nature and the characteristics of the nation state. He claims that each individual is

driven by the desire for power, but because individuals are subject to an overawing

sovereign, their desires can be effectively channelled into support for national foreign

policy. In contrast, he claims that the state exists in a chaotic international environment

without any one entity maintaining a monopoly of coercive force; therefore each state

must pursue its national interests with all available power. According to Morgenthaus

political realism, the permanent dynamic of power and the necessity of self-interest are

the sole universals in international affairs. In this reductive account, concepts such as

justice and morality are extirpated because they are not binding in political

circumstance.2

In contrast, the idealist school posits values such as equality, liberty, and justice

that are necessarily vague and without effect in actual international affairs. Idealists

erected international institutions, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations,

based upon these ineffable principles in order to steer states towards harmonious

interaction guided by norms. Idealists believe that reason was the dominant aspect of

human nature, and thus human political interact could be shaped according to reasons

determined a priori. They operated deductively, positing desirable premises as ideals

towards which politics ought to conform. But, Morgenthau argues, that each case of

disarmament, collective security, international government, international law, and any

2 Morgenthau and classical political realism is not strictly mechanistic or fatalistic. He argues strenuously for

a moral dimension to realism which will be discussed in Chapter One. Morgenthau believes, as the subtitle

for his book suggests, that both power and peace are fundamental aspects of international relations; but that

the former ought to be wisely manipulated through realist theory for the sake of the latter.

3

instance of normative desire are all attempts to impose vague notions that paper-over

the real dispute for power. The idealist tradition continues, and although shaken by the

realist challenge, is represented here by the two versions of liberalism.

The persistent realist challenge has significant implications for international

relations and philosophical theory. It serves as a vital crucible for testing prospective

theories and their conformity to political reality. The realist challenge tests prospective

theories by requiring that they account for the material requirements of interest defined

in terms of power. If a theory fails to do this, then they cannot claim purchase in the real

world of international affairs. If, as Hans Morgenthau and the realists claim, any attempt

to appeal to international justice to make evaluative claims is at best moot (since justice

cannot have meaning in the course of actual political affairs) and at worst dangerous (as

national concepts of justice are incorrectly universalized and then conflicting

interpretations are resolved with force), then the nations and their populations cannot

but be at the whim of national interest. Without justice, those who command the greatest

power in international affairs are therefore morally unaccountable, except perhaps to

their own national interest of survival.

What is Necessary for a Just International Theory?

Given the pessimistic tone of Morgenthaus realism, and continuing international

strife, the question at issue here is: can justice play an effective role in international

relations? This larger question requires much greater depth than is available here; as

such, the scope will be limited to answering a question necessary in order to begin

4

confronting the larger problem. Specifically, can there be just international relations

theory? This project will examine realism and liberalism, two prominent theories of

international relations, and compare them in terms of the following criteria for justice. If

the theories that guide international statesmen cannot articulate a rational notion of

justice, then there is little hope that their prescribed actions can in turn be just. The final

question then is: if realism and liberalism are left wanting, are there any competing

international relations theories that can be offered in their place? But first it must be

established what criteria can be used to asses the merits of an international relations

theory with regard to justice. I will posit three conditions that must be met for a theory

to be effective in international relations, while remaining just in its evaluations and

recommendations. These criteria have been selected to confront and meet the demands

of the realist challenge. The criteria, when met, would mandate that a theory be

efficacious in application, accurate in evaluation, but also neutral with respect to

available power all of which are necessary precursors for just evaluation and action.

First, for an international relations theory to be just it must maintain

prescriptions for principled judgment. That is, it cannot only state that an action on the

international stage is efficient, expedient, prudential or advantageous. It may be all of

those things, but the theory must be able to make a statement that, for the sake of justice,

an action was right or wrong in a significant moral sense. Any mechanistic theory can

describe outcomes as efficient or prudent, but the goal for justice is to provide firm

ground for judgment that entails a normative ought statement. That said, morality

demands the consideration of pragmatic sensibilities be respected to ensure the basic

5

material requirements of survival and sustenance are met. But, a theory must be able to

moderate pragmatic necessity and normative demands. Neglecting prudence or

normative goals does not make for a theory that is just or sound. Realism attempts to

collapse morality and prudence, and justice into interest. This is perhaps necessary for

realist methodology, but it may not be sufficient for the purposes of international justice.

Nor is realism sufficient for the next criterion, that of equality of application. This

is similar to, but not identical with, justice as fairness as articulated by John Rawls.3

Equality of application is similar to justice as fairness in the sense of equal application of

principle regardless of the power wielded by the actor, but it is divergent in that equal

application is not necessarily concerned with the redistribution of resources. Equality of

application seeks the transparency of power or privilege in making judgments on the

international scene. In other words, if a powerful international actor feels it prudential to

conduct a certain act, and a theory condones it as prudential but says nothing more, this

theory is not just it must recognize the concept of isonomia.4 Liberal international

relations theory seeks to meet this criterion by neutralizing considerations of power in

regards to judgment and action. In the sense that it demands that liberal polities behave

consistent with liberal principles regardless of relative strength between the participants.

3 Cf. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 14, No.

3 (Summer, 1985), pp. 223 251. 4 Isonomia is the Greek term roughly translated as equal political rights. I use this term to distinguish this

claim from any legal notions, but to retain the concept of equality of application which is a precursor for

justice. Isonomia is a political concept that is prior to law, chosen here in distinction from the later English

word isonomy. Cf. Gregory Vlastos, Isonomia, The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 74, No. 4. (1953),

pp. 337-366. Where he states: Because equal distribution says too much, as equality before the law says

too little. For what is conceived as equally distributed in Isonomia is restricted to Nomos, i.e. to the political

domain. (p. 352)

6

The third criterion for a just theory is its ability to guide action by providing

accurate descriptive and predictive stipulations. Theories that purport to establish a

particular theory of justice, but cannot extend their influence to the international sphere,

are mute in their ability to prevail in the world of political action. For a theory to be just

it must not diverge from actions and evaluations in particular circumstance, as the

realists charged against the idealist school. The theory must remain attuned to reality

while attempting to guide it towards just actions. A caveat to this notion is that a just

theory must not be strictly materially contingent. For example, the condition known as

the liberal peace the tendency for liberal states to coexist peacefully and operate

external to the competition for power although successful, remains inordinately

dependent upon material circumstance. Although the liberal peace may allow justice to

exist within its frontiers, it cannot hold for describing actions as just or unjust

throughout the entire scope of international relations (i.e. the whole of the world).

None of these three strictures, principled moral judgment, equality of

application, and concrete behavior guidance, are sufficient on their own to promulgate a

just international theory. However, each aspect remains necessary for a theory to be

considered just. To a greater or lesser degree, all theories under consideration here have

aspects of some of these qualities but none adheres to all of them. Accordingly, we

begin the investigation of international relations theory in the next chapter by examining

Hans Morgenthaus realism in detail.

7

Chapter One

What is Realism?

Defining a school of thought, its influence and

why it ought to be studied philosophically

This section will describe political realism as articulated by Hans J. Morgenthau

(1904 1980) in his Politics Among Nations, originally published in 1948. The advent of

this new theory of international relations codified an intellectual movement opposed to

the traditional idealism common to the study of global politics, law, diplomacy and

philosophy. While the publication of Politics Among Nations spurred rapid growth in

international relations, debate grew within other disciplines as its implications

fundamentally challenged their intellectual assumptions. Although attributed most

prominently to Morgenthau, what is now known as classical realism was also articulated

in the twentieth century by thinkers such as E. H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, and George

Kennan. In their view, political behaviour was increasingly divergent from theory, and

sought to reclaim the tradition informed by historical figures such as Thucydides,

Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau.5 These modern realists proposed a methodology

with the goal of reuniting political theory with political practice. Idealisms carefully

constructed theoretical and legal edifices, twice destroyed and rebuilt within

Morgenthaus lifetime, were left wanting for new methods to try to prevent or mitigate

the effects of future global conflicts. The intellectual challenge presented by Morgenthau

5 Cf. Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: Norton,

1997), p. 9.

8

and his contemporaries, coupled with the material exigencies of global conflict,

encouraged future thinkers to develop the realist tradition eventually establishing it as

the dominant school of thought for international relations scholars and political actors

alike.

Realisms influence is such that most international relations scholars are either

self-identified or readily identifiable realists.6 For example, in one exhaustive study of

the development of the realist paradigm since World War II, almost three quarters of

all the phenomena noted, and over 90 percent of the hypotheses tested, were identifiably

realist in inspiration.7 Despite academic institutional supremacy, realism remains vital

with many different views participating in a lively internal and external debate. Realist

thinking in general encompasses a family of related arguments sharing certain common

assumptions and premises. Realist theories seek to explain politics as it really is, as

opposed to normative theories that offer prescriptions for how politics ought to be.8

The main criticisms against the realist school have been its inability to predict

and account for the collapse of the Soviet Union, and explain the existence of a pervasive

peace between liberal nations. Despite this criticism, as Stephen Walt argues,

there is still a place for a realist approach to[international

relations]highlighting the dominant role of major powers, their

ability to evade legal constraints when they feel it necessary, and

the tendency for customary law to reflect the interests of states

rather than any exogenous set of normative standards.9

6 Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 41. 7 Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 41. 8 Stephen Walt, The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition. In Political Science: State of the

Discipline III. Ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (Norton, 2002), p. 199. 9 Walt, Enduring, 228.

9

If one is concerned about the attainment of justice in international relations, then they

ought to take the legacy of liberal scholarship seriously.

Realism, in any of its variant forms, makes philosophical assumptions and

assertions while simultaneously challenging philosophical theory from having effect in

reality. Realists deny to philosophers the ability to make judgments that are efficacious

in international relations, or even to question the validity of realism. If the realist school

of thought determines the academic and political agenda, philosophers must ask if this

school is philosophically sound and in accordance with particular theories of justice.

Turning to classical realism, I will examine the core tenets in detail, including a

discussion of the concepts power and interest, the moral status of realism, and the

delimited political sphere. The chapter concludes with an argument for why realism

must be studied philosophically.

The Core Tenets of Classical Realism

Reacting to two successive world wars, and the failure of legal and political

theories to prevent them, Hans Morgenthau infused a new vitality into the scholarship

of international relations. These material and intellectual motivations impelled him to

formulate a theoretical model to help preserve the post-World War II peace and prevent

the next great war. Thus, political realism for Morgenthau is a descriptive and predictive

apparatus with real moral underpinnings. The book that sparked this uproar, and the

central subject of investigation here, is Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and

Peace. First published in 1948, it has been reprinted and revised through six editions.

10

With its publication, Morgenthau generated academic upheaval, and achieved his

purpose of presenting an entirely new theory of international politics.10

His choice for a name, realism, attempts to capture the subject matter the real

world of political relations but also the standards against which realisms merits are to

be gauged.11 As such, political realism claims it must be judged not on a priori principles

imported from other academic domains, but by the accuracy of its predictions with

respect to the actions and reactions found in actual political conduct. Abstract principles

such as justice are deemed practically unrelated to reality and are thus inadmissible in

regards to the validity of realism as a methodology. Realism must be judged by its

purpose: to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would

remain disconnected and unintelligible.12 This is not to say that Morgenthau believes

that theories of justice, morality, theology, and the like are pedantic or unimportant; it is

simply that they are antithetical to good politics. They distract the statesman from his

true domain of power and interest towards external spheres that are not able to affect

the ongoing dynamic of power politics, thus jeopardizing his states fortunes.

Morgenthau argues adamantly against the normative, idealist thinkers and

philosophers who have encroached and denatured politics. The idealist school of

thought is characterized by Morgenthau as one that,

10 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace Sixth Edition, revised by

Kenneth W. Thompson. (New York: Alfred A Knopf Inc., 1948 1985), p. 3. 11 Morgenthaus fellow realist, and Christian critic, Reinhold Niebuhr states the core of realism to be: the

disposition to take all factors in a social and political situation, which offer resistance to established norms,

into account, particularly the factors of self-interest and power. Reinhold Niebuhr, Augustines Political

Realism In Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Scribner, 1953), p. 119. 12 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3.

11

believes that a rational and moral political order, derived from

universally valid abstract principles, can be achieved here and now.

It assumes the essential goodness and infinite malleability of

human nature, and blames the failure of the social orderon lack

of knowledge and understanding, obsolescent social institutions, or

the depravity of certain isolated individuals or groups. It trusts in

education, reform, and the sporadic use of force to remedy these

defects.13

Idealism seeks to rationalize political interaction, not to improve its predictive or

descriptive capacity, but to institute reasoned rules as fundamental to political

behaviour.

In opposition to the idealist school of thought, Morgenthau begins to construct

the new vision of realism in the twentieth century. The tradition from which

Morgenthau speaks, and which he desires to resuscitate, looks first to the world and

understanding that as

imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, [it] is the result

of forces inherent in human nature. To improve the world one must

work with those forces, not against them. This being inherently a

world of opposing interests and conflict among them, moral

principles can never be fully realized, but must at best be

approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests

and the ever precarious settlements of conflicts. This school, then,

sees in a system of checks and balances a universal principle for all

pluralist societies. It appeals to historic precedent rather than to

abstract principles, and aims at the realization of the lesser evil

rather than the absolute good.14

Accordingly, throughout Politics Among Nations he cites widely from history, invoking

wise statesmen and prudential theorists who have embraced the notions of power,

13 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3. 14 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3.

12

interest, and the balancing of each as the proper theoretical model for an uncertain

world.

From these two motivations, to argue against idealism and to launch a new

theory of politics, Morgenthau describes the six tenets of political realism. These tenets

provide the intellectual framework which ought to be used to understand political

action, evaluate political options, and guide political decisions in the real world. The

tenets will be listed and then elaborated in the discussion following. They are the

distilled laws and principles against which all events, evaluations, and decisions will be

measured and from which all future derivations of realism take as their touchstone:

1. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is

governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.

2. The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through

the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined

in terms of power.

3. Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an

objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow

that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.

4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action.

5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular

nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.

13

6. The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of

thought is real, and it is profound...the political realist maintains the

autonomy of the political sphere.15

The following will discuss these six tenets with particular attention to the notions of

interest and its relation to power, the moral status of political realism, and describe the

critical notion of the political sphere.

The First Tenet Objective Laws and Human Nature

Morgenthaus realism is firmly founded on a specific account of immutable

human nature. This provides the foundation for a theory that can, in a fashion similar to

but not identical with the scientific method, manipulate the forces present in politics and

mold them towards desired ends. These ends are determined by our capacity to

understand the regularity of human nature and the laws of politics. With a careful

understanding of these features realists will seek to shape policy in a technological

manner to balance the system like an engineer would an ongoing, unstable, chemical

reaction.

Morgenthau charges that idealist political theories place reason as the primary

aspect of human nature. Therefore, through education, legal innovations, and

institutional fine-tuning they can mould humans and their nature towards desired

normative ends. The realist will invert this, and say that reason can only be used as a

15 Principles one to six can be found in Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4 13. Emphasis added.

14

guide towards the ends that are delimited by the remainder of the tenets of realism.

Thus, human nature is permanent, and reason is strictly instrumental. A thoroughgoing

realist will take the laws of human nature into consideration not a priori, but only in

context of specific acts that demonstrate the nature of a particular foreign policy for a

nation. By combining the contingent and the universal the arbitrary historical facts

coupled with the laws of human nature the realist is able to project consequences of

foreign policy into the future and thereby synthesize objective criteria for a rational

theory from the constantly unique events of history.

The Second and Third Tenets A Discussion of Power and Interest

Those laws that determine the possible ends of political action are the second

principle: the notion of interest defined in terms of power. This for realism is what

provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the

facts to be understood.16 Interest and power are the theoretical devices that link the

permanent with the contingent. These are not merely normative stipulations, but the

essential ingredients for a political theory per se the twin pillars of interest and power

give direction and regularity to a chaotic world.

Although interest defined as power is stipulated as eternal and necessary for any

theory, these concepts are imposed as a theoretical stricture, and therefore a realist will

assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power and the

16 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5.

15

evidence of history bears that assumption out.17 This theoretical rigour is the

methodological prerequisite on the observer who evaluates, judges and plans policy.

These strictures prevent theorists from straying into the unknowable regions that

prevent testability, reliability or objectivity. In short, they prevent against two popular

fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences18 and

return politics to reality.

By restricting political action to interests attainable given available power in a

particular circumstance, conceptual thought is strictly delimited between what is

desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete

circumstances of time and place.19 For the practitioner, realism asserts that neglect or

ignorance of the realities of power and interest have created an international scenario in

which the very structure of international relations as reflected in political institutions,

diplomatic procedures, and legal arrangements has tended to become at variance with,

and in large measure irrelevant to, the reality of international politics.20 Any system in

politics or engineering that attempts to proceed contrary to natural law will ultimately

end in catastrophe. Therefore, the realist is persuaded thattransformation can be

achieved only through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have

shaped the past as they will the future. The realist cannot be persuaded that we can

bring about that transformation by confronting a political reality that has its own laws

17 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5. 18 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5. 19 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 7. 20 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 8.

16

with an abstract ideal that refuses to take those laws into account.21 For classical

realists, understanding or controlling international order by existing concepts,

institutions, or norms is catastrophically flawed. This is the sharpest point in the realist

challenge to all disciplines that have contact with the political world.

Realists charge that applying universal principles, such as justice or morality, is

not amenable in concrete to specific political situations as they contribute nothing but

confusion and error. However, the third pillar of the realist framework holds that

although interest and power are objective and eternal, they do not maintain any

particular definition that is fixed. As such, interest is whatever the actor decides it to be,

and power spans a broad spectrum of influential tactics. In an evaluative role, interest is

also whatever an external observer deems it appropriate to be for a particular actor.22

While Morgenthau gives interest and power wide range being whatever the actor or

evaluator could possibly attribute to them they do not contravene the immaterial

strictures that it is claimed justice does. As power and interest are widely drawn, politics

for Morgenthau is very tightly constricted and this is how the realist avoids the

contradiction between interest and power as immutable, ineffable, yet applicable to

objective evaluation. While justice and morality are in some senses the same as power

and interest (ineffable, undetermined) they remain proscribed from material evaluation.

This is because justice and morality do not have material interests as their goal; they are

21 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. 22 For example, if the United States desires to evaluate Chinese behaviour, it attributes interests to the

Chinese government to the best of their knowledge on the assumption that they will behave in accordance

with them.

17

directed at other ends such as fairness, equality or notions otherwise indefinable for a

realist.

Interest, essentially whatever a nation chooses to be its desires, does however

impose some rigour upon the person proposing it. Because interest is contextual, it

cannot be a stipulated end based upon particular features. In other words, not all

interests will have the common feature of x but rather, each instance of interest is

disclosed by the usage of the term in specific contexts, satisfying certain criteriaThis

conceptual distinction implies that particular attention has to be paid to the reasons

supplied in the descriptive meaning; criteria will have to be specified that the reasons

must satisfy.23 This imposes rigor upon the observer, and places the burden of proof on

those who declare a goal to be in the national interest. Those making a claim of interest

are thus compelled to provide evidence. Without evidence, their claims are not

amenable to evaluation or concrete action. Without supporting reasons, claims to

interest are capricious and dismissed as such. If those who claim to speak for the

national interest, or those who interpret the interests of others, can be held to account

then this is nothing other than the legitimacy of the public authority, and its resultant

ability to make binding decisions, [which] depends crucially upon perceptions that its

decisions are in the public interest.24

As all politics for Morgenthau is power politics, the objective of this power is the

fulfillment of its own interests. And power is anything that establishes and maintains

23 F. Kratochwil, On the Notion of "Interest" in International Relations. International Organization Vol. 36,

no. 1 (1982), p. 13. 24 Kratochwil, On the Notion of Interest, 9.

18

the control of man over man,25 while political power is the mutual relations of control

among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large.26

Given the different interests that can be deemed relevant, power can encompass any

form of coercion from subtle negotiations to brute force any and all things that shape

the thinking of another political actor in the name of self-motivated interest. For this

reason, realism ignores motivations, ideologies and the internal organization of a nation

state.27 Liberals criticize this billiard ball approach to the nation state enshrined in the

realist model.28 However, based on the definition of power that covers the domination

of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by

constitutional safeguards...and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds

its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement29

it is neutral between internal organization. Morgenthau holds that the conduits along

which power travels constitutional, monarchical, or otherwise are of no moment

when evaluated in terms of objectively adjudicated actions. All power exercised is the

25 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 11. 26 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 32. 27 Cf. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 388. The second answer holds, that regardless of their domestic

politics or the character of their governments, nations try to pursue their interests in a rational

mannerHence, a democratic countryhas to deal with all kinds of governments, even those whose

character and policies it morally condemns, and must take as the yardstick for its policies the interests and

power of the of the nations concerned. It cannot afford to jeopardize its own interests by indulging its

domestic political preferences and moral judgments of other nationsNations have in fact consistently

taken this position, since a rational foreign policy is otherwise impossible. 28 First, they [realists] believe that States are the primary actors in the international system, rational unitary

actors who are functionally identical. Second, they assume that State preferences, ranging from survival to

aggrandizement, are exogeneous and fixed. Third, they assume that the anarchic structure of the

international system creates such a degree of either actual conflict or perceived uncertainty that states must

constantly assume and prepare for the possibility of war. In this context, outcomes of State interactions are

typically zero-sum and thus are determined by relative power. For Realists, power is the currency of the

international system. States interact with one another within that system like billiard balls: hard, opaque,

unitary actors colliding with one another." AM Slaughter Burley, International Law in a World of Liberal

States European Journal of International Law Vol. 6, No. 4 (1995), p. 5. 29 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 11.

19

same, and the constitutional arrangements of the actors wielding power have little effect

upon the final evaluation or action.

The importance of interest defined as power is not merely an evaluative

technique. Morgenthau maintains a concept of justice, not articulated in Politics Among

Nations, that is entirely dependent on the centrality of power and interest. His definition

of justice is not normative, but dependent upon subjective, self-interested appraisal:

For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities

pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we

are able to do justice to all of themWe are able to judge other

nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this

fashion, we are then capable pursuing, policies that respect the

interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of

our own.30

Through the notions of power and interest realism attempts to resolve the contradictions

of justice and self interest, transient and eternal, theory and practice, necessity and

principle: the necessity is that of protecting the interests of the group for which one

serves as trustee and the principle is that of undifferentiated loyalty to values such as

justice and equality.31

The Fourth Tenet The Moral Status of Political Realism

Morgenthau, and realists in general, assert that theirs is not a positivist theory.

They recognize and follow moral dispositions, and normative principles in their

30 As quoted in Thomas L. Pangle, Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), p. 231. 31 RC Good, The National Interest and Political Realism: Niebuhr's Debate with Morgenthau and

Kennan, The Journal of Politics Vol. 22, No. 4 (1960), p. 597.

20

calculations outside the political sphere. These motivations can inform action within the

political sphere, but for correct realist analysis they must be omitted and substituted

with power and interest. Rational foreign policy based on the understanding of

particular interest and available power constitutes the sole normative metric for judging

political decision. This, however, is a normativity of calculation; good policy is one that

minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral

precept of prudence and the political requirement of success.32 Thus good and moral

are collapsed to what is successful or prudent.

Although Morgenthau attempted to draw a strict line between morality and

politics, the realist is called upon to recognize that political decisions have a necessary

moral impact. The corollary is that moral choices and political success make for an

ineluctable tension.33 The tension exists between the moral command and the

requirements of successful political action.34 But Morgenthau formulates it such that the

prudent is nothing but the correct moral action. As such, the rational choice, the moral

choice, and the successful choice are not necessarily the same, and may often be in

conflict. Although realism is aware of the moral significance, one may need to choose

success over morality. Realists do not wish to ignore morality, or have morality

dominate politics; rather they embrace the tension and embrace it as unavoidable. This

point further disambiguates the differences between interest and justice in realism. The

notion of interest, unchanging but contextually determined, is deduced for each

32 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 10. 33 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. 34 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12.

21

situation. However, universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of

states in the abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the

concrete circumstances of time and place.35

The individual and the state may both value freedom (or justice, or equality) and

in so doing, the individual has every right to sacrifice their own interests (their life, their

possessions) for the sake of any particular principle or ends. In contrast, the state has

no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of

successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival.36

The overarching principle of state action is survival, which relies on the collapse of

morality into prudent action. Without prudence, there can be no political morality

which, in turn would seem to equally eliminate justice, principle, law or any other item

that (1) cannot be filtered to a particular time and place (2) or that require a sacrifice of

the nations interest in survival. The difference being that ethics in the abstract judges

action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political

consequences.37 Although the moral foundations of realism are centrally important to

Morgenthau, ironically, they are most often articulated by its critics rather than

subsequent realist scholars.38

35 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. 36 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. 37 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 12. 38 Cf. Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 19; Michael C Williams, Why Ideas Matter in International

Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics,

International Organization Vol. 58, No. 04 (2004); or AJH Murray, The Moral Politics of Hans

Morgenthau, The Review of Politics Vol. 58, no. 1 (1996), p. 83 who states: First, it becomes obvious that

Morgenthau was in no way a positivist. His theory does not assert a necessity in international politics which

excludes the possibility of freedom or moral responsibility. Second, it becomes clear that, far from ignoring

22

The Fifth Tenet National Morality is not Universal Morality

The fifth tenet of political realism is the opposite border to the boundary laid by

the fourth. The fifth tenet states that the moral convictions of a nation are not to be held

as the universal morals laws to be imposed universally. Thus, if the fourth eliminates

importing universal principles, the fifth eliminates particulars from becoming universal.

Therefore, political realism seeks to tread between nihilism and absolutism, and it is

exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that

moral excess and that political folly.39

The Sixth Tenet The Foundations of a Theory and the Constrained Political Sphere

Realists claim that for politics to proceed in a prudent and rational manner it

must operate unencumbered. Politics, formulated as an autonomous discipline, prevents

judgments external to the political realm from impinging on the realist demand for

prudence. Any judgments outside the political sphere may be acknowledged, but

ultimately subordinated to power and interest. Morgenthau offers a brief example of the

necessity of the autonomous political sphere that illustrates the importance of the sixth

tenet. He looks to the French and British responses regarding the growing belligerence

of Germany in the 1930s. France and United Kingdom in this period allowed the

answer to the legal question, legitimate within its sphere, to determine their political

the moral questions that this raises, Morgenthau regarded them as central to his theory, and made a serious

effort to address the problems that they generate. 39 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 13.

23

actions. Instead of asking both questions, that of law and that of power, they asked only

the question of law; and the answer they received could have no bearing on the issue

that their very existence might have depended upon.40 This relates to the central

question here as to why it is the case that appeals to justice (in this case to the justice of

international law) are simply invalid in the face of political power.

While Morgenthau expanded the realm of interest and power in the second and

third tenet, he contracts politics in the sixth with the purpose of making politics

rationally coherent and power and interest dominant. Although power is primary for

Morgenthau, the autonomous political sphere provides the ability to discriminating

between what forms of power will be admitted as legitimate. The autonomous political

sphere will allow legitimate political authority and seek to reject raw power. In fact, a

limited conception of politics is part of a sophisticated intellectual strategy seeking to

address the centrality of power in politics without reducing politics to an

undifferentiated sphere of violence, to distinguish legitimate forms of political power, to

insulate the political sphere from physical violence, and to discern the social structures

that such a strategy requires to be successful.41

Morgenthaus project, although intended to bring power to the fore in political

understanding, is not to glorify or legitimize a situation in which the capacity to wield

any form of power particularly physical violence is the ultimate arbiter of authority

and legitimacy.42 He makes four distinctions among the varieties of power available,

40 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 14. 41 Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 637. 42 Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 634.

24

between power and influence, between power and force, between usable and unusable

power, between legitimate and illegitimate power.43 The main point of contention is the

difference between legitimate power the exercise of which is sanctioned by moral or

legal justification rather than naked power which is simply at the whim of its wielder.

Morgenthaus reason for favoring legitimate power is only that it is likely to be more

effective than equivalent illegitimate power, which cannot be so justified. That is to say,

legitimate power has a better chance to influence the will of its objects than equivalent

illegitimate power.44 It is for this reason that, despite the moral dimension of realism, it

is a valid claim to attest that there is no resourceto prevent the development of a

cynical awareness that I may expand at your expense if I have the power to get away

with it.45

Although there exists this limited argument against naked power, and there

remains the possibility to profit from illegitimate force, it is incorrect to view Politics

Among Nations as a re-write of Machiavellis Prince. Morgenthau states his purpose as

twofold: The first is to detect and understand the forces that determine political

relations among nations, and to comprehend the ways in which those forces act upon

each other and upon international political relations and institutions.46 Michael

Williams argues that Morgenthaus delimited political sphere is the correct means to

guide realist policy towards more hopeful outcomes. Williams argues that moving the

focus towards interest defined as power implies an ethical dimension; a specific outline

43 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 33. 44 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 34. 45 Good, National Interest and Political Realism, 615. 46 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 18.

25

for legitimate authority and proper political action. By decrying both vague notions of

justice and concrete forms of brutality the narrow conceptual definition of politics is

here part of an attempt to distinguish the exercise of legitimate political power and

domination, and particularly to insulate this sphere from the intrusion of physical

violence and domination.47

With its new limited range, politics becomes the rational realm of legitimate

action and authority. Realism imposes a proper procedure on international decision

making which includes accepting a right course, but not a proper end. Any theory

sanctioning violent, or illegitimate, political authority would corrupt the political sphere

and return it to a contest of might. If realism were to sanction power tout court, that

would then subordinate the autonomy of the political sphere to interference by irrational

actors who can wield the greatest force. This would undermine realism and its goal of

bringing reason to politics as arbitrary violence and naked power are antithetical to

rational evaluation.

Delimiting the political realm is a strategic and prudential move. It invokes the

favoured mode of control for a realist the balance of power. By giving politics firm

borders, it becomes possible to balance distinct social spheres and interests against one

another to limit the reach of politics while also limiting the influence of other spheres on

the political.48 This prevents political overreach while simultaneously maintaining

political autonomy. The political realm stresses practise, but it is balanced in turn by

external principles. When operating within their assigned spheres, normative principles

47 Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 649. 48 Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 650.

26

can act as a counterweight to prevent practise from operating in a moral vacuum. This

method of balancing constrains politics, and provides a mechanistic approach to locating

the mean between extremes without imposing arbitrary normative restraints. Also, this

method preserves political autonomy, and the realist account of human nature.

Returning to the example above, when France and England in the 1930s imprudently

neglected the political sphere to act wholly on legal grounds, they neglected the

exigencies of the balance of power (both intellectually and materially). They chose

principle over practise in a realm where this is strictly prevented by human nature and

the laws of politics. The inevitable result was the invasion of France, and the near

collapse of Britain in the face of German aggression.

This realist conception of the political sphere poses the problem that, distinct

social spheres (economic, legal, moral, aesthetic) operating within their specific logics

and forms of power49 each have a demarcation that is decided a priori with a backdrop

of ends towards which each pursues distinct from any other. To say that these spheres

exist and that one of them, politics, is uniquely autonomous along the variable of power

and interest is to say that there are areas of influence demarcated metaphysically or by

realist fiat. If these disciplinary boundaries are not present in the same way that human

nature or the laws of politics are, but are only prudentially asserted, then realist

assumptions ought to be open to philosophical criticism. If politics is an autonomous

realm by nature, then that is a claim beyond which politics can address. If it is not, and

the political sphere is merely a methodological shortcut, then is the argument presented

49 Williams, Why Ideas Matter, 650.

27

for the political realm sufficient for it to be immune from principled or philosophical

judgment? This question is briefly addressed in the next section, and will recur as the

investigation proceeds to see if realism can provide sufficient evidence for its claims.

Why Study Realism philosophically?

As we have seen, realism maintains many philosophical presuppositions. The

political sphere was posited to secure politics as an autonomous discipline, and this

zone is designed with the purpose of preventing imprudent action. But is this political

sphere philosophically sound in itself? Can politics truly be said to be autonomous? By

eschewing philosophical notions, scoping power and interest broadly, and shrinking the

political realm, politics is removed from external oversight. These unanswered questions

provide an indication why political realism requires philosophical evaluation.

Although Morgenthau attempts to be conscientious of justice and morality, they

remain secondary. Despite his best intentions, there remains no stricture against the

illegitimate domination of the powerful within accurate realist analysis. Thus, realism is

at best in an ambiguous position with respect to justice. To examine an alternative, we

turn in the next chapter to the idealist response: that of liberal theory.

28

Chapter Two

Two Variants of Liberal Justice and

Their Incompatibility with Realism

Domestic Liberalism

Liberalism has had several decades to respond to the realist challenge and

continues to be the strongest non-realist theory of international relations. Two variants

of liberalism will be discussed domestic and international. The domestic variant is the

one most often discussed by philosophers. Developed by John Rawls, it was originally

articulated in the Kantian tradition, but has subsequently been amended into a strictly

political notion. Rawlsian theories will be named domestic here because, although they

are not attached to any specific nation or group, they do depend upon a well organized

society adhering to the rule of law.

Domestic liberalism does not extend beyond national barriers, and of itself, does

not take account of international relations. But, if one is to take the domestic theories of

justice seriously, they must do so with an awareness of international affairs. As realism

remains the dominant theory in international relations, one cannot entertain a domestic

theory if it can be violated by actors in the international sphere who do not respect the

notion of domestic justice. Furthermore, Rawls seeks justice as fairness, while realism

denies fairness as an action-guiding principle. Nor does realism recognize well-ordered

societies as privileged within international politics. As such, there is a direct conflict

between philosophical theory and political practice if one wishes to pursue philosophic

justice with any notion that it is related to a world under the influence of power and

29

interest. Some scholars have made fledgling attempts to extend Rawls theory into the

international arena; but these attempts remain immature and unable to rival either the

international liberalism or the dominant realist school.50

Rawlsian domestic justice extends from particular procedural principles. They

are the principles of equal access to basic rights and liberties, and that any inequality in

society is justified only if it assists those least well off.51 If the two principles of justice are

followed, then society can be said to be organized in a just manner. This image of social

organization proceeds from individuals as bearers of rights,52 proceeding to mutual

advantage within an accepted plurality of beliefs. These principles provide a schema for

a political community that will function by eliminating fundamental beliefs such as

religion or morality from public debate. The community will retain only discourse that

embraces public reason53 and only endorse political action that observes the two

principles of justice. This will allow each person to pursue their desires within the

community without the interference of irreconcilable comprehensive views that

proclaim fundamental truths or ends. This pluralitistic notion of a just community

requires the existence of a well-ordered society amenable to the rule of law that has

50 Molly Cochran describes the attempts of authors such as Thomas Pogge and Charles R. Beitz to extend

Rawls internationally in: Cosmopolitanism: Rawlsian approaches to international distributive justice, in

Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 51 Cf. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 227. 52 Liberalism has been identified with an essential principle the importance of freedom of the individual.

Above all, this is a belief in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to treat

others as ethical subjects, and not as objects or means only. Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and

Foreign Affairs Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), p. 206. 53 I propose that in public reason comprehensive doctrines of truth or right be replaced by an idea of the

politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizensThe basic requirement is that a reasonable doctrine

accepts a constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law. John Rawls, The Idea

of Public Reason Revisited, The University of Chicago Law Review Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer, 1997), p. 766.

30

already emerged from a constitutional consensus. In short, justice for Rawls is equality

before the form of law which is constructed upon a fair procedure that represents

ideals we already intuitively accept.54

However, the world at large is not a well organized society able to recognize

persons as rights bearing individuals capable of equal participation. Nor is there a need

for global consensus within Rawls theory. The only requirement for justice is an

agreement among individuals to form a polity by assenting to a pluralist constitution

along principles they already intuitively accept.55 Rawls would have it that these rules

can be justified retrospectively with the aid of the original position. In the original

position, individual rational choosers are sequestered from any knowledge of position,

advantage, or social ends and they must posit procedures that will create the fairest

institutions. This may provide a means for justifying decisions made within a society,

but extending it beyond borders yields no more than international norms familiar to us

all: the equality of nations, self-determination, a right to non-interference, and that

treaties are to be kept.56

Rawls political idea of procedural justice that depends on an overlapping

consensus of differing views is similar to Morgenthaus political sphere which accepts a

plurality of interests among nations. Both postulate a decision procedure based upon a

54 Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 30. 55 A well-ordered society amenable to Rawlsian justice must meet four criteria: it must maintain a public

conception of justice based on generally accepted beliefs (frequently articulated in the rule of law following

a constitution), the members of the community recognize themselves and their fellows as free and equal

moral agents, the third being a lack of a super-abundance of material goods (scarcity) with a plurality of

opinion held by its members, and held within the limits of justice that remains stable in the community is

the fourth. Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 31. 56 Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 26.

31

notion of human nature. For Morgenthau the individual a self-interested, power-hungry

person; for Rawls, however, the person is a person because of their status as citizen.

They remain self-interested, rights holding, agents who can becitizens, that isfully

cooperating member[s] of society over a complete life.57 The domestic liberal notion of a

person-as-citizen is fundamental for a just society, but limits their rights-as-persons to

rights-as-citizens. While Rawls maintains persons are the primary unit of political

consideration, Morgenthau admits only state actions that are internationally relevant to

the balance of power in his political sphere. Rawls argues that if one is to have a concept

of justice within constitutional democracies, it cannot through philosophy, but instead

must be secured in both political procedure and the acceptance of reasonable pluralism.

In this sense, Rawls shifts his notion of justice into a position analogous to Morgenthaus

autonomous political sphere and to a form that corresponds to Morgenthaus first and

fifth tenets of realism. Because Rawls shifts from a philosophical to a political conception

of justice, he attempts to confine it to the bounds outlined by the realist challenge, but

without the ability to extend his justice beyond national boundaries.

If a domestically liberal state cannot reach beyond its borders and carry with it a

concept of justice, then it must adopt a power-oriented foreign policy. Neglecting the

strictures of power and interest means risking the well-ordered society necessary for

justice to emerge. However, Thomas Pogge a Rawlsian international relations scholar,

states that nations are prevented from extending Rawlsian justice due to a lack of a moral

57 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 233.

32

reasons. 58 Whereas the classical realist will contend that because of international

disorder, and the strictures of power and interest, there can never be moral reasons

sufficiently compelling for international organization. Although international

institutions exist, and have some influence, for a realist they do not fail because they lack

the values of a well-ordered society, but because there cannot be effective values shared

internationally. International politics must rely upon material exigencies of interest

defined as power to provide guidelines for action. The same characteristic of the state

system that gives rise to well-ordered societies, the concept of national sovereignty, is

the same one that undermines attempts to institutionalize any shared international

values. This is borne out by the consequences of the original position which generates

the witnessed norms in international relations that of sovereign equality which in turn

breeds power politics. Therefore, there is a contradiction between the desires for

international relations coherent with domestic justice, and the demands of the original

position when used in interstate relations.

In the end, adherents of domestic liberalism must engage in the power politics

advocated by realism. Given the moral politics of Morgenthaus realism, liberal states

ought to abandon normative principle in international relations to protect their own well-

ordered societies that are the necessary conditions for Rawlsian justice. They have a

moral obligation to behave prudentially when engaging in foreign policy. This is the

only judgment of ought that extends from a Rawlsian perspective on the international

58 Pogges two hypotheses are that the present world order is a modus Vivendi, and that international

institutions are largely unsuccessful because they lack shared values integral to well-ordered national

societies. Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 42.

33

scene. It is the ought of prudential action that betrays the primacy of persons, the

necessity of just distribution, and decisions blind to power and advantage. This collapse

of morality into prudence is the very nature of realist political morality: the primacy of

self-preservation to maintain the necessary conditions for liberal justice. The irony of this

position is that the just society must be prepared to behave unjustly to preserve its

justice-as-fairness against other powers who accept incompatible political goals. If

domestic liberals do not adopt a realist foreign policy, they risk losing their own well-

ordered societies to those who will engage in power politics to the liberals detriment.

Although realism eliminates moral judgments from potential decisions in favour of

qualifying actions as good or prudent, for a nation to behave morally it ought to behave

prudentially or risk its own existence. The only moral judgment that realism offers is to

take domestic liberal justice and impose realist international behaviour.

Pogge, in an attempt to transcend the realist challenge and the prevailing

disunity of sovereign equality, provides a values-based approach to minimize the

tumult of power politics. This moral outlook demands that nations accede to the

pluralistic acceptance advocated by Rawls political liberalism, only writ large to

encompass the community of nations. This would require that societies should accept

morally rather than prudentially the continued existence of one another and the values

central to their domestic social contracts.59 This is followed by the demand that there

ought to be a fair distribution of burdens and resources, and that countries be convinced

of, and ascribe to, this moral obligation as action guiding. Pogge maintains that with

59 Pogge as quoted in Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 43.

34

the experience of trust and cooperation, commitment to a just scheme based on shared

values would deepen and widen.60 However, it is convincingly argued by the realists

that nations would not abandon their vital interests to implement obscure moral

principles in the way Pogge wishes. By trying to promote an international order based

on broad, undefined values he invites their breach by negligent parties with sufficient

power. Recalcitrant or negligent actors will exploit the principles that bind all other

nations to their own advantage without a mechanism to counter their aspirations. In

short, he is not able to overcome the realist challenge.

Although domestic liberalism attempts to reintroduce the ought of principled

judgment into politics by establishing a theory of justice, when it is extended to

international relations it (a) differs very little from the classical realist model of

international behaviour due to the original position, and (b) Pogges values-based

attempt to extend Rawls internationally fails in the face of realist criticism. Because

domestic liberalism is dependent on the well-ordered society, it cannot extend its

principles of justice to international relations without relapsing to realism or risk

destruction. Therefore it cannot be said to be just based on three criteria outlined above.

If the preferred philosophical theory of justice cannot overcome the realist

challenge, can we turn to international relations theory in the liberal tradition to provide

a just theory? The next section will look to international liberalism and its response to

realism.

60 Cochran, Cosmopolitanism, 43. Emphasis in original.

35

International Liberalism

The second variant to be examined is international liberalism represented here

by Michael W. Doyle. Writing from the Kantian tradition, his scholarship is aware of the

historical development of realist international relations. Despite this, he asserts that

Kantian liberal principles have provided a firm anchor of the most successful zone of

international peace yet established.61 The expanding liberal peace envisioned by Kant is

now claimed by liberal scholars to be a historical fact. This zone is maintained by liberal

principles that promote commercial relations, transparency in judicial processes, and a

view of humans as rights-bearing individuals; all of which provide points of contact

between countries. These interactions undercut power politics among similarly

constituted states. For the international liberal, however, the competition of power

politics and illiberal behaviour generally predominates between the liberal and non-

liberal world.

Doyle argues that there are specific values understood in the liberal tradition

which have generated rights and institutions.62 The unique principle that underlies these

is that humans are moral ends in themselves with associated rights and reciprocal

duties. From this comes freedom from arbitrary restraint (embodied in equality before

the law), the promotion of capacities and opportunities (or positive freedom), and a

third liberal right, democratic participation or representation, is necessary to guarantee

61 Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs,

Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn, 1983), p. 343. 62 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 206.

36

the other two.63 For international liberals, the individual is prior to the state, and the

state is justified only with the informed consent of its constituents. States behaving in

foreign affairs are subject to the same considerations as their component individuals; the

concept of national sovereignty is therefore akin to the sovereign equality of persons. In

other words, the

basic postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have

the right to be free from foreign intervention. Since morally

autonomous citizens hold rights to liberty, the states that

democratically represent them have the right to exercise political

independence. Mutual respect for these rights then becomes the

touchstone of international liberal theory.64

International liberals do not deny that states exist in a realist security dilemma;

that they must contend against other states with the mutual desire for power in an

anarchic world. However, Doyle claims that the characteristics of liberal political

communities have formed a separate peace, and through economic and legal ties, have

annexed themselves from the competition of power politics. Unlike domestic liberal

theorists who wish a direct moral solution to international problems, Doyle argues that

through the continued growth of liberal democracies the political bond of liberal rights

and interests have proven a remarkably firm foundation for mutual non-aggression. A

separate peace exists among liberal states.65 Therefore it is not merely a moral desire

that solidifies peaceful coexistence, but a principled stand extending from the concept of

the individual. This notion of persons leads to the construction of institutions and states

63 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 207. 64 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 213. 65 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 232.

37

that respect individual rights, and through relations with other similarly constituted

polities, a zone of peace and understanding has emerged. This conceptualization of

relations contravenes the realist unitary (billiard ball) concept of the state.66 The relations

between sub-national components, particularly economic ties, entangle liberal nations at

an extra-national level that can prove to be superior to the power relations between

states.67

International liberals assert that these multifaceted intra-state relations are the

causal factors for the liberal peace. Through these interactions, trust between countries

with similar internal structure breeds transparency of intent, an increase of

communication, and therefore confidence in the decision mechanisms of foreign states.

The chance of misunderstanding therefore decreases, the risk of insecurity minimizes,

and relationships between nation states grow friendlier. The realist model fails to

appreciate these types of relations, and consequently states in a competitive scenario

suffer the chance that an inoffensive exchange may escalate into animosity and taint the

remainder their interactions. The liberal democracies are insulated from this due to the

extent and variety of commercial exchanges [which] guarantee that a single conflict of

interest will not shape an entire relationship. But between liberal and nonliberal

societiesa single conflict of interest will define an entire relationship.68 Similarly to

realist desires for checks and balances of forces, the interdependence of economic

66 Cf. Slaughter, World of Liberal States, 5 and Note 28 above. 67 Cf. Slaughter, World of Liberal States, 39. The world of liberal statesis a world of individual self-

regulation facilitated by states; of transnational regulation enacted and implemented by disaggregated

political institutions - courts, legislatures, executives and administrative agencies - enmeshed in

transnational society and interacting in multiple configurations across borders; of double-edged diplomacy

and inter-governmental agreements vertically enforced through domestic courts." 68 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 326.

38

relations, for example, will provide a counter-weight for security tensions and

international desires for power. So a beneficial economic relation will balance a stressful

security relation amongst liberal states.

In contrast to domestic liberals, international liberals do not fully accept

pluralism as a touchstone of peaceful coexistence. In fact, liberal internationalism

among liberal states has been deficient is in preserving its basic preconditions under

changing international circumstances, and particularly in supporting the liberal

character of its constituent states.69 Doyle cites the United States as paradigm example

of how liberal states must reinforce each other and their shared principles in order to

affirm the international liberal order. It is claimed that acting with foresight and

coherent intentions, after World War II the United States following was prepared and

able to take measures70 to maintain liberal society internationally with economic and

political aid. However, this is simply another way of saying that the United States had

an interest in maintaining a particular form of government in Europe, and had sufficient

power to achieve it. Thus the principled liberal stand may be nothing more than prudent

realist necessity.

If the goal of this investigation is to seek a notion of justice that is pervasive, the

liberal peace is circumstantial at best. The international liberal peace is a coalition of

prudence dependent on certain material conditions, and not a principled victory. It

achieves a unique historical advantage, but not in a way that is fundamentally different

than an effective balance of power. For example:

69 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 232. 70 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 232.

39

If domestic economic collapse on the pattern of the global

propagation of depressions in the 1930s were to reoccur, the

domestic political foundations of liberalism could fall. Or, if

international economic rivalry were to continue to increase, then

consequent attempts to weaken economic interdependence

(establishing closed trade and currency blocs) would break an

important source of liberal accommodation.71

The liberal peace is only a form of muted competition due to material circumstance, and

not different-in-kind from realist alliances of coherent interests and their associated

reduction in security competition. When circumstances emerge to skew interest or

power sufficiently to compel states to diverge from the liberal alliance, realism remerges.

Therefore, any international justice present in the liberal peace is not founded upon

liberal principles, but the pragmatic circumstances that make cooperation more efficient

than competition. The liberal peace is not a negative outcome to be so easily derided, but

without recourse to justice beyond material circumstance, we risk falling back into

realist power struggles even between liberal states. One can assert principles, and

invest in their economic manifestation, but the fact remains that power and the interests

towards which it is directed are the underlying mechanisms that sustain liberalism and

its peace.

If the liberal peace provides a form of just relations within the boundaries of

liberal regimes, what are the features of the relations between the liberal and the non-

liberal world? Those not party to the liberal peace are not afforded the rights of being

ends in themselves; in

71 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies I, 233.

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liberal practice, some nonliberal statesdo not acquire the right to

be free from foreign intervention, nor are they assumed to respect

the political independence and territorial integrity of other states.72

The notion of extending the liberal peace is a necessary factor for justice, and one that is

desired in order to entrench liberal principles globally. If the United States invokes its

power, as it did after World War II to maintain liberal nations, Doyle claims that this

ought to be the mandate of all liberal states. They should work to strengthen liberal

policies in other countries, and amend the gap that existences in behaviour between

liberal and non liberal states. To do this, liberal states should encourage nonliberal states

to secure basic human needs, civil rights, and democracy, and to expand the scope and

effectiveness of the world market economy.73 These are the liberal principles that, it is

claimed, give rise to the material conditions for peace. And this, then, leads to Doyles

statement that most distances international liberalism from domestic liberal and from

realist theories. He states that unlike the realist approach to foreign policy: powerful

and weak, hostile and friendly nonliberal states must be treated according to the same

standards. There are no special geopolitical clients, no geopolitical enemies other than

those judged to be such by liberal principles.74 This example denotes that liberal

policies must apply equally in the sense of isonomia regardless of material power,

external relations, and internal composition. It demands that nations have equal

treatment from the liberal world; it provides a metric against which good and bad

behaviour can be judged morally; it takes a stance that is disinterested with respect to

72 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 325. 73 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 344. 74 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 344.

41

power or interest. That is to say, a nation is not a client, in that its friendship or just

treatment is not dependent on what it can deliver to its powerful master, and animosity

does not spring from opportunity or geography. Animosity is reserved for those that

oppose the individual liberty, autonomous existence of other states and the civil rights,

human needs and others that flow from the person, to the state to the international

scene. However, this equal treatment does not extend to those other nations who deny

liberal principles. The international liberal must then choose between the principled

stand to respect the sovereign equality of nations, or confront the illiberal states using

coercive means and potentially abridge the populations individual rights.

To follow this principled stance

requires abandoning the national interest and the balance of

power as guidelines to policy. The interests of the United States

must be consistent with its principles. We must have no liberal

enemies and no unconditional alliances with nonliberal states.75

But simply stating or desiring it does not make it so. If principles do not align with

interest or power, then they fail to affect policy and diminish the project that one wishes

to follow. Instances such as the Hungarian revolution of 1956 where the United States

contributed much liberal rhetorical support, but no material assistance, the result was

the suppression of the population and a loss of face for American officials. Because most

liberal states were not willing to risk their own interests or test their power against the

Soviet Union for the sake of principle, this only weakened the liberal world and their

normative desires because they were not coherent with the interest of refraining from

75 Doyle, Kant Liberal Legacies II, 345.

42

war, and they presented insufficient power to restrain soviet interference.76 Thus,

principled politics must be subordinate to power politics in a direct confrontation.

Moreover, principled politics tend to weaken themselves in this respect when they are

not backed with sufficient material power.

76 Cf. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 166. Which discusses the combination of bellicose rhetoric and

political inaction which will only guarantee failure. Also: As the London Economist observed on 30 august

1952: Unhappily liberation applied to eastern Europe...means either the risk of war or it means nothing...

Liberation entails no risk of war only when it means nothing. As quote by Norman A. Graebner, The

United States and NATO, 1953 1969, in NATO After Thirty Years eds. Kaplan and Clawson (Wilmington:

Scholarly Resources, 1981), p. 37

43

Chapter Three

Reinhold Niebuhrs Reformed Realism

Having seen the merits and difficulties with prevailing international relations

and philosophical theories, is there an alternative that is accurate in evaluation, effective

in practice, while also meeting the requirements for justice? Reinhold Niebuhr begins to

addresses this question through an understanding of St. Augustines The City of God

Against the Pagans. Niebuhr describes a reformed realism that acknowledges

Morgenthaus material requirements, but also demands effective non-material goals. For

Niebuhr, aspects of human nature that transcend power and interest are necessary to

temper the self-destructive qualities of classical realism. This reformed realism will

challenge the wisdom of Morgenthaus constrained political sphere, while seeking to

extend justice beyond the material contingency of the liberal peace. If he is successful,

then there is an avenue for philosophy to inform the material necessity of the political

realm without sacrificing realisms precision. By investigating this alternative,

philosophers can begin to work from a Niebuhrian standpoint and integrate themselves

into debates of international affairs and recommend just action.

The realist aspect of Niebuhrs theory begins in his agreement with

Morgenthaus derivation of realism from a particular theory of human nature. For

Niebuhr the origins of communities are coincidental and prudential, not planned or

principled, as people are driven together by common material interest or familial

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relation. The beginnings of a community are not under the influence of justice; the

interests and relations come first, and their cohesion is achieved by using power to

subdue internal conflicts of interest. But acknowledging power and interest does not

exclude principles of justice for Niebuhr. He recognizes Morgenthaus stress on material

constraints, but contends that doing so is not fatal to the establishment of justice.77

Because of Niebuhrs Augustinian influence, the two drives of human nature the

material drive recognized by realism, and the transcendent interest of morality and

justice are reflected in Augustines two cities: the city of man and the city of God.

These also represent the two loves, the love of God and the love of self.78 One love, or

one drive, cannot be ignored to the expense of the other. Morgenthau seeks to engage

and mitigate the love of self through a refined understanding of human nature and

political relations, but he fails to understand that two drives cannot be separated. These

two drives are not two types of people [who] dwell together but[that] the conflict

between love and self-love is in every soul.79 Following Niebuhr, then, we must

undertake the study of international relations in a manner that is able to study the whole

of human desires, and to take account of the totality of human nature in the political

sphere.

Following the model of the two cities, philosophers and international relations

scholars can work to amend Morgenthaus account of human nature. This change in the

77 Rein