17035479 Independent Baluchistan Ataullah Mengals Declaration of Independence

8/14/2019 17035479 Independent Baluchistan Ataullah Mengals Declaration of Independence

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Independent Baluchistan?Ataullah Mengal's 'Declaration of Independence'

Lawrence LifschultzTheplight of small nationsor nationalities ituated ncrucially trategic egionson the borderline et-weentwo great systemshas ever been one of tragedy,threatof extermination,and an all-too-familiarmanipulationof local aspirationstowards self-determinationby more powerful and cynical regimes.Baluchistan,Pakistan's argestprovince,presents a modern versionof the classicaldilemmaof a smallnation under iege. Thedilemma sfurtheraggravated y the developments recedingand since the SovietinterventionnAfghanistan.Thisarticle,basedon an interviewwithAtaullahMengal, the Baluch leaderwho headedthe onlyelectedgovernment f Baluchistan, onsiders he background f Baluchnationalism nd theconsequencesof the 'Declaration f Independence'which, as AtaullahKhanMengal makesclear in his interview,hasbeen orced uponthe Baluch n orderto ensure heirmeresurvivalas a nationality.The nterviewtself is appendedat theendof thearticle.

THE plight of small nations or na-tionalities wedged between great empireshas for centuries been a story of tragedy,extermination and an all-too-familiarmanipulation of local aspirationstowards self-determination by morepowerful and cynical regimes. The Poles,the Kurds, the Meo and the Eritreansallknow what it is like to be someone else'sbattleground. Only at rare moments dosmall nationalities emerge on their ownconditions of self-determination. Theprice in blood and sacrifice is usually ashigh as the tactical intelligence andheroism required to achieve the goal.When such a nationality finds itself inacrucially strategic region on the border-line between two great systems, ratherthan in the same remote backwater ofworld indifference, it may discover thatits own hopes are pressed tightly betweenthe loaded gun-barrels of powers whichcarenothing for the independent rightsofa peripheralpeople. A modern version ofthe classical dilemma of a small nationunder siege, fighting for survival on itsown terms, appears to be emerging inBaluchistan, Pakistan's largest province.The nationalism of the Baluch now lies atthe intersection of what is potentially anarea of immense superpowerconflict thatcould conceivably draw the world to-wards a major war. While the SovietUnion sustains an unpopular puppetregimein Afghanistan on the bayonets of80,000 soldiers, American policy hasfound its own reflection in its unam-biguous and financially substantiv,esup-port for Pakistan's militarydictatorship.The Baluch arecaught between these twocontemporary dictatorships, solemnlybacked by Moscow on one side andWashington (plus Beijing) on the other.The former Chief Minister of Balu-chistan hasissued a declarationfrom exilein London which threatens to have ser-

ious political repercussions not only forthe future of Pakistan but for the Gulfand the entire central Asian region. At-aullah Mengal, who headed the onlyelected Baluch government ever to servein Pakistan's westernmost province, hasdeclared that the Baluch will no longerpursue their thirty-five year quest tosecure 'provincial autonomy' as a re-cognised nationality within Pakistan, butwill now fight for 'complete indepen-dence' and the end of Pakistan as a statein its present form.Mengal, who has lived in exile sinceshortly after his release from prison in1977, is still regarded as a potent politicalforce within the province. His arrest in1973 along with most of his provincialcabinet set off a province-wide rebellionwhich engulfed the Pakistan Army in oneof the more brutal, yet least reported,wars in Asia. Mengal was detained by theBhutto governmnentn large part due topressure from the Shah of Iran who op-posed the presence of an elected socialdemocratic government contiguous toIran's eastern border. The consequencesof the arrests were traumatic as rebellionspread throughout the province. At onestage nearly a quarter of the PakistanArmy was deployed in the province alongwith units of the Iranian Armed Forces.The rebellioncame to an end followingthe coup d'etat which brought GeneralZia-ul-Huq to powerin July 1977.Withina week of the coup Zia personally flew toHyderabad Central Jail where Mengaland others were detained to begin nego-tiations for an end to the war. Ultimately,the Baluch leaders were all released, aceasefire was declared, the Army with-drew from operations in the interior ofthe province, and an amnesty to those in-volved in the rebellion was offered. Anuneasy truce has existed in the provinceever since.

Baluchistan is situated at a strategiccrossroads of major importance wedgedbetween crucial Western concerns withsecurity in the Gulf, and the presence ofSoviet forces to the north of Afghanistan.In an extended interview, Mengal de-clared that although the Baluch existed inthe very vortex of a superpowerconfron-tation in South West Asia, it remainedtheir intent to become neither the pawnnor the victim of either power, as theynow pursue their own independent na-tional aims. Such a goal will require ex-ceptional diplomatic skill and a capacityto make their own position an intractablefactor which other powers in the regionwill have to come to terms with. They areprepared to have direct relations withboth the US and the Soviet Union as wellas the Gulf states in determining thefuture configuration of the region'spolitical geography, so long as their ownposition is clearly taken into account as afactor by all concerned.Mengalstated he has issued his declara-tion because a crucial turning point hadfinally been reached after three decadesof violence. The option of a democraticresolution to the crisis within the struc-ture of Pakistan had now passedthepointof no return in his view. "We have triedour best over all these yearsto find a solu-tion to the issue within the framework ofPakistan," he said, "It is the reason whywe have been fighting for provincialautonomy and democracy at the all-Pakistan level. Had Pakistan acceptedthe concept of nationalities withinPakistan and the rights of those na-tionalities as partners within the boun-daries of Pakistan, one could have said,'Yes, adjustment is possible'. But theyhave always denied the existence of suchrights. From 1973 to 1977 the Army'soperations in Baluchistan has made clearto us that even if the demand for provin-

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Annual Number May 1983 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLYcial autonomy is made within a demo-cratic structure, it will be met with thesame violence from the Army which ismore or less comparable to what wewould have faced had we opted for in-dependence. For us there is only one wayleft. If the Baluch are to survive, then wemust struggle for an 'independent' Balu-chistan, outside the framework ofPakistan".

POLITICAL POLARISATION

Mengal, who has spent nearly eightyears in Pakistani prisons, half of themduring the mid-sixties under the first mar-tial law regime of General Ayub Khan,has always been considered one of themore moderate leaders of the country'sdemocratic opposition. His sharp mili-tancy today is one reflection of the poli-tical polarisation existing within the pro-vince.The central political dilemma that hasplagued Pakistan since its creation out ofthe partition of colonial India has beenthe country's unending confrontationwith the 'national question'. The forma-tion of Pakistan brought together anamalgamation of five provinces (two ofthem in part) into one state linked toone another by the notion of it existing asa 'Muslim nation', or homeland for theprincipalpersecuted religiousminority ofthe South Asian subcontinent. However,in threeof the four provinceswhich todayconstitute Pakistan-NWFP, Sindh, andBaluchistan-although formally existingas Muslim majority areas, dominant pol-itical sentiment in 1947 was led by seculardemocratic nationalists opposed to thefounding of a separate theocratic statebased on a religious demarcation. Thiswas to be seen most acutely in the pro-vince of Baluchistan at the very outset ofthe transition to partition.The position of Baluchistanwas one ofparticulardistinction from the other pro-vinces which were to make up Pakistan.The confederation of Baluch tribes andtheir titularhead, the Khanof Kalat,con-sidered their status within the disinteg-rating British Empire to be equivalent tothat of Nepal. While other so-called'native states' dealt with the British'Indian government' in New Delhi, Nepaland Baluchistan maintained treaty rela-tions directly with London. More signifi-cantly, the 1876treaty which had permit-ted Britain access to areas of Baluchistanand permission to establish specific for-tifications pledged that the British"would respect the sovereignty and in-dependence of Kalat". The BaluchDiwan or Assembly repeatedlyrejectedinvotes 'accession' to Pakistan anddirectedits leadership to secure by negotiations

the status of full independence as gua-ranteed in the 1876 treaty. A close re-lationship with Pakistan was not ruledout, but the pre-condition of full nationalsovereignty was laid down by the Diwanas the first step toward such an associa-tion. However, the province was forciblyannexed after a nine-month stalematedinterregnum which followed partition.The annexation set off a rebellion andPakistani Army units suppressedthe firstmodern armed revolt of the Baluch led byPrince Agha Abdul Karim, the youngerbrother of the Khan of Kalat. The newPakistan authorities imprisoned much ofthe recalcitrant Baluch leadership withKarim spending the next 18 years of hislife behind prison bars.From the 1950s to the 1970s the Baluchleadershipaccepted thefait accompli andthe political realityof Pakistan, but main-tained that only elected democraticgovernments at provincial and nationallevels would guarantee autonomy to theminority nationalities within the frame-work of secure constitutional guarantees.This alone was seen as the solution forgrowing inter-regional tensions, par-ticularly the perceived material domina-tion by the Punjab of all other provinces.The continued existence of military rulein Pakistan from 1958 nto the early 1970sobstructed a democratic solution to thecrisis and exacerbated inter-regional an-tagonisms. The democratic prospectultimately exploded into civil war whenthe Pakistan Army refused to accept theresultsof Pakistan's first general electionin 1970. The election results, had theybeen implemented, would have made theleaderof the majority party,Sheikh Muj-ibur Rahman of the Awami League,Prime Minister of Pakistan. Mujib'selevation to Premier along with hispolitical base in the majority province ofBengal was perceived by more conser-vative Armyelements as a threatto theen-trenched position of the Punjab withinthe existing state. Civil war in 1971 led tothe emergence of Bangladesh as Pak-istan's 'national question' ripened intosecession, and finally independence forthe eastern half of the country.

GROWING DISILLUSIONMENT

Two principal events contributed tothe growing disillusionment among theBaluch leadership who had become in-creasingly skeptical of a democraticPakistan ever emerging. The first con-cerned events in Bangladesh where elec-tions in Mengal's view led not to a transi-tion to democratic institutions, but toviolent repression from an Army unwill-ing and incapable of accepting demo-cratic norms, The second was the dismiss-

al and arrest in 1973 of the first electedprovincial ministry in Baluchistan..Thesense of betrayal from a civilian regimewhichhad signed iron-clad constitutionalguaranteeswas only a part of thegrowingnationalist sentiment which fueled thefour year rebellion which followed.Mengal claims that when the ceasefiretook effect in 1977 only one option re-mained which could have persuaded theBaluch to envisage a future withinPakistan. This was "a confederation ofstates similar to the United ArabEmirates". The confederation principlewithin the framework of a new form ofrepublic, with four associated states bas-ed on the existing provinces, was theminimumthey would have responded to.The timing of Mengal's 'declaration ofindependence' occurs at an exceptionallydelicate and fluid moment within theoverall context of conditions in centralAsia. In the opinion of senior United Na-tions sources, the Soviet Union has in-dicated it is prepared to move forwardtoward a negotiated withdrawal of itsforces from Afghanistan, if Pakistan willco-operate in formulating a workablesolution. Last July in Geneva the SovietUnion indicated its approval of the termsput forward by the UN Secretary Gen-eral's special negotiator, Diego Cor-dovez, when nine days of indirect talkswere held between the foreign ministersof Afghanistan and Pakistan under UNauspices. Three conditions were outlinedas part of the simultaneous processleading to a comprehensive solution.First, Soviet forces would be withdrawnin stages from Afghanistan. Second, in aphased manner refugees in Pakistanwould be simultaneously repatriated toAfghanistan. And, third, Pakistan wouldrestrain insurgent activity originatingwithin its borders and actively work foran effective ceasefire, so as to allow bothwithdrawal of troops and repatriationofrefugees under as near peaceful condi-tions as possible.The movement towards a more com-prehensivesettlement would bedetermin-ed by initial agreement on these points.Ultimately, there is no question that apolitical solution based on compromisewould haveto involve some form of coali-tion regime emerging in Kabul. TheSoviet Union has indicated to a numberof non-aligned states including India thatit would not be adverse to such a develop-ment. Whethersuch a position is a purelytactical element in Soviet strategy or asincere approach based upon the realityof the existing stalemate within Afghan-istan has yet to be tested. The shape andconstituent elements of a future coalitionwould emerge at a later stage once pre-liminary agreement on the first steps of

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Annual Number May 1983the Geneva negotiations is reached andimplementation initiated. Andropov'slong and unexpected discussion withGeneral Zia during the Brezhnev funeralis one indication of the seriousness of theSoviet Union's desire for the terms for-mulated in Geneva last July to move for-ward.

SOVIETINTERVENTION: EPRIEVETo ZIAIn Pakistan a genuine dilemma existsregarding an advance in negotiationstoward an Afghan settlement. The Sovietinvasion in December 1979 proved to be apolitical life-line for GeneralZia-ul-Huq's relatively new and stillunstable militaryregime. On the verge offinancial insolvency and isolated poli-tically, following the execution ofPakistan's last civilian premier, ZulfikarAli Bhutto, Pakistan's military authori-

ties under Zia parlayed the Soviet inva-sion into a remarkable source for econo-mic assistance of a magnitude unimagin-able until then. In October 1979, sixmonths after Bhutto's hanging and threemonths prior to the invasion, the Ziagovernment was entering a severe foreignexchangecrisis. Bankers were reluctant toloan to a regime which then appeared tooffer little prospect of political stability,and the Carter administration in Wash-ington was actively engaged in discourag-ing a major financial infusion. GeneralZia's pariah' status at the time, evenamong the Gulf states who had publiclyopposed Bhutto's execution, made long-range prospects look bleak.The Soviet invasion changed the equa-tion. Taking upon themselves the imageof a 'front line' state, Pakistan's militaryleadership developed their position asdefenders of the 'free world' in spite ofthe internalambiguities of their own dic-tatorship. From the edge of insolvencyPakistan entered a period .of sudden pro-sperity in terms of foreign military andeconomic assistance. The new ReaganAdministration combined with Saudifinancial co-operation to fund a multi-billion dollar aid packagewhich was com-parable to that received during the erawhen Pakistan was an active member ofboth the CENTO and SEATO alliances.Allocations in the financial year 1983represented a 348 percent increase in USmilitary assistance to Pakistan over theprevious year. No othernation has receiv-ed such a sudden or comparable increasein American largesse in the past decade.The massive infusion of financial andmilitary aid was politically crucial instabilising Zia's own position within theArmy's still unsettled officer corps and tosecuring the junta's own dominance overthe body politic.

The strategy of posing the US and theUSSR against each other so as to yield amaximum material benefit has until nowproved exceptionally profitable for themilitary authorities in Islamabad. How-ever, it is a policy with certain limitationsand dangers. A genuine dilemma does ex-ist now for Pakistan's military regime inhow to approach negotiations with theSoviet Union without undermining thearchitecture of the American/Saudialliance upon which the regime inIslamabad is now wholly dependent.The issue of negotiations is not anacademic one from the point of view ofthe Soviet Union which is unlikely toshow unlimited patience if the process in-itiated at Geneva in July stagnates. Untilnow the Soviet Union has been excep-tionally restrained in its materialassistance to the wide array of politicalgroups operating underground in Pak-istan against the military government.The Soviet Union's Afghan allies inKabul have with Moscow's approval per-mitted the city to become a refuge for abroad spectrum of political exiles oppos-ed to theTmilitaryuthorities in Pakistan.By and large, however, the Soviet Unionhas until now done nothing to actively en-courage or provide significant materialsupport for an opposition which, if itwere better armed and supplied, mightpose a serious threat to the stability of theZia regime. Prior to the July negotiationsPakistan was wracked by a series of ex-plosions and successful assasinations offigures associated with the militaryauthorities. Most of these were associatedwith militant elements identified withBhutto's Pakistan People's Party. If theSoviet 'olive branch' of a negotiated set-tlement is not seized upon in the monthsahead by the Pakistani authorities andbyelements within the Afghan insurgencycapable of conceiving of a frameworkofnegotiations whereby a withdrawal andcoalition formula could be arrived atwhich might provide the form for an'honourable' exit of Soviet forces, thenthe situation regarding specific materialsupport for dissident groups withinPakistan could change dramatically.

DIVISIONSNCPSU POLITBUROThe CPSU Politburo was neverunifiedin the decision to intervene in Afghan-istan. Divisions at the top are believed tohave been collegial but deep,withMikhailSuslov, the Party's senior ideologue whodied last year, dominating the majority atthe time. The intervention was the finalmanoeuver in a sequence of efforts toremove Hafizullah Amin from leadership

and direction of the People's DemocraticParty of Afghanistan (PDPA). In the

Soviet view, Amin was a majorcause andsource of deteriorating political andmilitary conditions within the country.Although a communist and a leadingmember of the Khalq faction of thePDPA, Amin's methods of harsh and ag-gressively brutal military tactics combin-ed with mass arrestsand executions in theleading urban centres were driving moreand more of the population to take uparms against the regime. Attempts todislodge him from his position of directcommand in the Afghan Army in favourof a more gradualist and reformistpolicyhad failed. In September 1979, fourmonths prior to the massive intervention,the Soviet Union in co-operation withthen President Nur Mohammed Tarakkihad attempted to remove Amin. Thescheme failed and in the first of severalblunders, Tarakki, the 'father figure' ofthe PDPA and once Amin's .mentor hadhimself been killed by Amin's proteges.Amin, immediately took completepower, and demanded the withdrawal ofthe Soviet ambassador whom Amin quitecorrectly accused of complicity.The Soviet Union found itself now inthe dilemma of formally supporting aman it had attempted to remove and withwhose excesses it continued to be iden-tified internationally. Advocates of in-tervention believed Amin could be dis-lodged quickly with a major show offorce and persuaded to leave for a dip-lomatic post abroad. His departure intheir view would allow a reconstitution ofthe PDPA coalition by the organisedreturn of the purged Parcham faction ledby Babrak Karmal. Tarakki, in a secretMoscow meeting with Soviet leaders andBabrak Karmal on his return from thenon-aligned conference in Havana, isreportedto haveagreedto such a move. Anew moderate political course would bethe first step to the scaling down of thecivil war.According to detailed interviews with awell informed Soviet source with intimateknowledge of events in Kabul betweenSeptember 1979 and January 1980, andCommunist Party of India sources withclose association with the PDPA, the en-tire Soviet operation in December 1979backfired and was botched up badly.Amin chose to stage.alastditchresistanceand would not be gently persuadedto goabroad on a diplomatic assignment.He isreported to have ordered the Sovietemissaryshot who presentedhimwiththefait accompli. He then staged a finalstand and after a twelve-hour gun battlewith Soviet forces at the PresidentialPalace, Amin went to his death withnear-ly 2,000 loyal members of his ArmouredCorps.The smoothly planned transition to a

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ECONOMICAND POLITICALWEEKLY AnnualNumberMay 1983more moderate coalition was in a sham-bles. According to Soviet sources, theSoviet commander of the entire opera-tion, General Paputin, reportedly com-mitted suicide upon his recall to theSoviet Union days after the invasion andAmin's death. The entire operation hadgone quite differently than planned. Ac-cording to the dissident Soviet historian,Roy Medvedev, "The replacement ofAmin by Karmalwas meant to take place2-3 days after the successful securing ofthe capital by the Soviet army, but itseems something 'went wrong' with thisscenario. The murder and death of Aminand part of his circle of followers andrelatives on the night of December 28,1979, was not planned but happened as aresult of unexpected developments dur-ing the seizure of Kabul on December27-28 ."Although Soviet forces releasedthousands of political prisoners fromPuli-i-Charkhi and other prisons themorning after the invasion, they werehardly seen as liberators in the country asa whole. The manoeuver to remove Aminand to reconstitute a moderate coalitionled by the Parcham had transformed it-self into a very different phenomenon.The invasion itself now eclipsed all priorissues.From the start a minority faction with-in the Politburo had opposed the invasionarguing instead for a withdrawal ofmilitary and civilian support to Amin.Even Soviet newspapers at the time des-cribed how tens of thousands of innocentpeople were suffering at the hands of theruling group in Kabul. The advocates ofwithdrawal argued it would mean Amin'sdemise in the end, and was preferable tothe risksand uncertainties of full-scale in-tervention. It is now widely reported, notonly by Soviet sources, that Yuri Andro-pov headed this minorityview within thePolitburo; that Suslov had his way overAfghanistan; and, because of itscatastro-phic consequences, Andropov had hisway over Poland. If, in fact, it is correctthat this earlier minority opinion hasascended to power in Moscow with therise of Andropov, then it is plausible thatSoviet proposals regarding a negotiatedsettlement in Afghanistan may indeed beserious.

PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTIn the view of Selig Harrison from theCarnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace, and author of "In Afghanistan'sShadow: Baluch Nationalism and SovietTemptations", the prospect of a nego-tiated settlement must be taken seriously.

"Sceptics arguethat Moscow's participa-tion in the negotiations is a cynical ploy.

This appraisalcan be tested soon enoughwhen the United Nations Under-Secre-tary General, Diego Cordovez, presentshis proposals for a settlement to the con-cerned parties in the months ahead. If itbecomes clear that Moscow is not serious,then the onus wilW e on Moscow andKabulfor any breakdowninthe dialogue.However, there areincreasing ndicationsthat Yuri Andropov's regime wants tofind out whether what it regardsas a face-saving settlement is actually possible".Mike Barry, a Paris-based Americanscholar of Afghan affairs, argues that ifthe Soviet Union genuinely wants tonegotiate a withdrawal it must bringabout a fundamental shift in military tac-tics that are depopulating entire regions.Barry has been a leading participant n re-cent hearingsheldby the BertrandRussellTribunal which has focussed on the Sov-iet occupation of Afghanistan. Accord-ing to Barry,"There is not a single exile orinternal Afghan resistance group whichwould not be prepared ultimately tonegotiate an assured status of interna-tional neutrality in return for a Sovietwithdrawal. All would certainly pledgenot to accept membershipor involvementwith any Westernmilitary alliance. But ifthe Soviets want to achieve withdrawal,they must first make peace with the Af-ghans on the ground. Everything they aredoing is in the opposite direction. One-fourth of the population has fled asrefugees. Soon it will be a third. Militaryoperations particularly in Logar Pro-vince, south of Kabul have been brutaland murderous in the extreme, withvillage after village burned to the ground.I saw these with my own eyes. If theSoviets want a negotiated settlement,they cannot expect to go on escalating thewar on the ground and find Afghans inthe opposition camp prepared to speakwith them." Should negotiations not ad-,vance, Barry believes that an implicitSoviet threat to back Baluch nationalaspirations, and thus open a 'secondfront' in the region's conflict, must beregarded with utmost seriousness. "IfAtaullah Mengal is prepared to declareindependence," says Barry, "it meansthe backing he needs is potentially withinhis reach. Such an announcement byMengal must be taken extremelyserious-ly."If the Soviet Union is indeed seriousregarding the negotiation process, thenprogress will have to move forwardwith-out major -delay or prevarication. Therole of Pakistan as an intermediarywithelements within the insurgency is ex-tremely crucial if the negotiations are toprogress. The insurgents are politically adeeply divided force. Their braveryagainst Soviet forces has been paralleled

at moments by an almost equally savagecivil war between contending factions.Certainelements, though not all, amongthe insurgents are dominated by the prac-tice of warlordism. There is fierce rivalrybetween the six principalexilegroups bas-ed in Pakistan's North-West FrontierProvince. A similarbreach exists betweenmembers of the 'internal front' operatingwithin Afghanistan who are doing mostof the fighting, and well supplied exiles inPakistan who organise most of the pressconferences. At this stage there appearsno one Afghan leader,with the possibleexception of King Zahir Shah in exile inRome, who might command enough sup-port to enter into negotiations. Even theKing, who was overthrown in 1973, is op-posed by a number of the exile factions.Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, a senior Af-ghan foreign service official who onceserved as President of the UN GeneralAssembly and fled from Kabul lastMarch, has been one of the few Afghanfigures advocating proposals calling for anegotiated settlement leading to a Sovietwithdrawal. However, at present withsuch a divided and inchoate polity,Pakistan would have to serve at least inthe preliminary stages as an intermediaryif any serious process of negotiation is toadvance.A genuine dilemma exists for Pakistanregarding negotiations. If serious talksactually move forward toward the emer-gence of a 'neutralist' Finnish style coali-tion in Kabuland the ultimatewithdrawalof Soviet forces, Pakistan's status as a'front line' state would be dramnaticallydiminished. The public rationale for themassive rearmament and economic as-sistance programme that has sustainedthe mnilitaryegimewould ebb. Thereare,thus, reasons from the point of view ofthe Pakistani Army to prevaricate onnegotations and make progress a drawnout matter.However, there are also real potentialcosts to Pakistan's military governmentshould it be too coy for too long. TheSoviet Union is unlikely to court Pakistanfor an indeterminate period without mak-ing a serious evaluation of the realitiesunderlying the entire prospect of a nego-tiated settlement. If a negotiated with-drawal of Soviet forces becomes impossi-ble due in part to equivocation onPakistan's side, then the Soviet Unionmay be compelled to enact a severe anddramatic shift in its entire approach toPakistan, so as to relievepressure on itsforces in Afghanistan. A wide array ofpotential strategic alignments exist whichcould readily encompass a spectrum offorces within Pakistan which have neverbeen, nor are ever likely to regardthem-selves as Soviet proteges, but are never-

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Annual Number May 1983theless, prepared to make alliances of aunited front character against themilitary regime in Islamabad.

INDEPENDENT BALUCHISTAN

It is here that the Baluchistan questionpresents itself with its potential force.Within this broader context AtaullahMengal's declarations regarding inde-pendence must be assessed. In Mengal'sown judgement, if circumstances compelan alternative approach, then the SovietUnion might at first seem to prefer a pro-Soviet Pakistan, rather than to have anindependent Baluchistan or a balkanisedPakistan. But future attitudes on theirpart, he argues, will depend on how farthe Soviet Union is forced to weigh fac-tors as they emerge and how actual forcesmaturewithinPakistan. "As far as we areconcerned," he says, "the Communistsfrequently claim that they believe in therights of nationalities. We believe thatwithin this overall situation the Russianswill in the end have no objection as far asthe emergence of an independent Balu-chistan is concerned. We are trying ourbest to be 'non-committed' to any power.The interest we are committed to is that ofour own people. That is our priority. But,we have objectives and we would certain-ly accept any aid that comes from anyquarter without committing the integrityof Baluchistan". Mengal spoke of effortshe and Khair Bux Marri, former Presi-dent of Baluchistan's National AwamiParty and Sardar of the 1,35,000 strongMarri tribe, had made to persuademembers of the US Congress not to sup-port a comprehensive military aid agree-ment for an undemocratic regime inIslamabad. In 1981 they had a meeting inLondon with a delegation of the HouseCommittee on Foreign Affairs. Accor-ding to Mengal: "We spoke with them atsome length and told them our views ofthe political repercussions such a majoraid programme would have within thecountry. Most of the delegation seemeddetermined that Pakistan must get thisaid. They had preconceived ideas andtheirinterest in our opinions seemed onlya formality. Again like the past their con-cern seemed to be more for the Russianson the Northern border than with thepeople who live within Pakistan."Mengal hasallegedthat new contingen-cy arrangements exist between Pakistanand the United States for the use of basefacilities now being developed in Balu-chistan. He claims facilities are underconstruction at Gwadar in south-westernBaluchistan andelsewhere nthe provincewhich would be made available to unitsofthe American Rapid Deployment Force(RDF) should the contingency arise in Fa

regional crisis. Gwadar overlooks theStrait of Hormuz, entryway to the Gulf,and lies within eighty miles of Iraniannaval facilities at Chah Bahar. Accessagreements for RDF forces already existwith Oman which stands on the southernflank of the Strait. The RDF itself has (asof early January) been integrated into thenewly formed United States CentralCommand for South West Asia. Its com-mander has a military status comparableto commanders of American forces inEurope and the Pacific."It must be understood that Balu-chistan is the only part of Pakistan thathas special significance for theAmericans. It now fits into Americanplans with regard to their approach toGulf Security", says Mengal. "We ap-prehend that the point where the RDFwill come and land if a regional crisisdevelops will be near Gwadar. As theelected representativesof the Baluch, weobject fundamentally to any bases beingset up in Baluchistan. I have no desire forBaluchistan to become the battlegroundfor the big powers".A spokesman for the Pakistan govern-ment, Qutubuddin Azia, has calledMengal's allegation 'baseless' and statedthat the United States is not building amilitary base in Gwadar or anywhere elsein Baluchistan. The question of the possi-ble existence of contingency arrange-ments for RDF access to Pakistani facil-ities under crisis conditions has not beenanswered. Spokesmen for the StateDepartment havecategorically denied theexistence of any American facility atGwadar.Mengal's life in exile has not beenwithout incident. On May 12 last year hisresidence in London was fire-bombed bya Molotov cocktail in the middle of thenight. A week later one of his sons wasseriously beaten by toughs in the localvillage and had to be hospitalised. He hasaccused the Pakistan government of hav-ing been behind both incidents. A spokes-man for the Pakistan embassy categori-cally denies any association with eitherevent. Local police have attributed bothincidents to racial attacks.In February 1976, while Mengal was inprison, his eldest son, 21 year oldAsadulla, was shot and abducted in frontof his Karachi residence in full view oflocal residents. According to a formermember of Prime Minister Bhutto's cab-inet charged with investigating the inci-dent and interviewed by this writer in1980, Mengal's son died soon after theshooting while in the custody of a unit ofthe Army's elite commando formation,the Special Services Group (SSG). TheSSGhad carriedout the action. The boy'sbody was never returned to the family;

nor was that of Ahmed Shah, a memberof Mengal's National Awami Party, whowas killed at the same time. AlthoughBhutto is said to have deeply regrettedtheaffair, no action was taken against theBrigadierin charge, since it was believedat the time that a court martial wouldhave had an unsettling effect within theArmy-something Bhutto could little af-ford as time would demonstrate.Within Pakistan Ataullah Mengal's'declaration of independence' will beregarded by some merely as a 'max-imalist' position, which following thepotential collapse of the military regime,an elected civilian government might stillbe able to negotiate with, and still find abasis for national reconciliation. How-ever, none of the principalcivilian partieswho might constitute such a new regimehave ever considered the minimum posi-tion put forward by the Baluch politicalleadership, that of reforming Pakistan in-to aconfederation of associated republicsbased on the boundaries of the existingprovinces. Mengal, who sees no immi-nent or permanent return to democraticinstitutions in Pakistan, claims such anoption no longer exists.By thus challenging the Pakistaniauthorities, Mengal has introduceda newand unsettling element into the politics ofa region already buffetted by the IranianRevolution, the Soviet invasion of Af-ghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and an ac-celerating arms build-up throughout theGulf. With their border extending fromthe southern reaches of Afghanistanalong the eastern borders of Iran andacross the northern tier of the Gulf, theBaluch are at the vortex of the region'sconflicting currents. Having now issueda'declaration of independence', Mengaland the Baluch he represents have yet todemonstrate that they have the capabilityof forging the necessary alliances and theforce within their own nationalist move-ment to achieve theirgoal of a newstateinCentral Asia.

Interview withAtaullah Mengal

A taullah Mengal, former ChiefMinister of Pakistan's BaluchistanProvince, has been in exile since 1978.From his home in London he spokewith Lawrence Lifschultz about hisyears of conflict with authorities inPakistan, and thestrategic dilemma6,Baluchistan in the present Soviet-American confrontation in CentaidAsia.LIFSCHULTZ: How would you disrtinguish between the policies of GeneralZia-ul Haq's government towards Baiu-

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Annual Number May 1983chistan and those of previous regimes inPakistan?MENGAL: In our view there has beenno basic change as far as the attitude andmotives of the present government whenwe compare it to previous regimes. Theirapproach to the Baluchquestion has beenessentially the same. From our point ofview they have one precise motive andthat is to colonise Baluchistan; to extractand plunder the maximum they can getout of it. Whether a regime enters into aseriesof military operations, or whetheritdoes it through peaceful means, as far asour interests as a nationality areconcern-ed it has come to one and the same. TheBaluch interest was indangerinthe begin-ning of Pakistan and it is still in danger.The attitude of various governments to-wards the Baluch national interest hasbeen one and the same right from thebeginning. There has been no change.

About the Baluch one thing must bekept in mind. The methods have beenchanged butthe object has been the same.Therewere military operations against useven in Jinnah's time. People were killedeven back in 1947. Military operationswere going on in Baluchistan a fortnightprior to Iskandar Mirza's departure frompower in 1958. Then in Ayub Khan'stimethere were major military operations andpeople were imprisoned and hanood.Then Bhutto and the Shah's militarl :t.-tions you saw. We were also imprisonedduring that period (1973-77).So that is that. Whether it has beenthrough bullet or through the gallows thepolicy has remained. Death has been of-fered us by every regime which came topower. Bhutto offered death throughbullets. Ayub Khan offered bullets andgallows. Jinnah gave us bullets. Zia'sregime so far has offered us gallows. SoPakistan from the Baluch point of viewhas shown us one common face. Therehas been no basic change by the Pakis-tanis toward the Baluch. Zia-ul Huq'sorder to hang the young student whomthe High Court had declared was wronglyconvicted was a continuation of what wehave seen and expect from Pakistan.Zia has claimed variouismotives at dif-ferent moments. On the one hand he sayshe does not want to adopt a policy ofharshness and high-handedness towardthe Baluch. He wanted to say to us that hewas a thorough gentleman, and at thesame time he wanted to impress upon theAmericans his capacity to be harsh andruthless if called upon. When theAmerican Under-Secretary of State,James Buckley, arrived in Pakistan lastyear to negotiate the military aid agree-ment, they chose the day of his arrivaltoexecute Hamid Baluch. This act was thefirst hanging of a political prisoner in

Baluchistan in nearly twenty years. Sohow is Zia better for us?LIFSCHULTZ: How can the 'nationalquestion' in Pakistan as it regards theBaluch be solved? Is it still feasible toresolve it within a reconstituted denmo-cratic structure in Pakistan, or can it besolved within a framework of martiallaw? Or, in your view has the point beenreached that the problem can no longer besolved within the framework ofPakistan?MENGAL: Actually, we havetriedourbest over all these years to find a solutionto the issue within the framework ofPakistan. It is the reason why we havebeen fighting for provincial autonomyand democracy at the national level. Lit-tle did those in power know or com-prehend that by advocating provincialautonomy we in fact were calling for thesolidarity of Pakistan. We can now saythis no doubt was a mistake on our part.Rather, it was a blunder. It was a blunderwhich we came to realise as time went on;not during the earlier stages. But whenEast Pakistan was kicked out of Pakistanin such a brutal way, the Punjabis refusedto learn a lesson from it. When theypounced upon Baluchistan in 1973 andstarted their military operations, then werealised that the issue was not as simpleaswe had thought at the beginning. It wasnot because of one 'bad' government or afew 'bad' elements within a governmentthat we were being deprivedof our rights.Rather it was part of a clear and cal-culated policy on the part of the domi-nant Punjabis that no rights would beallowed to the 'minority' nationalities, orindeed the 'majority' nationality in thecase of the Bengalis prior to 1971. 'OneUnit' under Ayub was a move towardsthe direction of total denial of 'national'entities and only because of pressurefrom East Pakistan, Pakistan had toabandon 'one unit' and restore the pro-vinces. They claim to believe in only onethingand that is to createa newnation, anartificial nation, on the name of theMuslim nation. And on that name theybelieve they have the right to dominateand exploit the smallerprovinces and na-tionalities. They believe in only one prin-ciple: that everything that belongs to youis mine;whatever Ihavealreadyisalreadywith me, and that is mine too. Now theydon't believe in the principle of 'let live';they know only 'how to live'. And, theychoose to live off others. Now with thattype of thinking, withr hat concept, it isvery difficujt for as to adjust.LIISCHULTZ: But for a long whileyou believed that the national problemcould be solved within the framework.pfa'democratic' Pakistan. Do you'ho lorngerbelieve this?

MENGAL: No, I don't. Because, Ihave come to the firm conclusion thatPakistan is a country which exists only tomaintain the privileges of its Army.Rather, it is one of the countries in thethirdworld wheresociety is coerced so asto maintain the domination of a single in-stitution and the coercion is done by thesame institution, the Army. Normally ar-mies in other countries are there to pro-tect and maintain the integrity of thecountry, but Pakistan is a country wherethe society is condemned to obey andserve the Army's dictatorship. The mo-ment, in fact, a part of the country or thepublic is no longer willing to obedientlyaccept the Army's privileged status, thenas it happened in East Pakistan in 1971, itwill be the Army itself which will be.thefirst to do away with its opposition,whatever the cost.LIFSCHULTZ: You say that EastPakistan (Bangladesh)was "kicked out"of Pakistan. Some people in Pakistan.would say that East Pakistan had seced-ed. How would you make a distinctionbetween the two?MENGAL: I would disagree. It is wellknown that Mujib did not want in-dependence initially. I believe it was onMarch7 (19-l1), if I am notmistaken, thathe held a public meeting in Dacca.Everyone was expecting Mujib would an-nounce the independence of Bangladesh,and there was a great deal of pressureonMujib from many quiarters o make suchan announcement af-- the Army hadpostponed the conver. Ifthe NationalAssembly and had virLua:iycancelled theelection results. Still, Mujib refused toannounce independence. Mujib waspushed into a corner where he had no op-tion left. He had won the ele4ion with99.9 percent of the votes in East Pakistanand constituted thereby a majority inPakistan. Never in the history of anycountry was theresuch a measureof sup-port.The Army knew that if the electionresult was honoured and implemented intoto and its powers were handed over to acivilian government led by the Bengalimajority in the National Assembly, thenthe minimumthe Bengalis proposedto dowas to implement parity in the Army andother state institutions after so manyyearsof neglect and discrimination. Theywould ask for 56 per cent representationin the Army. The Army would not ac-commodate itself to the consequences ofa democratic election. The Army wouldhave had to accept patity as would havethe civil servants. But, tjey would havenone of it. They were notpreparedto givea proportionate quota to the Bengalis.This leaves aside the Army's apprehen-sions that Mujib was not even prepared o

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Annual Number May 1983 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLYretainthe bloated scale of the Army itself.They feared he might cut their-budgetsize. Mujib had said that in such a poorcountry there was no need for such a'white elephant'. Mujib wanted to havegood terms with India and with all statesneighbouring Pakistan. In such a contextthere was no need to have such a 'whiteelephant' like the existing Army whichwas consuming over 60 percent of the en-tire national budget.At the beginning of the negotiationswith the Army after the elections Mujibwas forced into a compromise. He wasasked to give a guarantee that he wouldnot touch the Army and he did agree thatfor five years he would not touch it. TheArmy didn't believe him. They thoughtthat Mujib was only making a tacticalconcession and was not going to stick tohis word. Once power was handed over tohim, once he became Prime Minister ofPakistan, it would be extremely difficultfor the Army to control him. So eventswere soon manipulated. You willremember that Yahya Khancalled off themeeting of tije National Assembly. Thiswas uncalled for on Yahva's part. Therehad been fair elections which all partiesrecognised. But when the Assembly wasdue to meet, the Army simply refused toallow it to convene. The Army did thiswith the full connivance of Bhutto whowas out for power himself. This is thebackground to what preceded thecrackdown in Dacca. Canl there be anydoubt the Bengalis were 'kicked out' ofPakistan after having won anlelection?LIFSCHULTZ: If you no longerbelieve that the national question for theBaluch can be solved within a reneweddemocratic frameworkin Pakistan, whatnow is your standpoint in termsof a solu-tion to the national question?MENGAL: We have opted for a verydifficult path. But for us there is only oneway left. If the Baluch are to survive, thenwe must struggle for an 'independent'Baluchistan, outside the framework ofPakistan. We are conscious of ourselvesas a national entity. If the present situa-tion is allowed to prevail, then that entitywill be lost. Efforts are being made inPakistan at the moment to drawn us withan influx of refugees and immigrants.The authorities in Pakistan want to out-number the people of Baluchistan by br-inging settlers from outside Baluchistaninto the province as labourers, peasants,and businessmen. The goal is to bringpeople in and force the Baluch out.LIFSCHULTZ: So you nowstandune-quivocally for independence?MENGAL: Yes, we arenow absolutelyout for independence.LIFSCHULTZ: Inall these thirtyyearsyou have until now refused to take such a

stand. Why at this moment have youchosen to issue a declaration of in-dependence?MENGAL: There are three aspects ofthis question. The simplest of all is thatthe consequences we have suffered in ourstruggle for provincial autonomy anddemocracy would not have been worsethan what we would have suffered had webeen struggling for an independent Balu-chistan. Bangladesh suffered a terriblemassacre only for asking for the im-plementation of the election results andthe formation of a government whichhadbeen elected to take over Pakistan. Thepunishment rendered for asking merelyfor democracy within Pakistan was notless than what would have occurred hadthey set out from the start with the goal ofan independent Bangladesh. From 1973to 1977 the Army's operations in Balu-chistan has made clear to us that even if ademand for provincial autonomy is madewithin a democratic structure, it will bemet with the same violence from theArmywhich is more or lesscomparable towhat we would have faced had weopted for independence. If at allthe result we face is the same violencewhether we want autonomy or indepen-dence, then whyshould not one go for thegraceful and dignified course-indepen-dence? That is number one. Secondly, itis my firm belief now that the Baluch willnever realise their rights within theframework of Pakistan. By Pakistan Imean the Punjabi ruling elements.Whenever I refer to Pakistan I inean thePunjabi ruling class. Had Pakistan ac-cepted the concept of nationalities withinPakistan, and the rights of those na-tionalities as partners within the boun-daries of Pakistan, one could have said,"Yes, adjustment is possible". But, rightfrom the beginning there has been adenial of the rightsof nationalities, as faras it concerned the Punjabi ruling class.They have always denied the existence ofsuch rights. Not only that, but on anumber of occasions they have dubbeddemands for the recognition of suchrights due to the nationalities to betreacherous denmands.We who have al-ways tried to plead the case of the pro-vinces, have been labelled astraitors. Youwillneverpoint out to me a single Punjabipolitician in Pakistan who has been labell-ed a traitor. No matter what language hemight have used in his political speeches,or what demands he put forward, or ac-tions he may have taken, he will neverhave been labelled anti-state. This at-tribution has been specified and reservedexclusively for those who belong to thesmaller provinces. At one time whenthere was an 'East Pakistan', it was alsoreserved for the political leaders of the

largest province. Now, all this has adefinite motive behind it. If these smallprovinces were left alone to look aftertheir own problems and destinies, wherewould the Punjabi ruling class go as far asits future programmesand plans are con-cerned? The Punjab must resettle anddeploy its population somewhere due tothe crisis within the province. TheWestern countries will not permitanymore immigrants from the region.Punjab is bursting as far as the popula-tion to land ratio is concerned. From theperspective of the Punjab their popula-tion has to be resettled or employedelsewhere. It already employs nearly4,00,000 with the Army itself. But, theyare looking for land and resources else-where to expand into. Baluchistan isminerally a very wealthy area and has agreat deal of potential. It potentiallycould accommodate hundreds of thou-sands of people coming from outsidewere these resources to be ffilly exploited.But in the process they would ruin anddestroy us as they are already doing. It isthis we have cast the die against.LIFSCHULTZ: Under the provincialautonomy arrangements guaranteedunder the 1973 Constitution, would youhave been able to restrict the type of im-migration and cultural destruction youhave described?MENGAL: If provincial autonomyhad worked, our objective would havebeen to rehabilitate and develop theeconomy for our own people first. Wewould have parted only with thoseresources which are surplus with regard oour needs. We would not have let ourpeople look for a loaf of bread and givebetter things to our neighbours. No, cer-tainly not!LIFSCHULTZ: For many years youmaintained that a fully democratic andconstitutional set-up in Pakistan couldresolve the national question. But, youare now saying after the four year civilwar (1973-77), you have abandoned anysuch hope.MENGAL: Yes, that is correct becausewe have had the bitter experience of thatperiod. The 1973 Constitution used to bea sacred document which a variety ofpoliticians, and even Zia-ul Haq, used torefer to concerning its guarantees re-garding provincialautonomy. Somebodyhas to go and ask them, where is thatwretched 1973 Constitution now! It hasbeen completely abrogated. Yet, themilitary governors enjoy referringto therighteous promises of autonomy in thisdocument. Where is the rest of this sacredConstitution of 1973?The part concern-ing the judiciary has been torn to piecesand thrown into the dustbin. The partwhich concerns the western democratic

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Annual Nuziber May 1983concept of elected government has beentorn to pieces with the enthusiastic sup-port of the West itself. The NationalAssembly is completely gone. Zia-ul Haqbeing head of state today is nothing lessthan high treason according to that Con-stitution. All these concerns have beenthrown into the gutter.

The only part which the authorities sayis still intact today is the Constitution'sprovision regarding autonomy. Why dothey even bother to refer to it at all? Thereason is simple: the actual provisions,whatever the appearance, provided vir-tually no autonomy whatsoever. Theessence had been drained away before itwas enacted. This is why all of them, notonly Zia-ul Haq, but even opposition par-ties declare, "In the 1973 Constitution allpolitical parties settled the issues of pro-vincial autonomy, so it cannot be reopen-ed".LIFSCHULTZ: You are saying the1973 Constitution provided no guaranteewhatsoever for provincial autonomy?MENGAL: It did not. But, we did givea fair trial even to their so-calledautonomy provisions, even though it wasutterly against the concept we had beenseeking in the constitution of our party.We gave it a fair trial. Our own partyConstitution reserved three subjects forthe jurisdiction of the Federal author-ities. These were defence, foreign affairs,and currency. All other provisions werereserved as the responsibilities of the pro-vinces. In the 1973Constitution there aretwo 'lists': one is the 'Federal'; the otheris the 'Concurrent' list. The 'Federal' list,of course, is precisely those areas ofresponsibility reserved for the Federalgovernment. The 'Concurrent' list is onedominated by the Federal authoritieswith the concurrence of the provinicalgovernment. I also call it a Federal list.But, there is a 'third' list, which does notspecify anything exactly which is what Icall the 'residue' list. Whatever is leftfrom these two lists-the Federal andConcurrent-is the rightsremaininguntothe provincial government. But, if you

examine it all minutely, there is nothingleft out of the first two lists. We evenagreed to that wretched list and said, allright, let us give it a fair trial. If the Pun-jabis have got no ulterior motive, well wecan work out problems in the future. But,they did not even allow us to functionwithin those provisions. Even thosecrumbs their hunger could not spare forlong.LIFSCHULTZ: At one stage co-oper-ative relations existed between demo-cratic forces in Baluchistan and certaindemociktic political parties from otherprovinces. Now that you have given a callfor the independence of Baluchistan do

you envisage any possible co-operationwhich could be sustained withdemocraticelements within Pakistan?MENGAL: As far as otherdemocraticorganisations and movements are con-cerned, we can only co-operate when wefind a common ground for co-operation.When we speak of an independent Balu-chistan, as we do now, there is hardly anyground left for those parties or organisa-tions which still believe in the concept ofPakistan to meet with us on. Accordingto the general concept of secession, youhave to think of disintegrating a countryto bring into being a part of it as an in-dependent nation. Under these circum-stances no organisation bearing al-legiance to Pakistan will accommodate usnor will we be able to accommodatethem. At one stage there certainly was apossibility for co-operation and indeedthere was co-operation. Within Pakistanthere are many people who have a softcorner for the plight of the Baluch andwould like to searchfor a way back. But, Iam afraid it is rather ate. Itwould only bepossible if these elements had a real sayinthe affairs of the Pakistani state. Nor, dothey have much prospect of politicalpower.We also could not be persuaded to godown the old road of Constitutionalguarantees. Three constitutions havebeen abrogated in toto-the '56, the '62,and the '73 constitutions have been com-pletely buried. So there is no question oftrusting any constitutional guarantee,when the constitutions as a whole do notcount. So, what guarantees could begiven for provincial rights. If constitu-tional guaranteesare not worthanything,then verbal guarantees certainly do notcount.For us a guaranteenow could lie in onlyone of two ways. First is to form a con-federation of states similarto the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE). Secondly, if theythink a confederation is too much tospeak of at this stage, then let themacceptan equal division of power at the level ofthe Federation. This could have beenanother alternative. Under a confedera-tion four independent states would existin association. They would be the fourprovinces of the present federation ofPakistan. In this arrangement he four in-dependent states could live comfortablyand in peace. As I said, something like theUAE.Most people said that this is too muchat this stage to ask for. They say nobody isgoing to agree. 'Nobody' meansthe Pun-jab and its Army. Earlier we also sug-gested having an equal division of powl-erat the level of the federation. This wouldhave been the only guarantee whichwould have allowed the rights of the

country's nationalities to have theirrightssafeguarded. But, if you give the gun tothe Punjab and at the same time you de-signate 56 per cent of the seats in a Na-tional Assembly to the Punjab, then howcan there be any safeguardsfor provincialrights? Now all three provinces togethercould not beat the Punjab in such anAssembly. When there was East Pakistanthevotes would have been overwhelming-ly against the vested interests of the Pun-jabis. In this sense we constituted a clearmajority in the country. It is precisely forthis reason that the Army would notabide by the 1970 elections and kickedEast Pakistan out of the Federation. Nowall the guns lie with the Punjab. TheArmyand the civil serviceare overwhelm-ingly Punjabi. In the beginning if thePunjab had accepted these terms, theprovinces could have been satisfied. Buttoday they are not prepared to listen toanything beyond the 1973 Constitution.As far as we are concerned, that is pointzero.LIFSCHULTZ: I am not clear on thispoint. Are you saying you are stillprepared to consider the possibility of a'confederation', or has the situation gonebeyond that point also?MENGAL: I said that if at an earlierstage the Punjabis had the vision, a con-federation could have been a solution.But at this stage if I can be independent, Iwould not choose a confederation. Inorder to have avoided an independentBaluchistan, or an independent Pak-toonistan, or an independent Sindh, thePunjabis could have offered such a solu-tion. But now they have lost their credi-bility. Or, as I have said, they could havebrought forward a proposal offering anequal division of power with the contextof Pakistan. But, they are not going topart with anything. They want to have thefull cake and eat it at the same time.LIFSCHULTZ: Baluchistan is now si-tuated in an important strategiccrossroads between the Soviet Union inAfghanistan and the United States' ownheavy commitment to the military regimein Islamabad. How will the specificnature of your geo-political location bet-ween two major blocs in confro-ntationaffect your own goal of achieving an in-dependent state?MENGAL: As far as our situation inBaluchistan is concerned, it has a darkside and a bright one. There is no doubtthat Baluchistan today has a strategicat-traction for the Soviet bloc as well as theAmerican bloc. Now in that case onestands to be a loser as well as a gainer.Loser, in the sense, that whatevergoes inthe interest of one bloc will force theotherbloc to use all its forces and resourcestostop the success of its antagonist. I can

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Annual Number May 1983say that the present geo-political situationin the region is certainly going to create agreat many hazards and problems for us.It already has. But we are hopeful that astage will come, or rathera situation willdevelop, where Baluch independence willbecome an inevitable and acceptablereality even to those who at present wouldprefer our movement not to gain ground.It will leave them with no other alter-native, but to accept the real fact, thatonce this idea has entered into the mindsof the people of that area, and once theyare determined to achieve it, historyshows that they cannot be denied thisright. When the Americans come to thisconclusion, they will perceive their owninterest differently than they do now. Atthe moment it is not suitable to theAmericans that Baluchistan should haveitsown aspirations. The United States hasselected Pakistan.as a whole to use in itsconflict against Russia. In time they willcome to the conclusion that they are justbeatinga dead horse. And, that willbe forus to demonstrate, once the indepen-dence movement is launched and fullydeveloped.Pakistan's strategic importance existsonly because of Baluchistan. If you takeBaluchistan out of it, Pakistan is notworth two pennies. Once it is establishedthat Baluchistan is going to get its in-dependence under any circumstances, Ithink at that stage the venues of sense willnot be shut, as far as the American mindis concerned. This is what I hope. How-ever, it usually takes a very long periodfor sense to prevail in American quarters,but I hope it will at that stage.LIFSCHULTZ: Is it also possible thatit may not be in Soviet interests that an in-dependent Baluchistan emerge?MENGAL: According to my assess-ment, Russia would prefer to have a pro-Russian Pakistan, than to have an in-dependent Baluchistan or a BalkanisedPakistan. But future attitudes will de-pend on how far the Russians are forcedto weigh factors as they emerge and howactual forces mature within Pakistan.The Soviets now face Pakistani involve-ment with various forces opposing theirown position in Afghanistan. Muchdepends upon the patience of these Rus-sians. At the same time, a complicatedgame is being played from the Pakistaniside. When the Russians lose their pa-tience and believe Pakistan is makingthings rather difficult for them, then theRussianswill come to certain conclusionsof their own. What I mean is thatPakistan ip adopting a strategic rolewhich is becoming a permanent menaceas far as Russian interestsare concerned.As far as we are concerned, the Com-munists frequently claim that they-believe

in the rights of nationalities. We believethat within this overall situation, the Rus-sians will have no objection as far as theemergence of an independent Baluchis-tan is concerned, unless they feel it isspecifically against their interest. There isno doubt that every state has to look afterits own interest and for that matter theSoviet Union cannot be expected to ig-nore its own interest. We as Baluch havetried to make a comparison between theSoviet attitude and the American attitudeas far as their past actions in regard to usare concerned. What we can see is thatthere are bullet marks in the dead bodiesof the Baluch from bullets that weremade in America. Someone has to pointout a bullet mark made by the Russiansagainst the Baluch. Someone has yet topoint out to us Russian roubles flowinginto Pakistan to aid the anti-Baluchgunmen in Pakistan. Someone has yet toshow us Soviet manufacturedaeroplanes,helicopters, or military pacts like thosewith the Shah which were used to aid thePakistan government in its attempt tocrush us in 1973.There is no doubt the Soviets are a bigpower and like all big powers they wish toextend their influence. But, we are tryingour best to be nobody's pawns; to makeBaluchistan 'non-committed' to anypower. The interest we are committed tois that of our own people. That is ourpriority. We have no desire or intentionto commit ourselves to any power. But wehave objectives and we would certainlyaccept any aid that comes from anyquarter without committing the integrityof Baluchistan or allowing ourselves to beused as anyone's pawn.LIFSCHULTZ: While no one canpoint to a Soviet bullet in the body cffanyBaluch or of any Soviet roubles financingmilitary operations in Pakistan, one canhardly regard the Soviet Union as purelybeneficent in the region. After all thereare plenty of Soviet bullets in the bodiesof Afghans and there is a civil war inAfghanistan.MENGAL: This is precisely why we donot want to be the pawns of any power. Ifwe become the pawns of one, then cer-tainly the Baluch will find the bullets ofthe other in his body. We have not beenthe pawns of the Soviets, yet still we havethe bullets of the Americans in our body.If we become the pawns of the Ameri-cans, as some of theAfghans have, inpar-ticular some of these mullahs, then wewill find Soviet bullets in Baluch bodies.But, the blame will not only lie with theSoviet Union, the blame will lie with usalso because we have thrown ourselves in-to the American lap. If we throw our-selves into the Soviet lap in toto, then theAmericans might be justified in their way

of thinking. But so farover all these yearsthe Americans have had no suchreason toinflict their bullets upon our people, butthey did! So there is a difference betweenthe two from our point of view. We havebeen no one's pawns. We have stood forourselves. But, for no rhyme or reasonthe United States has allowed theirbulletsand weapons to be used again and againagainst the Baluch people. How can theAmericans justify this?LIFSCHULTZ: How is it possiblegiven the strategic position of the Gulfand the existing oil interests that the ma-jor powers will cease their confrontationand withdraw to leave the smallernationsand societies in the region to the resolu-tion of their own affairs without outsideinterference? Are there any conditionswhich might allow such an improbablesituation to arise? Is it possible or is itnaive to imagine you will be left alone?

MENGAL: In our view a situation willemerge which willwarranta sort of settle-ment between the Soviets and the Ameri-cans in the region. They will each reachthe conclusion that any move fro'meitherside could bring them to the brink ofWorld War or nuclearwar. I believe theywill avoid such a situation and a settle-ment will emerge.LIFSCHULTZ: But for societies inareas like Central Asia'where you are inBaluchistan, such a settlement couldmean just a redrawingof the line of con-trol between two spheres of influence. Inyour view could any conditions emergewhere the major powers might withdrawto leave the nations such as the Afghansand the Baluch to resolve their own af-fairs and exist without outside influence?MENGAL: To a certain degree thisdepends on ourselves and how our ownforces develop and take hold of the situa-tion. But I don't think either power issatisfied with the presentsituation neitherthe Russians nor the Americans. If bothpowers come to the conclusion because ofthe actual situation that they are each go-ing to lose a great deal from further con-frontation and escalation, the conditionsfor a settlement could emerge. Then ourstand will have to be taken into account.LIFSCHULTZ: Last autumin theUnited States initiated a $1.2 billionmilitary aid programme for Pakistan.What is your attitude toward thisdevelopment and the Reagan Adminis-tration's Pakistan policy in general?MENGAL: I can say this is a most con-demnable act. But, Idon't believeanyonein Baluchistan appreciates orrespects thisAmerican move. Now there are two as-pects to this issue. There is first thegeneral attitude the Americans havetowards a regime like the junta inPakistan. It is really surprising for us to

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Annual Number May 1983watch how the United States has movedto support this regime, but also previousregimes of a similar type. Somehow theAmericans have become fond of support-ing unpopular regimes throughout theworld and Pakistan is no exception. Un-fortunately, the United States has twoyardsticks: one for their country and theother for the third world. In the thirdworld or the underdeveloped countries,they support dictatorships and brutalregimes. They have a soft corner for thistype of regime. The United States pro-fesses a pure form of democracy, but itsactions have been ones which have des-troyed democratic rights in countries likeours. In the long run American foreignpolicy has never gained. Policies of thistype have gained the sympathies of thosewithin the dictatorship, but they havealways lost the sympathies of the peoplewithin these countries. This will be thefinal result of American policy inPakistan. This is my firm prediction.We in Baluchistan have seen Americansupport to previous regimes like the onewe have nQw. I remember the 1964 mili-tary operations. Even before that, also in1958 there were operations against us,and at that time we told the Americansdirectly, "Look here your arms are beingused against us whichyou alwaysclaimtohave given to Pakistan to use againstCommunism. But they have been usingthem against the people within this coun-try." Now again the weapons Reagan isgiving to Pakistan will be used against thepeople of Pakistan as a whole. It is com-pletely ridiculous to assume these armscould be used against a Russian attack. Ifit at all takes place, these arms will be ofno use. They will be worth two penniesagainst the Soviets. They are not meant tobe used against India. So wherewill thesearms be used? These armscan only be us-ed for internal purposes, that is at anytime they feel there is an insurgency inPakistan then they will be used. InPakistan the main apprehension is aboutthe Baluch. Americans know it and thePakistanis have been claiming so. Youcan see Zia-ul-Huq's interview with theAmerican writer Selig Harrison. Zialeaves no doubt about his anxiety overBaluchistan. It is clear these weapons willas in the past be used against us. That iswhy for us the newmilitary aid agreementis the most condemnable act on the partof the Americans.Reagan tries to play upon the Ameri-can people's minds and fears over theRussianbear. The Reaganadministrationsays only one thing to the American peo-pleand Congresswithregardto Pakistan.Here is the Russianbearto the North. Wemust deter it! We must deter it! But, atwhat cost to people in Pakistan!

LIFSCHULTZ: Before themilitaryaidagreementwas voted by the Congress didyou have any communication with repre-sentatives of the American governmentconcerning your own views? Did you notmeet a Congressional delegation whichwas enroute to Pakistan to investigate themerits of such aid?MENGAL: Yes, we did indeed. TheCongressional delegation which was dueto go to Pakistan stopped here in Lon-don. They did contact us and KhairBaksh Marri and myself met with them.We spoke with them at some length andtold them our views of the political reper-cussions such a major aid programmewould have within the country. I don'tknow why, but most of the delegationseemed determined that Pakistan mustget this aid. They had preconceived ideasand their interest in our opinions seemedonly a formality. The reasons for this isbest known to them. Again like the pasttheir concern seemed to be more for theRussians on the Northern border thanwith the people who live within Pakistan.LIFSCHULTZ: To your knowledgehas the US asked for any bases inBaluchistan?MENGAL: According to our informa-tion Pakistan has agreed to allow the useof Baluchistan to the Rapid DeploymentForce (RDF). Facilities are now underconstruction in Gwadar and elsewhere. Itmust be understood that Baluchistan isthe only part of Pakistan that has aspecial significance for the Americans. It

now fits into American plans with regardto theirapproach to Gulf security. This iswhy we apprehend that the point wherethe RDF will come and land if a regionalcrisis develops will be near Gwadar. Nor-mally people talk of military bases andthink in terms of the old type. But, there isa new military concept which was notthere in the old days. Previously airfieldshad to be built and all venues had to beready and open. But now with the RDFthe only thing you need is for the materialsupport requirements of the RDF tobe stored and readyfor the moment whenthe RDF will land for its operations.I know for sure that this material isbeing landed at Karachiport. Radarandother electronic facilities are under con-struction at Gwadar. There is an enor-mous peninsularrock face, the hill top ofwhich overlooks the Gulf. It projects outfrom the coast and main town of Gwadarfor about two miles. For the first timeever civiiians have been banned fromenteringthe area. Thereis a constant traf-fic in helicopters from ships offshore.Construction of a base facility in underway. Besides Quetta these days is filledwithAmerican military and 'civilian' per-sonnel. People are saying that Quetta is

looking like the 'old' Quetta as far as theAmericans are concerned. The 'old'Quetta was when they secretly operatedtheir base at Badebar from whercehe U-2planes flew.What is happening is not a secret to usalthough people in Pakistan and Americamay not know much about it. The Ameri-cans have themselves said in so manywords that Pakistan has agreed to extendcertain concessions to the United States inreturn for the military and economic aidthat has been given. Now what conces-sions could Pakistan give in return?LIFSCHULTZ: If these facilities areactually based in Baluchistan, as theformer Chief Ministerof the province, doyou have a position regarding whetherthese facilities should be located inBaluchistan?MENGAL: Certainly, we object fun-damentally to any bases being set up inBaluchistan. I have no desire forBaluchistan to become the battlegroundfor the big powers. We will stand to becrushed between them. Suppose these bigpowers come to a head-on collision andthe fighting ground is Baluchistan, thenwho willdie? Other than those in the paidforces, the normal man who will sufferwill be the Baluch, not any otherPakistanis. Why should we suffer? Whyshould we bear the miseries of Pakistan?Why should we suffer for their militaryalliances? Why should we suffer forPakistan from which we get nothing? Allthat we have received from Pakistan hasbeen bullets, prisons, torture, and kill-ings. Should we suffer for that? There isno justification in it.LIFSCHULTZ: You have argued thatthe Americans lack any perception of theBaluch issue. Do you have any anxiety orfear that a movement for independencecould in the midst of a military,conflictwith the Pakistan Army find itself upagainst American forces? Do you haveany fear that the United States and itsRapid Deployment Force might con-ceivably intervene on the side of thePakistan government against your move-ment in Baluchistan?MENGAL: As long as there is a gov-ernment in power in the United States ofMr Reagan's type, then one could expectanything from them. All Ihope is that thepeople in America will at one stage suc-ceed in stopping their government fromaiding dictatorships like that in Pakistanwhich stand against movements whichare genuinely fighting for democraticrights. It is our hope that one day theAmericans will succeed in having agovernment of that sort. But, as far as thepresent administration s concerned, theyare there to help Pakistan and they willcertainly come to Pakistan's aid even

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Annual Number May 1983against the Baluch.LIFSCHULTZ: In your view how longwill the United States continue to identifyits own regional policy with Pakistan'smilitary authorities?MENGAL: It is my assessment thatZia's regime is rapidly approaching themoment when it will have outlived itsutility. The Americans will not repeat themistake they made in Iran. Sooner orlaterthey will try to put pressure on Zia toaccept the so-called transfer of power toso-called public cum American nomineepoliticians (mainly from a selected groupwithin the People's Party), because theAmericans fear that if they do not mani-pulate a change of theirown choice, theycannot stop the replacement of Zia bysomeone whose alignments could hardlybe predictable. After the bitterexperienceof Iran, Americans are in no position totake a chance with Pakistan which is theironly potential proxy on that side of theGulf. Zia has undoubtedly all along beena very faithful servant of the Americans,but this does not qualify him to gain pre-ference over American interest. There-fore, Zia's replacement through a decep-tive democratic manoeuvre has more orless become an inevitable option.It will be very difficult for Zia to agreeto the proposition of a transfer of powerto elected representatives. He is beinghaunted by Bhutto's ghost and for thetransfer of power the facade of an elec-tion is bound to take place for which the1973Constitution will be reactivated. Ziaknows that the 1973 Constitution has aprovision where the imposition of Mar-tial Law is an act of high treason and ispunishable by death. And, at the sametime there is no guarantee that after thetransfer of power the Americans will goout of their way and stop the successive(sic) government from invoking that veryprovision of the constitution. Therefore,it will be difficult to satisfy Zia on thispoint. The only other alternative left willbe to have Zia replaced and to achievethat goal the Americans at the appro-priate moment may make things difficultfor him. It is merely a matter of timebefore the ball will be set rolling inPakistan.LIFSCHULTZ: What do you anti-cipate the attitudes of other states in theregion will be towards your indepen-dence? What response do you anticipatefrom the Arab states? Do you hope tosecure theiracquiescence theirneutrality,or their co-operation? Or, do you expecttheir antagonism given their currentalliance with Islamabad?MENGAL: Actually our own attitudetoward the Arab states is in principlequite friendly. There are many Baluchworking in these states. But, unfortunate-

ly many Arab governments do not maketheir policies on an independent basis.Regarding Pakistan they follow theAmericans. It is our hope that these stateswill realise the situation in Pakistan andat least cease their anti-Baluch aid whichthey are currently providing to Pakistan.So at the moment all we have seen and areseeing is the antagonism on their part. Atthe moment there is no co-operation, butwe hope in the future that they shallrealise we are potential friends within theregion, and that as such they will at leastcease to aid the enemies of the Baluch.LIFSCHULTZ: Do you believe Indiawill be neutral, antagonistic, or sym-pathetic?MENGAL: It all depends on a numberof factors. There are negotiations goingon between India and Pakistan at the pre-sent. One cannot saywhere they will end.But, if the negotiations fail then at leastPakistan will not have a big sympathiserlike Indiain that region and that willbe anindirect help to the Baluch cause.As far as Baluchistan itself is concern-ed, we might have expected quite a lotfrom India. However, the experience ofBangladesh has turned out rather dif-ferently than hoped for by the Indians.India went out of its way and came to theassistance of Bangladesh. In return Indianow faces at the United Nations andelsewhere another representativeof a so-called Islamic country voting against In-dia and rebuking India. What is theguarantee that there would not be anAmerican backed coup d'etat in othercountries which became independent, asin Bangladesh?But, we can sayone thing for certain. Ifthe present relationship between Indiaand Pakistan countinues to be one of an-tagonism, then India will certainly notfeel unhappy if apartof Pakistan becamean independent state. This is our pre-sumption about India. But, India willdefinitely not play any positive role in thegame. She does not want to be sorry againfor her own efforts. However, if Balu-chistan became independent by its ownmeans, I do not believe India would bearus any grudge.LIFSCHULTZ: When you speak of anindependent Baluchistan are you speak-ing exclusively of the territorythat is nowpart of Pakistan, or do you refer also toareas in Iran and Afghanistari?MENGAL: I can wish for all Baluch,but can only speak for the Baluch in Pak-istan. It is certainly my hope that peoplewho live in other Baluchistans will bethinking in the same terms. If they thinkin the same terms, then I think it will berather good news for me. But, I cannotspeak for people in other countries.As far as Afghanistan is concerned, we

do not have anyterritorialclaims. All thatwe can say is that the boundaries could beredemarcated. There is Afghan territoryin Baluchistan which Afghanistan claimsto be its territory. There are areas inAfghanistan which the Baluchthink to be;their area. So there could be an arrange-ment and a redemarcation in certainareas. Certain areascan go there and cer-tain areas can come here.Iran is another matter. Iran for a longtime has been helping the Pakistangovernment to crush our people inBaluchistan. They have not only beencrushingpeople on our side of the border,but have also been curshing their ownBaluch which is a considerable popula-tion. So we have been bearing this bruntof Iranian might right from the begin-ning. But, anyhow even then it is not wewho aregoing to decide, it is the people ofthat Bauchistan who will decide. We canonly wish that they do so.LIFSCHULTZ: You have also formedan organisation called the BaluchistanLiberation Organisation (BLO). Canyououtline its objectives and the contents ofits social and political programme?Whatis the BLO's attitude and your own at-titude towards the traditional role of theSardar, the future role of the Sardar,andthe structure of tribal organisation in anindependent state?MENGAL: The basic aim of the BLOis to organise and to supervise the armedstruggle in Baluchistan toward the objec-tive of an independent Baluchistan. Oncethis is achieved we will implementa seriesof fundamental social reforms.The "Sardari" by itself is not a system.The system is the tribal system. The Sar-daris the by-product of the tribalsystem.Such a system can only be changed whenit is replaced by some other social system,not just by the stroke of a pen. Onlysocialand economic changes in the system cando away with the Sardar.I will give you an example. There arestill Sardars in the Punjab, although of-ficially they do not exist. The Mazariareaof the Punjab still has a Sardarisystem.Officially the Mazari Sardaris no longerthere. But, the Mazari tribe still acceptthe Sardar, because no form of official'reforms have brought a basic change in,the tribal structure in the Mazari area.When there are serious disputes, peoplestill go and seek solutions,from their Sar-dar. Unless a bettersubstitute is providedpeople will continue to go to menthey atraditionally familiarwith. The substitute.the present governmentand state arepro-viding can hardly be consideredbetter, Itis a worse substitute and people will noropt for a worse substitute. A substitqteshould only be a better one. Now if youask people to change from the Sardar to

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Annual Number May 1983 ECONOMICAL AND POLITICAL WEEKLYthe present legal system as it is beingoperated by the military and civilian of-ficials at the local level, what do you ex-pect people to do? Whenever someonegoes to a government official with a pro-blem there will only be talk of money.When poeple see official selling justice,selling permits, selling their executivepowers, then certainly a tribal man willprefer to go to his Sardar. When he goesto the Sardar he will get justice, whateverbe the kind of justice, or whateverbe themode of the justice, but he will get it withno cost and quickly. So at this level nobetter substitute has been given.When social and economic changeswhich are superior are brought into socie-

ty, the Sardari system will automaticallyvanish. Yet, as long as the tribal structureis not replaced by a better system, thingswill continue to work as they are until bet-ter means are introduced. But, this has tobe replaced. It cannot go on for long. Oursystem is an old system and whereverthere has been a tribal system anywhere inthe world it has operated in similar ways.But it has to go and it must go.

LIFSCHULTZ: So you believe thatyou are the last of the Sardars?MENGAL: I hope so. I hope Balu-chistan will become independent in myage and that will bring an end to the Sar-dari system.

Walchand Hirachand CentenaryTHERE is a Jonathan Livingston Seagullin all of us. It is this spirit which inspiressome of us to dream what others havenever imagined, and to do what othershave only dreamt. Walchand Hirachand,whose birth centenary year has justdrawnto aclose, was one such. The foun-dations of the industrial empire that hebuilt in the short span of 34yearstestify tothe spirit of his enterprise and sweep ofthe canvas he worked on.At a veryearly stage of his career, Wal-chand Hirachand took up the construc-tion of the Bhor Ghat tunnel, defyingskeptics. It is interesting to note thechoice of his ventures. Without the back-ground and experience of a Tata, he step-ped into the core sector industries, wheretechnological problems were bound todeter any other ordinary person.In his times, a developed capital mar-ket was non-existent. The attitude of theBritish government was invariably hos-tile. Therewere a number of ways to beatdown the native entrepreneur. Yet Wal-chand Hirachand moved from one ideatoanother, one activity to another withremarkable speed and organisationalcapacity. Not surprisingly, he oftensparked uneasiness amongst his familymembers and partners. None of them,bound by their traditions, could haveunderstood the panorama of his vision.Before starting the shipbuilding yard atVisakhapatnam, he had carefully goneinto a detailed process of site selection,generating local enthusiasm, obtainingmeticulous cost estimates, taking careeven to provide work shelter for allengineers and workers. And yet thereareexamples of instant decisions after whichthere was no stopping him in the speed ofhis execution. A chance meeting with aBritish engineer on a railway journeyfrom Delhi to Bombay brought him the

information that a passenger ship was upfor sale in Bombay. Directly he alightedfrom the train, he went to the docks to ex-amine the ship. This was February 16,1919. Within a matter of a few days Scin-dia Steamship Navigation Ltd had beenregistered, finance had been arranged,the ship purchasedand on April 5, 1919,it sailed for Europe and England on itsmaiden voyage for the company.His untiring efforts at building theshipping industry brought him the rea-lisation that shipbuilding was as impor-tant. The ImperialGovernment thwartedhis repeated attempts to select a site orgive financial assistance. Undeterred,Scindias startedwork at Visakhapatnamin 1941. The Japanese bombing of thisport city forced him to transfer men andmachines to Bombay. But with bulldog-like tenacity, he was back on the scene in1946, after the war, to complete threeberths and two steamers by 1948, despitemassive losses. He knew that a task asmassive as this could not be undertakenwithout the government stepping in andon March 1, 1952 the infrastructure hehad created became the nucleus of Hin-dustan Shipyard Ltd.

Only a Walchand Hirachand couldperhaps have drQamtof setting up assophisticated an industry as aircraftmanufacturing in India in the year 1939.Again a chance meeting with an Ameri-can launched him into a new excitingflight. With characteristic stubborness,he prodded the government until it cameforward with a challenge to establish thefactory in six months. The Scindiashare-holders were wary but he managed tosecure the Maharaja of Mysore's partici-pation. By December 1940, the companyhad been formed and by July 1941 thefactory was ready. Though he had to pullout of this industry soon as the govern-

ment's war-time demands requireda dif-ferent approach, he had, all the same,once again opened a totally new vista forthe young engineers of the country. It isthis same unit that is now known as Hin-dustan Aeronautics Ltd.Walchand did not lose sight of the im-portance of agriculture in the Indianeco-nomy. He acquired 1,500 acres of aridland at Ravalgaon in 1923, and later,more,at Kalamb(Walchandnagar), wherehe introduced scientific methods intofarming. Within a short space of time,Ravalgaon and Kalamb were transform-ed into lush, green fields of sugarcanethat have set records in yield per acre,sugar content and quality of cane. Keep-ing in mind that processing the rawmaterials from his farms was a vital steptowards self-sufficiency, he set up.a fac-tory at Ravalgaon from where some ofthe country's finest confectionery is pro-duced.

Finding that dependence on suppliersfor spare parts and machinery for hissugar factory at Walchandnagar was dis-rupting his production routine, Wal-chand decided to manufacture theselocally. Accordingly he set up a workshopat Walchandnagar which specialised inthe manufacture of sugar machinery. Theworkshop grew rapidly;expertise was ac-quired in fields other than sugarmachinery and today the company isknown as Walc

17035479 Independent Baluchistan Ataullah Mengals Declaration of Independence

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Transcript of 17035479 Independent Baluchistan Ataullah Mengals Declaration of Independence