17 July 2014

Table of Contents Countering Narcotics and Illicit Trafficking Program (CNIT) ..................................................................................................................... 2

Convergence ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 2

Corruption and Crime ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2

Illicit Natural Resource Trafficking ..................................................................................................................................................... 3

Irregular Migration ............................................................................................................................................................................ 4

Money Laundering ............................................................................................................................................................................. 5

Program on Cyber Security Studies (PCSS) .............................................................................................................................................. 6

Combating Terrorism and Cyber Crime ............................................................................................................................................. 6

Cyber Capacity Building ..................................................................................................................................................................... 7

Cyber Statecraft Development .......................................................................................................................................................... 8

Privacy and Security........................................................................................................................................................................... 8

Public/Private Partnership ................................................................................................................................................................. 9

Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS) ................................................................................................................................. 9

Al-Qaeda ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 9

Caucasus Emirate ............................................................................................................................................................................ 10

Developing CbT Strategy.................................................................................................................................................................. 10

Diplomacy in Combating Terrorism ................................................................................................................................................. 11

Disengagement and Deradicalizaion................................................................................................................................................ 12

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) .......................................................................................................................................... 12

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) ........................................................................................................................................ 13

Military Force in Counterterrorism and CbT .................................................................................................................................... 17

Terrorist Motivations ....................................................................................................................................................................... 17

Terrorist Narratives ......................................................................................................................................................................... 19

Terrorist Strategies and Tactics ....................................................................................................................................................... 20

Terrorist Use of the Internet ............................................................................................................................................................ 21

Seminar on Transnational Civil Security (STACS) ................................................................................................................................... 21

Crisis Management .......................................................................................................................................................................... 21

Energy Security ................................................................................................................................................................................ 24

Environmental Security ................................................................................................................................................................... 25

Information Sharing ......................................................................................................................................................................... 26

Law and the Use of Force ................................................................................................................................................................ 26

Strategic Communication ................................................................................................................................................................ 26

Countering Narcotics and Illicit Trafficking Program (CNIT) Convergence The New Criminal Blitz: Mali, Iraq and the Business of Asymmetry Ivan Briscoe – ISN: 10 July 2014 “In all these respects, the radicals’ dependence on a strong illicit revenue base has proved crucial. Against a backdrop of extreme ethno-political tension, financial leverage entices local elites, enables the purchase of weapons, and silences the majority of citizens already alienated from their states. Alongside the meting out of sharia law, all of these characteristics can be detected in northern Mali in 2012. The reports of ISIS’ extraordinary warchest, boosted by its protections rackets and the $500 million heist on Mosul’s banks, seem to have raised the threat posed by illicit income to a higher plane, in which crime, jihadism and the sectarian decomposition of the nation-state are intermingled in as yet unknown and unpredictable ways.Ä http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=181406 Responses and Reactions to the Threat of Organized Criminality Across Levels of Analysis Irina Alexandra Chindea and Byron Ramirez – Small Wars Journal: 10 July 2014 “This is the third and last essay in the series that examines the rising threat of organized criminality and its spillover effects across levels of analysis. The article addresses the ways in which individuals, communities, states, regional and international organizations respond to the illicit activities of criminal groups. We have divided our analysis into two sections. The first section examines the upstream responses and reactions of the major non-criminal actors or stakeholders operating at each level of analysis to the threats of organized criminality, and how these responses interact with one another across different levels. By upstream we refer to the direction in which these responses flow: from the individual or micro-level to the community, state, regional and transnational or the macro-level. The second section assesses at each stage of the framework the downstream responses – or the reactions flowing from macro- to micro-level – to the threats criminal groups yield.” http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/responses-and-reactions-to-the-threat-of-organized-criminality-across-levels-of-analysis Return to Top

Corruption and Crime Corruption in the Northern Triangle: The siren song of crime Ivan Briscoe – Clingendael: 15 July 2014 “The end of the civil wars in the Northern Triangle countries of Central America has made way for stable and more inclusive democracies. However, the governments of Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador have become infiltrated by criminal networks. Informal relationships, money and fear have initiated a vicious cycle of emergency responses, militarization and corruption that only virtuous policies with public backing can replace.” http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/corruption-northern-triangle-siren-song-crime

The Implications of China’s Anti-Corruption Drive Joseph A. Bosco – The Diplomat: 15 July 2014 “Clean, transparent government is a basic tenet of Western political liberalism, so we are naturally inclined to support government reform efforts elsewhere. But in the case of the People’s Republic of China, should we be rooting for Xi Jinping’s version of an anti-corruption campaign to succeed, or to fail, in its intended purposes? Or should we hope it succeeds spectacularly in ways not intended by Communist Party leaders, as glastnost and perestroika did under Mikhail Gorbachev?” http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/the-implications-of-chinas-anti-corruption-drive/ Leveling the Transnational Playing Field Luay Al-Khatteeb and Omar Al Saadoon – Brookings Institute, The Huffington Post: 10 July 2014 “The reality of corruption in rentier states, particularly those in transition towards a decentralized and democratic system of government such as Iraq is that host governments are caught in a fundamental paradox. On the one hand, vast energy resources seemingly insulates rentier governments from (a) pressures to combat corruption and (b) depending on their citizens for revenue through taxation. On the other hand, the negative impact on foreign direct investment in direct correlation to a country's ranking in reputable global corruption surveys as well as the ratification of multilateral conventions and initiatives is slowly yet inexorably turning the tables on state level and administrative corruption.” http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/07/10-level-playing-field-alkhatteeb Return to Top

Illicit Natural Resource Trafficking Illegal Trade in Wildlife and Timber Products Finances Criminal and Militia Groups, Threatening Security and Sustainable Development United Nations Environment Programme - UNEP News Centre: 24 June 2014 “One terrorist group operating in East Africa is estimated to make between US$38 and US$56 million per year from the illegal trade in charcoal, says the report. In total, militia and terrorist groups in and around African nations with on-going conflicts may earn US$111 to US$289 million annually from their involvement in, and taxing of, the illegal or unregulated charcoal trade. Other groups that benefit from the illegal trade in wildlife and timber products are also estimated to earn between US$4 and US$12.2 million each year from elephant ivory in the Central Africa sub-region, driving a significant reduction in elephant populations across Africa, the report says.” http://www.unep.org/newscentre/default.aspx?DocumentID=2791&ArticleID=10906&l=en Return to Top

Irregular Migration The Children Streaming Across the U.S. Border Are Fleeing Violence and Poverty Emma Carew Grovum – Foreign Policy, Passport: 2 July 2014 “Far and away the largest group, more than 2,400 children, traveled to the United States from San Pedro Sula, Honduras, a city best known for having the world's highest murder rate. The next most common points of origin are the Honduran cities of Tegucigalpa and Juticalpa, each of which saw more than 800 of their children caught migrating to the United States.“ http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/07/02/the_children_streaming_across_the_us_border_are_fleeing_violence_and_poverty [registration may be required] Fresh fighting in Pakistan's North Waziristan displaces more than 75,000 into Afghanistan UNHCR – 2 July 2014 “A military offensive in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal region has forced more than 75,000 people to flee their homes over the past two weeks, seeking shelter across the border in Afghanistan's Khost and Paktika provinces. Many left suddenly, with very few possessions.” http://www.unhcr.org/53b3fdcf9.html The Surge in Unaccompanied Children from Central America: A Humanitarian Crisis at Our Border Diana Villiers Negroponte – Brookings, UpFront: 2 July 2014 “The fate of 47 thousand children, most of them from Central America and the prospect of 43 thousand more children crossing the Texan border illegally by the end of 2014 poses a serious challenge to the laws of the United States and our humanitarian values. How should we treat these children? Should they be united with parents and family members living in the US or deported for entering the U.S. without sufficient reasons to justify asylum?Ä http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/07/02-unaccompanied-children-central-america-negroponte Responsibility for the Tragedy Julia E. Sweig – Council on Foreign Relations, Folha de Sao Paulo: 2 July 2014 “Exploitation also plays a role. The black market in child trafficking made immoral use of the word "permiso," to persuade desperate parents that their children would be allowed to stay in the United States if they crossed the border before an immigration law passed. It turns out that the "permiso" is just a subpoena for a deportation hearing in court. Critics blame Obama for last year's decision to allow a number of now young adults to stay in the United States whose parents brought them here before 2007. Reminder: Obama has deported more migrants from the United States -- nearly two million -- than any other president. And still there is not enough money to hire border agents, staff courts, or fund drones to keep people from risking their lives, dividing their families, often permanently.” http://www.cfr.org/immigration/responsibility-tragedy/p33198 In Portuguese: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/juliasweig/2014/07/1479561-responsaveis-pela-tragedia.shtml

Time to Rethink Approach to Iraq's Displacement Crisis Elizabeth Ferris and Vittoria Federici – Brookings Institute, CNN Global Square:11 July 2014 “In a scene reminiscent of Iraq’s 2006-2008 displacement crisis, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis are again fleeing violent conflict for perceived safer areas. Indeed, more than 1.2 million Iraqis have been displaced since fighting erupted in Anbar Province between Sunni insurgents and the Iraqi army at the start of this year, a situation dramatically worsened by the lightning advances of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Sadly, this mass displacement looks like it will be even more complicated than the previous one.” http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/11/time-to-rethink-approach-to-iraqs-displacement-crisis/ Why Are So Many More Central Americans Trying to Cross the Border Illegally Now? Ana Quintana – The Heritage Foundation, The Washington Times: 13 July 2014 “No longer do Mexicans constitute the majority of unlawful migrants to the U.S. Currently, they are estimated to account for only about 25 percent of border-crossers. Clearly, Mexico’s economic growth — combined with an improving security situation — has lessened the incentive to migrate. The same cannot be said for the Northern Triangle countries of Central America.

Located directly below Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras are caught in the cross hairs of drug trafficking organizations and the violent regional gangs that support them. The erosion of Colombia’s cartels and subsequent growth of their Mexican counterparts shifted drug trafficking routes to the isthmus. With that came the violence and criminality associated with these organizations.” http://dailysignal.com/2014/07/13/white-house-blame-influx-immigrants/ Return to Top

Money Laundering China’s Central Bank Investigates Report of a Bank’s Money Laundering Didi Kisten Tatlow – The New York Times: 11 July 2014 “China’s central bank is investigating a report by state television that a major Chinese bank is helping clients transfer large amounts of money overseas in a program that violates currency controls, Xinhua, the state-run news agency, said Friday.

The station, China Central Television, or CCTV, caused a scandal when it broadcast a program on Wednesday accusing the Bank of China of money laundering on a large scale.” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/12/business/international/chinas-central-bank-investigating-report-of-money-laundering.html [registration may be required] The Financial Police: CAD Annual Report 2013 Singapore Police Force and Commercial Affairs Department – Bloomberg, Bloomberg.com: 2 July 2014 – 19 June 2014 “Organised crime groups are becoming more sophisticated and taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by our expanding financial services sector. They continue to launch direct

attacks on our payment systems by stealing data to commit credit card fraud. They attack our financial industry by committing insurance fraud that can have a direct impact on consumers if there is an increase in premiums. Phone scams and internet scams are also becoming more audacious. Recently, scammers have even dared to pose as government officials. We have redeployed our uniformed officers to increase our resources in this area, as well as step up our crime prevention efforts with the financial industry and outreach to increase public awareness of such scams.” http://www.cad.gov.sg/content/dam/cad/docs/Annual%20Reports/CAD%20AR%202013%20compressed.pdf Tanzania seeks technical help from Switzerland to probe ill-gotten assets as foreign bank holdings soar Kizito Makoye – Thomson Reuters Foundation: 7 July 2014 “Tanzania is seeking help from Switzerland in investigating stolen government assets and illicit money stashed in offshore bank accounts, two years after a parliamentary inquiry first called for action. “ http://www.trust.org/item/20140707161929-3qdob Return to Top

Program on Cyber Security Studies (PCSS) Combating Terrorism and Cyber Crime After the breach: cybersecurity liability risk Judith H. Germano and Zachary K. Goldman – Center on Law and Security, NYU School of Law, 2014 “Cybersecurity’s evolving regulatory and liability landscape compounds the challenges that companies face from cyber attacks, and further complicates the ability of corporate executives and their advisors to understand and effectively manage cyber risk. Companies must prepare for and respond to a potential cyberattack’s direct damage, including financial and data loss, system and service interruptions, reputational harm and compromised security. Cyberattacks also expose companies to diverse and uncertain regulatory and civil liabilities. Although these risks generally become apparent post-breach, they must be contemplated and managed proactively, before a breach occurs.

"The decision-making of companies that are facing systematic and strategic cyber threats is, therefore, fraught with legal uncertainty about the implications of how they prepare for and respond to the threat. With piecemeal statutes and regulations, and emerging technologies, companies must navigate myriad potential sources of civil and criminal liability related to cyber incidents whose doctrinal contours are unsettled. Concerns include, for example, how to: Institute and monitor security protections; implement cyber incident response policies and procedures; disclose threat, vulnerability and incident information; and determine when, whether and how best to inform, and potentially cooperate with, government. In addition to the inherent difficulties in determining how to address these concerns, companies also must evaluate how each of those decisions may impact litigation risk...” http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/CLS%20After%20the%20Breach%20Final.pdf

McAfee Labs threats report McAfee Labs – Jun 2014 “This may sound like a fun topic, but it has some serious consequences. The Flappy Bird mobile game enjoyed a meteoric rise in popularity late last year and early this year but was closed down by its author in February. Based on its popularity, enterprising cybercriminals developed hundreds of Flappy Bird clones containing malware. McAfee Labs sampled 300 of those clones and found that almost 80% of them contained malware. Some of the behavior we found includes making calls without the user’s permission; sending, recording, and receiving SMS messages; extracting contact data; and tracking geolocation. In the worst cases, the malware gained root access, which allows uninhibited control of anything on the mobile device including confidential business information...” http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-quarterly-threat-q1-2014.pdf Return to Top

Cyber Capacity Building Akamai’s State of the Internet Q1 2014 Report David Belson, ed. – Akamai: June 2014 “In the first quarter, Akamai observed a 1.6% increase in the number of unique IPv4 addresses connecting to the Akamai Intelligent Platform, growing to just over 795 million, or about 12.5 million more than were seen in the fourth quarter of 2013. Looking at connection speeds, the global average connection speed grew 1.8% to 3.9 Mbps and the global average peak connection speed fell 8.6%, starting off 2014 at 21.2 Mbps. At a country/region level, South Korea continued to have the highest average connection speed at 23.6 Mbps, and South Korea had the highest average peak connection speed at 68.5 Mbps. Globally, high broadband (>10 Mbps) adoption grew 9.4% to 21%, and South Korea remained the country with the highest level of high broadband adoption, at 77%. Global broadband (>4 Mbps) adoption grew 1.7% quarter- over-quarter to 56%, and South Korea maintained a 94% adoption rate in the first quarter. 11% of global connections were considered to be “4K Ready” (>15 Mbps), with South Korea having 52% of connections to Akamai at those speeds.” http://www.akamai.com/stateoftheinternet/ Full Report: http://www.akamai.com/dl/akamai/akamai-soti-a4-q114.pdf Executive Summary: http://www.akamai.com/dl/akamai/akamai-soti-q114-exec-summary-a4.pdf Three Graphs that Show the Rapidly Changing World of ICT Joshua Bleiberg and Darrell M. West – Brookings, Tech Tank: 16 July 2014 “Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) have numerous benefits for their users. ICT makes it easier for firms to grow and for innovators to develop solutions to long standing problems. Over the past ten years the world has undergone a dramatic transformation as more people in the developed and developed world gain access to ICT. Recently the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) released their updated World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database. The update includes estimates for 2014. These predictions are likely to change, but they offer a view into many worldwide technology trends.” http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/techtank/posts/2014/07/16-changing-world-of-ict Return to Top

Cyber Statecraft Development Twiplomacy Study 2014 Burson-Marsteller – 25 June 2014 “World leaders vie for attention, connections and followers on Twitter, that’s the latest finding of Burson-Marsteller’s Twiplomacy study 2014, an annual global study looking at the use of Twitter by heads of state and government and ministers of foreign affairs. While some heads of state and government continue to amass large followings, foreign ministers have established a virtual diplomatic network by following each other on the social media platform. For many diplomats Twitter has become a powerful channel for digital diplomacy and 21st century statecraft and not all Twitter exchanges are diplomatic, real world differences are spilling over reflected on Twitter and sometimes end up in hashtag wars.” http://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2014/ Return to Top

Privacy and Security Dangerous practice of digital mass surveillance must be subject to independent checks and balances – Pillay Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights – United Nations: 16 July 2014 “UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay warned Wednesday that studies by her office and others have revealed a “disturbing” lack of transparency about governmental surveillance policies and practices, “including de facto coercion of private sector companies to provide sweeping access to information and data relating to private individuals without the latter’s knowledge or consent.”” http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Media.aspx?IsMediaPage=true&LangID=E Netizen Report: Researchers Uncover Mobile Phone Spyware in 60 Countries Worldwide Ellery Roberts Biddle, Lisa Ferguson, Oiwan Lam, et. al. – Global Voices Online, Global Voices Advocacy: 2 July 2014 “This week we begin with new research from Kaspersky Labs and the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab, where security researchers reverse engineered a mechanism developed by Italian company Hacking Team that a reported 60 governments worldwide are using to sweep up mobile phone data. Disguised as a regular news app for Android, the technical “implant” allows covert collection of emails, text messages, address books, and keystroke logging. It can take screenshots, record audio and photos, and monitor the user’s location through GPS.” http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2014/07/02/netizen-report-researchers-uncover-mobile-phone-spyware-in-60-countries-worldwide/ Rules and Architectures Julian Sanchez – CATO, CATO Unbound: The Snowden Files: 5 July 2014 “If we were confident that an adequate set of rules would both remain in effect and be followed scrupulously, arbitrarily far into the future, perhaps we could safely follow Ben’s advice. But rules are not always followed scrupulously, and indeed, rules can change far more quickly in

times of panic than architectures can. We had a fairly stringent set of rules embedded in statute on September 11, 2001, and soon thereafter loosened them substantially — rather too substantially for my taste — in order to further empower our intelligence community to prevent further terrorist attacks. And yet, as we learned only many years later, President Bush determined that even the loosened rules fettered him too tightly, secretly directing the NSA to launch an expansive program of warrantless surveillance, relying on a legal theory to which only a tiny handful of government officials were made privy — and one ultimately discarded as indefensible.” http://www.cato-unbound.org/2014/07/05/julian-sanchez/rules-architectures Return to Top

Public/Private Partnership The Three Effects of Dual-Use: Firms, Capabilities, Governance Daniel Fiott – EUISS, Brief 21: 4 July 2014 “It is easy to overlook the fact that many of the products and technologies we use on a daily basis – and now take for granted – have their origins in the defence sector. GPS navigation units, the internet, touch screens, digital cameras, and even microwaves, were all, in one way or another, invented and developed in the defence field and paid for out of defence budgets. The reverse is also true, however, with a number of commercially designed products and technologies now being employed in the realm of security and defence.

The term ‘dual-use’ has since emerged as a label which reflects these increasingly blurred lines. At a policymaking level, dual-use is seen as a means to address general decreases in defence expenditure across the European continent, market fragmentation, rising technology costs and fierce international competition. The hard truth is that Europeans are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain investment in the defence sector. Eurostat, for example, calculates that the EU28 allocated only 5.11% of their total research and development (R&D) budgets to defence in 2012. Additionally, ASD Europe estimates that out of the total €128 billion worth of sales in the aeronautics sector, only €46 billion was generated by military-related projects. For those firms with both defence and commercial arms, commercial R&D and sales are therefore increasingly essential to their competitiveness.” http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/the-three-effects-of-dual-use-firms-capabilities-and-governance/ Return to Top

Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS) Al-Qaeda Violence perpetrated by supporters of al-Qa’ida and Affiliated Movements (AQAM): fatal attacks and violent plots in the United States Jeff Gruenewald, et. al. – National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: June 2014 “This report provides an overview of violent incidents and plots committed or attempted by supporters of al-Qa’ida and affiliated movements (AQAM) who targeted the United States between 1990 and 2013. Since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, countering the dynamic threat of future AQAM attacks has understandably been a top priority under the broader homeland security mission. A key to terrorism prevention is developing a

comprehensive understanding of the patterned nature of the AQAM threat in the United States. Such an understanding begins with clear definitions and rich descriptions of AQAM-related offenders and incidents. There have been several efforts to chronicle successful, failed, and foiled AQAM-related plots against the United States. We believe, however, that the systematic definitional, data collection, and analytical approaches and procedures we have used allow us to fill key gaps in what is known about violence perpetrated by supporters of AQAM.

The data on AQAM-related violence analyzed in this report come from the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB). These data are unique as they include information on violent crimes in which AQAM supporters were indicted[1] at either the state or federal level. These data also cover successful fatal attacks and unsuccessful plots involving both lone actors and group-based offenders who support AQAM. Finally, and importantly, violent crime data from the ECDB allow for the disaggregation of two types of planned but ultimately unsuccessful violent incidents based on whether general or specific targets were identified. Each event that involves a spatially unique target, whether general or specific in nature, is considered a separate incident or plot.” http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/violence-perpetrated-supporters-al-qa-ida-and-affiliated-movements-aqam-fatal-attacks-0 Return to Top

Caucasus Emirate Caucasus Emir Seeks a Re-Brand Thomas de Waal – Carnegie, Eurasia Outlook: 2 July 2014 “The roots of the insurgency in the North Caucasus remain: local Muslims, especially in Dagestan, still experience rule by Moscow as brutal and corrupt and feel they have no stake in Russian society. These roots are only likely to get deeper as Russia becomes more autocratic.” http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=56062 Return to Top

Developing CbT Strategy Deterring Terrorism: a New Strategy Max Abrahms - Perspectives on Terroris 8(3): Jun 2014 “Terrorists are poor candidates for deterrence. They are difficult to deter because they are motivated by a wide variety of personal and strategic aims. The diversity of these aims practically ensures that many terrorists will derive utility from their actions regardless of how governments respond. In fact, even opposite government responses tend to generate utility for terrorists due to the complexity of their incentive structure. To an extent, however, terrorism may still be deterred by dissuading terrorist supporters since they are critical for mounting large-scale terrorist campaigns. Compared to terrorists, their supporters are more deterrable due to the relative simplicity of their incentive structure. People generally support terrorists for a single reason—to achieve their political demands. Fortunately, a growing body of empirical research finds that terrorism is a losing tactic for perpetrators to induce major concessions from governments. The policy community can help to deter terrorism by teaching its supporters about the tactic’s politically counterproductive effects.” http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/344

Lessons in Foreign Policy and National Security David Adesnik and George C. Marshall Fellows Class of 2012 – The Heritage Foundation, Special Report #155: 11 July 2014 “Future foreign policy leaders need more than expertise in particular policy areas. They also need the ability to appreciate and synthesize America’s traditions, values, and worldwide challenges into a grand strategy. Among the many lessons that emerge from the interviews in this report is that certain personal and intellectual qualities enable one to succeed when the chance arises, but making good policy depends on having solid principles. What, precisely, are those principles? Does conservatism provide a framework for success in foreign policy and national security? Even the best principles bring with them enduring questions about their application, especially the need to distinguish between pragmatic compromise and unprincipled concession. In the end, there are no easy answers to be handed down from one generation to the next. Instead, there is the constant imperative to learn and debate in order to have the best chance to find the right balance between prudent hesitation and decisive action.” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/07/lessons-in-foreign-policy-and-national-security Return to Top

Diplomacy in Combating Terrorism No Time to 'Study Options' for Jordan Dov S. Zakheim – Foreign Policy, Shadow Government: 2 July 2014 “The speed with which ISIS captured large chunks of Iraq demonstrates that Washington can ill afford to study "options" to death. If it does so in the face of an imminent threat to the Hashemite monarchy, Israel will likely step in with its own forces to protect its ally. It should be recalled that Israel almost intervened in Jordan 1970, when the Black September group threatened to destabilize the kingdom. There can be little doubt that Jerusalem would do so if it suspects an American response to be either too little or too late, or both. In fact, given Israel's virtual complete lack of trust in the Obama administration, it may well not wait too long before it intervenes. An Israeli intervention in Jordan, while it might temporarily stabilize that country, would further inflame an already turbulent Middle East.” http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/07/02/no_time_to_study_options_for_jordan [registration may be required] Russia's Contribution as a Partner in the War on Terrorism Henry Plater-Zyberk – SSI/AWC: 8 July 2014 “This monograph examines terrorism and counterterrorism from the Russian perspective so as to assess prospects for cooperation with Russia in fighting terror. It concludes that, regardless of the state of political relations between Russia and the United States at any given time, longer-term systemic and conceptual obstacles to meaningful cooperation may well prevent any significant Russian contribution to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. This monograph details Russian definitions of terrorism and then looks at the Russian security “pyramid,” which sets out the relevant authority structure. It examines the roles of coordinating bodies such as the Security Council and the National Anti-Terrorist Committee, before looking at the individual organs involved in counterterrorism operations, particularly the Federal Security Service and Ministry of the Interior. The monograph then explores the most important question for Russia in terms of

terrorism, the North Caucasus, and finally explores the wider context of the relationship between Russia and the West, particularly the United States, looking at the lengthy list of tensions affecting that relationship even before Russia's seizure of Crimea, which took place after the monograph was completed.” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1216 Return to Top

Disengagement and Deradicalizaion Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East Pew Research Center – Global Attitudes Project: 1 July 2014 “As well-publicized bouts of violence, from civil war to suicide bombings, plague the Middle East, Africa and South Asia, concern about Islamic extremism is high among countries with substantial Muslim populations, according to a new survey by the Pew Research Center. And in the Middle East, concern is growing. Lebanese, Tunisians, Egyptians, Jordanians and Turks are all more worried about the extremist threat than they were a year ago.

Meanwhile, publics hold very negative opinions of well-known extremist groups, such as al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah.” http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle-east/ Jihadist threat: Government must invest in prevention Bibi van Ginkel – Clingendael, DutchNews.nl: 9 July 2014 “The recent terrorist attack in Brussels seems to have acted as something of a wake-up call for politicians. Suddenly alarm bells were ringing everywhere. But experts have been sounding the alarm for much longer. In an on-the-spot decision, the cabinet has decided to earmark €25m to support the fight on terrorism. Coming on the heels of a €23m cutback and another €45m budget cut for the AIVD, it’s unlikely to make much of a difference.” http://www.dutchnews.nl/columns/2014/07/jihadist_threat_government_mus.php Return to Top

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) The IMU Ascendant: How Uzbek Autocracy Empowers Terrorist Entrepreneurs Luke Lischin – Small Wars Journal: 28 June 2014 “After approximately one decade spent in the shadow of the Afghan Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) claimed ownership over what appear to be increasingly frequent waves of violence focused in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and at the borders of Central Asia. While the return of the IMU as a capable fighting force may be rightly construed as a threat to the stability of Central Asia writ large, the risks are especially pronounced in the case of the region’s most populous state, Uzbekistan. Given recent signs of the IMU’s replenished vitality, this paper seeks to assess the prospects of an IMU incursion into Uzbekistan, arguing that

policies designed by Uzbek President Islam Karimov to subjugate Uzbek civil society and restrict foreign influence have actually strengthened the position of the IMU as a military and political threat to the regime.” http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-imu-ascendant-how-uzbek-autocracy-empowers-terrorist-entrepreneurs Return to Top

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Video: CSIS Transnational Threats Project: ISIS Panel Q&A compilation Thomas M. Sanderson and Arnaud de Borchgrave – CSIS: 8 July 2014 “On June 10, 2014, the terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) executed a rapid, violent sweep across large parts of Iraq in partnership with disaffected Sunni tribes and remnant officers from Saddam Hussein’s military and Baathist party. After chasing off Shiite-dominated Iraqi national army and police forces and capturing Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, ISIS emptied bank vaults and prisons of their most valuable contents. The world reacted with shock and concern, and soon Iran, the United States, Saudi Arabia and many others acknowledged a shared interest in slowing this confident, independent, vicious group which itself fell afoul of al-Qaeda senior leadership over the past year unrestrained warfare in Syria. The CSIS TNT Project quickly convened a high-level panel of experts to discuss the implications of these dramatic developments on June 19, 2014.” http://csis.org/multimedia/csis-transnational-threats-project-isis-panel-qa-compilation Cutting Off ISIS Foreign-Fighter Pipelines James Jay Carafano – The Heritage Foundation, The National Interest: 1 July 2014 “Foreign fighters—outsiders recruited or who volunteer to fight in another country for somebody else’s cause—are nothing new. What’s new is that they have become a staple of the Al Qaeda cohort.

It’s called the “pipeline” problem. Ferrying warriors to the war and also returning them home to spread the war elsewhere has become part of the stock and trade of how transnational terrorists do business. The new front in Iraq creates new opportunities for another wave of attacks against the West, either from “lone wolves” or cells organized or supported by the veteran extremists.” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/cutting-isis-foreign-fighter-pipelines-10783 Dear ISIS, Welcome to State-building… Jennifer Keister – Cato Institute, Cato @ Liberty: 3 July 2014 “ISIS’s public declaration that it has restored the caliphate has been noted as a bold move, potentially changing some elements of their revolutionary calculus. Even without such a pronouncement, however, rebel groups like ISIS always share some of the same challenges as states do—broadly speaking, both rebels and states are better off if the majority of their

residents comply with their demands. Far from a declaration of outright victory, ISIS’s announcement has simply underscored a number of interrelated challenges that all rebels and states face.

In other words, ISIS now faces the same problems as its enemies.” http://www.cato.org/blog/dear-isis-welcome-state-building Do Not Belittle the Islamic State Marc Pierini – Carnegie, Carnegie Europe: 10 July 2014 “While many people were busy watching the 2014 World Cup, a new entity appeared on the world map: the Islamic State, which emerged on June 29 as the successor to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (commonly known as ISIS), a jihadist militant group. This self-proclaimed “state” does not have a president, it has a caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Instead of a constitution, it has the Koran. Instead of ministers and embassies, it has suicide bombers and sabers. And instead of the rule of law, it has summary executions.

The Islamic State is now taking root in northern Iraq and northeastern Syria, where it has experienced fighters, many of them foreigners, as well as weaponry, money, and ambitions to expand across the Middle East and Turkey. As former U.S. ambassador to Syria and Iraq Ryan Crocker wrote on June 19, “this is global jihad, and it will be coming our way. . . . This is a determined enemy, and it will not stop where it is now.”” http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=56120 Five myths about the Islamic State Daniel Byman – Brookings, The Washington Post: 3 July 2014 “Al-Qaeda and IS differ on tactics, strategy and leadership. IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi embraces beheadings and crucifixions, and he focuses on local regimes and rivals, ignoring Zawahiri’s credo of hitting the “far enemy” — the United States.

These differences came to a head in Syria, when Zawahiri designated the relatively more restrained Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) as al-Qaeda’s local affiliate. Baghdadi believes that his group should be in charge of jihadist operations in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. The two groups turned on each other, with their infighting reportedly killing thousands.” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-the-islamic-state/2014/07/03/f6081672-0132-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html How to Stop ISIS in Iraq Ahmed Charai – The National Interest: 9 July 2014 “ISIS has a bold vision—a vision of terror and turmoil under the guise of a noble faith, which strikes an ominous chord with the onset of our holy month. Will support emerge for an alternative vision? This is a question worth pondering every day this month—and it is a call to action.” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-stop-isis-iraq-10830

"Iranians are Terrified": Iran's ISIS Nightmare Dina Esfandiary – The National Interest: 11 July 2014 “Iran is stuck between a rock and a hard place on ISIS and Iraq. Taking responsibility for security in Iraq – or even significantly contributing to it – would be a huge undertaking. But a fragmented Iraq on its border is a first-order concern for Tehran - it can’t just sit by with fingers crossed. The choice is complicated by Syria. Iran can’t continue to pursue its interests in Syria at the same level if it is mired in Iraq as well. It is likely that Tehran will have to choose, and it will choose Iraq.” http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/iranians-are-terrified-irans-isis-nightmare-10856 The Islamic State’s 1001 resources Myriam Benraad – ECFR: 9 July 2014 “With million dollars at its disposal, the Islamic State is the world’s wealthiest terrorist group, far ahead of al-Qaeda’s central command, from which it has deliberately distanced itself. This solid economic entrenchment will make the jihadists’ defeat even harder and can only be countered by the adoption of quick and adequate socioeconomic reforms by the next Iraqi government, regardless of its political composition.” www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_the_islamic_states_1001_resources286 ISIS and the Prospect of U.S. Intervention Karen Leigh and Matthew Levitt – World Policy Institute, World Policy Blog: 10 July 2014 “There's a reason why ISIS was kicked out of al-Qaeda, and why it's considered more radical than al-Qaeda. They believe that al-Qaeda is sitting on the sidelines, not doing what has to be done. They also feel that in Iraq, there is an opportunity [for power] because the central government, which is Shia-dominated, has created problems for the Sunnis. ISIS takes solace in the fact that it has cooperation from tribes, and that some in the Gulf have been referring to events in Iraq as an intifada.” http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/06/30/changing-institution-marriage-divided-syria-0 The ISIS Chronicles: A History Robert G. Rabil – The National Interest: 17 July 2014 “On June 10, 2014, Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq and the capital of Ninawa province, fell to the Salafi-Jihadi organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The fall of Mosul and the subsequent blitz with which ISIS took over other Sunni majority cities shocked Washington and Baghdad. However, the leaderships of the two countries have entertained different visions as to how to deal with this surging threat to regional and international stability. This has only added another layer of misconception about ISIS and its future military and religiopolitical program in the Middle East. ISIS has achieved what Al Qaeda failed to accomplish. A recent statement by ISIS in which it rebranded itself as the “Islamic State,” declaring the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria, led by its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as Caliph Ibrahim, shows both the astuteness of its military command and ingenuity of its ideologues. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Islamic State has already replaced Al Qaeda as

the paradigm organization of Salafi-Jihadists and stands, if not defeated in its formative stage, not only to change the map of political geography of the Middle East, but also the scope and breadth of Salafi-jihadi threat to the West and Middle East.” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-isis-chronicles-history-10895 The ISIS Paradox: A Mirage or Mortal Threat? Ross Harrison and Michael W. S. Ryan – The National Interest: 7 July 2014 “It is no simple feat to leap almost overnight from being a relatively unknown organization to capturing headlines around the world. From Washington’s vantage point, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has catapulted itself from being merely a localized challenger to secular rebel groups battling the Assad regime in Syria, to now posing a broader threat to regional stability and to the territorial integrity of both Iraq and Syria. By capturing large swaths of land in Syria and Iraq, including strategic border crossings, and then subsuming these spoils of war under a self-proclaimed Caliphate, ISIS is making a mockery of the existing regional order, claiming to have permanently erased the boundaries that have served as the framework for regional stability since the end of World War 1. Moreover, in a potentially stunning reversal of fortune, ISIS poses a threat to al-Qaeda, challenging its jihadist cachet and the durability of some of its most strategic alliances.” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-isis-paradox-mirage-or-mortal-threat-10818 ISIS: Terrorism Upgraded Mario Abou Zeid – Carnegie, National Interest: 8 July 2014 “Traditionally, terrorist groups aim to undermine the legitimacy of a ruling entity, destabilize a country’s security, weaken political institutions, drain a country’s armed forces, topple regimes and generate power that would allow them to control entire communities. Violence, suicide attacks, criminal behavior, and targeting civilians are the conventional means to achieve their goals. Al Qaeda was an exemplary group, applying this textbook model of conventional terrorism.

Not only has IS/ISIS resorted to these techniques to plant fear in the heart of the populace, but it has also upgraded it. IS/ISIS is trying to expand and control more territories and put them under its direct rule as it seeks to create and govern a Sunni heartland that bisects the Shiite-led alliance that stretches from Tehran to Hezbollah’s stronghold in Lebanon.Э http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-terrorism-upgraded-10825 The Man Who Would Be Caliph Makes A Subversive Video Debut Bruce Riedel – Brookings, Iran @ Saban: 6 July 2014 “It's tempting to dismiss the self-appointed Caliph Ibrahim (formerly Mr. Baghdadi) as a monumental egomaniac. And predictably Sunni clerics including some with jihadi credentials are labeling his Caliphate illegitimate. He probably has over reached much too far. But his command of the symbols and iconography of medieval Islamic history is striking. He has adopted a persona designed to evoke memories of revolutionary movements from early and medieval Sunni Islam.” http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/iran-at-saban/posts/2014/07/06-isis-caliph-ibrahim-iraq-saudi-iran-sunni-shia

Video: Strategic Snapshots: Crisis in Iraq Adam Ward and Toby Dodge – IISS, IISS Voices: 4 July 2014 “Adam Ward and Toby Dodge delve into Iraq's rapidly deteriorating security situation, tangled political web and weak institutions to ask how this strategically important country will deal with the announcement of an ISIS caliphate on its territory.” http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2014-b4d9/july-85cc/crisis-in-iraq-2169 Who is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi? Bruce Riedel – The National Interest: 14 July 2014 “Afghan sources have provided new information on the elusive leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, also now known as Caliph Ibrahim. According to these accounts, Baghdadi spent several years in Afghanistan working with the Arab jihadist community and the Taliban. Baghdadi apparently went to Afghanistan in the late 1990s with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian who founded al-Qaeda in Iraq after the US-led invasion in 2003. It was Zarqawi's group that would later evolve into the Islamic State.” www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/isis-baghdadi-taliban-links-afghanistan-zarqawi.html Return to Top

Military Force in Counterterrorism and CbT The Iraq/ISIS Debate: Beware the Ghosts of Saigon and Karbala Robert Tollast – The National Interest: 10 July 2014 “Are we about to witness a “Saigon moment” in Baghdad? Or are we perhaps witnessing something more comparable to Iraq's February 1991 uprising, only this time in reverse?” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-iraq-isis-debate-beware-the-ghosts-saigon-karbala-10840 Return to Top

Terrorist Motivations The Four Types of the Returning Jihadi Jonathan Githens-Mazer – RUSI, RUSI Analysis: 8 July 2014 “Recent reports on ‘Returning Jihadis’ seem to suggest that a threat is imminent and dramatic. What do we really know about the threat of blowback of Returning Jihadis from latest crises in Iraq and Syria. What does it mean to say that they have been ‘radicalised’ while fighting abroad? And if someone has fought under a black ISIS flag in Iraq or Syria – will they ever be ‘safe’ to return to British society?” https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C53BBDE309A3F2/#.U7-ZWkBqPdI

Home-Grown Terrorism – Russia’s Ticking Bomb Aleksandr Fisher and Maia Otarashvil – ISN: 8 July 2014 “The Sochi Winter Olympics re-illuminated the serious problem of domestic terrorism in Russia. However, Vladimir Putin’s artful maneuvering has successfully diverted the international community’s attention to the Ukraine crisis and away from this alarming issue. This is a problem that cannot be swept under the rug as there are important international consequences for Russia’s festering domestic terrorist concerns. The terrorist groups in northern Caucasus are part of rapidly globalizing network of Jihadists and self-made terrorists. The Boston Marathon bombers are a good example of such online-trained, self-made extremists who used their Chechen heritage as an inspiration for seeking out information online and waging their own Jihad.” http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=181348 Repression No Cure for Challenge of Political Islam Dalibor Rohac – Cato, CNN Global: 2 July 2014 “Instead of rushing to alarmist conclusions, we need a careful and dispassionate analysis of why Islamic political organizations succeed in some Middle Eastern countries. Somewhat surprisingly, this may have little to do with religion. In survey data from Muslim-majority countries, religious beliefs seem to be only weakly related to voting patterns or opinions about specific policy issues. Instead, the appeal of Islamists lies in the credibility with which they can make electoral promises, which itself has to do with their history and organization.” http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/02/repression-no-cure-for-challenge-of-political-islam/ Returning Western foreign fighters: The case of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker – ICCT, Background Note: 20 June 2014 “Authorities are increasingly worried about the large number of Western foreign fighters present in Syria. The fear is that these fighters will return radicalised, battle hardened and with extensive radical networks that might encourage them to commit a terrorist attack in the home country. The recent attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels – allegedly by a returned foreign fighter from Syria – seems to be a case in point. However, the conflict in Syria is not the first to attract foreign fighters. In this Background Note, Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker investigate three historical cases of foreign fighting: Afghanistan (1980s), Bosnia (1990s) and Somalia (2000s). In this paper they aim to give insight into what happened to these foreign fighters after their fight abroad had ended. The authors distinguish eight possible pathways for foreign fighters that can help to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of this complex phenomenon.” http://www.icct.nl/publications/icct-papers/returning-western-foreign-fighters-the-case-of-afghanistan-bosnia-and-somalia

Suicide bombings in Afghanistan Riaz Hassan – iSAS, NUS, ISAS Working Paper 191 : 17 Jun 2014 “…The findings of my research on suicide bombings largely discredit the commonly-held view that the personalities of the insurgent suicide bombers and their religion are the principal causes of their actions. Although religion can play a vital role in recruiting and motivating potential suicide bombers, the driving force is not religion but a cocktail of motivations including politics, humiliation, revenge and retaliation, as well as altruism. The meaning and nature of suicide in a suicide bombing are strikingly different from those of an ordinary suicide. Ordinary suicide involves the killing of only oneself, whereas in suicide bombings the killing of the perceived enemy is encoded in the action. Religiously and nationalistically coded attitudes towards an acceptance of death, stemming from a collective sense of humiliation, suffering and powerlessness, enable political organisations to offer suicide bombing as an outlet for feelings of desperation, deprivation and injustice (Hassan 2014).

“For the individual, participating in a suicide mission is not simply about dying and killing but has broader significance to do with the achievement of multiple goals – from personal to communal...” http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Working_Paper_No._191_-_Suicide_Bombings_in_Afghanistan_17062014100159.pdf Return to Top

Terrorist Narratives The Age of Grievance Michael J. Mazarr – Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs: 3 July 2014 “In the Middle East, terrorists are making a comeback. And with the exit of U.S. troops from Iraq and Washington’s continued absence in Syria, the momentum appears to be in their favor. The RAND Corporation reports that since 2010 the number of jihadist groups in the region has increased by 58 percent, the number of extremist fighters has doubled, and the number of attacks by al Qaeda affiliates has tripled. Recent events, meanwhile, provide little cause for optimism. In Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), an al Qaeda offshoot, has fought its way nearly to Baghdad.

The growth of such groups has not merely been a product of their brutality. Studies conducted in the past decade have demonstrated that they use carefully cultivated victim narratives to play on intense popular frustrations, especially during crises of governance. Al Qaeda is a case in point: from the beginning, Osama bin Laden emphasized the humiliation of Muslims at the hands of Western oppressors and called on his followers to reclaim their dignity as God’s chosen people. ISIS has invoked similar themes in Iraq, harnessing Sunni anger at the Shia government in Baghdad. Extremism in defense of Islam is often an ontological phenomenon, attracting people seeking to assert their identity and self-worth.” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141617/michael-j-mazarr/the-age-of-grievance [registration may be required]

The Caliphate’s Scholar-in-Arms Cole Bunzel – Jihadica: 9 July 2014 “With the Islamic State’s Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, or Caliph Ibrahim, seeking to displace al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri as the leader of the global jihadi movement, a parallel displacement effort is taking place in the more recondite realm of jihadi ideology. The old guard of jihadi intellectuals—Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Qatada al-Filastini, and Hani al-Siba‘i, among others—has come out unanimously against the Islamic State and its caliphal pretensions, denouncing the “organization” as hopelessly extremist and out of touch with reality. Their reproach has left a younger generation of pro-Islamic State jihadis no choice but to take up their mantle. One in particular, decrying his jihadi elders and their fierce opposition to his beloved caliphate, appears to be peerless in this effort. He is also the Islamic State’s most prominent and prolific resident scholar, based in Syria since at least February 2014.

Known previously to Jihadica readers by his pseudonym, Abu Humam al-Athari, this young ideologue from Bahrain now uses his given name, Turki al-Bin‘ali (@turky_albinali), or kunya, Abu Sufyan al-Sulami.” http://www.jihadica.com/the-caliphate%E2%80%99s-scholar-in-arms/ Religious Violence and the Cultural Alienation of North African Youth Eden Almasude – ISN, Diplomatic Courier: 28 June 2014 “Strategies to combat radical Islamic influences in North Africa would be more effective by strengthening the indigenous Amazigh traditions and cultural institutions, which have long been banned or otherwise repressed across the region. This could include widespread support of the Tamazight language, state support of Amazigh holidays, and inclusion of Amazigh history in school curricula. Both government and civil society support of Tamazight language education, extensive support for mass media, and the promotion of Amazigh arts and pluralistic religious institutions are initial steps to the revitalization of Amazigh culture and language.” http://diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/africa/2249-religious-violence-and-the-cultural-alienation-of-north-african-youth Return to Top

Terrorist Strategies and Tactics How ISIS changed its game plan in Iraq Hadi Salama – Al-Monitor: 14 July 2014 “The significant media focus on the Islamic State (IS), formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, in Iraq and Syria is not strange, particularly since the latter has witnessed quick developments that could draw a new map of the entire region’s forces. Yet, it is strange that the group’s policy is different in Iraq than in Syria, although it has one authority in both countries.” http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/07/syria-clans-isis.html Return to Top

Terrorist Use of the Internet @ISIS Is #Winning Kori Schake – Hooever Institution, Foreign Policy: 9 July 2014 “The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham is running a brilliantly effective social media campaign. With the group rebranded as the Islamic State (IS), its grisly messaging gets attention and discourages resistance to its military operations, both where it is fighting and among countries that might be inclined to intervene against it. After it took Mosul, IS streamed video of its men executing dozens of captured Iraqi soldiers -- which very likely helped encourage the choice of Iraqi security forces to quietly desert their posts. IS live-tweeted its military advance through Iraq, showcasing the bravery of its fighters and what little resistance Iraqi security forces offered. It threatened decapitations in London's Trafalgar Square. And as the United States was busy playing its World Cup round-of-sixteen game, IS tweeted a picture of a decapitated head with the caption that it was the Islamic State's ball.” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/09/isis_is_winning_social_media_hashtag_diplomacy [registration may be required] Transcending organization: individuals and ‘the Islamic state’ Jarret Brachman – National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Analytical Brief: 30 Jun 2014 “The innovative ways that foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq are leveraging social media and mobile apps to recruit aspirational supporters in the West reveal what is actually a paradigm shift occurring within the global jihadist movement, away from the organization-centric model advanced by Al-Qaida, to a movement unhindered by organizational structures. Counterterrorism policy and practice must rethink the way it approaches countering online radicalization. http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_TranscendingOrganizationIndividualsandtheIslamicState_AnalyticalBrief_June2014.pdf Return to Top

Seminar on Transnational Civil Security (STACS) Crisis Management Are We About to See Three New Nations Replace Iraq? John McLaughlin – Brookings, Ozy C-Notes: 2 July 2014 “Iraq as we know it is in danger. Which means it’s time to start thinking about what the nation will look like if it does disintegrate, and consider what policy challenges would then confront the world.

Though Iraq’s three major ethnic groups — Sunnis, Shia and Kurds — live in generally distinct geographic regions, there will be nothing neat or clean about a breakup. A split won’t calm political waters nor will it bring near-term stability. And for US policy? The already labyrinthine geopolitical puzzle will become even more maddeningly complex.” http://www.ozy.com/c-notes/the-spy-who-told-me-what-a-divided-iraq-would-look-like/32454.article

Can the PA survive Israel’s attack on Hamas? Geoffrey Aronson – Al-Monitor: 1 July 2014 “These are terrible times for the PA. Already attacked by Israel for reconciling with Hamas and criticized by its own people for cooperating with Israel’s ongoing campaign of arrests and closures in the West Bank, the notable resilience of the PA is facing its greatest challenge since Operation Defensive Shield in April 2001 erased the security boundaries that had acted as a brake on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) action in Area A, nominally under Palestinian control.” http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/palestinian-authority-survive-attack-israel-hamas.html Gaza and Israel: New Obstacles, New Solutions International Crisis Group – Middle East Briefing 39: 14 July 2014 “Israel and Hamas are locked again in combat likely to yield – beyond tragic life and property loss – a return to a destructive status quo. The immediate triggers were the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli yeshiva students, for which Israel holds Hamas responsible, and the revenge torture and murder of a Palestinian teen by vigilante Israeli Jews. The nature and extent of Hamas’s involvement in the initial obscenity remains unclear, but the attack’s consequences are anything but. Since Israel launched Operation Protective Edge on 8 July, 168 Palestinians have been killed (80 per cent civilians, a fifth of whom were children) and about 1,150 wounded. Some 1,000 rockets have been launched toward Israel, of which about 200 were intercepted by the Iron Dome defence system. Previous rounds ended with each side claiming at best a Pyrrhic victory, because Israel can achieve lasting stability only when Gaza does, and vice versa. Breaking this pattern is even more urgent today, because the stakes of this escalation could be higher.” http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/b039-gaza-and-israel-new-obstacles-new-solutions.aspx Iraq: The Enemy of My Enemy is Not My Friend Anthony H. Cordesman – CSIS: 15 July 2014 “We do not face one enemy. We face at least three: Assad, Maliki, and the mix of ISIS/ISIL and other hostile Sunni elements in Syria and Iraq. We also face a significant adversary in Iran, and the risk the growing tensions between the U.S. and Russia will lead Moscow to play a spoiler function in pushing its new view of the Color Revolution and effort to expand its role outside Europe by supporting Iran and Maliki. If there is any proverb to be employed under these conditions, it is that “our friends must remain our friends.” Our focus needs to be on Jordan, Turkey, Israel, and key Arab Gulf military powers like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait – as well as security partners with vital facilities like Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt and Oman.” http://csis.org/publication/iraq-enemy-my-enemy-not-my-friend Israel’s Hamas Challenge: The Third Way Ofer Zalzberg – International Crisis Group, The Times of Israel: 6 July 2014 “The kidnapping and murder of three Israeli yeshiva students — and the extensive Israeli military campaign against Hamas, members of which Israel presumes to have perpetrated the

act – illustrate the urgency of revisiting Israel’s policy options toward the Islamist group. Largely ignored since the last outbreak of violence, the issue is today again on the public agenda. How should Israel deal with Hamas?” http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/op-eds/zalzberg-israels%20hamas-challenge-the-third-way.aspx Thailand in Crisis Kathleen B. Rustici – CSIS: 8 July 2014 “Thailand is in the midst of a period of political upheaval that started with massive antigovernment protests in November 2013 and took a menacing turn with a military coup in May 2014. But this is just the latest incident in a cycle of instability that has gripped the nation for a decade or more—a cycle that the military coup will not resolve. The real watershed will come with the country’s royal succession, when forces elite and mass-based, civilian and military, will jostle for primacy as the country enters a new era, without long-reigning King Bhumibol Adulyadej at the helm. Just weeks before the recent coup, CSIS undertook a study to determine the likely scenarios that could play out during this seminal moment, which could come anytime in the coming years.” http://csis.org/publication/thailand-crisis What Hamas Wants, What Israel Needs Natan B. Sachs – Brookings, Foreign Policy: 11 July 2014 “But if we are interested in preventing the suffering rather than using it for political purposes, the real question is not whether Israel is stronger than Hamas (it is, and feels no need to apologize for that fact), nor whether Hamas spends its energy stoking terror (it does, and does not even claim otherwise) rather than on governing and developing Gaza. Faced with the terrible consequences of war, the real questions we face now are: How can this round of violence end? And what are the sides really after?” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/11/what_hamas_wants_what_israel_needs_gaza_attrition What price for a stable Egypt? Aziz El-Kaissouni – ECFR, 4 July 2014 “On the political front, an unexpected consequence of the presidential election was the debunking of the myth of Sisi’s overwhelming popularity. Lackluster turnout drove the government to panic. A Pew survey had already suggested that support for Sisi was not widespread as claimed by adoring public and private media outlets. Pew found support for Sisi stood at around 54% but that dissatisfaction with the direction Egypt was heading was higher than before Mubarak’s downfall.

Despite having been the de facto ruler of Egypt since July 2013, the perception that Sisi is untested by office has been carefully cultivated. Consequently, his approval ratings are likely to suffer if he fails to produce a quick, relatively painless economic turnabout - a prospect Sisi himself clearly does not believe is realistic.Ä http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_what_price_a_stable_egypt284

Will the Palestinian Unity Government Survive? Mahmoud Jaraba and Lihi Ben Shitrit – Carnegie, Sada: 2 July 2014 “The new Palestinian unity government was sworn in on June 2, 2014, promising to end seven years of violent dispute between Fatah and Hamas and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The mild optimism that the agreement on the unity government generated, however, has been short-lived. The challenges to security, institutional, and economic integration remain as contentious as they were during previous attempts at reconciliation. Disagreements over security coordination with Israel have in particular heightened discord between Hamas and Fatah.” http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/07/02/will-palestinian-unity-government-survive/hf1b Return to Top

Energy Security Video: EU Energy Security and Transatlantic Cooperation Sarah O. Ladislaw and Dominique Ristori – CSIS: 1 July 2014 “The CSIS Energy and National Security and Europe Programs are pleased to host Dominique Ristori, Director General for Energy for the European Commission, to discuss the strategic importance of transatlantic cooperation for key energy priorities. With a rapidly evolving energy landscape featuring novel sources of supply alongside supply disruptions, the need for cooperation has become increasingly salient. Mr. Ristori will discuss the common objectives of the U.S. and the EU, including competitiveness, security of supply, and decarbonization, and the importance of cooperation on those objectives.” http://csis.org/multimedia/video-eu-energy-security-and-transatlantic-cooperation Water Wars in the Land of Two Rivers Keith Johnson – Foreign Policy: 2 July 2014 “On Monday, Islamist insurgents in the Islamic State, formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, renewed their offensive in Iraq's Anbar province, moving toward the key hydroelectric dam of Haditha. The dam's security has concerned U.S. officials for years and protecting the country's second-biggest dam was a priority objective during the 2003 invasion.

Meanwhile, Iraq's biggest dam, the Mosul dam, is right next to a hotbed of Islamic State activity and poses catastrophic risk even if the terrorists don't open the floodgates or blow it up. If the dam fails, scientists say Mosul could be completely flooded within hours and a 15-foot wall of water could crash into Baghdad.” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/02/water_wars_in_the_land_of_two_rivers [registration may be required] Return to Top

Environmental Security As food shortages hit 800,000 African refugees, UNHCR and WFP issue urgent appeal UNHCR – 1 July 2014 “The UN refugee agency and the World Food Programme (WFP) on Tuesday warned that funding difficulties, compounded by security and logistical problems, have forced cuts in food rations for nearly 800,000 refugees in Africa, threatening to worsen unacceptable levels of acute malnutrition, stunting and anaemia, particularly in children.” http://www.unhcr.org/53b2a1969.html Before the Flood Kenneth R. Weiss – Foreign Policy, Dispatch: 2 July 2014 “Despite its dysfunctions, Dhaka is packing in more people every day. Precise numbers are elusive, but tens of thousands of rural migrants arrive every month, crowding into its slums, according to demographers at the nonprofit Population Council. Some newcomers are following the global pattern of urban migration, lured by the opportunity of the big city when the family farm has been subdivided so many times among sons that the parcels are too small to support the family.

Many more arrive in the capital with no other place to go. They are forced from their homes, fleeing droughts, floods, and other ravages of a changing climate. Uddin and others are part of a new wave of environmental refugees that experts predict will swell into the tens of millions by midcentury, due to elevated temperatures, rising seas, and violent weather. Half of Bangladesh's population lives less than 17 feet above sea level, putting this country at the forefront of this harrowing development.” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/02/before_the_flood_0 Modi’s twin challenge- Oil and water Subir Gokarn – Brookings India, The Business Standard: 30 June 2014 “They say that oil and water don't mix. Literally true, perhaps, but, speaking metaphorically, they can be an explosive combination. The mix between the two poses the most significant risk to the Indian economy over the next few months. It threatens to reignite the drivers of inflation, the fiscal deficit and the current account deficit. At this point, it is still a risk that might abate over the next few weeks, but if this were to happen, it would be entirely due to meteorological or geopolitical factors - clearly outside the control of the Indian government. At this point, the government's best course of action is to anticipate worst-case scenarios and put mitigative measures in place.” http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/subir-gokarn-oil-and-water-114062900714_1.html Return to Top

Information Sharing Egypt’s Media in the Midst of Revolution Rasha Abdulla – Carnegie: 16 July 2014 “More than three years after the January 25 revolution toppled then Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, Egypt continues to struggle with an authoritarian media sector and constraints on freedom of expression. Postrevolution regimes have not capitalized on opportunities to reform state and private media, and critical voices have been harassed and marginalized by state and nonstate actors. As long as Egypt continues to be governed by rulers who believe controlling the media is in their best interest, reform will only come about through the few dissident voices in the media backed up by support from civil society and the masses.” http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/16/egypt-s-media-in-midst-of-revolution/hg1v Return to Top

Law and the Use of Force Pakistan: Withdraw Repressive Counterterrorism Law Human Rights Watch – 3 July 2014 “The new law would violate fundamental rights to freedom of speech, privacy, peaceful assembly, and due process protections embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR), which Pakistan ratified in 2010. In its current form, the law could be used to suppress peaceful political opposition and criticism of government policy.

Media reports described the Parliament and Senate’s approval of the law as a means to support Pakistani security forces, which have launched a massive offensive against suspected terrorists in North Waziristan. Pakistan’s Minister of Science and Technology, Zahid Hamid, reportedly said the law would “give statutory cover” to security forces involved in the ground offensive. However, Pakistani security forces have a long history of using inappropriate force in response to perceived security threats.” http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/03/pakistan-withdraw-repressive-counterterrorism-law Return to Top

Strategic Communication Israel: Why Crisis Messaging Matters Ben Rosner – World Policy Institute, World Policy Blog: 7 july 2014 “Israel's public relations battle revolves around how to reclaim the narrative. As a result of inadequate crisis strategy, Israel has suffered by often having the right answers, but no willing ears to listen. Its message is drowned by the sea of dissenters.

For a problem as complex as the Israeli-Arab conflict, which has incessantly raged on since the end of the Ottoman rule, Israel finds itself as the punching bag of blame in international headlines, the United Nations, and academic institutions.

How can a conflict with nuanced shades of grey be splashed in broad brushstrokes of black and white by international media?” http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/07/07/israel-why-crisis-messaging-matters Return to Top