167 ESCTER 16 E - Migration crisis - 167 E… · Web viewMass migration, including the movement...

ESC167 ESCTER 16 E rev.1 finOriginal: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

ECONOMICS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE

THE ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CONSEQUENCES

OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS

REPORT

Ossur SKARPHEDINSSON (Iceland)Rapporteur

Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Economic Relations

www.nato-pa.int 19 November 2016

167 ESCTER 16 E rev.1 fin

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................1

II. MASS MIGRATION IN PERSPECTIVE....................................................................................3

III. THE ECONOMICS OF MASS MIGRATION.............................................................................4

IV. LABOUR MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF MASS MIGRATION: THE RECENT EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES.................................................................................5

V. MASS MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN EUROPE.........................................7

VI. SHARING THE BURDEN.........................................................................................................9

VII. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FRONT LINE STATES............................................12

VIII. THE SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS.............................................13

IX. CONCLUSIONS: RESPONSES AND WAYS OUT................................................................15

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....................................................................................................................19

I.


II. INTRODUCTION

1. Mass migration, including the movement of refugees across borders, is a phenomenon abounding with economic, humanitarian, political, social, psychological and security implications. The mass exodus of Syrians from their homes since the outbreak of civil war in that country has once again moved this issue on to the diplomatic front burner, particularly after these refugees began to flood into Turkey, the Western Balkans and EU Member States at an unprecedented pace. The phenomenon has assumed a compelling security dimension insofar as this massive flow of refugees threatens to destabilise several neighbouring countries and, as the Brexit debate in the United Kingdom revealed, appears to have the capacity to undermine fundamental assumptions about politics and policy choices in the West. Indeed, the influx of refugees into Europe ranks among the most salient and divisive political issue on the continent today. It is undermining European unity while roiling domestic politics in a number of European countries. The treatment of refugees and migration in general has also become a central issue in US presidential elections.

2. The security dimensions of mass migration are highly complex. Fear of immigrants is hardly a new phenomenon and has been in evidence not only in countries unaccustomed to large waves of immigrants, but also in those societies that have long defined themselves as immigrant nations. Countries which have not traditionally defined themselves in this manner often confront particularly trying challenges in terms of integrating newly arrived immigrants and refugees. Economic, cultural, political, psychological and historic factors are all at play here.

3. Not surprisingly, the matter of accepting large numbers of refugees from the crisis-ridden Middle East has created new fissures in Europe. Terrorist attacks in Brussels, Paris, Turkey and elsewhere have cemented the view of some that Europe and North America assume enormous risks by admitting more refugees and migrants from war-torn Syria. It is a facile argument for some politicians to exploit and it paints all refugees with the same broad brush. Unfortunately, this kind of politics can pay off in unsettled societies and has even provided fodder and political leverage to demagogic movements in what we generally understand to be highly stable democracies. This is not to say that there are not security concerns linked to mass migration. There are, but not in the manner and degree which is often portrayed.

4. Although there have been isolated cases of refugees participating in terrorist acts, these have been exceedingly rare. Most terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States have involved domestic citizens or perpetrators who are not refugees. Of course, security controls and clearance systems are essential. The United States, for example, demands that refugees undergo a series of controls before they are granted admission to the country. They are vetted at US Embassies, are subject to investigations, biometric checks, interviews by Department of Homeland Security, medical screenings and counter-terrorism investigations. This can take up to three years and is clearly a very thorough process. Asylum seekers must undergo equally rigorous scrutiny. It is worth mentioning that of the 750,000 refugees resettled in the United States since September 2001, only two have ever been arrested on terrorist charges and these were for providing material support to Al-Qaeda in Iraq. It should also be noted that in recent terrorist attacks in Europe many of the known assailants have been returning foreign fighters with European citizenship as well as those who never fought in the Middle East but were radicalised in the West. This is a very serious problem but one that ought to be treated apart from the refugee crisis as such. 5. One of the risks linked to the current refugee crisis is not posed by the refugees at all, but by political actors who might be tempted to exploit their presence and their plight to advance highly divisive and even authoritarian ambitions in the West or undermine the solidarity that has been the lynchpin of European peace and security since the end of the Second World War. The refugee crisis has, at least in the minds of some, become the face of globalisation and the populist reaction in Europe and North America now poses a serious political challenge to those who recognise that nationalism, isolationism and authoritarianism are far more threatening to peace and security than well-managed, prosperity generating, liberal internationalism.

3


6. Europe and North America accordingly need to develop a far greater capacity to manage this crisis both within and beyond their borders alongside their international partners. The West is well positioned to assist some of those fleeing violence and it cannot be stressed enough that doing so makes security as well as humanitarian sense. Again, governments require proper screening and vetting systems to prevent infiltration by extremists and to reassure their own publics that security matters. Small and more fragile countries bordering Syria - particularly Jordan and Lebanon - each of which has taken in millions of refugees also need significantly more assistance. In those two cases, the situation is far direr, and the problem has effectively become an existential one. Such countries cannot shoulder this burden alone.

7. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that as of 4 July 2016, that there were 4,839,350 registered Syrian refugees living beyond the borders of that country, while millions more are internally displaced. This figure includes 2.1 million Syrians registered by UNHCR in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, 2.7 million Syrians registered by the Government of Turkey, and more than 29,000 Syrian refugees registered in North Africa (Syria Regional Refugee Response). Ninety percent of Syria’s refugees have remained in the region in countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt, while slightly more than 10% of the total have moved on to Europe (UNHCR, 15 February 2016). Between April 2011 and April 2016 there were a total of 1,037,760 Syrian asylum applications filed in Europe. It should also be noted that more than twice as many asylum seekers sought to enter the EU in the first ten months of 2015 as in the same period of 2014. Ten times as many migrants sought to cross the sea into Europe in the first six weeks of 2016 than in the same period the year before, and in that period, 409 people died making the journey (MacAskill and Graham-Harrison). Those numbers could well increase if the situation in Syria worsens, and it is no coincidence that the NATO Council recently decided to deploy ships into the Aegean Sea as part of a counter human trafficking effort but also to provide a degree of reassurance in the face of this unprecedented surge of refugees into Europe.

8. The explosive growth of migration into Europe, not surprisingly, has bolstered the immigrant share of the total population in many European countries with the particularly notable exceptions of the United Kingdom and France. The largest share increases were in Sweden, Hungary, Austria and Norway, the foreign population of which underwent an increase of at least 1% between July 2015 and May 2016. Those four countries now have foreign born populations respectively of 18.3%, 5.8%, 18.5% and 15.3%. By comparison, the share of immigrants in the United States took ten years to rise 1% between 2005 and 2015. This suggests that some European countries have faced significant and sudden demographic changes as a result of migration. The United Kingdom and France already have significant immigrant populations so the number of migrants relative to the existing migrant population was significantly smaller than in these countries. Although Germany received the largest absolute number of asylum seekers in Europe, it has a relatively large population, thus a capacity to absorb a large number of migrants. Lithuania, Spain, Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia underwent a decline in their immigrant share of the total population. It is worth noting that in both Canada and Australia nearly one in four residents were foreign born in 2015 (Connor). The number of refugees in Europe per 1,000 ranges from 0.01 in Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia to 14.8 in Sweden. By comparison the highest proportions worldwide are Lebanon and Jordan with 232 and 87 registered refugees per 1,000 inhabitants respectively (IMF). The refugees that began arriving en masse in Europe last year are much younger on average than the population in host countries.

9. Although Syrians are the largest single group in the current refugee surge, many migrants and refugees are also coming from Iraq, Afghanistan as well as from Pakistan, Africa (Eritreans, Nigeria, Somalia, Gambia, and Sudan among others) and even the Western Balkans. Many of those reaching Europe are doing so through illegal border crossings across the Eastern Mediterranean from Turkey into Greece and through the Western Balkans, across the central Mediterranean from Libya to Italy, across the Western Mediterranean into Spain and a very small number from Russia into northern Norway.

4


III. MASS MIGRATION IN PERSPECTIVE

10. Migration on such a mass scale was last registered in Europe in the early 1990’s during the Balkan crisis (BBC News). In 2015 alone, EU member states processed 1,321,560 asylum claims. The passage that these migrants undertake can be extraordinarily dangerous, and many of these refugees are desperately assuming grave risks to achieve a modicum of security. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has reported that an estimated 214,861 migrants and refugees had entered Europe by sea in 2016 through 22 June, arriving most frequently through in Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Spain. The number of deaths in this period stood at 2,861 compared with 1,838 through the first six months of 2015. In other words, fatalities on the Mediterranean Sea in 2016 were 1,000 higher than last year’s mid-year total (Missing Migrants Project).

11. Refugee movements are, however, only part of a broader picture of mass migration, which has had a profound effect on economic, social and political life in much of the world. In global terms, there were 244 million international migrants in 2015, up from 222 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000. Roughly two thirds of all international migrants live in Europe (76 million) and Asia (75 million) while North America hosts 54 million. The United States is the country that hosts the largest number of international migrants (47 million). Refugees are a subset of this very large migrant group (UN International Migration Report, 2015). By the end of 2015, there were 65.3 million displaced people worldwide, the highest figure ever recorded. This included 40.8 million people forced to flee their homes but residing within the confines of their own countries, 21.3 million refugees and 3.2 million people in industrialised countries who at the end of 2015 were awaiting decisions on asylum (Edwards).

12. In historical terms, mass migration is nothing new. It is worth recalling that the 19th century was also characterised by massive movements of people, for example, from Europe to North America. Historians have tended to see 19th century migrations as essentially economic matters driven by the “pull” of the New World’s open spaces and opportunities and the “push” created by the lack of economic prospects in Europe (Taylor and Williamson). That insight is important. Even the current and tragic mass movement of people out of Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan and other conflicted countries, has important economic dimensions and consequences.

13. Coping with the sudden influx of people poses particular challenges to host countries. Even in countries as large as the United States, which, from its origins, has defined itself as a country of immigrants, the politics of welcoming migrants has not always been easy. Social and political difficulties were apparent in the United States even when migrants brought enormous benefits to the country and represented a critical source of economic dynamism and cultural enrichment. Indeed, as the American frontier diminished, the public view of immigration became more unsettled. By the late 19th century, there was no real American frontier to speak of, and the US government had begun to exercise far greater control over who could and who could not gain access to the country.

14. The economic impact of this mass movement of people, however, was tremendous and was clearly a central element in the rise of the United States as the foremost world economic power. Over fifty million people left Europe for the New World between 1813 and 1913. Higher wages in the New World reflected global labour market disequilibria that the mass movement of people over that century partly corrected. It is important to note that much of this period is often described as the golden age of globalisation and was characterised not only by the flow of migrants to the Americas but also by free trade, relatively unhindered capital movement and a British-led gold denominated exchange rate system. All contributed to American dynamism, but migration to American shores was an essential factor.

5


IV. THE ECONOMICS OF MASS MIGRATION

15. The classical economic view of mass migration influences some of the assumptions policy makers currently make about the phenomenon. Broadly speaking, economists make almost no prima facie distinction between refugees and other migrants. The differences in terms of economic impact lie largely in the policies and laws that shape the lives of refugees and their economic opportunities in host countries. In the frictionless, open-trading international system often used as the default model in economics, the movement of people across borders has important micro-economic consequences, similar to the effects of trade on the price of goods, capital and labour and in terms of potential economic gains stemming from these movements. From a purely economic perspective and, other things being equal, the mass movement of people from a low wage under-developed country to a high wage, developed country would theoretically reduce factor price differentials. In other words, if wages were genuinely flexible in both the labour exporting and labour importing country, then the movement of people from low wage to higher wage countries would theoretically drive down the price of labour in the labour importing country and drive up wages in the labour exporting countries, particularly if the quality of labour on both sides were equivalent. This is often not the case in the real world. Capital productivity in the labour importing country would also benefit from the falling price of labour as the yield per unit of capital would increase as labour costs fell. The movement of labour could theoretically, therefore, also diminish productivity differentials between the labour exporting and labour importing country (IMF).

16. A secondary potential impact would be to increase trade between the two countries as the demand preferences of migrants would likely include a basket of goods from the country from which they had departed. Increased capital flows would likely follow initially in the form of wage remittances to the labour exporting country, but later in more complex flows of investment flows partly driven by increased bilateral trade. In the real world, in fact, substantial shares of migrant earnings are often repatriated to the labour exporting country. These remittances have often been found to be more consequential than development aid in terms of their development impact and can thus be critical agents of positive economic change in poor countries. The labour exporting country also stands to benefit from a long-term access to capital technology and knowledge that might accompany increased commercial and financial exchanges which migrants foster. Although the labour exporting country may suffer from a so-called “brain drain”, eventually well-trained emigrants may return home and bring with them the knowledge and contacts they have obtained while living abroad. Finally, wage earning migrants are also consumers and their presence provides a boost to overall demand in labour importing countries, which in turn contributes to Gross National Product (GNP) growth.

17. The above described phenomena, however, are abstract although and, for example, assume that the labour from the country of emigration could be seamlessly integrated into the job market of the labour importing or host country. Of course, there are many legal, cultural, and linguistic barriers to this happening, and there is also the matter of possible deviations between the kind of labour demanded in the host country and the kind of skills the immigrants bring to that country. If, for example, a country requires highly trained service workers and the country of emigration is not training its workers to those standards, there is a clear mismatch, and what initially seemed a potential economic opportunity, in fact, becomes an economic burden, at least in the short term until migrants are retrained.

18. But studies have also verified these predicted economic impacts, at least under certain circumstances. Clearly wage impacts are among the most apparent economic consequences linked to the mass movement of people. But in an era of labour-protecting legislation and regulation in wealthier industrialised societies, and given the persistence of labour unions defending this protection, wages are often “sticky” and do not necessarily adjust downwards as the models predict. Here we are operating in the realm of politics and not in the assumption driven world of economic models. Indeed, a range of offsetting forces is likely to mitigate the potential economic upheavals linked to mass migration. Ultimately, policy matters, and states can do a great

6


deal to offset the economic shock of mass migration while ensuring that the integration of migrants, be they economic migrants or refugees, unfolds in an economically beneficial and politically sustainable fashion.

19. Reality has long posed an analytical problem for economists. This is not to discount the insight economics might give to the phenomenon of mass migrations in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Economic as well as security driven pushes and pulls constitute a central reason why people decide to improve their lot by leaving their countries of birth. We need to understand both in order to fathom the nature of the current challenge.

20. Indeed, the principal catalyst of movements into Europe over the past year has not been the quest for economic opportunity as such, but rather terrible insecurity. Uncontrolled mass migration from Syria is essentially a product of war, insecurity, and desperation. The movement of Syrians into Europe that accelerated substantially in 2015, was, in turn, largely a consequence of the saturation of refugee reception facilities and basic capacity in the countries bordering Syria and Iraq as well as the dwindling resources needed to underwrite overburdened support systems in Syria itself and in those bordering countries. In these conditions, the movement to Europe became inevitable. That some of the protagonists in the war have criminally sought to foster a refugee crisis has only worsened the situation. In any case, there are economic implications to this mass movement of people and they need to be better understood.

V. LABOUR MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF MASS MIGRATION: THE RECENT EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

21. Even when there is an apparent economic and demographic need to import labour, doing so poses practical as well as political problems. The United States provides a case in point. The Pew Hispanic Center estimated that there were 11.1 million unauthorised immigrants living in the United States in March of 2011, down from a peak of 12 million in 2007. Although the political debate in the United States has largely focused on the illegal status of this population and border enforcement matters, one of the most critical drivers of this mass migration has been the demand for labour in the US economy. It is often said, for example, that US farm harvests would fall precipitously if this source of labour suddenly vanished. This has led to suggestions by many analysts that there has been a mismatch between the need for migrant labour in the United States and current immigration policies. Between 2000 and 2007, an exploding real estate and construction market required labour imports far exceeding legal quotas and this triggered a massive influx of illegal immigration. The recent decline in illegal immigration to the United States and the falling number of illegal migrants living there has more to do with reduced labour demand there than it does increased enforcement of the border with Mexico (Passel and Cohn). In any case, US immigration policy in recent years has tended to be more restrictive than actual labour market demands would dictate, and illegal immigration has essentially helped fill the inevitable gap.

22. In the United States, and contrary to popular perceptions, many illegal immigrants pay taxes. According to the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy between 70 and 80% of unauthorised immigrants pay local, state and federal taxes, bringing as much as USD11.8 billion into public coffers in the United States. Providing more workers with legal status would likely raise this figure (Pianin). Many illegal immigrants have contributed to the Social Security system without enjoying any rights to later draw on it for their own pensions. This means that they have provided significant net infusions to the American Social Security system while providing tax resources to underwrite local, state and national budgets. This produces a net wealth transfer from unauthorised immigrants to older pensioners in the United States that, according to some estimates, could be as high as USD7 billion a year. Potential tax contributions also hinge on the age of the migrants. Working age migrants obviously will make the most significant fiscal contributions over the long-term if they are indeed able to work. It is worth noting here that many of those streaming into Europe are young and are moving into an aging continent which will increasingly require an

7


infusion of young workers, despite current unemployment rates in some European economies, to sustain growth and to help finance national pension systems.

23. Illegal immigrants have also imposed costs in terms of public services such as education for children, even though the total costs are low relative to the size of overall state spending. According to a 2007 Congressional Budget Office study, for example, in the United States these costs generally outweighed the taxes unauthorised migrants pay, although the difference in most cases was not consequential. It is here also worth considering the cost of failing to educate these children, which many would argue is considerably higher than doing so.

24. Both legal and illegal migrants contribute to economies not only in labour market terms but also on the all-important demand side of a national economy. One study suggests that migrant worker spending in the United States in one year was the equivalent of USD150 billion in government stimulus spending (Tapinos). Illegal immigrants tend to live on the edge of poverty and consequently need to spend a high percentage of their earnings on basic necessities. This actually enhances the demand side stimulus of their earnings. This stimulus represents a gain to the overall economy, which, in turn, can generate additional demand for labour. According to a recent IMF study, the first important economic impact on GDP of a large and sudden influx of migrants into a country, stems from the increase in government expenditure this initially induces and the related impact on aggregate demand. Obviously, the actual impact varies among countries and depends on how large the influx is relative to the size of the host population, and the amount and nature of the spending the host government undertakes in response.

25. A recent study on the longer-term impact of refugees on public budgets in Europe suggests that refugees who arrived in Europe in 2015 could rapidly offset the initial costs of accommodating them by their contribution to overall economic growth. When allowed to work, refugees can create jobs, increase demand for goods and services and plug gaps in European work forces while contributing to public pensions and public finance. According to a recently published study, while refugee’s expenditures could cost EUR69 billion between 2015 and 2020, refugees could help GDP increase by EUR126.6 billion in that same period. In other words, this study by the Tent Foundation suggests that the investment of underwriting refugee settlement could yield a return of twice that amount (Legraine).

26. Additional spending on migrants and refugees can have a positive demand side impact on economic growth. Public spending to provide housing, food, health and education to recently arrived migrants, like any significant injection of public expenditure, would have a positive impact on aggregate demand and thus on GDP growth, although obviously it can increase fiscal burdens. Nevertheless, this growth can counteract some of the costs associated with these budgetary costs as well as the potential downward pressures on wage and employment associated with a sudden influx of job seekers.

27. IMF estimates indicate that the fiscal cost stemming from the migration to Europe in 2016 could range from 0.012% in Cyprus to 0.37% in Finland and 0.35% in Germany. But it also suggests that the EU’s GDP as a whole will increase by 0.09% in 2016 and 0.13% in 2017 as a direct result of this movement of people and the spending that occurs because of this movement. Countries like Germany, Sweden and Austria hosting large numbers would see significantly larger increases that countries hosting relatively less migrants (IMF). Austria, for example, could undergo a growth rate that is 0.5% higher than it otherwise would be as a result of the recent influx of refugees and migrants to the country.

28. Over the medium term, whether the influx of refugees can have a positive economic impact or not will hinge on the speed with which the newly arrived are integrated into Europe’s job markets. Rapid integration, in turn, can quickly reduce budgetary burdens while generating supply side benefits. When refugees are rapidly assimilated into the labour market of the host country,

8


they immediately begin to underwrite public finances by paying taxes and social contributions rather than simply consuming public assistance.

29. One serious problem is that not all European economies currently enjoy the job creating dynamism that typifies the German economy. It is both practically and politically more difficult to integrate newcomers into an economy already beset by high unemployment. There is also the very real potential for a political backlash against the presence of such a large number of refugees, particularly in societies less accustomed to accepting immigrants or those suffering high levels of unemployment. This phenomenon is already apparent with some countries refusing to host refugees and others setting strict limits on the number admitted. It is nonetheless worth considering that one reason why unemployment levels are so high in certain European countries is that their labour markets are so rigid. The influx of migrants and the need to respond to the situation, however, might present new opportunities for structural reform, although political resistance to such notions is doubtless inevitable.

VI. MASS MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN EUROPE

30. In demographic terms, Europe is significantly older than the United States and its very low population growth rates have become a genuine source of concern among economists and demographers. Insufficient population growth reduces the foundation for long-term economic growth. Low population growth rates create an unfavourable imbalance between pensioners and the active workers needed to support them. Although no demographer would argue that the recent influx of migrants and refugees into Europe would fully counteract these trends in Europe, migration could provide one avenue for beginning to cope with the challenge, although a broad range of compensatory policies are required in policies ranging between labour market reform to policies likely to boost fertility rates.

31. It is worth noting that in 2012 the 6.6 million foreigners living in Germany paid USD4,127 more in taxes and social security on average than they received social benefits, and overall generated a surplus of EUR22 billion on Germany’s balance sheets. German experts recently estimated that the country will need to attract an estimated 1.5 million skilled migrants to stabilise the pension system as more and more Germans begin to retire (Groden). For an aging continent that will increasingly need to find young workers to maintain long-term economic dynamism, migration could theoretically provide one element of the answer.

32. Economists do not distinguish between refugees and other migrants and, indeed, their economic impacts are broadly similar. Obviously what matters most are skill levels, language abilities, host country regulations governing the labour market and prevailing economic conditions. By definition, economic migrants are moving expressly to find work whereas refugees are moving for reasons of security. Generally, those moving to Europe from countries like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Eritrea are on average significantly less well-trained and educated than European host country populations and are less likely to have had a full secondary education and significantly less likely to have acquired a full university education. But there are exceptions. According to the IOM, between 2013 and 2014, 21% of Syrian asylum seekers had a university education, a percentage that roughly mirrors that of Germany itself (IMF). In the case of those fleeing war, one problem is that the longer a conflict endures, the more likely the education system in that country will be seriously impeded. This means that as time passes, those arriving will likely be less well educated than earlier waves of migrants from that country, and their labour market impact will vary as a result.

33. Moving refugees, asylum seekers and other migrants into the labour market provides new opportunities to assimilate these people more rapidly into the host country than would otherwise be the case. A working, tax paying guest worker is both far less costly and far more socially and culturally integrated than one who is compelled to remain idle and dependent on the largesse of

9


the state. Many of the 1.2 million people who have come to Europe over the last year are young, able bodied, possess skills in demand and are eager to work. The problem is that there are myriad barriers to their entering the labour market. This paradox poses a critical challenge that European leaders must now address.

34. Germany accepted roughly 1.1 million refugees in 2015 of which half are from Syria. Many others have come from Afghanistan and Iraq although many European countries including Germany generally consider Afghans as economic migrants rather than refugees. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has called for safe zone in Afghanistan to protect the most vulnerable Afghans but has made it clear that most of these migrants cannot stay in Germany. As of October 2015, Germany had recognised only 1,361 Afghans as refugees (Beaty and Surana).

35. According to Eurostat, of the 729,000 asylum seekers who registered in Europe between May and October 2015, 82% were younger than 34 years of age. The median age in Germany today is 46 (and 38 in the United States). Some estimates suggest that the recent refugee influx represent a 0.4% increase in the European labour force and 1% in Germany which is Europe’s largest economy. Although many of the newly arrived are relatively poorly educated and low-skilled, there are nonetheless substantial numbers with secondary education and education at a university level. Significant numbers have professional and trade skills that are needed in the host countries although varying degrees of retraining are often required (The Economist, 12 December 2015).

36. Labour market economists suggest that Germany needs not only lower-skilled workers but also those at the middle and high end of the market. German citizens are often unwilling to take on menial jobs and Germany has had many job openings at the lower skill level. At the same time, the so-called mittelstand - medium sized manufactures - are seeking apprentices in order to train up the next generation of more skilled workers. Experts suggest that Germany currently needs 173,000 high skilled workers in mathematics, IT, natural sciences and other technical areas. Likewise, Sweden which accepted 200,000 asylum seekers in 2015, needs workers across a range of skill levels (The Economist, 12 December 2015). Supplies of rural labour are also insufficient in many parts of Europe and not coincidentally, there are efforts underway to find employment for some of the newly arrived in rural regions to support the farming, food processing and energy sectors. Clearly some of the migrant refugee population flowing into Europe can help fill existing gaps in the labour market, particularly in lower skilled professions. Syrians are among the most skilled of those currently entering Europe and perhaps the best poised to contribute to its economy.

37. One serious integration challenge for Europe is that the continental labour market remains highly rigid. Myriad rules and regulations prevent the seamless integration of refugees and migrants into the labour force, even on a temporary basis. Throughout much of Europe there seems to be a preference to provide social support and shelter to refugees while denying asylum seekers and refugees the right to work or, at least, making it very complicated and time consuming to enter the job market. Some countries have even blocked state support for language lessons as it is feared this could encourage migrants to stay rather than focus on returning to their countries of origin. Such policies, however, have serious, if not readily apparent, social and economic costs.

38. Indeed, the longer integration is postponed, the more difficult and costly it becomes. Delaying integration introduces a host of other problems including rising outlays to support essentially idle refugees and deepening frustration among those denied the right to work. Once alienation sets in, it can trigger an array of related social and psychological problems that can be difficult to overcome and which exact their own price on the host society. An idle recipient of social support is an economic drag and could become even more of one if that idleness results in social alienation, which can be the source of costly anti-social behaviours. By contrast, a working asylum seeker or refugee can quickly begin to contribute to national income and the tax rolls while more quickly accommodating his or herself to the mores of the host country. In short, those integrated in the labour market are better prepared to contribute to society more broadly.

10


39. Germany seems to have moved more quickly than many other European countries to find a place for refugees in the national economy. It has, for example, encouraged refugees to take up apprenticeships. Some German companies would like to see apprentices given the right to remain at their work place for two years after completing their traineeship so that firms actually derive longer-term benefit from the training that they have offered. The German government now permits only those under 21 who have not had their refugee status approved to remain employed after the apprenticeship.

40. Another problem is that there are no systems in place to assess the skills and education levels of those who have recently arrived. Some firms have been lobbying the German government to create a database with systematic assessments of the skill levels of those entering the country, but the government is reluctant to do so. It is still considered politically risky to undertake measures like skills assessment that might imply that the state is seeking to circumnavigate normal labour market rules and regulations. The problem is that such regulations do not account for the situation in which Europe now finds itself. Extraordinary measures are needed, and a European-wide system of assessment and even job placement would be enormously helpful.

41. A related barrier involves the problem of recognising the accreditation for certain kinds of employment. European countries often have stringent training requirements even for fairly low level service positions. They are very reluctant to accept the training standards of less developed countries without a proper assessment of training systems in those countries. This puts skilled migrants into a kind of limbo that delays their integration into labour markets or even denies them the precise training they need to make an effective contribution to the host society.

42. There are important exceptions. Sweden, for example, is putting Syrian teachers from the migrant population into a fast track training programme to get them into teaching positions, particularly for recently arrived children. One Dutch foundation is working on training certification, paperwork and language training to help highly skilled migrants swiftly move into professions consummate with their background. More efforts are needed, however, to assess local language skills and professional qualifications and to design programmes to remedy deficiencies quickly and effectively. Calling the recently arrived refugees, a “rich source of human capital”, Christine Lagarde, the head of the IMF, has said that the key to minimising the adverse economic impacts of the surge of arrivals to European shores lies in facilitating their rapid integration into the labour market (The Economist, 12 December 2015).

VII. SHARING THE BURDEN

43. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), refugees tend to concentrate in countries with resilient economies if, indeed, they can manage to get to those countries. Robust job markets are particularly attractive to refugees, who are acutely aware that one of the primary challenges they confront lies in financially supporting themselves and their families. The United Kingdom is frequently understood as enjoying one of Europe’s more open labour markets and it is no wonder that many migrants have expressed an interest in reaching that country’s shores. Many European countries have no recent experience with mass refugee and migrant inflows, and the current influx has tested not only their institutional capacities and physical infrastructure but also their political resilience and sense of identity. This has come as something of a shock, and it is no wonder that many now see the current refugee crisis as Europe’s greatest contemporary political and institutional challenge.

44. At the time of writing, the war in Syria has displaced roughly 12 million Syrians, 7.5 million of whom are internally displaced. Another 4 million Syrians have fled the country. Of these Syrian refugees, UNHCR has currently registered an estimated 2.7 million in Turkey, 1,048,000 in Lebanon and 657,433 in Jordan and 29,000 in North Africa. These countries are also hosting refugees from previous conflicts. As suggested above, Lebanon and Jordan are now near a

11


breaking point and simply lack the capacity and resources to host any more refugees. Meanwhile the international community has not funded UNHCR to the degree needed. The 4 July UNHCR situation report indicated that it has appealed for USD4.5bn to properly care for Syrian refugees in the region and has received only USD1.4bn or 30% coverage (UNHCR) Insufficient funding for refugees support in the immediate region around Syria is one compelling reason why hundreds of thousands of refugees have arrived on European shores.

45. There has been a growing backlash in the United States against taking in refugees from Syria and this opposition grew in the wake of the Paris attacks in November 2015. It was at that point when the refugee crisis suddenly and, in the view of many experts, unjustly, became conflated with terrorism. After the Paris attacks, 31 US governors announced that they were not prepared to accept refugees from the conflict, although their authority on such matters is, at best, limited (Fantz and Brumfield). Despite political resistance, the United States has begun to accept more Syrian refugees and has just met President Obama’s target of 10,000 Syrian refugee admissions in Fiscal Year 2016. The United States has now accepted nearly 12,000 Syrian refugees since the civil war began in 2011. Those who do not have family in the United States have been located to regions where jobs are relatively abundant and the cost of housing is low (Park and Omri). As of early August 2016, 78% of these refugees were women and children according to State Department figures (Goyette). Meeting the administration target required the United States to reinforce its refugee processing capacity.

46. The United States has been a world leader in terms of the financial support that it is providing refugees. At the Supporting Syria and the Region Conference in London on February 2016, for instance, US Secretary of State John Kerry announced nearly USD601 million in new humanitarian funding for Syria and neighbouring countries. This includes nearly USD364 million from the State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) and USD232 million from United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of Food for Peace to support humanitarian efforts in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. It also included nearly USD5.3 million from USAID/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance dedicated to humanitarian assistance inside Syria. This brings the total of US government humanitarian assistance related to the Syrian crisis to USD5.1 billion (USAID, 4 February 2016).

47. Canada has taken a different approach than that of its southern neighbour, although it is also providing financial support to the region. Late in 2015 the Canadian government began airlifting Syrian refugees into the country with a plan to bring in 13,200 refugees by February 2016 at a cost of USD472 million. In March, however, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that, in fact, Canada had settled 25,000 Syrians fleeing the war. The Canadian resettlement programme is co-sponsored by private citizens and groups who commit to covering some expenses for the refugees and helping these newcomers settle in (Kassam).

48. According to UNHCR, there were a total of 238,836 refugees and asylum seekers in Russia in January 2016. Only 2,340 were from Syria and that number has since fallen to 1,600. In September 2015, Russia had granted asylum to only 2 Syrian refugees. Its government has argued that the crisis is the fault of the West, and that it has no obligations in this regard. Amnesty International has criticised Russia for deporting several Syrian refugees who sought asylum in the country and some, like US Senator John McCain, have accused the country of “weaponising” the refugee crisis both to demonstrate its capacity to foment chaos if countries do not take into consideration what it defines as its strategic interests and to divide NATO and the EU (Jones). In other words, Russia may be using the crisis to communicate to Europe the cost of not working with Russia on Russian terms. That might be a cynical reading of Russian intentions, but there are many who subscribe to this notion.

49. Still European leaders acknowledge that there need to be limits on the numbers of refugees and migrants that their countries are prepared to accept. They are also unhappy with European processing processes. Migration reception procedures, and particularly, the Common European

12


Asylum System, have proven seriously inadequate. The old procedure of making the country of entry the country responsible for the application is no longer functioning given the overwhelming burden this had placed on front-line states like Greece, Italy and Hungary. Some EU countries have essentially closed their doors to asylum seekers, while border controls have reappeared even within the Schengen area. Sweden has now replaced permanent resident permits to asylum seekers with temporary ones and Germany has narrowed the list of countries from which it will accept asylum requests. The EU is now working to develop measures to shore up its borders and, for example, has signed an agreement with Turkey to limit what has been an unrestricted flow of migrants from that country. The EU and Turkey agreed that:

1) All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016, will be returned to Turkey;

2) For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU;

3) Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for irregular migration opening from Turkey to the EU;

4) Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or have been substantially reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated;

5) The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016. Turkey will take all the necessary steps to fulfil the remaining requirements;

6) The EU will, in close cooperation with Turkey, further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated EUR3 billion under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Once these resources are about to be used in full, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility up to an EUR3 billion to the end of 2018;

7) The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work on the upgrading of the Customs Union.

8) The accession process will be re-energised, with Chapter 33 to be opened during the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the European Union and preparatory work on the opening of other chapters to continue at an accelerated pace;

9) The EU and Turkey will work to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria. (European Commission Press Release, 19 March 2016).

50. This arrangement is closely linked to difficult accession talks between Turkey and the EU, and the matter of visa free access to Europe for Turks. Visa liberalization for Turks travelling to Europe was an integral part of the agreement struck with the European Union. Turkey has explicitly linked the agreement’s implementation to the visa free arrangement. At the time of writing, the matter has yet to be resolved and there are concerns that the agreement could collapse (Associated Press, 26 August 2016).

51. In May, the Commission advanced proposals to relocate 40,000 people from Italy and Greece to other EU countries and to resettle another 20,000 outside of the EU. The Council would have to adopt that scheme by a qualified majority and with the consultation of the European Parliament. Italy, Germany and Austria have backed a quota system within the EU to encourage member countries to share in the burden, but other countries, including Hungary have strongly opposed this idea. Brussels wants standardised asylum processing procedures across Europe

13


while some European countries prefer national frameworks in which member states alone determine how many people to resettle each year (Garavoglia).

52. Finally, the political challenges involved in the current migration crisis seem increasingly consequential. Concerns about mass migration, for example, were frequently cited as the single most important factor shaping the British referendum vote to leave the European Union. The issue has become a highly salient matter in the politics of a number of NATO countries on both sides of the Atlantic. There is an increasing disconnection between what might constitute sound policy and good politics, and the challenge for politicians is to make sure that good policies also make political sense. That will require strong and, at times, courageous leadership.

VIII. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FRONT-LINE STATES

53. Even though parts of the western media have focused on Italy, Greece and South Eastern Europe in particular as the epicentre of the Syrian refugee crisis, in fact, the most profoundly affected countries border Syria itself. Indeed, the majority of refugees - some 90% - are hosted in countries that lack the requisite resources to handle these extreme burdens. Turkey is the exception in this regard as it has largely financed caring for migrants out of its own budget, although its burdens are daunting. Turkey’s government has spent roughly USD12 billion caring for migrants and has received only USD512 million in international support. Other front line states now depend on international support to help sustain the lives of millions of Syrian refugees. Several of these countries are also politically fragile, and the influx of huge numbers of refugees appears to have upset very delicately forged internal political balances. The presence of these migrants is putting enormous strain on the host countries, several of which suffer the lingering consequences of their own recent conflicts, the long-time presence of other refugee groups (Palestinians in both Lebanon and Jordan) and enduring poverty.

54. The case of Lebanon is also telling. More than a quarter of Lebanese people live under the national poverty line of roughly USD3 per day. Most of this impoverished population inhabits the poorest and most isolated regions of Lebanon, namely the Bekaa Valley and Mount Lebanon, precisely where most Syrian and Iraqi refugees are now living (EUI). More than 80% of the Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon spontaneously settled in these areas, and are intermingled with the local population rather than settling in refugee camps. This has imposed additional social strains to regions already fraught with economic and political tensions and has complicated efforts to provide international support.

55. Conflicts in Syria and Iraq have had devastating effects on the economic and social conditions of the neighbouring countries. The government budgets of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey are under grave stress as a result. All three states have willingly supported a vast number of refugees with basic services at a moment of global economic uncertainty. A UNDP-UNHCR Joint Secretariat report (2015) stated that the Syrian conflict ‘’will have cost Lebanon USD7.5 billion in cumulative economic losses between 2012 and 2014’’. The data for Jordan, Turkey and Egypt are not as precise, but Jordanian losses are probably in line with Lebanon’s, whereas Turkey is a significantly larger country and thus better positioned to absorb refugees even if it too, is finding this increasingly challenging.

56. But even in these hard-pressed countries, some positive macro and micro-economic impacts have been seen as a result of the influx. The arrival of refugees has benefitted landlords, contractors in the construction industries and suppliers of basic consumer goods. The burgeoning presence of international aid agencies has injected liquidity into these countries with a potentially powerful demand side, as well as inflationary impacts. That spending has stoked a degree of job creation although certainly not enough to provide gainful employment to the millions who have sought refuge in these countries. Finally, because the war in Syria has utterly paralysed that country’s economy, space has opened up for Jordan and Lebanon to help fill the resulting gap

14


created in certain regional markets. But overall the war itself has terrible regional economic consequences, not the least of which has been the blow it has struck to investor confidence.

57. Indeed, the overall economic situation throughout the region remains deeply worrisome, and external support has become crucial. According to the UN, “Given the structural weaknesses of the economies and the potentially adverse outcomes of a free-market adjustment model, external assistance is needed to underpin these strategic requirements in terms of enhanced Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), budget support, project financing, loans and grants’’ (UNDP-UNHCR).

58. There is also strong evidence that labour market conditions have significantly worsened in the past three years in countries around Syria. The mass flight from Syria is not introducing differently-skilled workers to regional markets but rather workers with skills on a par with those of local residents. The International Labour Organization (ILO) reports that Lebanese workers in the Bekaa Valley typically earn double the wage of their Syrian counterparts, but the mass movement of people from Syria is now bidding down local wages. The World Bank estimates that unemployment rates in Lebanon will likely rise from 15% to 20%. Labour market impacts are less apparent in Turkey and Egypt, given their large size and greater capacity to absorb refugees. Still there are signs of tension in these countries. There are regions within both countries where local workers feel they are now competing with refugees for very scarce jobs. According to the UNDP-UNHCR, major investment is needed to support the expansion and diversification of employment opportunities for migrants and to ease intense pressures on local labour markets and government budgets throughout the region (UNDP-UNHCR).

59. Syrian and Iraqi refugees in the immediate region are also not receiving assistance sufficient to meet their daily needs, and UNHCR funding has consistently fallen short of what is required. Soaring local food prices stoked by burgeoning demand and insufficient supply are generating economic, social, political and security-related tensions throughout the region. Not surprisingly, local resentment of refugees is mounting, and some observers suggest that the best way to cope with this is to facilitate supply side driven economic growth. Local housing markets are also particularly strained with rent levels rising substantially. Syrian refugees are outbidding some locals for rental space by pooling the funds of more than one family to rent dwellings. This has bid up prices significantly and undermined the bargaining leverage of local home renters.

60. There are important resource costs linked to a sudden mass migration in a resource poor region. Jordan, for example is one of the driest countries in the world and access to water there has grown ever more restricted with hundreds of thousands of refugees now living in this very small, poor and exceedingly water stressed country. In Lebanon, solid and sewage waste disposal poses a major challenge due to the massive influx of people and the lack of sanitary facilities to support them. Again, these problems point to the abiding requirement that the international community provide generous support to countries which are shouldering the lion’s share of the burden.

IX. THE SECURITY DIMENSIONS OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS

61. Invariably, security considerations have become linked in the public mind to the mass influx of refugees and migrants into Europe. That should hardly be surprising as one of the central requirements for a genuinely sovereign and cohesive state is that it must exercise full control over its borders. The current crisis, however, has exposed a serious deficiency in Europe in this regard. The problem has been exacerbated by wars in the broader Middle East and the growing threat of terrorism linked to those wars. That legions of European-born “foreign fighters” have moved, at times seamlessly, across borders from Iraq, Syria, Libya and Turkey into the EU has naturally led to an unfortunate conflation of the refugee crisis and the terrorist challenge. The two problems are certainly very different although there is clearly a need to exercise strong security checks of all migrants.

15


62. As this report has suggested, there has been very little evidence to suggest that refugees have been involved in terrorist attacks in Europe. Most attacks, including those in Paris and Brussels, were undertaken by European citizens, several of whom had travelled to fight with Daesh or other terrorist groups, while those who attacked the airport in Istanbul were from Russia and Central Asia. The problem remains, however, that the uncontrolled movement of hundreds of thousands of people into Europe potentially provides cover of extremists. Recent reports worryingly suggest that Daesh has both established a network of semiautonomous cells trained to attack vulnerable targets and has engaged an estimated 440 fighters for this purpose. Roughly 5,000 Europeans have gone to fight in Syria alone. These cells have now provided Western-based terrorists with a degree of redundancy so that, for example, the arrest in Brussels of Salah Abdeslam, who had played a role in the Paris attacks, hardly thwarted the horrific attacks two days later in Brussels (Hinnant and Dodds). This is one reason Europe and Turkey are working to reassert full control over national borders.

63. Other challenges include: inadequate security and intelligence coordination among many European and Western countries and their partners in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region; policing policies and structures that have failed to adjust to a rapidly evolving and very daunting security landscape; and finally, the international community’s failure to deny Daesh control of territory in Iraq, Syria and Libya - a problem that is now being rectified. Nevertheless, this very dangerous organisation has developed a means to generate revenue for itself through taxation, looting and oil sales. It has also used the territories it controls to launch and to inspire attacks in Europe and elsewhere. Daesh is now exploiting the fact that it is losing control of these territories to inspire attacks in the West and elsewhere so the international community could now be entering a new and dangerous phase of the conflict. This however, is a challenge that is distinct from the refugee crisis as such even though the wars in which Daesh is engaged are causing people to flee the areas of conflict.

64. NATO itself has recently agreed to deploy naval ships to intercept vessels engaged in illegal human trafficking between Turkey and Greece. On 11 February, NATO Defence Ministers decided to deploy ships to support the efforts of Greece, Turkey and the EU’s border control agency, Frontex, to manage the migrant and refugee crisis in the Aegean. NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 2 was deployed in the Aegean within 48 hours to conduct reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance in the territorial waters of Greece and Turkey and in international waters. NATO has some advantages over the EU insofar as it can operate in waters from where the migrant ships are launched (Zhukov). The goal has been to help governments exercise greater control over what has been an illegal, disorderly and perilous passage which has undermined border management. Although only three ships were initially engaged in the operation, there are now seven NATO ships operating in these waters. This, in turn, has made it possible to begin to undermine a pervasive illegal trafficking business and to save lives. The number of those crossing the Aegean subsequently decreased (NATO website) although crossings across the Mediterranean increased dramatically in the summer of 2015, particularly along the Libya-Italy corridor. NATO has also established a close operational and tactical relationship with Frontex and has exchanged liaison officers and shares information with it in real time. Consultations between NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, EU Council President Donald Tusk, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and the EU Commissioner for Migration Dimitris Avramopoulos have facilitated the working relationships now in place.

16


X. CONCLUSIONS: RESPONSES AND WAYS OUT

65. The international community confronts a complex emergency in Syria which will continue to strain the resources as well as the diplomatic and moral energy of many countries both in the region and beyond. Coping with this will require funding, political commitment, and a high degree of international concertation on several fronts. Most important, of course, will be the diplomatic effort to bring about a political solution in Syria which engages all communities to end the conflict or at least to create a viable ceasefire. Such a solution is an essential precondition both to halting the exodus and eventually to laying the groundwork for the return of millions of Syrians to their homes.

66. But conditions for such a solution may not soon be in place. It is thus incumbent upon the international community to plan for far less optimistic scenarios. Failure to do so could make an already untenable situation worse and would add to the degree of instability and uncertainty both in the region and in Europe. The stakes here are very high.

67. Western countries as well as other members of the international community, including the Gulf countries, will need to substantially increase their support to those front-line states that are now shouldering so much of the burden stemming from the situation in Iraq and Syria. The desperate circumstances of refugees in these countries, most notably in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, are now pushing them to move toward Europe. That movement will be inevitable if their basic needs are not being met in the immediate region and if the situation in Syria itself continues to drive that country’s citizens to flee.

68. Western countries should also be prepared to continue to accept refugees from the fighting over the coming months. There is scope to do more, particularly if the burden is properly shared. Countries such as Germany, Sweden and Canada have demonstrated that the provision of sanctuary to those fleeing injustice and dreadful violence are fundamental to their respective identities as tolerant, open and democratic societies. The Obama Administration’s efforts in the face of strong political opposition have also been laudable. Some Western countries, however, have so far failed to live up to these standards and could do much more in terms of offering sanctuary (Schake).

69. Regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar could and should also help lower the pressures placed upon Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Japan and Russia have so far resisted the notion of resettling refugees on their respective territories but they too have responsibilities in this regard.

70. The European Commission and the EU member states have provided EUR5 billion to underwrite relief operations related to the Syrian crisis including funding to refugees and their host communities in neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt. Saudi Arabia claims to have taken in over 2.5 million Syrian refugees, including 100,000 children attending schools. The UAE claims to be hosting 100,000 Syrians, of which 17,000 children are attending school and Kuwait claims to be hosting 120,000 Syrians. In addition, the EU has pledged EUR3 billion at the “Supporting Syria and the Region” conference held in London. The London Conference raised over USD11 billion in pledges - USD5.8 billion for 2016 and a further USD5.4 billion for 2017-2020. The UN estimates that regional governments will need an additional USD1.2 billion in funding this year to carry out national response plans. These funds are needed simply to manage the crisis. The Donor’s Conference also aimed to support access to education for all refugees and host community children by the end of the 2017 school year, creating job opportunities for refugees and host communities in neighbouring countries, ensuring enforcement of international humanitarian law, extending healthcare and education in Syria itself while protecting the most vulnerable in that war torn country, and beginning to outline a reconstruction effort for Syria (“Supporting Syria and the Region”).

17


71. The EU recently pledged an additional EUR3 billion to assist Turkish refugee support efforts. This additional funding will finance humanitarian development and other assistance to refugees and host communities in Turkey. The progressive delivery of this assistance is conditional on the implementation by Turkey of its commitments under a recent EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. This Facility for Refugees in Turkey represents the response to the European Council's call for significant additional funding to support refugees in Turkey. The Facility provides a joint coordination mechanism for actions financed by the EU budget and national contributions made by the member states, designed to ensure that the needs of refugees and host communities are addressed in a comprehensive and coordinated manner (European Commission, Press Release, 18 February 2016). There has been some progress in implementing the arrangement and the flow of refugees across the Aegean has slowed substantially while Member states have increased efforts on resettlement and offering legal and safe ways to achieve asylum. Return operations are also being carried out. The parties have also made progress in the visa liberalisation programme for Turks coming to Europe which is part of the programme. It should also be reiterated that crossings at other refugee corridors such as the Libya-Italy corridor remain at near-records levels (Kingsley). 72. In early March 2016, the EU also announced a EUR760 million emergency refugee aid package for the thousands of refugees trapped on the border between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia1. This was the first emergency aid package the EU has ever planned to alleviate conditions within its own borders (Kanter). At that moment, thousands of refugees were trapped on that closed border, without permanent shelter.

73. In the absence of a political solution in Syria the exodus of refugees and other migrants towards Europe is bound to continue despite enhanced border controls. This massive and uncontrolled movement of people is exposing serious weaknesses in Europe’s asylum and border control systems and has opened up fundamental questions about Europe’s identity and its institutions. Europe has so far responded with a series of patchwork solutions designed to cope with immediate problems. Longer term solutions will be needed, and the burden will have to be more equitably shared. But there appears to be little consensus about what a real solution might entail.

74. The spill-overs from this crisis are many and grow more costly by the day. How the international community and individual countries respond will dictate the damage it ultimately inflicts. To be clear, there are costs linked to both inaction and action. Western governments will need to cope with the situation they actually confront and not what they would like to confront.

75. It is very important to ensure that refugees and migrants admitted into Western countries are given opportunities to integrate and to work, even if the length of their stay is unknown. Integration and employment are not distinct notions. They are interconnected and both are needed to ease the burden on refugees and host societies alike. In practical terms, this means that refugees and asylum seekers should be quickly extended the right to work once their status is confirmed in the host country. Failure to do so could add to the host country’s fiscal burden, delay integration and unwittingly provide an impetus to illegal untaxed black markets often dominated by criminal groups (Tapinos). Keeping refugees idle moreover represents a shortcut to social alienation and this too has its costs.

76. Western governments should accordingly develop simple protocols to assess quickly the skills, qualifications and experiences of those who have newly arrived. This information should be shared broadly with potential employers. Short-term exemptions to typically stringent job qualification requirements should also be extended when this poses no risk to consumers or to workers. All of this would help governments develop labour schemes to cope with the influx of potential workers, while also helping companies tap into this potential resource. Typically, European governments have required certification of local language skills before they focus on

1 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

18


professional qualifications and training for migrants. There is a need to pursue these ends simultaneously to hasten the process of integrating new arrivals into the job market.

77. Opening up opportunities for self-employment can speed integration into the host society while providing new opportunities for refugees and asylum seekers to become self-sufficient while contributing to the coffers of the host country rather than become a burden on it. This will require a degree of structural reform in some countries. In a number of instances, such reforms would be beneficial even without the present migrant crisis.

78. Lower administrative demands on new or start-up firms and less bias in favour of existing firms would not only help reinvigorate job creation in several national economies, but would also open up new avenues for refugees seeking to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency. One of Europe’s enduring structural weaknesses has been a persistent bias in favour of incumbent over start-up firms, which among, other things, has driven entrepreneurs to countries where such biases are less pronounced and the cost and administrative burden of opening new companies is low. There is also a related question of finance for those who want to start their own firms. Making credit and even micro-credit available to newly arrived migrants and refugees offers an important potential option for these people to sustain themselves in the host country rather than asking them to rely on government social spending. Finding ways to finance such initiatives could prove beneficial both to the host country and to the migrants. Microfinance holds out a particularly useful option in this regard, and several European countries have successfully employed small lending programmes to help migrants kick-start their own enterprises (IMF).

79. This crisis thus presents an opportunity to adopt proactive reforms designed both to facilitate integration of refugees and asylum seekers into national economies while galvanising economies long hamstrung by out of date regulations that impede entrepreneurial activity. It is generally understood that the incentive for individuals to forgo social benefits in order to work is often very weak in Europe due to exceedingly high marginal effective tax rates. In other words, for some it is desirable to remain unemployed with ample benefits rather than employed but heavily taxed. Structural reforms that discourage such calculations while encouraging more hiring have long been needed. The sudden influx of working age people into Europe may encourage politicians to move on this front.

80. Specially structured integration programmes can facilitate the process of moving migrants and refugees quickly into productive economic activity. The Swedish introduction programme, for example, has helped refugees quickly achieve relatively high rates of employment. The programme is open to all refugees aged 20-64 and those 18 to 19 years old without parents. It includes an introduction interview by public employment service in order to assess experience, education and ambition and to develop an introduction plan. The program provides financial support to those participating in it and helps participating migrants find accommodation in regions where labour demand is high.

81. Newly arrived migrants, refugees and asylum seekers need access to education and job training so that they are prepared to enter the job market quickly and relatively seamlessly. This can be beneficial at many levels as it prevents idleness which can be socially destabilising and can facilitate their integration into the host country economy and turn net consumers of government spending to net contributors to national budgets. Even if refugees eventually return to their home country, they do so with skills that can be critical to national reconstruction.

82. Recent European Commission proposals to reform the Dublin system, which were described above, are a step in the right direction and could facilitate collective rather than strictly national approaches to problems linked with migrant and refugee surges. The Dublin system failed in the face of the migrant surge of the past two years as it placed enormous burdens on front line states. A system that more fairly shares the burden is now needed as the problem is a collective one. More needs to be done to cope with the challenge of integrating these migrants in their host

19


society and to facilitate family reunification. The problem today is that short-term solutions seem to be prevailing over longer term collective approaches that would lead to a fairer sharing of the burden and more holistic and sustainable approaches to the migration challenge.

20


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Associated Press, “Turkish PM says EU refugee deal could collapse,” 26 August 2016BBC News, 22 December 2015, “Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe explained in graphics,”

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911 Beaty, Thalia and Kavitha Surana, “Afghan refugees receive a cold welcome in Europe,” Quartz,

9 December 2015Clark, Dave, “How the US plans to welcome 10,000 Syrian Refugee Business Insider, UK,

12 September, 2015Connor, Phillip, “Immigrant share of populations jumps in some European countries,” Pew Research

Center, 15 June 2016Edwards, Adrian “Global forced displacement hits record high,” UNHCR, 20 June 2016,

http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forced-displacement-hits-record-high.html

European Commission - Press release, EU-Turkey Cooperation: First meeting of the Steering Committee of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, 18 February 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-340_en.htm

European Commission Press Release, “EU-Turkey Agreement: Questions and Answers,” 19 March 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm

EurActiv.com, “26 US States refuse to take in Syrian refugees following Paris Attacks,” 17 November 2015

European University Institute (EUI), June 2014, Thibos, Cameron, “One million Syrians in Lebanon: a Milestone quickly passed,” Migration Policy Centre.

Fantz, Ashley and Ben Brumfield, “More than half the nation’s governors say Syrian refugees not welcome,” CNN 19 November 2015

Foreign Policy, “If You Think Europe Has A Refugee Crisis, You’re Not Looking Hard Enough”, January-February 2016

Garavoglia, Matteo, “After the emergency:What European migration policy will eventually look like, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/2016/07/27/after-the-emergency-what-european-migration-policy-will-eventually-look-like/

Giles, Chris, “IMF stresses benefits of newcomers,” Financial Times, 21 January 2016Gotev, Georgi, Commission on collision course with member states on migration,” EurActiv.com,

27 May 2015 http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/commission-on-collision-course-with-member-states-on-migration/

Goyette, Jared, “It’s now clear that most of the Syrian refugees coming to the U.S. are women and children,” Global Post, 8 August, 2016

Groden, Claire, “Here’s why Germany is welcoming migrants with open arms,” Fortune, 8 September 2015

Henley, Jon et al, “Refugee Crisis: European leaders demand urgent support for Greece, The Guardian, 1 March 2016

Hinnant, Lori Paisley Dodds, “ISIS has at least 440 fighters trained to attack Europe in deadly waves, The Independent, 23 March 2016

Kingsley, Patrick, “Dramatic photos show refugees fleeing Libya being rescued at sea,” The Guardian, 29 August 2016 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/29/dramatic-photos-show-refugees-fleeing-libya-being-rescued-at-sea

IMF, Aiyar, Shekhar et. al, “The Refuge Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges,” IMF Staff Discussion Note, January 2016, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1602.pdf

International Labour Organisation, 2014, “Assessment of the impact of Syrian Refugee Crisis on Host Communities in Lebanon”

Jones, Sam, Russia accused of “weaponizing Syria Refugees,” Financial Time 14 February 2016Kanter, James, “European Union Plans Emergency Aid to Help Trapped Refugees,” The New York

Times, 2 March 2016Kassam, Ashifa, “Canada is making history with airlift of Syrian refugees, says Minister,” The Guardian,

21 January, 2016“Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016,” The Government of Lebanon and the United Nations,

BeirutLegraine, Philip, Refugee’s Work: A Humanitarian Investment that Yields Economic Dividends, Tent

Org. and Opennetwork.net, 16 May 2016

21

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1602.pdf

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/29/dramatic-photos-show-refugees-fleeing-libya-being-rescued-at-sea

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/29/dramatic-photos-show-refugees-fleeing-libya-being-rescued-at-sea

http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/commission-on-collision-course-with-member-states-on-migration/

http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/commission-on-collision-course-with-member-states-on-migration/

https://www.brookings.edu/2016/07/27/after-the-emergency-what-european-migration-policy-will-eventually-look-like/

https://www.brookings.edu/2016/07/27/after-the-emergency-what-european-migration-policy-will-eventually-look-like/

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-340_en.htm

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-340_en.htm



http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911


MacAskill, Ewen and Emma Graham-Harrison, “NATO launches naval patrols to return migrants to Turkey, The Guardian, 11 February, 2016

Missing Migrants Project, “Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals in 2016: 214,861; deaths: 2,861,” 4 June, 2016, http://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-2016-214861-deaths-2861

NATO Website, NATO’s Deployment in the Aegean Sea, Fact Sheet, May 2016http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_05/20160519_1605-factsheet-aegean-sea.pdf

Park Haeyoun, Rudy Omri, U.S. Reaches Goal of Admitting 10,000 Syrian Refugees. Here’s where they went,”” New York Times, 31 August 2016

OECD, Migration Policy Debate, No. 7, September 2015, “Is this humanitarian migration crisis different?”

Ostrand, Nicole, “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A comparison of Responses by Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States”, Center for Migration Studies, NY, Journal on Migration and Human Security, 2015

Passel, Jefrey S. and D’Vera Cohn, “Unauthorized Immigration Flows are Down Sharply Since mid-Decade,” Pew Hiscanic Center 1 September 2010http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/126.pdf

Pianin, Eric, Study finds illegal immigrants pay $11.8 billion in taxes,” The Fiscal Times. 16 April 2015Porto, Euduardo, Illegal Immigrants are Bolstering Social Security With Billions,” New York Times, 5

April 2005.Schake, Kori, “The American Way of Refuge,” Hoover Digest, No. 1 Winter, 2016.“Supporting Syria and the Region”: London 2016, https://www.supportingsyria2016.com/about/ Syria Situation: Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan and Humanitarian Response Plan, 2016

Contributions to UNHCR as of 9 February 2016 https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=10199

Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, UNHCR, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

Tapinos, G, “Illegal Immigrants and the Labour Market, OECD Observer, http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/190/Illegal_immigrants_and_the_labour_market.html

Taylor, Alan and Jeffrey Williamson, Convergence in the age of Mass Migration, NBER Working Papers Series, Working Paper no. 4711 National Bureau of Economic research, April 1994.

The Economist, 17 October 2015, “Yearning to breathe free.” The Economist, 18 October, 2015, “Why America does not take in more Syrian refugees.” The Economist, 12 December, 2015, “Getting the new arrivals to work”Tisdall, Simon, “Refugees are becoming Russia’s weapon of choice in Syria, The Guardian,

16 February, 2016UN International Migration Report 2015,

http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2015_Highlights.pdf

UNDP-UNHCR “Regional Trends in the Impact of the Syria Crisis on Livelihoods and Opportunities, a Socio-economic study of impacts and opportunities,” Amman, Jordan, October 2015

UNHCR, “Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal,” 15 February 2016” http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

UNHRC’s overall funding requirements for carrying out the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) and Humanitarian Response Plan, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php

USAID, Syria Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #2, 4 February 2016, https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria/fy16/fs02 Zhukov, Yuri, “NATO’s Mediterranean Mission,” Foreign Affairs, 21 February 2016

_____________________

22

http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php

http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php



http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/190/Illegal_immigrants_and_the_labour_market.html

http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/190/Illegal_immigrants_and_the_labour_market.html

http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=10199

https://www.supportingsyria2016.com/about/

http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/126.pdf

http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_05/20160519_1605-factsheet-aegean-sea.pdf

http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_05/20160519_1605-factsheet-aegean-sea.pdf

http://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-2016-214861-deaths-2861

167 ESCTER 16 E - Migration crisis - 167 E… · Web viewMass migration, including the movement...

Documents

Transcript of 167 ESCTER 16 E - Migration crisis - 167 E… · Web viewMass migration, including the movement...