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Fascist Propaganda and the Italian Community in Peru during the Benavides Regime, 1933-39Author(s): Orazio A. CiccarelliSource: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Nov., 1988), pp. 361-388Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/156719 .

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362 Ora.io A. Ciccarelliwas clearly won by the latter, judging from Latin America's role in theSecond World War. Nonetheless, until 1939 the outcome of that conflictwas in doubt with both sides convinced that the other was turning publicopinion in Latin America against it and gaining influence over a growingnumber of Latin American governments.To the democratic forces it was obvious that Germany posed thegreatest military threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere.However, many believed that Italy was more effectively advancing theAxis cause by utilising its cultural, religious, and ethnic affinities withLatin America. Its propaganda themes of religion, family, and order werebelieved to have found particular favour among the Latin American elitesand middle sectors. Moreover, the millions of Italian nationals residing inLatin America were receptive to Italian ideological blandishments. Andthrough its nationals - many of whom were believed to be fascistagents - Italy was thought to have gained influence over a number ofSouth American governments.3Peru was one of the countries where Italy seemed to be reaping greatbenefits. To the casual observer it might indeed appear that Italian fascismhad firmly rooted itself in the repressive political and social institutions ofPeru thanks largely to a well orchestrated propaganda campaign financedmostly by the rich Italian community and condoned by the pro-fascistregime of Oscar Benavides (1933-9). The avalanche of pro-Italian newsreports and feature stories published by Peru's leading newspapers in 1936and 1937 as well as the dramatic increase in the playing of Italian-producedfilms, newsreels, and radio programmes created the perception of asuccessful fascist advance in Peru. The expansion and/or creation offascist organisations among members of the community beginning in1936, and the intensified efforts to indoctrinate young Italians to fascismthrough the establishment of youth organisations and the politicalmanipulation of school curricula, appeared to give substance to the2 For a comparative look at the question of propaganda see Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi

Propaganda London 1964), pp. 54-75, 104-17. By 1939 German radio broadcasts toLatin America amounted to twelve hours daily, higher than to any other region of theworld. Harold L. Childs and John B. Whitton (eds.), Propaganda By Short Waveincluding Charles A. Rigby's The W[aron theShort Waves(Princeton, 1942). It containsessays on short-wave propaganda by Germany, Britain, Italy, France, and the UnitedStates. Alton Frye, Nazi Germanyand the AmericanHemisphere, 933--I94I (New Haven,I967), pp. 3i, passim; Philip M. Taylor, TheProjectionof Britain. BritishOverseasPublicityandPropaganda London, I98I), pp. 8I-259; Harold Lavine and James Wechsler, WarPropagandaand the United States (New York, 1972).3 Carlton Beals, The Coming Strugglefor Latin America (New York, 1938), p. 92;'Memorandum on Italian Fascist and German Nazi Activities up to March I938', U.S.National Archives (USNA), US State Department (USSD), file no. 3850.

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Italian Fascists in Peru, 1933-39 363impression of Italian success. The simultaneous growth of closer militaryand political ties between Italy and President Benavides in 1936 and 1937,in the form of increased arms sales to Peru, the contracting of Italian airforce and police missions, and the establishment of a Caproni aircraftmanufacturing and repair plant in Lima, seemed to confirm the success ofItalian propaganda and community efforts in favour of fascism and tointensify fears that Peru was being drawn inexorably into the Axisorbit.4

The reality both of Italy's propaganda operations in Peru and of theItalian community's fondness for fascism was quite different. Italiandiplomatic documents reveal that such activities - virtually non-existentuntil I 9 35 and most intense in 1936 - grew in response to the internationalcondemnation of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, and to League of Nations'sanctions rather than as part of a plot to dominate Peru. The successfulconclusion of the African crisis in July 1936 brought a rapid dismantlingof key components of the propaganda apparatus that had gained greatsupport for Italy's cause. By 1937 Italian propaganda activities were beingcurtailed dramatically, the result of the Italian community's unwillingnessto subsidise them and of the Italian government's reluctance to maintainthem. By I939 Italian operations were reduced to a defence of nationalinterests against German and Japanese advances and to the mounting ofa cultural propaganda campaign aimed mainly at the indoctrination ofyoung Italians. Even these modest goals met with only marginal success,victims of a structurally flawed and grossly underfunded propagandaoperation. That Italy - though not fascism - continued to enjoy greatfavour in Peru after 1936 was attributable less to propaganda efforts thanto the immense goodwill built over the decades by the Italian communitythere.During the first decade of fascism, Italy abided by Benito Mussolini'spronouncement that fascism was not an article for export by rejecting

In 1937 United States Ambassador Fred Dearing had reported that Benavides wasproving to be a 'poorer and poorer neighbor every day'. In the next i8 monthsWashington believed that matters had deteriorated as Benavides strengthened economicand political ties with Italy and Germany. See Haglund, Latin America, pp. 103-4;Laurence A. Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Lima, 9 Oct. 1937, (USSD) file no.723.65/7; R. M. Lambert to Secretary of State, Lima, 12 June 1937, (USSD) file no.723.65/7; Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Lima, 5 Nov. 1937, (USSD) file no. 7I0,Italy-Peru, no. 98; Steinhardt to Secretary of State, Lima, 8 Nov. 1937, (USSD) file no.800 B; 'Memorandum on Italian Fascist and German Nazi Activities'.5 This conclusion is based on a reading of Italian Foreign Ministry documents between1922 and 1935. See also 'Memorandum on Italian Fascist and German Nazi Activities',p. 9; Haglund Latin America, p. 55.

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364 Ora-io A. Ciccarelliinternational fascism and curbing the activities of the Fasci all'Estero.Originally created in 1920-z2 for the purpose of using Italians abroad tospread fascist ideology, the organisation's activities were curtailed first inI925 when it was placed under the direction of the Foreign Ministry, andthen again in 1928 when the Fasci were placed under the control of localdiplomatic representatives and were ordered to refrain from all politicalactivities in the host country.6 The sincerity of Italy's intentions regardinginternational fascism was confirmed by the government's failurethroughout the 1920z to develop a credible propaganda apparatus.Indeed, responsibilities for propaganda were so widely diffused andactivities among the Ministries were so poorly coordinated as to haverendered Italian propaganda virtually non-existent.Events of the early 1930s finally gave impetus to the concept ofUniversal Fascism. The economic crisis in the liberal-democratic countriesincreased the respectability of the corporate state and presented Italy withmajor propaganda opportunities. More importantly, the rise of Nazism inGermany and the subsequent creation of an elaborate internationalpropaganda apparatus challenging Italy's hitherto exclusive claim tofascist orthodoxy, mobilised Italian energies into a more visibleinternational role including the consolidation of disparate propagandaservices under an Undersecretary of State for Press and Propaganda,under the immediate direction of the head of State. It was the Ethiopiancrisis in 1935, however, which gave the greatest impetus to both UniversalFascism and to the drive to refine the propaganda structure.7 On 24 June1935, Press and Propaganda was raised to ministerial rank and by I936 ithad been given control over all aspects of cultural and propagandaactivities formerly conducted by a variety of ministries and quasi-publiccorporations.8While Italian troops carried on the war in the battle-fields of Ethiopia,it was left to the newly created Ministry for Press and Propaganda toconduct the war of words against international condemnation and theLeague of Nations' economic sanctions which threatened Italy's successfulconclusion of the war. Late in 1935 the Ministry for Press and Propagandalaunched a systematic propaganda campaign to enlist world opinion in

6 Enzo Santarelli, 'I fasci italiani all'estero', Ricerchesulfascissmo(Urbino, 1971), p. 124;Guiseppe Bastiniani, Gli italiani all'estero (Milan, I939), pp. 46-53.7 Philip V. Cannistraro, Lafabbrica del consento:ascismo e mass media(Rome-Bari, 1975),pp. 102-4, Io6-7, izo20-; Michael A. Ledeen, UniversalFascism. The Theoryand Practiceof the Fascist International,1928-1936 (New York, I972), pp. 62-3.

8 Taylor Cole, 'The Italian Ministry of Popular Culture', PublicOpinionQuarterly,vol. 2(July 1938), p. 426.

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Italian Fascists in Peru, 1933-39 367infiltrate fascism into Peru. They were the result of a successfulpropaganda campaign mounted by members of the Italian community toassist the mother country during one of its darkest hours.The intense propaganda campaign in Peru was organised in August1935 at the instigation of the Italian minister Vittorio Bianchi and with thefinancial support of leading members of the Italian community. TheNucleo di Propagandawas created for the purpose of shaping Peruvianpublic opinion in favour of the Italian cause in Africa and to combat -according to its leader Gino Bianchini - the anti-Italian and pro-Ethiopianand pro-League propaganda coming to Peru through the 'Anglo-Saxonand Jewish' news organisations in New York - meaning the AssociatedPress and United Press International.l3 By the beginning of 1936 theNucleo had successfully turned the Peruvian press into an advocate ofItaly's cause in Africa and into a seemingly fascist mouthpiece. Bianchini,the manager of the Empresas Electricas Asociadas, the company with amonopoly over Lima's electricity and its trolley system, could boast thatthe Nucleo had changed Peruvian public opinion on the Ethiopian crisisfrom one of opposition and/or apathy to one 'completely favourable toour cause and points of view'.14 This achievement resulted mainly fromboth the personal influence of leading members of the Italian communityand from the monthly financial subsidies paid to the newspapers to guidethem along the desired ideological path.Financial and ideological backers of the Nucleo included some of themost influential individual and institutions of the Italian community inPeru. The BancoItaliano, Peru's largest, was the major contributor to theNucleo's funds with a minimum monthly sum of S/.i,ooo, and membersof its board of directors, such as Gino Salocchi and Ernesto Magnani,added personal contributions of about S/.5o per month. The EmpresasElectricasAsociadas made the second largest contribution to the Nucleowith S/.I00 to S/.i5o per month, while the chairman of its board,Pietro Vaccari, and its manager, Gino Bianchini, added a personalmonthly contribution of S/.5o.'5 As the head of the Nucleo, Bianchinialso underwrote major expenditures meant to influence leading Peruvianopinion makers. For example, in 1936 he paid Lit. io,ooo.oo for thetranslation and publication in Italy of Mir6 Quesada's In tornoagli scrittie discorsidi Mussolini,ten thousand free copies of which were distributed13 Gino Bianchinito Talamo, Lima, 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.14 Vittorio Bianchinito MAE, Lima, 13 June 1936 (DGAP), Peru 1936, busta 3.15 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru i937, busta 8.

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368 OrazioA. Ciccarelliin Europe and Latin America.16 Other contributors to the Nucleo'spropaganda fund included the textile manufacturing company El Pacifico,leading businessmen like Luigi Nicolini, owner of the Nicolini Brothersflour mill and pasta factory, and Giovanni Batta Isola, proprietor of theSan Jacintotextile and manufacturing firm. Their monthly contributionsaveraged S/.5o. In all the Nucleo received over S/.2,0oo per month orabout four times the S/.5 5o per month budgeted for propaganda in Peruby the Ministry for Press and Propaganda in Rome.l7The funds controlled by the Nucleo were strategically distributedamong Lima's leading newspapers and their editors. The Nucleo paid thelargest subsidy to El Universal,which received S/.75o a month for thepublication of bulletins from Radio Roma as well as other articles of ageneral political and cultural interest. An additional S/.Ioo per monthwere paid by a Mr. Zozly, the newspaper's foreign news editor. La Cronicawas paid S/.33o, with S/.8o going to the newspaper itself and theremainder to two editors, Roberto McLean Estenos (Viracocha), whoreceived S/.i o, and Rauil de Megaburu, who was paid S/.ioo. Amonthly sum of S/.330 was also paid to El Comercio,with the majorityof it going to its editors, Clodoaldo Lopez Merino (S/.zoo) andLamberto Cobos (S/.ioo), who doubled as one of La Prensa's owneditors. Although the Nucleo's budget did not earmark a specific sum forLa Prensa,Cobos ensured that the newspaper published articles selectedfor it by the Nucleo.8 These and other expenditures assured thepublication of hundreds of articles on the Ethiopian conflict favourable toItaly, and as many essays, columns, and editorials touting the progressmade by Italy under Mussolini and offering the promise of even greaterfuture achievements. It was this kind of unabashed reporting whichhelped form the impression that Peru was falling under Italian tutelage. Infact the newspapers' commitment to Italy and fascism appeared to dependon the Nucleo's ability to subsidise the Italian propaganda effort, on thecommunity's commitment to it, and on Italy's continued interest inpressing the propaganda advantages already gained. None of thesesurvived the end of the Ethiopian conflict.16 Bianchini to Talamo, Lima, 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru i937, busta 6. Bianchini also

paid for the translation and publication of one of Jose de la Riva Aguero's books. RivaAguero was one of the most vocal and articulate defenders of Italian fascism.17 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 8.18 For a complete listing of recipients of the Nucleo's funds see Talamo to MAE, Lima,20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 8. In I936 one dollar equalled S/.4.3 and Lit.12.5 respectively. In 1937 the value of the sol had risen to 3.7 to the dollar while thatof the lira had fallen to I9. to the dollar.

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Italian Fascists in Peru, 1933-39 369The successful conclusion of the Ethiopian crisis and the lifting of the

League's sanctions against Italy in July 1936 marked the beginning of thedecline of the Nucleo's intense propaganda activities in Peru. Members ofthe Italian community, arguing that official propaganda should againbecome the sole responsibility of the government and claiming that othercommunity projects required their support, terminated their monthlycontributions to the Nucleo.l9 This by no means meant that communitymembers would stop defending Italy's good name. Indeed members of thecommunity continued to use their personal influence with editors andpublishers to obtain favourable treatment for Italy in the Peruvian press.Nonetheless, the end of the monthly contributions, and the consequenteventual demise of the Nucleo early in 1937, led to the severe curtailmentof propaganda activities and to the loss of the immense influence Italianshad enjoyed over the press throughout 1936. Although irritated by thecommunity's decision to suspend contributions, and aware that theNucleo's demise would quickly follow as a result, the Italian ministerTalamo was forced to accept the contributors' decision. He did not wishto risk antagonising individuals who were continuing to support otheractivities and who could be counted on again for help in case of otherextraordinary needs.20The Italian community, the largest European colony in Peru since thei86os, represented one of the most successful Italian settlements in theAmericas in spite of its relatively small size. (It had reached a peak of13,000 in 1906 but had shrunk to 5,ooo by the 1940S.)21The per capitaincome of its members was probably higher than that of any other Italiansettlement in the Western Hemisphere and its integration into Peruvian19 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo toMinistero per la Stampa e Propaganda (MSP), Lima, 3I March I937 (DGAP), PeruI937, busta 6; Talamo to Emanuele Grazzi, Lima, 25 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937,busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March I937 (DGAP), Peru i937 busta 5.20 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru i937, busta 8; Talamo to MSP,Lima, i8 and 31 March i937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima,

23 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 5; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 25 Jan. I937(DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.21 The literature on the Italian community in Peru - particularly for the period before1914 - isgrowing.Themore ignificant orksareEmilioSequi ndEnricoCalcagnoli,La vita italiana nella repubblicadel Peru; statistica, biografie Lima, i9I ); Janet Worral,'Italian immigration to Peru: I860-I914' (Ph.D Diss., Indiana University, 1972);AntonioFranceschini,L'emigrazionetaliana ell'AmericaelSud Rome, 1908); GabriellaChiaramonti,Empresariostalianos procesode industrializacidnn el Peruentrefinalesdel siglo XIX y la primera uerramundial',n Actas de la sextareunionehistoriadoresatinoamericanistaseuropeos Stockholm,2 5-26 May 198 ), pp. 551-99.

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370 Ora

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Italian Fascists in Peru, I933-39 371The community's integration into Peruvian society and economy hadmade its members less than eager to embrace any cause that might

endanger their peaceful and prosperous existence in Peru. Moreover,physical distance from the mother country and a paucity of newimmigrants to reinvigorate the ageing community, had contributed to adeterioration of its cultural and linguistic integrity notwithstanding theschools and the numerous social and fraternal associations maintained bythe community. This gradual deterioration struck Italian visitors andpreoccupied diplomatic officials in Lima who tried unsuccessfully to arrestits progress.Integration into Peruvian life and declining cultural ties help explainthe community's attitude towards fascist propaganda. Members of thecommunity had overwhelmingly and enthusiastically gone to Italy'sassistance during the Ethiopian crisis when they believed that theirmother country was being unjustly treated. However, when the crisis hadbeen successfully resolved, they saw no reason to continue supporting apropaganda campaign whose purpose had seemingly become the spread offascism and whose impact on community interests might be negative.26This was precisely the interpretation given by the Italian minister Talamoto the community's suspension of contributions to the Nucleo. In a 1937despatch Talamo remarked bitterly that some of the leading members of

Peruvian census put the size of the Italian colony at 6,990; by I891 the population haddeclined to 4,5 I I as a result of the War of the Pacific and of the economic and politicalcrises that followed it; by 1906 the community reached its peak with I3,000; by 1927Italians in Peru numbered about 8,000 and by I940 only about 5,ooo according toItalian estimates and 3,774 according to the Peruvian official census. All these numbers,with the exception of the first and the last, come from Italian sources. They may notreflect accurately the real size of the community because they tend to include Peruvian-born children of Italian residents who were legally Peruvian. Peruvian statisticsbetween 1876 and 1940 are even less reliable as no formal census was taken betweenthose years.The decline in the number of Italian residents occurred mostly outside of Lima. In thePeruvian capital the size of the community declined less dramatically, from a high of3,283 in I876 to a low of 2,491 in 1940.The size of the Italian community in Peru was miniscule compared to Argentina(1,00,000o in 1924) and Brazil (285,oo000 in 1940), but its national importance wasnot.25 Talamo to MAE, Lima, i6 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE,Lima, 30 Dec. I938 (DGAP), Peru I938, busta 9; Ugo Faralli, Italiani al Peru (Rome,I941), pp. 42-43. According to Talamo the community's weakened ties to Italy wereexplained in part by the very little effort and money spent by Italian governments onefforts to maintain the cultural integrity of resident Italians.26 By the end of 1937 the Lima Fascio, reorganised and revitalised by Talamo, numberedonly 403 card-carrying members many of whom, according to Talamo, seemed not todemonstrate the proper enthusiasm for fascism. See Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec.1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9.

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372 Orazio A . Ciccarellithe community 'seem to live in the continuous fear of any kind of Italianor fascist affirmation',27 and in another he accused them of beinguncooperative, indifferent, and passive towards the mother country.28 Inhis final despatch the exasperated Talamo told his government that thegreatest obstacles he had faced in carrying out the legation's activities hadbeen presented by the Italian community itself rather than by foreigncompetitors.29 Talamo's successor, Ugo Faralli, similarly charged thatItaly benefited little from the success enjoyed by the Italian community inPeru and argued that Italy should concentrate on the education andtraining of the children of resident Italians if it wished to have in thefuture a more cooperative and loyal following.30The community's caution also led it to criticise Rome's courting ofPresident Benavides as potentially damaging to Italian interests in Peru.31As successful practitioners of the art of survival in the unpredictableworld of Peruvian politics, Italians had traditionally sought to eschew anycourse of action that might arouse antagonism by avoiding intimateassociation with any political faction. They believed that Rome wasundermining the community's future security by its pursuit of thePeruvian president who ruled only through control of the militaryestablishment. Indeed, Benavides did not have a popular base. He wasvehemently opposed by the leftist Alian.a Popular Revolucionaria Americana(APRA), Peru's largest party, and by the rightist Union Revolucionaria(UR), the party which had received the second largest number of votes inthe 1936 presidential election after the APRA-supported candidate.32Benavides had also failed to gain the loyalty of the elite some of whosemembers considered the President ill-equipped to occupy the office, whileothers viewed him as too weak to deal with the gravest threat to Peru's27 Talamo to MAE, Lima, io July 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 5.28 Ibid.; Talamo to MAE, Lima, I6 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo toMAE, Lima 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9.29 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. I937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9.30 Faralli, Italiani nei Peru, pp. 42-3.31 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 10 July 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5. On a number ofoccasions community leaders had warned Talamo that too close an identification byItaly with the Benavides regime might bring about anti-Italian measures by thegovernment that would succeed it.32 For interesting nsightsinto Peruvianpoliticsduringthe Benavidesregimesee ThomasM. Davies andVictorVillanueva eds.),3oodocumentosara ahistoria elAPRA (Lima,

1978);ThomasM. Davies and Victor Villanueva(eds.), SecretoslectoraleselAPRA:correspondenciadocumentose 1939(Lima, I982). The 1936 presidentialelection wasnullifiedby Benavidesand rescheduled or 1939.

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Italian Fascists in Peru, I9j33-3 373stability, the APRA party. Because of Benavides' lack of support outsideof the military, the Italian community believed that Rome should distanceitself from the regime or risk future retributions from an oligarchicgovernment which, in all likelihood, would succeed it. The community'swarning was not heeded. Rome, believing that Benavides was potentiallyits most important ally,33 continued assiduously to court the PeruvianPresident causing, in the process, further community alienation from theircountry's policies.The demise of the Nucleo di Propagandapresented Talamo with thechallenge of continuing to maintain the high level of propaganda activitiesreached in 1936. Although disappointed by the community's suspensionof contributions, he had philosophically agreed with its members thatpropaganda activities should have been an official function of the Italiangovernment. Talamo argued in despatches to Rome that to makepropaganda activities dependent on private contributions resulting fromofficial 'mendicancy' cast a shadow on Italy's dignity and placed an officialfunction such as propaganda on an 'unstable and artificial' foundation.The only proper course of action, he insisted, would be for the Ministryfor Press and Propaganda to increase its subsidies to the ministry in Limafor propaganda activities.34 However, not only was the Ministry reluctantto pay in order to maintain the same level of propaganda activities, it wasalso unwilling to increase the subsidy in order to pay off the S/.8, 88.45debt accumulated by the Nucleo in 1936 and financed personally byBianchini.35

The reluctance of the Ministry for Press and Propaganda to increasecontributions for propaganda activities clearly reflected the Italiangovernment's growing financial crisis as a result of the massive33 The Italian government made no serious attempt to establish close ties with importantrightist political groups opposed to Benavides. Italy believed that the Peruvianpresident afforded the best opportunity for Italy to enhance its interests there.34 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MSP,Lima, 3I March I937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 25 Jan.1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March 1937 (DGAP),Peru I937, busta 5.35 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 8. The Nucleo's debthad more than doubled by July I937. Bianchini had continued to finance the debt

personally although he had resigned himself to the probability of never being repaid.See Bianchini to Talamo, Lima, 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6. The onlysolution offered by Rome was to use part of the meagre S/.55o per monthappropriated to pay off the debt to Bianchini. See Guido Rocco to Talamo, Rome, 4Aug. I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

LAS 203

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374 Ora.io A. Ciccarelliexpenditures incurred both in Ethiopia and Spain.36 It may alsodemonstrate Italy's continued relegation of Latin American affairs to aminor position in its geo-political considerations in spite of GaleazzoCiano's inculcation of fascism into the Foreign Ministry after 1936 and thefascist rhetoric generated by Italian officials for Latin Americanconsumption.37 Diplomatic correspondence between Lima and Rome in1937 clearly underscores the Italian government's lack of interest in takingadvantage of the propaganda gains made in 1936. Despatches fromTalamo show him continuously pleading with the Ministry for Press andPropaganda for more funds or appealing to the Ministry for ForeignAffairs to intercede in support of his request. He repeatedly assured Romethat Peru was 'worth the effort', because public opinion there could bewon 'with a relatively minor effort', and that from a base in Peru, Italycould exert influence in neighbouring countries.38 He also remindedRome of the superb calibre of the Italian colony in Peru, of its solideconomic position and prestige, of the favourable attitude of theBenavides government toward Italy, and of the potential expansion ofarmaments sales to the Peruvian armed forces.39 All these advantages, hewarned, would be lost very quickly if propaganda activities werediscontinued because 'normally, only currents generally unfavourable tous penetrate [Peru]'.40 He predicted serious damage to Italy's prestigeand to the unity of the Italian community which saw the curtailing of36 Macgregor Knox. Mussolini Unleashed, 936-194I. PoliticsandStrategy n Fascist Italy'sLastWar (London, i982), pp. 30-3. In 1938 the reserves of the Bank of Italy had shrunkfrom over 20,000 million lire in 1927 to under 3,000 million in 1939. The Ethiopian warand the subsequent pacification campaign, plus intervention in Spain, had drained thetreasury. From 1934-5 to 1939-40 over 5 % of Italy's state expenditures of 249,000million lire went to Ethiopia, Spain, Albania and other colonies, and to the military. In

I940 Foreign Minister Ciano warned that Italy was broke, that its reserves were downto ' ,400 miserable millions' and that when they were spent 'we will have nothing leftbut our eyes to cry with'.37 Between I922 and 1936 the Italian Foreign Ministry had remained relatively untouched

by the establishment of the fascist regime in Italy. In 1936 the appointment of CountGaleazzo Ciano signified the beginning of the Ministry's shift towards fascism withpersonnel and policy changes reflecting more faithfully its goals and ideology. SeeH. Stuart Hughes, 'The Early Diplomacy of Italian Fascism', and Felix Gilbert, 'Cianoand His Ambassadors', in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats,1919-1939 (Princeton, I953).38 Talamo to MSP, Lima, 31 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.39 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 20 Jan. 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 8; Talamo to MSP,Lima, i8 and 31 March 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima,23 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 25 Jan. 1937(DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.40 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

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Italian Fascists in Peru, 933-39 37 5propaganda activities as a return to the days of'liberal insensitivity' andthe severing of spiritual ties with the mother country.41 The choice left toItaly, Talamo wrote, was not whether to reduce already insufficient fundsbut whether or not 'to liquidate the entire structure of our press andpropaganda work here'.42All the pleas, warnings, and impassioned arguments failed to loosen thepurse strings of the Ministry for Press and Propaganda.43 Even when latein 1936 Galeazzo Ciano himself had urged that propaganda activities inPeru be intensified 'so as to produce favourable repercussions on otherSouth American States',44 this appeal was rejected as were those made byTalamo. Guido Rocco, General Director for Foreign Press Services,wrote to Emanuele Grazzi, General Director for Transoceanic Affairs inthe Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who had forwarded Talamo's manyrequests for more funds, that the subsidy given to the legation in Limawas relatively higher than those 'assigned to diplomatic posts havingmore important tasks in the area of press and propaganda'.45 If anything,Rocco continued, the Ministry would be more inclined to reduce ratherthan increase the subsidy.46 In relaying Rocco's response to Talamo,Grazzi in effect told the minister in Lima to stop requesting more fundssince they would not be forthcoming.47 Talamo, of course, did not followhis friend's advice and continued to bombard the Ministry with pleas formore funds until his diplomatic tour in Peru ended in December 1937.In the end the only major victory won by Talamo on the propagandaissue was its continued funding at the same rate of Lit. 28,ooo per year,which in reality constituted a 40 % reduction because of the recentdevaluation of the lira.48 This decrease in purchasing power meant thatmost of the pro-Italian articles printed in the Peruvian press in the secondhalf of 1937 appeared largely as a result of Bianchini's persuasive powers.41 Bianchini to Talamo, Lima, 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6.42 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 3 April 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6.43 Talamo enlisted the able and patrioticBianchinito scale down the Nucleo'sbudget inorderto make it morepalatable o Rome. Bianchiniproposedto El Universal budgetcalling for drasticreductions,eliminatingsubsidiesto certaineditors and governmentofficials,and transferring upport of Italia Nuovato privatesources. Although thesemeasureswouldhave cut in half(to S/. I090) theNucleo's udget,theyalso wererejectedas too extravagant. Bianchini to Talamo, Lima, I5 and 30 June 1937 (DGAP), Peru

I937, busta 6.44 Galeazzo Ciano to MSP, Rome, 9 Dec. I936 (DGAP), Peru I936, busta 3.45 Rocco to Grazzi, Rome, 24 Feb. I937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 6.46 Ibid.47 Grazzi to Talamo, Rome, 3 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.48 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 23 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5.

13-2

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376 Ora.io A. CiccarelliHe cajoled his contacts on the Lima newspapers to publish articles andphotographs Talamo had received from the Ministry of Popular Culture.This approach could hardly ensure propaganda success, and Bianchinireminded Talamo that payments had to be made every time non-Italianswere used to spread propaganda, since only a few Peruvians like Jose dela Riva Agiiero and Carlos Arenas Loayza could be counted on to supportItaly unselfishly. Otherwise, Bianchini wrote, 'we must resign ourselvesto the abandonment of systematic press campaigns of the type conductedin the last two years because we have lost the collaboration of thenewspapermen we utilised for just such works of propaganda'.49The insufficiency of funding led to the disbanding of the Nucleo in1937, followed by a dramatic decrease in the appearance of pro-Italianarticles in the Lima press and a noticeable change in the tone of theinternational news published in Peru. A major cause of this change wasthe press's dependency on AP and UPI,50 international news agenciesconsidered by Talamo anti-fascist and thought to supply most of themisinformation which for the first time was infusing a hostile tone in 'apress which until now had been excellent toward us'. If this trend was nothalted, he warned, anti-fascism would become entrenched in the press andin Peruvian public opinion.51Talamo was probably unrealistic in believing that the Lima press couldagain be influenced as thoroughly as it had been in 1936. Even if theItalian government had chosen to invest much larger sums, successfulcontrol of the press, made highly unlikely by the reluctance of the Italiancommunity to lend financial assistance and to embrace fascism, wasrendered virtually impossible by the growing United States-inspired anti-Axis campaign spreading through Latin America. Until the middle ofthe I930S the Western Hemisphere seemed so secure from external threatsthat the United States army and navy war planners 'had to display muchdexterity in conjuring up a plausible enemy to plot against'.52 However,by the end of 1936 and for the remainder of the decade the United Statesgovernment came to believe that the security of much of LatinAmerica - and by extension that of the United States - was imperiled.The confidential information from and concerning Latin America reachingWashington was usually of an alarmist nature and it was this information49 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 9 Aug. I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 7.50 Talamo to MAE, Lima, I6 July 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 5.51 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 28 Aug. 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 3. Talamo pointed

specifically to APRA as the principal source of anti-totalitarian propaganda. Hereferred to the party as 'the school for anti-fascism'.52 Haglund, Latin America, p. z.

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Italian Fascists in Peru, I933-39 377which helped mobilise United States officials into an active and aggressivepolicy in defence of American security.53 What concerned Washingtonwas the uncertainty over whether the Latin American republics would orcould resist the threats and/or the blandishments of the Axis powers. Thisuncertainty, according to Haglund, 'began to be experienced mildly atfirst, by American policy makers in late 1936; by 1938 the uncertainty hadturned to dread; by May and June 1940 the dread had turned toparanoia'.54 It is debatable whether the Axis threat was as serious asimagined by the United States.55Nevertheless, the string of imperialisticsuccesses by the Axis powers in Europe, Africa and Asia had renderedUnited States officials understandably concerned about the security of theWestern Hemisphere.56The growing concern in Washington over the Axis threat to theWestern Hemisphere, fuelled by Latin America's leftist and democraticforces and by British intelligence reports,57 led the United States toundertake a series of diplomatic, military, and cultural initiatives intendedto develop continent-wide security cooperation.58 At the same time, theUnited States launched a propaganda campaign exalting liberal-demo-cratic principles and portraying Latin America as a continent sliding into53 Ibid.,p. i6.54 Ibid., pp. 34, 52-3, 56, 65-6. It was after February I937 that United States officialsstarted to sense that matters were not going well in the Western Hemisphere and thatthe danger of Nazi and fascist penetration was growing. Such concerns were deepenedwhen late in 1937 Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact of Germany and Japan, andGetulio Vargas established a dictatorial regime viewed on both sides of the Atlantic asrepresenting a definite shift by Brazil towards the Axis.55 Ibid., p. 78. Ironically, while the United States believed that the Axis powers weremaking headway in Latin America, Italy, Germany, and Japan were equally convincedthat the United States was making greater advances. In the case of Peru, Italianministers there had repeatedly informed Rome of the dominant position enjoyed by theUnited States and of the unlikelihood that it could be dislodged.56 Adding greatly to United States concern was the appeasement policy practised byEngland and France culminating in the Munich agreement. The outcome of theconference had raised doubts in Washington about the reliability of England. It hadalso increased the probability, as seen by United States officials, of an Axis attack onAmerica. See Haglund, Latin America, pp. 52-3.57 Ibid., pp. 51-2. Some of the more influential Latin American works were: ErnestoGiudici, Hitler conquistaAmerica (Buenos Aires, 1938); Genaro Arbaiza, 'Are theAmericas Safe?' CurrentHistory, vol. 47, no. 3 (Dec. 1937), pp. 29-34; Manuel Seoane,Nuestra Americay la guerra (Santiago de Chile, 1940); Hugo Fernandez Artucio, TheNazi Undergroundn South America (New York, 1942).58 Haglund, Latin America, p. 78; Samuel Guy Inman, Inter-American Conferences,1826-19i4: Historyand Problems(Washington, I964), pp. i60-95. For an official responseto cultural penetration in Latin America see J. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-AmericanBeginnings f U.S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936-1948 (Washington D.C., 1976), pp. 1-157.

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378 Ora.io A. Ciccarellithe Axis orbit. Germany, and to a much lesser extent Japan, were thetotalitarian nations identified, particularly after 1938, as posing thegreatest threat to the security of the Americas. Nonetheless, at least until1938, Italian activities in Latin America were presented in as sinister a wayas those of Italy's Axis partners.

Throughout 1937 and I938 United States diplomatic despatches fromLima painted an alarming picture of Italian activities in Peru. R. M. deLambert, the US charge'in une 1937 expressed the concern to his superiorsin Washington that 'Peru is being strongly drawn toward the Fascistsystem',59 and in October of the same year, ambassador LaurenceSteinhardt alarmingly wrote of the 'intense Italian activities in Peru', ofthe Italian government's 'none-too-well concealed determination' toexploit Peru's resources after first acquiring 'a firm grasp on variousPeruvian Government agencies, including military and naval aviations'.60He warned that 'the steadily increasing Italian influence in Lima shouldnot be underestimated' and that Italy's determination to exploit theadvantages already gained in Peru should be 'viewed in light of presentItalian imperial ambitions'.61 By early 1938 Steinhardt reported thatItalian influence had grown to 'serious proportions' and that Italy'sobjective was to turn Peru into an Italian colony. He warned that 'whilethe Peruvian flag would remain the national emblem and the countrynominally retain its sovereignty, only a relatively moderate furtherextension of Italian influence over the present government would virtuallyplace the vital interests of Peru under Italian domination'.62These alarmist official reports of Italian threats to Peruvian sovereigntywere accompanied by paranoid expressions of concern from United Statesjournalists and writers. They charged that the rich Italian community inPeru, its leading institutions, such as the Banco taliano,and its educational,cultural, and social organisations were instruments of the Italiangovernment and as such were tools to be used in the spread of fascism inthe South American country. Italy's nefarious activities, they charged,were succeeding because President Benavides was a fascist sympathiserintent not only on establishing a fascist state, but on turning control of thearmed forces over to Italian missions. They pointed out that Benavideshad brought an air force mission to Peru to take control of the aviationarm of the navy, he had invited a police training mission to run the59 R. M. de Lambert to USSD, Lima, 9 Oct. 1937 (USSD), file no. 710, no. 5192.60 Steinhardt to USSD, Lima, 9 Oct. I937 (USSD), file no. 723.65/7.61 Ibid.62 'Memorandum on Italian Fascists and German Nazi Activities', file no. 3850.

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Italian Fascists in Peru, 1933-39 379institution and to organise a spying network intended to silence opponentsof Benavides and fascism, and he had allowed the establishment of aCaproni aircraft manufacturing plant outside of Lima thus permittingItaly the use of Peru as a base for the potential conquest of South Americaand for possible attacks on the strategically crucial Panama Canal. Finally,the news media also alleged that Peru's slide to fascism was being assistedby the country's major newspapers, which made fascism appear to be thewave of the future while liberal democracy was portrayed as a decayingand antiquated ideal, by the Peruvian Church and by the country's eliteboth of which were reportedly propagating fascist ideology and assistingItaly in its penetration of Peru.63The dire warnings emanating from the United States press, andgenerally shared by the government in Washington, were wildlyexaggerated. The Italian community, as we have seen, was not a tool ofthe fascist government. Benavides was not a fascist, a point repeatedlymade by the Italian minister in Lima.64 Peru's military institutions were63 The list of works is particularly long after I937 when the alarmist tone described wasassumed even by some of the period's well known Latin Americanists. See, for

example, Samuel Guy Inman, DemocracyIVersus he Totalitarian States in Latin America(Philadelphia, 1938); Carlton Beals, The Coming Struggle; Beals, 'Totalitarianism inLatin America', Foreign Affairs, vol. I7, no. i (Oct. 1938), pp. 78-89; Beals, 'BlackShirts in Latin America', CurrentHistory, vol. 49, no. 3 (Nov. 1938), pp. 32-4; JohnGunther, Inside Latin America (New York, 194I); Hubert Herring, Good Neighbors.Argentina, Brazil, ChileandSeventeenOtherCountries(New Haven, 1941); David Effron,'Latin America and the Fascist Holy Alliance', Annals of the AmericanAcademy,vol. 204(July I939), pp. 17-25; Richard F. Behrendt, 'Foreign Influence in Latin America',Annals of the AmericanAcademy,vol. 204 (July I939), pp. i-8; Gaston Nerval, 'EuropeVersus the United States in Latin America', ForeignAffairs, vol. 15, no. 4 (July 1937),pp. 636-45; Nathaniel Weyl, 'Latin America Faces Fascism', The New Republic,vol. 96,no. 1243 (28 Sept. 1938), pp. 209-o0; N. P. McDonald, 'The Axis in South America',Fortnightly,vol. 151 (1938), pp. 336-43.For one of the few non-alarmist tracts on the subject, see J. Fred Rippy, 'The NewPan Americanism and the Fascist Threat', in Robert E. McNicoll and J. Riis Owre(eds.) Lectures Delivered at the Hispanic American Institute, no. i (Coral Gables, I939).Rippy minimises the fascist threat as well as the Latin Americans' attraction to thatideology.64 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 9 Feb. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE,Lima, 10 July, 7 Aug., 12 Nov., io Dec. 1937. Since 1934 Italian representatives inLima had written hopefully of Benavides' fascist 'sympathies', 'tendencies' and'orientations', continuously raising the possibility that Benavides would openlyembrace his real ideological inclinations. Such an optimistic picture of the Peruvianpresident was permanently shattered by Talamo in 1937. In his despatches to Rome heincreasingly questioned Benavides' usefulness to fascism and Italy and concludedfinally that the president's 'liberal-democratic background, age, and temperamentprecluded the possibility' that he either would or could be a fascist.

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380 OraZioA. Ciccarelliunder the control of Peruvian officers largely loyal to Benavides.65 TheCaproni plant, plagued by production and personnel problems, manu-factured only about a dozen airplanes.66 The Peruvian elite, seen by Italianofficials in Lima as socially selfish and politically unsophisticated,contained only a small group of men the Italian government could relyon.67 The Peruvian press was influenced less by ideology than bydominant political currents and financial considerations; the Italians haddominated the four major Lima newspapers in I936, but after the Nucleowas disbanded and the Italian contributions to propaganda declined, thepositive coverage of Italy and fascism in the Lima press declined alongwith it.68 And finally, the Italian government did not have the means, thewill, nor the interest to press forcefully for a fascist penetration of Peru.By I937 the Italian treasury had been drained by Italy's adventuristforeign policy in Ethiopia and Spain. More importantly, by late 1938 theItalian government, lacking a clear and consistent Latin Americanpolicy69 and increasingly overshadowed by its German ally, had becomea minor player in Latin American affairs.70 Finally, in the case of Peru by1938 even the Italian mission in Lima, which had earlier pleaded withRome to take advantage of the available opportunities for fascistexpansion, had grown more cautious and less optimistic as a result of thegrowing United States-led offensive against totalitarianism. According toItalian officials in Lima, United States economic and political influence in65 Davies and Villanueva, 3oo documentos, . 24. The authors forcefully argue that the armywas never opposed to Benavides and that it supported the president at every turn.66 Talamo to MAE, Lima, i6 Nov. 1937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE,Lima, 8 Sept. 1937 (DGAP), Peru i937, busta 8; Alcide Fusconi to Ministerodell'Aeronautica, Lima, 23 July 1938 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta II; 'Peru, Situazione

politica nell'anno I938', Lima, 4 Apr. 1939 (DGAP) Peru 1939, busta i2; Steinhardtto USSD, Lima, 12 Nov. 1937, file no. 723.65/II.67 Talamo to Grazzi, Lima, 9 Feb. I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to Ciano,Lima, 9 Aug. I937 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta 7. Two good examples of Peruvianfascists, according to Talamo, were Riva Agiiero and Carlos Arenas Loayza. They,Talamo reported, understood fascism and could be counted on to assist its expansionin Peru. Talamo's remarks on the paucity of real fascists within the Peruvian elite is notshared by Jose Ignacio L6pez Soria who in El pensamientoascista (190o-194y) (Lima,

I98i) attaches the fascist label to a rather large segment of the Peruvian elite.68 Talamo to MAE, Lima, i6 July 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE,Lima, 28 Aug. I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 3.69 The lack of clear direction was evident even in Brazil where Italy made a major effortin 1937 to extend its influence by supporting the Integralista party. See Ricardo Silva

Seitenfus, 'Ideology and Diplomacy: Italian Fascism and Brazil (1935-38)', HispanicAmerican Historical Review,64, no. 3 (Aug. I984), pp. 503-34. The author's conclusionis that, unlike Germany and the United States, Italy did not have a well-definedobjective in its relations with Brazil.70 Alan Cassels, Fascism (Arlington Heights, I975), pp. 79-80.

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Italian Fascists in Peru, '933-39 38Peru was so overwhelming as to render pointless any effort at dislodgingit.71They suggested instead that Italy should try to protect its position inPeru against the expanding activities of Germany and Japan, and that itshould concentrate its efforts on strengthening cultural and political bondswithin the community.72

By 1939 these facts were apparently acknowledged by United Statesofficials whose concerns about Italian fascism became negligible comparedto the dread of German subversive activities.73 Nevertheless, in 1937 and1938 United States propaganda regarding Italian activities in Peru wasintense. Its effect was to change the tone of the Peruvian press regardingItaly and fascism, and to strengthen the predisposition of the Italiancommunity to proceed cautiously in regard to its support of Italianpropaganda activities and of Italy's assiduous courting of Benavides.Still another effect of the growing United States concern with Axisactivities in Latin America and of the diplomatic and propagandacampaign it launched against them was APRA's public embracing of aunified continent-wide campaign against the machinations of the 'blackinternational'. As part of this undertaking, the party publishedmanifestos, pamphlets, books and newspaper articles warning of theimminent absorption of Peru into the Axis sphere and blaming theBenavides government, along with the country's elites, for the impendingloss of Peruvian sovereignty. Benavides was accused of selling Peru toItaly rather than see it governed by APRA; that he had already turnedcontrol of the police and air force over to Italy and was facilitating Italy'ssubjugation of the army; that the Peruvian president had given Italycontrol of Peru's industry, commerce and finances, and that he was71 Haglund, Latin America,p. 164-202; Faralli to MAE, Lima, i Aug. 1938 (DGAP),

Peru 1938, busta 9. Faralli suggested to Rome that Italian efforts in Peru should beconcentratedon 'saving whateverwas salvageable'.Faralli'spessimismstemmedfromhisperceptionof growing UnitedStates nfluence n Peru due largelyto its propagandaefforts.The belief that the United States was dominant n Peru had been expressedbyItalian representatives in Lima throughout the 1930s. It was also the view oftenexpressed by Italian observers of Latin America - see, for example, Gioacchino Volpe,'Italia e America Latina' in Mediterraneoorientale,protocollidi Roma. Italia e AmericaLatina. Le notiie prime. Societa dele Nationi (Milan, 1937), pp. 177-92.72 Faralli to MAE, Lima, 5 Jan. 1940 (DGAP), Peru I940, busta i6. Italian ministers inLima saw Japan and Germany as competitors in Peru not allies. This point was maderepeatedly in despatches whose content is summarised in the legation's annual reportson Peru's international relations.73 Haglund, Latin America, pp. I64-202; Faralli to MAE, 5 Jan. 1940 (DGAP), Peru1940, busta i6. According to Faralli, even among the more democratic sectors ofPeruvian public opinion, Italy was not associated with its Axis allies, Germany andJapan - a situation Faralli found embarrassing.

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382 Orazio A. Ciccarelliallowing the Italians to brainwash Peruvian children.74 Control of Peru,the apristaswarned, was only one of Mussolini's aims. His major goal wasoccupation of the Panama Canal and subjugation of all of SouthAmerica.75 This, according to the apristas, would be achieved in part byusing the fleet of aircraft being built up in Lima by the Caproni factory.The company, APRA charged, had already built most of Peru's 'fivehundred planes' and had the capacity to construct 'three hundred more'per year.76APRA's alarmist portrayal of a scenario linking Benavides to an Italiandrive to subjugate Peru and the rest of South America was patently false.Also false was the party's increasing identification with democracy'sstruggle against totalitarianism in the Americas. Party documents showthat its leader Victor Raiil Haya de la Torre had been eager to makeopportunistic agreements with Nazi and Fascist organisations if theycould enhance the party's chances for power.77 Thus, the party's anti-totalitarian propaganda was intended to further sour United Statesrelations with Benavides, expedite the president's removal from power,regain legality status for the party - denied it by Benavides - and use itspopularity and organisation to gain power.78 The end of the Benavidesregime in 1939 did not bring APRA to power. However, the party did infact help raise the level of the anti-Axis campaign being waged in theAmericas. It also provided journalists in the United States with additionalammunition with which to portray Italy as a threat to Peruvianindependence, to nations bordering Peru, and to United States politicaland commercial interests on the west coast of South America.

The growing anti-totalitarian sentiment being fomented by the UnitedStates and other parties in the Western Hemisphere came to be reflectedincreasingly in the Peruvian press, important segments of which by 193874 Le6n de Vivero, Avance del imperialismo ascista en el Peri (Mexico D.F., I938), pp.

11-13, 15-17, I9. 75 Ibid.,p. I8.76 Ibid. The total number of airplanes n the Peruvian arsenalwas Io and they weremostly of Italian,United States,and French make. See Livio Garbaccio to MAE, 4Apr. 1939, p. 9 (DGAP), Peru 1939, busta 12.77 Davies and Villanueva, Secretoselectorales,pp. 68-72, 73-6, 79-80, 83-4. Haya de laTorre even attempted to engage the Chilean Nazi Party in the struggle againstBenavides (pp. 21-4).78 Ibid.See the documenton pp. 21-4 as anexampleof APRA's efforts o alarm he UnitedStatesabout Benavides'supposedties to the 'black international'.Hayaalso presentedhimselfandthe partyas supportersof a continent-wideallianceof alldemocratic orcesagainst totalitarianism. See also Faralli to MAE, ii Feb. and Io May 1938 (DGAP),Peru I938, busta9. Farallireported violent attacks'by the United StatesambassadoragainstItalian influence on the Peruvianpress.

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Italian Fascists in Peru, I933-j9 383had embraced demands for the safeguarding of Peru's economic andpolitical independence against Axis threats.79Japan, and to a lesser extentGermany, rather than Italy, were the countries accused of threateningPeruvian sovereignty. Nonetheless, as Talamo indicated, the tone of thepress had changed, and it no longer seemed to be within the reach of Italyto influence the press as it had done in 1936 nor to redirect its course intoone favourable to fascist ideals and goals.80That Italy was spared from the attacks of the Lima press was due largelyto the prestige enjoyed by the Italian community and by its members'successful integration into Peruvian society. Part of the reason, however,at least until 1939, was the warm relationship existing between Italy andthe Benavides regime.81 Throughout his six-year tenure PresidentBenavides and several of his officials, most notably Lima's Prefect JorgeMeave Seminario, proved themselves to be friends of Italy and protectorsof her good name against detractors, so that even when anti-Axispropaganda intensified after 1937, rarely did anti-Italian materialappear.82 For example, when the columnist Ayax (Victor AndresBelaunde) wrote a column in which he implied that King Victor Emanuelwas a mere figurehead, Talamo angrily protested to the director of LaPrensa and threatened to have the newspaper closed by the governmentunless the matter was corrected immediately. The following day thenewspaper printed a retraction and apology, the editor who had let theoffending story pass was dismissed, and the column itself was temporarilydiscontinued.83

In 1939, as anti-fascist propaganda increased, the acting Italian minister79 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 14 Dec. i937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9; Talamo to MAE,Lima, 30 Dec. 1937.80 In the questionnaire to all legations and embassies circulated in 1940 by the Ministerodella CulturaPopolare- the ministry which in I937 had replaced the MSP - one questionenquired about the possibility of fascist success if active propaganda were pursued. Theminister in Lima answered that the moment was not propitious for an open propagandacampaign because of the strong 'ultra-democratic and ultra-nationalistic winds'blowing across Peru. See Italo Capanni to Ministero della Cultura Popolare (MCP),Lima, 5 May 1940 (DGAP), Peru 194I, busta 17. The experiences of the Japanesecommunity in Peru were a source of concern for the Italians. Throughout the 1930S theanti-Japanese campaign in Peru was fierce, leading to official restrictions on Japaneseimmigration and commercial activities. For an analysis of the forces behind thecampaign see Orazio A. Ciccarelli, 'The Anti-Japanese Campaign in Peru in the 193os.A Case of Economic Dependency and Abortive Nationalism', CanadianReviewof Studiesin Nationalism (spring I982), pp. 113-33.81 Italian ministers to Peru repeatedly and consistently referred to Benavides as a friendof Italy and admirer of Mussolini although they never labelled him a fascist.82 Garbaccio to MAE, Lima, i Sept. I939 (DGAP), Peru I937, busta I2.83 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 April 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 6.

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384 OrazioA. CiccarelliLivio Garbaccio appointed a special team of observers, drawn from theranks of the Italian community and assisted by the Italian police mission,to survey Lima's 'cultural scene' for the purpose of identifying andeliminating insulting material. The squad apparently took its assignmentto heart and scoured Lima's movie houses, cabarets, and theatres for anyevidence of anti-Italian material. Thus, it had the play 'The ItalianMurderer' suppressed even though it was not truly offensive and wasbeing presented by a small theatrical group in a rundown theatre of thecity; the squad also forced a Brazilian band in a local night club to removefrom its repertoire a song mimicking Faccetta Nera, an Italian balladwritten in conjunction with imperial expansion in Africa; and it was ableto have offensive portions of commercial films cut and to haveunfavourable editorial comments deleted.84 The squad's success wasattributed largely to the support received from Prefect Meave Seminario.Married to an Italian, he used threats of closure and outright censorshipto keep potential critics of Italy in check.85Official sympathy and reduced levels of propaganda activities after 1937helped shield Italians from the more severe aspects of the anti-totalitarianpropaganda of the late 1930s. Italian officials in Lima after 1938 hadchanged their propaganda tactics to reflect the reduced financial resourcesavailable to them and the cautious attitudes of the Italian community.Thus, beginning in 1938 Italy funded a propaganda campaign which,while still attempting to encourage favourable treatment in the newsmedia, sought to strengthen cultural and political bonds with thecommunity and safeguard Italy's position against inroads being made bythe Japanese and Germans. To achieve those ends, Rome finally gavepermission to the legation in Lima to establish a press office - OficinaPrensaItaliana(OPI) - under the directorship of Toto Giurato, a leader ofthe Lima Fascio and publisher of its organ, L'Italia Nuova. The officecarried out all the Legation's press services in addition to the transcriptionand translation of the Radio Roma service, baptised locally as AgenZiaItalia. The office also prepared the bi-weekly Spanish language bulletin IILittorale, offered free and thus used extensively by provincial newspapers.The Press Office also circulated articles from the 'Roma Press' agencyof Buenos Aires and from the AgenZia dell'Italia e dell'Imperowhosetranslated and edited bulletins were disseminated to daily newspapers inLima and Callao. The Press Office also distributed photographs84 Garbaccio to MAE, Lima, I July I939 (DGAP), Peru I939, busta 12.85 Garbaccio to MAE, Lima, I Sept. 1939 (DGAP), Peru 1938-9, busta 13-I5; Farallito MAE, Lima, 8 Nov. 1939 (DGAP), Peru I939, busta I2.

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Italian Fascists in Peru, I933-39 385originating from the Ministry of Popular Culture, published Italia Nuovaand RomanaGens,another official publication of the Fascio, arranged localradio broadcasts of news bulletins and cultural programmes of generalinterest produced by professors of the Collegio taliano n Lima,86 oriented'the activities of sympathetic Peruvian newspapermen, and contracted forpublication of favourable stories on Italy. The most ambitious contractwas signed with Rafael Larco Herrera's La Cronica,which published twospecial numbers on Italy; the first in January 939 ran to 20 pages; and thesecond, in July of the same year, contained 24 pages.87The operations of the new propaganda structure did not always runsmoothly. Budget appropriations were erratic and usually insufficient forthe fulfillment of the stated strategy; the news bulletins from Radio Romawere transmitted at a time when few people were at home, and thefrequency used was usually unclear.88 Of more serious consequence werethe shortcomings afflicting RadioRoma's news service. Carried only by ElComercioand dependent on the translation and transcription of bulletinsfrom Radio Roma, this service, according to Minister Faralli, 'does notshine either for the volume or importance of its news and even less forthe freshness of its materials'.89 Faralli complained to Rome that RadioRoma transmitted only ten to twelve news stories instead of the thirty tofifty required to fill the space set aside by El Comercio,and that theircontent was usually outdated, irrelevant, and extracted from non-originalsources. Even news events originating in Italy were reported morequickly and more completely by the AP and UPI. Faralli pleaded withRome for immediate improvements in the operations of Radio Roma. Heurged that there be a very substantial increase in the number of newsstories, that they be current and interesting, and that they deal withvarious aspects of Italian life rather than with summaries of stalejournalistic opinions. Without such improvements, he warned, the RadioRoma service might be dropped. El Comerciowas already under pressurefrom AP and UPI to do so or risk the loss of its contract with the twoNorth American organisations. A similar threat, according to Faralli, hadearlier been used successfully against La Crdnicaand it might succeed86 Faralli to MAE, Lima, 5 Jan. 1940 (DGAP), Peru 1939, busta 9.87 Faralli to MAE, Lima, i8 March 1938 (DGAP), Peru I938, busta 9; 'Peru: situazione

politica nell'anno XVII', pp. 27-8, Quaderno no. 5I (DGAP), Peru I940, bustaI6.88 Garbaccio to MAE, Lima, 31 Aug. 1939 (DGAP), Peru 1938-9, busta 13-I5; Capannito MCP, Lima, 5 May 1940 (DGAP), Peru I94I, busta 17.89 Faralli to MAE, Lima, io March 1938 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta io.

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386 Orario A. Ciccarelliagain, especially if El Comerciocould not be guaranteed a larger andconsistent supply of fresh, interesting and relevant news.90

Although irregularly, El Comerciocontinued to carry Radio Roma'sservice; its shortcomings, however, were never resolved.91 As a result, themost consistent source of news about Italy became the weekly fascistorgan Italia Nuova, whose readership was almost exclusively confined tomembers of the Italian community, making its propaganda value minimal.Italia Nuova had never been deemed a very important propaganda vehicle.In fact, from time to time its termination had been recommended as aneconomy move. Its value increased slightly after 1940 when propagandaoutlets in the Peruvian press became increasingly difficult to find.Nonetheless, the newspaper remained so narrowly focused on theactivities of the Lima Fascio as to have minimal influence on the Peruvianreader. 92

Marginally more successful, if only because of the brevity of theexperiment, was the Italian mission's effort to turn venerable old Italianinstitutions in Peru towards fascism, such as the Societb di BeneficenZaand the Circolo Italiano, to revitalise the ones created since 1922, and tocreate new organisations more directly under the control of the Italianminister in Lima. This cultural propaganda campaign got underway in1937 as part, it appears, of the new direction taken by the Foreign Ministryin Rome following the appointment of Ciano as its leader. The menappointed to head the mission in Lima, Talamo, Faralli, and Italo Capanni,were, unlike their predecessors, militant fascists. Talamo and Faralli inparticular proceeded aggressively, but ultimately unsuccessfully, to'discipline' the Italian community.93 They appointed faithful fascists tohead their institutions, tried to infuse new vitality into fascist organisationssuch as the Fascio, the Istituto Italo-Peruano, and the Ente del Libro, andfounded and nurtured chapters of the Dopolavoro n Callao and Lima -social clubs where members of the community could engage in socialintercourse and be subjected to political indoctrination.94 Even greater90 Ibid.91 Capanni to MCP, Lima, 5 May I940 (DGAP), Peru 194I, busta I7.92 See Italia Nuova for the years 1939-41. The BibliotecaNacional in Lima does not havethe complete run of this weekly newspaper.93 Talamo to MAE, Lima i6 March I937 (DGAP), Peru 1937, busta 5; Talamo to MAE,Lima, 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta 9. Talamo frequently commented on thedifficulty of converting Italian institutions to fascism because of the resistance to it bycommunity members.94 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru I938, busta 9; Talamo to MAE,Lima, 5 June I937 (DGAP), Peru I938, busta ii; Faralli to MAE, Lima, 5 Jan. I940(DGAP), Peru I940, busta i6.

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Italian Fascists in Peru, 1933-39 387attention was given by the Italian ministers to the education andindoctrination of the young. Holding little faith in the possibility that theolder community members could be made to defer their interests to thoseof the mother country, they saw in the early indoctrination of the youngthe future formation of a more pliant community.95 To this end theyforced a change in the curricula of the CollegioItalianoin Lima, the MariaMargheritaschool in Callao, and in the schools run by the Italian-basedSalesian brothers. They also forced the hiring of fascist teachers fromItaly, sent deserving students to Italy, organised youth summer and wintercamps outside of Lima, and conducted reunions throughout the year inthe same premises used by the Dopolavorowhere the young people sung,played, and discussed current events.96These methods of cultural propaganda may have served in time tostrengthen community loyalty to fascism. However, the outbreak of warin Europe and Italy's intervention in it in June 1940 brought thecampaign to an early end. For a brief period members of the communityagain rallied to the defence of the mother country and organised acommittee - Comitato Italiano Fondo Unico Pro Patria - to collect monthlypledges for the purpose of conducting propaganda activities in defenceof Italy's position.97 Anaemic by 1936 standards, this organised campaignincluded the publication in Spanish and the free distribution of ItaliaNuova, the daily collection and distribution via mail of Radio Roma's newsbulletins to two thousand 'of the people of major consideration in thiscountry', the diffusion of some of the same news bulletins to localnewspapers, and a one hour nightly transmission on RadioInternacional fa programme called OraItaliana.98These and other minor efforts won verylittle sympathy for Italy, and they were unceremoniously terminated whenthe United States declared war on the Axis powers, and Peru proceededto curtail all activities by citizens of those nations.99The anti-Axis measures undertaken by the Peruvian government duringthe war were aimed largely at the Japanese and German communities. The95 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. i937 (DGAP), Peru I938, busta 9.96 Talamo to MAE, Lima, 30 Dec. 1937 (DGAP), Peru 1938, busta9; Talamo to MAE,Lima, io March 1938 (DGAP), Peru I938, busta ii; Garbaccio to MAE, 'Peru,relazioneannuale,1938', Rome, 4 April 1939(DGAP), Peru I939, busta 12; Faralli oMAE, 5 Jan. 1940 (DGAP), Peru I940, busta I6.97 Capanni o MAE, Lima, i8 July 1940 (DGAP), Peru I940, busta i6. 98 Ibid.99 The curtailingof Italianactivities had intensifiedthroughout I941, although the realtargetof the restrictive egislationhad been Japan.See MinisterCapanni'sdespatchesfor I94I and early 1942.

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388 Ora.io A. CiccarelliItalian colony was relatively unaffected because it had never beenperceived as a serious threat to Peruvian sovereignty. The community'scommitment to fascism had never been strong, and its support of fascistpropaganda activities had been subordinated to the greater need ofsafeguarding the Italians' economic and social position in Peru. Moreover,the Italian government had not been willing to commit adequate resourcesand energy to Latin America, judging its interests there less crucial thanthose in Europe and Africa. Thus, Italy's most aggressive efforts toinfluence public opinion in Latin America came in connection with theEthiopian crisis when support of the American republics was needed tocombat the League of Nations' sanctions against Italy. Once that crisispassed Italy's interest in Latin America again abated. Thus, if, as charged,Italy had ever had tutelage over Peru, it was lost as early as 1937 when theItalian community reduced drastically its contributions to propagandaactivities, and the Italian government resisted demands to assume a largerfinancial role in their continuation. By 1939 the increasingly aggressiveanti-totalitarian propaganda waged by the United States, APRA andsectors of the Peruvian press, combined with Benavides' replacement byPrado, had ensured the eventual success of liberal democratic ideas inPeru, and for Italy the loss of all remaining gains made during theBenavides years.