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Dealing with the Communist past: Central and East European Experiences after 1990Author(s): Helga A. WelshSource: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 3 (May, 1996), pp. 413-428Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/152734

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EUROPE-ASIA TUDIES,Vol. 48, No. 3, 1996, 413-428

Dealing with the Communist Past:Central and East European Experiencesafter 1990HELGA A. WELSH

Weforget hat hepast s linkednotonlyto archives-that t is not limited o whatwas-but that it continues o live. The pastwalksthroughhe streets.Ghosts alkto us, andsometimeswe see themon television.Now andthenwe are our ownghostswithout venknowing it.1ATTHE NDOFTHE 980s the so-calledThirdWave of democratisation2inallyreachedCentral and Eastern Europe3 and the former Soviet Union. Before the recentoverthrowof communistregimes, the rathervoluminousbody of literatureon regimetransitions was based almost exclusively on political transitions from right-wingauthoritariano democraticpolitical rule. The transitions rom communist to pluralistpolitical systems differ from previous transitions n a number of importantaspects.Issues of political and economic system transformationequired mmediateattentionand,in severalcountries,problemsof nationalreconstitution ook priority.4However,despite importantsystemic differences among transitionprocesses, the stages, con-cerns and tasks that are part of democratisationprocesses bear considerableresem-blance to one anothereven across differentregime types.On a global scale, the re-emergenceof authoritarian ule or the succession ofunconsolidatedpluralistregimes are the frequentresult of failed efforts to democra-tise. In view of the uncertain outcomes of system transformation,much scholarlyattentiontraditionallyhas focused on (pre-)conditions o democracyand on methodsby which the institutionalisationof polyarchy is accomplished.5In more than oneway, it becomes a question of how the past influences the future. The legacy ofcommunism nvolves, amongotherthings, the specific impactof the communistpaston currentpolitical culture, solving problems of restitution,political rehabilitation,legal problems relating to communist party assets, evaluating roles of the formernomenklatura s privatisationproceeds,anddealingwith formercommunistfunction-aries and state securityservices. It is the last aspect thatI will address n this article.Historically,most systemtransformationsave been accompaniedby various formsof politicalpurgeand attempts o effect justice. At the same time, the frequencyandintensityof purgesseem to be declining,as seen in theregime changesin the southerncone of Europeand most of LatinAmericain the last two decades.Those in favour0966-8136/96/030413-16 1996Universityof Glasgow

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HELGA A. WELSHof an explicit policy against previousoffendersarguethatpublic institutionsneed tobe purgedof discreditedmembers of the old elite. It is justified by providinga basisfor democraticbeginnings rooted in the rule of law; it rectifies past injustices andprovidesa basis for a thorough nvestigation nto the past. Others maintainthatonlya policy of leniency will providea basis for national reconciliation and will foster aspiritof tolerance crucial to the building of a democraticpolitical culture.In Central and EasternEurope many emphasise the complexities of past involve-ment in communistregimes, particularly he relatively high level of participation npolitical parties and mass organisationsand the compliance on the part of the vastmajorityof the population,and the attendantdifficulty of separatingvictims fromperpetrators. n addition, the argumentproceeds, it is more importantto settle theissues of the future than those of the past. Centralto dealingwith the past in Centraland EasternEuropeis the questionwhether 'decommunisation' s an integral partofthe democratisationprocess or whether thatprocess automaticallyentails the decom-munisation of society.Dealing with formerhigh-level communistsand securityapparatuseswere clearlyamong the centraltasks facing governments immediatelyafter communismdisinte-gratedin much of Centraland EasternEurope.In the past years, scatterednews fromthe different countriesin Centraland EasternEuropeprovidedan interestingpicture:on the one hand,the issues were quite similaracrossthe region;on the other,initiallypolicy outputs differed widely while there was considerableconvergence in policyoutcomes.6Thatis, despite differing policies, in all countries the extent of decommu-nisation was quite limited in nature.Lately, the importanceof decommunisationhasdeclined substantiallyand, some argue,has even vanished into oblivion.7I will first outline major characteristics of decommunisation,concentratingonefforts to bringto justice formeragents of the state securityservices and communistofficials who have been chargedwith criminalactivities. But the focus of this studyis on the factors that have influenced the vigour (or lack of it) with which this issuehas been pursued. Specifically, I propose that initially the history of politicalrepression and the specifics of recent political transitions have been importantinfluencesupon why certainpolicies have been attempted n some countriesbut notin others. However, as time passed, differences in decommunisation have beendiminishingacross the region. At the same time, its function as a tool in the strugglefor political powerhas become more defined.The communistpast has been exploitedby some politiciansto undermine he legitimacyof political opponentsor to enhancetheir own.8

Dealing with the communist past: an overviewThe screening and vettingIn past transitions, or example,in Latin Americaand in the southerncone of Europe,a primaryconcern has been the past and future natureof civil-military relations.9In Central and EasternEuropemost investigationsare primarily ocused on whetherindividualshave been affiliatedwithrepressionby the state,in particularhe activitiesof the state securityservices, or take the form of legal inquiriesinto political crimes

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DEALINGWITHTHE COMMUNISTPASTand corruptioncharges.In general,communistpartyofficials and members are onlyincludedin lustrationl? r legal procedures f they had collaboratedwith statesecurityagencies or if they had been involved in criminal activities. The major exception tothis rule is the formerCzechoslovakia,where former communist functionaries romthe townshiplevel up were barred romholdingcertainpositions.In Bulgaria,formersenior communistswere not allowed to occupypositionsof governance n universitiesand research nstitutes. That law was annulledat the beginningof 1995.11Both lawsattracted nternationalattention;they have been criticised by internationalhumanrights organisationsand the Council of Europefor applyingcriteriaof collective guiltto formercommunist officials.

Following the 'revolutionary'upheavals n 1989, in Centraland EasternEuropethecommunist state security services were dissolved and new ones were created.However, the extent to which the reorganisationalso resultedin the legal investiga-tion and/orreplacementof the previous personnelhas variedconsiderably.In Poland,special screeningcommissionsinvestigatedformersecurityofficers,12but the ratio ofnew-to-old employees in the newly established State Security Office (UOP) isunknown.In Bulgaria,senior officials of the so-calledsixthdepartment f the InteriorMinistry,the state securityservice, were askedto retire.However,many others weregiven the opportunity o participate n building the Bureaufor the Protectionof theConstitutionwithin the Ministryof InternalAffairs,whose powerswere broadened n1993. With one exception, several decommunisation laws modelled after theCzechoslovakexampleeitherfailed to get a majority n parliamentor were declaredunconstitutional.3The absence of significant personnel turnoveris most obvious in the Romaniancase. In March 1990 a new secret service (SRI-Serviciulroman de informatii)wascreatedin Romania.Many assertthat it resembles its predecessor,the Securitate, nmany aspects, includingthe compositionof its staff. Accordingto differentsources,between 17 and 80% of the formerSecuritatepersonnelhave been rehiredand nomore than 20 to 30 former members were tried in court.14No legal measures havebeen passed in Romania that require systematic investigation into past Securitateaffiliations with public officials.In Poland and Hungary,even deciding whether former state security agents orpolitical collaborators should be identified has been particularlyuncertain.For apopulationof 38.4 million people, the Polish InteriorMinistrykept approximatelythree million files and the militarycounterintelligenceaddedanother400 000. It hasbeen estimated that the numberof full-time officers in the secret services amountedto 24 000; thereare no reliable estimates of how many secret informantsworked forthe securityservices but the number was considerablyhigher.'5 Repeatedefforts bydifferentpolitical groups to investigate, among other things, possible affiliationsofmembers of parliamentwith the SecurityService (SB) in Poland have been abortedor rejected.16After lengthy discussion, many failed efforts, and pressure to act prior to thenationalelections, the Hungarianparliamentpassed a law in March 1994 to requirescreening of high-rankingofficials for collaboration with the secret service andparticipation n the suppressionof the 1956 uprising. It is estimated that the law,which took effect in July 1994, will apply to between 10 000 and 12 000 people.17

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HELGA A. WELSHWhile it was alreadydifficult to identify and bringto justice agents and function-ariesof the formerstatesecurityservices,it provedto be especially tryingto deal withthose who had worked as informantsfor the state. In Czechoslovakiaand Eastern

Germany any kind of political collaborationwith the state security service wassufficient to excludeformer office-holders rompublicservice.The federalparliamentof the then Czechoslovakia passed a law in October 1991 that banned certaincategories of people (including functionaries,agents and collaboratorsof the statesecurityservice) fromholdingelected or appointedpublicor professionalpositions instate organisations,and in joint-stockcompaniesin which the state holds a majorityof the capital,for a periodof five years.18Accordingto the Annex of the UnificationTreatybetween the two Germanstates,which took effect on 3 October 1990, activeinvolvement with the East Germansecurity service and in crimes against humanityare a 'reason for exceptionaldismissal' in the public sector.19

Statuteof limitationsCanjustice now be done for crimes committed underthe communistregimes?Theproblems are myriad, one of the most importantbeing that some of the abhorrentevents occurred a long time ago. Specifically, statutesof limitation have expired,many of the accused are elderly and ill, and key witnesses have died or are difficultto find.20In Bulgaria,in March 1990, the statuteof limitationswas changedfrom 20 to 35years. In contrast to some countries in the region, no specific acts of terror orrepressionstand out. But it is revealingthatin a climateof mutualsuspicionand amidefforts to underminethe continuedpopularityof the successor organisationof theBulgarianCommunistParty,current nvestigationsagainst former communist func-tionariesare particularly ar-reaching.The charges against former members of thenomenklaturanclude,amongothers,ecological crimes,financialmisappropriationypreviousgovernments,embezzlementcharges, illegal transferof arms to Third Worldcountries, crimes against humanity associated with the infamous Lovech andSkravena abourcamps(in operationbetween 1959 and 1962), and crimes committedin connection with the assimilation campaign against ethnic Turks, and, finally,'nationaltreason'.In November 1991 the Hungarian parliamentpassed a law which would havesuspendedthe statuteof limitationsfor all crimes of murder, reasonand aggravatedassault in the last 45 years. Its clear intention was primarily o prosecutethose whohad been involved in the suppressionof the 1956 uprising, and the law's mainobjective was not so much the punishmentof those involved but the revelationof their identities to the public.21PresidentArpad G6ncz referredthe law to theConstitutionalCourt,which decided unanimouslythat it was unconstitutionalsinceit made laws retroactive for the purpose of punishing individuals.22However, inOctober 1993, the ConstitutionalCourt accepted a more restrictive law that didmake it possible to prosecutethose who committed crimes associated with the 1956uprising.23Just as in the case of Hungary,in Poland investigationsinto political crimes arecentredaround a specific time periodand specific events, in particular he periodof

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DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTPASTmartial law at the beginning of the 1980s. The Polish case also demonstratesthedifficultyof prosecutingpoliticalmurdereven if the events remain fresh in the publicmind. So far, trials have been prolongedand some cases never were pursued,

partly or lackof sufficient videncebut also because he Minister f InternalAffairshasused his discretionaryowers o refuse heprosecutorsccess to classifiedmaterialn theministry's rchives....24On 9 July 1993 the Czechparliamentpasseda law which declared hepastcommunistregime 'illegitimate'.The legislation suspendedall statutesof limitationfrom 1948 to1989 and allows for the prosecutionof crimes committedduringthese years. It isestimated that approximately2000 people might be affected by the law.25In Germany,criminal acts associated with the communist regime are liable toprosecution,providedthat they were committedprior to 3 October 1990 and werepunishable according to the laws of the former GDR. But the provisions of theUnificationTreatyregarding he statuteof limitationshave been criticised for lack ofclarity.26Tens of thousandsof cases await trial.They addressa wide rangeof crimesand accusations:acts of violence along the inner-Germanborder, electoral fraud,economic crimes, torture,and kidnapping.In Romania,prosecutionof crimes and screeningof securitypersonnelhave madethe least progress. Security police files are manipulated and used against thedemocraticopposition,27and only relatively few former communistparty officialsand security officers have been tried. Those political trials which took place weredirectly related to the violent December 1989 demonstrations.Former communistofficials were charged with complicity in mass murder and/or aggravatedmurder.The overall extent of those convictions is unclear, as is the extent of subsequentacquittals.The filesMany of the controversiessurrounding he lustration of former communist officialsand statesecurity agentsare relatedto the difficultquestionof how to judge theirpastpolitical activities in the light of the existing documentation.Access or denial ofaccess to state securityfiles has served as an importantpolitical weapon to discreditpolitical opponents and to underminethe credibility of new political institutions.Securingfiles of the formerstate securityagencies, the reliabilityof those files, andrumourssurrounding he disappearanceand/or destruction of many files are majorconcernsin all countries n CentralandEasternEurope.In all countriesthe reliabilityof the files has been questionedand it is well established thatmany of the files weredestroyedafter the fall of communism.Therightto access to the statesecurityfiles has been legally established n the caseof Germany.While no one disputes that files were destroyedin Germanytoo, theresolute actions of many citizen committees in the turbulentautumn of 1989 actedagainst widespread destruction,and files on over six million people have beensecured. The federalagency supervisingthe files of the formerStateSecurityServiceof the GDR employs more than 3000 staff membersand the administrative osts areextensive; yearly federal appropriations mount to more than DM 260 million. By

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DEALING WITH THE COMMUNIST PASTPOLITICS F THEPRESENT

WEIGHT FTHEPASTBackgroundactorsLevelof political ppand role ofstate secModes of transition

Political ettingStrengthof post-communistpoliticalorcesPolarisation f politicallandscapeInstitutionalet-upContextualactorsContagion ffects acrosssocietal sectorsValueorientationsExternal ventsCross-national iffusioneffectsInternationalaw

)ression:urity

FIGURE 1. PREDICTORS OF EXPLANATION.

Predictors of explanationNot surprisingly, policy choices in the Central and Eastern European arena have beendetermined by legacies of the past and current political circumstances (Figure 1). Thisholds particularly true for how the communist past is dealt with. No simpleexplanation suffices to analyse the dynamics within and the differences among thesecountries.36 The extent of political repression and penetration of society by the statesecurity forces, including the time elapsed since acts of terror and political crimeshave taken place, are among the factors that explain post-communist policies, as is theimpact of different modes of transition.37 Increasingly, however, the 'weight of thepast' is being replaced by 'politics of the present'.38 In addition, political purges aremore likely as an immediate outcome of regime transition; with the passage of timetheir urgency and the probability of their implementation diminish.

The weight of the pastPolitical repression and its forcesIn general, a policy of moderation has characterised Central and East Europeanapproaches to dealing with the communist past. One of the reasons for the generalabsence of revenge seeking is linked to the changing mode of repression in thosecountries. The history of political terror is very much associated with the period of

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HELGA A. WELSHcommunist takeover and the initial phase of consolidation, i.e. covering the yearsfrom 1945 until the mid-1950s. Show trials, institutionof labourcamps, eliminationof political opposition,and violence associated with collectivisation and nationalisa-tion were largelylimitedto this period. Only in those countrieswherede-Stalinisationwas rejected(in particularn Romania and Albania, and, to some extent, Bulgaria),was the reign of terrorprolonged. Since then, memories of terror have faded, andthose who committed the worst crimes are old or have died.The decline of political terror led to periods of relaxation of political repressionwhichalternatedwithperiodsof tighteningcontrol,as seen in 1968 in Czechoslovakiaand in 1981-82 in Poland. In general, physical violence was replaced by structuralviolence characterisedby calculated intimidation and public submissiveness. But italso led to morerefined forms of political surveillanceandbetter coordinationamongthe communist secret services. From 1979 the political police forces of all WarsawPact membercountries(with the exception of Romania)were linked togetherin aninternational lectronic networksystemcalled SOUD (InterlinkedSystemsfor Recog-nising Enemies).Ratherthandeclining, the numberof people workingfor police andstate security forces increased considerablyin some cases. Nowhere is this morepronouncedthan in the former GermanDemocraticRepublic,where the numberofpeople working full-time for the Stasi nearly doubled between 1973 and 1989.39Thus it is not surprising hat the state securityservices have been given particularattention n the aftermathof 1989. But it is also true that the penetrationof societyby the state security service-acting simultaneouslyas a policing and observationdevice for the rulingcommunistparties-has variedconsiderablyacross Central andEasternEurope. On the one hand, in the case of Hungary,there was surveillance,materialsprinted by opposition groups were often confiscated,and the police keptfiles on people. However, persecution was limited and political imprisonmentofintellectuals did not occur.4 On the otherhand, the sense of control was ubiquitousin the former GDR andin Romaniaand extendedfarbeyond the circles of identifieddissidents.Therefore,East Europeanmemories differ substantially n respect of therole of the formersecurityservices, contributingo the differencesin approaches eenacross the region.Modes of transitionPolitical environments n Central and EasternEurope vary across the region and thepolitics are still characterisedby uncertainty and electoral volatility. While thesentiment was widely shared that the powers of the old elite needed to be diffused,the wisdom of completely disarming hemwas also questioned.Central o this notionis the idea that the authoritarianegime is more likely to agree to liberalisationandultimately to a systemic transitionif a policy of clemency is part of the politicaltransitionprocess.41For this reason,political pacts42 ften garer support,butthey canonly be upheld if the authoritarian arties (i.e. the military, the dominantpoliticalparty,statesecurityandpolice apparatus) ave not discredited hemselvesto the pointof squanderingall rights to legitimaterule.With the exception of Romania, the transitionsin Central and EasternEuropeentailed elements of negotiationbetween the old and the newly emerging elite.43

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DEALINGWITH THE COMMUNISTPASTHowever, Poland is the only case where the opening of the political system wasclearlycontingentupona political pact.Although manydetailsregarding he outcomeof the Round Tablenegotiationshave been kept secret,rumourspersistthatSolidaritynegotiatorsagreedto a settlementsafeguarding hose who had acted on behalf of theformer communistgovernment.44In those cases where openingof political systems evolved over longer periodsandwherethe communistpartyencouragedat least a slight openingof the political space,as in Hungary,the role of the state securitywas clearly less pronounced.Just as inthe case of Poland, there has been speculation that, in the summer of 1989, a'gentlemen'sagreement'was concluded to preventa future witch huntagainstformercommunists. Despite accusations by former communist party officials that theagreementhas been violated, no majorcontroversieshad eruptedover the lustrationissue before the passage of the screeninglaw in March 1994. A more lenient attitudetoward former communists is justified more easily in the Hungariancase thanelsewhere since the reformwing of the formercommunists is credited with playingan importantrole in liberalisingthe political regime.In East Germanyand Czechoslovakia,implosion of the communistregimes cameunexpectedlyand no provisionsfor former communist officials' fate had been made.In the foundingelections of 1990, the communists' defeat was particularlydevastatingand reckoningwith the past has been more thoroughthan in other countriesin theregion. It should be noted, however, that the 1991 lustrationlaw was seen as toorigorousby many of the former Czech dissidents-turned-politiciansthe then FederalPresident,VaiclavHavel, was one of them), and it has been asserted that the coupattempt n the former Soviet Union in August 1991 might partly explain the changefrom the moderatedraft version to the much more extensive final lustration law.45

While decommunisation egulationsandimplementationof lustrationpolicies varyacross space and time, there also has been considerableconvergence.More recently,as Holmes suggests, 'in most of them, the anticommunistmpulsehas peteredout'.46Increasingly,variationand convergence can no longer be attributed argely to the'weightof the past', but to the emerging political landscape,a topic to which we nowturn.

Politics of the presentThe political settingWhile past factors must not be completely dismissed in explaining the attitudesofCentraland East Europeangovernmentstowardformer communistregimes, currentpolitical circumstances increasingly dictate policies. Successor parties of formercommunistpartiesor emergentpartiesdrawingon the supportof formercommunistscontinue to play a substantialrole in the new political landscape. But even incountries where the former communist forces initially suffered a severe defeat,reconstitutedbut substantiallydifferent-both in ideology and structure-successororganisationshave been able to stage a comeback.The electoral successes of thosepartieshave ensuredthata numberof formercommunistpartyofficials are once againin positions of power. On the one hand,this means there are no extensive purgesor

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HELGA A. WELSHretroactivelegislation. On the other, however, it has also contributed to politicalpolarisation.Independent f thepolicy approaches aken,no countryescapedscandals associatedwith lustration,and in some cases the political effects have been far-reaching.Forexample, political controversy surroundingthe lustrationprocess in Poland con-tributedsignificantlyto the downfall of the Mazowiecki and Olszewskigovernments.In 1993, following the success of the post-communistforces in Poland, the Demo-cratic Left Alliance and the Polish PeasantParty,issues of lustrationand decommu-nisationresurfaced.Criticsof the screeninglaw in Hungaryhave pointedout that thetimingof the law-prior to the May 1994 elections and at a time when the HungarianSocialistPartywas leadingin publicopinionpolls-suggest thatit was 'motivatednotby legal or moral considerationsbut by a desire to damage ... [the government's]majorpoliticalrival'.47Therigorousapproach o lustrationwhich was favouredby theCzechs and opposed by leading Slovak politicians has been cited as a contributingfactor in the break-upof the former Czechoslovakia.48The weaker the electoral strengthof the formercommunists,the easier it has beento move ahead with decommunisation fforts.In BulgariaandRomania,where formercommunistshave continuouslybeen able to garer substantial lectoralsupport, ssuesof lustrationandprosecutionof crimes committedundercommunistrule have addedto the already substantialpolitical polarisation. In Bulgaria efforts at politicalcleansingquicklybecame a pawnin the strugglefor power.Since the firstdemocraticelections in 1990 governmentalresponsibilityhas shifted several times between newand old political forces. Mistrust of formercommunists,manifestedin particularbyfearsthatthey would undermineeconomicreformefforts,combined with a perceivedneed to consolidatepolitical power, led to relativelywidespread,politicallymotivateddismissals under the newly instituted minority government of former oppositiongroups,the Union of DemocraticForces, in 1991 and 1992. Encouragedby relativelyfrequentshifts in power, allegations of decommunisationand recommunisationarerampant,and issues of political rivalry are entangledwith the question of how torelate to the communistpast.49In most countries,and particularly o in Bulgariaand Hungary,the constitutionalcourtshave played an importantrole in definingthe limits of retributive ustice andhave generallyacted as restraining orces.50 n turn,the courtswere most often calledinto actionby heads of statewho portrayedhemselves as moderatorsas well. Holmescalled this a form of power sharing in which parliamentaryanti-communismwasmediated 'with strategiesfor compromisedeveloped by other branches'.51But theConstitutionalCourtin Bulgaria, normally praisedfor its moderation,became entan-gled in political controversies as well. The lustration law that aimed at formercommunists in leadership positions in state-owned banks was declared unconstitu-tional.A different aw, targetingscholarsclosely affiliatedwith the formercommunistregime, was upheld by the Court. 'It is almost certain', Kolarovastates, 'that thecontext of currentpolitical events heavily influenced the justices' decision. Whilein the first case the presumptionof the justices was to soften the retributiveanti-communistpolicy of theparliamentarymajority, n the second case theyhad to decideagainst the backdropof a newly formed and unstable parliamentarymajoritythatincludedex-communistdeputies'.52

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DEALING WITHTHE COMMUNISTPASTGermancircumstancesare distinct because of unificationand the continued debateabout what went wrong with similar efforts to 'cleanse' Germanpolitical life afterWorld War II. In addition,the legacies of 40 years of mutual suspicion in inner-German relations, the special circumstances and the inhumanity of borderfortifications,including the Berlin Wall, have made attemptsat dealing with thecommunistpast a special case.53Members of the new political elite in the formerGDR have beenparticularly ffectedby allegations,accusationsandsuspicions.Somewith past connections to the state security service have had to resign, others only'stumbled'and resumed theirpolitical careers.The picture is furthercomplicated by the dominance of western Germansin theunificationprocess and differing regulationsin the five states which constitute theformer GDR. Thus,there is considerablevariation n the actualimplementationof thescreening procedures: he 'treatmentof politically incriminatedpublic officials of theformer GDR' has been called 'confusing and contradictory'.4But the widespread

replacementof political and administrativeelites as well as others in the publicservice cannot be reduced to issues of politically motivated screening and vettingmeasures alone but has also been influencedby changed recruitmentqualifications,the need to trimthe bloated administrative pparatus, nd the availabilityof qualifiedmanpowerfrom the west.55Contextual factorsAs time passes, revelationsconcerningformer affiliation with state securityservicesand the communistpartyhave lost most of theirpotency. In Hungary,as elsewhere,it has been emphasisedthat lustration 'was an issue not of historicaljustice but ofpresent accountabilityandtransparency-of not allowing people subjectto blackmailto be given power'.56Priorityhas been given to the rightto know and not to the needfor condemnationor punishment.The general public appearsmore interestedin towhat extent the formernomenklaturahas takenadvantageof its privileged position inthe privatisationof the economy (nomenklaturaprivatisation),57nd in the abolitionof privileges given to the former communistelite, thanin purges.Thus, even formeraffiliation with the state security services or active involvement in the communistregime often no longer act as a deterrent o a successful political career. At first,thisseems surprising.But the perceivedunreliabilityof the files, the difficultyof drawinga line between perpetratorsand victims, the increasinglypolitical characterof thedebate, and the dangerof witch-hunts are often cited as reasons for the absence ofpolitical cleansing, even among police collaborators.Other factors have reinforcedthis tendency, such as the re-evaluationof the communistpast, the passage of time,and the restriction of political cleansing to the public sector and a climate ofcompromiseand moderationduringthe transitionperiod.In view of the severe social and economic disruptionsassociated with the recentsystemic transformations,he communist period is re-evaluatedby many. Popularperceptionsabout life under socialism differ considerably; ew hadjoined the ranksof dissidentswhile most had come to arrangementswith the old regime.The absenceof revenge seeking may also call into questioncommon Westernperceptionsof the'totalitarian'natureand the causes for the collapse of the communistregimes. Large

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HELGA A. WELSHsegmentsof society hold a highly differentiatedview of the communistperiodwhichhas little in common with fervent anti-communism.This differentiationalso appliesto former office holders. Collective, unqualified rejection of all functionaries islargely absent; instead, they were and are being judged on performance,whichexplains, at least partly, the success of many of the previous communist partymembersin recent elections.58 n addition,lustrationalmost always is limited to thepublic sector. Leniency in employing former communist functionaries and statesecurity agents in the private sector has unavoidable spillover effects that workagainstcontinuedlustration n the public sector.A policy of leniency was facilitated by the fact that most former prominentcommunistofficials were close to or beyondretirementage andin manycases did notexhibitanydesire to holdpolitical positions.In addition, t shouldbe rememberedhatthe majorityof formercommunistpartymembers who occupy positions of influencein post-communistgovernmentsandadministrationsome from whatBaylis calls the'lower nobilityof the communistera', i.e. former communistpartyofficials who hadnot previouslyoccupiedpositions of nationalvisibility.59 n addition,public interestin dealing with the communist past has declined since other issues, in particulareconomic ones, have claimed priority.This developmenthas been encouraged by aconciliatoryattitudeon the partof most formerdissidents toward the old guard60 ndby the nature of the transitionprocess, which emphasised compromiseand bargain-ing.61At times, however, when political competitionintensifies, old front lines areresurrected o combat the political opponent and lustration turns into a tool in thestruggle for power. But instead of mobilising the public it seems to have added todisillusionment and political apathy;thus, it has been buriedrelatively quickly.62

ConclusionOverall, the past few years have been characterisedby policies of moderation-notof revenge seeking. East Europeanexperiencessuggest thatpolicy choices were notguided by retribution r reconciliationper se.63 In those countrieswhere lustrationhasbeen moderate or conspicuously absent, this has not happened from a desire forreconciliationbut because prevailing power arrangementshave preventedlustration.In those countrieswhere lustrationhas been more far-reaching, t was still relativelymoderateby most accounts and in generalnot guided by revenge seeking. It mightbe this aspect of dealing with the past that explains why different approachestolustrationhave not led to more markedlydifferent outcomes. The examples drawnfrom Central and EasternEuropealso seem to confirmthe Latin Americanexperi-ences, namely, that there is no sure model to follow.64The complaintthat too much political energy is being spent on settling the pastinstead of focusing on the importanteconomic and social issues that will determinethe future is common acrossnationalsettings.So is the use of vetting procedures orpolitical gain in the struggle for elite positions. Criminal prosecution of formercommunistswill takeyears,and it is reasonable o assume thatthe numberof officialswho will be triedand sentencedwill be small. Criminalprosecutorsrepeatedlyhavecautionedthatlegal proceedingscannotbring justice to forty years of injustice.Mostobserversagreethat the purposeof much of the legislationin the countries of Central

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DEALING WITH THE COMMUNIST PASTand Eastern Europe is noteworthy more for its moral than legal implications. Ingeneral former communist officials have only been investigated if they had collabo-rated with the security services or if they could be tried on criminal charges such asembezzlement, mismanagement and corruption. The latter has been confined torelatively few key figures, and the sentences have been largely symbolic. As previouspurges have shown, the momentum cannot be maintained forever. The tendency toforgive and forget is enhanced by the passage of time. Interests shift to other issuesonce the need for making peace with the past has been exhausted.

Ultimately, the question remains whether policies of retribution or reconciliationserve the interests of emerging democracies best; and while it is often assumed thatan investigation of the past is necessary to provide the basis for a democraticbeginning, in the transition period this may be true more for its moral than for itspolitical or legal implications. Osiatynski, for example, concludes his essay on Polishdecommunisation: 'It may also turn out that the failure of decommunisation andresistance to the retributive phase of the revolution-with its predictable violence,injustice and destructiveness-will be praised, in the future, as one of the mostimportant successes of the post-communist transformation'.65A policy of reconciliation might best serve the interests of an emerging democracyin transition periods but may become a liability during consolidation periods. Layingaside cultural and historical differences, and remembering Germany, Italy and Franceafter World War II, shows that the past does not simply disappear with the passageof time and that troubling questions do resurface. Referring to Argentina, Perelliemphasised the significance of the past as 'a central political commodity' in 'allhas-been countries', i.e. in those countries where myth building flourishes andnostalgia abounds.66 Parallels can be found in Central and Eastern Europe.67 And ina political climate in which former communists have been able to resurrect themselvessuccessfully in the eyes of the public, the issues of dealing with the past never ceaseto be instrumental in the struggle for political power. Thus, issues of how to deal withthe former communists and state security agents will probably continue to resurfaceas a pawn in the struggle for political power.Wake Forest University

1OctavianPaler, 'Wir sindunsereeigenenGespenster',Die Zeit,30 July 1993, p. 39.2 SamuelP. Huntington,The Third Wave.Democratizationn the Late TwentiethCentury(Norman ndLondon,1991);DohChullShin, 'OntheThirdWaveof Democratization. SynthesisandEvaluation f RecentTheoryandResearch',WorldPolitics, 47, 1, 1994,pp. 135-170.3For thepurposesof thisarticle,Central nd EasternEuropencludes hefollowingcountries:Bulgaria, he formerCzechoslovakia, he formerGermanDemocraticRepublic(GDR), Hungary,PolandandRomania.Previousversionswerepresented t theFourthConference f the GDR StudiesAssociation,Washington,DC, 12-15 November1992 and at the EighteenthAnnualConference fthe German tudiesAssociation,Dallas,TX,29 September-2October1994.The articlehas benefitedfrom the advice of ThomasA. Baylis, PeterBrod,PatriciaDavis, Ann L. Phillips and JohnP.Willertonas well as from the comments made by the participants t lecturesgiven at CornellUniversity February 994)andtheUniversityof Leipzig(July1994).I gratefullyacknowledgehevariouscontributions hichhavehelpedgreatly o refinemy arguments nd which have addednewones.Any remaining hortcomingsremy own.4 See, forexample,ClausOffe, 'Capitalism y DemocraticDesign?DemocraticTheoryFacingtheTripleTransitionn EastCentralEurope',SocialResearch,58, 4, 1991,pp. 885-901 and Sarah

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HELGA A. WELSHMeiklejohn Terry, 'Thinking About Post-Communist Transitions: How Different Are They?', SlavicReview, 52, 2, 1993, pp. 333-337.5 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz & Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Politics in DevelopingCountries. Comparing Experiences with Democracy (Boulder and London, 1990), chapter 1; PhilippeC. Schmitter, 'Democratic Dangers and Dilemmas', Journal of Democracy, 5, 2, 1994, pp. 57-74.

6 However, the main focus of the study is not on policy implementation but rather on policyintentions. Political purge is also narrowlydefined since it is limited to penal codes and ignores issuesthat might be subject to labour and social legislation (e.g. retirementprovisions for former agents andfunctionaries).7 See Stephen Holmes, 'The End of Decommunization', and Wiktor Osiatynski, 'Decommu-nization and Recommunization in Poland', East European Constitutional Review, 3, 3/4, 1994, pp.33-36 and pp. 36-41. Stewart & Stewartpoint out, for example, that 'decommunisation and screeningas political themes in Poland have been reduced to the obsession of a segment of the right wing', andthat, after the break-up of Czechoslovakia, 'Slovakia pauses in its decommunisation'. Debra W.Stewart & Cynthia V. Stewart, 'Lustration in Poland and the Former Czechoslovakia: A Study inDecommunization', International Journal of Public Administration, 18, 1995, pp. 887, 893.8 As Bertschi puts it: 'When political power is threatened the weapon of lustration can bewielded to gain sympathy and to quiet opposition. However, one question continues to affect thewhole of Eastern Europe: How long can new social conflicts be concealed by the smokescreen of

purification?'.C. Charles Bertschi, 'Lustration and the Transitionto Democracy: The Cases of Polandand Bulgaria', East European Quarterly, 28, 4, 1995, pp. 447-448.9 For a discussion of the role of the military in Central and Eastern Europe see Zoltan D.Barany, 'East European Armed Forces in Transitions and Beyond', East European Quarterly, 26,1992, pp. 1-30.10Lustration is the commonly used translation from the Czech term that refers to politicallymotivated 'cleansing'. The term lustration is derived from the Latin lustrum which refers to expiatorysacrifices that are limited to a period of five years.1 OMRIDaily Digest, 41, Part II, 27 February 1995. At the same time, in the Czech Republicthere was some discussion to extend the screening law for another two years.12 Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, 'Problems of Poland's State Security Office', RFE/RL ResearchReport, 1, 28 February 1992, p. 17.13 See Siidosteuropa, 42, 3-4, 1993: 'Bulgarisches Helsinki-Komitee: Menschenrechte inBulgarien nach den Wahlen vom Oktober 1991', pp. 244-256. See also 'Dokumentation:Menschenrechte', Siidosteuropa, 43, 6-7, 1994, pp. 403-414.14 Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 5/6 January 1994, p. 8; see also Dan lonescu, 'Romania's Public Warover Secret Police Files', RFE/RL Research Report, 1, 17 July 1992, pp. 9-15.15 Sabbat-Swidlicka, 'Problems of Poland's State Security Office', p. 17; 'Nothing has EndedYet. Interview with Zdzislaw Rurarz', Uncaptive Minds, 4, 4, 1991-92, p. 33.16 For example, on 19 July 1990 a motion in the Senate sought to determine whether candidatesfor parliament had collaborated with the security police or military counterintelligence. Only 29senators voted for the investigation, 22 against it, seven abstained and 42 (!) preferrednot to showup for the vote. Six days later the government decided that any investigation into parliamentarycandidates would violate several laws.

17 Edith Oltay, 'Hungary's Screening Law', RFE/RL Research Report, 3, 15 April 1994, pp.13-15. By February 1995 only two members of the former communist milita had been convicted fortheir involvement in the killing of civilians in 1956. See OMRIDaily Digest, 34, PartII, 16 February1995.18 For a detailed discussion see Jiri Pehe, 'Parliament Passes Controversial Law on VettingOfficials', Report on Eastern Europe, 5 October 1991, pp. 4-9 and Paulina Bren, 'Lustrationin theCzech and Slovak Republic', RFE/RL Research Report, 2, 16 July 1993, pp. 16-22. The categoriesare: (a) functionaries or agents of the state security; (b) collaborators of the state security who werefully aware of their collaboration; (c) communist party functionaries from the township level up(except those who served from 1 January 1968 to 1 May 1969) and members of so-called action,verification and normalisation commissions; (d) members of the People's Militia; and (e) students andjunior assistants who were in KGB schools for a period longer than three months.19'Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen DemokratischenRepublik iiber die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands. Einigungsvertrag', Bulletin, 104, 6 Septem-ber 1990, p. 1059.20 JudithPataki, 'Dealing with HungarianCommunist Crimes', RFE/RL Research Report, 1, 28February 1992, p. 21.21 Pataki,p. 21.

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HELGA A. WELSHGuillermo O'Donnell & Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. TentativeConclusions about Uncertain Democracies, 2nd edn (Baltimore and London, 1989), p. 37.43 Helga A Welsh, 'Political TransitionProcesses in Central and Eastern Europe', ComparativePolitics, 26, 4, 1994, pp. 379-394.44 'Nothing has Ended Yet', Interview with Zdzislaw Rurarz, pp. 32-33; 'Verzicht auf eineHexenjagd als Preis fur die Macht', Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 28/29 December 1991, p. 9.4 Engelbrekt, 'Bulgaria's State Security Archives', p. 26 and Bren, 'Lustration in the Czech andSlovak Republics'.46 For a listing of examples see Holmes, 'The End of Decommunization', p. 33.47 Oltay, 'Hungary's Screening Law', p. 15.48 Bren, 'Lustration in the Czech and Slovak Republics', p. 21.49 Thus, since in most cases no legal basis has been available, the alleged lack of sufficientprofessional qualifications was employed both as rationale and justification to defend politicallymotivated dismissals. But professional qualifications have also been used to retain and/or reinstateprofessionals with communist ties. Legislation passed in February 1994 stated, for example, that onlyjudges and prosecutors with five years of experience were eligible for higher positions in thejudiciary. See RFE/RL News Brief, 3, 14-18 February 1994, p. 19.50 For an evaluation of the role of the Constitutional Court in Hungary see Laszlo Solyom, 'TheRole of the Hungarian Supreme Court in the Change of the Social System', Kritische Vierteljahres-schrift fiir Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft, 76, 1, 1993, pp. 34-45.51 Stephen Holmes, Conceptions of Democracy in the Draft Constitutions of Post-CommunistCountries, Working Paper 5.11, Center for German and European Studies, University of Californiaat Berkeley, April 1993, p. 17.52 Rumyana Kolarova, 'A Self-Restricting Court', East European Constitutional Review, 2, 2,1993, p. 50. As mentioned earlier, the law is no longer in effect.53 For a more detailed account see my chapter, 'Shadows of the Past: Germany and the Legacyof SED Rule', in Peter H. Merkl (ed.), The Federal Republic of Germany at Forty-Five. Unionwithout Unity (London and New York, 1995, pp. 113-127.54Der Spiegel, 31, 1993, p. 44.55Dieter Segert, 'The State, the Stasi and the People: The Debate about the Past and theDifficulties in Reformulating Collective Identities', Journal of Communist Studies, 9, 3, 1993, pp.205-206. See also Gregg 0. Kvistad, 'Accomodation and "Cleansing": Germany's State Employeesfrom the Old Regime', West European Politics, 17, 4, 1994, pp. 52-73.

56 'What Went Right in Hungary. An Interview with Balint Magyar', Uncaptive Minds, 6, 3,1993, p. 111.57 For an interesting account of the nomenklatura privatisation in Hungary and in Poland seeIvan Szelenyi, 'Kompradoren, Nomenklaturakapital, Kleinbtirger', in Jozsef Bayer & Rainer Deppe(eds), Der Schock der Freiheit. Ungarn auf dem Weg in die Demokratie (Frankfurtam Main, 1993),pp. 199-205.58 See Stewart & Stewart, pp. 887, 890-891, 895.59 Thomas A Baylis, 'Plus _aChange? Transformation and Continuity Among East EuropeanElites', Communistand Post-Communist Studies, 27, 3, 1994, pp. 315-328.60 While this generalisation holds true for most of Central and Eastern Europe, it fails to reflectthe attitudes of many former eastern German dissidents. Partlybecause of their political marginalisa-tion, efforts to deal with the communist past have emerged as one of the key issues that have helpedto keep alive the legacy of opposition in the former GDR. However, it also assists western Germaninterests since it emphasises the 'totalitarian' nature of the old regime.61 See Irena Grudziriska Gross, 'Post-Communist Resentment, or the Rewriting of PolishHistory', East European Politics and Societies, 6, 2, 1992, p. 146 and Welsh, 'Political TransitionProcesses...'.62 For a concise overview of reasons why efforts at decommunisation have failed in EasternEurope see Holmes, 'The End of Decommunization', pp. 34-36.The dichotomy of the two strategies is explained by Jamal Benomar, 'Justice After Transi-tions', Journal of Democracy, 4, 1, 1993, pp. 4-6.64 See Benomar, 'Justice After Transitions', p. 14 and Pion-Berlin, 'To Prosecute or to Pardon?',pp. 129-130.65 Osiatynski, 'Decommunization', p. 41.66 Carina Perelli, 'Settling Accounts with Blood Memory: The Case of Argentina', SocialResearch, 59, 1992, pp. 415-451.67 Tony Judt, 'The Past is Another Country:Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe', Daedalus,121, 4, 1992, p. 100.

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