1474574 US Air Force Miracle

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41MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2003

S OME ARMY LEADERS believe that deny-ing media access to military action is a mis-take. General Wesley K. Clark, U.S. Army, Retired,now a military analyst, believes that as a result of the Vietnam mentality the military made an error

by restricting press coverage during the PersianGulf war. We had a 1st Armored Division tank battle that was just incredible, perhaps the biggestarmored battle ever, but not a single image was re-ported or documented for history by the press,Clark said. 1 One U.S. Army officer said aboutAfghanistan, There was nobody there to tell thestory of the youth of America going out and doingthis great mission with such success in real toughterrain. It was a missed opportunity that I hopewe dont [repeat] in the future. 2

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, approximately 500 journalists, photographers, and news crews wereembedded within U.S. and British military units;another 2,000 unilateral journalists were in Ku-wait. In the planning stages of war, AssistantSecretary of Defense for Public Affairs VictoriaClarke told reporters they would have more ac-cess than had been available during the Persian Gulf war and in Afghanistan. She said, Its in our inter-est to let people see for themselves through the newsmedia, the lies and deceptive tactics SaddamHussein will use. 3 Clarke made this statement af-

ter U.S. journalists complained they were deniedaccess to U.S. troops during the first few monthsof the campaign in Afghanistan. 4 An embeddednews media program ensures that the media re-ceives every opportunity to observe actual combatoperations.

U.S. Army public affairs officer (PAO) ColonelMelanie R. Reeder, who was deployed to Af-ghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, saidinitial public affairs guidance was restrictive andpassive because of host-nation sensitivities andlimitations. Reeder said, When the public af-fairs posture changed from passive to active,

I n Operation Desert Storm, the Army shunned the news media, while the

USMC fully accepted them. . . . John Fialka examined eight news media sources. He

found that although the Army outnumbered the Marines by more than 200,000 soldiers,there were only 271 articles about the Army;

there were 293 stories about the Marines. . . .Fialka writes that the USMC had a flair for

public relations that made the reporters wonder whether they came from the same

country that produced the Army.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tammy L. Miracle, U.S. ArmyCenter for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, D.C.


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42 September -October 2003 MILITARY REVIEW

it was difficult to catch up and get the media outin front with the troops. 5 Reeder added that theeight embedded reporters in Operation Ana-conda helped blaze the path for a large-scale,Secretary of Defense-dictated, embedded-mediaprogram in OperationIraqi Freedom.

Reeder, who partici-pated in writing the pub-lic affairs chapter for theCenter for Army Les-sons Learned, Fort Leav-enworth, Kansas, whichfocuses on the coalitionforces land componentcommand public affairsmission in Afghanistan,said, When journalists

were provided access,the accurate story wastold. When they werenot provided with infor-mation, the result wasspeculation, misinforma-tion, and inaccuracy. 6

UnprecedentedMedia Access

Before Operation IraqiFreedom, Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-feldt and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B.Myers issued a directivethat stated, We must organize for and facilitateaccess of national and international media to ourforces, including those engaged in ground operations.Our goal is to get it right from the start, not days orweeks into an operation. We will commit communi-cations systems and trained joint public affairs teamsto facilitate the international press getting a firsthandlook at coalition operations. 7 These policy changes

profoundly affect the way PAOs operate. Newscrews, individual journalists, and photographers areassigned to specific combat units for days, weeks,or months.

In Operation Desert Storm, the Army shunned thenews media, while the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)fully accepted them. In his book Hotel WarriorsCovering the Gulf War, John Fialka writes that theUSMC received too much coverage because it hada flair for public relations that made the reporters

wonder whether they came from the same countrythat produced the Army. 8

Thus far, news reports from Operation Iraqi Free-dom reveal that the embedded media program isworking. Embedded journalists have unprecedented

access to troops, andthe U.S. public is seeingactual footage of Armyactions in Iraq. After thesand settles, however,will embedded journalistscomplain that unit com-manders inflicted toomany rules that keptthem from telling thereal story? Embedded

journalists have alreadynoted that restrictions

are sometimes placed onwhat they can report,but such limitations areliberal and based solelyon operational securityand force protection.

The level of coopera-tion between journalistsand soldiers depends onthe unit commander.Positive news coverageindicates that Armycommanders are openand available to em-bedded journalists evenon the battlefield. Pos-sibly a new level of

trust will evolve between soldiers and journalists.This alone is history in the making.

Journalists who covered Operation Desert Stormwere in Riyadh and Dhahran hotels while battlesraged. Of the 1,600 media representatives inSaudi Arabia, only about 10 percent managed toproduce stories that told the news and documentedhistory. Still, the lack of media access during

Operation Desert Storm was not entirely theArmys fault. Saudi Arabian officials were reluc-tant to permit reporters to enter the country andwere concerned about reporting that might offendcultural sensibilities. 9

A New Level of TrustFriction between the Army and the media is not

new. Many Army leaders, and not just Vietnam-eraleaders, painfully distrust the media and are cautious

CNN News correspondent Peter Arnett in Baghdad, Iraq, 1992.

M any Army leaders, and not just Vietnam-era leaders, painfully

distrust the media. . . . In many cases, news media rush to deadline. Attribution, a fundamental part

of news reporting, is often absent,and essential military terminology

and critical facts are sometimes

incorrect. In some cases, stories are completely fabricated.

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about what gets out to the press. One possible ex-planation for the Armys distrust of the news mediais that journalists do not always take the time for ac-curate reporting. In many cases, news media rushto deadline. Attribution, a fundamental part of newsreporting, is often absent,and essential military ter-minology and criticalfacts are sometimes in-correct. In some cases,stories are completelyfabricated.

In July 1998, Time andCNN publicly apologizedfor running the Opera-tion Tailwind story, whichalleged that U.S. forcesused nerve gas during

the Vietnam war. 10 AprilOliver produced theCNN piece, and warcorrespondent PeterArnett delivered it to thepublic. Oliver and Arnettalso received bylines forthe story in Time . Thestory claimed to haveuncovered a top-secret,covert military operationin Laos whose objectivewas to assassinate U.S.defectors. Allegedly, theoperation went awry andground commandersemployed sarin nervegas to kill enemy soldiers as well as civilians. Thefollowing day, newspapers across the country spreadthe story.

The Department of Defense (DOD) initiatedan extensive investigation. Research revealed noevidence of sarin use, nor was it a goal of Opera-tion Tailwind to target U.S. defectors. The Centerfor Military History interviewed several individu-als identified as possibly having firsthand knowledgeof the operation, but none knew of the use of sarinor any other lethal chemical agent. The missionsonly purpose was to attack installations on the HoChi Minh Trail to create a diversion for anotheroperation.

In an attempt to prevent further damage, Time rana letter from the editor apologizing to readers. Oliverwas fired and producer Jack Smith resigned. Arnett,who was initially reprimanded for his role in the

story, was later fired because of relentless pressurefrom the Pentagon.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Peter Arnettwas once again fired, this time by NBC, foralledgedly saying on state-run Iraqi television that

the allied war efforthad failed because of Iraqi resistance. TomJohnson, CNN NewsGroup chairman andCEO, issued a statementsaying Arnetts storycould not be supported:The fault lies with theeditors, producers, re-porters, and executivesresponsible for the pro-gram and its contents. 11

An embedded mediamight have negated suchmisinformation.

Another reason theArmy might be reluctantto have embedded me-dia while at war is theresponsibility for protect-ing journalists. Howdoes a soldier keep agung-ho reporter fromcrossing the line intodanger to get thatPulitzer Prize-winningphotograph? What hap-pens if a journalist istaken prisoner? Accord-

ing to the 1949 Geneva Convention, journalists ac-credited by an accompanying military force are con-sidered part of the military entourage and must betreated as prisoners of war. 12 Also, they might besecurity risks, given what they might know.

Unlike FOX News reporter Colonel Oliver North,USMC, Retired, most journalists do not have a mili-tary understanding of war. Under current Pentagonguidelines, embedded journalists are not allowed tocarry weapons, use a personal vehicle, or break away from the military unit.

During the first week of Operation Iraqi Freedomfour journalists were killed, none of whom were partof the embedded media. In 2001, 37 journalists werekilled; eight while covering the war in Afghanistan. 13The British newspaper The Guardian reported thatthe Taliban was offering $50,000 to Afghans whokilled Western journalists. 14

C olonel Reeder, who was deployed to Afghanistan during

Operation Enduring Freedom, said initial public affairs guidance was restrictive and passive because of host-nation sensitivities and

limitations. . . , When the public affairs posture changed from

passive to active, it was difficult to catch up and get the media out in front with the troops.

Fox News correspondent Steve Harrigan in Afghanistan, 2001.

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dedicated U.S. soldiers. Todays uniformed men andwomen are the best in the world. They will tell afirst-class story for the Army.

DOD Media Boot CampThe DOD news media boot camp helps embed-

ded journalists develop a relationship with the mili-tary services and prepares them for the rigors of combat, including possible exposure to biological orchemical weapons. DOD should require all journal-ists who want to be embedded with troops to at-tend the boot camp. The camp allows broadcastnews crews to experiment with improved commu-nications gear and satellite uplinks. The Pentagonmust continue to make the training as realistic as pos-sible. Few reporters are combat veterans or havehad combat experience.

The Army must position extremely competent sol-diers to manage the embedded media program to

allay the type of criticism it received after Opera-tion Desert Storm because of how it managed pub-lic affairs operations. According to Fialka, We sawan Army public affairs system fashioned as a dead-end career for officers and staffed with a sprinklingof incompetents put there by media-wary generals,some of whom still blame the media for losing theVietnam war. 24 In contrast, competent, dedicatedPAOs have been responsible for media successesin Afghanistan. In addition, the Army must continueto rely on U.S. National Guard (USNG) and Re-serve Component (RC) PAOs, who in many cases,are members of the civilian media and could be an

asset in implementing the embedded media program.In addition to the embedded media program,Army PAOs and escort officers must be equippedto support the hundreds of journalists who operateunilaterally during military operations. For the newsmedia, Operation Iraqi Freedom was considered tobe the first real digital war. 25 News crews havelipstick cameras, satellite videophones, laptop videoediting, and portable TV-transmission dishes. 26PAOs must have the physical ability and resourcesto support high-tech news crews.

Establishing Trust and Credibility1. Walter Isaacson, News From the Frontline, The Wall Street Journal, 9 January

2003, Opinion sec.2. Kerry Sanders, Pentagon Recommends Boot Camp for Journalists Covering theWar, CNBC: The News with Brian Williams, 10 February 2003.

3. Howard Kutz, A Battle Plan for the 03 Campaign, The Washington Post, 20January 2003, D1.

4. Afghanistan: Report Says Pentagon Restricted Journalists Access to War, Ra- dio Free Europe, on-line at ,4 March 2003.

5. COL Melanie R. Reeder, interview by author, 2003, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.6. Ibid.7. Ibid.8. John J. Fialka, Hotel Warriors Covering the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Woodrow

Wilson Center Press, 1992), 2.9. Joint Publication (JP) 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations (Wash-

ington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 14 May 1997), 1-3.10. April Oliver and Peter Arnett, Operation Tailwind, Time and CNN, 7 June 1998.11. Allan Wolper, CNNs CIA Connection: New Tailwind Controversy, Editor & Pub-

lisher Inc ., 132: 1-2.12. Jennifer Harper, Embedded Media Gets Mixed Reviews in Early Stages of the

War, The Washington Times, 25 March 2003, Nation, A12.

13. For information about the Committee to Protect Journalists, see on-line at

.14. The Guardian. Reference information not provided.15. Mathew Rose and Emily Nelson, Media Will Put Reporters Safety First, The

Wall Street Journal, 12 March 2003, B1.16. Victoria Clarke, pre-war briefing. Reference information not provided.17. James T. Madore, Journalists: Back to the Front; Some Skepticism Over Em-

bedding of Media, Newsday, 3 March 2003, A14.18. Ibid.19. Dan Rather, Interview by Larry King, CNN Larry King Live, 14 April 2003.20. Susan B. Glasser, Media and Military Try Experiment in Openness, The Wash-

ington Post, 7 March 2003, A14.21. Howard Kurtz, Media Weigh Costs, Fruits of Embedding, The Washington

Post, 11 March 2003, A15.22. Fialka, 7.23. Walter Isaacson, News from the Frontline, The Wall Street Journal, 6 January

2003, A19.24. Fialka.25. Emily Nelson, TV Crews Plan to Employ a Range of High-Tech Gear Unavail-

able in 1991 Conflict, The Wall Street Journal, 12 March 2003, B1.26. Ibid.

NOTES

J ohn Hendren, who stayed with the 3d Infantry Division in Kuwait before

the war, said, When youre living in tents with these guys and eating what they eat and

cleaning the dirt off the glasses, its a whole different experience. You definitely have a concern about knowing people so well

that you sympathize with them. If the public believes embedding journalists is a way for the Pentagon to control the news rather than to report it, the Army

will have gained nothing.

Army leaders must include media operations dur-ing the earliest stages of war planning. Logistics plan-ners must include public affairs operations and post-conflict media support in the process. PAOs need

sufficient means of transportation, communicationsgear, and competent personnel for escort duty.Embedding the media brings the soldier closer to

the American people and puts a face on battle. Co-operation between the media and the Army is es-sential for the program to be effective. Journalistsmust understand operational security and respect theunit commanders security concerns. Embedded

journalists must follow the ground rules imposed onthem for their safety and the safety of the troops.They must establish trust and credibility with thecommander and learn to use the correct military ter-minology and acronyms.

During the war with Iraq, Americans received thenews 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; they listenedto it, read about it, watched it, or surfed for it on theInternet. The world has watched as embedded jour-nalists interviewed soldiers, and officers and enlistedsoldiers are showing the public that they are pro-fessional, trained, disciplined, and ready to risk theirlives for their country. Embedding journalists intoArmy units provides an opportunity for the world tosee the American soldiers capability and dedicationto the mission. MR

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