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The Law of Nature in Locke's Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian?Author(s): Patrick CobySource: The Review of Politics, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter, 1987), pp. 3-28Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review ofPolitics

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The Law of Nature in Locke's SecondTreatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian?Patrick CobyThe question ddressed ythis ssay s whether homas Hobbes is thetrueintellectual orebear fJohnLocke. A brief omparison ftheteachings fthese wo uthorswith espect onaturalustice nd civilusticewould eem tosuggesthatLocke s a determineddversaryfHobbes whoseviewson usticeare reducible o themaxim that mightmakesright." ut a reexaminationfLocke's Second reatisehowsthatLocke adoptsthisprinciplewithhardly essthoroughnesshan Hobbes. Even so, an important ifferenceemains,forLocke takes teps odisguise hegrim eality fpower,whereasHobbes makes

theenlightenmentfpeoplethe ine uanon f hispolitical cience.Locke'sde-parture romHobbes is seenas an attempto nstillnthebodypolitic degreeof usticethatwouldnot otherwisexist.'Locke scholarshipforsome thirty earsnow has fixed tself nthe question of Locke's intellectualpedigree-Was theWhig phi-losophera sincereChristianand faithful onveyorof the naturallaw tradition, r was he insteada closetHobbesian, to saynothingof a bourgeois ideologist?The reason behind such concentratedfocus is the recognitionby many scholars thatLocke is inconsis-tent,or apparentlyso, and thus difficult o interpret.A case inpoint s Locke'sdescription f thestate ofnature.Locke is at painsto distinguish is account from hat of Hobbes (SecondTreatise,ec.19), and yethe retainsenough Hobbesian features o justify heconclusionthatman's life in nature, ifnot "solitary,"s certainly"poor, nasty,brutish, and short." Some scholars explain these

problems as changes of mind, perhaps as mere inadvertencies,and are satisfied o say thatLocke makes mistakes.2OthersplaceLocke in his historicalsetting,examine thoroughly he debatesand vocabularyoftheday,and concludethatfew fanydifficultiesreallyexist,theirdetectionbeing theconsequence ofan unhistori-cal approach.3Finallya thirdgroupof scholars xplainLocke's in-consistencies s a stratagem orconcealinghis indebtedness o the"justlydecried"Hobbes.4 Those who advance this ast interpreta-tion have attemptedto show thatneither the Bible nor RichardHooker's Laws ofEcclesiastical olity re authoritative texts forLocke, despitethe factthatLocke quotes frequently romboth.I should confess t the outset thatmy sympathiesie withthosescholarsofthe thirdgroupwhobelievethat Locke is a Hobbesian.My intentions to supporttheirpositionbyexaminingthesubjectofnatural aw as presentedbyLocke in the SecondTreatise.might

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4 THE REVIEW OF POLITICSadd, however, hatwhile I accept Locke's Hobbesianism, I do notregardhim merelyas a disciple. There are differences o be ob-served,and one in particular willdevelop in the closingportionofthepaper.

LAWS OF NATUREIt is a much remarked factabout Locke thathe givesno sys-tematic account ofnaturallaw in the SecondTreatise:itwould be

beside my present purpose, to enter here into the particularsofthe Law of Nature" sec. 12).5 Even so, the work contains an im-pressivecollectionof obligationswhich are called natural laws atsome pointor another. fLocke'sdisclaimer s thensetaside and alistcompiled,one discoversat least thirteennaturallaws in totaland as many as six functioning n the state of nature. Thosewhichexistpriorto and independentof civil society re: (1) self-preservationsecs. 6, 135, 149, 171); (2) thepreservation f man-kind (secs. 6, 134, 135, 159, 171, 182, 183); (3) privateproperty(secs. 30, 31); (4) restrictions n privateacquisition,namelytherequirements hatnothing ppropriatedbe allowed to spoil (secs.31, 36, 37, 46, 50) and thatthere be "enough, and as good left"forothers secs. 27, 33, 34); (5) parents'care ofchildren secs. 56,58, 66, 67, 71, 72, 74); and (6) children's are, defense, comfort,and honor ofparents secs. 66, 67, 68, 71, 72, 74). Of the six thefirst our mean to regulatethebehavior of individuals,while thelast twoaddress ife n thefamily.Once civilsocietyhas been established, even additional aws ofnaturecome intoplay. They concern therelationship f the com-monwealth o its citizensor thecommonwealthn itsdealingswithother states. The first ategory ncludes (1) limitedgovernment(secs. 135, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142); (2) government y consent(secs. 95, 176, 186, 192); (3) majority ule sec. 96); (4) legislativesupremacy secs. 149, 150);6 (5) prerogative ower sec. 159); and(6) the rightof revolution secs. 168, 196). The second sort con-tainsonlyone law,namely, he aw of ust conquest,but ustice inthisregardhas the fourfollowingpecifications:71) that therebeno dominion over formerallies (sec. 177); (2) that despoticalpowerextendonlyto the livesand liberties f thecapturedenemy(secs. 178, 179, 180); (3) thattherebe no seizure ofenemyprop-ertybeyondwhat is needed forreparation secs. 180-84), and thateven thisclaim be relinquishedwhen the lives ofinnocentpeople


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IS LOCKE A HOBBESIAN? 5are at stake sec. 183); and (4) that therebe no governing f con-quered territorieswithout the consent of their inhabitants sec.192).Beforeconsidering n detail Locke's thirteen aws ofnature,wemight ake note ofsome apparentdeparturesfrom heHobbesianoriginal.Firstofall, Hobbes does notdifferentiate,s does Locke,betweennatural aws appropriateto a state ofnature and naturallaws appropriateto civil society.He does not because he deniesthat the state of nature is actuallygovernedby natural law. ForHobbes naturallaw has the sole function feffectingman's prog-ress fromnatureto society,whichprogress s accomplishedby so-cializing an otherwiseunsocial creature and by establishing le-mentalrules offair reatmentElementsfLaw I. 4, 10, 15). It is infact the absence of effective aw in nature that leads Hobbesto assertthe priority f natural right,defined n De Cive as theright tohave all, and to do all" (I. 10). In a Hobbesian state ofnature,people enjoy such a degree of license thatdistinguishingbetween awful and lawless conduct is all but impossible.Accord-ingly,Hobbes's descriptionof the state of nature is pointedlyamoral. Locke, on the otherhand, presumesa firmdemarcationbetweentwo typesof people, the law-abidingand the criminal.Secondly,Hobbes argues that ustice is the keepingof contracts,and that contracts n a state of nature are mostly nvalid De CiveII. 11; Leviathan iv.pp. 124-25). Locke, though,believes thatanyviolationof natural aw is an injustice, nd he identifies ixlaws innature that can be violated. Thirdly,Hobbes is convinced thatjustice is lacking n naturebecause privateproperty,n which us-tice depends, is an institution onfinedto civil society De CiveDedication). But Locke explainshow property s appropriated nnature and how ust relations pply in that state.Withrespect o civilsociety,Hobbes and Locke are evidently topposite poles, withHobbes using naturallaw to defendabsolut-ism and Locke usingnatural aw to promote imitedgovernment.Hobbes arrives at his conclusion by investigatingthe varioussourcesofrightful ominion,which sources he claims are three nnumber: consent, generation (tacit consent), and conquest. Ineach case, though, power is absolute and despotical,that is, theruler rules n his own interest, nd thesubjectsubmitsout of fear.Thus to Hobbes's mind a kingand a tyrant re one and thesame;likewise a king and a parent-master, orthe cityis but a largefamily,nd thefamily small city De CiveVIII. 1). Hobbes con-


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6 THE REVIEW OF POLITICScludes then thatthesovereign'segitimacys a function fstrength(eitherhis own [acquired government] r thatadded to his by theconsent ofothers instituted overnment]); nd because what thesovereign ommands is law,thesovereign'smight s thesovereign'sright-mightmakesright.Locke also differentiates hree sources of legitimate power,whichhappen to be the same threerecognizedby Hobbes. Butthese threesources, says Locke, designatethree distinctkindsofpower: political,parental,and despotical.Only in thecase ofdes-potic poweris powerabsolute,politicaland parentalpowerbeingstrictlyimited.Hence there s a difference etweenkingship ndtyranny. here also is a differenceetweenpoliticsand parentingin thatparental poweris temporary nd confined o theliberty fthe child. Locke furthermaintains thatthose subject to politicalrulehave giventheirconsentfreely.Hobbes saysmuch the same,althoughHobbes supposes thatcontractsbased on fear which ishowhe explainsthesocial contract) re fully alid (De Cive I. 16;Leviathan iv. pp. 126-27). Locke insists, however- and ratherstrenuously thatactionsmotivatedbyfear are notto be takenasvoluntary. inally,Locke contendsthat egitimate oliticalrulede-rivesfrom heconsentofnaturallyfree nd equal people. Power san instrument f government, ut it is not the cause of its legiti-macy.Thus mightdoes not make right.In assessingLocke's Hobbesian lineage, a usefulplace to beginis with the second law ofnature,thepreservation fmankind,be-cause it is thereespeciallythatLocke obligesthe individualto in-teresthimselfn thewell-being fothers:

The State fNatureas a Law of Nature o governt,which bligesevery ne: And Reason,which s thatLaw, teaches ll Mankind,whowillbutconsultt,that eing llequalandindependent,ooneought oharmanothern hisLife,Health,Liberty,r Possessions(sec. 6).Locke goes on tomentionthat an additional reasonfordutiful e-haviour towards others s that all men are theworkmanship ndproperty f God:

For Men being ll theWorkmanshipf one Omnipotent,nd infi-nitelywiseMaker;All theServants f one SovereignMaster, entinto theWorldbyhis orderand about his business, hey re hisProperty,hoseWorkmanshiphey re,made to astduring is,notone anothers leasuresec. 6).


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IS LOCKE A HOBBESIAN? 7Upon reflection his second reason seems more the cause ofman'sobligationsthan his species equality.8Equality by itself annot es-tablishdutiesbeyondthe singledutyto treat fellowhuman beingsequally.The trouble s that human beings are treatedas equals ifthey re equally conceded the naturalright to have all, and to doall." Equality is consistentwith, and even supplies the basis for,that absolute license in Hobbes (Leviathan iii. pp. 110-11).9Manratherhas obligationsbecause he belongsto God - firstheobliga-tion to preservehimself, nd then the obligationto preservehisequals because theyare equally thecreaturesofGod. Self-preser-vation is therefore he first aw of nature, fromwhich is derivedthe preservationof mankind as the second law of nature. Al-thoughwe began with the second law ofnature,notingthat it isother-regarding, e now see that it is tied to the first aw ofna-ture,which in an unexpected way is also other-regarding-a re-gard forGod our maker.Self-preservation, natural aw,is sometimes alled by Locke anatural right secs. 11, 25, 87, 123, 128, 149, 208).1o Now itwould seem to make bettersense to treat self-preservations anaturalright, ince man is powerfullynclined to preservehimselfanyway.Locke speaks openlyofthis nclination n the FirstTreatise(secs. 56, 86, 87, and 88). Not only is self-preservationhemostimperiousof man'sdesires, t is also theseat ofhis rightsthatde-sire engenders rights s the startingpoint of Hobbes [De CiveI.71]." But ifself-preservations a right ooted n instinct,why s italso a law, a discovery freason that constricts ehavior?'2Sincehuman beings do not ordinarily ine up to destroythemselves,what is there in human conduct to restrain?Two answers seempossible. In the first lace it should be noted that Locke's argu-ment here has a rhetorical ffect earingon the second law of na-ture. Because Locke identifieself-preservations a duty, his s aconsequenceofman'screatureliness,tcomes as no surprise nd isindeed ratherobvious that the preservation f mankind is simi-larlya duty.Locke implies-he does not say directly-thatman isobligedto preservehis fellowsbecause he is even less theproprie-tor of theirbeing than he is the proprietor fhimself.Failure toown himselfobligeshim to preservehimself;failuretherefore oown others,who are his equals, obliges thathe preservethemaswell. But ifman in fact s not obligedo preservehimselfunder alaw ofnature, s rather nclinedo preservehimself nder a right fnature, then no law commandingthe preservation f others can


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8 THE REVIEW OF POLITICSbe derived from elf-preservation.he second law of nature wouldthusdepend on an artful onflation f obligationand inclinationas regardsthe firstaw-right fnature.Even thoughman need hardlybe told to preservehimself, tillthere s a sense in whichself-preservations obligatory. he law ofnature is described n itsmostgeneraltermsas reason: "The StateofNaturehas a Law to govern it, which obliges everyone:AndReason, which s thatLaw . . ." sec. 6). Reason can obligeman,not simply o preservehimself-forthis s instinctual but to pre-serve himself n a way consistentwithreason; and rational self-preservation may commonly entail the preservationof others,since to threatenothersneedlessly s to introduce nto one's sur-roundingsthe distrust nd ill-will hat make abandonment of thestate of nature and the surrenderof natural rights nevitable.'3Were all men perfectlyational,that s, perfectlybedient to natu-ral law,governmentwould have no cause to exist sec. 123). But ifenlightened tilitarianisms the sense in whichself-preservationsa particularpreceptof natural aw and reason the whole of naturallaw,thenLocke'sunderstanding iffersn no substantialwayfromthat of Hobbes who says in Leviathan hat"a law ofnature,lexna-turalis,s a preceptor generalrule,found out byreason,bywhicha man is forbidden o do that,which is destructive f his life. ."(xiv.pp. 116-17).Man is said to have obligationsconsequent on his creatureli-ness. But theseobligations re made suspectbyLocke's vacillationregardingthe matter of suicide. Time and again Locke repeatsthe prohibition gainst self-destruction, ore often than not forthepolitical purpose ofdenyinggovernmentts claim to absolutepower.But Locke is not consistent. n section23 of theSecond rea-tise,he first eiterates heprohibition nd thensuspendsit:

For a Man, nothaving he Power f his ownLife,cannot,yCom-pact,orhisownConsent, nslaveimselfo anyone,norputhimselfundertheAbsolute,Arbitraryowerofanother,o takeawayhisLife,whenhepleases..whenever e finds hehardship f his Slavery ut-weighhevalueofhisLife,tis nhisPower, yresistingheWillofhisMaster,to draw n himselfheDeathhedesires.

It has been suggestedby some that Locke merelyacknowledgesthepowerto commit suicide but confersnot theright.'"This ar-gument,however,s less thanpersuasivesince Locke makes no ef-


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IS LOCKE A HOBBESIAN? 9fort n section23 to distinguish owerfromright.15n the first fthe twopassages quoted above, the wordpower s used plainlytodesignatea rightwhichman is said not to have: "Fora Man, nothaving the Power of his own Life"), and elsewherein the para-graphpowers a normative ermconnoting herightful r wrong-ful use offorce.'6 t is hardlyclear, in this ast use ofpower-theslave'spowerto terminatehis life that the word is devoid ofnor-mativeconnotations.Not onlyhas the slave thecapacityto bringon his death(thishe shares withothers),but he seems also tohavethe right,for Locke suppliesthe reasons which impel him to theact.The slave is understood o have forfeited is right o life,whichforfeiturempowers he masterto kill the slave at anytime and forany cause. To this Locke adds that the slave can precipitatehisown executionby defyinghis master's will. Now it mightbe ar-gued that Locke concedes here theright o suicidebut confines tspossessionto the slave'7-having lost the rightto life, the slavegainstheright o death. The problemis thatanyright mpliesanentitlemento some good, in this case thegood of death giventhehardshipof life. But whywould a person,who is definedby theabsence ofrights, ome to possess a right hat s denied to others?If it is truethat under the law of natureonlya slave can kill him-self,then a person seeking death (perhaps because disease hasmade his life notworth iving)would be in compliancewithnatu-ral law ifbeforecommitting uicide, he took steps to become aslave. We can be veryartful bout thispassage, either n defend-ing the prohibitionor in devisingescapes, but the factremainsthatLocke has caused us to questionthe absolutenessofself-pres-ervation;and giventhe centrality f thisprincipleto his politicalteaching limitedgovernment epends directly n the suicidepro-hibition), t is difficulto believe that Locke could have spokensocasually.Of course Locke has not spokencasuallyif t is his inten-tion to cast doubtupon the natural aw obligationto preserve ne-self.8The second law of naturewhichdictatesthatno one harm an-other n his "Life, Health, Liberty, r Possessions" sec. 6) has itsrationale in the theologicaldoctrine that human beings are thecreaturesof God-"they are his Property" sec. 6) and thus areforbidden o damage themselves r theirneighbors.But elsewhereLocke affirms heveryopposite,avowingthat man is the owner ofhimself-"yet everyMan has a Propertyn his own Person"sec.


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10 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS27).19 The quotation is no incidentalremarkfor t explainswhythe individual in nature has a rightto property-he owns prop-ertybecause he owns his labor, and he owns his labor because heowns his person.20 The labor theoryof ownership founders ifLocke sticksbyhis earlierpronouncement hat man is theposses-sion ofGod, but unless man is the possessionofGod, the secondlaw of nature cannot oblige solicitousbehavior toward others.21Thus both laws ofnature,the second and the first, eem incom-patiblewithLocke's teachingon property.

Locke explainsthat man'sdutyto see to thepreservation fhisfellows s a contingentduty,operative onlywhen the individual's"own Preservationcomes not in competition"sec. 6). The firstlaw of naturetakespriority ver the second. On thispoint it hasbeen notedby othersthat the second law ofnature will effectivelyoblige onlyifthe individual s not greatly nxious about his exist-ence; that the individual'speace ofmind is a directresult of thepeace ofnature; and that thepeace of naturedepends on a law ofnature that s knownand observedbymen, and on an economyofabundance thatmitigates hecompetition ornecessarygoods.22 thas been furtherrgued that Locke's state ofnaturesatisfies oneof these conditions: nature is not bounteous but penurious, re-quiringhuman labor to supplythe sum ofitsvalue (secs. 36, 37);natural law is not apprehended easily and quickly throughthemedium of conscience but demands studyand deliberateconsul-tation (secs. 6, 12, 124, 136); also natural law is not muchobeyed,for hegreaterpartofmankind are "no strictObservers ofEquity andJustice" sec. 123); finallynatureis more warlikethanpeacefulbecause lifethere s disturbedby"thecorruption, nd vi-ciousness ofdegeneratemen" sec. 128) and bypassionate,self-in-terested ttempts t enforcingnatural law (sec. 136). From theseseveralpoints t is concluded thatman in thestateof naturewouldhave ample warrantforneglecting hesecond law ofnature.

An additionalpoint,not so commonlynoticed, s thecharacterof this aw ofnaturethatstipulates hepreservation fmankind.Ifwe hope to find n this aw some assurance that man is naturallymoral beingwithresponsibilitieso others,we are likely o be dis-appointed. The second law of nature is not a golden rule com-mandingthatwe treatcharitably ur fellowhuman beings; nor isit even, in any seriousway,a restrictivenjunctionorderingthatwe hold back fromgratuitousharm.What purposethesecondlawof naturemainlyserves s to supplyman in naturewitha license


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IS LOCKE A HOBBESIAN? 11tokill,and to explainhowpoliticalauthority omesbytheright oinflictpunishmenton its subjects. The second law of nature isabout killing.Consider the scope of operationwhich Locke con-cedes to it. The executivepower belongs alike to victimsand tobystanders.The first lass ofenforcers s mostprobablyhotforre-venge (sec. 125), althoughtheyare told to employ"calm reasonand conscience" sec. 8), while the second class are withoutnum-ber for it becomes everyoneand anyone'sbusiness to capture,judge, and punish the offender,who, having sinned against thelaw ofnature,is held to be a noxious animal deservingof speedyexecution. Nor is it necessarythat some hideous crime be com-mitted.Anysettleddesign againstthe ifeof anotherprecipitatesstate of war (sec. 16). Such a state impartsa generalentitlementto take all measures necessaryto defend one's life,and also one'sliberty,ince theslightesthreat o libertys quite possibly hedir-est threat o life sec. 17). To be set upon by a robber and forcedto hand over one's purse is to be at war and thusempoweredbythe second law of nature to take the robber's ife even when themoney lost to him would be of no significant alue (sec. 207).More than that,no one but the individual himself s allowed tojudge whether state ofwar has begun (sec. 21). Hence it is notrequiredthatanymisdeedbe actuallydone, onlythat theindivid-ual suspect that one is coming. If a person fears his neighbor,whetherwithcause orwithout foronlythe individual can judge),bythispartialand subjectivedetermination heneighborbecomesa wild beast and is lawfully estroyed.But thentheneighbor,nowthe targetof attack,mightunderstandably onclude thathis as-sailant is the wildbeast (and of thisonlytheneighborcan judge)and so endeavor to execute the law of natureagainsthim. Clearlythe state of nature, ifnot synonymouswith the state ofwar,23sharassed by anxietiesconcerning he outbreak of war and by un-certain identificationf the innocent and the guilty.About thismoral confusionLocke says:

For theLaw of Naturebeingunwritten,nd so no whereto befound ut ntheminds fMen, theywhothroughassion r Inter-est shallmis-cite,r misapplyt,cannot o easilybe convinced ftheirmistakewhere here s no establish'dudge:And so it servesnot, s itought, odetermineheRights,nd fence hePropertiesfthose hat iveunder t,especially here very ne isJudge, nter-preter,nd Executioner f it too, and that n his ownCase (sec.136).


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12 THE REVIEW OF POLITICSIn the absence of a neutral udge, no one can accuratelyknowwhetherhis cause is right r wrong.Thus everyone s at liberty obelievehimself n the right.But thisthen means thatthe stateofnature will not divide neatly into groups of upright aw-abidersand selfishmalefactors. tillthereare thosecalled "degenerate" yLocke, but theyhave no conceivable motive to proclaim them-selvescorrupt; they ike everyonewill find some groundsforvin-dicatingtheirbehavior at least to theirown satisfaction, hich sall thatmatters.Moreover,because the law of nature"servesnot,as it ought,to determinethe Rights, and fencethe Propertiesofthose that ive under it," herecannot be a right o property hat sacknowledged and respectedby others,for even if labor is theavowed source of property ights, here are otherrights, uch asself-preservation,hatmayconflict.24 ence no mine and thine sallowed to nature that is unequivocal and unchallenged, andhence no justice in nature thatgivesto each his own.Locke, it appears, takes the three fateful tepsthat in Hobbeslead inexorably o the absolutelicense ofthe individual: therightto preserveoneself,the rightto adopt the means necessaryforpreservation,and the rightto be the judge of one's own case.These three rightseffectivelybolish the obligations of naturallaw, or, more precisely, heyabrogate the second law of nature.And eventhoughLocke affirmshat nature "is not State fLicense"(sec. 6) and devotesmuch space to describing hepain and suffer-ing that await the criminally nclined,nonethelessLocke showsthat the actionsofmen in thestate ofnatureare subjecttono realrestraint. Locke's "strangedoctrine" by which people who arejudges in theirown case enforcenatural aw (secs. 9, 13), is littlemore than Hobbesian natural rightdressedup in the splendifer-ous garbof egal righteousness."25ocke thus sideswithHobbes inbelievingthe state of nature to be an amoral conditionand in re-gardingcivil societyas the true home of ustice, for t is only insociety hatproperty ights an be defined nd protected.There are other aws ofnature that were said beforeto operatein the stateof nature,but theyfollowmuch the same pattern sself-preservationnd the preservation fmankind and so will betreatedmore briefly. rivateproperty, r appropriationfromthecommon store, s called a naturallaw,but like self-preservationtrequiresnothing hat would not be done without t; thus it is bet-terregardedas a naturalrightwhichit is also called). Spoilage issaid to be againstthe aw ofnature,thereasonbeingthat the was-


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IS LOCKE A HOBBESIAN? 13trel nvades his neighbor'sshare (sec. 37). But Locke also main-tains that n naturethere s more thanenough of thematerialsofwealth to go around,26so one wonders how spoilage encroachesupon another's share. Moreover, it is almost comical to hearLocke say thatwastingis an offense gainst nature,when seventimes he calls nature a wasteland (secs. 36, 37, 38, 42, 43, 45).Were man not presentin nature to appropriate,everything, yLocke's reckoning,would go towaste.27 n factLocke impliesthatthe real crimeof spoilage is againstpractical utility nd commonsense, forit hardly profits man to heap up apples and plumsonlyto have themrotin his cell (secs. 46, 51). Spoilage is a self-enforcingregulationbecause wasting is a "foolishthing";28 ndwhile it may please Locke to call spoilage "dishonest," othing sadded to theenforcement f the aw forhishavingdone so. As forthe requirement hatthere be "enoughand as good left"behind,Locke assures us thatprivateappropriation,rather than depletenature'sresources,vastly augments them (secs. 36, 37, 40, 42,43). He further ontends that an exchange economy based onmoneyeliminates heproblemofspoilageand so frees heindivid-ual to acquire all the propertyhe can (secs. 46, 50). The mostLocke offers y way of other-regarding esponsibilitiess the ex-pectationthat freeenterprise nlargesthe generalfundofwealthand thata day laborer under such a system ives betterthan anIndian chieftainsec. 41).29Two final aws thatoperate in nature are care of offspringndhonor to parents.These laws seem not to arise fromself-interestbut rather o be dutiesoriginating romwithout.Parentsmust arefortheirchildren,and childrenmusthonor theirparents. How-ever,all is not as it appears. Care ofoffsprings a dutywhich hu-man parentssharewithanimals (sec. 60). It is an instinct, n in-clination to tenderness sec. 63, 67), and as such not the properinstrument fnatural aw, which,as Locke says,is communicatedthroughreason alone (secs. 6, 57, 63). Althoughcalled a naturallaw, the care of offspring allsoutside the definition.Somewhatdifferent, ut no less problematic, is the duty childrenhave tohonor theirparents. Locke pointsout that thisdutyis a productof contractualreciprocity;honor and gratitudeare owed to par-ents in proportion o the care and protectionreceived (secs. 67,70). Ifparentsfailto supplytheiryoungwith nurture nd rearing,parentsare deserving fnothing n return;the debtpasses insteadto the children's uardians. Filial duties,therefore, ave theirori-


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14 THE REVIEW OF POLITICSgin in tacit,self-servinggreements nd are not to be understoodas selfless bligationsto others.The second categoryof natural laws, those that institute ndhelp governcivil society, re simpleutilitarian evices30S-theyef-fectman'sremovalfrom hestate of nature for he betterpreserva-tion of his property. ut civil societycannot accomplishits mainobjective f t does not offer ignificantelieffromwhat makes thestate ofnatureso threatening. ocke maythenagreewithHobbesthat in the state of nature"might s right',"ut seeminglyhe dis-putes theclaim thatcivil society s builtupon the same principle.Civil society s a fortress rectedagainstthe lawlessnessof nature.The problemwith the Hobbesian sovereign,Locke appears to say,is thathe has not come out ofthe stateofnature:his power s ab-solute; his command is law; his might s right.He is somethinglike a Trojan horse-magnificentfrom farbut ruinous if et pastthe citygates. As interpreted y Locke, naturallaw prohibitshisadmission.

A second search throughLocke's Troy,however,uncoverstell-tale signsof the horse'spresence. One of Locke's natural laws istheright f themajority whenany number of Men have so con-sented to make one Communityor Government, . . to act andconclude the rest" sec. 95). Upon joining society, he individualagreesto surrender bsolutely nd permanently heright o act inhis own defense exceptwhen circumstancesforcehim back intothe stateof nature (secs. 207, 226) or when he chooses to leaveone societyforanother [sec. 1211) and to be judge and execu-tionerof the law of nature (secs. 127, 128).31This surrenderofright s theoriginofsociety's egislative nd executivepower secs.88, 129, 130). The individual in society s totallyunder the com-mand of themajority-more immediately f the government32-and is expectedtobelieve,in Hobbesian fashion Leviathanvii,p.158), that he authorizes byhis initialconsent)all thatthegovern-ment woulddo, including egislationhe directly pposes (secs. 88,89). Nor does theindividualhold on to a residueofrights hatareimmune to social interference.33ocke neverquite says that ife,liberty,nd property re inalienable rights.34 n the contrary, eexplains that it is withinsociety'spower, n order to prosecute tswars, to tax an individual'spropertysec. 140), to conscripthiminto service sec. 130), and to send him to his death (sec. 139)-because thereare, as Locke asserts,"nobler"uses than bare pres-ervation sec. 6). Indeed, once society s created,the first aw of


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IS LOCKE A HOBBESIAN? 15nature sanctionssociety'spreservation verand above thepreser-vationofthe individuals who comprise t (sec. 135). The individ-ual, in a word,has no guaranteed protections gainstthepowerofsociety nd itsgovernment.35ociety'smight s society's ight.If Locke then is something ess than a champion of individualrights, s he sometimesseems, still he does take up the cause ofthemajority n its struggleswithoppressivegovernment.36ockestatesthat the egislativepower s supremerelative o theexecutiveand federative ower (secs. 132, 150), but not thatit is supremerelativeto thepeople (sec. 149). The people are the finalmastersand as such have theauthority o cashier unwantedgovernments.But thereare no institutional rrangements n Locke forthe re-placementof one set of rulersby another.What Locke providesinstead is theemergency ightofrevolution.The people have theright o takeup arms againsttheirgovernmentfthrough a longtrain of abuses" itproves tscontemptfor theoriginal purposesofsociety life, liberty, nd property. t should be noted that therightof revolution s not the kind of rightwhichby its self-evi-dency enjoystheglad deference f others. t does notpersuade theoppositionof its obligations;it is not calm reasonablenesssubsti-tutingforstrength.Rather it is right n the sense ofpower.Thosehave therightwho have thepowerto make good their"appeal toheaven" Locke's euphemismfor the resort o force.But ifpeoplemustapplyforce n order to exercisetheirright fsupremacy, ndifthe forcethey apply mustprovemightier han that of the gov-ernment, hentheright frevolution,wheneffectivelysserted, san exampleofpowerthat s supremeand absolute and a manifes-tation of the Hobbesian maxim that "mightis right."37 espiteLocke's many precautionsand rhetoricaldenunciations,the Tro-jan horse of absolute sovereigntybe it popular as in the case ofrevolution r governmentals in the case of citizensubordination)has slippedinto thecity.

JUSTICE AND THE CONCEALMENT OF POWERLocke is a Hobbesian, I conclude,because he subscribes o thethesisthat"mightmakes right." ven so, I wish now to argue thatHobbes and Locke adopt this principlewithvarying degrees ofsatisfaction and that theyutilize it in differentways. Hobbesthinks hatnothing an better afeguardcivilpeace than thefrank

declaration that power is absolute and despotical. Locke thinks


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16 THE REVIEW OF POLITICSthatnothing o enhances theprospectsforustice and fairdealingthana politicdissembling bout therealitiesofpower.Here thenis thedifferenceetweenHobbes and Locke: Hobbes asks mainlythatcivilsocietybe the strongguardianof men's ives; Locke asksalso thatcivil societybe the fountainhead f ustice. It is not thencorrect, n my estimation,to say that Locke merely perfects helogic ofHobbes, providingthe individual witha greatersecuritythrough heinstitution f imitedgovernment.38or itdefiesdem-onstration that limited government can actually redeem thispromise; it may instead,dependingon the times,be the catalystof civil unrest.Locke does say,and the point is not denied, thatthe preservationof property of life, liberty, nd estate is thefunction fsociety.But there s another voice in Locke striving odedicate societyto the higher purpose of ustice, willingeven totake calculated riskswith the association'scapacityto preserve t-self. n Hobbes there s nothing ike thisconcern or this inclina-tion to risk-taking.

Hobbes and Locke bothgive to civil society helarge and gen-eral purpose of correcting he deficiencies f the state of nature.Now purposefulness s itself a type of ustice--not that usticewhich looks to the detailed specifics f contractualobligationbutthe rationale which informs nd makes sense of theundertaking.Purposefulness supplies a transcendent tandard that allows forthe interpretationf ambiguities,thedetermination fgood faithcompliance, and the measurement of progress toward the ulti-mate goal. Anyhuman endeavor that s deliberateand intelligentrequires of the participants that theybe true to the purpose.Hobbes cannotdenythatthepurposeful haracterof thepoliticalassociation carries with it an obligation,and that the obligationapplies even to the sovereign.Concerning the sovereign's itle toproperty, obbes says:

Forseeing hesovereign,hat s to say, hecommonwealth,hosepersonhe representeth,s understoodo do nothingut n order othe commonpeace and security,hisdistributionf ands, s to beunderstoods done norder o the ame:andconsequently,hatso-everdistributione shallmakein prejudice hereof,s contraryothewillofevery ubject, hat ommitted ispeace,and safetyo hisdiscretion,ndconscience;nd thereforeythewillofevery ne ofthem,s to be reputed oid.Notice that actions prejudicial to the purpose of the association


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IS LOCKE A HOBBESIAN? 17are "to be reputed void." And yet in the very next sentence,Hobbes denies that the sovereign s under any bindingbligationwhatsoever:

It is true, hat sovereignmonarch, r thegreater artof a sover-eignassembly,mayordainthedoingofmany hingsn pursuit ftheir assions, ontraryo their wnconsciences, hich s a breachoftrust,ndofthe aw ofnature; ut this s notenough o authorizeanysubject, ither omakewarupon,or somuch s toaccuseof n-justice, ranyway ospeak vilof'theirovereign;ecause hey aveauthorized ll his actions, nd in bestowinghesovereign ower,made them heir wn Leviathanxiv. . 235).

In order to provide against the consequences of equal power,whichcharacterizes he state of nature and renders t so perilous,theremust be instituted superiorpower,and the logic of supe-rior power is that it is subject to no obligation. This of coursemeans that society, rganized as Leviathan, is compelled to re-nounce the ustice thataccompanies faithful ttention o society'spurposes.Locke, too, is aware of the logic ofpower,but he conceals itsimperatives ehindrepeatedreminders fwhy society xists.Un-likeHobbes, Locke rivets hepurposeofsocietyfoursquarebeforeitsrulers,alerting hem to the limitationsmposed by original n-tentions.39t is as if Locke is trying o strengthenhe trusses fra-tional obligation,recognizingwith Hobbes that the sovereign sbound bylittle lse. Rational obligation,saysHobbes in the Levia-thanxiv.p. 119),40 is thatpredilection fthe mind for ogical rec-titude. Because themind abhors absurdity,t wants not to contra-dict itselfby sayingone thingand then its opposite; likewiseittakes offense f a course of action once decided on is later re-versed. The mind seeks consistency nd endeavors to oblige thewill to discharge faithfullyts contracts.But the mind is a weakcounselor, nd so faithfulompliancemustultimately est on fearofpunishmentLeviathanvii. pp. 153-54;De CiveV. 4). Of courseHobbes would not have his sovereign punished; and althoughLocke does threatenhis supreme powerwith thespecterof revolu-tion,what Locke mainlyrelies on is the self-restraintf rationalobligationbrought o fullconsciousnessby exhortation.Several scholarshave noticed that trust s an important ompo-nent of Locke's civilsociety.4' he legislative nd executivepowersare deputies of the people entrusted o serve the common good.


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18 THE REVIEW OF POLITICSNow it would seem thattrust s a close cousin to purposefulnessand thatbothconcepts pointto a notionof ustice thattranscendsself-interestedontracts.A case in point is theprerogative ower,positionednot in the egislaturewhich s supremebut in theexec-utive which is subordinate.The prerogativepower is permittedthemagistratebecause of contingencies eyond the vision of lawand because thepurpose of the association,particularly hepres-ervationof as manyas possible,can be assistedbythis discretion-aryauthority. he executiveactswhere the law is silent and evenagainst the law where the public good is not attainableby legalmeans. Since there s frequent isputeconcerning hepublic goodand the means appropriate to its achievement,the prerogativepower s an obvious dangerto the tranquility fsociety.Who willjudge betweena legislature laimingsupremacyand an executivewillingto suspend the law? There is no final court of appeal, asLocke himself dmits- onlythe appeal to heaven, or civilwar, nthe event of serious deadlock (secs. 207, 240). The prerogativepower,therefore, annot be comprehendedsimplyas an efficientinstrument orattainingthe narrowand immediateends of gov-ernment,since its exercise may imperil these very same ends.Rather it must also be examined for the contributiont makes tojustice. By facilitatinghe government'sfforts o keep its trust,the prerogativepowerworksto insurethe people that the found-ing principles f theircommonwealth emainin force.As rational creatures men institute ocietyfora purpose, thepreservation fproperty,ut theirrationalitys capable ofdisplay-ing standardsof itsown. "Truth nd thekeepingofFaithbelongsto Men, as Men" (Sec. 14). Hence it is an affront o man's na-ture,42n injustice,forpromisesto be wantonlydisregarded.Menare treatedas "a Herd of inferior reatures" nd as "void of Rea-son, and brutish" sec. 163) if their ntentions nd theirwelfareare not theguidingstar ofgovernment. ocke's principalassump-tion throughout he SecondTreatises that men are by naturefree,equal, and rational;and thequestionLocke asks himself s, Howwould such people behave? Hobbes makes the same assumption,but concludesthat two of thesefeatures, reedom nd equality, rethe cause of infinite rouble,and so must be renounced, by thethird,reason, which is whollythe servantof fear. Locke permitsno renunciation of freedom and equality. To be sure, his mainconcern lies with safety;men must be accounted free and equalbecause superior power, n Locke's judgment, is more hazardous


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IS LOCKE A HOBBESIAN? 19than equal power (equal freedomor equal natural right).But asecondreason, communicatedmorebytone thanby expressedar-gument, s that men are no longermen ifthey llowtheirfreedomand equality to be denied them: theyare instead herd animalswhose master"keepsthem,and works them forhis own Pleasureor Profit" sec. 163). 3 This may help explain whycontracts x-tortedthroughfear are always invalid--not always are theybadbargains,but alwaysare the insultsto human freedom.Locke, asithappens, proffers o rejoinderto Hobbes's contention hatfearis a legitimatemotive of action and that the social contract s aresult of fear. Rather than debate the issue, he appeals to man'sintuitive ense of ustice:

Shoulda Robberbreak ntomyHouse, and with Daggerat myThroat,makeme sealDeedstoconveymyEstate ohim,would hisgivehimanyTitle? sec. 176).Sealing deeds may save one's lifeand be theprudent thingto do,but thetransaction s void because of the offense tgivestohumannature. Justicedemands that human beings be treated as free,equal, and rational creatures.I have attempted o show that Locke remains committed o us-ticedespitehaving accepted the Hobbesian teachingabout power,that"might s right'." he question now to be considered is howLocke proposesto make thiscommitment fficacious, ow to findspace forustice in a worldgovernedby power.Locke's chapteronconquestprovidesa clue.Locke confessesthat his remarkstreatingthe subject of ustconquestconstitute "strangedoctrine"sec. 180). It mightbe re-called that Locke proposed another"strangedoctrine"earlier intheSecond reatise,hat one concerning heexecutivepowerofpun-ishment.What Locke now calls "strange"s his argumentthat thevictor n a just war has no rightful laim to the property f thevanquished,excepting hatportionnecessary o make reparations,whichreparationshe must in turnforego ftheirpaymentwouldjeopardize the lives of innocent people. Both strangedoctrineshave in common thatthey specify ules forhuman behaviorin astateofnature; but theydiffer ignificantlyn the sense in whichthey re strange.The executivepower s strangebecause it allowsan individualto udge in his own case, and so sets oose a cycleofattack and reprisal indistinguishable from Hobbesian natural


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20 THE REVIEW OF POLITICSright.On the otherhand, the doctrineof ust conquest is strangebecause it denies the victor the customary spoils of war. Onestrangedoctrine,thatgoverning ndividualsin a stateof nature,prolongs,even perpetuates,theviolence (secs. 20, 21); the otherstrangedoctrine,thatdetermining elationsamong societies,dis-courages violence by removing a prime incentive to war nospoils forunjust conquest, and veryfewwhere conquest is just.Locke's point, it seems, is thatnations are capable of greaterre-straint nd greaterustice than are individualswhen leftto theirown resources n a state of nature. Because the individual lacksthe barestmarginof security, ecause he has no respitefrom heburden ofdefendinghimself,t is not to be expectedthathe willtake any chances or give any quarter.The people who make upsocietyon the other hand do commonlyenjoy the safety f theircommunity;theyare spared the worrisomeresponsibilityfpre-servingthemselves;vigilanceand combat are not theirdaily rou-tine. Having been grantedthetime and the space to build up thehabits ofpeace, they an be put upon, whenwarcomes, tobehavemore decently nd to show theirenemies some mercy.Civil soci-ety, n a word,civilizes sec. 299).44There are, however, roblemswith the argumentofthischap-ter.Twice Locke asserts that children have a natural rightto in-herittheproperty f theirfathersecs. 182, 190). But previouslyLocke stated that the fatherhas a contraryrightto bestow hisproperty n whoeverpleaseshimbest sec. 72), so long as his chil-drenare "out ofdangerofperishingforwant" sec. 65). The rightof nheritances tied to the second law of naturewhich"willeth hepreservationof all Mankind as much as is possible" (sec. 182).Locke explains that this righttransmits ndefinitelyhroughthegenerations sec. 192); distantdescendantshave the rightno lessthannewlydeprivedchildren.But distantdescendants,whiletheymay suffer diminishedstandardofliving,are not threatened ntheir existence forhaving lost the familyfortune centurybe-fore at least there s no necessaryconnection hatwould warranta right f inheritance n groundsofpreservation.The same pointcan be made in a secondway.The victor n ajust conflict, ays Locke, has despotical powerover the lives andlibertiesof his captives;but his powerstops shortof the captives'property, art of which is shared in by theirwives,with the restpassing to their children fortheirsustenance.When speakingofthe slaverythat falls to the captured enemy,however,Locke re-


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IS LOCKE A HOBBESIAN? 21marks thatthey"forfeitedheirLives, and with it theirLiberties,and lost theirEstates" sec. 85). Property, e it noted, is not ex-emptedfromthe general surrender; lso despoticalpower is saidto be exercised "overthosewho are stripp'dof all property"sec.173). The second law of nature commands thepreservation f asmanyas possible. It is by the enforcement fthis aw thatthe in-nocent have theirbest chance ofescapingharm. Now if strict un-ishmentof offenders forfeiture f life, iberty, ndpropertysuc-ceeds in deterring ggression,where eniencywould fail,then thevictorwho confiscates roperty aves the innocent the dangersoffuture wars and so abides by the second law of nature. Onceagain, thepreservation fmankindneed not ustify rightof in-heritance.Finally,Locke cites the example of the biblicalJephthah n ex-plainingtheright fdescendantsto reclaimproperty nd self-ruleunjustlytaken away in war; the oppressed, says Locke, may ap-peal to heaven, as Jephthahdid, in order to redresstheirwrong.The story fJephthah s recounted n the Book ofJudges,chapter11. Jephthah,we find t said, is the bastard son ofGilead. Forcedinto exile by Gilead's legitimate heirs, Jephthah becomes theleader ofa rovinggang of bandits.When the Ammonites ater de-clare war againsttheGileadites,Jephthah s recalled and made hispeople's permanent eader. In negotiations recedingtheoutbreakofhostilities,heAmmoniteking explainshisbelligerence s a jus-tifiable ttempt o regainland long ago takenby the Israelites ontheirwayfromEgyptto Canaan:

Because sraelon coming rom gypt ookmy andfrom heArnontotheJobbok nd to theJordan;now thereforeestoretpeaceably(TheNewOxfordnnotatedible, 1:13).The messengersofJephthah respondwith a complicated historywhicharguesdivinesanction for ll that srael has done, and theyfinish p bydisputing herightofthepeople to reclaim ostterri-tory t anytime n thefuture:

And theLord,theGod of srael,gaveSihonand all hispeople ntothehandof srael, ndthey efeatedhem; o Israeltookpossessionofall the and oftheAmorites, ho nhabited hat ountry. . . Sothen heLord,theGod of srael,dispossessedheAmoritesrom e-forehispeople srael;and areyoutotakepossessionf them?Willyounot ossess hat hemoshour od ives ou opossess?nd ll the ordourGodhasdispossessedefores,wewill ossess.. . While sraeldwelt


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22 THE REVIEW OF POLITICSin Heshbon nd itsvillages,nd inall thecities n thebanks ftheArnon, hree undredyears,whydidyounot recover hemwithinthat ime?11:21-26, mphasisdded.)

Now it is Locke who refers s to the story fJephthah,but thereis nothing n this reference o supporthis teachingon just con-quest.45 Quite the reverse,Judges XI explicitlycontradicts theproposition hatconquerors acquire no right o theproperty f thedefeated and that subsequent generations retain an indefiniteclaim on theconqueredterritoryftheir ncestors.So what are we to make ofthischapter? ts theory f ust con-quest is inconclusivebecause a child's rightof inheritancemaycontendwith a parent's rightof freedisposal, because humanetreatment ftheinnocentmaycause future onflictswhich endan-ger the innocent,and because biblical warfare, lthoughcited asauthoritative,omplieswithnone of therules set forth y Locke.At the same timeLocke seems aware ofthesedifficultiesnd qui-etlycalls our attention o them he certainly oes withthethird).46Thus there s concealment n thechapter, s I believe there s con-cealment throughout he SecondTreatise. ther scholars have ar-gued, most notably Leo Strauss, that Locke adopts an esotericstyle n orderto deflect ccusationsofHobbism, which fbelievedwould endangerhimpersonally nd denya fairhearingto his po-liticalphilosophy."47accept this explanation,but I wish also toadd that Locke conceals his tiesto Hobbes, conceals the Hobbes-ian realityofpower, n order to make a realityof ustice in thiscase thatconquerors oughtnot to despoil the conquered. I con-clude, therefore,hat some credit s to be givento Strauss'sneme-sis, PeterLaslett,who detects n Locke an abidingconcern forpo-litical virtue. But Laslett is wrong in supposing that politicalvirtue s natural.48Neitherthe stateofnaturenor civilsociety s ofitselffriendly o virtue. On the contrary, oth states are under-girdedby the principlethat"mightmakes right."But unlike thestate ofnature,civilsocietycan civilize,its"strangedoctrine" anlessen theinducements o violence,ifthe darktruth bout politicsis notfastened pon and propagated.Hobbes counts tamong thenaturalduties of the sovereign o instruct nd enlightenhis sub-jects as to the nature of sovereignpower;nothing s to be hidden(Leviathan xx. p. 323).49 Locke chooses instead to write esoteri-cally.50He acknowledgesand accepts the Hobbesian truth bout


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IS LOCKE A HOBBESIAN? 23power,but mainlyhe looks awayfrom t and has us look away soas to see bettera rhetorical urfacethat teaches ustice."1Locketherefores not so honestas Hobbes, but he is more noble in hispurposes,and, if may generalize,more successful, ecause mod-ernliberalsocietieshave done wellbydomesticpeace without ak-ingHobbesian precautions o ensure it. In ElementsfLaw Hobbesanticipatesthe argument for limited government nd refutes twith a series of "whatif' objections--what frevenues are neededto defend the state, and the taxing power lies with a refractoryparliament Part II. 1. 13). By dwellingon and making provisionfortheworstpossible case, Hobbes closes thedoor on justice. Byrisking ustice, at least throughthe rhetoric f the SecondTreatise(e.g., sec. 176), Locke helps to produce a society hat s less pronetoworst-case mergencies.

NOTES1This article is a revised and condensed versionofa paper presentedat the1985 American Political Science Convention; the original contained a lengthydiscussion of the differences etween Hobbes and Locke.

2 J.W. Gough, JohnLocke's PoliticalPhilosophy,nd ed. (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1973); W. von Leyden, Introduction,Essayson the aw ofNatureOxford:Clarendon Press, 1954); John Plamenatz, Man and Society, ol. 1 (New York:McGraw-Hill, 1963).3John Dunn, The PoliticalThought fJohnLocke:An HistoricalAccount ftheArgumentfthe Two TreatisesfGovernment'Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1969); Dunn could also be included in the above list, e.g., ibid., p. 164,and 'Justice and Locke's Political Theory,"Political tudies16 (February 1968):

71; James Tully,A Discourseon Property:ohnLocke and His AdversariesCam-bridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1980); Martin Seliger, The LiberalPoliticsofJohn ocke New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969).SLeo Strauss, NaturalRightand History Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1953); Richard Cox, Locke on Warand Peace (Washington: UniversityPress of America, 1982); Robert Goldwin, "JohnLocke" in History fPoliticalPhilosophy, nd ed., ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: RandMcNally, 1972), pp. 451-86.5 Locke quotations are fromTwo TreatisesfGovernment,ev. ed., ed. PeterLaslett (New York: New American Library, 1963). Unless otherwise stated,section citationsrefer o the SecondTreatise. obbes quotations are fromThe En-glish Works f ThomasHobbesofMalmesbury,d. Sir William Molesworth (Lon-don: John Bohn, 1839-45), vol. 2, Philosophical udimentsoncerningovernmentand Societybut referred o by itsmore familiartitle,De Cive),vol. 3, Leviathan,and vol. 4, ElementsfLaw (also known as De Corporeolitico).6 Locke never actually says that legislativesupremacy is a natural law, buthe clearly implies as much. A similar inferencewould not be warranted in thecase ofseparation ofpowers,however, ince Locke says that "wellorder'dCom-monwealths"divide legislativeand executivepower,not thatall commonwealthsdo (secs. 143, 159).7Locke does not directlyexplain what a just war is. He takes it forgrantedthatcombat can be either ust or unjust and proceeds to consider those powers


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24 THE REVIEW OF POLITICSthat fall to a "Conquerourn a Lawful War" sec. 177.) Cox, however,pieces to-gethera just war theory using both Treatisesnd A LetterConcerningoleration.War is unjust, says Cox, if it is foughtforthe personal gloryof the ruler, fitspurpose is imperialistic subjugation of another people, or ifit is undertakeninthe service of religiousbelief(WarandPeace,pp. 154-56).

8 George Windstrup, "Locke on Suicide," PoliticalTheory (May 1980): 169.9 Ramon Lemos, Hobbesand Locke:Power nd ConsentAthens: UniversityofGeorgia Press, 1987), pp. 76-77.o10 n factnearly all of what Locke calls natural law he also terms naturalright.A ready explanation for Locke's seeminglyindiscriminate manner is thesupposition that everyright mplies an obligation-one person's entitlement sanother person's duty. But this explanation does not hold in the case of self-preservationbecause the obligatoryside of the coin is comprehended under aseparate law of nature, the preservationof mankind. Self-preservation s notlike care of offspringwhere the rightof the child is simultaneouslythe dutyofthe parent." See Cox, War and Peace,pp. 85-89; C. B. Macpherson, "Natural Rightsin Hobbes and Locke" in Political Theory nd theRights ofMan, ed. D. B.Raphael (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 1967), p. 7. Cf. Tully,A Dis-course nProperty,p. 46-47. Tully offers teleological explanation of man's de-sires-man seeks his preservationbecause God designed him that way. Tullygoes on to say thatthe second law of nature depends entirelyon this nterpreta-tion: "If, on the otherhand, preservationwere nothingmore than the subjec-tive goal consequent upon an individual's desire for self-preservation, noLockeian moral theorywould be possible. It would be impossible to generatethe positivedutyofpreservingothersand to discovera natural criterionof us-tice which could be used to define and delimit legitimateacts of self-preserva-tion" p. 47).

12 Aquinas makes self-preservationa natural law, but he places it at thelower end of a hierarchyof natural instincts.Self-preservations an animal de-sire. Reason affirms he goodness of thisdesire, but reason does not produce it.So regarded, self-preservation ails to meet Locke's definition of natural lawwhich is a discoveryof reason (SummaTheologica-II, Q. 94, A. 2).13 Robert Goldwin, "Locke's State of Nature in Political Science," WesternPoliticalQuarterly9 (March 1976): 128-31.14 Dunn has recourseto thisexplanation, claiming that Locke "did not sup-pose thata man has a rightto do anythingwhich he has a powerto do. Indeedthe entire Two Treatisess specificallyconcerned to refute such a position . . "(PoliticalThought, p. 108-09 n. 5). Dunn accounts forthe exception by suppos-ing that a slave is not a moral agent and thus not responsible foranythinghemightdo (pp. 108-10). But could it be Locke's considered opinion, the surfaceargumentsof the Second Treatise otwithstanding, hat a human being destroyshis moral intelligence,becomes in effect n animal, forhaving once brokensome preceptofnatural law? Dunn himselfsays otherwise p. 107). See Wind-strup,"Locke on Suicide," pp. 172-73.15 At numerous otherpoints in the SecondTreatise,ocke uses power s a syn-onymforrightsecs. 7, 11, 65, 87, 128, 149, 171, 184). See Seliger,LiberalPoli-tics,p. 131.16 Seven times n section 23 Locke repeats the wordpower;never does he usethe wordright. oncerning themaster and his slave, Locke once says, "when hehas him in his Power"Powerwould seem here to mean force,but the largercon-text s still thatofrightful orce.17 Cf. Gary Glenn, "Inalienable Rights and Locke's Argument forLimitedGovernment: Political Implications of a Right to Suicide,"JournalofPolitics 6


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IS LOCKE A HOBBESIAN? 25(February 1984): 84-86. Glenn seems to argue that suicide is not self-destruc-tion, but self-destructionwhere there is the right (duty) of self-preservation.Having lost the right of self-preservation, he slave can kill himselfwithoutcommitting uicide. Were it not for this too-subtletechnicality,Glenn would beadmittingthat suicide is a rightof the slave.18 Laslett (Two Treatises,. 325, n. sec. 23) believes Locke to be inconsistentbut offersno comment or explanation.9 J. P. Day, "Locke on Property," n Life, Liberty, nd Property. ssays onLocke's Political deas, ed. Gordon Schochet (Belmont, California: Wadsworth,1971), p. 117; also Francis Devine, "Absolute Democracy of IndefeasibleRight: Hobbes Versus Locke,"JournalofPolitics 7 (August 1975): 762 n. 162.Locke seems to distinguish n section 6 between person and life "thoughManin that State have an uncontroleable Libertyto dispose of his Person or Posses-sions, yethe has not Liberty to destroyhimself'); but this distinctiondoes notreallyhold. See note 21.

20 Cf. Tully,A Discourse nProperty,p. 108-109. Tully admits no connectionbetween ownershipof one's person and ownershipof one's body. But if man hasno property n his body,whywould he have property n the labor of his body?It mightbe argued in replythatman's body is like the natural world createdand owned byGod but utilized by man. However, Locke says thatman's use ofnature giveshim titleto it; thus it followsthat use of the body includes title tothe body as well. Now ifone responds that man's title s relative to other menbut not to God ("This no Body has any Right to but himself' [sec. 27]), still asecond problem arises: in order to establish man's right o appropriateprivatelyfrom the common store, Locke must assert that the materials of nature arenearlyworthless,1/1000part ofvalue; hence God's creationof the human bodyis similarlyworthlessuntil put to good use by man. According to this calculusman would have title even relative to God since man and not God is the truecreator of value.

Tully suggeststhat life s an inalienable rightbecause man's lifeis not his toalienate; it is God's (p. 114). But life s alienable - man may take his life"wheresome nobler use, than its bare Preservation calls for it" (sec. 6), and societymay take his life where the preservationofsociety s at stake, as in times of war(sec. 139).

21 In two additional passages Locke states again the independence and self-possession ofman: "' . . yetMan (by being Master ofhimself,and Proprietorfhis own Person . 7 (sec. 44), and " . . . A Right fFreedom ohisPerson,whichnoother Man has a Power over, but the free Disposal of it lies in himself" sec.190).The word disposal or a variant) shows up again in section 6 where it seemsnot to implyan individual's complete command over himself:" . . thoughManin that State have an uncontroleable Liberty,to dispose ofhis Person or Posses-sions, yethe has not Libertyto destroyhimself. ..." Locke distinguishesfree-dom and propertyfrompreservation,saying thatman is master of the formerbut not of the latter.However, Locke elsewhere asserts that liberty s the indis-pensable means of preservation(sec. 17) and that propertyis similarlyvital(sec. 27). If man has an "uncontrolleable liberty, o dispose of his Person orPossessions,"and ifpersonal freedom and propertyare essential to man's pres-ervation,then itwould seem to follow thatman also has an uncontrollable lib-ertyto dispose ofhis life.22 Strauss, NaturalRight ndHistory, p. 224-31; and Cox, War ndPeace,pp.81-94.23 For a clear and instructivediscussion of the state of nature/state f war

question, see Goldwin, "JohnLocke," pp. 454-56.


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26 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS24 See Goldwin (ibid., p. 465): " . . . if there is a scarcityofperishable pro-visions in the original state, therecannot be natural property." ousseau's state

of nature degenerates into a state of war at the point where people begin quar-reling about the source of propertyrights-whether it is self-preservationhatconfers thisright,or labor, or first ccupancy, or the needs of the greaternum-ber. (The First nd Second iscourse fJean-Jacquesousseau, d. Roger D. Masters[New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964], pp 158-59.)25 Cf. Laslett, Introduction, pp. 122-35. Laslett develops what he calls the"Lockeian doctrine ofnatural politicalvirtue" p. 111) which views the exerciseof the executivepower as essentiallyaltruistic.But Laslett is aware that his in-terpretationruns somewhat afoul of a second argument in Locke that empha-sizes power and willfulness p. 130). Cf. Dunn, PoliticalThought, . 127.26 Lest there be confusion here, nature is potentially wealthy,but actualwealth depends on human labor; and in the absence of human labor nature ispenurious.27 Goldwin, "'JohnLocke," p. 466. Lemos tries to improve on Locke in away that avoids thisproblem (HobbesandLocke,p. 146).28 Plamenatz, Man andSociety, . 243.29 That Locke is a proto-capitalist s the thesis ofMacpherson and Strauss.Macpherson, The Political Theory f Possessive ndividualism London: OxfordUniversityPress, 1964), pp. 208 ff.;Strauss, NaturalRight ndHistory, . 246.See also Cox, "Justice s the Basis of Political Order in Locke," in Nomos VI.

justice, pp. 254-61. Cf. Laslett, Introduction,p. 119.30 Once in force, however,these institutions ake on a higherpurpose. Seebelow.31 Cf. Gough, Locke'sPolitical hilosophy,. 32. Gough is uncertainabout theextentof the surrender, itingsection 99 where Locke says thatman surrenders"all the power, necessaryto the ends for which theyunite into Society . " (Seealso sec. 129). But what is necessary on any given occasion is determined bythe majority, o whose decisions the individual is absolutelybound (sec. 97).32 Cf. Dunn, PoliticalThought, p. 127-29.33 Wilmoore Kendall, JohnLocke and theDoctrine fMajority-RuleUrbana:

Universityof Illinois Press, 1965), p. 68.3' See Glenn ("Inalienable Rights,"pp. 90-102) for an argument thatrightsare inalienable.35 In A Letter oncerningolerationJames Tully,editor, [Indianapolis: Hack-ett Publishing Company, 1983]) Locke makes an exception forlibertyof con-science, suggestingon threeoccasions that it is an inalienable right pp. 26, 48,55) (that it is a natural righthe says explicitly p. 51]). But he later implies thatthis iberty s inalienable in a Hobbesian sense, i.e., the individual is entitledtoexercise it, but if its doctrines are injurious to the public good, the society isalso entitled to suppress it (pp. 49-51). Thus there ensues a contest of rightswiththe strongerprevailing.36 Kendall, Majority-Rule, p. 103, 112-19; also Lemos, Hobbes ndLocke,p.124.37 This is not to say that revolutionaries reright ecause they prevail, onlythat because theyprevail, theyhave right,t least one that is effective. f theydo not prevail, theymay still have a right,but this rightavails them little astheyare marched to the scaffoldor left anguishing in prison. See Seliger,Lib-eralPolitics,pp. 135-38. On one occasion, however,Locke does suggest that aright may be effective ven when disjoined frompower. He says that "thebestfence gainstRebellion"s the rightof the people to forma new legislature, forwhen publicly affirmed t can work to deter governmentfromthe abuse of itspower (sec. 226). If the governmentpractices self-restrainteitherout of fear of


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IS LOCKE A HOBBESIAN? 27a multitudemade resoluteby the doctrine of natural right,or persuaded itselfof the injustice of absolute power), then there will be no test ofstrength nd noprovingthe effectiveness f the rightof revolution.38 This seems to be Strauss's understanding (NaturalRightand History,p.231).39 Because those original intentions--life, liberty,and property-are notmerely agreed on, but determinedby natural law, it is appropriate to say thatLocke is not a strict ontractarian. See PatrickRiley, Will and Political egitimacy(Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1982), pp. 63-74.

40 This expression actually belongs to Michael Oakeshott (Introduction,Le-viathanOxford: Basil Blackwell], p. lix).41 Gough, Locke'sPoliticalPhilosophy, p. 154-92; Laslett, Introduction, pp.

126-35; Dunn, PoliticalThought, . 162.42 See Robert Kraynak, 'John Locke: From Absolutism to Toleration"Amer-ican Political cienceReview 74 (March 1980): 61. Kraynak suggests that Lockecame round to a position of toleration in part because he concluded that thepride men take in their opinions is a major source of their human dignity.Lockean man, says Kraynak, is a "partial" animal, which means that he is lessthan the rational animal of Aristotle but more than the vainglorious animal ofHobbes.3 Kendall, Majority-Rule, . 134.* Cf. Rousseau, SecondDiscourse, . 161. See Hilail Gildin (Rousseau'sSocial

Contract:The Design of theArgumentChicago: University of Chicago Press,1983], p. 47) who thinks that Rousseau and Locke are in essential agreementon thispoint.5 Strauss, NaturalRight ndHistory, . 214.

46 Cf. Macpherson ("Natural Rights," p. 10) who implies that Locke is un-aware of what he is doing, that he denies natural law (except for Hobbesiannatural law) and yetaffirms t in order to limit the powers ofgovernment.7 Strauss, NaturalRight ndHistory, p. 206-209. Cf. Seliger,LiberalPolitics,p. 36. Seliger disputes Strauss's thesis on grounds that the rightof revolution,which Locke brazenly proclaims, was more dangerous and offensive han anyof its theoreticalunderpinnings. But Locke could hardly have concealed whathe was most concerned to teach, that people have a rightto overthrow heirgovernment.Still thisteachingwould have gone unheeded if t was apparent toall that Locke's intellectualforebear was Hobbes. As for Locke's personal safety,the Two TreatisesfGovernmentas not published until after the issue had beensettled and thus at a time when revolution was an acceptable and popular no-tion. Although the threat of counterrevolutiondid persist, throughoutthe pe-riod (the 1690's) Locke steadfastlyrefused to admit his authorship, doing soonly on the last possible occasion-as a codicil to his will. See Cox, War andPeace,pp. 1-44; also Dunn, "Justice nd Locke's Political Theory,"p. 70 n. 1.

48 Locke does say,as noted above, that "Truthand keeping ofFaith belongsto Men, as Men, and not as Members of Society." n lightof the examples headduces to confirmthis claim (see Cox, Warand Peace,pp. 94-105), I under-stand him to mean that the capacities fortruthtelling nd trustworthiness renatural to men but thattheir realization depends mostlyon society.,9 Strauss, NaturalRight ndHistory, . 198.50 Laslett explains in detail how incrediblycautious a man Locke was (In-troduction,pp. 58-79; especially pp. 77-79). But Laslett does not draw the con-clusion that Locke's caution mighthave affectedhis writing.And when Strausscomes to this conclusion independently,Laslett dismisses it out of hand (p.119, n. 21). See Kendall, '"JohnLocke Revisited," The Intercollegiateeview2


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28 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS(January-February1966): 230-34. Kendall has the distinctionofbeing the onlyLocke scholar to have changed his mind.

51 I think that Glenn comes to a similar conclusion, although what he re-gards as genuine in Locke is the exact opposite of my own position. Glennwants to know whyLocke never uses the expression"inalienable rights," nd heargues that Locke deliberatelysoftenshis claims for the absoluteness of rightsso as to make themcompatible withstable government "Inalienable Rights,"p.102). Believing that theweightof the evidence is on the side ofLocke's Hobbes-ianism, I argue, on the contrary, hat Locke deliberately disguises the absolute-ness of government in order to make its power compatible with individualrights.Glenn is not concerned with Locke's relation to Hobbes, but it is inter-estingthat when he asks the question of whetherrightsexist which cannot besurrendered, his answer is strictlyHobbesian (De GiveVI. 13)-by consent,says Glenn, the individual gives fullpower to the governmentto take his lifebut nonethelessretains the rightto defendhimself pp. 97-102).

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