137 Whither Social Science?

7/28/2019 137 Whither Social Science?

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International Studies

DOI: 10.1177/0020881705043002022006; 43; 137International Studies

Om BakshiWhither Social Science?

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Whither Social Science?/137

Whither Social Science?

Om Bakshi

The development of new approaches in recent times has brought about major changes in the

study of social and political life. They reject almost everything that has been traditionally

accepted, for which they have been severely criticized. But focusing on academic issues alone

wont help much. We can understand the new approaches, their concerns, their rejection of

science as model, their disdain for objectivity, universality, truth, relevance and so on, more

adequately by relating them to the social conditions that obtain in the West. There are, however,

major differences between these conditions and those that obtain in countries like India. And

the kind of problems facing these countries can be addressed meaningfully by the more

traditional approach than by the approaches developed recently. This is why, while it does not

seem to have much future in the West, where it originated and continued for long, it may

survive, even flourish, in countries like India.

Rarely has the discussion on the nature of social and political inquiry been as

intense as in our times. The concept of inquiry developed by classical thinkers

and adopted by numerous thinkers over the centuries has been rejected and, under

the influence of contemporary movements in philosophy, alternative approaches

have been developed.1 In spite of the enthusiasm generated by them, however,

their usefulness remains doubtful. Those shaped by positivist thinking revealed

major weaknesses when employed in the study of social life. The efforts to overcomethese from within the positivist framework didnt quite succeed, revealing more

than anything else the limitations of this philosophical position. As these ap-

proaches began to lose ground, social scientists started turning to alternative

approaches. Developed under the influence of different strands in continental

philosophy, these approaches have proved very attractive to scholars, including

many in India. A careful examination, however, shows that these, too, have serious

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 43, 2 (2006)

Sage Publications New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London

DOI: 10.1177/002088170504300202

Acknowledgement: The author is extremely thankful to Professor Randhir Singh for his comments

on this article. For the views expressed in this article, however, the author alone is responsible.

The author is Professor of Political Theory, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru

University, New Delhi.

1 For a discussion on the nature of the traditional approach to the study of social and political life,

see pp. 14955 of this article and Bakshi, 1987: 111.

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limitations. In this article, the changes that have taken place in the study of social

and political life in the last few decades will be critically analysed. In the course

of this discussion, an attempt will be made to develop an alternative approach.

Instead of applying some philosophical insight to the study of social and politicallife, however, the effort will be to explore how we can meaningfully approach it.

Science as Model

In the last few decades, there has been a strong urge to develop social sciences on

the model of natural science. Those conversant with the history of ideas, however,

would not regard this as a new development since efforts to make the study of

social and political life scientific have been made from the very beginning. Theymight refer to Books IV, V and VI ofPolitics in which Aristotle made a careful

analysis of the situation obtaining in the cities in ancient Greece. The truth is that

even Plato sought to put the study of social and political life on a scientific basis,

although today many would hesitate to regard his approach as scientific. With the

success of the natural sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, how-

ever, the urge to make the study of social life scientific became stronger. Their

continuing success in our times has ensured that the model of scientific inquirywill continue to be emulated by social sciences.

This, however, does not mean that there is agreement on what constitutes

scientific knowledge. In everyday life people generally equate it with the know-

ledge of facts. In their thinking, this reliance on facts separates scientific knowledge

from prejudice, superstition and ignorance. This view of scientific knowledge

might appear nave to many, but we should remember that it dominated social

sciences not so long ago. Indeed, in the period following the Second World War,

social scientists concentrated their energies on gathering facts on a scale perhapsnever seen before. Although this view came under criticism, particularly at the

hands of those influenced by anti-positivist trends in philosophy, it brought about

significant changes in social sciences. In particular, it played an important role in

emancipating the study of social and political life from the influence of meta-

physical thinking. The importance of the elimination of a lot of verbiage from

social sciences cannot be exaggerated.

This is not to deny that there are serious difficulties in developing scientific

knowledge by gathering facts. For to study facts as they are may seem unprob-

lematic, but how we should go about studying them is not obvious. Since the

facts of social life are very large in number, we must know which facts to select.

There is also the difficulty that how we understand a fact depends on its relationship

with other facts. We may understand it in one way if we relate it to one set of facts

and in another way, if we relate it to another. This is why we must know how to

establish relationships among them. There is a feeling that we depend on our

ideas to guide our factual inquiries. This was the position taken by Weber, whoby RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009http://isq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
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believed that we rely on our values for selecting and ordering facts. This was also

the experience of social scientists in the mid-twentieth century. Although they

collected facts in the hope of developing reliable knowledge of social life, it was

widely observed that they made inquiries in the perspective of liberal democraticvalues. It is, therefore, not surprising if the feeling has grown that, since we can

collect facts in a variety of moral frameworks, there is little possibility of providing

an objective account of social reality. Today social scientists are as uncertain of

accepting objectivity as a realistic goal as they were certain of it not so long ago.

The reason why this view of science seems nave to many is that a pile of facts,

however meticulously collected, does not provide adequate knowledge of social

and political reality. It helps neither in explaining past or present events, nor in

delineating their future course. This was also the experience of social scientists inthe mid-twentieth century who collected facts merrily in the hope of developing

reliable knowledge, but found themselves lost in the midst of huge piles of facts.

They were widely criticized for adopting a crude form of empiricism. This led

them to revise their concept of science. The feeling grew that theories, not facts,

give us knowledge of social reality. Social scientists were enjoined not to rest

content with collecting facts but to make generalizations on the basis of those

facts.

Although it is widely believed that this is how we develop scientific theories,

this view is not without difficulties. To begin with, we can never close the pos-

sibility of discovering evidence against our generalizations. This has led thinkers

from Hume onwards to wonder whether a collection of facts, however large it

may be, provides a secure basis for claiming regularities in nature or social life. It

is, however, not possible to discuss here the concept of induction, which has been

a subject of considerable philosophical interest. What needs to be noted is that

this proposal does not come to grips with the difficulties involved in collectingfacts. In other words, if our generalizations depend on the facts at our disposal,

then the question remains exactly how we go about collecting them. While this

proposal assumes that we develop ideas on the basis of facts at our disposal, the

feeling, as we have seen earlier, is widespread that we gather them in the light of

our ideas, values, concepts or theories.

Thus, there is widespread scepticism regarding the possibility of acquiring object-

ive knowledge of social and political reality, given the possibility of approaching

it from a variety of points of view. Weber, for instance, has no doubt that, thanks

to the dependence of sociological inquiry on our values, our knowledge is always

knowledge from particular points of view. There is no absolutely objective

scientific analysis of social reality (Weber, 1949: 7285). This does not mean

that there are no rules of reasoning to regulate our inquiries. In fact, according to

Weber, we are bound by these rules here as elsewhere. What this means is that a

critic could examine whether we have taken into account all the relevant facts,

whether we have checked them carefully, whether the inferences we have drawnby RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009http://isq.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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from them are warranted and so on. But whether this would render our account

objective is considered doubtful.

This argument has proved very attractive to social scientists. They have in-

creasingly become sceptical of the possibility of providing an objective accountof social phenomena. Those who accept the more traditional model of social

science, however, continue to have serious objections against such a position. They

agree that we rely on our concepts or theories for making sense of what is going

on around us, but insist that we can always check them against objective reality.

Even if at any given time we have several competing accounts or theories, they

deny that this means that these are equally valid. Their position is that we must

submit our accounts or theories to critical scrutiny to know which, if any, could

be accepted as valid.This position has increasingly come under attack in recent times. It has been

argued that our accounts or theories provide different ways of looking at social

phenomena. Those who take this position reject the positivist claim that we can

check the validity of our theories. The trouble, they argue, is that there are no

facts independent of theories. Facts are theory-laden, is how those who espouse

this view put it. The assumption regarding the objective existence of social reality

accepted for long has been given up. It is widely assumed that everything dependson how we perceive it. The possibility of a variety of theories of the same social

phenomena would leave those who accept a more traditional view of social science

uneasy, but not the exponents of the new approaches. For them this is not a problem.

The view that we must decide which of them is true, they believe, is a relic of

positivist thinking. We are advised to accept them all as valid. The reason for the

persistence of a sense of uneasiness with this position is that we continue to cling

to an antiquated concept of truth. In their opinion, truth is an authoritarian con-

cept which is intolerant of different ways of perceiving social phenomena. Thetime has come to discard it.

In recent times, thus, relativistic tendencies have been on the ascendancy. Al-

though the exponents of the more traditional view of social science continue to

attack relativistic thinking, the latter never seemed more convincing to many at

any time in the past than today. But this would leave at least people in everyday

life perplexed. They would find it hard to comprehend a position which denies

the objective existence of social and political reality. They would wonder whether

it is a matter of our concepts, theories or frameworks that a bulk of the people in

countries like India are living in conditions of abject poverty; that millions of

young men and women are unemployed; that countless children are suffering

from malnutrition, millions of them are underage workers, toiling in inhuman

and hazardous conditions and so on. Indeed it is hard to imagine that anybody,

whether a scholar or a person in everyday life, could claim that these are the pro-

ducts of our thinking. These, to use words commonly employed by critics of social

science but for exactly the opposite reason, are really out there. If we accept thescholarly trends in contemporary thought, however, we would not regard accountsby RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009http://isq.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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or theories which ignore the vast majority of people as inadequate. This would

appear surprising to many, especially to people in everyday life in countries like

India, given the number of people facing these problems and the extent of their

suffering. They may not have a satisfactory explanation for these problems, norknow how to go about solving them. But they have no difficulty in recognizing

these problems, no matter what their beliefs, concepts, theories or frameworks.

In any case, major problems give rise to tensions, disruptionseven upheavals

in society, affecting a large number of people in a variety of ways. This is why

people in everyday life would not regard any social account or theory for which

these problems do not even exist as adequate. It is hard to see how we can disagree

with them.

Methodological Difficulties

Even those who accept this argument would not think it prudent to ignore the

methodological difficulties which social scientists encounter while making

sociological inquiries. For Weber is surely right when he claims that, since social

and political life is extremely complex, it is not obvious how we go about analysing

it. But instead of embracing a relativistic position, we need to look at the whole

issue afresh. This we can do by questioning the way writers like Weber believethat we go about making inquiries. This question has been raised by Popper, who

feels that knowledge does not start from the collection of data, facts, observations

or perceptions, but from problems (Popper, 1976: 88). According to him, a problem

arises when a scientific theory is unable to account for the phenomena to which it

purported to apply. We offer a hypothesis for solving the problem and try to test it.

If it withstands our efforts to falsify it, we accept it for the time being.

Popper argues that social scientists, too, should rely on this method. Although

what this means is that they should write in response to the problems of their

sociological theories, he enjoins them not to ignore the problems facing society,

since these problems also give rise to significant problems of a purely theoretical

kind. The importance of writing in response to practical problems cannot be

exaggerated, although it is true that in social science, like in natural science, we

can write in response to theoretical problems. For example, Weber developed

much of his sociological thought in response to social and political theories of

Marx. But the trouble is that social reality does not remain static. And when thefacts a theory was designed to explain change, it is rendered anachronistic. This

is not the sort of situation that arises in natural sciences like physics. Since in the

social universe a theory was designed to explain may itself undergo large-scale

changes, it may not provide a starting point for inquiry. This is why we must look

for another starting point, which is provided by major social problems.

The importance of knowing where and how to begin inquiry cannot be ex-

aggerated. Since social life is extremely complex, we do not know which of the

myriad aspects of social reality we should study. And whatever we study seems tobe related to a variety of social phenomena, leaving us wondering which of these



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would help in explaining it adequately. It will not be surprising if we come to the

conclusion that everything is connected with everything else. In recent times,

thus, it has been widely argued that, thanks to the complexity of social and political

life, we cannot establish a cause-effect relationship. This conclusion might seeminescapable to those who think about social and political life in a vacuum, but not

to those who approach it in the context of social problems. For these problems

would provide them with criteria to decide which aspects of social life to study

and help them to establish cause-effect relationships. Those writing in response to

social problems, thus, would be able to separate the relevant from the irrelevant,

the necessary from the contingent, and the underlying from surface phenomena.

This would save them from getting lost without any clue in the complexities of

social life.It might be objected that problems of social life do not exist independently of

our thinking, that we recognize them with the help of our values. This is why

doubts might be raised as to whether this approach gives us any distinct advantage

over those who analyse social reality in the perspective of their values. That this

objection is based on a misconception will become clear if we analyse the na-

ture of social problems. At any given time, every society, however well organized

it may be, is faced with several problems, some of which raise questions about

best means to ends which are widely accepted. For example, it may find its policeunable to protect its citizens adequately from criminals or its public health services

unable to provide proper medical care to the sick. Such problems can arise in any

society whether liberal, socialist or Islamic. However, a problem may be peculiar

to a society because it is organized on a certain normative basis. Persecution of

religious minorities may be considered a problem in a society which accepts

secularism but perhaps not in a theocracy. Development of practices which are

intolerant of dissent may be regarded as problems in democratic societies but not

in authoritarian regimes. We regard these as problems because they undermine

the values which provide the basis on which social and political life is organized

in a society. This is why we are often guided by our values in identifying social

problems.

But civilized societies have also faced problems which could not be identified

with the help of values providing the basis of their social and political life. It is,

for example, doubtful whether oligarchic principles could help in recognizing prob-

lems which arose in Greek cities like Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.For these principles were not concerned with the kind of claims then advanced by

the class of merchants, artisans, craftsmen and others. And yet the fact is that

Aristotle, who is widely believed to have imbibed oligarchic prejudices, was able

to recognize the problems which arose following the emergence of this class and

developed his ideas in response to them. To take another example, the early liberal

theory, concerned mainly with maximizing utilities, could hardly lead one to

notice the kind of problems which unregulated capitalism gave rise to in the nine-

teenth century. And yet several liberal thinkers were able to take cognizance ofsuch problems as the exploitation of industrial workers and theorized in their



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context. While it is difficult to deny the possibility of dominant values proving a

hindrance in recognizing such problems, the question is whether they render us

incapable of recognizing human suffering. In any case, as noted earlier, we may

be forced to take cognizance of social problems as they, unlike theoretical prob-lems, may create tensions in social life and even cause serious disruption in it.

Indeed, the truth is that in such conditions the hold of dominant values is likely to

weaken, which would help us in taking notice of social problems. It may be pointed

out that thinkers like Plato, Aristotle and Marx wrote in response to problems of

this kind.2

Theorizing Meaningfully

An additional advantage of writing in response to problems facing society is that

this imposes discipline on our speculative impulses. In social sciences particularly

there is a danger of developing theories which are not open to critical scrutiny, of

lapsing into empty verbalism. Writing in response to social and political problems,

on the other hand, helps us to develop theories that can be empirically checked

(Bakshi, 1988). The importance of submitting our thinking to standards like test-

ability cannot be exaggerated, although in our times there has been a tendency to

ignore this. Take, for example, the plea to develop theories advanced by those dis-satisfied with the tendency in social sciences to focus on gathering facts. We have

seen earlier that social scientists were enjoined to make generalizations on the

basis of facts they had gathered. But there was another scholarly tendency which

stressed the need to construct analytical frameworks composed of concepts identi-

fying major variables and their possible relations. The tone of this kind of research

was set by scholars like Parsons. Although systems theories as developed by them

attracted considerable attention, there was a strong feeling that these theories

operated at such a high level of abstraction that it was difficult, if not impos-

sible, even to check them against facts. The exponents of this view in political

science like Easton admitted that this criticism was perfectly true, but argued

that the demands of empirical verification imposed an unnecessarily severe

burden on those engaged in theoretical inquiry (Easton, 1971: 31417). They

agreed that the ultimate test of any theory was its correspondence with facts, but

did not think it was necessary to formulate ideas in a form which could straight-

away be tested by reference to facts. The feeling was that social scientists had tobe given latitude to freely develop theories. The translation of their ideas into

verifiable form was, thus, a separate task that could be undertaken some day. At

a time when social scientists insisted on the need to prove things which every

ten-year old child of normal intelligence knew, as Leo Strauss put it in his

2 The very fact that a thinker can recognize problems which raise questions about the moral principles

on which social and political life is organized, may lead some to doubt whether they really do so.

Now such a question can always arise, and it can be decided only on the basis of concrete evidence

in a given case. All one can perhaps say is that we should study the most serious problems confronting

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inimitable style, it was not surprising that the exponents of this kind of theorizing

emphasized the need to develop theories unhampered by the worries of veri-

fication. But the question is whether testing hampers theoretical inquiry. For, as

Popper argues, it not only checks theoretical inquiry but it also stimulates us totry again. Far from inhibiting the development of scientific knowledge, testing

plays an important role in developing it.

In any case, the question is how discipline could be imposed on the speculative

impulses of theorists were theoretical enterprise to become autonomous. Since

the latitude to theorize could easily become a license to fantasize, the possibility

of theoretical speculation losing touch with social reality cannot be ignored.

A social scientist may not even know that, caught up in a momentum of its own,

his inquiry has degenerated into empty verbalism. We must therefore adopt anapproach that helps in developing theories which can be subjected to critical

scrutiny. This is precisely the advantage of writing in response to the problems

facing society. For we can meaningfully discuss the usefulness of the concepts

we develop and the relationships we establish among them in the context of prob-

lems. We can find cogent arguments both for and against any concept or any

relationship we establish in the abstract, making it difficult to rationally decide

which would be more useful in analysing social reality. There have been serious

disagreements on the question, for instance, whether it is more profitable to usethe concept of social group based on status and prestige or that of class based on

its relationship with the system of production. The reason for such disagreements

is that we can classify people in a variety of ways. While this has led some to re-

gard all concepts as equally valid, it has led others to think that none could claim

validity. It is therefore not surprising that writers like Foucault believe that the

possibility of classifying social phenomena in a variety of ways undermines the

very possibility of social science. Although this view has been enthusiastically

endorsed by many, we must resist the temptation to draw relativistic or sceptical

conclusions. For, contrary to what the detractors of social science think, we can

critically examine the usefulness of the classifications that we make if we examine

them in the context of the problems facing society.

Making Research Socially Relevant

Writing in response to problems facing society will also help us in developingsocially relevant knowledge. The need to take interest in matters which concern

society at large cannot be exaggerated. Nor has it escaped the attention of those

concerned with the study of social life. Indeed the relevance of research in social

science has been one of the major issues in contemporary thought. In the mid-

twentieth century, for example, social scientists were widely criticized for not

taking interest in matters affecting people at large. There was a feeling that their

insistence on making inquiries strictly according to the norms of scientific reason-

ing, whether it helped them in developing reliable knowledge or not, preventedthem from doing socially relevant work. This might appear puzzling to many; for



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it is not immediately clear how enjoining scholars to write with clarity or precision

could result in making their research socially irrelevant. They would regard rele-

vance as one of the more important norms to regulate scientific inquiry. Although

they might admit that scholarly work is often done merely to satisfy curiosity orfor the sake of acquiring professional competence, they would insist that the task

is to work on issues which are socially relevant.

Although this view is not without substance, we need to discuss why social

science has often been indicted for being irrelevant to the needs of the people at

large. For this feeling has been so widely shared that we cannot rest content merely

with claiming that, like truth, relevance is a major norm to regulate our scientific

inquiries. Among those who share this feeling are the followers of Marx. Their

argument is that since social scientists aim at discovering regularities in sociallife they tend to accept the capitalist system as given, as natural. This does not

serve the needs of the people, particularly those belonging to the working classes,

who would rather be interested in a radical transformation of society. This view

has proved attractive to those who think that the solution to the problems facing

people at large requires restructuring social and political life. What has lent cre-

dence to it is the proclivity of social scientists in general to acquiesce in the existing

conditions. In spite of the wide endorsement this line of thinking has received,however, it is open to question. For a careful analysis of social life alone can

provide a basis for any meaningful proposal for social change. It cannot be over-

emphasized that Marxs plea to restructure the existing society on socialist

principles was not the product of a utopian dream, a fantasy or poetic imagery but

of a careful analysis of the existing capitalist society.3 There is no reason why

those who analyse social reality as it existed are destined to acquiesce in it.

The view that the desire to emulate natural science renders research in social

science irrelevant to the needs of society, however, has not been confined to thefollowers of Marx. It is commonly believed that this leads social scientists to

insist on precisely measuring the phenomena they are investigating. Hence the

tendency in social sciences to concentrate on subjects amenable to precise

measurement, whether they are socially relevant or not. There is also a feeling

that some crucial aspects of human behaviour like intentions or purposes are not

amenable to precise measurement. Although the usefulness of concentrating on

such phenomena as intentions is not beyond doubt,4 it is hard to deny that those

who insist on precisely measuring social phenomena are likely to focus on subjects

they can study with the help of methods at their disposal, thus making their methods

the criteria for selecting subjects for investigation. The trouble, however, is that

methods cannot guide us in deciding what to study. Indeed this reverses the

relationship between methods and subjects for investigation. For we can rationally

3 The close relationship between moral principles and empirical analysis is discussed in Bakshi,

1987: 98110 and Bakshi, 2000: 97113.4 For a discussion on this question, see below, pp. 16768.



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decide what methods to use only in the light of the problems we want to study.

Instead of selecting problems amenable to the methods at our disposal, we should

first decide what to study. It is possible that we do not even have the methods to

study the problems in which we are interested. But, instead of ignoring them, weshould try to develop methods for studying them. And the truth is that interesting

and difficult methodological questions arise when we face problems which do

not yield to the methods at our disposal. This is why we can develop methods

meaningfully in the context of concrete problems for investigation. On the other

hand, those who place methods at the heart of the study of social and political life

would be more interested in applying the methods at their disposal. Instead of

addressing issues which concern people at large, they are likely to produce exercises

in fashionable methods.This argument might seem far-fetched to some, but not to those conversant with

contemporary thought, because in the mid-twentieth century there was a widespread

feeling that methods provide the key to a reliable knowledge of social and political

life. For social scientists methods became the ultimate criteria for accepting

statements about social life (Almond and Verba, 1963: 43). In other words,

they regarded only those accounts of social reality reliable that were produced

with the help of certain methods, and not because they described social reality

adequately. It is therefore not surprising that social scientists took keen interest inrefining methods and techniques at their disposal and in looking for those being

used successfully elsewhere. Although doubts were often raised about the use-

fulness of quantitative analysis, they continued to hold that reliable knowledge

could be developed only by precisely measuring social phenomena. The result

was that they tended to concentrate on subjects like voting behaviour and to ignore

those like racialism and social violence.

It is therefore not surprising that in our times there has been widespread dis-

cussion on how to make research in social science relevant. The proposal which

is widely favoured is that social scientists should select topics for investigation

because they are significant from a moral point of view, not because they lend

themselves to quantitative analysis. This is, however, not a particularly novel

idea, for social scientists are often guided by moral considerations in selecting

subjects for investigation. Those committed to the principle of equality, for

example, have investigated discrimination on the basis of race, caste and sex. The

trouble, however, is that there are major differences in defining concepts likeequality, liberty and rights. This is why those interested in a rigorous analysis of

social and political life would be hesitant to place moral concepts at the heart of

their inquiry. In the mid-twentieth century, thus, social scientists were not favour-

ably inclined towards this proposal. The advocates of relevance did not deny that

their proposal might result in diluting analytical rigour of research in social science,

but felt that it was better to be vague about matters that were important from a

moral point of view than to be precise about matters that were not. This view had

a strong appeal for all those dissatisfied with the kind of research in which socialscientists were then interested.



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There is a great deal of truth in the view that we cannot pursue precision for the

sake of it. We should be interested in carefully measuring social phenomena only

when it is the demand of the inquiry that we are making. This is why how precise

we should be can be decided meaningfully only in the context of our inquiry.To say that we should not have a fetish for precision does not mean, however, that

vagueness is a virtue to be inculcated by social scientists. We should remember

that vague statements do not lend themselves to critical scrutiny. It is arguable,

thus, that champions of relevance have not addressed the genuine concerns

of those interested in analysing social life.5

The proposal to rely on our values for selecting subjects for investigation has

further difficulties. Since every moral theory defines the needs of the people dif-

ferently, it is not clear how we could rationally decide about the subjects to beinvestigated. Few would think that working in fascist, fundamentalist or racialist

frameworks would make research socially relevant. It seems that in general those

who advocate the desirability of working in moral frameworks have more humane

values in mind. This makes the proposal attractive to many, but it also leads them

to overlook its weakness. They do not even examine the possibility that working

in a framework of humane values may not help. We should remember that not-

withstanding their desire to ban values from scientific inquiry in mid-twentieth

century, social scientists were actually working in the framework of liberal demo-

cratic values, which did not quite help them in addressing issues which affected

people at large (Bakshi, 1987: 5561).

It is possible to argue, however, that the situation would be different were we to

become conscious of the need to work in a framework of humane values. That we

may espouse values which help us in becoming socially relevant, cannot be denied.

But there is no certainty that those who consciously espouse humane values would

care for the interests of those at the receiving end. This can be illustrated byreferring to the writings of Feyerabend who has endeared himself to many a social

scientist by denying that science provides the model for other intellectual pursuits.

He is critical of science on the ground that it regards truth as the highest norm to

regulate scientific inquiries. His argument is that we can realize freedom, and

hence happiness, by giving up the pursuit of truth. Thus, he agrees with the view

that we can pursue our moral concerns only by diluting our commitment to cannons

of scientific reasoning (Feyerabend, 1981: 197230 and 1983: 15667).

5 In recent years, however, the feeling has grown that the text should be open, that we should be

sufficiently vague about what we want to say. The argument is that this permits the reader, instead of

merely being a passive recipient of wisdom or truth that the authors wish to convey, to interpret them

in his own way. This might seem an unusual way to make the reader active. But we should remember

that the aim of the protagonists of this view is not to provide analysis of social reality but to develop

interpretations for the pleasure of the experience. It is not hard to understand the growth of such a

view in societies which have succeeded in largely addressing their social problems. But the question

is whether it could be adopted by scholars in societies facing major social and economic problems,since they would be interested in an analysis ofsocial reality.



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The view that renunciation of the standard of truth would serve the cause of

freedom might come as a surprise to many who would imagine that the growth of

science liberated mans thinking from the hold of prejudice, superstition and

mysticism. In this way, it served the cause of freedom of thought and investigation.According to Feyerabend, however, whatever its role in the past, science inhibits

freedom of thought today. For the prestige science has acquired in the last few

centuries has led many to expect other disciplines to shape themselves in its image.

This has resulted in a tendency to regard disciplines which do not as inferior,

if not fake. The dilution of the image of science would, thus, permit us to pur-

sue disciplines which do not conform to the image of science today. While many

would doubt the desirability of returning to ancient and rigid forms of thought

and pursuing subjects like astrology and witchcraft, Feyerabend feels that freedomis possible only when different forms of thought flourish. This alone permits us to

pursue what interests us, develop our potentialities and thus become happy. This

is why he would like science to give up severe standards of truth and rely on

judgments of taste.

We might fear that renunciation of the standard of truth would undermine

science, but Feyerabend is not unduly worried. He thinks that a world in which

science has no role will be a better place. This would surely leave many perplexed.

For, contrary to what Feyerabend thinks, science is not just for contemplation, forproviding pleasure to those leading comfortable lives. It plays a major role in our

fight against poverty, hunger and disease. This is why it is difficult to agree with

Feyerabend that a world in which science plays no role whatever...would be

more pleasant than the world we live in today.

The commitment of writers like Feyerabend to humane values, thus, leads them

to disregard the needs of the vast humanity. And, although they relentlessly attack

cannons of scientific reasoning, they also find it convenient to doubt whether we

have an explanation for all the misery and an excellent way out of it. Now their

skepticism may be justified. Perhaps we have not been able to analyse the problems

facing a large part of humanity adequately. The question is, however, whether we

will be able to do so. If we repudiate truth and rehabilitate prejudice, superstition

and mysticism; abandon rationality in favour of irrationality; and exalt subjectivity

over objectivity; we undermine the very possibility of analysing social reality

adequately. In the absence of such an analysis, we would not know how to go

about solving the problems facing millions of people. This is why truth mustremain the most important norm to regulate our inquiries. The needs of the people

in large parts of the world, far from necessitating dilution of standards of social

inquiry, require us to adhere to them.

The Traditional Approach

Instead of relying on our values, perspectives derived from social background or

some other academic consideration for selecting subjects for investigation, thus,the task is to concentrate on problems facing society. The importance of writing



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in response to problems is, as noted earlier, greatly emphasized by Popper. His

inquiries into the history of ideas show that scientific theories are developed in

the process of solving theoretical problems, which arise when existing theories

are subjected to critical scrutiny. This view of scientific inquiry is, of course, notacceptable to historians like Kuhn, who feel that far from being interested in

theoretical work, in testing their theories or developing new theories, scientists

premise current theory as the rules of [their] game, concentrating on the

puzzles it offers (Kuhna, 1981: 123). In this context, it may be noted that some

of even those who agree with Popper that theoretical inquiry lies at the heart of

science, however, question his claim that scientists theorize in response to the

problems of existing theories. For, according to Feyerabend, for example, the

history of science shows that theories can start even from some irrelevant activity(Feyerabend, 1979: 17180). This is why he does not think that asking scientists

to write in response to theoretical problems would prove profitable. Although the

anarchist thinking of Feyerabend has proved attractive to many, including those

interested in the study of social and political life, it is not certain how helpful it

would prove in developing scientific knowledge. It is not possible for us to go

into this question, but there is no doubt that this view will not prove helpful

to those studying social and political life, especially in countries like India.

The plea to theorize in response to irrelevant activities may seem fascinating tothose living in societies which are not facing major social problems, but those

living in societies facing such problems as poverty, unemployment and exploitation

on a massive scale cannot take an anarchist position, assume anything goes,

and turn against method. They must write in response to major social problems.

It will be a mistake to think, however, that when Popper advances a plea to

write in response to social problems, he has in mind the approach adopted by

traditional political thinkers. In fact, he attacks political theorists like Plato for

advocating large-scale changes in social life and favours altering one institution

at a time. In his view, we should make our way step by step, carefully comparing

the results expected with the results achieved, and always on the look-out for

unavoidable consequences of our attempts to alter institutions. This is how we

learn about social and political life. According to Popper, thus, small-scale changes,

combined with critical analysis, is the main way to practical results in social

sciences (Popper, 1963a: 58). There is, no doubt, a great deal of truth in this

argument. Every society is faced with several problems which it tries to tackle byadjusting institutions within the framework of other institutions. Social scientists,

too, analyse these problems and formulate proposals for solving them, which

they submit to critical scrutiny. They also study the results of altering institutions

and compare them with the results expected. In these ways, they learn a great deal

about social life.

In the history of mankind, however, societies have also faced problems which

required restructuring social and political life on a large scale. We may refer,

for example, to the change from the closed, tribal society to the open societywhich took place in ancient times in the Greek citiesa change which Popper



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greatly admires (Popper, vol. 1, 1963b). He also shows that Plato developed his

social and political ideas in response to the problems that these cities then faced.

Although Popper is known more for his attack on Platos plea for large-scale

changes in social life, he has great admiration for Plato as a sociologist. One ofthe most interesting features of his interpretation, which has often gone unnoticed,

is that Plato approached social phenomena in the spirit of scientific investigation.

Popper refers not only to the wealth and detail of his observation but also to the

amazing acuteness of his sociological intuition. Plato saw things which had

not been seen before him, and which were rediscovered only in our time. In this

context, Popper mentions his emphasis upon the economic background of the

political life and the historical development, which was later revived by Marx.

Indeed, in his opinion, Plato was able to identify factors which proved extremelyuseful in analysing the existing situation. In particular, he analysed society in

terms of classes and showed that class-war was the main force of social dy-

namics. Although the setting for Platos empirical inquiry was provided by

his speculative theory of forms, Popper does not think it prevented him from con-

structing an astonishingly realistic theory of society, capable of explaining the

main trends in the historical development of the Greek states as well as the social

and political forces in his own day. This interpretation of Platos thought chal-

lenges the conventional interpretation which regards Plato as an idealist withlittle interest in empirical reality. While Poppers critique of Platos rejection of

moral ideas like equality has attracted a great deal of attention, we must comple-

ment him for drawing attention to the empirical aspect of Platos thought, which

historians have tended to ignore. It is important to note, however, that his inter-

pretation does not lend support to his own concept of sociological inquiry. In

particular, it does not show that we learn about social and political life only when

we try to adjust institutions within a framework of existing institutions. Rather it

shows that we learn when we grapple with the major problems facing society.

The same conclusion can be drawn from Poppers account of social and political

thought of Marx (Popper, vol. 2, 1963b). While it is widely believed that he criticizes

Marx for advocating large-scale reconstruction of social life, we should not ignore

that he also highlights Marxs keen sociological insight into the existing reality,

praising his analysis of the existing capitalist economy, for example, his analysis

of the tendency towards the accumulation and concentration of wealth, his theories

of increasing productivity, of the trade cycle, of surplus population and so on.Popper also refers to his theory of the state which furnishes an enlightening

interpretation of the conditions of his time. Indeed in his view, Marx opened

and sharpened our eyes in many ways. His use of class analysis to study the

working of the institutions of the industrial system, for example, was admirable.

His plea to consider things in their relation to economic background, too, was

a most valuable suggestion, indeed it was an extremely valuable advance in the

methods of social science.

Popper goes much further than this and highlights Marxs contribution to themethodology of social science. He points out that by questioning the view that



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sociology must in principle be reducible to social psychology, Marx opened

the way to the more penetrating conception of specific realm of sociological laws,

and of a sociology which was at least partly autonomous. In Poppers view, to

have questioned psychologism is perhaps the greatest achievement of Marx asa sociologist. Also, as we will see later, Popper lays great stress on the need to

study the unintended consequences of our actions. In this context, it is worth

noting that he acknowledges his indebtedness to Marx who was one of the first

to analyse the unintended consequences of the voluntary actions of people acting

in certain situations (Popper, 1972: 125). It is therefore not surprising that Popper

regards a return to pre-Marxian social science as inconceivable.

The question, however, is, whether such a view of Marxs sociological and eco-

nomic analyses of contemporary society can be reconciled with the position thathe was a major exponent of the historicist method, which Popper regards as

very poor. That his assessment of Marxs empirical analysis would lead many

to wonder whether his criticism of the historicist method was justified, has not

escaped the attention of Popper. But he does not find any confusion in his thinking,

because, according to him, Marx did not use the historicist method when he

analysed existing society. This might come as a surprise to the followers of Marx

as well as to historians of ideas. But it shows Poppers deep insight into Marxs

thought when he points out that Marx made an honest attempt to apply rational

methods to the most urgent problems of social life. In other words, instead of

relying on laws of historical development, historical tendencies, or stages of de-

velopment, Marx carefully analysed existing social conditions. In particular, he

relied on the logic of class situation to explain the working of institutions of the

capitalist system. This is what Popper calls the method of institutional analysis. It

is clear, however, that he is not saying that Marx learned from small-scale changes,

altering one institution at a time, comparing the results expected with the resultsachieved, which, as noted earlier, is the approach he recommends for social

sciences.

This interpretation of Marxs approach to social and political life enables us to

see Marx in a different light. It is not hard to see, however, that it will invite con-

siderable opposition, since it goes against the traditional interpretation which places

his view of history at the centre of his thought. The fact is that it also goes against

Marxs own belief that the historical method, as developed by him, helps in un-

raveling the mysteries of social life. Historians of ideas would attach much import-ance to what Marx himself believed. This is not to deny that there would be many

who would not regard this interpretation as unwelcome. For in recent years, there

has been a tendency to encourage the reader to develop his own interpretation of

the text. But we need to distinguish our reason for accepting this interpretation of

Marx from their reason to develop interpretations. The exponents of new tendencies

in contemporary thought exhort the reader to develop his own interpretation for

the pleasure of the experience, while we are interested in learning how to make

sociological inquiries meaningfully. The method of inquiry that Marx adoptedwill be of great interest to all those who rate his analysis of social reality highly.by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009http://isq.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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This is why it is surprising that Popper continues to regard Marx as an exponent

of the historicist method, although his own analysis shows that Marx relied on

rational methods for analysing social reality, which would be considered crucial

by scholars interested in the methodology of social science. Those who think thatthe real strength of Marxs social thought lies in his analysis of the existing society

will not have much interest in his historicist method.

This does not mean, however, that we write off Marxs interpretation of history.

For we might find it helpful when approaching past societies, although, as Marx

himself pointed out, we need to be cautious in applying it. We should remember

that when Marx generalized from his theory of class, which he had derived from

the capitalist society of his time, and claimed that history of all hitherto existing

societies was the history of class struggle, he was careful to point out that thetwo-class model was applicable more to the society in his own time than to past

societies, which were often characterized by a manifold gradation of social rank.

The Revolt Against Theory

It is arguable, thus, that in a world characterized by poverty, hunger and disease,

the need to theorize about social and political life cannot be denied. But what we

find is the development of a strong sentiment against theory in recent decades.The exponents of post-modern thinking refer to theories as meta-narratives, grand-

narratives, grand theories and so on, rejecting them for being logocentric, linear

and totalizing. We might think that the notion of theory defended in this article is

much more modest than the kind of theories which seem to be the target of this

attack. But those who mount this attack do not care much about such niceties.

They want to end the intellectual hegemony that, they believe, is implicit in the

very notion of theory. They question the truth claims of theory and deny its pri-

vileged status. With them theory has become community specific, true only, if at

all, in terms of its own discourse. Whereas social science must decide which of

the competing theories is true, post-modernist thinking doubts the possibility

of deciding between opposing points of view. Nor does it think it worthwhile to

choose between or reconcile opposites. It welcomes the situation where a variety

of theories exist, and none can claim superiority over any other.

The resentment against theory is, of course, not new. As we have seen, in the

mid-twentieth century it was widely believed that facts, not theories, give know-ledge. This had led social scientists to focus on small segments of social life. The

truth is that even those who do not take a specifically anti-theoretical stand, favour

small-scale investigations. One reason for this tendency is that, unlike traditional

thinkers who moved freely between different aspects of social life, social scientists

have divided the study of social life into economic, social, political and other

aspects. The result is that they have become essentially students of subjects like

economics, political science and sociology, and so tend to choose topics which

fall in the domain of their own subjects. Indeed the tendency to chop-up socialreality has not stopped here. In their enthusiasm to make a more rigorous analysis



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of social and political life, social scientists concentrate on ever smaller segments

of it. This they think helps to observe facts more clearly. But there has been a

feeling that piecemeal observations give us nothing but fragments torn out of

their context. The accuracy obtained by a meticulous attention to detail is,thus, outweighed by the loss of perspective. In other words, those who con-

centrate on minute segments of social reality fail to see the wood for the trees.

Indeed sociologists like Mannheim do not think we could even understand frag-

ments adequately without relating them to other aspects of social life. There will

be many who will be sympathetic to this view. But Mannheim goes much further

than this and claims that we can understand petty details adequately only by

relating them to the total structure of society. The task, according to Mannheim,

is to piece together fragmentary observations provided by small-scale investi-gations so as to develop knowledge of the structure of society as a whole

(Mannheim,1954: 2636, 184).

The need to study society as a whole has been emphasized by the followers of

Marx, too. They are also critical of research in social science which focuses on

limited aspects of social life, since this prevents one from grasping the true nature

of society or the direction in which it is evolving. Those who accept this view of

social inquiry, we are told, treat society as it exists as given, as natural. According

to writers like Lukacs, only by studying society as a whole can we understandthat it is a capitalist society and that it is moving towards socialist transformation.

Hence Lukacss advice to adopt the method developed by Marx, at the heart of

which, he believes, lies the concept of totality. It is this method, rather than

Marxs theories, which is for Lukacs the distinguishing feature of what he calls

orthodox Marxism. Instead of relying on the findings of social sciences like

Mannheim, Lukacs turns to the perspective of the working class for developing

the view of society as a whole (Lukacs, 1993: 126). It is views such as these

which give credence to the thinking of post-modern writers, whose major target

when they attack grand theories, is Marxs social theories.

This is not to deny that there is a great deal of truth in the view which questions

the usefulness of focusing on small segments of social life. For we often have to

relate these to large-scale phenomena to make sense of them. When some com-

modities become scarce in the market, we refer not just to a railway employees

strike, for example, or to truck owners agitation, but also to such large-scale phe-

nomena as the operation of market forces. This does not mean, however, that wehave to study all aspects of social life, that we have to study society as a whole.

For we need to study only those aspects which help us in adequately analysing

the phenomena in which we are interested. In any case, we cannot study society,

indeed anything, as a whole. For, as Popper argues, our study of any phenomenon,

natural or social, is inevitably selective. But this does not mean that there are no

wholes or that a thing is a mere sum of its parts. Nor does it mean that a society

is no more than a sum of individuals composing it, on whom we must focus.

Even those who accept the validity of this argument might still wonder whetherit has any lessons for social scientists. For Poppers argument is that even if we



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want to study society as a whole, we can study only some aspects of itaspects

which we find useful for making sense of the phenomena in which we are inter-

ested. We should not ignore the feeling widely shared by scholars, however, that

our account should be comprehensive, that we should take into account all aspectsof social life. We often find critics indicting scholarly inquiries for ignoring aspects

close to their own hearts. It is well known that, while writers like Lukacs believe

that Marx studies society as a whole, Marx has often been criticized for con-

centrating on the economic aspect and ignoring other aspects, a criticism which

even Engles, who collaborated with Marx in his scholarly pursuits, seemed to

concede. The truth is that social reality can be analysed in a variety of ways. The

relevant question is whether a given analysis helps in adequately explaining the

phenomena under investigation. We can, no doubt, criticize it for ignoring certainaspects of social reality. But we must show that ignoring them renders the analysis

inadequate.

It is possible to argue, however, that what those who want to study society as a

whole have in mind is the need to study large-scale social phenomena and not

literally every aspect of it. There is some substance in this objection, since this

view has generally been advocated by those dissatisfied with the tendency to con-

centrate on small segments of social life. An exponent of this view like Lukacs

argues, thus, that we can make sense of a variety of social phenomena only whenwe relate them to the way economic goods are produced. This is certainly not a

plea to take every aspect of society into account but to rely on certain large-scale

economic phenomena. It is clear that Lukacs has in mind the economic theories

of Marx. Those who feel that the task is to theorize about social and political life

should have no objection against such a view. The only question is whether this is

what Lukacs has in mind, because he is critical of the very concept of social

science which aims at analysing social reality. He believes those who concentrate

on analysing social reality tend to acquiesce in it.

Lukacs is not alone in visualizing the work of traditional social and political

thinkers in a grandiose manner. There has been a strong tendency among historians

of ideas to interpret them in a similar vein. Writers like Berlin, for example, believe

that at the heart of political theory, as traditionally conceived, lie values like

equality, freedom and justice. The values a thinker espouses are, however, closely

connected with his view of man, which, in turn, depends on the metaphysical

model he accepts (Berlin, 1962: 133). This view of political theory is very grand-iose and can be described as meta-narrative or grand theory. Although it is true

that through the ages social and political theorists were deeply concerned about

moral issues, the question is how they went about studying it. No doubt, thinkers

like Plato, Aristotle and Hegel were deeply concerned about metaphysical ques-

tions. They often took interest in the study of human nature, too. But, still, it is

not certain whether the views of writers like Berlin provide an adequate under-

standing of what traditional thinkers were doing. For instance, the analysis of

social conditions in Greek cities made by Aristotle in Politics, which has won theadmiration of historians ofideas, had little to do with his concept of man developed



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inNichomachean Ethics or with his metaphysical theories like that of final cause

developed in his Metaphysics. Rather the basis of his concept of proportional

justice is provided by his analysis of existing conditions in Books IV, V and VI of

Politics.6

To take another example, Marx was not much interested in philosophicalquestions.7 Nor had his analysis of the capitalist society of his times much to do

with his view of man as developed in hisEconomic and Philosophical Manuscripts

of 1844.8 The principles of socialism he propounded were, in fact, closely connected

with his analysis of existing capitalist society. We can understand social and pol-

itical theories of writers like Aristotle and Marx more adequately if we consider

them as attempts to find solutions to the problems of their societies.

This view of political theory is much more modest in comparison to the grandiose

view accepted by Lukacs, Berlin and others. It does not even have the kind of uni-versality which many writers believe is its major characteristic. We should realize

that a theory concerned with problems facing societies like India would apply to

one kind of society, admittedly large in number. Those who think that political

theories must be applicable to every society, past or present, might be disappointed.

But the value of a theory which has relevance to the lives of a major part of hu-

manity cannot be exaggerated.

It is not hard to imagine, however, that in societies which succeed in addressing

their major problems, scholarly interest might shift to local knowledge, to personal

6 The author agrees with Professor Narinder Kapurs observation that in the authors earlier work,

Aristotles Political Theory, Aristotles moral ideas are treated more as a response to the social and

political conditions which obtained in ancient Greek cities, a position that reflected the dominant

philosophical position (Kapur, 2001). But the close relationship between Aristotles moral thinking

and his empirical analysis has been stressed in several of his subsequent writings (see, for example,

Bakshi, 1986: 1618).

It may be argued, no doubt, that Aristotle accepted virtue, which was closely connected with hisconcept of man, along with free-birth and wealth, that provided the basis for participating in the

political life of the cities, as a legitimate basis for claim to power. But we should remember that he

did not think there was much possibility of realizing the view of justice which recognized virtue as

the sole claim, even as one of the claims. This is why he did not have much interest in aristocratic

forms of government. The author is thankful to Prof. Kapur for his comments on the concept of

moral reasoning developed in Bakshi, 2000 (pp. 97113).7 Many would object, however, that historicism provided the framework for Marxs thinking, but,

as discussed earlier, it is arguable that this objection is misconceived.8 It is possible to argue, no doubt, that Marxs concept of socialism is closely connected with his

concept of man developed especially in hisEconomic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Those

who take this view can claim that when Marx talked of socialism he was visualizing a society in

which man would be able to realize his species powers. The trouble is, however, that this interpretation

leaves out Marxs entire analysis of the existing capitalist society. And this analysis was the product

of his efforts to explain why the working class was subjected to brutal exploitation. It showed that

the condition of the workers was not the result of some chance factors but of the way social and eco-

nomic life was organized in the capitalist society. Nor did he think that there was much chance of

these problems being solved within the existing system. This analysis provided the basis for developing

principles of socialism. He felt that the condition of a major part of society could be ameliorated only

by reorganizing social and economic life on the basis of these principles. The point is, thus, that Marxwas not trying to maximize happiness but to minimize suffering.



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testimony, to direct experience of individuals and communities. In these societies,

scholars could begin to doubt the usefulness of analysing social and political

reality and to discover virtues in community-based narratives, in traditional

narratives and so on. Although resentment against theorizing about social andpolitical life has been brewing for long, it is only in recent times that conditions

have been created in the West in which it could flourish. It cannot be over-

emphasized, however, that these conditions do not obtain in countries like India,

which continue to face major social and economic problems. This is why those

who advance a plea to give up theorizing about social and political life in these

countries need to re-examine their position.

Rethinking Nature of Science

Many would sympathize with the argument developed so far that the kind of

problems which are widely believed to arise in the study of social and political

life, making social sciences different from natural sciences, are not insurmountable.

But even some of them might wonder how far such an argument could go, given

the doubts that have been raised about theories in natural sciences in the last few

decades. While for long scientific theories were regarded as true, making the con-

trast with social sciences (which many thought could not develop a reliable know-ledge of social reality) sharp, it has been realized that even well-corroborated

scientific theories might reveal errors over time. This realization dawned on phil-

osophers and historians of science when Newtons theory, the very paradigm

of scientific knowledge for long, began to encounter difficulties in accounting for

the phenomena to which it purported to apply. Many have begun to wonder, thus,

whether the concept of truth could be used even in the context of scientific theories.

Although some thinkers have tried to salvage the situation by replacing the concept

of truth with that of probable truth, it is not certain whether this comes to grips

with the issues raised by the fate of some of the even well-corroborated theories.

For, as Popper argues, a theory stands falsified once we discover evidence against

it. This is why there must be a more radical solution to the questions which have

arisen in the philosophy of science. In Poppers view, thus, the history of a theory

like that of Newton shows that we can never be certain that our theories are true,

since we cannot close the possibility of discovering evidence against them. This

might leave many particularly those interested in developing social science onthe model of natural science disheartened, but not Popper, who believes that

the task is rather to search for evidence which undermines our theories. In oppos-

ition to the views of writers belonging to the Vienna Circle who emphasize the

need to verify theories, he highlights the role of critical scrutiny of theories in the

growth of scientific knowledge. His argument is that refutation of our theories

spurs us to develop new and better theories, which are nearer truth than those that

they have replaced. This is why Popper does not think we can dispense with the

concept of truth. Even if we can never be certain that what we know is true, truthmust remain a norm, indeed the most important norm, to regulate our inquiries.



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This is an ingenious solution to the problems which have arisen in the phil-

osophy of science. But Poppers view of scientific inquiry is not acceptable to all.

The most serious challenge to it comes from Kuhn, whose views, widely discussed

by historians and philosophers of science, have proved particularly attractive tothose inclined to a relativistic position in social sciences. The thrust of his argument

is that the scientist, far from being interested in critically examining the current

theory, as postulated by Poppers view of scientific inquiry, premises it as the

rules of his game. He is mainly interested in exploring it: in fleshing out, articu-

lating and extending it. This is what Kuhn calls normal science. He does not

deny that the current theory could be subjected to critical scrutiny. But he insists

that this takes place when it is in crisis, which is brought about by its inability to

cope with persistent anomalies.The feeling is widespread that Kuhn has drawn attention to certain aspects of

scientific research which had been ignored for long. The question is, however,

whether we should derive our view of science from normal science, the work

routinely done by scientists, or from theoretical revolutions, science at its best.

Kuhn believes we should derive it from the former, since it accounts for the

overwhelming majority of work done in the basic sciences. He agrees with his

critics that theoretical revolutions are the central episodes in scientific advance

those which make the game worth playing and the play worth studying (Kuhn,

1981b: 241). But, still, he does not think we are justified in deriving our view of

science from its occasional revolutionary parts. Writers like Popper and Lakatos,

on the other hand, focus on theoretical revolutions, since progress in science de-

pends on them.9 They regard normal science as boring, uninteresting and

pedestrian, indeed a danger to science10 (Feyerabend, 1981; Lakatos, 1981;

Popper, 1981). They even question Kuhns claim that normally there is one do-

minant theory in each scientific discipline. The truth, according to them, is thatvery often scientific disciplines are characterized by competing theories. This re-

sults in a critical scrutiny of theories on a more or less regular basis rather than

occasionally, when the ruling theory is in crisis, as Kuhn thinks.

In any case, as noted earlier, Kuhn admits that critical scrutiny of theories takes

place when the hold of the ruling theory is weakened, following its failure to

cope with persistent anomalies. But he does not agree with the orthodox Popperian

position which focuses on the role of rational considerations in making a choice

between competing theories. According to him, a study of science as it has actuallybeen practised shows that irrational considerations play a major role in the process.

Kuhns view has generated a big controversy, with his critics claiming that he

relies on the bandwagon effect to explain the transition from one theory to another.

This is not to say that they deny the role of irrational considerations in science.

But while they emphasize the need to reduce it, to make science more rational,

those who think that science is what scientists do, wonder whether we can legislate

9 There are major differences between Popper and Kuhn on the nature of progress in science.10 In fact, Popper believes that it is a danger not just to science, but to civilization.



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for scientists. This is widely believed to be the position of Kuhn, although he

denies that he relies on mob psychology to explain the transition from one theory

to another. He is at pains to argue that there are good reasons for choosing one

theory rather than another. Although it might be unfair to dismiss his protestsaltogether, there is little doubt that he does not regard truth-content of theories as

the main reason for making a choice between competing theories, the reason

which lies at the heart of Poppers thinking.

Since the whole emphasis of Kuhn is on the psychology or sociology of research,

rather than on the logic of discovery, on which Popper focuses, we might think

that the difficulties in comparing theories that he has in mind have to do with the

mental make-up of scientists or the nature of scientific communities. But the

reason why Kuhn denies the possibility of meaningfully comparing scientifictheories is that they are incommensurable. This is an argument with which

social scientists would be familiar. For the feeling has been widespread that rational

communication is possible only between those who agree on basic assumptions.

This view is, of course, not without substance. We often find it difficult to under-

stand the arguments of those who accept different frameworks. Even when the

same terms are used, they often carry different meanings. For long, social and

political thinkers regarded this as the bane of social science. What Kuhn is arguingis that even in natural sciences there are severe communication difficulties between

those who accept different theories. This is one of the major controversies in

the history and philosophy of science. Thinkers like Popper do not deny that there

are difficulties in comparing theories, but insist that it is just a dogma that they

are like mutually untranslatable languages. They think we can always compare

the truth-content of theories. The truth-content of Einsteins theory, for example,

is greater than that of Newtons. On the other hand, Kuhn doubts whether we can

ever say that the truth-content of the new theory is greater than that of the theoryit superseded. This would come as a surprise to people in everyday life who think

that there has been a phenomenal growth of scientific knowledge in the last few

centuries. This is also the thinking of writers like Popper who believe that since

we can compare the truth-content of theories, it is possible in science and only in

science to say that we have made genuine progress: that we know more than we

did before. This is the reason why Popper believes that theoretical revolutions

lie at the heart of science.

It is clear that there are major disagreements among historians and philosophers

of science. Although Kuhn has drawn attention to certain aspects of science which

had been ignored for long, serious doubts can be raised about his view of science,

in particular about the claim that we cannot rationally choose between competing

theories. The exponents of the relativistic view in social science need to be cautious

in invoking his name.

This discussion is likely to leave many a social scientist exasperated. Let us try

to clarify the issues which have been raised by it. It is widely argued that we makeempirical inquiries with the help of our values, concepts, theories and so on.by RAVI BABU BUNGA on October 19, 2009http://isq.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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By drawing attention to certain aspects of social reality, they help us in making

sense of what goes on around us. But the trouble is that they also keep us from

observing a variety of other aspects. This is the reason why those belonging to

higher castes often fail to notice the disabilities suffered by the masses occupyingthe lower rungs in the caste hierarchy, particularly the dalits. While this lends

credence to the view which places perspectives derived from social background

at the heart of the study of social life, we should remember that we often modify

or alter our beliefs or acquire new ones. It is therefore not surprising that in the

twentieth century those belonging to the higher castes generally became aware of

the sufferings of the dalits. Indeed a major contribution to the upliftment ofdalits

was made by the leaders of the freedom movement like Gandhiji, who belonged

to the upper castes. This is why we should be skeptical of the claim that we arecaptives of the beliefs that we derive from the social background. Even those who

concede this might still wonder, however, whether we rationally examine our

beliefs, changing them if we find them inadequate. There is no doubt an element

of truth in this objection, for there could be a variety of social and political factors

which lead us to change our beliefs. Many would explain the change in the attitude

towards dalits by referring to the need to forge a strong national movement by in-

cluding all sections of the Indian society or the electoral compulsions of politicalparties today.

This does not mean, however, that we do not rationally discuss our beliefs but

that, while physicists may critically examine their theories when they come across

facts which raise doubts about their theories, we are often forced by conditions of

social life to critically examine our ideas, to alter them, even to abandon them.

This has generally not received attention of those who believe that the task of

social scientists is far more difficult than that of natural scientists. At any rate, we

often critically examine our beliefs when we are confronted with different beliefs.Following the advent of British rule, when people in India became conversant

with more egalitarian ideas, for example, they began to critically discuss principles,

in particular those of caste, which had regulated their social life for ages and to

make attempts to alter them. In fact, a number of movements to bring about changes

in social life were launched. The truth is that clashes between cultures have often

proved very fruitful. Historians of ideas have shown that discussions about social

and political issues started in ancient times when, following development of inter-

national trade, the Greeks came in touch with a variety of beliefs obtaining in

differe

137 Whither Social Science?

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