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Reduction to Evidence as a Liberation of ThinkingHusserls Idea of Phenomenology and the Origin of Phenomenolog-ical Reduction1

Shigeru TaguchiHokkaido University

Abstract

Husserls theory of the phenomenological reduction is often explained by a radicalchange of attitude. Such an explanation is useful but sometimes misleading. TheIdea of Phenomenology clearly shows that the original idea of the reduction was

achieved through a radicalized critique of evidence. Although Husserls appealto evidence has often been criticized as an unjustified limitation of philosophicalthinking, a close examination of Husserls lectures reveals that the very limita-tion to the phenomenological evidence (or self-givenness) breaks our naturalinclination toward objective identities and liberates our thinking from the natural

but misleading division between transcendence and immanence. Thus, thephenomenological reduction can be interpreted as a transition from the thinkingwithout regard to evidence (i.e., based on naively positing things and their divisionswithout understanding their reason) to the philosophizing intrinsically mediatedby evidence, which can secure access for intuitive analysis to every conceivabletype of givenness insofar as it manifests itself.

What is fundamental is to apprehendthe sense of absolute givenness,the absolute clarity of being given [...]

Hua II, 9/662

1 Introduction

The idea of phenomenological reduction has sometimes been criticized for being tooesoteric or even mystic. Such an impression might be created if phenomenologistsemphasize the change of attitude that is supposed to be understood only whenit has already carried out. It is true that the phenomenological change of attitude(Einstellungsnderung) is a highly important issue that Husserl himself stressed since

Ideen I(1913). However, the original idea of phenomenological reduction in the lecturespublished under the title The Idea of Phenomenology (1907) does not necessarily dependon the theory of change in attitude. The radical transformation of attitude is neitherthe means nor the aim, but a result of phenomenological reduction. At least, it can be

1The original version of this paper was presented at the 41st Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle,June 23, 2010, New School for Social Research, New York. I thank Nicolas de Warren for his highlyvaluable comments on the original manuscript. My thanks are also due to George Heffernan, who acted ascommentator on this paper in its originally presented form, and to the participants of the meeting whohelped me with their comments and questions to increase the quality of this paper. This work was supportedby the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (22520006).

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said that it is inappropriate to rely just on the description of the change of attitude toexplain what is the reduction. 2

In the following I propose to re-examine Husserls discovery of the phenomeno-

logical reduction in The Idea of Phenomenology to clarify what the reduction originallymeans. In these famous Five Lectures and the relevant texts written during the sameperiod it is well documented how Husserl became explicitly aware of the functionof the critique of evidence (Evidenzkritik), which is not sufficiently emphasized inthe literature. In my view, it is a radicalization of his critique of evidence that leadsHusserl to the full development of his theory of the reduction. Whereas Ideen Imightgive an inadequate impression that the reduction is a limitation to a particular domainof being which alone is evident, The Idea of Phenomenology clearly shows that thereduction leads to a new mode of philosophizing mediated by rediscovered evidencealone. This interpretation makes it possible to understand why the phenomenologicalreduction is not a sort of retreat or withdrawal into a merely subjective, individualconsciousness, but a method ofliberating ones thinking. The reduction does not disclosea merely wider sphere of being, but it provides us with a completely different foothold

of thinking that enables us to discuss another dimension oftruth and its unknownorder.3

It must be noted that the Five Lectures lack an easily comprehensible, systematicstructure because through them Husserl is struggling for a clear understanding ofhis own phenomenology. It thus becomes necessary to reconstitute Husserls train ofthought through these lectures. Husserl himself attempted such a self-interpretationand reconstruction in a short text written immediately after the lectures.4 Thoughthis self-interpretation is still not sufficient, it can be more clearly understood throughthis short text how the examination of evidence can shed light on the perplexingpresentation of these lectures. In what follows I will clarify his train of thought byaccentuating the direction of Husserls self-interpretation. In this way, I will show howHusserls conception of phenomenological reduction makes it possible to liberate our

philosophical thinking from its natural limitation based on insufficient interpretationsof immanence and transcendence, and how fundamentally the theory of evidencecontributes to this self-liberation of thinking.5

2I basically sympathize with Fllesdals attempt (2006) to interpret Husserls reductions in relation to thechanges of attitudes that are already done in our everyday life, but it cannot be explained in this way howthe phenomenological changes of attitudes in such a radical form are motivated. Especially the systematicperformance of the transition from the eidetic to the transcendental reduction is not motivated in the naturalattitude. As Drummond points out, mere description of different attitudes is not sufficient to explain to onewho remains in the natural attitude why he should abandon it when doing philosophy. ( Drummond 1975,47). It is indispensable to critically examine the starting point for philosophy in regard to its evidentialcharacter of apodicticity (Drummond 1975, 48).

3At this point, I completely agree with Sokolowski 2008: What Husserl does in the reduction is toestablish his own philosophy as a distinct intellectual project, one that both secures and tries to understandthe achievement of truth Sokolowski 2008, 170-171. He also notes: Instead of speaking about a special

kind of reflection and a new kind of attitude, we would do well to speak about a new kind of vocabularyand discourse, one proper to phenomenology Sokolowski 2008, 172. In the following, I also attempt topropose a way of speaking about the reduction that is based on the critique of evidence rather than thechange of attitude.

4The train of thought in the lectures (Hua II, 3-14/61-70).5John Brough convincingly argues by clarifying Husserls argumentations in The Idea of Phenomenology

that consciousness is not a bag or container that cannot go beyond itself Brough 2008. In contrast to hisapproach that attempts to show the whole range and richness of Husserls argumentations in the lectures, Iwill rather focus on the reason why the bag conception of consciousness could be overcome through a mereexamination of the givenness of phenomena. As for this approach to the problem of the Kapsel-Vorstellungof consciousness, see also Chapter I, 12 and Chapter II ofTaguchi 2006.

Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

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Reduction to Evidence as a Liberation of Thinking 3

2 What is given? Immanence and Transcendence

The Five Lectures Husserl gave in the spring of 1907 are motivated by the riddle ofknowledge or the question: How is objective knowledge possible? In the naturalattitude, we take it for granted that objects of our knowledge are given to us.Philosophical questioning, however, severely shakes this natural confidence. Howcan knowledge go beyond itself and reach its objects reliably? What appears to naturalthinking as the matter-of-fact givenness of known objects within knowledge becomesa riddle.6

In the face of such a riddle, Husserl radicalizes an interrogation regarding whatis (really) given? This can be interpreted as a straightforward expression of hisevidence-theoretical motivation to secure a truly reliable starting point for philosophicalthinking.

At the first stage, a clue is provided by the conceptual pair immanence and transcen-dence. What is to be transcendent can be typically exemplified by physical things in theouter world. Closer examination reveals, however, that such thingstranscendent

thingscannot be free from skepticism. This is showed by the Cartesian doubtwhich is based on a type of the argument from illusion: every perception cannotfundamentally exclude the possibility that it may prove to be an illusion. Therefore, itcannot be considered to be absolutely reliable. Such a methodological doubt showsthat the transcendent object cannot be a starting point of a critical philosophicalthinking. In opposition to the transcendent, what is immanent, understood ascogitatio, can bear the test of critical skepticism. For in making the judgment thateverything is doubtful it cannot be doubted that I am making this judgment (Hua II,30/23). Even if the object of my mental act proved to be an illusion, it is undeniablethat I am perceiving, judging, imagining, etc. At least, I cannot think that I am notperforming these acts while performing them.

This classical argument, however, is used by Husserl for an intrinsically different

purpose than that of Descartes. At the beginning, Husserl himself was not aware ofthe significance of his reinterpretation of the Cartesian consideration, which I will nowexplicate in the next section.

3 Radicalized Thinking of Evidence

In the Second Lecture, Husserl makes a short, relatively modest comment on theCartesian procedure that he just introduced. Descartes made use of this considerationfor other purposes; but with the appropriate modifications, we can use it here as well(Hua II, 30/24). Husserl does not intend to secure the thinking ego as a substance onthe basis of which he can build a logically deduced system of theory.7 Rather, heconcentrates on the reason why the cogitatio can be regarded as absolutely given.

Husserl first calls attention to the intuitive givenness of experience, especially that ofperception. He finds an absolute ground in it: [...] the perception, as long as it lasts,is and remains an absolute entity, a this-here, that is what it is in itself, somethingthat I can refer to as a final criterion in determining what being and being-given mightmean, and here must mean, at least for the manner of being and givenness exemplified

6Hua II, 20/17.7Cf. HuaMatIII, 89, 90-91. UngleichCartesius suchen wir nichtnach denabsolut sicherenFundamenten,

aufdenen wir nachabsolutsicheren Prinzipien das Gesamtgebudemenschlichen Wissensaufbauen knnten[...] (Hua Mat III, 90). The same type of criticism can be found in many of Husserls writings. See especially10 of the Cartesian Meditations (Hua I, 63-64).


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by the this-here. And this holds for all specific forms of thought, no matter how theyare given (Hua II, 31/24-25).8

The manner of givenness that is signified by this-here, that is what it is in

itself, is characterized by immanence: [...] because of such immanence, this formof knowledge is free of that enigmatic character which is the source of all skepticalpredicaments (Hua II, 33/26). However, in the meantime, immanence has alreadyacquired a different meaning from that originally suggested at the first stage of thelectures. Husserl now becomes aware of this ambiguity and draws a clear distinction

between the immanence as real [reelle] containment in the experience of knowingand an entirely different kind of immanence, namely, absolute and clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute sense (Hua II, 35/27). It is obvious that such a characterizationof givenness can be expressed by the term evidence in Husserls terminology. Infact, he paraphrases self-givenness as follows: This givenness, which excludes anymeaningful doubt, consists of an immediate act of seeing and apprehending the meantobjectivity itself as it is. It constitutes the precise concept of evidence, understood asimmediate evidence (Hua II, 35/27-28).

We can reconstitute this train of thought by simplifying it in the following way:Why can we consider real [reelle] immanence as being given? Because it is clearand distinct, i.e., evident. It is not immanence that makes things evident. Rather,it is the evidence that gives the reason why immanence can be conceived as beingabsolutely given.

In this way, Husserl radically transposes his foothold of thinking. The natural,naive distinction between immanence and transcendence cannot be a reliable basis ofphenomenological thinking. It cannot be a starting point to think that only that whichis really [reell] contained in the psychological consciousness is indubitable, that whichtranscends it is dubitable. Rather, the only criterion of phenomenological givenness iswhether something is evident or not. It is not the distinction between immanenceand transcendence that makes it possible to distinguish evidence from non-evidence.

Conversely, it is evidence that enables us to define what is immanent and what istranscendent in phenomenological sense.9

This fundamental insight into the methodological peculiarity of phenomenologicalthinking is fully expressed in the Third Lecture, where Husserl retrospectively refersto the Cartesian doubt and the two senses of immanence.

Descartes asked, as you will recall, after he had established the evidence of thecogitatio [...]: What is it that assures me of this basic givenness? The answer: clear anddistinct perception [clara et distincta perceptio]. We can latch onto this point. I neednot mention the fact that we have already grasped the matter in a purer and deeperway than Descartes did, and that we have thus grasped and understood evidence,clear and distinct perception, in a purer sense. With Descartes we can now takethe additional step (mutatis mutandis): whatever is given through clear and distinct

perception, as it is in any singular cogitatio, we are entitled to accept (Hua II, 49/37; bold

emphasis added).

In my view, this is the most crucial move in these five lectures and even oneof the most decisive moments in Husserls philosophical life. He gained a clear

8With final criterion Husserl implies evidence, which is first mentioned in the recapitulation in themiddle of the second lecture (Hua II, 33/26).

9This is the insight which, de facto, Husserl has already gained in the Appendix ofLogical Investigations(External and Internal Perception: Physical and Psychical Phenomena). The Idea of Phenomenology enablesHusserl to break through to a new level of understanding of his own phenomenology on the basis ofthat insight. Cf. Hua XIX/2, 751-775/ 852-869. The fundamental significance of this Appendix for aphenomenological turn of Husserls thinking is elaborated by Nicolas de Warren (2003).


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insight into a new style of philosophizing in which we can accept whatever is givenin evidence. This newly discovered principle of phenomenology, which apparentlybecomes echoed in the principle of all principles ofIdeas I,10 continues to determine

the character of Husserls phenomenology until the latest period of its development.11

It is important to keep in mind that Husserl did not achieve a particular domainof being or experience, but a new way of thinking that is exclusively mediated byevidence in the phenomenological sense, instead by something particular that issupposed to be evident. In what follows, I will show how the strict observance of theprinciple of evidence, against naive expectations, opens our eyes to the whole range ofphenomenological givenness.

4 Essences are also given

The next question is: What does the new principle bring about in phenomenology?The Cartesian doubt led Husserl to the evidence ofcogitatio. However, a philosophicalscience cannot begin with such fleeting cogitationes (or an eternal Heraclitean streamof phenomena) from which we can grasp nothing other than individual facts ofexperiencing, nothing other than this here! As Husserl asks: What statements canI make about it? (Hua II, 47/36) It is impossible to make something clear only bysaying: This, this, this! or Here, here, here! Therefore, it is necessary to find othertypes of self-givenness. In any case, it is illuminating to note that the possibility of acritique of knowledge depends on the indication of forms of absolute givenness otherthan the reduced cogitationes (Hua II, 50/38). Husserl then indicates that not onlyparticulars, but also universals, universal objects, and universal states of affairs canbe brought to absolute givenness (Hua II, 51/39). This indication is elaborated in thenext, Fourth Lecture.

As Husserl writes: [C]an universality, can general essences [...] actually achievethe same kind of self-givenness that a cogitatio does? (Hua II, 55/41) This is a crucial

question, for universality apparently transcends acts of knowing; it cannot be found inthe real (reell) stream of consciousness as its real (reell) component. The self-givennessof such a transcendent object is something incomprehensible insofar as we conceivethat only the real (reell) immanence of consciousness assures self-givenness. However,we now have the new principle of phenomenology that is discovered in the ThirdLecture: Whatever is given through clear and distinct perception, i.e., evidence, we are entitledto accept. According to this principle, we can reasonably accept universality if it isself-given.12

Not only can the real (reell) experience ofcogitatio satisfy the critical criterion ofevidence; but also the givenness of universality can be clear and distinct, or evident,insofar as a universal object is given in the intuitive consciousness. It can easily

10[...] The principles of all principles: that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of

cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its personal actuality) offered to us in intuition is tobe accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presentedthere. (Hua III/1, 51/44).

11See also Husserls remark in the Cartesian Meditations: Naturally everything depends on strictlypreserving the absolute unprejudicedness of the description and thereby satisfying the principle of pureevidence, which we laid down in advance (Hua I, 74/36).

12To discuss the theory of essence on the basis of the relevant argumentations in Logical Investigations isbeyond the scope of this brief paper. For my purpose, it is enough to show that there are such types ofgivenness that cannot be reduced to real (reell) givenness; they transcend real (reell) immanence and areevidently given at the same time. As George Heffenan pointed out in his comment on the initial versionof this paper, a more critical and detailed discussion is needed to convincingly show whether and howuniversality can be regarded as phenomenological givenness.


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be confirmed that we cannot pick up and pin down only an individual moment ofsensation. Such an absolutely isolated impression is nothing other than an abstractionfrom concrete givenness.13 Every impression is given with its relation to other

impressions that are concretely united with it in succession or coexistence.14

Thus,concrete intuitive experience always contains intuitive givenness of relations that gobeyond a single impression.

Let us take the typical example employed by Husserl. If we see a red thing, wecannot help finding it in relation to other things that are also called red. What we callthe essence of red is such a moment of intuitive experience that makes it possible toequally describe various objects as red. Without this universal moment we cannotcompare those objects exactly in that specific way. [...] if two species of red are givento us, two nuances of red, can we not judge that they are similar to each othernotthese particular, individual red phenomena, but rather the species, the nuances assuch? Isnt the relation of similarity a universal that is absolutely given? (Hua II,57/42)

If a universalobject is only meant as universal, it is incomprehensible or meaningless

to say that it is not what it is. Insofar as essence is concerned, it is nonsense tosay: Red can be something different from what we understand by red; becausered in specie is exactly what we mean by red. If we take another expression: Itis possible that the red we know is not the true red, then what is meant is not theessence of red as it is, but a red specified in a certain way. Such specification would

be meaningless if we dont know what is specified. The essence of red is a simplemoment of consciousness without which all consciousness and verbal expressions ofred are meaningless; in other words, a type of primitive givenness which enables usconcerning various objects to say: I see a red or It is red. 15

The givenness of red does not necessarily need to have such absolutely identifiablecontents as mathematical objects do. However, we must know what is red so as todiscuss whether an object is red or not; otherwise we cannot even know if we talk

about the same topic or not. Thus, such discussion already presupposes the redin specie as a certain kind of givenness that is different from the factual, individualdatum of sensation. Insofar as such a non-individual kind of primitive givenness ismeant, it is impossible to think that red as red is not what it is given to us. Thus it issenseless to question and to doubt what the essence of red is, or what the sense of redis, provided that, while one is seeing red and grasping it in terms of its specific kind,one means by the word red exactly what is grasped and seen (Hua II, 57/42-43).

It must be noted that the intuitive consciousness of the essence of red does notimply that we can have an image of the very essence itself. To have the essence of redas intuitive givenness, we need not to be imagining or picturing the essence of red nextto a red thing. Rather, intuition here corresponds to adequateness. If what is meantis fulfilled as it is exactly meant and does not contain any empty intention that can befurther fulfilled, we can then appropriately refer to the intuition as adequateness. 16

13See Hua X, 326/338.14Fllesdal seems to support this interpretation. See Fllesdal 2006, 109-110.15Essence is not a metaphysical entity, but a sort of extremely simple and obvious givenness, whose

obviousness makes it difficult to grasp in reflection. Husserl indicates such obviousness in Philosophie alsstrenge Wissenschaft: Der Bann des urwchsigen Naturalismus besteht auch darin, da er es uns allen soschwer macht, Wesen, Ideen zu sehen oder vielmehr, da wir sie ja doch sozusagen bestndig sehen, sie inihrer Eigenart gelten zu lassen, statt sie widersinnig zu naturalisieren. Wesensschauung birgt nicht mehrSchwierigkeiten oder mystische Geheimnisse als Wahrnehmung (Hua XXV, 32); cf. Hua XXV, 36; XX/1,282.

16Cf. Hua XXV, 32f. Incidentally, it is not necessary for the validity of essence to be adequately intuited.


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And it is exactly such a kind of evidence that requires us to accept universality inits phenomenological givenness. Universal objectivities and states of affairs come toself-givenness for us, and they are in the same sense [as cogitatio] unquestionably

given, in the strongest sense adequately self-given (Hua

II, 60/45).Thus, it seems reasonable to suppose that repudiation of universal givennesswould lead to abstraction from concrete givenness. Assuming it to be true, it may beconcluded that universality can be counted as phenomenological immanence. Thusthis givenness is a purely immanent givenness, not immanent in the false sense, namely,existing in the sphere of individual consciousness (Hua II, 57/42). Universal objectswhich are initially considered as transcendent are now integrated into the sphereof phenomenological immanence so that such objects can be phenomenologicallyanalyzed on the basis of evidence. It is clear that this integration is enabled by theevidence-theoretical reinterpretation of immanence.

Through this consideration, we can confirm again that the appeal to evidence worksas a principle: Not the real (reell) immanence, but evidence assures us phenomenologi-cal givenness. This point is now more clearly noticed by Husserl himself: One must

get especially clear on the fact that the absolute phenomenon, the reduced cogitatio,does not count as an absolute givenness because it is a particular, but rather because itdisplays itself in pure seeing after the phenomenological reduction as something thatis absolutely self-given. But in pure seeing we can discover that universality is no lesssuch an absolute givenness (Hua II, 56/42).

5 Extension of the Given through Intentionality

Based on the principle of evidence, Husserl further extends the sphere of phenomeno-logical givenness. As already announced at the beginning of the Fourth Lecture,phenomenological immanence also includes that which is intentionally given. [...]here we will not only be concerned with what is really [ reell] immanent, but also with

what is immanent in the intentional sense (Hua II, 55/41). This insight is fully developedin the Fifth Lecture. Finally, at this stage, the phenomenological immanence coversthe whole sphere of the given that is conceivable (at least at this stage).

At the first stage, the phenomenological reduction was applied to the objectivetranscendence. As Husserl notes in the Second Lecture, all transcendence that comesinto play here must be excluded, must be supplied with the index of indifference, ofepistemological nullity (Hua II, 39/30).17 However, Husserl now asks in the FifthLecture whether transcendent objects are also phenomenologically given in a peculiarsense: In the perception of an external thing, say the house standing before us, it isprecisely the thing that is perceived. This house is a transcendence, and forfeits itsexistence after the phenomenological reduction. What is then actually given is theappearing of the house, this cogitatio, emerging in the stream of consciousness and

eventually flowing away. In this house-phenomenon we find a red-phenomenon, anextension-phenomenon, etc. And these are given with evidence. But is it not alsoevident that a house appears in the house-phenomenon, thus giving us a reason tocall it a house-perception? (Hua II, 72/53)

If we separated the house from the house-phenomenon, we could not call it

Husserl accepts the essence-intuition in a broader sense than the adequate one (cf. Hua III/1, 15). See alsothe distinction between empirical universal and pure essence or eidos by Sokolowski Sokolowski1974, 58-62.

17At this stage, phenomenological reduction is called epistemological reduction (Hua II, 39/30, 43/33).The term phenomenological reduction first appears in the third lecture (Hua II, 44/34).


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house-phenomenon anymore, since, in this case, it would be an intrinsically differentphenomenon. The phenomenon contains that moment on account of which it is calledhouse-phenomenon; and furthermore, what is appearing in this phenomenon is not

the house in general, but a particular house. So, this phenomenon has particularmoments and characteristics without which it cannot be the phenomenon of the veryhouse that is standing in front of me, a brick building, with a slate roof, etc. Suchcharacteristics are descriptive moments in the phenomenon, which means that theyare given in intuitive evidence.

The same applies to objects of imagination and symbolic thinking. In imagining,St. George is an appearing, transcendent object, but manifests itself within theappearances as a givenness (Hua II, 72/53). As for the symbolic thinking of counter-sensical objects (for example: round rectangle) are also given as it is thought in thisthinking. We think exactly that object which is round and rectangular at the sametime. Here an intentional object is nevertheless obviously there (ibid.).

In this way, every intentional object can be counted as phenomenological givenness,insofar as it cannot arbitrarily be separated from the phenomenon that gives the

object as the very object which is given in the phenomenon. In regard to thisphenomenon, not only the intentional act as cogitatio but also the intentional objectcan have phenomenological givenness, because they are the decisive moments of thatphenomenon in which they are inseparably related. That is to say, various modes ofintentionality can also be regarded as self-given. What is indicated in the Third Lecturecan now be understood in detail: The relating-itself-to-something-transcendent,to refer to it in one way or another, is an inner characteristic of the phenomenon(Hua II, 46/35). On the basis of this inner characteristic of the phenomenon, it ispossible to exhibit the different modes of genuine givenness, and, in this regard,the constitution of the different modes of objectivity and their relation to each other(Hua II, 74/54). In such an investigation of genuine givenness, an object and itsappearing cannot be separated; they must be examined in correlation; and the

essential correlation between appearing and that which appears (Hua II, 14/69) is notan external relation like that between a sack and a thing in it, but another expressionof constitution, i.e., the phenomenon in which the object constitutes itself (Hua II,74-75/55). This everywhere ongoing occurrence is also lived as an experience, and canthus be phenomenologically analyzed.

Thus, all types of givenness that have been examined so far whether it manifestsitself in connection with something merely represented or truly existing, real or ideal,possible or impossible (Hua II, 74/54) fall into the sphere of phenomenologicalgivenness. At the beginning, the phenomenological reduction had to exclude allthat is posited as transcendent (Hua II, 5/63). At the final stage of lectures, all thatwas excluded comes back to the sphere of phenomenological givenness; what ismore, it is enriched with an intrinsically deeper understanding. This outcome ofthe phenomenological reduction is fully expressed in the lecture Einfhrung in diePhnomenologie der Erkenntnis (1909):

Vermge der Intentionalitt der cogitatio oder des Bewusstseins [...] umspannt diePhnomenologie, die wir auch als Wissenschaft vom reinen Bewusstsein bezeichnenknnten, in gewisser Weise all das, was sie so sorgfltig ausgeschaltet hat; sieumspannt alle Erkenntnisse, alle Wissenschaften und in gegenstndlicher Hinsichtalle Gegenstndlichkeiten, auch die gesamte Natur. Die Wirklichkeit der Natur,die Wirklichkeit von Himmel und Erde, von Menschen und Tieren, von eigenemIch und fremdem Ich schaltet sie freilich aus, aber sozusagen ihre Seele, ihrem Sinn

behlt sie zurck (Hua Mat VII, 64).


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In this passage, we can glimpse the mature expressions of the phenomenologicalreduction of later years, in which a kind of regaining by abandoning is stressed: Imust lose the world by epoch, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination

(Hua

I, 183/157).18

6 Conclusion

According to Husserls considerations in the Five Lectures, nothing is left as givennessthat cannot be treated in the sphere of phenomenological immanence. In this sense,phenomenological immanence does not stand opposed to a particular region ofgivenness or subject-matters, but to a certain kind of attitude or way of seeing; that is tosay, the transcendence vis--vis the phenomenological immanence would consist innaively positing such objects as we naturally believe to have without sufficient reason,i.e., without evidence. Therefore, the reduction to the phenomenological immanence

though this term immanence seems not appropriate anymore19 does not meana withdrawal into the real consciousness conceived as a bag or capsule. Instead,the reduction expresses a movement in which the thinking that is imprisoned byits groundless beliefs breaks its limit and becomes open to every conceivable type ofgivenness as it manifests itself, namely, to the things themselves. 20

Thus, the phenomenological reduction proves to have a liberating function that isenabled by the critique of evidence. The radicalization of the appeal to evidence makesit possible for phenomenological thinking to free itself from the naively presupposeddivision between the real [reelle], psychological immanence and that which transcendsit, so that all conceivable kinds of givenness can be phenomenologically analyzed.21

The Idea of Phenomenology clearly shows that there is nothing esoteric about the opera-tion of the phenomenological reduction; rather, it represents the evidence-theoreticaltransformation of philosophical thinking that, once it has gained greater clarity in the FiveLectures, continues to determine Husserls thought. I will finish by quoting a passage

from the Fourth of the Five Lectures, which may serve as evidence for my conclusion:

Accordingly, the phenomenological reduction does not signify the limitation ofthe investigation to the sphere of real [reellen] immanence, to the sphere of what isreally [reell] contained in the absolute this of the cogitatio, and it does not at allsignify the limitation to the sphere of the cogitatio, but rather the limitation to thesphere ofpure self-givenness, to the sphere of what is not merely talked about andreferred to; but also not to the sphere of what is perceived, but rather to what isgiven in exactly the same sense in which it is meant and self-given in the strictestsense in such a way that nothing that is meant fails to be given. In a word, it is alimitation to the sphere of pure evidence (Hua II, 60-61/45).

18See also Hua VIII, 166: [...] alles preisgeben heit, alles gewinnen.19In another paper Taguchi 2011 I showed how Husserl overcame the abstract dichotomy of immanence

and transcendence through his radicalized thinking of evidence.20In this sense, it is striking that James Dodd characterizes the reduction as phenomenalizationDodd

2004, 188ff.21In this paper, I focused on the liberating function of evidence, but of course this is not the only

significance of this concept. After the whole sphere of phenomenological givenness was secured, theconcept of evidence should be differentiated in order to discriminate various types of givenness whileuncovering the interrelation between them. See Brough 2009; Taguchi 2006, 48, 200ff.


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