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YSMAEL v. CA

G.R. No. 96999

June 10, 1997

Prepared by: Jose Ben L. Campos

FACTS:On January 27, 1965, petitioner Carlos Ysmael sold two (2) parcels of subdivision lots to

private respondent Eliseo R. Jamlang on installment basis. On February 25, 1974, Jamlang completed

the payments for the aforementioned lots. However, records show that one of the lots was mortgagedto Pilipinas Bank prior to the sale while the other lot was subsequently mortgaged to Equitable

Banking Corporation. The foreclosure of the said lots prevented Jamlang from acquiring the title forthe lots.

Due to petitioners failure to deliver the titles of the subject lots, Jamlang sought relief fromthe Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) by filing a complaint for specificperformance with damages. Petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary period. He

also failed to attend the scheduled hearings despite notification. Thus, petitioner was declared indefault and the decision was rendered against the petitioner ordering the delivery to Jamlang the title

of the lots.After the decision became final, the HLURB issued a writ of execution directing petitioner tocomply. However, it was unsatisfied due to the foreclosure of the subject lots by the mortgagee banks.A criminal case was then instituted against the petitioner for violation of Sec 25 of P.D. 957.Consequently, Jamlang filed a motion for an alias writ of execution and prayed that he be reimbursedthe current market value of the two lots subject of this case as an alternative relief. The HLURBgranted the aforestated motion and issued an alias writ of execution which is substantially the same as

the first writ but with the addition of an alternative command for petitioner to pay private respondentJamlang the current market value of the lots subject of the judgment.

By virtue of the alias writ of execution, real property owned by petitioner was levied onexecution and sold at public auction on June 2, 1989. Jamlang was the highest bidder. A certificate ofsale was duly issued in favor of Jamlang on the same date. Petitioner failed to redeem the said

property within the period allowed by law for redemption and as a result, a Sheriffs Final Deed ofSale was issued in favor of Jamlang. On June 28, 1990, a Notice to Vacate was issued and was postedon the perimeter fence of the property.

On July 2, 1990, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorariand prohibition with preliminaryinjunction and prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order to review the Order of the HLURBand the issuance of the Notice to Vacate. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that petitioner was deprived ofdue process in the execution of the HLURB decision.

HELD:No. We rule against petitioner on grounds of fairness and equity particularly on the principle

of estoppel.Petitioner contends that the alternative relief contained in the alias writ of execution issued by

the HLURB, ordering petitioner to pay Jamlang the current market value of the subject lots in theevent that he (petitioner) fails to deliver the land titles, is contrary to or is virtually an amendment ofthe terms of the original judgment by default. Fundamental is the rule, petitioner avers, that the writ of

execution must conform to that ordained in the dispositive part of the decision. A court, except forclerical errors, can no longer modify a final and executory judgment hence, an order of execution

which varies the tenor of the decision is null and void. Despite his passionate arguments, however, thedoctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice,and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to theinjury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon.

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In the case at bar, it is quite telling that petitioner failed to take any kind of action to manifest

his protest against the alias writ of execution. His indifference to the whole proceedings was quiteevident as it was only after the final deed of sale was executed and a notice to vacate was issued to

him that he filed a special civil action. It would seem that petitioner only complained because, andafter, the sheriff was finally ordered to evict him from the premises. Furthermore, in the notice of sale

for the public auction of his property, the gist of the alias writ of execution was plainly stated. At thisstage, therefore, petitioner could and should have made his challenge and taken action to stop theproceedings, but he did not. He remained seemingly unconcerned. He allowed the proceedings to be

completed and during the one-year period of redemption wasted anew his opportunity to protestand/or redeem his property by doing absolutely nothing. Petitioners inaction in this case has

amounted to estoppel. To rule otherwise would result in iniquity and grave injustice to privaterespondent Jamlang. His (private respondent) triumph in justice comes to naught if the judgment inhis favor would be impossible to execute.

Petitioner repeatedly stressed that he is not questioning the default judgment itself, andcertainly he would not, since it cannot be enforced against him anyway. Said judgment merely

required him to deliver the titles to Jamlang which is no longer possible due to their foreclosure by thebanks. He deliberately defaulted in the proceedings before the HLURB because he knew that the land

titles could no longer be delivered to private respondent Jamlang. Moreover, we cannot allowpetitioner to be unjustly enriched at the expense of private respondent Jamlang, having obtained boththe full purchase price paid by the latter for the sale of the two lots and the loan proceeds covered bythe mortgage on the said properties from the banks.

Lastly, petitioner complains that he was unjustly denied due process in the executionproceedings, adding that his inaction and default status at the trial stage was unduly extended to theexecution stage. However, petitioners attempt to separate and make a distinction between due process

at the trial stage and due process at the execution stage will not succeed. Trial and executionproceedings constitute one whole action or suit. Petitioner cannot unduly separate the two so that hecould conveniently escape the effects of being declared in default. The essence of due process is theopportunity to be heard. Petitioner was given this opportunity, yet he chose to ignore it. Thus, hecannot now complain that he was denied due process.