12 DPI403 Constitutions
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Transcript of 12 DPI403 Constitutions
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Constitutional choices
Consensus v. majoritarian democracies
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Lijphart 2
Policy Areasy
Map ofMap of Program Options
Constitutions IDEA
Human rights, justice,
rule_lawAmnesty
Democratic governance
ElectionsACE/UNDP
Media freedom
Amnesty
governance UNDPIFES
Parlt, tiCivic
CPJ
parties, womenQuotas Project
PAR, decentralization, anti-corruption
TI
Civic society, soc
capCIVICUS
TI
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Lijphart 3
Class Structure
I Lijpharts typology of types of I. Lijphart s typology of types of democracy
II Majoritarian democracy II. Majoritarian democracy Case study of the UK May 2005 election
III Consensus democracy III. Consensus democracy Case study of the Swiss 2003 election
IV Discussion exercise IV. Discussion exercise What might be the arguments for adopting either type
of democracy for new constitutions in Iraq, Af h i t S d d N l?Afghanistan, Sudan, and Nepal?
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Lijphart 4
Additional resources
Pippa Norris Pippa Norris Driving Democracy (CUP 2008)
www pippanorris com (under books)www.pippanorris.com (under books ) Comparative Constitutions Project
http://netfiles uiuc edu/zelkins/constitutions http://netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions
International Constitutional Law DocumentsDocuments
http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/index.html
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Lijphart 5
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Lijphart 6
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Lijphart 7
Theoretical framework: Lijphartjp
Arend Lijphart Arend Lijphart The Politics of Accommodation (1968) Democracy in Plural Society (1979) Democracy in Plural Society (1979) Democracies (1984) Electoral systems and party systems (1994)y p y y ( ) Institutional design in new democracies (1996) Patterns of Democracy (1999) Thinking about Democracy (2008)
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Lijphart 8
Why focus on constitutions?y
Institutions can influence democratic governance e.g.
Electoral rules have a mechanical impact on the number of parties in parliament and in governmentp p g
Executive-legislative relations influences state capacity for effective governance
Potential for practical political reforms e.g. Potential for practical political reforms e.g. Electoral reform in Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Venezuela Constitution-building in Bosnia, Cambodia, South Africa,
Afghanistan, Iraq, Nepal, SudanAfghanistan, Iraq, Nepal, Sudan Peace-settlements in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995, Kosovo
2001, Northern Ireland 1998
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Lijphart 9
Constitutions
Formal institutions Formal institutions Written constitutions, legal statutes,
administrative decisions, executive decrees, judicial rulings, budgetary allocations
Open to short-term political reform Informal institutions
Norms, values and common practices which h d t i h b h ishape and constrain human behavior
Open to long-term cultural evolution
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Lijphart 10
Stages of Institutional Reformg
State building State building Post-conflict peace settlements
E.g. Afghanistan constitution
State reform Transition from autocracy
Eg Choice of electoral system in post-Communist statesEg Choice of electoral system in post Communist states Common in established democracies
Improving existing arrangements within a limited set of parameters/options p p
eg UK green paper The Governance of Britain (2007)
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Lijphart 11
Consociational democracyy
Lijphart (1968) The Politics of Accommodation Netherlands exemplified pillorized divided society Yet there was stable democracy and elite consensus Why? Constitutional arrangements Why? Constitutional arrangements
Executive power-sharing/grand coalition Minority veto in government Proportional representation of all major groups in
elected/appointed officeelected/appointed office Cultural autonomy for groups
Model for other divided (plural) societies? E g Belgium Switzerland Lebanon Cyprus E.g.Belgium, Switzerland, Lebanon, Cyprus
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Lijphart 12
Normative valuesMajoritarian
(Westminster) Consociational democracy( )democracy Goals
government accountability
democracy Goals
consensual decision-making bargaining and government accountability
and transparency of decision-making
single-party executives,ff ti iti ti
making, bargaining and compromise
multiple parliamentary parties, each with a stake in coalition government and effective opposition parties,
vigorous parliamentary debate, and
decisive elections.
coalition government, and dispersed decision-making
processes. Yet dangers of decisive elections.
Yet dangers of elective dictatorship, permanent majorities,
g ineffective governance, extreme multiparty
fragmentation, l k f t bilit lack of checks and
balances. lack of accountability.
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Lijphart 13The logical sequence of consociational theoryconsociational theory
PR electoral systems or
reserved seats
Election ofethnic minority
partiesPeaceful
democratic consolidation
Greater support within minority communities
Plural societies
Federalism & decentralization
Election ofethnic minority
parties
Does the logic make sense? Criticisms?
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Lijphart 14
Potential criticisms?
For constructivists, ethnic divisions have meanings gshaped by political structures and elites. Power-sharing regimes can thereby freeze/reinforce ethnic cleavages (Donald Horowitz)g
Eg Bosnia-Herzegovina
By contrast, majoritarian elections force vote-pooling across groups and bridging appeals (Ben Reilly)across groups and bridging appeals (Ben Reilly)
Not the only outcome: some peace settlements are negotiated, others result from outright victoryM j it i l ti b ff ti i Majoritarian solutions may be more effective in restoring fragile states. Sequencing process in peace settlements? (Mansfield and Snyder)
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Lijphart 15
Types of DemocraciesypSource: Lijphart Democracies (1999)
Democracies
Majoritarian Mixed Consensus(Westminster) (Consociational)
egUK?
N Z l d?
egUSA
C t Ri
egEU
B l iNew Zealand?Barbados
Costa RicaFrance
BelgiumSwitzerland
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Ref: Arend Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999
Majoritarian ModelEffective and accountable
Consensus ModelInclusive and representativep
Exec-Parties One-party cabinet Coalition government
Parliament Executive dominant Balanced exec-legislature
Party system Two-party Multi-party
Electoral system Majoritarian Proportional Representation
Interest groups Pluralist Corporatist
Federal-UnitaryFederal Unitary
Government Centralized-unitary Decentralized-federal
Parliament Unicameral Balanced BicameralParliament Unicameral Balanced Bicameral
Constitution Flexible More Rigid
Judiciary Parlt sovereign Judicial reviewJudiciary Parlt. sovereign Judicial review
Central Bank Dependent Independent
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Lijphart 19Typology of DemocraciesRef: Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999
3
USGER
Consensual
e
r
a
l
2SWI
CAN
AUT
AUL
a
r
y
-
F
e
d
e 1
0VEN
TRI
SPAPNGNET
MAUJPN
BELBAH
U
n
i
t
a 0
1 UK
TRI
SWEPOR NORMAL
JAM ITA
ISR
IRE
ICE
GRE
FRA
FIN
DENCRBOTBAR
BAH
-1
-2
UK
NZ
Majoritarian
Executive-Parties
2.01.00.0-1.0-2.0j
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Lijphart 20
Consensus democracy mattersy
For the inclusion of minority parties For the inclusion of minority parties For the protection of minority interests
F t ti For womens representation For public policy, economic outcomes,
and welfare states
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II: Majoritarian institutions
Case study: UK 5th May 2005 y ygeneral election
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Lijphart 22
Institutions: UK 1945-1997
Unwritten constitution Magna Carta etc.g One-party cabinet government since 1945
Collective responsibility, primus inter pares
Two-party parliamentary competition Two-party parliamentary competition Labour and Conservative in govnt and opposition
Programmatic & disciplined partiesMass branch part organi ations fe independents fe Mass-branch party organizations, few independents, few backbench rebellions, manifesto program
Parliamentary sovereignty (no Supreme Court)U it t t (l l t d i i t ti ) Unitary state (local government administration)
Bicameral parliament but Commons predominant Plurality FPTP elections exaggerates votes: seats u a ty e ect o s e agge ates otes seats
for winner
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Lijphart 23
UK House of Commons, June 2005
923100%
62
Conservative
LibDems
197
50%
OthersNatsLd
Majority 66
355
50% LdemConLab
Labour
355
0%
MPs in UK House of Commons
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Lijphart 24
UK Ballot paperp p
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Lijphart 25
2005 UK election resultJune 2005 % of Votes % of seats Ratio Number of
seatsLabour 35.2 54.9 1.56 355
Conservative 32.3 30.4 0.94 197
Lib Dem 22.0 9.5 0.43 62Lib Dem 22.0 9.5 0.43 62
SNP 1.5 0.9 0.60 6
PC 0.6 0.5 0.83 3
Other 8.4 3.4 0.40 23
Labour Maj. 2.9 24.5 66
Total 100 100 659
Source: Pippa Norris & Chris Wlezien Ed. Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)
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Lijphart 26
Winners bonus UK
1 541.56
1.60
1.441.46
1.54
1.50
1.28 1.27 1.28
1.37
1.30
1.40
s
:
s
e
a
t
s
r
a
t
i
o
1 09 1.10
1.171.14
1.20
1.13
1.221.23
1.20
V
o
t
e
s
1.091.07
1.10
1.00
1.10
1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005
Note: The votes-seats ratio is calculated as the percentage of UK seats divided into the percentage of UK votes for the governing party. A ratio of 1.0 would indicate no electoral bias for the government. Source: Pippa Norris & Chris Wlezien Ed. Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)
1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005
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Lijphart 27
UK % Vote 1900-200570
50
60
30
40
%
o
f
U
K
v
o
t
e ConLabLDOther
20
%
Other
0
10
19001906191019101918192219231924192919311935194519501951195519591964196619701974197419791983198719921997200120050 6 0 0 8 2 3 4 9 1 5 5 0 1 5 9 4 6 0 4 4 9 3 7 2 7 1 5
Source: Pippa Norris Elections & public Opinion The Blair Effect II: The Labour Government 2001-2005Edited by Anthony Seldon and Denis Kavanagh Cambridge University Press
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Lijphart 28
UK % Seats600
400
500
300
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
M
P
s
ConLabLDOther
100
200Nu
0 1900190619101910191819221923192419291931193519451950195119551959196419661970197419741979198319871992199720012005
Source: Pippa Norris Elections & public Opinion The Blair Effect II: The Labour Government 2001-2005Edited by Anthony Seldon and Denis Kavanagh Cambridge University Press
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Lijphart 29
Why exaggerative bias for winner?
1 Malapportionment1. Malapportionment Unequal size of electorates in each seat Decline of urban pop/Labour constituencyDecline of urban pop/Labour constituency Delayed effect of boundary changes
Differential turnout Differential turnout Lowest in safe Labour seats
Anti-Conservative tactical voting Anti Conservative tactical voting Efficient distribution of party votes
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Lijphart 30
Geography also matters:UK 2005 Election SeatsUK 2005 Election Seats
Source: Pippa Norris Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)
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Lijphart 31
Simulated seats GB June 2005
355400
239300
350 LabConLd239
197 207
140150
200
250 LdemUKIPNat
62
119 1850
100
150 GreenBNPOther
0 119 180 50 44 30
50
Actual results FPTP List PR
Source: Dunleavy and Margetts in Pippa Norris (Ed) Britain Votes 2005 OUP
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Lijphart 32
Projection next UK general election
380
400
320
340
360
380
e
M
P
s
7
8
9
Conservative Government
Vote swing is the %
260
280
300
o
f
C
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
3
4
5
6
Hung Parliament
change in the two-party vote
200
220
240
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
0
1
-1
2
140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360 380 400
N b f L b MP
140
160
180 Labour Government
Number of Labour MPs
Note: The estimates assume a Con-Lab uniform national swing across the UK with no change in the share of the vote for the other parties.A positive swing indicates a fall in the Labour party, and increase in the Conservative party, share of the total vote. A negative denotes theopposite. The winning post necessary to assure an overall parliamentary majority for one party is half the 646 MPs ie 324. Source: NorrisBritain Votes 2005 OUP.
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Lijphart 33
Moderate party competitionp y p
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project/ Judith Bara EPOP 2005
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Lijphart 34
Breakdown of classic ideal type since 1997
Federalism: Devolution for Scotland and Wales Northern Ireland assembly Elected Mayor/Assembly for London
Electoral reform: Party list PR for Europe AMS for Scotland/Wales AMS for Scotland/Wales STV for Scottish local elections
House of Lords reform (?) Written Bill of Rights- Euro. Convention Direct referendums
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Advantages andAdvantages and disadvantages?
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III: Consensus democracyy
Switzerland
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Lijphart 37
Swiss democracyy
Pop 7.4mp Plural cleavages
Religion (46% Catholic, 40% Protestant) Language
(65%German, 10% Italian, 18% French),
Region/canton Region/canton Class ($32,800 per capita PPP 2003)
Social divisions, yet elite consensus? Stable power-sharing coalition but lack of
accountability?
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Lijphart 38
Swiss democracy y
Since 1848, Switzerland has been a confederation, tl ith 26 t d 2873currently with 26 cantons and 2873 communes.
The Government (Federal Council) has 7 members elected by parliament for 4 yearsy p y
From 1959-2003, magic formula 2 seats each for the FDP, CVP, and SPS, and 1 seat for the SVPSVP.
October 2003, 2 seats given to SVP, 1 CVP Annual president rotates as primus inter pares
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Lijphart 39
Swiss parliamentp
Bicameral Federal Assembly: Bicameral Federal Assembly: Direct elections PR List elections w. high proportionality votes : seats
Th N ti l C il ( l t ti 200 t The National Council (popular representation, 200 seats, based on population size per canton) and
The Council of States (cantonal representation, 46 seats, 2 t )2 per canton)
Eight party factions in Federal Assembly and 13 parties in total.
Federal Supreme Court Many popular initiatives and referendums.
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Lijphart 40
October 2003 Election resultsNationalrat and Stnderat: 19 october 2003 (%) %Vote 200 %Seats 46
Schweizerische Volkspartei SVP 26.6 55 27.5% 8
Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz SPS 23.4 52 26.0% 9
Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei der Schweiz FDP 17.3 36 18.0% 14
Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz CVP 14.4 28 14.0% 15
Grne Partei der Schweiz GPS 7.4 13 6.5% -
Liberale Partei der Schweiz LPS 2.2 4 2.0% -
Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz EVP 2.3 3 1.5% -
Eidgenssische Demokratische Union EDU 1.3 2 1.0% -
Schweizer Demokraten SD 1 0 1 0 5%Schweizer Demokraten SD 1.0 1 0.5% -
Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz PdA 0.7 2 1.0% -
Lega dei Ticinese LdT 0.4 1 0.5% -
Solidarits Sol 0.5 1 0.5% -
Christlich-Soziale Partei CSP 0.4 1 0.5% -
Alternative Liste AL 0.5 1 0.5% -
- Sozialistisch Grne Alternative Zug SGAZ 1
Freiheitspartei der Schweiz FPS 0.2 - -
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Lijphart 41
Swiss party competitionp y p
European LiberalEuropean Liberal
SP Social Free CVP Christian Democrats
RightLeft
Democratic Democrats
SVP Radical right
Green Party right
Conservative
Note: Legislative voting patterns 1999-2003
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Advantages andAdvantages and disadvantages?
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Lijphart 43
IV: Discussion exercise
In designing new constitutions for In designing new constitutions for Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Nepal, what are the pros and cons of each typewhat are the pros and cons of each type of democracy?
What would be the major consequences What would be the major consequences of these institutional choices for stability and effectiveness?and effectiveness?
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Lijphart 44
Conclusions
Useful classification of democratic institutions From ideal types to continuous measures Clarifies values and normative debates Systematic comparisons Consequences of institutional design?
Next class: Electoral Systems
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Lijphart 45
Next classPart III: Options: reform strategies and agencies
h13 Mon 16th Mar Strategies and options for strengthening democratic governance
#1
14 Wed 18th Mar Constitution-building: International IDEA
15 Mon 30th Mar Elections: ACE and IFES
16 Wed 1st Apr Strengthening parliaments, parties, and womens empowerment: the Inter-parliamentary Union
17 Mon 6th Apr Building the state: public administration reform, local governance, and anti-corruption: Transparency International
18 Wed 8th Apr Civil society social capital and media: the Open Society18 Wed 8th Apr Civil society, social capital, and media: the Open Society Institute and CIVICUS, Committee to Protect Journalists
19 Mon 13th Apr Human rights, justice, and rule of law: Amnesty International # 2
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Lijphart 46