8/10/2019 11_RabinovCruz_Buenviaje

1/1

Prepared by: Manolo R. Buenviaje III

DANILO RABINO ET. AL. v. ADORA CRUZ ET. AL.

G.R. No. 95775

May 24, 1993

Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,

nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

FACTS:This case stems from the ejectment case filed by private respondents against David Palmenco, et.

al. docketed as Civil Cases No. 630 and No. 631 of the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal, for therecovery of portions of a parcel of land located at Sitio Sampalucan, Barangay San Isidro, Taytay, Rizal.Petitioners also occupies said land but were not impleaded in the aforementioned cases.

The MTC rendered its decision in favor of the respondents and ordered the ejection of Palmenco.The court thereafter issued a writ of demolition which Palmenco appealed in the Court of Appeals. The

Court of Appeals denied the petition.

The petitioners, who were not impleaded in the Civil Cases, filed a case as an opposition to thewrit of demolition. The MTC, on December 6, 1988, issued a restraining order for said writ. The

Respondents appealed the December 6, 1988 order in the Court of Appeals which declared such ordernull and void, hence the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners were denied due process of law by including them in the writ ofdemolition

HELD:

Yes. The petitionersright to due process was violated because they were not impleaded asparties in Civil Cases No. 630 and 631, which are the basis for the writ of demolition. The rule is thatjudgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action. This rule is anchored on the constitutional

right of a person to due process of law.

Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely: (1) There must be a courtor tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must

be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over property which is the subject of the

proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must berendered upon lawful hearing."

It must be noted that respondent was not a party to the ejectment cases wherein the writs ofdemolition had been issued; she did not make her appearance in and during the pendency of these

ejectment cases. Respondent only went to the court to protect her property from demolition after thejudgment in the ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence, with respect to the judgment in

said ejectment cases, respondent remains a third person to such judgment, which does not bind her; nor

can its writ of execution be enforced against her since she was not afforded her day in court in saidejectment cases.

Clearly, the second requirement aforementioned does not obtain in Civil Cases no 630 and 631,

for the trial court in said cases did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioners as they were notimpleaded therein and were consequently not summoned to appear and present their defenses to resist theclaims of private respondents.