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LBjLIDRARY fibndatQry Review Cas. # Nt] 8'[-,"1:r Document # _ b

Intelligence Report DIRECTORATE OF

INTELLIGENCE

The Situation in South Vietnam (Weekly)

Approved fer1. Release .... .,. JU~ II!!! i

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WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United Stat(.'S, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of it5 conknts to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by Jaw.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM (26 August - 2 September 1968)

CON TEN T S

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Cabinet developments; support and praise for Huang increases; Militant Buddhists gaining official favor; Alliance support within Buddhist ranks; Dai Viet - Can Lao alliance; Leniency for dissident nation­alists~ Lien Minh difficulties; Govern­ment-FULRO negotiations.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Revolutionary Development cadre; Neutralization of the communist infra­structure; communist agent operations.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

US sector employment; GVN deferment policy; possible taxi strike in Saigon; Prices; Currency and gold.

ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table) Monthly and weekly Currency and Gold

Prices (graph)

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Section

I

II

III

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I. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

A cabinet member has proposed that a land reform program which would include urban as well as rural areas be included in a new political action program. PriMe Minister Huong, meanwhile, appears to be increasing his power position in the Lower House. While both the legislative and executive branches of the government are considering mOVes to give the militant Buddhists equal recognition with the rival moderate faction, a leading militant leader was reportedly asked to join the Commu­nists' Alliance. Two political parties may form an alliance that might have an anti-Huong orientation. A bill calling for a lenient government policy toward dissident but non-Communist nationalists has been introduced in the Lower House. The progovernment front, Lien Minh, is suf­fering from the personal rivalries of some of its old-line political leaders. The government-FULRO negotiations are hung up on the mantagnards' demand that they be allowed to foxm independent military units within the regular army.

cabinet Developments

1. Prime ~nister Huang's cabinet is becoming increasingly concerned about political developments in a postwar period, and is already preparing the broad outlines of a political action program de­signed to counter expected Viet Cong activity"after a cease-fire. In addition. Labor Minister Hien reportedly has suggested to his colleagues that the government's land reform program should be accel­erated and expanded to include urban areas.

felt of the over-all political action plan and, as a step toward undercutting communist subversive efforts in the cities, should include urban as well as rural

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6. Thien was pUblisher of the Vietnam Guardian when then Prime Minister Ky suspended the newspaper's operations in December 1966 and clearly harbors a grudge against the military regime. Thien and Tuoi feel that "Ky' s apparatus" is working hard to bring about Huong I s resignation. Thien char<;ted that the recent rumors of impending cabinet changes, for in­stance, were deliberately spread by Ky's men to create confusion and undermine the authority of the prime minister's government.

7. The in£or.mation minister said that the harsh, five-year sentence meted out to oppositionist politician Truong Dinh Dzu was Thieu's responsibility because, Thien claimed, the President insisted that Dzu he tried by a military court and refused Huang's recommendation that Dzu be allowed to go into exile. Thien emphasized that Thieu frustrates Huong's re­commendations, not by rejecting them, but by refrain­ing from signing the necessary papers or giving the necessary direction. Thien revealed that Huang plans to submit to the President the dossiers of 62 military officers against whom substantiated charges of large-scale corruption have been drawn Up. Should Thieu refUse to authorize a civil trial for the offioers, Thien said, Huong will make the cases a public scandal.

Militant Buddhists Gaining Official Favor

8. Both branches of government apparently feel that the militant faction of the Buddhists deserve equal recognition with the moderates. On 28 August, 40 members of the Lower House sent President Thieu a petition requesting that he abrogate the decree law which approved the charter of the moderate fac­tion. The signers, who included members of each Lower House bloc, pointed out that the militants took a "reasonable, moderate position" after their :recent national congress, exhibited an "honest con­cern" for the stat.us of Buddhism, and showed them­selves to be the "most important religious group in Vietnam."

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9. Two days earlier, Thieq's special assistant Nguyen Cao Thang told a US Embassy officer that the government was thinking of proposing leqislation that would lay dawn requirements for religious organ.zat.ons in such a way that the various factions of each religion could all comply~ The result would be that no s.ng~e group would then have the ex­clusive right to speak and act for any religion, as the moderate faction now has for the Buddhist church.

lO~ There have been indications that individ­uals around the President are showing some interest in gaining the support of the militants, possibly to counter the moderates, who are sympathetic to Vice President Ky~ The Lower House adjourned on 30 August for a month, preventing immediate delibera­tion of the issue until October.

All~ance Support within Militant Buddhist Ranks?

11. Prominent Buddhist layman Tran Quang Thuan recently told _ that a militant leader, Thich Thien Minh, was approached in late July by a low-ranking Buddhist official with a sug­gestion that Minh join the communist-sponsored A~liance. Minh reportedly rejected the suggestion. Thuan allegedly fears that many Buddhist leaders, including monks, will eventually defect to the Viet Cong because the government mistrusts them and treats them as second-class citizens, while the Viet cong "respectfully solicit ·their support."

versus

however.~~.:.~~~~~~ _Thich for the Buddhist socialist party Minh is at-tempting to form. Thuan reportedly replied that President Th~eu should first be contacted because, without his moral support, a Buddhist party could not succeed. It is no longer a quest~on, Thuan told Minh, of supporting or opposing the government, but of preparing for a pOlitical struggle with the Cornmun~sts, and even IIbad nationalists"--presmnably meaning sarne or all of those in the government--are better at this point than the Communists. Minh

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replied to all this by merely promising to think about contacting Thieu.

Dai viet - Can Lao Alliance

13. The Revolutionary Dal Viet Party and the Revolutionary Social Humanist Party--a neo - Can Lao group--have reportedly agreed to form a polit­ical alliance which may in part be the result of recent joint Dai Viet - Catholic efforts in the Upper House to portray the Huong government as "soft" on Conununism. I.e Trong Quat, a leader of the nec - Can Lao Party, and Dai Viet leader Ha Thuc Ky decided, that the political union of their two groups would take place some months hence, after each has met the reqUirements for registration as a party.

l4~ Quat and Ky reportedly felt that the Catholic Greater Solidarity Force of Senator NI,~ven Gia Hien would also fit in with . a'H', an"e, ~~~~~~~~~~~i,!iii!~~ Hien, ."eo" ii.s.r~eiiliUic~tiianiiit.tio commit himself. Hien

is Lam on forming a two-house which wouJ.d ally northerners and and would eventually form a national party. Lam has, reportedly work with Hien if in the deal. Hien an alliance with L3lU as more because Lam is draw-inq closer to and because a north-south aliqnment will be more important in the long­term political struggle between nationalists and communists than will a right-wing alliance of northerners and central Vietnamese like the Can Lao Dai Viet union.

15. Although Hien and many of his fellow Catholic senators have joined the Oai Viets in their recant criticisms of the government, he apparently feels that it would not be to his advantage to unite his group formally with an organization which will probably take an oppositionist stance and may ~n any event be short lived.

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Leniency for D1sS1dent Nationalists

16, A draft bill wh~ch would strengthen the government's hand in carrying out a lenient pOlicy toward d~ssident but non-communist nat10nalists has been introduced in the Lower House. The bill would provide for a review of "unjust legislation, execut1ve, or judicial decisions which resulted from polit1cal events of the period 1 November 1963 to 1 Apr!l 1967, intended to punish the political opposition." The draft bl.ll calls for the establish­ment of a council to reVl.ew tbe petitions of those claiml.nq to have been unJustly treated during those turbulent years. Some members of almost every polit­ical faction in South V1etnam would stand to benefit from such a law.

Lien Minh Difficulties

17. The work of the progovernment front, Lien Minh, is hampered by dissension among its leaders, although it 1.S continuing to move ahead on its social welfare projects. The front's secretary general, Tran Thuong Nhon, told an embassy officer on 23 August that many of the old-time political leaders in the Lien Minh are attempting to run the show personally and are thus hindering efforts at effective cooperation. The Lien Minh 1 s New Life Action program is progressing, however, and a one­week training program was scheduled to begin this week for 800 cadres who will start their social welfare work in the various wards of Saigon in September.

la~ Nhon, who is also a leader of the Demo­cratic Freedom Force and has hopes of eventually developing this into a politica~ party, said that President Thieu is hesitating about firmly identify­ing himself in pub~ic with either organization. Thieu's reluctance, Nhon claims, probably results from a belief that neither group shows sufficient 'promise of remaining a viable force and that if he were to commit himself to a group that eventually went under, he would lose much personal prestige.

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19. Thl.eu apparently does want the Lien Minh

succeed, however, intends to :::~~~~~~ this j

Lower House and a women's group he is promoting, are all necessary if his administration is to succeed.

Government-FOLan -Ne-gotiations

20. Government negotiations with the dissident montagnard organization FULRO came to a temporary halt on 27 August when FULRO leader Y Bham ~nuol returned to his headquarters in Cambodia to confer with his followers. The government has agreed to "gO percent" of FULRO's demands, according to an official in Prime Minister Huong's Office, but the two sides appear to have hit a real snag on FULRO's demand that montagnard military units be created wi thin ARVN.

21. Despite this impasse and the fact that Y Bham made no definite commitment to return and take up the negotiations again, the contenders are closer toqether than they have ever been. Each side has shown a greater willingness to compromise than in the past, and futUre dealings may well lead to a fina~ agreement.

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c.. II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

The number of Vietnamese Revolu­tionary Development (RO) teams has risen to 690, and the number of montagnard RD teams has settled at its present level of lOB. The total number of persons working in the cadre program has topped 53,000. Most of the RD teams are working in the countryside, but only 40 percent of them remain overnight in their hamlets. The elimination of the Viet Cong infrastruc­ture in the rural areas remains a difficult task for these groups.

More than 7,300 members of the Com­munist infrastructure have been neutral­ized during 1968. Local Vietnamese anti­infrastructure operations continue to take shape and are apparently achieving pro­gressively better results. Much of this, however, has been due to the redirection of US pacification support resources toward this goal, particularly since Tet.

In a province north of Saigon, accord­ing to a captured document, the Communists directed over 1,500 agent assets in late 1967. Most of these people probably func­tioned more as informants than as agents in the classical sense. It is nevertheless as-

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sumed that the enemy has penetrated most im- ::. portant government civil and military offices.

Revolutionary Development Cadre

1. As of 31 July, the number of Vietnamese Revo­lutionary Development (RD) teams had reached 690. This marks an increase of 135, or 24 percent, for the first seven months of 196B. The field strength of the Viet­namese RD teams stood at 36,299, and their total strength, including trainees and supervisory cadres, was over 46,600.

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c. 2. The montagnard or Truong Son RD teams have

settled at their present level of lOB teams. Their field strength on 31 July was 6,446. Including trainees at the Pleiku center and control personnel, their total strength stood at 7,242 •

. 3. Although RD cadre desertions have been de­clining for the past five months, this still remains a problem. Based on the January to July figures, the projected 1968 desertion rate is approximately 18 per­cent and 26 percent for the Vietnamese and montagnard RD" cadres, respectively. The provisions of the June 1968 mobilization decree should, if enforced, tend to reduce the number of drop-outs. One of the pro­visions of the new law calls for the impressment of deserters into military service.

4. The end of July reports from the field in­dicate that of the 798 RD teams, 773 were working in the hamlets assigned them for this year. of the remaining 25 teams, 15 were receiving in-province training and 10 had been assigned other, unspecified duties. In II, III, and IV Corps, there were 606 Vietnamese and rnontagnard RD teams working in the field. only 243, or 40 percent, could stay in their hamlets 24 hours a day. Many of these 243 teams prob­ably sought refUge at night in local paramilitary outposts. No figures are available on the number of teams in the field in I corps, but, in light of the generally poor security which prevails in most of this corps, the percentage of teams remaining in their hamlets overnight is probably about the same as the countrywide average.

5, finished of these

Thus far this year, RD teams claim to have their work in 110 hamlets. About two thirds completed hamlets are in II and IV Corps.

6. Considering the level of security in most of South vietnam, the employment and activities of the RD teams is judged by US officials to be generally satis­factory. Teams are not fully productive, however, because of detracting factors such as poor security, weak leadership, inadequate support from the tech-nical services, high attrition, poor local relation­ships and, in some cases, team members not native to the area they are working in. One of the most signifi­cant problems seems to be the general lack of high-

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level government interest and sUpport for the RD cadre programs which appear to be taking a back seat to other political and military problems.

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7. Since January, provincial. RD cadre plans have been largely revised and the operational format of the teams has been greatly simplified. plans are now being Lroplemented to expand the influence of the teams by gradually adopting a village concept whereby one team has the responsibility for all the hamlets of a village and will stay permanently in the village. US advisers are also placing great stress on the training of 1,000 Popular Force (PF) platoons to do RD-type work. Nevertheless, one of the major goals of the program--the elimination of the Viet Cong infrastructure and support for their cause in the hamlets and vi1lages--remains an extremely dif­ficult task for the RD teams and PF platoons.

Neutralization_ of the Communist Infrastructure

8. In the first seven months of 1968, more than 7,300 members of the communist infrastructure in South Vietnam are reported to have been neutral­ized by allied operations. Of the 1,291 identifi­able members of the Viet cong infrastructure (VCI) rolled up during July, 631 are regarded as hamlet, 501 as vil~age, 122 as district, 34 as province, and three as regional level cadres.

9. US officials hope to neutralize a total of 12,000 members of the VCI during 1968. This goal will ~ probably be reached and may even be surpassed.

10. After much prodding, President Thieu signed a decree on I July which sets up the Phung Hoang (Phoenix or anti-infrastructure) plan for the direc­tion, control, and coordination of all GVN efforts aimed at rendering the VCl ineffective. It has taken six months for the GVN to provide a national directive to spell out the details of a program ordered imple­mented by the prime minister on 20 December 1967.

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.~-----""~-'-.. ----1JI~I! l 11. During this interim period, local Phoenix

organizations--despite the lack of a detailed direc­tive--continued to take shape and achieve progres­sively better results. Much of this, however, was due to the redirection of us pacification 9upport assets toward this goal, particularly after Tet.

12. Over the past several years, an improve­ment was noted in the effectiveness of the govern­mentis anti-VCI operations. In some areas of the country, such as in Binh Dinh Province and Nha Trang city, intelligence operations against the VCI prior to and during the enemy's Tet offensive suc­ceeded in restricting the enemy's military action. Moreover, during Tet, a number of additional Lmpor­tant Communist cadres surfaced and were apprehended. In some cases, these people provided leads which enabled the government intelligence services to extend the roll-up to other members of the VCI. In no area, however, have the VCl and its subordinate networks been completely neutralized.

13. The essential element in the anti-infra­structure effort is the District Intelligence-Opera­tions Coordinating Center (DIOCC). This center usually includes representatives of the Police Special Branch (PSB), the district office of the province S-2 (intelligence), the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), and the Census Grievance and Revolutionary Development cadre programs. Liaison officials from allied military units which customarily operate in the district should also be present on a full-time basis, as should a representative of the Police Field -Forces, if such a unit is in the district. us of­ficials anticipate placing an American adviser in each DlOCC and having a US Phoenix coordinator at the province level.

14. By the end of June, at least 41 provincial Vietnamese phoenix committees had been established and were reported functioning with various degrees of effectiveness. About 189 OIOCCs had also been es­tablished.

15. Since the attack on the infrastructure is generally a local effort, various problems or advan­tages are found in the different corps, provinces,

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and districts. Despite the existence of a national ~ policy directive, this program remains dependent on continued enthusiasm or at least tolerance by local GVN officials and military commanders. Hindering the operations of the DIOCCs is the continuing poor secur­ity situation existing in much of the countryside, the shortage of competent Vietnamese personnel at the local levels, and the difficulty of maintaining an adequate police presence in the countryside. \

16. Generally speaking, in I Corps the con­tinuing security threat prevents full participation of the DIOCCs in anti-VCI operations. In II Corps, the program has reportedly benefited from the sup­port of the regional police chief and the Vietnamese Army corps intelligence staff. In III Corps, suc­cessful operations against the VCI in populous Gia Dinh Province have gone up markedly in the past sev­eral months due to the concentration of allied forces in and around the area. Elsewhere in III Corps, the pressure o£ enemy military forces appears to be pre­cluding an aggressive anti-infrastructure program at the district level. While the program in IV corps has had SOme successes, only an average of. 1.5 percent of the VCI is believed to be neutralized each month. us officials feel that at least six percent must be neutralized each month if the program is to have an appreciable effect on the VCI.

17. Eliminating agents, sympathizers, sappers, and guerrillas, who apparently compose the majority thus far eliminated, causes only peripheral damage to the infrastructure. It is the hard-core leaders and decision makers, who apparently have not yet been identified and targeted, who must be neutralized for the program to have a lasting effect.

Communist Agent Operations

18. The Communists operate an extensive agent apparatus in conjunction with and probably under the control of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). During 1967 the enemy--according to a recently captured docu­ment--purportedly directed 1,589 agent assets in one Viet cong province alone. This province, Thu Dau Mot,

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was located immediately north of Saigon and generally corresponded to the government's Binh Duong Province. In late 1967, most of this Viet Cong province was in­corporated into what the enemy now calls Subregion 5.

19. Of the total number of agents listed in this document only several hundred are classified as to their status or function, such as security elements, secret guerrillas, military intelligence, or secret party members. Some of these persons would probably be car­ried in vel strength figures. Of the more than 1,100 enemy agents the document does not classify, the number of really valuable assets is unknown. Most likely, the majority of these are low-level, and re­port only what they see or hear in their own locales, such as troop movements or supply buildups. These people probably function more as informants than as agents in the classical sense.

assumed. the enemy is able civil offices and

~~:;;~t:~:; units to the local levels. Coun-t , a number of cases are continually being

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uncovered. The total number of Communist penetra­tions and the access these individuals enjoy has, how­ever, remained a matter of conjecture.

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., .... ------------------------~----------------------=--= III. ECONOMIC SITUATION

Emp~oyment by us military and civilian agencies and their contractors was higher at the end of June 1968 than at the end of

.1966 ~hen military construction activity was near its peak. The Ministry of National Defense has agreed to work out a draft de­ferment policy with representatives o£ private industry following the latters' protests against the ministry's original plan. Saigon taxi drivers have threatened to strike if their demands for rate in­creases are not met. Retail prices in Saigon increased one percent during the week ending 19 August primarily because of higher rice prices.

us Sector Employment

1. Despite a decline in major military con­struction projects in Vietnam, employment in the US sector was higher at the end of June 196B than at the end of 1966 when construction activity was near its peak. The total labor force employed by US military and civilian agencies and their con­tractors reached 175,000 at the end of June, an in­crease of ten percent since 31 March 1968. Of these, Vietnamese workers numbered 146,000, or 10-15 per­cent of Vietnamese employment in all industry and commerce. Third country nationals (TCNs), mostly Koreans and Filipinos, accounted for 16,000, or slightly fewer than reported by the Ministry of Labor in late July. The remaining 13,000 were Americans. More than 90 percent of the total are employed by US military components and US civilian firms under contract to the military.

2. The increase in us sector employment from 166,000 at the end of 1966 to 175,000 at the end of June 196B is due primarily to the increasing demand for services by the steadily growing US military establishment, as well as to some increase in the number of workers hired by US civilian agencies and

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.I ............ ______________ ~[--------------...... their contractors. Employment by US firms under contract to the military--mostly construction fir.ms-­declined nine percent during the period.

3. The increase in US sector employment during the three-month period ending 3~ June probably also reflects the rehiring of employees laid off during the Tet offensive, as well as some net increase be­cause of greater reconstruction activity following the Tet and May-June offensives. The largest in­crease came in the number of TCNs, which rose 14 percent. Employment of TCNs probably will continue to increase as mobilization reduces the supply of Vietnamese skilled labor~ According to Minister of Labor Hien, increased use of TCNs is inevitable, but he still believes that US employers are not making sufficient effort to train unskilled and underem­ployed Vietnamese. He also maintains that Wlem­played female labor is available to fill many open­ings for drivers and messengers.

4. Some Korean workers apparently are causing headaches far the Ministry of Labor because of their" public behavior and tendency to disparage the ability of Vietnamese workers. In addition, the ministry is concerned about the number of Korean veterans who remain in Vietnam following their military dis­charges in order to earn high wages working for US contractors. There currently are 800 such veterans, and the ministry fears that those who cannot be

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absorbed into the labor force will become malcon- -tents and public charges. Vietnamese officials re­portedly hope to resolve these problems with the Korean Ministry of Labor or, failing that, to re­strict the number of work permits and visas for Koreans. The Korean Government probably will. be anxious to cooperate, however, because Korean em­ployees of foreign firms in Vietnam sent home about $16 million during the first half of 1968, or about 20 percent of Korea's foreign exchange earnings from Vietnam during that period.

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GVN Deferment Policy

5. The Ministry of National Defense (MONO) has agreed to scrap a clearly unsatisfactory plan for deferment of essential personnel in the private sector of the economy. Representatives of private industry and various government ministries currently are devising a new policy which should be ready fOr implementation shortly.

6. The MOND originally proposed to use a point system which ranked companies in order of thei;r importance to the economy. The greater the number of points, the mOre deferments the firm would receive. Four criteria were to be used to ~­locate the points: (l) contribution to the war effort; (2) contribution to essential needs of the civilian population) (3) size of work force (maximum points for 100 or more employees); and (4) importance of the firm in making the country a self-sufficient producer.

7. Private sector spokesmen strongly protested this plan, contending among other things that it favored manufacturing fir.rns at the expense of import/ distribution activities upon which most firms rely for raw materials and that the number of employees is not a meaningful criterion for judging the con­tribution a company makes to the economy. In addition, it would appear that the MOND plan offered an open invitation for graft on the part of ministry officials~

8. Under a agreement reached on 13 August, critical personnel aged 33 and under who were scheduled for call-up in August will be deferred until 15 october. Those 34 and older who earlier had requested temporary deferments will be deferred until 31 October. Mean­while, representatives of industry and government are preparing new criteria which presumably will go into effect before 15 October. According to embassy officials, the question of deferments in the private sector is receiving thorough consideration and they expect that a reasonable and workable policy will result.

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Possible Taxi Strike in Saigon

9. The Saigon taxi drivers' union affiliated with the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor has threatened to strike some time after 2 September if a meeting with city officials on 1 September does not produce a settlement. Because of increases in the cost of living and higher operating expenses, the union is demanding increases of 150 percent in the starting rate, 100 percent in the rate per kilometer, and 200 percent in the minimum rate per trip. City officials have offered increases. of 100, 20, and 100 percent, respectively. According to the chair.man of the union, expenses have risen sharply since the current rates were set in 1966. License fees have increased from 500 to 6,000 piasters, tires and spare parts are 'more expensive an4 often can be obtained only on the black market, and fines for various traffic violations have increased to about 30 times the 1966 level.

10. The union claims that bus and lambretta drivers will support a strike because they also have claims pending for rate increases. Embassy officials believe, however, that union leaders will not call a strike without weighing carefully the hardships that a public transport strike would cause.

Prices

11. The USAID retail price index for Saiqon increased one percent during the week ending 19 August,

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primarily because of higher rice prices. Prices ~ of all grades of rice rose from two to five percent, reportedly in anticipation of the government's impending purchase program which will undoubtedly result in somewhat higher rice prices for urban consumers. With the exception of fish and shrimp, prices of most foodstuffs coming to Saiqon from the delta declined moderately. Fresh pork prices de­clined about seven percent, apparently because in­creased supplies of frozen pork were available at lower prices. (A table of weekly retail prices in Saigon is included in the Annex.)

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12. The index for prices of imported goods also rose slightly as a result of the five percent increase in the price of US rice.

Currency and Gold

~3. Free market currency and gold rates for 19 August were reported last week and are shown in the graph on monthly and weekly currency and gold prices included in the Annex.

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TABLE

We~k1y Retail Prices in Saigo~

3 Jan 2 Jan 29 Jul 5 Aug 12 Aug 19 Aug

1967 1968 1968 1968 1968 1968

Index for All Items z.1.i 308 22£ m n2 Mll

Index for Food Items ua 1M 1M M!J. ill 462

Of Which: (In Piasters)

Rice-Soc Nau (100 kfo> 1,700 2,500 2,350 2,300 2,300 2,400 Pork Bellies (, kg. 130 220 290 300 280 260 Fish-Ca Tre (1 kg.) 150 230 350 380 400 420 .. NU::lC Mam (j ax) 90 150 190 190 190 190

rl ro rl Index for Nonfood Items 122 W ~ 286 2S? ~ rl .. Of Which: rl (In Piasters) ro rl rl Fire'Wood {cu. meter} 560 600 680 680 680 680 A Cigarettes (pack) 14 14 25 22 22 22

'" White Calico (meter) 33 52 55 60 62 65

H Kerosene (liter) 10.5 9 10 10 10 10

'"' ~ m •• Data are from USAIn sources . For all indexes 1 Jan 1965 - 100. E ~ i\ u 0

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Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices ,00

PIASTERS PER I us DOLLAR

,

• 00 .

31 JULY

0 lJ\ ~2~ ~ U 0 r

/ J\. 178 V '-

30 9AUr

v2j V

21.

r-' 1 -

100

o ' 1965 1966 1967 1968 .sUN .sUL

1968 AUG

- US $10 GREEN

-- US $10 MPCMfllh.ryPay"' .... C..tlR""-w{ocrlp)

..

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