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Ten Myths of the Wehrmacht in NormandyAn Englishman by birth, Dr Russell A. Hart gained his PhD in1997 from Ohio State University. At thetime of this address, he was Assistant Professor of History at Hawaii Pacific University, Honolulu andwas formerly Senior Lecturer at Ohio State University.

He is the author of Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner,2001) and co-author of German Tanks of WWII; Weapons and Tactics of the Waffen-SS as well asPanzer: The Illustrated History of Germany's Armored Forces in WWII and The German Soldier in WWII .

What follows is a transcript of an address in May 2001 to the RMA Sandhurst War DiscussionGroup,[WARDIG], by Dr Russell A Hart, based on his research for Clash of Arms, and introduced by hisidentical twin brother [and co-author] Dr Stephen Hart, a lecturer in War Studies at RMA Sandhurst.

Tonight I would like to examine some of the myths and distortions thatcontinue to dominate historical understanding of the German defence ofNormandy during 1945. Given the time constraints, I would like to examinejust a few of the more significant of these myths and perhaps an appropriateplace to start is to suggest how such myths arose.A major cause was a lack of access to actual German wartime militaryrecords in the immediate post war period. Consequently Anglo-Americanopinion both scholarly and popular on campaigns powerfully influenced byemotional memoirs both allied and German that emerged in the late 40s andearly 1950s. Soon after these memoirs emerged the onset of the Cold Warimposed an ideological lens through which Anglo-American perceptions of thecampaign became refracted. Historians both consciously and unconsciously Isuggest sought to emphasise the remarkable achievements of the Westernallies. Historians thus focused on alleged German battlefields deficienciesfor poor quality manpower, bad intelligence, a confused chain of command,poor strategic leadership from the mad corporal for example rather thanexamining the grave logistic deficiencies that were actually central to theGerman defeat. Once these two sets of overlapping and re-enforcingdistortions became entrenched in the historiography of the Normandycampaign by the 1960s have proven very difficult to dispel since.What follows therefore is just a brief overview; nothing more than some of themore significant distortions and the first I want to examine is the myth thatallied aerial interdiction attacks had effectively isolated the Normandybattlefields prior to D-Day. This assertion has been made so often by somany that it has become etched in stone. Unfortunately it is simply not true,Yes, allied air attacks prior to D-Day had disabled most of the bridges over theSeine and the Loire river but not all of them, simply because the Allies hadelected to strike single track railway bridges deemed to be of too low capacityto be worthwhile destroying. Clearly, in retrospect, this decision was an errorof judgement because, though the capacity of the single track line is obviouslyfar less than that of the double track line, the Germans used every availablerail line to get supplies to Normandy. These included single track linesspanning both the Loire and Seine rivers, and also the Orleans gap - thenarrow corridor between the Seine and Loire rivers. The Germans also usedprivate industrial narrow gauge rail lines that the Allies never bothered toattack either. While these were of very limited capacity they did allow theadditional movement of supplies to the battlefront. In fact during the firstweeks of invasion the significant proportion - perhaps the majority - of the total

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German supplies were delivered via these two types of railway (single-tracklines and private industrial lines).In addition not all the bridges knocked down remained destroyed because theGermans repaired and re-built them. The few thousand German railengineers deployed in the West made Herculean efforts to replace destroyedbridges, and managed to rebuild them at an astonishing rate of one bridge perday throughout the entire campaign. The actual origin of this historical mythwas an Allied aerial bombing analysis report on the 3 June; this reportconcluded that all the targets struck had been destroyed and that thereforeNormandy was effectively isolated, but this aerial reconnaissance reportnaturally never mentioned the single track bridges that had never beentargeted in the first place. Moreover, by the 6 th of June, the Germans hadrepaired at least one 2-track rail bridge over the Seine river, and others wouldfollow in the following weeks. Although the Allies would smash repairedbridges, the Germans solidly rebuilt them time and time again, andconsequently enjoyed intermittent rail communications with Normandythroughout the campaign.The second myths I would like to turn to are myths about German manpowerin the campaign. These have essentially revolved around the quality ofGermany manpower. Anglo-American literature has often given muchattention to the alleged unreliability of Volksdeutsch - ethnic Germans livingoutside of pre-war Germany recruited into the German Armed forces andOsttruppen - Eastern volunteers recruited from amongst the German/Sovietpeoples. (Here’s a picture, if you don’t know what we are talking about, of anOsttruppe - an asiatic volunteer captured in Normandy, from the Easterntroops). If you look at the literature it emphasises both the sets of German useof such manpower categories and the alleged unreliability of them and againsuperficially there appears to be reliable evidence to support these assertionsparticularly allied prisoner of war records and interrogations which indicatethat large numbers of these manpower categories were taken prisoner duringthe Normandy campaign.Generally, however, historians have exaggerated both the German use ofthese two manpower groups and the detrimental consequences of suchmanpower policy and there is no doubt that the racist Nazis themselves haddoubts about the reliability of Volksdeutsch and Osttruppen. Yet there werepowerful Nazi ideological prejudices regarding racial purity and Bolshevikcontamination that led them to denigrate the marshal capabilities of thesemanpower groups. Yes these very same racist stereotypes ensured that theGermans imposed strict ceiling on the proportion of Volksdeutsch in front linecombat formations although combat conditions did not mean that such limitscould always be maintained, and there were several German Divisions whofought in Normandy that had much higher proportions of Volksdeutsch. TheGermans endeavoured to distribute a smattering of Volksdeutsch amongstcombat units.Moreover, because of the liability concerns the number of Volksdeutsch ineach combat formation was routinely recorded on monthly strength returnsallowing one to approximate how many Volksdeutsch fought in the campaign,and armed with that statistic what becomes readily apparent if you look

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closely at Allied prisoner of war returns is that the Allied took prisoner inNormandy, far more ethnic Germans than ever fought in the campaign. Thereare several explanations for this apparent paradox, and how to record theissue was a simple matter of diverging definitions: for the Allies countedAustrian and German Czechs as Volksdeutsch whereas the Germansclassified them as Reichsdeutsch. Ethnic Germans from areas occupied afterthe outbreak of the War in September 1939 were classified by the Germansas Volksdeutsch .Secondly it is evident that many German soldiers claimed to be Volksdeutschon capture when they were not, in an effort to secure preferential treatment orto evade punishment or mistreatment.While Allied authorities highlighted increased willingness of ethnic Germans tosurrender, and much anecdotal evidence from oral histories and memoirstends to support this, there is no credible documentary evidence tosubstantiate the allegation that ethnic Germans would surrender. The alliedPOW reports cannot be relied upon, given that German soldiers routinely liedabout their ethnicity. Indeed, instead we need to look at German records yethere there is no clear evidence either. Almost all the German formations thatreported on the reliability of their ethnic Germans during the campaign setsthem as either adequate or good. A similar situation existed with the easternvolunteers. In accordance with Nazi racial attitudes there were not distributedas combatants among German combat formations, but only as eitherindividual volunteer auxiliaries – known as Hilfswilliger or ”Hiwis” - or ascombatants segregated into auxiliary Eastern companies, and Hitler’s racistviews of their unreliability - itself the product of the Nazis own racialmistreatment - led to the transfer of these units from the Eastern front wherethey had fallen against Bolshevism, to West and Southern Europe. TheGermans had few illusions about the value of these units, using them to guardthe most unlikely invasion sites, and by D-Day more than 70 of theseBattalions were deployed in the West.These Eastern volunteers were largely nationalists and anti-communistsrather than fascists, and they were naturally dismayed at being sent to theWest. Others were motivated by pure survival; Nazi prison camps in the Eastwere indescribably bad and at their worst in the winter of 1941-42 prisonerswere dying off at a rate of 2% per day. Although conditions improvedconsiderably during the middle of the war, the Soviet experience of being aGerman prisoner was very harsh, and it is that harsh conditioning that tells usa lot about the combat performance of Osttruppen.A number of Eastern battalions contained thousands of Hiwis participating inthe Normandy campaign. Anglo-American literature has often dwelled ontheir alleged unreliability. One of the most commonly cited examples of poorperformance was the precipitate surrender of the 795 th Georgian Battalionnorth-east of Utah beach on the 7 June. Yet while is true that sometimesOsttruppen did not fight very well in Normandy, what is actually much moresurprising is that they often fought pretty well. After all these very sameGeorgians were surrounded by vastly more powerful enemy, heavily batteredby air, artillery and naval attack and had absolutely no prospect of relief.Their situation was far more critical than that of the 1 st Battalion 6th Parachute

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Regiment which disintegrated at the very same time just a couple of miles tothe South West of the Georgian position. Even then by no means did theentire Georgian Battalion surrender. The HQ Company, which criticallycontained the German Cadre, and second Company continued to hold out foranother 36 hours before surrendering. Clearly in this alleged case ofunreliability the Georgians fought better than the elite German paratroopers.In fact the Osttruppen fought better than their racist Nazi masters expected ofthem. Another case in point was 451 st East Battalion. So poorly did theGermans judge this units capability that it was rated unfit for any combatwhatsoever and consequently relegated to construction tasks in land fromcoast nevertheless D-Day this Battalion counter-attacked towards the coast.A similar story with the 642 nd East Battalion, another unit rated as unfit forlimited defence, launched repeated counter attacks against the BritishAirborne bridge-head east of the Orne. This Battalion stayed in the front linefor over a month.If you look at the times the Eastern units fought poorly, some commonaltiesemerge. They tended to perform most poorly when they were isolated andmost importantly when their German leadership cadre had been killed orincapacitated. Under these circumstances Eastern volunteers had a greatertendency to surrender, but when they remained firmly under control of theGerman cadre they usually acquitted themselves decently. What thisevidence suggests to me is that they were made more afraid of the Germanmasters - and who can blame them - than they were of the Allies.Next I want to briefly discuss the myth of the apolitical Army disaffected withHitler and National Socialism. I think it is fair to say that historians of theNormandy campaign have rarely examined in detail the character, thecomposition and the world view of the German army of the West [ Westheer ].Most Historians have thus embraced the self serving and false imagepresented by the German Generals after the War that the German Army waslargely apolitical. Of course we now know that the German Army in 1944 wasa Nazi Army.Historians have largely failed to introduce ideology to an understanding of theNormandy campaign. This is a serious flaw, because the German conduct ofthe Campaign can only be understood in ideological terms. During the springof 1944 the Westheer underwent a profound Easternisation - a massiveinflux of veteran officers and NCOs hardened and brutalised by the viciousideological war on the Eastern front. These Ostkämpfer – Eastern fighters –pursued a major programme of ideological indoctrination intended tocompensate for numerical, materiel and qualitative deficiencies. Suchindoctrination and propaganda contributed directly to the Westheer’scohesion, its fighting power and tenacity. Such propaganda persuadedGerman soldiers that the Allies would not take prisoners, and rhetoric aboutpowerful new vengeance weapons buttressed German morale and cohesion.Eastern hardness, inculcated through, indoctrination, helped troops surmountthe terrible conditions in which they fought in Normandy.In fact the evidence demonstrates that the picture portrayed by the literature -the German Soldier increasingly disillusioned with Hitler and Nazism is simply

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not true. Although many German prisoners expressed disillusionment aftercapture and even more claimed to be anti-Nazis after the war, contemporaryprisoner of war interrogations concluded that most German troops remainedideologically committed to National Socialism, that they rarely blamed Hitlerfor Axis defeats, and that they still had faith in ultimate victory. Nazipropaganda clearly reinforced the will of the German troops to continue anincreasingly hopeless conflict and indoctrination was one element of militaryeffectiveness in which Nazi Germany maintained a marked edge over theWestern Allies throughout the War. In reality most German Soldiers in theWest maintained their allegiance to both Hitler, to National Socialism and theGerman Volk because they viewed the future of all three to be indivisible.Another myth is the success of Allied deception efforts - OperationFORTITUDE, the Allied deception that the invasion of France would come inthe Pas De Calais [Fortitude South], and historians have often contended thatthese were a significant factor in Allied victory in Normandy. Not only didFORTITUDE mean the Germans were unable to throw the allies back into thesea on D-Day but it kept powerful Germans forces in the Pas de Calais toolong to prevent an Allied breakout from Normandy.I would argue however that the continuation of Fortitude long after D-Dayprobably did not speed Allied victory, and - to the contrary - it might haveactually delayed an Allied breakout, for without FORTITUDE the Germanscould have rushed their reserves to Normandy and in the process collapsedthe tenuous logistic infrastructure underpinning their defence. Why I believethis to be the case will become evident later when I talk a bit about Germanlogistics in the campaign.Another myth involves the events that took place at Omaha Beach on themorning of the 6th June. It has become commonplace to ascribe a significantresponsibility to the initial difficulties that the Americans faced on Omahabeach on the Germans redeployment of the 352 nd Infantry Division, a front-line Infantry Division up behind Omaha beach, and the failure of alliedintelligence to detect them.While is true is that the Germans did move up this Division between Carentanand Bayeux in the month before D-Day, the Germans moved only a singleartillery and two infantry battalions into the Omaha beach area. Moreover ifyou examine the company dispositions, the infantry of the 352 nd Division wereplaced at the landward end of the Omaha draws, and in the villages of theinterior, behind the coast, not in the front, in the beachhead strongpoints.The Troops that manned the bulk of the beach strong points that stoppeddead the 1st and 29th US Infantry Divisions on the morning of 6 June camefrom 716th Division. The real explanation of the near-fiasco at Omaha is thatthe Allies fundamentally underestimated the difficulties imposed by the terrainand by topography.Another fixation of mine is what I see as the effective sanitisation of theNormandy campaign. Failure to examine the campaign in ideological termshas ensured that Historians have presented an overly clean view of thecampaign. Whilst it is true that atrocities never reached the depths ofextermination that characterised the war on the Eastern front, Normandy saw

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bitter, and often brutal, combat. Although Historians have focussed on thesmall number of well-documented SS atrocities committed in Normandy atthe time, the Allies repeatedly alleged numerous crimes committed asfrequently by Army as by Waffen SS Troops.Likewise Anglo-American historians have focused on egregious SSmassacres of French civilians for example the massacre by the 2 nd SSPanzer Division ‘Das Reich’ at Oradour, but Army units regularly participatedin anti-partisan sweeps and routinely did not take prisoners. If you lookbeyond these single egregious instances, to the everyday engagements, tensof thousands of French civilians were killed in anti-partisan sweeps in themonths prior to and during the Normandy campaign, and most of those werevictims of action by regular German troops: not Police, not SS.At he same time, the Germans complained loudly and frequently to the neutralSwiss regarding perceived Allied violations of the Geneva and Hagueconventions. The Germans repeatedly protested against the Allied use ofNapalm, [Jellied Gasoline] and white phosphorous [Willy Peter, as theAmericans called it] which the Germans claimed – with some justification –were illegal chemical weapons. The German also remonstrated against thefrequent allied air attacks against Red Cross ambulances. Besides theinherent problems of accurate target identification faced by pilots during theSecond World War, there was ample documentary evidence to substantiateextensive German employment of Red Cross ambulances as troop transports,and for carrying supplies in contravention of the rules of War.Another source of frequent German complaint was the refusal of the Allies torecognise small German hospital ships despite their official registrations. Infact the Germans constantly complained about Allied air attacks on suchvessels. This was a real problem for Germans because shipping limitationsfrequently compelled them to rely on small coastal hospital ships in the West,particularly the Atlantic coast. This unilateral Allied position - which really didnot have the weight of international legal backing behind it - was that the smallhospital ship were really pilot rescue vessels, which Allies interpreted asfalling outside the technical description of a hospital ship and therefore fairgame for attack. We attacked many dozens of German hospital ships. I knowof no author who has written on the war in North West Europe who hasdiscussed these Allied attacks on small German hospital ships. Like all wars,the Normandy campaign was a dirty war.One of the most pervasive and distorted perspectives of the Normandycampaign, is the image of the unimaginative German Army blindly followingunrealistic orders from above. One of the least recognised and most crucialdynamics of the Normandy campaign was the rapid adaptation that emergedamongst German troops. To the contrary, the Germans could be highlyadaptive and innovated continually throughout the campaign, to fight moreeffectively despite being massively outnumbered. In particular the Germansmodified their defensive practices to fight more effectively. The impact ofsuch innovation was to shift significantly the casualty exchange ratio in theirfavour despite mounting allied superiority. Up to 11 July the Germans suffered102 casualties for every 100 allied casualties, but by 13 August the balancehad shifted considerably will the Allies suffering 116 casualties for every 100

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German casualties. This is remarkable given the steady increase in Alliednumerical and materiel strength vis-à-vis the Germans. In fact one wouldassume the very opposite that, as the allied superiority grew, the casualtyexchange ratio would shift in their favour.How does one explain this trend? The explanation lies in German defensiveadaptations. Initially Germans employed traditional Eastern front defensivetechniques; that emphasised linear defence, forward concentration,firepower, and immediate counter-attack. When the German went over todefence on 10 June, and sought to confine the Allies in the bridgehead, lackof troops and the absence of prepared defences inland initially forced them toadopt linear defence, but Allied artillery, aircraft and naval gun fire inflictedheavy losses against these forward concentrated German defenders, but asGerman reserves moved up to the front, German troops quickly returned tothe traditional doctrine of defence in depth to minimise their casualties andbuttress their defensive strength. The relative brevity of the front allowed theGermans in late June to erect defences in depth in the southern Cotentinpeninsula, in the thick bocage south of Cabault[?] and before Caen.

At the same time the Germans refined their defensive techniques in light ofcombat conditions in Normandy. Allied aerial mastery and their pronouncedfirepower advantage rendered standard German defence less effective inNormandy than it had proven in the East or in Africa. In particular forwardconcentration and immediate counter attack brought heavy German lossesfrom allied artillery. Moreover allied firepower and the devastating effect ofcarpet bombing meant that even standard defence in depth could neither stopthe Allies from gaining ground, nor prevent heavy losses.The Germans thus gradually refined their defensive techniques to counteroverwhelming Allied aerial mastery and fire power of superiority. Formationsgradually adopted extreme dispersions as troops deepened their defensivezones, and further dispersed their manpower. When Time resources andcombat conditions allowed, the Germans erected additional defences behindtheir MLR, and withdrew troops into these rearward positions. Thesedefensive tactical adaptations emerged from the classic bottom-up, top-down,decentralised pattern of German adaptation. Innovation emerged on an ad-hoc unit to unit basis during June, and after collection analysis of these after-action reports the German Command, Army Gp B, published guide lines inearly July for dispersed deep defence that were copied across the entire front.Extended defence in depth curtailed German losses and contributed directlyto the defeat of Montgomery's GOODWOOD offensive between 18 and 20July. Extreme dispersion reduced German losses from artillery and air attackand at the same time made it even harder for allied forces to penetrate thedepth of German defences.The Germans also adapted to offset allied numerical and materiel superiorityas well as the enemy’s growing fighting power and combat proficiency. Sopowerful did Allied artillery become in Normandy, that Germans troops soonlearnt that only instant counter-attack before allied troops could consolidate orregister fire could retake objectives in normally platoon strength local counter

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attacks often materialised within 15 minutes of the loss of an objective, and inCompany or Battalion strength within an hour.Troops learnt from trial and error the need for strict radio discipline, and tolocate radio equipment away from Command Headquarters, to minimiseattacks on command and control facilities. Initial failure to adoptcountermeasures led to the neutralisation of Headquarters Panzer GroupWest by air attack on the 10 June. Thereafter the Germans adoptedelaborate security measures to safeguard command + control facilities.By 1944 coordinated defensive artillery fire had become the backbone of theGerman defence on the Eastern front where troop density were often halfthose attained in Normandy. Although the Germans established a heavyconcentration of Artillery in Normandy, Allied aerial mastery and Germansupply shortages rendered this force ineffectual, and it was rarely able tobuttress the German defence . In fact Allied air attacks hampered Germangunners to an unprecedented degree as they harassed and suppressedGerman artillery fire. The air threat necessitated that guns relocate often andadopt elaborate camouflage & concealment.The threat often forced the Germans to abandon mass fire, and instead resortto shoot-and-scoot tactics or random sprinkling fire, or roving fire involvingindividual guns. At the same time, ammunition shortages prevented theheavy barrages needed to repulse allied attacks. Massed fire was thus rareand gunners increasingly abandon counter battery fire entirely. The absenceof strong artillery support compelled the German troops to rely heavily onmortars, which they used to great effect for fire sp in Normandy.The Germans had more, and heavier calibre mortars than the Allies, andsince mortars were more mobile and more easily concealed, they were lessvulnerable to air attack than artillery pieces. The Germans also madeincreasing use of Nebelwerfers ; mobile, multi-barrel rocket projectors, andthe Germans soon established, opposite the British sector of the front, theheaviest concentration of Nebelwerfer batteries actually seen in the war.These projectors could bring down such rapid mass fire that Allied troopscame to dread their “stonks” and the characteristic demoralising wail of theprojectiles in flight. Adaptations like these made the Germans more efficientfighters inflicting heavier losses on their enemy while simultaneously reducingtheir own casualties.Another myth is the exaggerated rôle of ULTRA during the campaign andhaving examined the ULTRA decrypts from the Normandy campaign at thepublic record office, it is easy to appreciate the limitations of ULTRA in thecampaign. For a start, the excellent French telephone system ensured thatthe Germans only sparingly despatched information by encoded radiotransmissions. These transmissions had then to be intercepted and de-codedRarely was full decoding possible, and deciphering took time; to such anextent that by the time the information had been de-coded and disseminatedto the field its operational usefulness was often limited. Moreover for securitypurposes the origin of such intelligence was rarely disclosed to fieldcommanders, ensuring that they often failed to fully appreciate its value. Onlyduring August when the German front collapsed did the volume of radio trafficdramatically increase. But so fluid had the ground situation become, that

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usually, by the time ULTRA intelligence made it to the field, the situation onthe ground had changed appreciably, rendering the intelligence of little value.The best example of what I am talking about is the frequently exaggeratedrole of ultra enforcing the German counter offensive against Avranches,launched on the 6 August. Although ULTRA intelligence did provide advancewarning of the impending attack most front line units received a non specificwarning a mere 60 minutes before the German attack began and for someunits it was less than 5 minutes; obviously 5 minutes is not much time to doanything about it.Another myth concerns the explanations of the success of the Americansbreaking out on the southern most sector of the front during Operation Cobra.During late July. After seven weeks of heavy combat the German defence inNormandy collapsed, and historians have traditionally interpreted the Germancollapse as the inevitable consequence of sustained attrition; after theconstant battering of allied forces conventional wisdom maintains that theGermans were simply too weak to stop the American breakthrough.Unfortunately the evidence simply does not fit this interpretation. In the firstplace the Germans had continually reinforced their defences on the St Lôsector – the American sector of the front – and in fact during Cobra werevirtually as strong as the forces that had successfully thwarted the Anglo-Canadian GOODWOOD offensive the previous week.So how does one therefore explain the complete American success of Cobraand the dismal Anglo-Canadian failure of GOODWOOD? Part of the story wasthe respective capability of the allies, and the basic reality that the AmericanArmy had been, and was, learning faster, and more effectively from itsbattlefield experience than its Anglo-Canadian allies. Equally so, logisticdeficiencies explained the German collapse at St Lô. Despite heavy losses,the German forces were not so attenuated that they were incapable of haltingthe American breakout, and in fact the German 7 th Army had halted allprevious American attacks and heavy American losses, and massivemunitions expenditures suffered in the battles in the bocage and before St Lô,placed real limits on American firepower support to Cobra. So if the Germandefence was not too weak to prevent an American breakthrough, why didCobra succeed?Improved American capabilities resulted in a better conceived &executedoffensive but equally important was the deteriorating German supply situationcontributed directly to 7 th Army's failure to halt the American breakthrough.Thus the Germans defeat in Normandy was fundamentally a logistic defeat asthe Westheer were unable to reinforce and re-supply a field force of sufficientsize to contain the allies in their lodgement.To understand why this was so and also why I think that continuingFORTITUDE long after D-Day was a mistake, one has to briefly characterisethe German logistic position in the west at the beginning of the campaign. Andone can only characterise the German logistic position as precarious;munitions stockpiles were sufficient for about one month of sustained combat,but most of these stockpiles were at inland depots.

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The German fuel situation was even worse. Germans had seven to ten daysworth of fuel available for their strategic reserves. Moreover allied air attackshad crippled the French rail net and forced the German supply operation on tothe roads thereby further depleting German fuel stocks. Distribution had thusbecome a serious problem even before D-Day, and the Germans hadintroduced stringent rationing to preserve their dwindling stocks. When theGermans failed to beat the allies on the beaches they could only fight aprotracted defence on the West if adequate supplies of fuel and ammunitionwere brought forward from the Reich, but given pure transport shortages,planned German troop redeployments to Normandy grossly exceeded theavailable trucking capacity and the German ability to re-supply these forcesonce committed.The Germans thus consistently prioritised getting troops to the Normandyfront to cordon off the allies in a small bridgehead; only then could they try tosupply the forces committed but allied air attacks so badly hampered Germanresupply operations, and so slowed the flow supply to Normandy thatpersistent logistic deficiencies plagued the German defence. TheQuartermaster General West could deliver only a fraction of the suppliesconsumed at the front, with the result that stockpiles rapidly diminished. TheGasoline situation rapidly became critical as they depleted their entirestrategic fuel reserve by 13 June, and the crisis at the destruction of the mainGerman fuel depot at Genneville, outside Paris, on the 22 June furtherexacerbated that situation. Genneville was the main German fuel depot in thewest, and with its destruction, the Germans lost about 90% of their stockpilesof gasoline – a serious blow to the logistic position of the Westheer.Within the first week of the invasion the Germans realised that only a dramaticimprovement in their supply situation could allow a protracted defence ofNormandy. German quartermasters and supply troops thus improvised tospeed the flow of supplies as they sought to restore limited railcommunications to Normandy.In the first week of the invasion the Germans could not run a single supplytrain into Normandy across either the Seine or the Loire rivers. Thereafterthey abandoned their uncoordinated and dispersed rail repair operations, andfocused on opening two major rail arteries into Normandy; the line Paris -Versailles – Dreux - Vieux - Surdon from the East, across the Seine, and theline Tours - Le Mans – Alencon – Sees - Vieux - Surdon from the South,across the Loire. The Germans focused on repairing and trying got keepopen these two arteries, which they never do, but they do manage to open uprail traffic through to Dinant[?], and across the Loire to Alencon.In late June the German logistic situation in Normandy finally began toimprove as rail movement into Normandy recommenced as large scaleferrying operations got underway, and as combat units began to collectsupplies from the depots themselves. In late June the Germans began alarge scale ferrying operation across the Seine, and during July delivered amajor proportion of the supplies that reached Normandy.When combined with the re-opening of rail communications the flow ofsupplies to central Normandy increased steadily in the first weeks of July. Butthe major German problems remained in the trans-shipment of those supplies

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to railheads and docks to the front as allied air attacks inflicted a heavy toll onGerman trucks. On average the Germans lost 75 trucks destroyed per day inNormandy, mainly to air attack.Only by collecting supplies themselves could front line combat unitscompensate for the supply services dwindling ability to shift stocks from thedepots to the front. During July the German logistic situation on the easternflank – Panzer Group West opposing the Anglo-Canadians - slowly improvedas rail movement recommenced, and Seine ferrying operations increased theflow of supplies to Normandy. Allied air forces were unable to neutralise theSeine ferrying operations, because ferries were much harder to hit thanbridges or railways, and they mainly operated at night. But on the Germanwestern flank, where 7 th Army opposed the Americans at St Lô, there was noparallel logistic improvement during July; to the contrary the Germans supplysituation continued to decline. Ferrying was far less significant on the Atlanticcoast; re-supplying distances were far greater and communication lines lessdeveloped. But it was the German inability to sustain rail deliveries across theLoire river that directly contributed to the collapse of the St Lô front in lateJuly. The catalyst for the ultimately fatal decline of the 7 th Army supplysituation on the American sector of the Normandy front, was the reneweddestruction of the railway bridge and marshalling yards at Tours on 15 July.The attack on 15 July fatally undermined the 7 th Army's logistic positionbecause the Quartermaster General West could not compensate for theinterruption to rail delivery of fuel and munitions by increased road delivery.German fuel stocks on the St Lô front thus dwindled at the very moment thatAmerican forces launched Operation Cobra, their breakout bid.After frenetic work the Germans re-opened the Tours rail bridge on 23 July -two days before the start of Cobra - too late to re-supply the 7 th Army beforethe American attack. In the meantime replenishing Panzer Group West afterits GOODWOOD expenditures, meant that Quartermaster General Westcould only despatch fuel by road to 7 th Army on one day in the week betweenthe 18 and 25 July. This is missed by everyone; when D’Este has writtenabout catastrophe at Goodwood he has emphasised that it had a critical effecton diverting the German truck resupply operation to the Caen sector of thefront; only on one day in that week between GOODWOOD and Cobra couldthe Germans dispatch truck columns with fuel to St Lô.As a result on the eve of COBRA on 25 July, German fuel stocks on the St Lôsector of the front had sunk perilously low. Defending 84 Corps had less thantwo days supply, at average consumption rates - not intense combat rates - ifyou are thwarting a major offensive, that’s about a day’s worth of fuel; that’sall they had.The closure of the Tours rail route also had an important indirect impact onthe 7th Army's munitions stocks. To decrease turnaround, time theQuartermaster General West abandoned deliveries to 7 th Army's largest andmost forward munitions depot MICHEL, at St Sever, 10 miles behind the fronton 17 July, and instead delivered stocks to MARTHA 10 miles further awaynear Domfront. What is critical about this, is that it quadruples the distancethat front line combat units on the St Lô front had to travel to collect munitions,and obviously it also furthered depleted German fuel stocks.

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[This is MICHEL this was the forward, main German munitions depot for theNormandy sector. In order to turn around truck columns more quickly on the17th they just stopped delivering to there. Which means a much longerjourney - four times longer - to MARTHA for front line combat units to collectsupplies, and it means they could only bring back small quantities ofmunitions, and of course they were just burning off their fuel, but they werequite happy to go and collect supplies from this depot as it was further backfrom the front.]Therefore on the eve of COBRA German forces deployed on the St Lô frontsimply lacked the munitions to halt any major concerted American offensive.For the first time in the campaign during COBRA supply shortages crippledthe German defence, and prevented them from cordoning off the AmericanCOBRA break in on the 25/26 th July as they had all previous allied defences.It’s the supply shortages which explained why the elite and still powerful 2 nd

SS Panzer Division Das Reich fails to make its presence felt on the COBRAbattlefield - Read accounts of COBRA; where is the Das Reich, one of theélite SS Panzer divisions? It barely gets a mention; it’s got no fuel. TheGerman LXXXIV Corps report to higher headquarters on 26 July "thatgasoline shortages significantly prohibited" German counter measures andforced the Das Reich to abandon two entire companies of Panzer tanks, iseloquent testimony to the scale of the fuel crisis.It is clear therefore that the German logistic deficiencies played a central rolein the American Cobra breakout. Moreover it is evident that the fortuitousdestruction of the Tours rail bridge 10 days before the onset of COBRAproved perfect timing. If it had been destroyed any earlier- just a day or twoearlier - then the Germans would have had time to have repaired the bridgeand to have rushed off new supplies of stockpiles by rail to the St Lô sector ofthe front. Any later after the 15 July and there would have been insufficienttime to erode the German front line combat stockpiles to critical levels.The timing of 15 July - completely inadvertently, with nothing to do with anyconnection to the planned COBRA offensive, which was part of the ongoingallied bombing attacks against German infrastructure - was perfect timing inretrospect.The final issue I want to talk about tonight I think is the most significantdeficiency regarding the German defence in Normandy. I think the historianshave neglected to study the last ten days of the campaign. Most studies stopwith the liberation of Paris on the 25 August, and most scholars havegenerally viewed this period as a rather anti-climactic concomitant to the alliedbreakout, and a transition phase to the exciting breakout and the frantic dashtowards Antwerp and the German frontier. But this neglect is unfortunate, forfrom a German perspective, the last ten days of August represents the singlemost important period of the Normandy campaign, for it witnessed thegreatest German defensive success in Normandy. During the last ten days ofAugust the Germans extracted virtually all of their remaining troops and asurprising quantity of heavy weapons behind the Seine River in a generalstrategic withdrawal.Now, while this is a negative outcome, given the predicament the Germanswere in late August 1944 was an astonishing achievement. For on 19 th August

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the Allies had encircled a substantial proportion of the German forces in theFalaise pocket and the next day had forced the Seîne river.Given the catastrophic German supply situation at this juncture and continuedinterdiction attacks on the Seîne, the Allies possessed a never-to-be-repeatedstrategic opportunity to roll up the German flank along the Seîne, and envelopand annihilate the bulk of the Westheer against the Seîne.The Germans salvaged much of their Army for a number of reasons. Theyretreated skilfully despite great handicaps after the 21 August in a full-scalestaged withdrawal behind the Seine. At the same time the allies were unableto interdict effectively the enemy's retrograde movement. Despite Herculeanbridge building efforts, Allied air attacks continued to demolish the Seînebridges faster than the German could re-build them thus in late August not asingle bridge capable of taking automobiles remained standing between thenorthern outskirts of Paris and the English channel. Though increasedferrying and use of pontoon bridges greatly increased traffic across the Seînefrom late June, these ferries were totally inadequate for a rapid massevacuation.Changing strategic priorities, increasing demands for air support and theweather, all prevented allied air forces from impeding the German retreatbehind the Seîne. The allies radically revised their air interdiction plan afterthe 9th August to slow the German retreat. Though the Seîne bridgesremained a high priority, allied aircraft increased attacks on targets East ofParis and also took on the river bridges west of the Seîne. But planes hadbarely resumed large scale attacks on the Seine bridges on the 18 Augustwhen SHAEF decided to try and capture them intact and thus abandoned airattacks entirely. Tactical aviation turned instead to transportation targets, ashift that relaxed pressure on German communications. The breakout alsovastly increased the number of targets, and inevitably dissipated Allied airpower as aircraft supported ground operations across the entire front ofBrittany along the Loire river to Paris. Moreover the punishing strikeslaunched against the Falaise pocket from 16 th to 21st August absorbed theattention of the considerable element of Allied air power. Unseasonably badweather for late August also aided the Germans as it grounded all Allieddaylight missions on 21 st and 23rd August. Air power proved unable toprevent the German retreat behind the Seîne.The failure of Montgomery's tired and depleted forces to pursue aggressivelythe retreating enemy, and stubborn rear guard action against advancingAmerican troops, also aided the Germans escape. Germans used in excessof 60 crossing points over the Seîne and employed every conceivable meansof crossing; ferries, barges, rafts, yachts, row-boats, inflatable dinghies as wellas nocturnal pontoon and boat bridges. And again the extensive Germanexperience of large-scale river crossing operations on the eastern front clearlyaided their efforts.Forced to retreat in daylight towards the Seîne, Germans suffered heavylosses from air attacks and at the same time a catastrophic fuel situationforced the Germans to abandon motor vehicles and heavy equipment indroves. Yet the Germans extricated virtually every soldier, and most of theequipment that made it to the Seîne, across the river, and although badly

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battered and bruised the Westheer escaped to fight another day, and thefailure to destroy the Westheer against the Seîne had significant strategicramifications.Firstly it ensured that the war in the West would not end in 1944. Secondly itallowed Hitler to flesh out a new Westheer on the skeleton of the Army thathad escaped from Normandy, first to restabilise the defensive front along theWest Wall during the Autumn of 1944, and then to launch a strategic counteroffensive in the Ardennes during December. Without the German success onthe Seine in August it is unlikely the Germans could have restabilised the frontalong the German frontier during the autumn and inconceivable that Hitlercould have counter-attacked in the West at all during 1944.In conclusion; tonight I have tried to examine - albeit very briefly - a few of themore significant myths regarding the German defence of Normandy and I ammore than happy to elaborate on questions over dinner.

Question and Answer Session

1. The sound quality of the recording hereafter is variable. The hashsymbol [#] appears where the audiotypist was unable to distinguishthe words spoken, and I have not been able to fill in the gaps.

2. Italic script is sused to indicate words spoken by the audience. DrHart’s replies are in normal Arial font.

The Normandy campaign is one that we are very familiar with, and would besurprising given the huge amount of literature written on it there are still hugegaps of misperception out there to be discovered that you have clearly beendigging very hard and managed to produce several new loads of discoveriesto set people going in the future. I would like to steal the Chairman'sprerogative and ask you the first question if I may.You talked about the influx of the Ostkampfer in late 43 into early 1944; couldyou give us some idea of the scale of the influx that had happened here andalso was it a deliberate policy by the German high command? Is there aperception that the Westheer is weak and flabby after 3 years of peacetimedoddling around and needs some really tough, hardened individuals to getthere, crack heads and really work them up into fighting fitness for theinvasion the German high command is expecting to be imminent in the nextsix months?Oh absolutely there is no doubt whatsoever that the perception was that theforces in the West had been spoilt by sunny French weather, croissants,calvados and the need some major stiffening. This is a deliberate consciouspolicy and on a massive scale; if you look at Officers you will see that the bulkof German officers that are in the West in June 1943 are not there a year laterthey have all been replaced. Some units we are talking about are 60, 70,80% turnover rates, getting rid of these old lax guys, and getting in decoratedeastern front veterans - tough guys from the tough war in the East.What happened to General Von Klinkerhoff [?]######### ?He would have certainly been one of the ones to have gone if he had existed.

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Where did they go?Went back to German, went to Norway or somewhere out of the way whereincompetence would not be a major burden. Most of them went back to rearEchelon headquarters in Germany.

The relative lack of success by 29 th US division at Omaha was attributed bysome authorities to the fact they refused to use those swimming tanks. Doyou attach any weight to that?They did employ amphibious tanks but obviously they sank as they were toofar out because of the bad weather but frankly even if the amphibious armourhad got ashore they were not getting off the beach - this is Dieppe all overagain. The German defences - you have these Coastal bluffs and you have5 narrow draws and the Germans have substantial anti-tank guns on the sidesof those draws, and you can't knock them out. This is very, very difficultterrain for any force to penetrate and I think it is a case of fundamental under-estimation of how difficult the landing at Omaha was going to be. If you lookat the planning, from what I've seen, there is just no real sense that things aregoing to be much tougher at Omaha. That's my sense of it - I just don't see akind of serious realisation of just how tough it was going to be; just asAmericans fundamentally misunderstood just how tough it was going to be tofight in the Bocage. Let's face it, how many Americans fought in Normandywho'd ever been there before? The only people who knew anything about iton the ground were people frorm the AEF who had gone there in 1918, whenCherbourg had been one of the major entry ports, and that's about it; I meanit's a fundamental lack of knowledge of the terrain.It is very similar terrain to that in which much of the US Army trained inEngland - Devon and Cornwall have very similar lanes with high banks andthick hedges - but they didn't us the training opportunity given by the ground.I think they probably went out and found open bits of ground, and that wasmore fun - it's a failure of command.(Stephen Badsey) On the impact of ground on the defence: taking that a bitmore; 352nd: the distance between the sea edge and he top of the drwaws isonly 500 to 1000m. Those people were involved in Omaha beach - I wentthere for the 1994 commemoration, and there were a number of unofficialGerman memorials put there which the French, very sadly, took away veryquickly after, though I photographed them first, and even with a Bn HQ whereit was, I don't think there is any doubt that elements of the 352 nd were directlyinvolved.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- # # # # # # # # 1916-1917 on the western front the same kind ofreasonably rapid adaptation takes place but I would like to link this in withwhat you said about the casualty exchange rates. I mean in fact you say thatat one stage it is like a 102 to 100 a bit later 116 to 100. Now the point here,surely, is that from the German point of view - massively outnumbered - this isnot at all good; I mean you are on the defensive most of the time and hopingto reap the advantages of being on the defensive but obviously principallybecause of the absolutely overwhelming allied firepower in fact you are not

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reaping that much advantage at all. You know you are in real real deeptrouble and sooner or later you are going to lose with an exchange rate likethat and also I mean with the points I think you are perhaps being a little overgenerous to the Germans I think this is my impression when you are sayingthat OK there is a tactical shift obviously they go more for defense in depth,and that it implies greater dispersal and that obviously is going to bring thecasualty rate down. But the other thing you mentioned which seems to mepossibly a good deal significant is a shift in the policy on counter attacks nowthat certainly is something that happened in 1916-1917 and the Germansobviously met immediate counter attacks in strength, but very quickly the Britsand the French got wise to this kind of thing as counter attacks come in theyjust get blown to bits with Artillery. So what the Germans tend to do as timegoes on is they do fewer and fewer of them now that’s a good way of savingcasualties. But what you are saying what they do is they tend to try and do itfaster and with fewer people.It certainly reduced unit size and a reduction in companies' assault platoonsbut that’s mainly a function of officer casualty rates.Get your counter attack in very fast and use just a relatively small number ofpeople that you have got to hand rather than summoning a large group ofpeople to do the counter attack. Now that will be a major factor actually incutting your casualty rates, that you’re not counter attacking in such largenumbers.You have also got to remember of course that the casualty exchange rate isnot the only thing we need to be thinking about clearly is reducing theexchange rate without presuming the consequence of doing that isn'tnecessary a good idea but you have obviously got to balance it with trying toactually achieve current and strategic operation, tactical objectives in thecampaign at the same time so we are looking at a very complicated issuewhich integrates with all sorts of variables and makes it difficult to discussthese things.What I was saying really is that given what we have said about the defensiveadvantages of the terrain the exchange rate is not very favourable at all; itreally isn't. # # # # committed at any one time you got to think about the scale of theAmerican superiority as well.My thoughts are saying that given this massive logistical and firepoweradvantage, in which You have Artillery often 50:1 or 100:1, and given thatfigure I mean I would counter that by saying that given the Allied aerialmateriel and artillery superiority, I would expect the casualty exchange rate tobe even higher.Just to take some American parallels Grants army attacking # # # # #Virginia which is also difficult terrain in 64 the exchange rate was far morefavourable to the defending side.But of course the bulk of German casualties in both the first world war and thesecond world war incurred on the counter offence and this was a fundamentalproblem with the German defence # # # # # # # # # # the worst case inNormandy is the Engineer Battalion of the 12 th SS which on the 9 th and 10th

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June counter attacks across an open field with no fire support whatsoever andsuffers 600 casualties. But of course you can see similar losses on theAmerican. One of the lessons you learn simply as time goes on is not to dothat.But the Germans don’t know that.The next book I am writing on is called Hitler’s Last Hope and it is about theGermans effort to leave Hitler in Berlin and on the 20 April 1945 when theSoviets storm across the Oder North of Berlin that the Panther Army throwsin all its reserves in suicidal counter attacks and you have # # # # # # havebeen reconstituted from smashed remnants over the last months to fullstrength that # # percent casualty rates in a single day and not surprisinglyunable to hold the Soviets back for more than a couple of days.Presumably singing Happy Birthday Dear Fuhrer.If you # # sense and ability towards combat lessons and tactics rapidly inNormandy why this sudden incapability to look at the adoption # # # # # #because you have to keep faith in that # # purely being on the defensiveknowing you cant win.Well this is it I mean it’s the element of national socialism, introducing theelement of ideology into the German Battalion like never before and itbecomes a question of will you cannot win just by standingWell you got shot. The Draconian Nazi military system these guys do itbecause they know they were going to be court martialled and shot. By 1945the Germans had probably executed 30,000 of their own troops and it waseffective and kept troops in line.Exactly the same with the Osttruppen it was very clear they remained farmore petrified of the Germans than the Allies. You know in Tyrol when theirOfficers are dead or wounded then they run away.At what point were the railheads terminated northward # # # # or westwardatAt what date did that occur because it seems to me that Northwest of thatthere was no rail lines at all.Apart from local command moving things along industrial narrow gauge railroadsSo they made the most use of that but otherwise there were no rail lines leftshortly before the invasion.The continuing breakdown of rail # # rail bridges had been destroyed largerailyards had been destroyed, locomotives had been destroyed, # stationsits just the overall cumulative destruction if you haven't got locomotives andyou haven't got wagons and trailers and you haven't got coal that none ofthese things are ever in the same place at the same time and the rail systemwas so dislocated that it took days if not weeks to get all the bits together inone place to be able to resume getting troops their first

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The higher command was largely # # # at the end of 1943 in the Normandyarea was that simply because they were incompetent I rather thought theGermans anticipated invasion in Calais and not in Normandy at all.This is going on throughout the Western theatre you are talking aboutthousands of officers and thousands of NCOs.So it had nothing to do with an unanticipated landing.No, No it was just going on throughout the West. The Germans didn't knowwhen they were going to land and I am also not someone who thinks that theGermans were obsessed with # # # # # [Pas De Calais?] . It’s just not true.If you look at German records, # # # # # # going on elsewhere they werenot gamblers they don’t gamble everything on the Pas De Calais; then again ifyou look at things like # # Eastern front # # # # # as many of them toNormandy as sending them to Pas De Calais. They are not taking risks theyhave their # # # # # everywhere wherever it comes.

The Panzer divisions # # actually combat capable as opposed to recovery

The whole idea # # kept half dozen first regular divisions in the Pas DeCalais that could have done the non-resistant is simply not true. If you look atthe returns of divisions they are non operational.

# # # # # # # # # # # # #