10 21 13 72675 Supplemental Post-trial Motions and Supporting Declaration Bw

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1/18 -motion for new trial, notice of appeal of all orders to the 2jdc request for all audio transcripts, order for

transcript of trial and all hearings, and request for docket and all nrs 189.030(1) papers at public expense.

Zach Coughlin, Esq. NV Bar 9473 (temporarily suspended but authorized to practice on his own behalf in Reno Justice Court), license not suspended before the USPTO 1471 E. 9th St. Reno, NV 89512 Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402 [email protected] Self Representing Attorney Defendant

IN THE RENO JUSTICE COURT COUNTY OF WASHOE; STATE OF NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA, PLAINTIFF

vs.

ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN; DEFENDANT

))))))

RCR2013-072675

D5, then reassigned

SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, NOTICE OF APPEAL OF 10/11/13 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE AND 10/14/13 JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND COURT ORDER AND ALL

OTHERS ORDERS (INCLUDING 9/24/13 ORDERS, 5/30/13 ORDERS, 6/18/13 ORDERS AND ANY OTHER ORDERS ) TO THE 2JDC) AND REQUEST FOR COPY OF DOCKET AND ALL AUDIO

TRANSCRIPTS IN THIS CASES, AND REQUEST FOR PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPT IMMEDIATELY NRS 189.030(1) AND COPY OF ENTIRE RECORD SO FAR AT PUBLIC EXPENSE AND

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR POST-TRIAL AND SENTENCING CRITICAL PHASES AND SUPPORTING DECLARATION.

Coughlin hereby files this Motion for New Trial (NRS 176.515) and Notice of Appeal of the 10/14/13

judgment of conviction and all other orders ever entered in this case (and especially the 10/14/12 Judgment of

Conviction and Court Order, and all orders made in connection with the 5/30/13, 6/6/13, and 9/24/13 court dates

(it is especially unjust fail to recognize Coughlin’s filing between 5/23/13 through the 6/18/13 removal of R.

Bruce Lindsay as counsel when Coughlin had not agree to or even applied for any sole counsel appointed

counsel) to the second judicial district court. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Coughlin hereby moves for and files the following: Motion for New Trial pursuant to NRS 176.515, and a Motion to Arrest

Judgment per NRS 176.525, and Motions for a Judgment of Acquittal per NRS 176.165.:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



Motion for New Trial pursuant to NRS 176.515: Grounds for new trial in general. (1). In general. (2). Disqualification or

prejudice of judge or officers at trial. (clear violation of ADKT 0411 by Judge Glasson, in addition to his persistently advocating on

behalf of the State and making argumentation where DDA Stege failed to in support of the most key areas of dispute regarding the

material elements of the crimes charged, in violation of Breliant) (3). Absence of witness. (Coughlin does not believe his proposed

subpoena of Bailiff Reyes wife Cathy Ann Reyes was ever responded to by the RJC) (4). Imposition of improper sentence. (Coughlin

reserves his right to address this post the 11/6/13 sentencing hearing); Errors and irregularities in preliminary proceedings. (the

cumulative prejudicial effect of the RJC and its bailiffs and clerks refusing Coughlin access to and copies of materials necessary to his

defense; the forcing of a conflict out conflict counsel in Lindsay that the direct appointment of by Judge Clifton was in violation of the

dictates of ADKR 0411 that the judge presiding over trial refer to another judge all rulings on indigency, and the appointment of

conflict counsel, both of which Clifton and Glasson violated); Defects in the Criminal Complaint (failure to specify what the order

connected to complaint’s reference to “previously ordered by the court” actually was (ie, case number, date of order, name of order,

etc.; in addition to failing to provide any factual assertions whatsoever as to what “nuisance” Coughlin did “commit” and how

Coughlin may have so “committed” such “nuisance”; in addition to failing to specify in any way how Coughlin’s having purportedly

“physically resist(ing)” Bailiff Reyes manifested iteslef);Want of preparation. (the cumulative effect of the RJC’s illegal “Notice of

Document Received But Not Considered by the Court” and refusing Coughlin even copies to the docket in this matter (required under

NRS 4.230 and 4.240), as well as refusing Coughlin copies of the audio transcripts, even if Coughlin had paid for them (which he was

not required to given the appointment of Lindsay necessarily involved a finding that Coughlin was indigent and where Judge Clifton

had previously ruled that Coughlin was “absolutely entitled” to such at no expense, especially where the RJC’s Notice of Document

Received But Not Consider by the Court of 7/30/12 sought to apply ex post facto the 8/14/13 Admin Order 2013-06, in addition to

JCRRT 11 where such is not supportable in light of JCRRT 2 and NRS 178.600, .608, .610); Refusal of continuance. (1). In general.

(2). Absence of witness. (failure of Judge Clifton to comply with NRS 1.235 required a continuance, as did Judge Glasson’s violation

of ADKR 0411; and RJC’s failure to rule on Coughlin’s subpoena of Cathy A. Reyes);

Errors and irregularities in conduct of trial, Remarks by judge (Judge Glasson’s remarking on Coughlin’s credibility (even though

a non-jury trial, still had a coercive effect as to Coughlin’s testimony), Failure to appoint counsel for accused (both Judge Glasson and

Judge Clifton failed to appoint counsel for Coughlin (Clifton doing so by asserting that he felt Coughlin was “competent” which is not

all required in such inquiring, as Coughlin, whom met the presumptive indigency thresholds in ADKT 0411, which were not rebutted,

was absolutely entitled to counsel, especially where SCR 111(6) necessarily defines NRS 199.280 as a “serious” crime, where ADKT

0411 goes above and beyond the federal protections required by Argersinger, and Scott (the violations of which here preclude

sentencing Coughlin to any jail time, or even a suspended sentence), where states are permitted to provide stronger protections for

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



individual’s rights than that required under federal law, and the State of Nevada has now done so in the indigent defense appointment

of counsel setting in requiring appointment of counsel beyond those situations wherein such is required under Scott (and where

Lindsay was never actually appointed given the voidness of Clifton’s doing so in violation of both ADKR 0411 and Coughlin’s own

clause 5/24/13 Application for Court Appoitned Co-Counsel Only Subject to the Condition that Coughlin Retain All Final Say on All

Matters, Including Control of All Means, Tactics, and Objectives Relative to His Defense (under, even where Judge Clifton had ruled

on 6/18/13 that Coughlin could obtain appointed counsel at a later time, where Coughlin’s applying for such on or before 9/24/13 was

plenty of time for such to have been effected sufficient to defeat any prejudice to the State or delay argument);

Misconduct of counsel for prosecution. The State had a duty to provide all Brady videos, and clearly, where none of the hallway

between the café bench and civil and criminal division filings offices were provide (nor any of the Sgt. Mullens interaction), the State

has violated Brady, additionally the excision of four seconds of the video of the café bench between 16:25:06 and 16:26:10 augers for

a mistrial, further the State knows full well that a justice court bailiff (much less the 911 dispatcher in 65630) is not a “public officer”,

as such RPC 3.8 was violated, in addition to RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 in maintaining the NRS 199.280 charge); Incompetency or neglect

of counsel for defense (Lindsay failed to communicate a single time with Coughlin prior to his successfully moving to Withdraw

(without sufficient written notice to Coughlin) at the 6/18/13 hearing).

Rulings on evidence (it was reversible error to refuse to allow Coughlin to ask question relative to the egregious violations of the

Admin Order by the RJC bailiffs and misconduct by the RJC clerks, especially where the State was permitted to put on such lengthy

evidence relative to the irrelevant Sgt. Mullens interaction two hours before the events in question here).;

Misconduct of prosecuting witness. RJC bailiffs Reyes, Heibert, and Ramsey continued to refuse Coughlin access to his files in

the RJC between the arrest in question and the institution of the 8/14/13 Admin Order (which is a patently invalid order as well, judges

of courts of limited jurisdiction possess no such inherent authority and “The court also may not promulgate rules in order to diminish

constitutional rights, defeat the right of litigants to access to the court, Knox v. Eighth Judicial Dist Court of State, In and For County

of Clark, 108 Nev. 354, 830 P.2D 1342 (1992).”; Misconduct of officer. (the misconduct of RJC Bailiff’s Sexton, Reyes, Ramsey,

Medina, etc. all had a prejudicial effect to Coughlin’s defense in this matter, in addition to the misconduct of the RJC clerk’s Christine

Erickson, Cathy Wood, and Robbin Baker and audio transcripts reproduction clerk “Wendy”).

To whatever extent Coughlin is view to have failed to meet the ecessity of objection at trial, the coercive abuse of the contempt

power, or threats to so abuse such, obviate the effects of any such failure; Irregularities or defects in verdict as ground for new trial.

(the incongruity and collateral bar presented by Judge Glasson ruling the Admin Order an “anti-nuisance injunction” only to acquit

Coughlin of the nuisance charge, only to convict Coughlin incident to an allegation that any alleged resisting by Coughlin was not

justified in light of Reyes’ not making an illegal arrest where such arrest was premised upon an allegation that Coughlin was violating

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



the very “anti-nuisance injunction” that Judge Glasson ruled Coughlin did not violate);

Verdict contrary to law. (Clearly, a justice court bailiff is not a “public officer”, as such Reyes actions were in no was a “legal

duty of his office”, and Coughlin necessarily could not be said to be so “resisting”;

Verdict contrary to evidence. (.5). In general. (1). Weight and sufficiency of evidence in general. (2). Failure of proof. (3).

Objections and exceptions. 936. Surprise, accident, inadvertence, or mistake. (Coughlin’s objection to the final video the State sought

to introduce was premised upon Reyes incorrect assertions as to the contents thereof, and such video clearly impeaches Reyes

testimony as to his assertion that he did not throw Coughlin over the bench and that Coughlin allegedly took a step for the door, in

addition to Reyes false assertion that Coughlin has provided Bailiff Heibert an additional set of papers (or any papers for that matter)

just prior to Bailiff Heibert leaving Coughlin at the lobby bench and Coughlin soon thereafter proceeding past the security checkpoint)

(1). In general . . (2). Mistake of counsel. (ditto as to any purported objection by Coughlin as to the final video the State sought to

introduce) (3). Absence of witness or counsel. (Cathy Reyes, and the coercive nature of the proceedings and threats of and abuse of the

contempt power precluded Coughlin from calling on direct Bailiff’s Heibert, Ramsey, Sexton, and Medina, in addition to RJC Judges

(especially Chief Judge Pearson and Judge Clifton, as well as Court Administrator Steve Tuttle) (4). Surprise as to testimony of

witness. (Reyes’ false assertions vis a vis what the final video the State introduced would show). Also, on 10/11/13 Bailiff Heibert

indicated Judge Clifton directed the return of Coughlin’s filings on 10/10/13. LEGAL ARGUMENT:

NRS 199.280. Resisting public officer A person who, in any case or under any circumstances not otherwise specially provided for, willfully resists, delays or obstructs a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his…office shall be punished:..."

I. Coughlin must be acquitted of the resisting charge as there is “case” and these are “circumstances… otherwise specially provided for,” given that RCR2013-071437 (Admin Order 2012-01) precludes application of NRS 199.280 where such “specially provides” that “any violation of this Order may be considered contempt of court and punished pursuant to NRS Chapter 22…”

The 12/20/12 Admin Order 2012-01 involved herein (apparently, not that the 5/31/13 Criminal Complaint actually specifies

such…and it was reversible error for Judge Clifton to deny Coughlin’s Motion to Dismiss/More Definite Statement in that regard on

9/24/13) reads: “…5. Any violation of this Order may be considered contempt of court and punished pursuant to NRS Chapter 22 by a

fine of up to $500 and/or incarceration for up to 25 days in the Washoe County Detention Facility. 6. This Order is effective upon

personal service upon Mr. Coughlin.”. Such provision in the Admin Order 12-01 is exactly what NRS 199.280 is referencing in

precluding an application of such thereto where such statute provides: “under any circumstances not otherwise specially provided

for,”.

Additionally, consider: PEOPLE v. LASKO, 43 Misc.2D 693 (1964):

"... A second ground for dismissal is predicated on the defendant's interpretation of the wording of section 1851 of the Penal Law embodied in the words "in any case or under any circumstances not

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



otherwise specially provided for". In this regard, he argues that the charge of assault, second degree, in this indictment is such a situation as "is specially provided for" and falls within the quoted restrictive wording of this statute (§ 1851) preventing prosecution under section 1851 as long as the assault count remains....An examination of the sections of the Penal Code adjacent to section 124 provided for situations akin to resisting arrest. Section 119 of the Penal Code prescribed penalty for making arrests without lawful authority and section 120 for misconduct in the execution of search warrants. These situations could be construed, therefore, as cases and circumstances "otherwise specially provided for" which gave to the person to be arrested the right to resist.

For it would be impossible to prosecute a person for resistance to arrest where the arresting person, himself, had violated section 119 and/or section 120. (NOTE: such sections are analogous to NRS 281.340 (where a “public officer” fails to perform legal duty of his or her office, NRS 197.110 Misconduct of public officer; NRS 197.120 False impersonation of public officer; NRS 197.130 False report by public officer; NRS 197.170 Extortion by public officer or employee; NRS 197.180 Wrongful exercise of official power; NRS 197.200 Oppression under color of office, etc.) In this sense, sections 124 in juxtaposition to sections 119 and 120 of the Penal Code would be mutually exclusive.

These latter two sections, although amended in form, have found their place in sections 1846 and 1847 of the Penal Law charging misdemeanors for making arrest without lawful authority and misconduct in executing search warrants, and willful resistance to the illegality of this type of arrest would be no violationof section 1851. For, as the arrested party has a duty to submit to a lawful and proper arrest, a conviction under section 1851 will not lie where the arrest is unlawful. (People v. Richters' Jewelers, 265 App. Div. 767, Affd. 291 N.Y. 161.) The situations mentioned in these sections (1846 and 1847) would be situations "otherwise specially provided for" in section 1851. Provided the citizen does not use more force than sufficient and necessary to resist an illegal arrest, he does have the right of resistance (People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 308; People v. McNeil, 21 A.D.2D 1) without violating section 1851, if the resistance is justified under the afore-mentioned sections, or some other appropriate section, as for example subdivision 3 of section 246 of the Penal Law.

It is significant that the questioned statute makes no provision for the "legality" of the duty that the officer is performing and situations are conceivable where the "legality" of that duty would be of the utmost importance, especially in those cases where the officer is acting illegally or exceeding the authority of his office. Resistance in these situations is permitted under section 1851 only because of the existence of the limiting clause. This analysis compels the interpretation that the questioned wording here applies to the legality of the duty of the officer that the defendant is resisting and is limited to those special statutes and circumstances which materially affect the legality of that duty, which, if found illegal, permits resistance albeit not exceeding the bounds of reasonableness and necessity. No other interpretation is consistent nor compatible with reason and authority...."

(NOTE: the sections referenced in Lasko (and compare the fact that NRS 199.280 does include the term “legal” before the

term “duty” whereas the statute in question in Lasko did not) are analogous to NRS 281.340 (where a “public officer” fails to

perform legal duty of his or her office (which could included apparent “deputy clerks” (under NRS 4.353(6)) Christine Erickson (civil

division referenced by bailiffs Ramsey and Heibert) and Robbin Baker or Cathy Wood (criminal division referenced by Reyes as to

Heibert), NRS 197.110 Misconduct of public officer; NRS 197.120 False impersonation of public officer (Bailiff Reyes’s Arrest

Report and Declaration of Probable Cause lists WCC 53.200 among the charges (though on page 2 of 5 of Reyes’s Police Report he

lists WCC 53.140 (“disturbing the peace”, which code section specifies such only applies to “neighborhoods”, though, tellingly, Reyes

identifies such code section as “Resisting, Delaying, Obstructing Peace Officer in another brazen display of the fraudulent approach

Reyes and Chief Bailiff Sexton (whom signed off on the report) take to attempting to extend the powers and jurisdiction of their

positions as employees of the justice court (to say nothing of their willful failure to do what Chief Judge Pearson has told them to do,

in a display of ingratitude that has cast a pall of impropriety over these and other proceedings in the justice court), in addition to listing

on page 3 of 5 NRS 22.100, “Contempt of Court”, which falls under Title 2 of NRS “Civil Practice”, in another clear indication that

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



RCR2013-071437’s Admin Order 2012-01 is just the sort of “case” or “circumstance” precluding the NRS 199.280 charge,

particularly before another judge, in another case...its also indicative of the extent to which Bailiff Reyes and Chief Bailiff Sexton

believe they are judges, or, at the very least in position parallel to the judges they are supervised by, which is also exhibited in the

brazen, and legion instances of these bailiffs taking it upon themselves to alter, amend, vacate, and otherwise improvise upon Admin

Order 2012-01), though Reyes excised the word “public” from the phrase “public officer” (such mirrors NRS 199.280, though is

limited to misdemeanors), where Reyes merely lists “resisting, delaying, obstructing officer” in a telling clue to the fact that Reyes

knows he is not a “public officer”; NRS 197.130 False report by public officer; NRS 197.170 Extortion by public officer or employee;

NRS 197.180 Wrongful exercise of official power; NRS 197.200 Oppression under color of office.

Coughlin further argues that, where even Judge Glasson referenced the possibility of a criminal contempt charge pursuant to NRS

199.340 (Which arguably would not be barred by double jeopardy and collateral estoppel principles incident to the acquital of Count

II) every time another section of law is violated in the same transaction that gives rise to the violation of NRS 199.280, Such other

charge is tantamount to a "case" or "circumstance" "otherwise specially provided for. All the proof adduced by the State (DDA Stege)

at trial reveals that the acts alleged against the defendant in both counts of the complaint are identical in fact and not separate and

distinct acts arising out of a single factual transaction.....Further, collateral estoppel or double jeopardy principles bar this prosecution

where RJC Chief Judge Pearson has not instituted NRS 22 contempt proceedings or any other charges against Coughlin incident to

RCR2013-071437, Admin Order 12-01.

II. Coughlin Did Not Resist

The State must be permitted to only convict Coughlin on the case it charged in its Criminal Complaint, rather than relying

upon the additional basis proffered at trial in support of the State’s theory of the case. The State’s Criminal Complaint is limited to

alleging Coughlin “-refused to comply with Bailiff Reyes' command to move to an area where the defendant had been previously

ordered by the court to remain and did then” and that Coughlin then did “physically resist Bailiff Reyes while he attempted to escort

the defendant to said designated area”

No testimony about Coughlin allegedly “taking a step” towards the door after he had been “escorted” to “said

designated area” has an relevance, nor may it factor into the analysis of whether the material element of “resisting” was

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Am. Jur. Obstructing Justice § 65. Obstructing arrest Obstructing Justice: A statute prohibiting obstructing, impairing, or perverting the administration of law may not prohibit obstruction or prevention of one's own arrest. State v. Garrison, 230 N.J. Super. 609, 554 A.2D 874 (App. Div. 1989); State v. Purdy, 491 N.W.2D 402 (N.D. 1992).

Am. Jur. Arrest IV. Manner of, and Procedure in, Making Arrests B. Force and Resistance 2. Arrest for Misdemeanor § 87. Generally An officer arresting a misdemeanant may use such force as is necessary to effect the arrest,[FN1] but may not use force disproportionate to the offense.[FN2] As a matter of constitutional law, the severity of the crime is generally considered as one of several factors as to whether an officer has used reasonable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



force to effect an arrest, including the fact that the person is only allegedly claimed to have perpetuated a misdemeanor.[FN3]. [FN1] City of Lexington v. Gray, 499 S.W.2D 72 (Ky. 1973). [FN2] Bennett v. State, 169 Ga. App. 85, 311 S.E.2D 513 (1983). [FN3] Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3D 1007 (9th Cir. 2002) (Officer's use of drawn gun at close range, pointed at the head of an unarmed misdemeanant while he was handcuffed and detained is excessive); Phillips v. City of Fairfield, 406 F. Supp. 2D 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (As suspect committed a nonviolent misdemeanor, the severity of the crime at issue weighed against the use of force); Armstead v. Township of Upper Dublin, 347 F. Supp. 2D 188 (E.D. Pa. 2004).

Am. Jur. Arrests: 3. Resistance to Illegal Arrest § 89. Generally West’s Assault and battery k67; Obstructing Justice 2, 3, 5,7, 8 A.L.R. Library What constitutes obstructing or resisting officer, in absence of actual force, 66 A.L.R.5th 397 Modern status of rules as to right to forcefully resist illegal arrest, 44 A.L.R.3D 1078

Under the common law, a citizen generally is permitted to use reasonable force to resist an illegal arrest.[FN1] However, many states have abrogated the common law by statute,[FN2] or through court holdings,[FN3] reasoning the common-law rule is no longer consistent with the needs of modern society.[FN4] The constitutionality of statutes negating the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest constitute a valid exercise of police power and do not violate due process.[FN5] In some states, an individual may not use force against a law enforcement officer seeking to arrest the individual, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful,[FN6] provided the officer is acting under color of law.[FN7] In such jurisdictions, a person may not resist arrest even where an officer lacks probable cause,[FN8] or where the officer is acting in furtherance of a law found to be unconstitutional.[FN9] However, a person may resist arrest when an officer uses excessive force to affect an arrest.[FN10]

In other states, an individual may use reasonable force to resist an attempted illegal arrest,[FN11] …The right to resist arrest may be limited to the circumstance when both the arrestor and the arrestee have reason to know that the arrest is illegal.[FN13] In other states, an individual may resist an unlawful arrest without violencein some circumstances.[FN14] When an individual is authorized to use force to resist an unlawful arrest, the resistance is limited to force that is absolutely necessary to resist the arrest,[FN15] Under other authority, an arrestee has a right to resist the arrest with all force necessary, if the arrest is unlawful,[FN16] although a physical assault on an officer is not allowed.[FN17] …When a person is authorized to resist an unlawful arrest, an individual may attempt to escape in some jurisdictions,[FN19] … CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT Cases: An individual does not have the right to resist arrest simply because probable cause is absent unless the resistance is triggered by an officer's bad faith or provocative conduct. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Adams v. Kraft, 828 F. Supp. 2D 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2011). While an individual is entitled to resist an unlawful arrest or detention, the individual is justified in using only such force as is necessary to prevent the arrest or detention, i.E., Force proportionate to the force being used in the unlawful detention. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. Walker v. State, 314 Ga. App. 67, 722 S.E.2D 887 (2012). A person being arrested has no right to use force to resist an arrest by a known police officer, even if the arrest is unlawful, unless the officer uses excessive force. People v. Sims, 374 Ill. App. 3D 427, 312 Ill. Dec. 753, 871 N.E.2D 153 (3d Dist. 2007). [END OF SUPPLEMENT]

[FN1] State v. Wiegmann, 350 Md. 585, 714 A.2D 841 (1998); Com. V. Hill, 264 Va. 541, 570 S.E.2D 805 (2002). [FN2] State v. Roy, 944 So. 2D 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3D Dist. 2006); State v. Berker, 112 R.I. 624, 314 A.2D 11 (1974). [FN3] State v. Hobson, 218 Wis. 2D 350, 577 N.W.2D 825 (1998). [FN4] Com. V. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596, 447 N.E.2D 1224 (1983). [FN5] Ford v. State, 538 S.W.2D 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). [FN6] Tillman v. State, 934 So. 2D 1263 (Fla. 2006); State v. Fritz, 163 Ohio App. 3D 276, 2005-Ohio-4736, 837 N.E.2D 823 (2d Dist. Montgomery County 2005), appeal not allowed, 108 Ohio St. 3D 1437, 2006-Ohio-421, 842 N.E.2D 63 (2006). [FN7] State v. Wright, 310 Or. 430, 799 P.2D 642 (1990). [FN8] Com. V. Lender, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 303, 847 N.E.2D 350 (2006). [FN9] State v. Miller, 172 S.W.3D 838 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 2005), Reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Aug. 30, 2005) And transfer denied, (Nov. 1, 2005).

[FN10] Resisting excessive force § 90. [FN11] State v. Ealum, 283 Ga. App. 799, 643 S.E.2D 262 (2007) (an officer who carries out an unlawful entry into a residence or conducts an unlawful arrest is not lawfully discharging his duties, and a citizen who resists an officer under such circumstances is not guilty of obstruction); City of Monroe v. Goldston, 661 So. 2D 428 (La. 1995); Barnhard v. State, 325 Md. 602, 602 A.2D 701 (1992). [FN12] Walsh v. State, 758 P.2D 124 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). [FN13] Johnson v. State, 754 So. 2D 576 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). [FN14] Livingston v. State, 610 So. 2D 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3D Dist. 1992). [FN15] Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3D 1215 (10th Cir. 2006) (Fleeing the scene of a traffic stop is prohibited). [FN16] Smith v. Holeman, 212 Ga. App. 158, 441 S.E.2D 487 (1994). [FN17] Sosebee v. State, 169 Ga. App. 370, 312 S.E.2D 853 (1983). …[FN19] Barnhard v. State, 325 Md. 602, 602 A.2D 701 (1992)...”

The Arrest Report and Declaration of Probable Cause, wherein RJC Bailiff Reyes identifies himself as "a police officer" and "declares under penalty of perjury”:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



"At approximately 1620 hrs, I ordered Zachary Coughlin to voluntarily move to the RJC front entrance lobby, to await documents he requested, after he refused several requests to do so. I placed Coughlin in a control hold to escort him to the desired location. While passing through the "magnetometer unit", Coughlin upturned it onto the floor in a willful manner, since he was resisting. When advised he was under arrest, Coughlin told me "no, you're not, I'm leaving!".

The fact that Reyes specified in his Declaration of Probable Cause only the alleged failure of Coughlin to “voluntarily move to the RJC front entrance lobby, to await documents he requested” should preclude the State from now seeking to support such charge with the testimony by Reyes that Coughlin was somehow not permitted to be in the “common area” that Reyes also feels is somehow included within those areas considered the “exculsive premises of the Reno Justice Court” under AO12-01. The Criminal Complaint specifies “to an area where the defendant had been previously ordered by the court to remain”, and the use of the term “remain” necessarily invokes the concept of Coughlin waiting for a Bailiff to return with something, rather than, as Reyesadmits, Coughlin merely “not having to go home, but you can’t stay here” theory of Coughlin somehow violating the Admin Order merely by spending any time in the area near the café bench, even where, as here, Coughlin was not then in the process of conducting any business whatsoever with the RJC at all connected to the Admin Order. Further, even if such circumstances are viewed somehow as Coughlin so violating the Admin Order, the bailiffs would too, necessarily, be in violation of the Admin Order, particularly any Bailiff whom allegedly conducted any business with Coughlin at the café bench…Of course, come time for trial, Reyes’s testimony departed noticeably in several material aspects from the assertions he made in his Narrative of 5/24/13:

"On 05/23/2013, at approx. 1620 Hrs., I went to the 1st floor in Reno Justice Court (RJC), to relieve Bailiff D. Hiebert near the front entrance to the building, directly adjacent to the "Sipriano's Cafe". Hiebert had been engaged in obtaining document requests from Zachary Coughlin, who had seated himself on one of the benches beyond the front security screening line. As I approached within approx. 20 feet of Hiebert and Coughlin,… Hiebert did leave when Ramsey and I arrived…

I asked Coughlin what he needed and he said he wanted to file a request for a report from RJC, (NOTE: this conflicts with Reyes testimony at approximately the 9:47 a.m. mark where Reyes admits he failed to ask Coughlin why he was seated at the café bench and whether Coughlin had any reason precluding him from so sitting there) so I asked him for the request. (NOTE: of course here, Reyes is basically admitting to a violation of the requirements placed upon him by the Admin Order, in addition torevealing the entrapment aspect of any such conduct by any RJC bailiffs in accosting Coughlin outside of the lobby area and requesting and or receiving materials from Coughlin in violation of the Admin Order 12-01) Coughlin refused to provide the request to me, then gave it to Ramsey, who went to the RJC Criminal Div. (NOTE: both Bailiff Heiber and Ramsey testified only to interaction relative to the civil division)…

I became aware that Coughlin, without escort and of his own volition, had passed through the security screening moments after Bailiff Hiebert walked away to fulfill Coughlin's earlier request. (NOTE: only at trial, upon a close reading of the Admin Order 2012-01, did Bailiff Reyes figure out he needed to add the part about Coughlin have provided Bailiff Heibert “a newset of papers”, as an verbal request (though not in his Narrative, Reyes initially testified that he witnessed Coughlin provideHeibert a new set of papers at the café bench, something completely contradicted by Heibert’s testimony) under the Admin Order would be inoperative at best, and certainly not a basis for attaching even the civil contempt procedures referenced therein, andfurther, would provide no basis for any RJC Bailiff to comply with an alleged verbal request by Coughlin anyways. Tellingly, Reyes fails to indicate just how he “became aware” of Coughlin’s allegedly passing through screening during some vaguely alluded to “fulfilling” of Coughlin’s “earlier request” by Bailiff Heibert…whereas at trial Reyes jumped wildly from one purported source of such information to the next upon each offering he made being rendered more implausible, completely based upon an assumption only, or impossible, even, than the next).

“…According to Olympic Screening Services Officers …Coughlin … went straight to the bench and sat down, where I found him within the building unescorted. (NOTE: actually Reyes testimony at trial was that he “found” Coughlin conversing at the café bench with both Heibert and Ramsey, and that Reyes either witnessed Coughlin pass Heibert some “new set of papers” at the café bench (need to check trial transcript on that) or that Reyes assumed the “new set of papers” in Reyes hand (how Reyes would now what was in Heibert’s hand from Reye’s previous post on the second floor is rather unclear. Regardless, Coughlin’s allegedly interacting with both bailiffs Heibert and Ramsey at such café bench is hardly unescorted, and even Reyes alternate takes of these events is accurate, it begs the question, how would Coughlin know that either Bailiff Ramsey or Heibert would approve of Coughlin moving from the café bench, as Reyes indicates Ramsey and Heibert apparently approved of receiving materials from Coughlin at such location. Coughlin would then, necessarily, be entitled in believing he need wait at the café bench where his“escorts”, had allegedly left him to wait until their return) I asked Coughlin to walk back to the area designated for him in front of the security screening line, while waiting for his RJC requests, per RJC Adnistrative Order 2012-01 and past practice. (NOTE: Reyes’ reference here to “past practice” certainly implies the bailiffs have taken to altering or amending the Admin Order as they see fit, lending credence to the reasonableness of an alleged remaining at the café bench by Coughlin until his purported “escorts” bailiffs Ramsey or Heibert should return upon processing Coughlin’s “requests”)…

Going both to whether Coughlin resisted and whether Bailiff Reyes was performing “a legal duty of his office” are the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



numerous inconsistencies in the rationale offered by Reyes (both as to his own testimony contradicting itself, and as to the testimony

of Bailiff’s Ramsey and Heibert’s contradicting Reyes’ testimony and the assertions made in the Narratives of both Heibert and

Reyes and the Declaration of Probable Cause by Reyes.

Chief amongst those material inconsistencies (which go to the credibility of these bailiffs) occur where Reyes initially

testified , at the 10:41 a.m. mark at trial, that upon his leaving his post on the second floor that he witnessed Coughlin speaking to

Heibert at the café banch, and that Heibert had a new set of paperwork that Heibert was “headed to the criminal division with”

(though Reyes story alternates between his witnessing Coughlin and Heibert interacting at the café bench, to Reyes merely coming

across Heibert in the hallway while Heibert was headed to the criminal division filing office, which, Reyes, in a last gasp hail mary

offered upon his realizing that his incorrect previous assertion as to having witness a video of Coughlin providing Heibert “a new set

of paperwork” then Coughlin failing to wait in the lobby for the return of such, was not supported by the videos). Reyes was

ultimately forced to admit that he merely “assumed” such “new set of paperwork” Heibert was carrying was provided by

Coughlin…only for Reyes to then, finally, make up a new allegation (upon Reyes realizing that Heibert has not provided testimony

supporting Reyes’ contention that Coughlin and Heibert interacted at all at the café bench (where Heibert testified that after leaving

Coughlin at the lobby bench, (no further business to be conducted where mentioning “an extra courtesy” by Heibert (ie, outside the

purview of the Admin Order, combined with Coughlin’s testimony that his business with the RJC was concluded at the point of

Heibert skulking off after providing Coughlin with stamped received copies of the document Coughlin had earlier provide, along

with more crooked gibberish out of Heibert as to what civil division Clerk Christine Erickson had told him (ie, that Coughlin did not

have any pending cases, and therefore, would be afforded no access to such files (which, of course, is yet another example of “deputy

clerk” Erickson violating NRS 281.340 to her heart’s content, in addition to her continual application of JCRRT 10 to the very

“landlord tenant matters” that JCRRT 2 makes clear are not subject to the JCRRT) that Heibert had informed Reyes in passing, in the

hallway, that he was not finished conducting business with Coughlin, but, rather, was headed to the criminal division filing office to

continue conducting some business with Coughlin.

At the 10:42 a.m. mark, Reyes testifies that Coughlin “wrote some case numbers down and gave them to Bailiff Ramsey”.

However, Bailiff Ramsey’s testimony directly contradicts this, as Ramsey testified that no such thing occurred. Further, the state

failed to provide any such “paper” with any such “case numbers” that Coughlin allegedly provided to Ramsey. Coughlin testified

that he was not in the process of conducting any business with the RJC at the time that Bailiff Reyes allegedly commanded him to

return to the lobby. Ultimately, Bailiff Reyes even backed away from his previous testimony with respect to his previous contention

that Coughlin “wrote down some case numbers and gave them to Bailiff Ramsey.” In his testimony at trial, Bailiff Reyes failed to

indicate just what he meant by “gave them to Ramsey” (ie, whether any such alleged act involved physically transferring a piece of

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



paper with such case numbers to Ramsey, or merely showing Ramsey a piece of paper with some case number thereon, but

Coughlin’s failing to transfer possession of such to Ramsey). Such hardly meets the “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof.

III. Bailiff Reyes, a justice court bailiff, is not a “public officer”

Section of criminal procedure law to effect that public officer means person elected or appointed to position which is established by Constitution or statute of state, or by charter or ordinance of political subdivision, is to be used in criminal prosecutions…”. State v. Thompson, 1973, 511 P.2D 1043, 89 Nev. 320. The 1985 revision of NRS 193.019 to append the bare term “officer” along to the previously defined alone “public officer”

leaves Nevada courts without any legal authority to support finding literally every law enforcement officer (or even 911 operator) to

be a “public officer”. All the cases purporting as much were decided prior to the 1985 revision of NRS 193.019. Bailiff Reyes is a

Category II Peace Officer under NRS 298.470, but he is not a “public officer” under any of the four instances of such term being

defined in NRS.

“A prison guard is an employee of the State of Nevada and therefore a public officer as defined by NRS 193.019. See NRS

193.010.” N.R.S. 199.280. Walker v. State, 1986, 720 P.2D 700, 102 Nev. 290. Criminal Law 795(2.30)

Again, to be clear, Walker is no longer good law in the above respect (such excerpt is not even listed amongst the Notes of

Decision on Westlaw) in light of the 1985 revisions to NRS 193.019. Indeed, all of the cases listed amongst those Notes of Decision

involve trial court decisions coming prior to the 1985 revisions to NRS 193.019, and none of those Notes of Decision (Beddow v.

State, 1977, 572 P.2D 526, 93 Nev. 619; Walker v. State, 1986, 720 P.2D 700, 102 Nev. 290; McKinnon v. State, 1980, 618 P.2D 1222,

96 Nev. 821) purport to characterize one as a “public officer” in any way other than that in which the phrase “public officer” is defined

in NRS 169.164 and or NRS 281.005, neither of which includes a justice court bailiff within the purview thereof.

Further, while a justice of the peace is clearly a public officer under NRS 281, the State’s Criminal Complaint (and even its

argumentation at trial) failed to assert Coughlin resisted a justice of the peace, but, rather, the Criminal Complaint specifically limited

the accusation to Coughlin’s allegedly having “resist(ed) a Bailiff”.

IV. Bailiff Reyes was not “discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his…office”

Further, where the 12/20/12 Administrative Order 2012-01 is patently invalid in light of its specious violations of NRS

178.600, 178.608, NRS 178.610, and NRS 178.589…Bailiff Reyes’s purporting to enforce such is not tantamount to “a legal duty” of

his office.

Further, the testimony of these three bailiffs was so contradictory of not only each other, but especially in Reye’s case, of his

own testimony, that they assertion that Reyes honestly believe Coughlin was violating the Admin Order sufficient to provoke Reyes to

purportedly engage in some act meant to “discharge any legal duty of his office” is completely unsupportable.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT. Nature and scope of remedy by arrest of judgment. Grounds for arrest of

judgment..W,s. -- In general. (1). In general. (2). Preliminary proceedings. (3). Delay in trial. (4). Want of jurisdiction. (RCR2013-

071437 jurisdiction attached therein) (S). Defects or objections as to arraignment (Coughlin does not believe he was ever

appropriately arrainged, and or that Judge Clifton is not permitted to gag Coughlin for everything except offering a plea (especially at

to Coughlin’s clause ridden Application for Co-Counsel Only, etc…and the material prejudice to Coughlin’s Motion to Dismiss in

light of the violation of Coughlin’s right to s speedy trail and the apparent waiver thereof effected by Bruce Lindsay on Coughlin’s

behalf) Plea. (6). Former jeopardy or pendency of other accusation. (7). Errors and irregularities in conduct of trial. (8). Questions of

fact. …(13). Defects in record. (Judge Clifton and RJC clerks failing to include a docket in the file, and failing to file in Coughlin’s

filings submitted during his jail stay upon his arrest between 5/23/13 and 6/9/13) 969. -- Statutory provisions. -- Defects in Complaint

(see supra), Necessity and sufficiency of allegations (see supra); Defects in or objections to verdict. (1). In general. (2). Receiving

verdict in absence of judge or defendant. (3). Verdict inconsistent with accusation. --, Matter not apparent of record in general. ‘—

Competency or Insanity of accused. (Judge Clifton ruled overly quickly on Coughlin’s NRS 178.405 motion on 9/24/13) .

WCDA Chris Hick’s 5/31/13 Criminal Complaint reads: “CRIMINAL COMPLAINT CHRIS HICKS of the County of

Washoe, State of Nevada, verifies and declares upon information and belief and under penalty of perjury, that ZACHARY BARKER

COUGHLIN, the defendant above-named, has committed the crime(s) of:

COUNT I RESISTING A PUBLIC OFFICER, a violation of NRS 199.280, A misdemeanor, in the manner following, to

wit: That the said defendant ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, on or about the 23rd day of May, 2013, at Reno Township, within

the County of Washoe, State of Nevada, did willfully and unlawfully resist a Bailiff, namely John Reyes, with Reno Justice Court, in

discharging a legal duty of his office, at 1 South Sierra Street, Reno, Washoe County, that the said defendant refused to comply with

Bailiff Reyes' command to move to an area where the defendant had been previously ordered by the court to remain and did then

physically resist Bailiff Reyes while he attempted to escort the defendant to said designated area…”

So, for Count I the State failed to prove:

- resist a Bailiff, namely John Reyes, with Reno Justice Court (ie, a justice court bailiff is not a “public officer”, as the state

failed to allege that Coughlin resisted a justice of the peaces command, but rather, that Coughlin resisted the command of a only a

justice court bailiff.

- “in discharging a legal duty of his office,”

-refused to comply with Bailiff Reyes' command to move to an area where the defendant had been previously ordered by

the court to remain and did then

-physically resist Bailiff Reyes while he attempted to escort the defendant to said designated area

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



COUNT. II NUISANCE IN BUILDING, a violation of NRS 206.140, A misdemeanor, in the manner following, to wit:

That the said defendant ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, on or about the 23rd day of May, 2013, at Reno Township, did willfully

and unlawfully commit a nuisance in a public building, to wit: the Mills. B. Lane Justice Center located at 1 South Sierra Street,

Reno, county of Washoe, State of Nevada, and did cause damage to property during said act resulting in damage to property in

excess of $250.00.”

So, the WCDA’s Chief Deputy Hick’s Criminal Complaint is limited to only NRS 206.140(1) (“commits any nuisance”) and

is thereby precluded from alleging any of the basis detailed in NRS 206.140(2)-(3). As Count II rested only upon an allegation that

“during said act” (with the only acts detailed in the complaint being those mentioned in Count I (ie, whether Hick’s was just too lazy

in his Criminal Complaint to specify some act facts or “acts” to support Count II (get ready for the WCDA’s Office to argue that

Count II’s “did willfully and unlawfully commit a nuisance” was the “said act” referenced, rather than the factual recitation specified

in Count I...which would be particularly violative of RPC 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.8 to bring a prosecution against an individual where

failing to allege a single word of factual support for the allegation that Coughlin violated did “commit a nuisiance” (ie, if the DA

chargesone with “committing a nuisance” the Criminal Complaint damn well better specify just what facts the DA feels amounted to a

nuisance...enough of this “copy and paste the statute and add a defendants name the to Complaint” routine the WCDA is so fond of

(ineffective assistance of prosecutor? Non-meritorious claims and contentions? Lack of probable cause? Here, the WCDA must face

either those charges against its own practices, or be stuck with the incongruity of Judge Glasson convicting Coughlin of resisting a

command made by a non-public officer incident to the “anti-nuisance injunction” presented by Admin Order 2012-01. Where Judge

Glasson acquitted Coughlin of Count II, issue preclusion necessarily provides that Coughlin was not guilty of either of factual

allegations in Count I (ie, that Coughlin did not -refused to comply with Bailiff Reyes' command to move to an area where the

defendant had been previously ordered by the court to remain and did then; or “-physically resist Bailiff Reyes while he attempted

to escort the defendant to said designated area”)..which arguably is improper to attempt to incorporate by reference such supporting

facts from one count to another) Judge Glasson ruled that the State failed to prove:

-refused to comply with Bailiff Reyes' command to move to an area where the defendant had been previously ordered by

the court to remain and did then

-physically resist Bailiff Reyes while he attempted to escort the defendant to said designated area

Of course, the WCDA will now argue that Hick’s 5/31/13 Complaint was referencing a singular “said act”, ie “commit a

nuisance”. Where that is the case, given Judge Glasson’s ruling that the Admin Order 2012-01 is an “anti-nuisance injunction”,

Glasson’s acquitting Coughlin of Count II also rules as unreasonable Bailiff Reyes alleged assessment that Coughlin’s sitting on the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



café bench was somehow violative of the Admin Order 2012-01 (which the Criminal Complaint merely referenced vaguely

(“previously ordered by the court”). Give such ruling by the reasonableness of any alleged “resisting” (ie, refusing to move to the

lobby and thereafter “physically resist(ing” “while (Bailiff Reyes) attempted to escort the defendant” to the lobby (ie, the completely

unsupported allegation in the Narrative from Reyes’s report that Coughlin somehow demonstrated such “resisting” by taking a step for

the door (which is plainly false upon a review of the final video Stege sought to introduce, which Coughlin actually did not necessarily

object to the admission of but merely sought an opportunity to view prior thereto (it appears Coughlin was mistaken, and that such

video was propounded by the WCDA’s Office and such video actually is the best view of Reyes’s pushing Coughlin over the lobby

bench, with Reyes’s arms clearly shown in a swaggering throwing/pushing motion in allegedly “placing” Coughlin on the lobby

bench.” Further such video (and the attachments to Coughlin’s 7/26/13 filings contain the arguments made in Coughlin’s 7/24/13

filing in 63342, which reference just such video extensively), clearly demonstrates that the metal detector was not “upturned in a

willful manner” by Coughlin as Reyes alleged in his Declaration of Probable Cause. Reyes is a liar, period, a bullying, abusive one at

that, whom abuses the color of law that he proceeds under. Coughlin’s confusion incident to DDA Stege seeking admission of the

final video was born of another lie by Reyes, it, that there existed some video showing Bailiff Heibert taking documents provided to

him by Coughlin, Heibert then retreating out of view (ostensibly to go to the filing office with such documents), and Coughlin seconds

later allegedly violating the Admin Order 2012-01 by passing through the metal detectors. Of course, the final video (which, in

violation of Brady, starts just after the point (shown on the first video, but still (though matching the time stamping up reveals the lie

by Reyes) begins only immediately after Bailiff Heibert has handed Coughlin back documents that Bailiff had taken from Coughlin

and returned to the filing office with, had stamped “received” copies made (of only the first pages thereof, in violation of the Admin

Order 2012-01’s dictate that “copies” of the entire documents Coughlin submits be provide to Coughlin), and returned to the lobby

and provided such to Coughlin.

Of course, such lie by Reyes (ie, that at any point in the day on 5/23/13 that Coughlin had provided Heibert documents in the

lobby, then failed to abide by the Admin Order 2012-01 in venturing past the security check-in prior to Heibert returning with his

documents) goes directly to the legitimacy of Reyes contention that Coughlin was in violation of the Admin Order 2012-01 and thus,

that Reyes was “performing a legal duty of his office” in “commanding” Coughlin to “return to the lobby” where the “court had

previously ordered” Coughlin.

Where witnesses Reyes, Heibert, and Ramsey have all obviously decided to excise from their “story” the contention in

Reyes’ Narrative that Coughlin somehow provided some “paper” to Ramsey at the café bench, the State is now (and notice Judge

Clifton’s reversible error in refusing to make the State specify any of these alleged facts or allegations whatsoever in the 5/31/13

Criminal Complaint (rather, Clifton’s sense of justice was satisfied with a complaint that alleged a justice court bailiff was a public

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



officer (Clifton a 25 year veteran prosecutor knows full well such is not the case…just as he did in 65630 where he found a police

officer and a 911 dispatcher to be “public officers” as well in a brazen showing of the actual bias Clifton has maintained throughout

against Coughlin) and that any alleged failure to obey any command whatsoever by such justice court bailiff (or, some vaguely

reference “previously ordered by the court” allusion such command was allegedly premised upon) provided sufficient factual support

to meet the due process requirements that such Criminal Complaint afford defendant Coughlin notice and opportunity to be heard as to

of these charges against him.

A gross material inconsistency between Bailiff Heibert and Bailiff Reyes’ testimony concerns Bailiff Heibert indicating that

he had informed Coughlin Chief Civil Clerk Erickson (whom may be a “deputy clerk” sufficient to support a NRS 281.340

prosecution against her for her rampant and continual misconduct in failing to “perform a legal duty of her office (ie, she constantly

rejects filings in “landlord tenant matters” based upon an application of JCRRT 10 where she has been fully apprised of the fact that

JCRRT 2 clearly indicates that the JCRRT do not apply to “landlord tenant matters” (similarly, deputy clerks Cathy Wood and Robbin

Baker ought also be prosecuted JCRRT 2 makes clear none of the JCRRT apply to criminal matters either) see NRS 4.350(6): “6. If

no deputy clerk is appointed for a township, the justice of the peace shall be deemed to be the clerk of the court and may appoint

as many deputy clerks for the justice court as the justice of the peace determines necessary.”

Interestingly, Chief Judge Pearson has already ruled that the RJC Bailiff are in no way functioning as clerks incident to the

Admin Order 2012-01, where he did so in response to an allegation by Coughlin that they are effectively being utilized as clerks and

violating the duties placed upon Clerks, during the very 5/23/13 hearing in RCR2011-063341 (the Court Compliance Program hearing

of 2:00 pm that day that took place approximately thirty minutes after the interaction with Sargent Mullens/detainment/placing of a

control hold on Coughlin by Bailiff Reyes, began).

So, gross material inconsistencies include Bailiff Heibert indicating that upon his returning with the only documents

Coughlin provided Heibert during the time in question on 5/23/13 that he, Heibert, informed Coughin of deputy clerk Christine

Erickson’s contention that Coughlin has “no pending cases” in the RJC’s civil division, and, therefore,would not be afforded any

access to any such files (the final video Stege sought introduction of shows Bailiff Heibert skulking off in a fit upon Coughlin waiving

some papers around to make a point about the illegality of Heibert and Erickson’s three card monty routine…something all the RJC

Bailiffs engage in with respect to “relaying” unwritten “messages” from these RJC deputy clerks, whom have an exceedingly low

level of ethics and professionalism.

Bailiff Heibert made absolutely no mention of an interaction or communication with Bailiff Reyes in the hallway on Heibert’s

way to the filing office, during the time in which Coughlin is shown venturing to the lobby bench on the final video. In fact, the time

stamping does not match up very well at all for Bailiff Reyes’s contentions in that regard, particularly in view of his testimony of what

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



he heard on the radio of while he was stationed at a post on the second floor, regarding Coughlin being in the lobby only for Reyes to

discover Coughlin seated on the café bench upon his leaving his post on the second floor (which his Narrative indicates, implausibly,

that he was doing to “relieve” Heibert, whose “shift” allegedly, “was ending” (which is dubious given Heibert testified to transporting

Coughlin to the Washoe County jail later on along with Deputy Medina (whom indicated to Coughlin that he believes a white guy like

Coughlin has a problem with a Hispanic such as himself being in a position of power over him, then indicated surprise upon Coughlin

indicating he had been in a four and a half year relationship with a Hispanic woman fairly recently…Medina also indicated that he felt

that Bailiff Reyes was, rather obviously, also “white”, like Coughlin.

Further, Reyes failed to “mention” this alleged communication between himself and Heibert until Reyes’s previous story, or

stories, fell apart (ie, where Reyes indicated hes has witnessed a video showing Coughlin providing Heibert documents in the lobby,

only for Coughlin to then allegedly violate AO12-01 by venturing through the security check point prior to Heibert returning with

stamped copies of such (and, regardless, Reyes had not thought such out all that well anyways, as its not like Reyes was watching

these videos in real time), then where Reyes testified that he witnessed Heibert receiving documents from Coughlin at the café bench

prior to Reyes’s approach (something Heibert fully contradicted in his testimony where Heibert testified that after “as an extra

courtesy” skulking off (allegedly to the civil division to question deputy clerk Christine Erickson along with Deputy Ramsey…which

contradicts Reyes contention that Heibert informed him he was going, and did go, to the criminal division filing office to process some

documents that Coughlin provided to Heibert (Reyes initially indicated such document were provided by Coughlin to Heibert in the

lobby, only for Reyes to then flip his script upon being informed that no such video exists, as which point Reyes threw up his

allegation that he saw Coughlin provide Heibert documents on the café bench, and upon that being established as completely

contradicted by Heibert’s testimony and the videos of the café bench (well, not counting the four seconds that were excised from such

videos prior to their being provided to Coughlin (from 16:25:06 to 16:25:10 as, who knows what exculpating evidence those four

seconds would establish, not to mention evidence impeaching the testimony of one or more of the three bailiff witnesses (maybe it

involves one or more of them violating the duties of a “public officer”? Kinda puts Stege in a tough spot, no? Regardless, even if the

State had offered some evidence that Coughlin provided some “paper” to either Heibert or Ramsey at the café bench, its not as if

Coughlin had checked in with the security detail in the lobby and requested they summon the RJC Bailiffs pursuant to the AO12-

01…so how they Bailiffs would not be in violation of AO12-01, not to mention NRS 281.005 by alleging receiving documents or

“papers” from Coughlin at the café bench, for processing or filing, is not clear at all. What is clear is that Bailiff Ramsey testified that

he had already thrown away some documents Coughlin provided him for filing the day before, on 5/22/13, and that the State has failed

to produce any papers or documents that Coughlin allegedly provided to any bailiff on the café bench during the time in

question…meaning that either Coughlin did not do any such thing, or, that the bailiff or bailiffs again threw them away or otherwise

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



failed to maintain them in accord with Brady, the AO12-01, etc., etc.) in response to Coughlin’s waiving the stamped papers around

that Heibert had just returned to Coughlin after having taken them for stamping to the filing office (and the WCDA’s Office has

violated Brady (and Coughlin’s 7/26/13 filings made a motion for the production of such, which Judge Clifton refused, finally, at the

9/24/13 hearing) in failing to provide any of the video of the hallway between the café bench and the filing offices (both the civil

division and criminal division) where such face to face verbal communication between Reyes and Heibert would have allegedly taken

place (not to mention any recordings of the radio communications between these Bailiffs and one another and “court control”).

Heibert’s testimony clearly contradicts that of Reyes where Heibert testified at the 9:49 a.m. mark that he ventured to the civil

division filing office “as an extra courtesy” without any additional papers received from Coughlin, and that upon his exiting such, he

witnesses Reyes and Deputy Turner physically escorting Coughlin out towards the lobby. Heibert failed to testify to witnessing an

“resisting” by Coughlin during such escorting to the lobby. Deputy Ramsey can be seen in the final second of the café bench video

grabbing the papers of Coughlin’s that were left on the café bench upon Reyes attacking Coughlin (papers that decidedly were not

provided to Heibert or Ramsey in any video produced by the State) and returning them to Coughlin in the lobby, near where Reyes had

just thrown Coughlin over the lobby bench.

Deputies Turner and Stroup’s written statement both indicate that they assumed Coughlin was to be taken into custody upon

Reyes placing his hands on Coughlin at the café bench…indicating surprise at Reyes then simply attempting to physically escort

Coughlin to the lobby. Such is telling, as it is indicative of the fact that Reyes did not believe Coughlin in violation of AO12-01 upon

Coughlin’s alleged refusal to return to the lobby (which Turner indicates involved Coughlin indicating he was headed to family court),

but rather, just displays another instances of Bailiff Reyes, whom does not seem especially comfortable in his own skin, desiring to

place his hands on Coughlin, yet again (second time that time), in a domineering, top heavy manner (and remember, on 11/10/11,

Reyes already confessed to Coughlin a desire to insert objects into Coughlin’s anus, so…draw your own conclusions about what is

really driving Bailiff John Holguin Reyes here, especially considering all his whining about all the “special treatment” “Zachary”

Coughlin gets (Reyes continually referred to Coughlin as “Zachary” in his interactions with Coughlin over the last two years in the

RJC, something absolutely not one other person has done (everyone else using the more typical, less child like sounding “Zach”).

NRS 206.140 Nuisance in building; trespass upon grounds; disturbing assembly. Every person who:

1. Commits any nuisance in any building, public or private;

2. Commits any trespass upon the grounds attached thereto, or any fixtures placed thereon, or any enclosure or sidewalk

about the building; or

3. In any manner interferes with or disturbs those peaceably assembled within the building,

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



shall be guilty of a public offense proportionate to the value of any property damaged or destroyed, but in no event less than

a misdemeanor.

VERIFICATION AND DECLARATION:

1. I, Zachary Barker Coughlin declare pursuant to NRS 53.045, under penalty of perjury that this combined Supplemental

Post-Trial Motions and Declaration is true and correct and based upon my own first hand knowledge except those matters stated upon

information and belief (even where implicitly so stated), and as to those matters, I believe them to be true

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social security number of

any person.

DATED 10/17/13

/s/ Zach Coughlin, signed electronically

Zach Coughlin

Pro Per Self Representing Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE:

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I do hereby certify that, on this date, I, Zach Coughlin I deposited in the United States mail at Reno, Nevada, in a sealed envelope, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document and or electronically served (via electronic method of transmission previously given express permission to utilize by those with requisite authority to provide it, upon which Couglin reasonably relied and or relies), Mikohn satisfactory, and NRS 178.590 facsimiled prior to 5 pm and personally delivered to wcda too:

AMOS R. STEGE, ESQ. ZACHARY N. YOUNG, ESQ. Washoe County DA Office Address: 1 South Sierra P.O. Box 30083 Reno, NV 89520 Phone Number: 775-328-3200 Fax number: 775-325-6703 Email: [email protected] DATED THIS: Dated this 10/17/2013

/s/ Zach Coughlin

Zah Coughlin, Defendant

INDEX TO EXHIBITS:

Exhibit 1: Various relevant materials on a cd/dvd/discovery already propounded

In disc form and found at skydrive links

Exhibit 1:

1. Exhibit 1: Various relevant materials on a cd/dvd/discovery already propounded and 69 page 10/18/13 Declaration of Zachary Coughlin will be filed as a separate document in support of this filing.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



https://skydrive.live.com/redir?resid=43084638F32F5F28!9135

https://skydrive.live.com/redir?resid=43084638F32F5F28!8413

10 21 13 72675 Supplemental Post-trial Motions and Supporting Declaration Bw

Documents

Transcript of 10 21 13 72675 Supplemental Post-trial Motions and Supporting Declaration Bw