10 2 12 063341 Email to RJC Tuttle Et Al Problem With the File in RCR2011-063341 Buried Half a Sheet...

7/28/2019 10 2 12 063341 Email to RJC Tuttle Et Al Problem With the File in RCR2011-063341 Buried Half a Sheet Paper on

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problem with the file in RCR2011-063341

From: Zach Coughlin([email protected])Sent: Tue 10/02/12 10:25 PM

To: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; [email protected]

Dear Clerk of Court Tuttle,

Today, I was reviewing my file in RCR 2011-063341 and found that a half sheet of paper directedowards the extent to whether or not the August 29th, 2012 court date was merely for a Hearing onhe Motion to Suppress, or, in fact, a "Trial" date, especially in relation to the Order as rendered by

Judge Sferrazza at the previous Trial date on July 16th, 2011. I maintain that the August 29th, 2012date was never intended to be a "Trial" date, and that Judge Sferrazza rendered such an Order on July16th, 2012, something I have bitterly disagreed with my public defender, Jim Leslie about, andwhom was not present on July 16th, 2012 (Jeremy Bosler showed up for Joe Goodnight that Mondaymorning, despite the fact that Joe had videoconferenced with my at 4pm on the previous Friday andndicated he would be there the following Monday morning for Trial...only to have Bosler show up

out of the blue, refuse to tell me why Joe was taken off the case, then force Jim Leslie on me, whom have not gotten along with at all since he and I first me in October of 2011. Anyways, the half

sheet of paper in the file that I am referring to also had two handwritten post-it notes curiouslyattached to the back of it (only a truly obsessive person would have noticed this, and unfortunately

for some involved here...) that spoke to all three of the matters, in handwritten notation of my threecases RCR2011-065630, RCR2012-067980, and RCR2012-065630) as well as the extent to whichhe August 29th, 2012 date would, in fact be a trial. I am placing you non a LITIGATION HOLD

NOTICE with respect to the positioning and orientation and content of that half sheet of paper andhose two post-it notes in that file for RCR2011-063341, especially with respect to the fact that it

was placed before the May 2012 filings and documentation in that matter...whic is awfully curiousgiven the extent to which that setting has become a subject of debate and the fact that the post its andhat half sheet were only created, necessarily, after the July 16th, 2012 Trial in RCR2011-063341,hat was continued, and in the hallway, at the RJC counter, after I had been returned to custody, in

response to Judge Sferrazza's indication on the record that DDA Young and Jim Leslie shoudl meetand confer in the hallway, off the record, and pick a date for the Hearing on the the Motion toSuppress (as Judge Sferrazza pointed out it would not be prudent to force Trial Witnesses to show upon August 29th, 2011 should Coughlin's Motion to Suppress be granted, in which case a Trial wouldikely be unnecessary). While I am not telling you I have a picture or other documentation of the

placement and content of this half sheet of paper and two post-it notes in the file in RCR2011-063341, I am placing the RJC ON A LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE with respect to the mattersdetailed herein and politely requesting that you provide me with some such proof thereof.

Further problematic in that file is the extent to which the docket misdates several key filings,


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especially where the misdating is helpful to DDA Youngs case and the defense of any professionalmisconduct violation he ultimately may need defend against. To wit, the Amended CriminalComplaint is listed as having a filing date of August 24th, 2011, while the Amended CriminalComplaint was actually filed December 5th, 2011, an in my estimation was only filed in retaliationand the charge added violates RPC 3.8 in that it lacks probable cause and is also likely duplicative

and or presenting a "double jeopardy" violation) to the Motion for Sanctions I filed, or attempted tofile, on or about November 26th, 2011. I ask that the docket be corrected in that regard. Further,upon broaching the subject of the extent to which Judge Sferrazza had already rendered an Orderspecifying the August 29th, 2012 court date as merely devoted to a Hearing on the Motion to

Suppress, Judge Sferrazza (in addressing my due process concerns for the lack of notice attendant toJim Leslie apparently converting it to a hurry up Trial) alleged to have entered an "Order" on August9th,2012 (very soon after, coincidentally to the August 6th, 2012 Hearing for which the PublicDefender's Office, in either Leslie or Biray Dogan (counsel for me, along with Leslie, apparently, inRCR2012-065630 completely failed to notice me on in any way...likely due to the date picked byDDA Young and Mr. Bosler in the hallway after I was taken back into custody not being noticed tome in the customary manner of a tear off slip of paper from a public defender and also where JimLeslie's legal assistant, Linda Gray, has admitted to me that no notice was mailed to me respecting

he August 6th, 2012 Hearing in RCR2012-067980 and RCR2012-065630 in light of her Office'smistaken belief that PO BOX 3961, Reno, NV 89505 was no longer my "valid address". I never

made any indication that my address had changed, and the Public Defender's Office failed to mail menotice or provide a tear off slip regarding the hearing date picked by Bosler and Young and curiouslyburied in the filed the records thereof in RCR2011-063341, with post-it notes placed on the back of ahalf sheet of paper.) Respecting the alleged Order or "Notice" that Judge Sferrazza mentionedentering on August 9th, 2012, which he indicated made clear specified or clarified that the August29th, 2012 court date was indeed a Trial date, I saw that "Order" or "Notice" today upon reviewinghe file. It was a post-it note, handwritten, attached to my February 14th, 2012 (filed stamped

February 15th, 2012) Pre-Trial Motions filing (consisting of 101 pages of the Pre-Trial Motion and

77 pages worth of Exhibit 1). I asked for the filing office clerk to make me copies of certain thingsfrom the file today, yet the half page with two post-it notes affixed to the back of the half page I refer

o above were not copied or included by the clerk despite her agreeing to copy the pages I marked forcopying, and the cover page of my February 14th (filestamped February 15th, 2012) Pre-TrialMotion, with Judge Sferrazza's August 9th, 2012 "Notice" (as listed in the Docket for RCR2011-063341 under August 9th, 2012, as a "Notice") were note copied for me. The RJC Bailiffs rushed malong and told me you had entered an Order limiting my access to justice to ten minutes, even wherehere was no other individuals in the line at the filing office, and where I protested that the the most

salient and materials pages of those few I requested copied, were curiously missing. I ask that theRJC please fax or email me the half page with two post it notes on the back thereof (placed before

he May 2012 filings in RCR2011-063341 that I refer to above) in addition to th August 9th, 2011"Notice" by Judge Sferrazza (on a post-it handwritten note on the cover page of my February 15th,

2012 filestamped Pre-Trial Motion). Incidentally, that August 9th, 2012 dated post-it handwrittennote did not specify that the August 29th, 2012 court date was for a Trial, it merely indicated that myFebruary 15th, 2012 Pre-Trial Motion would be disposed of along with other pre-trial motions onAugust 29th, 2012, just as Judge Sferrazza rendered in an Order on the record, on July 16th, 2012 inRCR2011-063341.

am requesting the RJC provide me a copy of or retain under a LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE the


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audio and any records of the August 6th, 2011 "combo hearing" (my public defenders think so muchof the MSC rules that they combo-pack mine, two and three cases at a time, in hearings that theydon't even notice me on in any way...) Dogan and Leslie refuse to provide me a copy of the audio fohat hearing, and Leslie provides evasive answers as to whether Dogan was even at that combo-

hearing, while Dogan indicates the hearing did not occur in a court room (much like my September10th, 2011 hearing in RCR2011-063341, where Carl Hylin, through a "counter motion" obtained anOrder for Competency Evaluation that purported to be entered in response to a "motion by counsel".Lastly, Birary Dogan and DDA Young. Further, Jim Leslie refused to reset or vacate the September18th, 2012 Trial date he set on August 6th, 2012 in RCR2012-067980 despite it being clear that his

Office failed to send me any notice of the August 6th court date in that case, and it was only due toMr. Leslie's attempt to buy some time to figure out how to get out of the malpractice andprofessional misconduct stew he has created, some might say, in RCR2011-063341 by way of havingme subjected to a third Order for Competency Evaluation that I was able to avoid going to trial onhat "false statement to a public officer" charge in RCR2012-067980, which involved an alleged

failure on my part to do something or some alleged false statement I made while having the metaloverhead door to my rental at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive saw-zalled open by Deputy Machen of theWCSO, in connection with an Summary Eviction Order that was issued despite my advance notice to

he RJC that I submitted for filing a Tenant's Affidavit or Answer in Sparks Justice Court in light ofhe specifying of the forum for the Tenant to file such a tenant's answer (as required by law under

NRS 40.253, the landlord or his "agent" must set forth the forum to file a Tenant's Answer in the 5day Notice for Unlawful Detainer, found in the attached emails below to the RJC, and Chief CivilClerk Stancil, wherein such defective a 5 day notice was drafted by one committing the unauthorizedpractice of law for Nevada Court Services, and "eviction consulting and process service" businesscomprised of non-laywers who dress up like Sheriffs, and even cross the bar and argue before RJCJudges, like in RJC Rev2012-001048. Oh, and there is the fact that Nevada Court Services processserver, R. Wray, filed a false affidavit, attesting to personally serving me a 5 day unlawful detainernotice on June 14th, 2012 when he was met only with a metal garage door and a room with no

windows to serve the Notice to. R. Wray's lying in a sworn affidavit cut short by 3 days my time tofile a Tenant's Affidavit (and arguably, given the listing of Sparks Justice Court as the forum to file

he Notice, I didn't even need file one in the RJC). And, in light of my chosen profession and thedictates of SCR 111(6), even a misdemeanor like "false statement to a public officer", even in thecontext of such a retaliatory prosecution devoid of probable cause and based upon a void SummaryEviction Order, or one that should have declared void to the extent the RJC Judge presiding over theHearing on the Motion to Set Aside said Order indicated today that such matters are only properlydetermined by the Legislature...well, a conviction in that matter, would likely end my law career.And Jim Leslie describes his decision to not seek to vacate or reset the September 17th, 2012 Trialdate in that case, RCR2012-067980, which he made on August 6th, 2012 at a combo-pack MSC that

his assistant Linda Gray admits I was not provided notice of in any way, as an "executive decision"hat he made.

One last thing, the docket in RCR2011-063341 is further incorrect in that it fails to detail the extento which DDA Young violated NRS 178.405 by filing, with a filestamp time of 2:55 pm an

Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Appear as Co-Counsel despite the fact that DDA Young and

my public defender Biray Dogan, in RCR2012-065630 met in a clandestine status conference onFebruary 27th, 2012 at 1:30 pm, despite the fact that on February 24th, 2012 (and the files documents


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his as well) that very MSC was continued until March 29th, 2012 in light of a scheduling conflictattendant to the fact that I had a traffic citation trial involving myself in the RMC on that very day,February 27th, 2012 in 11 TR 26800 set for 1:00 pm. Judge Nash Holmes admits to communicationswith those involved in that clandestine, unnoticed, violating of attorney client privelege, February27th, 2012 MSC in RCR2012-065630 involving Dogan and DDA Young. However, that did not,apparently, despite the dicates of NRS 178.405, stop Judge Nash Holmes from continuing on with theraffic citation Trial minutes later in 11 TR 26800, wherein she sentenced me to 5 days in jail, and

denied a stay to me despite my then representing client's as a lawyer in time sensitive matters, findingme guilty of "summary criminal contempt" (which I had to report to the United States Patent and

Trademark Office and State Bar of Nevada as a SCR 111 criminal conviction). PLEASE BEAWARE I AM PLACING YOU AND THE RJC ON A LITIGATION HOLD NOTICE WITHRESPECT TO ANY MATERIALS BARING IN ANY WAY ON THAT CLANDESTINEFEBRUARY 27TH, 2012 STATUS CONFERENCE INVOLVING DDA YOUNG AND BIRAYDOGAN. Curiously, the Order for Competency Evaluation was signed by Judge Clifton, but theRJC's file and docket therein indicate that Judge Schroeder presided over the 2/27/12 1:30 pm StatusConference, despite the fact that the files indicates such a conference was reset, on 2/24/12 to3/29/12...I have ordered the audio from that 2/27/12 1:30 pm status conference in RCR2012-065630

from the RJC, yet it has not been provided. Please email it to me or provide it otherwise. Speakingof the extent to which Judge Nash Holmes continued on to conduct the Trial in 11 TR 26800 despite

he 2/29/12 Order for Competency Evaluation signed by Judge Clifton and file stamped 1:31 pm,despite the statutory dictate that "the other departments" "shall suspend any other proceedings relatingo the defendant until to defendant is determined to be competent", found in NRS 178.405, DDA

Young himself violated NRS 178.405 in that his 2/29/12 Opposition to Defendant's Motion toAppear as Co-counsel bares a file stamp of 2:55 pm. Please correct the docket in this regard, as welas revising it to reflect all of my filings, which were all file stamped, yet are not indicated on thedocket, especially the Notice of Appearance I filed, while I was still a licensed attorney, in additiono any Substitutions of Counsel I filed so very long ago (no matter what DDA Young tries to argue

about how "untimely" my attempts to be rid of the public defenders obstructive presence are).

Sincerely,

Zach Coughlin

Zach Coughlin

PO BOX 3961

Reno, NV 89505


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Tel 775 338 8118

Fax 949 667 7402

[email protected]

FW: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice Court

7/02/12

Zach CoughlZach Coughlin

[email protected]

To [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected],[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected],[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]:Zach Coughlin([email protected])

Sent: Mon 7/02/12 5:21 PM

To:

[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]

2 attachments (total 1164.6 KB)

combined ...pdfDownload(1086.2 KB)

Download all as zipNOrthwind and Nevada Court Services served and "amended 5 day notice of unlawful detainer onJuly 29th, 2012"...giving me five days to get my stuff out of unit 29 (the one the subject of JudgeSchroeer's Eviction Order, which was effectively rescinded by their serving a new 5 day unlawfuldetainer notice....) as well as units 71 and 45...whicih are two units to which i still have valide leaseagreements, ie, I cannot be trespassing for accessing them (the Reno PD has indicated they will arrestme for criminal trespass for accessing any units in the complex, including those to which I still havea valid possessory or property interest, in violation of 42 usc 1983).
mailto:[email protected]://bay148.mail.live.com/default.aspx?id=64855#https://bay148.mail.live.com/default.aspx?id=64855#https://bay148.mail.live.com/default.aspx?id=64855#https://bay148.mail.live.com/default.aspx?id=64855#https://bay148.mail.live.com/default.aspx?id=64855#https://bay148.mail.live.com/default.aspx?id=64855#mailto:[email protected]


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why does Sargent Miller have to give me a hard time? Isn't it enough for him to have his "Denzel"good looks and a much higher paying job than I will ever have? What up wit that?

Northwind and Nevada Court Services (which is practicing eviction law without a license) screwedup and put "Sparks Justice Court on Greenbrae" as the place for the tenant to file a Tenan'ts Answeror Affidavit. Doing so will make the RJC Order by Judge Schroeder null and void (Karen Stancil,Chief Civil Clerk at RJC admits this, but really, the fault lies with NCS and Northwind, not thecommitted professional at the RJC).

The Notice must identify the Court with jurisdiction. NRS 40.253(3)(a). ONe cannot be trespassing in a placwewhere they have a valid reason for being or a lawful right to be. NRS 207.200, RMC 8.10.040.

n

Aikins v. Andrews, 91 Nev. 746, 542 P.2d 734 (1975), the Supreme COUli construed the

predecessor statute to NRS 40.2516 to mean that the alternative five (5) day notice must be given

6

before the tenants can be dispossed and a lease can be validly terminated. The court stated that this

five (5) day notice requirement " ... neither can be waved nor neglected." 91 Nev. at 748.

tp://www.constitution.org/ussc/506-056a.htm

U.S. Supreme CourtSOLDAL v. COOK COUNTY, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)

506 U.S. 56 SOLDAL, ET UX. v. COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS ET AL.CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUITNo. 91-6516

Argued October 5, 1992Decided December 8, 1992

While evictionproceedings were pending, Terrace Properties and Margaret Hale forcibly evicted

petitioners, the Soldal family, and their mobile home from a Terrace Properties' mobile home park.At Hale's request, Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff's Department deputies were present at the eviction.Although they knew that there was no eviction order and that Terrace Properties' actions were illegal,he deputies refused to take Mr. Soldal's complaint for criminal trespass or otherwise interfere withhe eviction. Subsequently, the state judge assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the

eviction had been unauthorized, and the trailer, badly damaged during the eviction, was returned to

he lot. Petitioners brought an action in the Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiminghat Terrace Properties and Hale had conspired with the deputy sheriffs to unreasonably seize and

remove their home in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court granted


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defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Acknowledging thatwhat had occurred was a "seizure" in the literal sense of the word, the court reasoned that it was not aseizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment because, inter alia, it did not invade petitioners'privacy.Held:

The seizureand removal of the trailer home implicated petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights. Pp. 61-72.

(a) A "seizure" of property occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with anindividual's possessory interests in that property." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.109, 113. The language of the Fourth Amendment - which protects people fromunreasonable searches and seizures of "their persons, houses, papers, and effects" - cutsagainst the novel holding below, and this Court's cases unmistakably hold that theAmendment protects property even where privacy or liberty is not implicated. See, e.g.,ibid.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350. This Court's "plain view" decisions alsomake untenable the lower court's construction of the Amendment. If the Amendment's

boundaries were defined exclusively by rights of privacy, "plain view" seizures, rather

than being scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry, Arizona v. Hicks, 480U.S. 321, 326-327, would not implicate that constitutional provision at all. Contrary tothe Court of Appeals' [506 U.S. 56, 57]position, the Amendment protects seizure even thoughno search within its meaning has taken place. See, e.g., Jacobsen, supra, at 120-125. Also

contrary to that court's view, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, does not require a court,when it finds that a wrong implicates more than one constitutional command, to look atthe dominant character of the challenged conduct to determine under which constitutionalstandardit should be evaluated. Rather, each constitutional provision is examined inturn. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517. Pp. 61-71.(b) The instant decision should not foment a wave of new litigation in the federal courts.

Activities such as repossessions or attachments, if they involve entering a home, intrudingon individuals' privacy, or interfering with their liberty, would implicate the FourthAmendment even on the Court of Appeals' own terms. And numerous seizures of this typewill survive constitutional scrutiny on "reasonableness" grounds. Moreover, it is unlikelythat the police will often choose to further an enterprise knowing that it is contrary to thelaw, or proceed to seize property in the absence of objectively reasonable grounds for

doing so. Pp. 71-72.

942 F.2d 1073, reversed and remanded.WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

John L. Stainthorp argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners.Kenneth L. Gillis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Jack O'Malley, ReneeG. Goldfarb, and Kenneth T. McCurry. [*]

Footnote *] James D. Holzhauer, Timothy S. Bishop, John A. Powell, Steven R. Shapiro, HarveyM. Grossman, and Alan K. Chen filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amicicuriae urging reversal.Richard Ruda, Carter G. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, and Mark E. Haddad filed a brief for the Nationa

League of Cities et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
http://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=466&invol=109#113http://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=466&invol=109#113http://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=389&invol=347#350http://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=480&invol=321#326http://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=480&invol=321#326http://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=490&invol=386http://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=468&invol=517http://www.constitution.org/ussc/506-056a.htm#f%2ahttp://www.constitution.org/ussc/506-056a.htm#t%2ahttp://www.constitution.org/ussc/506-056a.htm#t%2ahttp://www.constitution.org/ussc/506-056a.htm#f%2ahttp://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=468&invol=517http://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=490&invol=386http://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=480&invol=321#326http://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=480&invol=321#326http://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=389&invol=347#350http://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=466&invol=109#113http://www.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=466&invol=109#113


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I

Edward Soldal and his family resided in their trailer home, which was located on a rented lot in theWilloway Terrace mobile [506 U.S. 56, 58]home park in Elk Grove, Illinois. In May 1987, TerraceProperties, the owner of the park, and Margaret Hale, its manager, filed an eviction proceedingagainst the Soldals in an Illinois state court. Under the Illinois Forcible Entry and DetainerAct,ll.Rev.Stat., ch. 110, 9-101 et seq. (1991), a tenant cannot be dispossessed absent a judgment of

eviction. The suit was dismissed on June 2, 1987. A few months later, in August 1987, the ownerbrought a second proceeding of eviction, claiming nonpayment of rent. The case was set for trial onSeptember 22, 1987.Rather than await judgment in their favor, Terrace Properties and Hale, contrary to Illinois law, choseo evict the Soldals forcibly two weeks prior to the scheduled hearing. On September 4, Hale notifiedhe Cook County's Sheriff's Department that she was going to remove the trailer home from the park,

and requested the presence of sheriff deputies to forestall any possible resistance. Later that day, twoTerrace Properties employees arrived at the Soldals' home accompanied by Cook County DeputySheriff O'Neil. The employees proceeded to wrench the sewer and water connections off the side ofhe trailer home, disconnect the phone, tear off the trailer's canopy and skirting, and hook the home to

a tractor. Meanwhile, O'Neil explained to Edward Soldal that "`he was there to see that [Soldal]didn't interfere with [Willoway's] work.'" Brief for Petitioner 6.By this time, two more deputy sheriffs had arrived at the scene, and Soldal told them that he wishedo file a complaint for criminal trespass. They referred him to deputy Lieutenant Jones, who was in

Hale's office. Jones asked Soldal to wait outside while he remained closeted with Hale and otherTerrace Properties employees for over 20 minutes. After talking to a district attorney and makingSoldal wait another half hour, Jones told Soldal that he would not accept a complaint because "`itwas between the landlord and the tenant ... [and] they were going to go ahead and continue to move506 U.S. 56, 59]out the trailer.'" Id., at 8. 1Throughout this period, the deputy sheriffs knew that Terrace

Properties did not have an eviction order and that its actions were unlawful. Eventually, and in thepresence of an additional two deputy sheriffs, the Willoway workers pulled the trailer free of itsmoorings and towed it onto the street. Later, it was hauled to a neighboring property.On September 9, the state judge assigned to the pending eviction proceedings ruled that the evictionhad been unauthorized, and ordered Terrace Properties to return the Soldals' home to the lot. The

home, however, was badly damaged. [2]The Soldals brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983,alleging a violation of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. They claimed thatTerrace Properties and Hale had conspired with Cook County deputy sheriffs to unreasonably seizeand remove the Soldals' trailer home. The District Judge granted defendants' motion for summaryudgment on the grounds that the Soldals had failed to adduce any evidence to support their

conspiracy theory and, therefore, the existence of state action necessary under 1983. [3]The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, construing the facts in petitioners' favor, accepted theircontention that there was state action. However, it went on to hold that [506 U.S. 56, 60]the removal ofhe Soldals' trailer did not constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment or a deprivation

of due process for purposes of the Fourteenth.

On rehearing, a majority of the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reaffirmed the panel decision. [4]

Acknowledging that what had occurred was a "seizure" in the literal sense of the word, the courtreasoned that, because it was not made in the course of public law enforcement, and because it didnot invade the Soldals' privacy, it was not a seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. 942
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F.2d 1073, 1076 (1991). Interpreting prior cases of this Court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that,absent interference with privacy or liberty, a "pure deprivation of property" is not cognizable underhe Fourth Amendment. Id., at 1078-1079. Rather, petitioners' property interests were protected only

by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. [5]We granted certiorari to consider whether the seizure and removal of the Soldals' trailer home

mplicated their Fourth Amendment rights, 503 U.S. 918(1992), and now reverse. [6][506 U.S. 56, 61]

II

The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Ker v. California, 374 U.S.23, 30(1963), provides in pertinent part that the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated... ."A "seizure" of property, we have explained, occurs when "there is some meaningful interference withan individual's possessory interests in that property." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 1131984). In addition, we have emphasized that "at the very core" of the Fourth Amendment "stands the

right of a man to retreat into his own home." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511(1961).See also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-179 (1984); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,316(1971); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601(1980).As a result of the state action in this case, the Soldals' domicile was not only seized, it literally wascarried away, giving new meaning to the term "mobile home." We fail to see how being

unceremoniously dispossessed of one's home in the manner alleged to have occurred here can beviewed as anything but a seizure invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Whether theAmendment was in fact [506 U.S. 56, 62]violated is, of course, a different question that requiresdetermining if the seizure was reasonable. That inquiry entails the weighing of various factors, and isnot before us.The Court if Appeals recognized that there had been a seizure, but concluded that it was a seizure

only in a "technical" sense, not within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This conclusionfollowed from a narrow reading of the Amendment, which the court construed to safeguard onlyprivacy and liberty interests, while leaving unprotected possessory interests where neither privacy noriberty was at stake. Otherwise, the court said,

"a constitutional provision enacted two centuries ago [would] make every repossession andeviction with police assistance actionable under - of all things - the Fourth Amendment[,which] would both trivialize the amendment and gratuitously shift a large body of routinecommercial litigation from the state courts to the federal courts. That trivializing, thisshift, can be prevented by recognizing the difference between possessory and privacy

interests." 942 F.2d, at 1077.

Because the officers had not entered Soldal's house, rummaged through his possessions, or, in theCourt of Appeals' view, interfered with his liberty in the course of the eviction, the FourthAmendment offered no protection against the "grave deprivation" of property that had occurred. Ibid.We do not agree with this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment protects thepeople from unreasonable searches and seizures of "their persons, houses, papers, and effects." Thisanguage surely cuts against the novel holding below, and our cases unmistakably hold that the

Amendment protects property as well as privacy. [7]This much [506 U.S. 56, 63]was made clear in
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Jacobsen, supra, where we explained that the first Clause of the Fourth Amendment

"protects two types of expectations, one involving "searches," the other "seizures." A"search" occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to considerreasonable is infringed. A "seizure" of property occurs where there is some meaningful

interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." 466 U.S., at 113

(footnote omitted).

See also id., at 120; Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133(1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,328(1987); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469(1985); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747-7481983) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91, n. 61980). Thus, having concluded that chemical testing of powder found in a package did not

compromise its owner's privacy, the Court in Jacobsen did not put an end to its inquiry, as would be

required under the view adopted by the Court of Appeals and advocated by respondents. Instead,adhering to the teachings of United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696(1983), it went on to determine

whether the invasion of the owners' "possessory interests" occasioned by the destruction of thepowder was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Jacobsen, supra, at 124-125. In Place, althoughwe found that subjecting luggage to a "dog sniff" did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendmentpurposes because it did not compromise any privacy interest, taking custody of Place's suitcase wasdeemed an unlawful seizure, for it unreasonably infringed "the suspect's possessory interest in hisuggage." 462 U.S., at 708. 8Although lacking a privacy component, the property rights in bothnstances nonetheless were not [506 U.S. 56, 64]disregarded, but rather were afforded Fourth Amendment

protection.Respondents rely principally on precedents such as Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347(1967),Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294(1967), and Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.583(1974), to demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment is only marginally concerned with propertyrights. But the message of those cases is that property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth

Amendment violations. The Warden opinion thus observed, citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.257(1960), and Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505(1961), that the "principal" object of the

Amendment is the protection of privacy, rather than property, and that "this shift in emphasis fromproperty to privacy has come about through a subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform."387 U.S., at 304. There was no suggestion that this shift in emphasis had snuffed out the previouslyrecognized protection for property under the Fourth Amendment. Katz, in declaring violative of theFourth Amendment the unwarranted overhearing of a telephone booth conversation, effectively endedany lingering notions that the protection of privacy depended on trespass into a protected area. In thecourse of its decision, the Katz Court stated that the Fourth Amendment can neither be translated intoa provision dealing with constitutionally protected areas nor into a general constitutional right to

privacy. The Amendment, the Court said, protects individual privacy against certain kinds ofgovernmental intrusion, "but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy atall." 389 U.S., at 350.As for Cardwell, a plurality of this Court held in that case that the Fourth Amendment did not bar theuse in evidence of paint scrapings taken from and tire treads observed on the defendant's automobile,which had been seized in a parking lot and towed to a police lockup. Gathering this evidence was not

deemed to be a search, for nothing from the [506 U.S. 56, 65]interior of the car and "no personal effects,which the Fourth Amendment traditionally has been deemed to protect" were searched or seized. 417

U.S., at 591(opinion of BLACKMUN, J.). No meaningful privacy rights were invaded. But this left
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he argument, pressed by the dissent, that the evidence gathered was the product of a warrantless, andhence illegal, seizure of the car from the parking lot where the defendant had left it. However, theplurality was of the view that, because, under the circumstances of the case, there was probable causeo seize the car as an instrumentality of the crime, Fourth Amendment precedent permitted the seizure

without a warrant. Id., at 593. Thus, both the plurality and dissenting Justices considered thedefendant's auto deserving of Fourth Amendment protection even though privacy interests were not astake. They differed only in the degree of protection that the Amendment demanded.The Court of Appeals appeared to find more specific support for confining the protection of theFourth Amendment to privacy interests in our decision in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517(1984).There, a state prison inmate sued, claiming that prison guards had entered his cell without consentand had seized and destroyed some of his personal effects. We ruled that an inmate, because of his

status, enjoyed neither a right to privacy in his cell nor protection against unreasonable seizures of hispersonal effects. Id., at 526-528, and n. 8; id., at 538 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Whatever else thecase held, it is of limited usefulness outside the prison context with respect to the coverage of theFourth Amendment.We thus are unconvinced that any of the Court's prior cases supports the view that the FourthAmendment protects against unreasonable seizures of property only where privacy or liberty is also

mplicated. What is more, our "plain view" decisions make untenable such a construction of theAmendment. Suppose, for example, that police officers lawfully enter a house, by either complyingwith the warrant requirement or satisfying one of its recognized exceptions - [506 U.S. 56, 66] e.g.,hrough a valid consent or a showing of exigent circumstances. If they come across some item in

plain view and seize it, no invasion of personal privacy has occurred. Horton, 496 U.S., at 133-134;Brown, supra, at 739 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). If the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment weredefined exclusively by rights of privacy, "plain view" seizures would not implicate that constitutionalprovision at all. Yet, far from being automatically upheld, "plain view" seizures have been

scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry. Thus, in the absence of consent or a warrantpermitting the seizure of the items in question, such seizures can be justified only if they meet the

probable-cause standard, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-327 (1987), 9and if they areunaccompanied by unlawful trespass, Horton, 496 U.S., at 136-137. 10That is because, the absenceof a privacy interest notwithstanding, "[a] seizure of the article ... would obviously invade the owner'spossessory interest." Id., at 134; see also Brown, 460 U.S., at 739(opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). Theplain-view doctrine "merely reflects an application of the Fourth Amendment's central requirement ofreasonableness to the law governing seizures of property." Ibid.; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403U.S. 443, 468(1971); id., at 516 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting).The Court of Appeals understandably found it necessary to reconcile its holding with our recognitionn the plain-view cases that the Fourth Amendment protects property as such. In so doing, the court

did not distinguish this case on the ground that the seizure of the Soldals' home took place in a [506U.S. 56, 67]noncriminal context. Indeed, it acknowledged what is evident from our precedents - that theAmendment's protection applies in the civil context as well. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 7091987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334-335 (1985); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504506 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-313 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court

of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528(1967). 11

Nor did the Court of Appeals suggest that the Fourth Amendment applied exclusively to lawenforcement activities. It observed, for example, that the Amendment's protection would be triggered"by a search or other entry into the home incident to an eviction or repossession," 942 F.2d, at 1077.12Instead, the court sought to explain why the Fourth Amendment protects against seizures of
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property in the plain-view context, but not in this case, as follows:

"[S]eizures made in the course of investigations by police or other law enforcementofficers are almost always, as in the plain view cases, the culmination of searches. The

police search in order to seize, and it is the search [506 U.S. 56, 68]and ensuing seizure thatthe Fourth Amendment, by its reference to "searches and seizures," seeks to regulate.

Seizure means one thing when it is the outcome of a search; it may mean something elsewhen it stands apart from a search or any other investigative activity. The Fourth

Amendment may still nominally apply, but, precisely because there is no invasion ofprivacy, the usual rules do not apply." Id., at 1079 (emphasis in original).

We have difficulty with this passage. The court seemingly construes the Amendment to protect only

against seizures that are the outcome of a search. But our cases are to the contrary, and hold thatseizures of property are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though no search within themeaning of the Amendment has taken place. See, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S., at 120-125; Place, 462

U.S., at 706-707; Cardwell, 417 U.S., at 588-589. 13More generally, an officer who happens tocome across an individual's property in a public area could seize it only if Fourth Amendmentstandards are satisfied - for example, if the items are evidence of a crime or contraband. Cf. Payton vNew York, [506 U.S. 56, 69]445 U.S., at 587. We are also puzzled by the last sentence of the excerpt,where the court announces that the "usual rules" of the Fourth Amendment are inapplicable if theseizure is not the result of a search or any other investigative activity "precisely because there is nonvasion of privacy." For the plain-view cases clearly state that, notwithstanding the absence of anynterference with privacy, seizures of effects that are not authorized by a warrant are reasonable only

because there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity. The seizure of theweapons in Horton, for example, occurred in the midst of a search, yet we emphasized that it did not"involve any invasion of privacy." 496 U.S., at 133. In short, our statement that such seizures mustsatisfy the Fourth Amendment and will be deemed reasonable only if the item's incriminating

character is "immediately apparent," id., at 136-137, is at odds with the Court of Appeals' approach.The Court of Appeals' effort is both interesting and creative, but, at bottom, it simply reasserts theearlier thesis that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy, but not property. We remain unconvinced,and see no justification for departing from our prior cases. In our view, the reason why an officermight enter a house or effectuate a seizure is wholly irrelevant to the threshold question whether theAmendment applies. What matters is the intrusion on the people's security from governmentalnterference. Therefore, the right against unreasonable seizures would be no less transgressed if the

seizure of the house was undertaken to collect evidence, verify compliance with a housing regulation,effect an eviction by the police, or on a whim, for no reason at all. As we have observed on morehan one occasion, it would be "anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully

protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."Camara 387 U.S., at 530; see also O'Connor, 480 U.S., at 715; T.L.O., 469 U.S., at 335. [506 U.S. 56,70]

The Court of Appeals also stated that, even if, contrary to its previous rulings, "there is some elementor tincture of a Fourth Amendment seizure, it cannot carry the day for the Soldals." 942 F.2d, at1080. Relying on our decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386(1989), the court reasoned that itshould look at the "dominant character of the conduct challenged in a section 1983 case [to]

determine the constitutional standard under which it is evaluated." 942 F.2d, at 1080. Believing thathe Soldals' claim was more akin to a challenge against the deprivation of property without due
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process of law than against an unreasonable seizure, the court concluded that they should not beallowed to bring their suit under the guise of the Fourth Amendment.But we see no basis for doling out constitutional protections in such fashion. Certain wrongs affectmore than a single right, and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution'scommands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying, as apreliminary matter, the claim's "dominant" character. Rather, we examine each constitutionalprovision in turn. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517(1984) (Fourth Amendment andFourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651(1977) (EighthAmendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause). Graham is not to the contrary. Itsholding was that claims of excessive use of force should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment'sreasonableness standard, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process test. We

were guided by the fact that, in that case, both provisions targeted the same sort of governmentalconduct and, as a result, we chose the more "explicit textual source of constitutional protection" overhe "more generalized notion of `substantive due process.'" 490 U.S., at 394-395. Surely, Graham

does not bar resort in this case to the Fourth Amendment's specific protection for "houses, papers,506 U.S. 56, 71]and effects," rather than the general protection of property in the Due Process Clause.

III

Respondents are fearful, as was the Court of Appeals, that applying the Fourth Amendment in thiscontext inevitably will carry it into territory unknown and unforeseen: routine repossessions,negligent actions of public employees that interfere with individuals' right to enjoy their homes, andhe like, thereby federalizing areas of law traditionally the concern of the States. For several reasons,

we think the risk is exaggerated. To begin, our decision will have no impact on activities such as

repossessions or attachments if they involve entry into the home, intrusion on individuals' privacy, ornterference with their liberty, because they would implicate the Fourth Amendment even on the

Court of Appeals' own terms. This was true of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Specht, with which, as

we previously noted, the Court of Appeals expressed agreement.More significantly, "reasonableness is still the ultimate standard" under the Fourth Amendment,Camara, supra, at 539, which means that numerous seizures of this type will survive constitutionalscrutiny. As is true in other circumstances, the reasonableness determination will reflect a "carefulbalancing of governmental and private interests." T.L.O., supra, at 341. Assuming, for example, thathe officers were acting pursuant to a court order, as in Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516 (CA10

1987), or Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, (1972), and, as often would be the case, a showing ofunreasonableness on these facts would be a laborious task indeed. Cf. Simms v. Slacum, 3 Cranch300, 301 (1806). Hence, while there is no guarantee against the filing of frivolous suits, had theejection in this case properly awaited the state court's judgment, it is quite unlikely that the federalcourt would have been bothered with a 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment violation. [506 U.S.

6, 72]

Moreover, we doubt that the police will often choose to further an enterprise knowing that it is

contrary to the law, or proceed to seize property in the absence of objectively reasonable grounds fordoing so. In short, our reaffirmance of Fourth Amendment principles today should not foment a waveof new litigation in the federal courts.

IV
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The complaint here alleges that respondents, acting under color of state law, dispossessed the Soldalsof their trailer home by physically tearing it from its foundation and towing it to another lot. Takinghese allegations as true, this was no "garden variety" landlord-tenant or commercial dispute. The

facts alleged suffice to constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, for theyplainly implicate the interests protected by that provision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is,accordingly, reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

Footnotes

1] Jones' statement was prompted by a district attorney's advice that no criminal charges could bebrought because, under Illinois law, a criminal action cannot be used to determine the right ofpossession. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, 9-101 et seq. (1991); People v. Evans, 163 Ill.App. 3d 561, 114ll.Dec. 662, 516 N.E.2d 817 (1st Dist. 1987).2] The Soldals ultimately were evicted per court order in December 1987.

3] Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides that:

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, ofany State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to thedeprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress."

4] The court reiterated the panel's conclusion that a conspiracy must be assumed on the state of therecord and, therefore, that the case must be treated in its current posture "as if the deputy sheriffs

hemselves seized the trailer, disconnected it from the utilities, and towed it away." 942 F.2d 1073,1075 (CA7 1991) (en banc).5] The court noted that, in light of the existence of adequate judicial remedies under state law, a

claim for deprivation of property without due process of law was unlikely to succeed. Id., at 1075-1076. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527(1981). In any event, the Soldals did not claim a violationof their procedural rights. As noted, the Seventh Circuit also held that respondents had not violatedhe Soldals' substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners assert thathis was error, but, in view of our disposition of the case, we need not address the question at this

ime.6] Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Soldals were required to establish that the respondents, acting under

color of state law, deprived them of a constitutional right, in this instance, their Fourth andFourteenth Amendment freedom from unreasonable seizures by the State. See Monroe v. Pape, [506U.S. 56, 61] 365 U.S. 167, 184(1961). Respondents request that we affirm on the ground that the Courtof Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient state action to support a 1983 action. The allegednjury to the Soldals, it is urged, was inflicted by private parties for whom the county is not

responsible. Although respondents did not cross-petition, they are entitled to ask us to affirm on thatground if such action would not enlarge the judgment of the Court of Appeals in their favor. TheCourt of Appeals found that, because the police prevented Soldal from using reasonable force toprotect his home from private action that the officers knew was illegal, there was sufficient evidence
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of conspiracy between the private parties and the officers to foreclose summary judgment forrespondents. We are not inclined to review that holding. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.144, 152-161 (1970).7] In holding that the Fourth Amendment's reach extends to property as such, we are mindful thathe Amendment does not protect possessory interests in all kinds of property. See, e.g., Oliver v.

United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-177 (1984). This case, however, concerns a house, which theAmendment's language explicitly includes, as it does a person's effects.8] Place also found that to detain luggage for 90 minutes was an unreasonable deprivation of thendividual's "liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary," which also is protected by the Fourth

Amendment. 462 U.S., at 708-710.9] When "operational necessities" exist, seizures can be justified on less than probable cause. 480

U.S., at 327. That in no way affects our analysis, for even then it is clear that the Fourth Amendment

applies. Ibid; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, at 703 (1983).10] Of course, if the police officers' presence in the home itself entailed a violation of the Fourth

Amendment, no amount of probable cause to believe that an item in plain view constitutesncriminating evidence will justify its seizure. Horton, 496 U.S., at 136-137.11] It is true that Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856), cast

some doubt on the applicability of the Amendment to noncriminal encounters such as this. Id., 18How. at 285. But cases since that time have shed a different light, making clear that FourthAmendment guarantees are triggered by governmental searches and seizures "without regard to theuse to which [houses, papers, and effects] are applied." Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden,387 U.S. 294, 301(1967). Murray's Lessee's broad statement that the Fourth Amendment "has noreference to civil proceedings for the recovery of debt" arguably only meant that the warrantrequirement did not apply, as was suggested in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338,352(1977). Whatever its proper reading, we reaffirm today our basic understanding that theprotection against unreasonable searches and seizures fully applies in the civil context.12] This was the view expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Specht v. Jensen,

832 F.2d 1516 (1987), remanded on unrelated grounds, 853 F.2d 805 (1988) (en banc), with whichhe Seventh Circuit expressly agreed. 942 F.2d, at 1076.13] The officers in these cases were engaged in law enforcement, and were looking for somethinghat was found and seized. In this broad sense, the seizures were the result of "searches," but not inhe Fourth Amendment sense. That the Court of Appeals might have been suggesting that the plain-

view cases are explainable because they almost always occur in the course of law enforcementactivities receives some support from the penultimate sentence of the quoted passage, where the courtstates that the word "seizure" might lose its usual meaning "when it stands apart from a search or anyother investigative activity." Id., at 1079 (emphasis added). And, in the following paragraph, itobserves that, "[o]utside of the law enforcement area, the Fourth Amendment retains its force as a

protection against searches, because they invade privacy. That is why we decline to confine theamendment to the law enforcement setting." Id., at 1079-1080. Even if the court meant that seizuresof property in the course of law enforcement activities, whether civil or criminal, implicate interestssafeguarded by the Fourth Amendment, but that pure property interests are unprotected in the non-aw-enforcement setting, we are not in accord, as indicated in the body of this opinion. [506 U.S. 56, 73]
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Zach Coughlin

PO BOX 3961

Reno, NV 89505

Tel 775 338 8118

Fax 949 667 7402

[email protected]

From: [email protected]: [email protected]: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice CourtDate: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 09:10:14 -0700

Dear Civil Supervisor Hansen

Zach Coughlin

PO BOX 3961

Reno, NV 89505

Tel 775 338 8118

Fax 949 667 7402

[email protected]

Dear Sparks Justice Court,

called and received permission to file this by fax...I am indigent and request a fee waiver, and failinghat, an opportunity to cure any filing fee deficiency.

From: [email protected]: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];[email protected]; [email protected]: Reno eviction noticed for Sparks Justice CourtDate: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 07:58:36 -0700

Dear Sparks Justice Court, WCSO, RPD, and Reno Justice Court.

have received (though not personally served) what appears to be an eviction notice (5 day unlawful


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detainer?) for rentals located at 1680 Sky Mountain Drive, Reno, 89523, but the notice indicates that Imust file a Tenant's Answer with the Sparks Justice Court.

Am I mistaken in viewing this matter to be outside the jurisdiction of the Sparks Justice Court, andrather, a matter to be handled in Reno Justice Court?

Given Sparks Justice Court is open 5 days a week (closes at noon on Fridays) and Reno Justice Courthas 4 judicial days a week, the deadline for filing a special appearance (to contest jurisdiction) and or aTenant's Answer of Affidavit is difficult to measure.

spoke with a Reno Police Department who identified himself as Sargent Miller last week and hendicated the WCSO planned to come effectuate an eviction on this date, June 26, 2012. I believe thatwould be premature, as Nevada Landlord Tenant law provides for filing a Tenant's Answer or Affidavitby noon after the fifth fullday (judicial days) and Fridays in Sparks Justice Court are not full daysinhat sense, and regardless, Sparks Justice Court, I believe, is not the appropriate forum where, as here,he situs is located in Reno (Ward 1-nap?)

Sincerely,

Zach CoughlinPO BOX 3961

Reno, NV 89505el 775 338 8118ax 949 667 7403

Civil Division

630 Greenbrae DriveSparks, Nevada 89431775)353.7603 Phone775)352.3004 Fax

Civil Department SupervisorChris [email protected]

The Civil Division of Sparks Justice Court is made up of three major functions:CivilCivil Complaints for damages in excess of $5000 or if a suit involves a breach of contract, punitivedamages, an action to obtain possession of property, a writ of restitution, or other like actions, legalcounsel is suggested for these types of actions.EvictionsAn act or process of legally dispossessing a person of land or rental property.Small ClaimsAn action filed in order to obtain a monetary judgment. Claims must not exceed $5000. A small claimsaction may be filed with the Sparks Justice Court if one of the following applies to the defendant:

1. They reside within the boundaries of the Sparks Township;
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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2. They are employed within the boundaries of the Sparks Township; and/or,3. They do business within the boundaries of the Sparks Township.

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