KNOWLEDGE CREATION AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE Chapter #4.
10-1 Chapter 10 – Corporate Governance. 10-2 Knowledge Objectives Studying this chapter should...
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Transcript of 10-1 Chapter 10 – Corporate Governance. 10-2 Knowledge Objectives Studying this chapter should...
10-1
Chapter 10 –Corporate Governance
10-2
Knowledge ObjectivesStudying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to:
1. Explain why ownership has been largely separated from managerial control in the modern corporation.
2. Define an agency relationship and managerial opportunism and describe their strategic implications.
3. Explain how three internal governance mechanisms – ownership concentration, the board of directors, and executive compensation – are used to monitor and control managerial decisions.
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Knowledge Objectives – cont’dStudying this chapter should provide you with the strategic management knowledge needed to:
4. Describe how the external corporate governance mechanism – the market for corporate control – acts as a restraint on top-level managers’ strategic decisions.
5. Discuss the use of corporate governance in international settings, in particular in Germany and Japan.
10-4
The Strategic Management Process
Chapter 10Corporate
Governance
Chapter 11OrganizationalStructure and
Controls
Chapter 13Strategic
Entrepreneurship
Strategy Implementation
10-5
Agenda1. Introduction to Corporate Governance
2. Internal Governance Mechanisms
3. External Governance Mechanisms
4. International Corporate Governance
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Problem: Backdating Options…
Sources: The Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2006: A6;Business Week, June 26, 2006: 40.
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… and its Consequences
Source: The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2006: A16.
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Separation of Ownership & ControlBasis of the modern corporation
Shareholders purchase stock, becoming “residual claimants”
Shareholders reduce risk by holding diversified portfolios
Professional managers are contracted to provide decision making
Modern public corporation form leads to efficient specialization of tasks:
Risk bearing by shareholders
Strategy development and decision making by managers
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Agency Relationship
hire
and create
NB: Agency relationship NB: Agency relationship also exists e.g. between also exists e.g. between senior managers and senior managers and employees!employees!
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Examples of the Agency ProblemProduct diversification
Increased size, and relationship of size to managerial compensation
Reduction of managerial employment risk
Use of Free Cash Flows
Managers prefer to invest these funds in additional product diversification (see above)
Shareholders prefer the funds as dividends so they control how the funds are invested
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Manager and Shareholder Risk and Diversification
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Agency Problems & CostsShareholders lack direct control of large, publicly traded corporations
Principal and agent have divergent interests and goals
Agent makes decisions that result in the pursuit of goals that conflict with those of the principal
It is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify that the agent has behaved appropriately
Agent falls prey to managerial perquisites and managerial opportunism
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Managerial OpportunismThe seeking of self-interest with guile (cunning or deceit)
Managerial opportunism is:
An attitude (inclination)
A set of behaviors (specific acts of self-interest)
Managerial opportunism prevents the maximization of shareholder wealth (the primary goal of principals)
Principals do not know beforehand which agents will or will not act opportunistically
Principals establish governance and control mechanisms to prevent managerial opportunism
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Agenda1. Introduction to Corporate Governance
2. Internal Governance Mechanisms
3. External Governance Mechanisms
4. International Corporate Governance
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Governance MechanismsLarge block shareholders have
a strong incentive to monitor management closely:
Their large stakes make it worth their while to spend time, effort, and expense to monitor closely
They may also obtain Board seats which enhances their ability to monitor effectively
The increasing influence of institutional owners (mutual funds and pension funds)
OwnershipOwnershipConcentrationConcentration
•Relative amounts of stock owned by individual shareholders andinstitutional investors
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Governance Mechanisms – cont’d
Board of directors
Group of elected individuals that acts in the owners’ interests to formally monitor and control the firm’s top-level executives
Board has the power to:
Direct the affairs of the organization
Punish and reward managers
Protect owners from managerial opportunism
OwnershipOwnershipConcentrationConcentration
Board of DirectorsBoard of Directors(a)(a)
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Governance Mechanisms – cont’d
Composition of Boards:
Insiders: the firm’s CEO and other top-level managers
Related Outsiders: individuals uninvolved with day-to-day operations, but who have a relationship with the firm
Outsiders: individuals who are independent of the firm’s day-to-day operations and other relationships
OwnershipOwnershipConcentrationConcentration
Board of DirectorsBoard of Directors(b)(b)
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Governance Mechanisms – cont’d
Enhancing the effectiveness of boards and directors:
More diversity in the backgrounds of board members
Stronger internal management and accounting control systems
More formal processes to evaluate the board’s performance
Adopting “lead director”
Changes in compensation of directors
OwnershipOwnershipConcentrationConcentration
Board of DirectorsBoard of Directors(c)(c)
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Exercise: Enron’s BoardEvaluate the quality of the Enron Board based on the information handed out by the instructor.
With the available information, how would you assess the effectiveness of the monitoring and control roles of each director?
What general guidelines would you suggest that might improve the corporate governance function of Boards?
http://www.boeing.com/corp_gov/corp_gov_principles.html (07/01/2007)
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Governance Mechanisms – cont’d
Forms of compensation:
Salary, bonuses, long-term performance incentives, stock awards, stock options
Factors complicating executive compensation:
Strategic decisions by top-level managers are complex, non-routine and affect the firm over an extended period
Other variables affecting the firm’s performance over time
OwnershipOwnershipConcentrationConcentration
Board of DirectorsBoard of Directors
ExecutiveExecutiveCompensation (a)Compensation (a)
•Use of compensation as incentive to align managers’ interests with shareholders’ interests
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Governance Mechanisms – cont’d
Limits on the effectiveness of executive compensation:
Unintended consequences of stock options
Firm performance not as important as firm size
Balance sheet not showing executive wealth
Options not expensed at the time they are awarded
OwnershipOwnershipConcentrationConcentration
Board of DirectorsBoard of Directors
ExecutiveExecutiveCompensation (b)Compensation (b)
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Agenda1. Introduction to Corporate Governance
2. Internal Governance Mechanisms
3. External Governance Mechanisms
4. International Corporate Governance
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Governance Mechanisms – cont’d
Individuals and firms buy or take over undervalued corporations
Ineffective managers are usually replaced in such takeovers
Threat of takeover may lead firm to operate more efficiently
Changes in regulations have made hostile takeovers difficult
Market forMarket forCorporate Control (a)Corporate Control (a)
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Governance Mechanisms – cont’d
Managerial defense tactics increase the costs of mounting a takeover
Defense tactics may require:
Asset restructuring
Changes in the financial structure of the firm
Shareholder approval
Market for corporate control lacks the precision of internal governance mechanisms
Market forMarket forCorporate Control (b)Corporate Control (b)
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Example – Carl IcahnTactics: Taking a big stake in the companyand then agitate to
break up the company to unlock value for shareholders (Time Warner, KT&G)
merge its two boards (Royal Dutch/Shell)
force Germany’s stock exchange to merge with other markets in Europe
Source: The Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2006.
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Agenda1. Introduction to Corporate Governance
2. Internal Governance Mechanisms
3. External Governance Mechanisms
4. International Corporate Governance
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International Corporate GovernanceGermany
Owner and manager are often the same in private firms
Public firms often have a dominant shareholder, frequently a bank
Frequently there is less emphasis on shareholder value than in U.S. firms, although this may be changing
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Responsible for the functions Responsible for the functions of direction and of direction and management management
Responsible for appointing Responsible for appointing members to the Vorstandmembers to the Vorstand
Responsible for appointing Responsible for appointing members to the Aufsichtsratmembers to the Aufsichtsrat
International Corporate Governance
VorstandVorstand
AufsichtsratAufsichtsrat
Employees Union Employees Union members members
ShareholdersShareholders
Germany: (Two-tiered Board)Germany: (Two-tiered Board)
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International Corporate GovernanceJapan
Important governance factors:
• Obligation
• “Family”
• Consensus
Banks (especially “main bank”) are highly influential with firm’s managers
Keiretsus: strongly interrelated groups of firms tied together by cross-shareholdings
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International Corporate GovernanceJapan – cont’d
Other governance characteristics:
• Powerful government intervention
• Close relationships between firms and government sectors
• Passive and stable shareholders who exert little control
• Virtual absence of external market for corporate control