1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT...

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISIONCASE NO. 10-MD-02183-SEITZ

IN RE: BRICAN AMERICA, LLC, Miami, Florida

EQUIPMENT LEASE LITIGATION September 4, 2014

10:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.

Pages 1 to 95______________________________________________________________

STATUS CONFERENCEBEFORE THE HONORABLE PATRICIA A. SEITZ,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

FOR PETER M. RONALD PENDL GOSSETT, ESQ.BLAUZVERN, et al.: ROBERT GOSSETT, ESQ.

GOSSETT & GOSSETT4700 Sheridan Street, Building IHollywood, Florida 33021

FOR STEVEN WIGDOR, DAVID H. CHARLIP, ESQ.et al.: CHARLIP LAW GROUP, LLC

17501 Biscayne BoulevardSuite 501Aventura, Florida 33160

FOR NCMIC FINANCE PHILIP A. NEMECEK, ESQ.CORPORATION: MICHAEL I. VERDE, ESQ.

KATTEN, MUCHIN, ROSENMAN, LLP575 Madison AvenueNew York, New York 10022

CATHERINE RODRIGUEZ, ESQ.FILLER RODRIGUEZ, LLP1688 Meridian Avenue, Suite 900Miami Beach, Florida 33139

Case 1:10-md-02183-PAS Document 580 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/16/2014 of 95

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REPORTED BY: LISA EDWARDS, RDR, CRROfficial Court ReporterUnited States District Court400 North Miami AvenueTwelfth FloorMiami, Florida 33128(305) 523-5499


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THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Case No. 10-2183MD-Seitz, Brican

America, LLC, Equipment Lease Litigation.

Counsel, please state your appearances for the record.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Ronald P. Gossett on behalf of the

Blauzvern Plaintiffs.

MR. ROBERT GOSSETT: Robert Gossett for the Blauzvern

Plaintiffs.

MR. CHARLIP: David Charlip, Wigdor Plaintiffs.

MR. VERDE: Michael Verde for Defendant, NCMIC.

MR. NEMECEK: Philip Nemecek, also for NCMIC.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Catherine Rodriguez on behalf of NCMIC.

THE COURT: And I see Mr. Cole in the back. He doesn't

have to sit back there, you know.

Please have a seat, everyone.

Thank you very much for the papers you filed. Having

read the papers, I'm satisfied that we don't need additional

argument on the motion for reconsideration.

Based on the parties' papers, everyone has always

agreed that the statute applies, but NCMIC makes some

legitimate points. And I will redraft the holder in due course

analysis and issue amended findings of facts and conclusions of

law.

However, the ultimate decision and conclusion that it

is not a holder in due course as to the particular Plaintiffs

will remain the same. I believe that you will see that -- I


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went back and read the opinion and I agree with you. It was

not well articulated.

And I can see why you were concerned about things that

I didn't intend to convey and that weren't the basis for the

decision. But I think that I can clarify the basis for the

Court's decision and particularly the relevance of the co-filer

testimony.

But, for now, the parties should proceed on the basis

of the existing findings of facts and conclusions of law. I

will probably be able to get the amended decision out before

the end of this month.

Looking at the proposed next steps, I saw a couple of

discrete issues that I'd like to talk to the parties about.

First, I see that the Plaintiff mentions that there is

an issue of attorneys' fees. But I don't see any basis for the

Plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees. There was no contract,

no statute and no class.

So what is the basis for your claim for attorneys'

fees?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: In the lease agreements, Judge,

there is a one-way fee-shifting provision to NCMIC and, under

57.105, that becomes reciprocal.

THE COURT: The Plaintiff isn't there yet. I mean,

we've got the reliance issues. And for more than half of the

Plaintiffs, they're out of luck.


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MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Yes, ma'am. I think it's less

than half. But, yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: And my recollection is that your retainer

agreement with your clients is each one contributed $1,000 to

the pool?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: At the beginning. Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: And I presume you've been keeping time

sheets and things like that.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I most certainly have.

THE COURT: How much -- just as a matter of -- if you

don't want me to put this on the record, that's fine.

How much have both sides spent in the way of attorneys'

fees thus far.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: My Plaintiffs have spent five and

a half million dollars.

THE COURT: How did that happen?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Well, the time slips show that. I

mean, it's the amount of work that went into this.

THE COURT: How much has the Defendant spent?

MR. VERDE: I don't have an exact number, but I believe

we've spent closer to three. It might be a little bit more

than that.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I'm sorry. I didn't hear the

answer.

MR. VERDE: Closer to three, maybe more than three. I


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don't have an exact number right now.

THE COURT: I'm feeling very shocked and guilty. This

case has got to come to an end. I don't know how much you all

want to continue to spend on attorneys' fees, but I just don't

see the benefits for the continuation of what you all have

outlined.

Let me look at the two issues. One are the

counterclaims by the Defendant and the other are the problems

that the Plaintiff has on the reliance issues.

Mr. Verde, what is the legal basis for a contribution

claim here? As I looked at the allegations, it said only if

NCMIC was held liable. But NCMIC is not liable for anything.

So what is the basis for contribution?

MR. VERDE: At the time we wrote that, your Honor, we

had claims for money damages that the Plaintiffs had brought

against us. That was one of the many theories in this case,

that there was a claim for money damages.

We also put that in since the Court is dealing with the

declaratory judgment action, declaring the rights of all the

parties. What we expected was that there would be -- it would

be more efficient in the course of hearing all the testimony.

Again, this being put in at the beginning -- this case

has changed substantive many times over since then. We thought

it would make -- if we were going to have significant testimony

from the Plaintiffs, that we could get those issues dispensed


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with now rather than go back to Iowa with the potential for

money judgments and then have to do it all over again and get

all the Plaintiffs to come into Iowa.

That still seems to make the most sense. If we're

going to have the Plaintiffs testify, it wouldn't be that much

of a burden to also ask those Plaintiffs who were referring

doctors or who received referrals what they understood, what

they said and what they were told.

THE COURT: And this is the 274 Plaintiffs?

MR. VERDE: Well, it's more like 650 that are still

viable Plaintiffs -- I'm sorry -- that did the referrals. Yes.

I'm sorry. Yes.

THE COURT: Right. Okay.

As I looked at the parties' submissions as to how we go

forward here and Plaintiff gives me a proposed judgment that

refers to Exhibits A, B and C and D and then I don't get A, B,

C and D, I'm now looking at -- how do we figure out which

Plaintiffs are in which group, which are out, which may -- but

I still don't see how a contribution claim is going to exist.

You would sort of have to concede you were a joint

tortfeasor here to get contribution besides the fact that a

contribution is a joint tortfeasor saying, "Okay. I may have

done something to contribute to this, but you also contributed

to it. And so, therefore, you need to make the payment."

So assuming we get by the initial question of how is


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there a contribution claim if you are not liable to pay

anything --

MR. VERDE: Right.

THE COURT: -- because the finding is simply that you

cannot -- if the Plaintiff proves reliance, that you're not a

holder in due course.

MR. VERDE: I take your point, your Honor. But we

still have Brican itself as a viable Defendant here. And

Brican is represented by a trustee. And I don't want to be

subject to a claim by the Brican trustee without having taken

all the steps to protect ourselves.

THE COURT: So maybe I should come back and then look

at the Plaintiffs' claims against Brican.

With all due respect -- I recognize we're all lawyers,

we've got to cross the Ts, dot the Is, provide for all

contingencies -- but at the end of the day, how is the

Plaintiff going to collect from Brican?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: If we have a judgment against

Mr. Vincent, he owns property in the Caribbean Island that he

paid $14 million for. We will execute on that property.

THE COURT: So what -- there's a default already?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: There is not.

THE COURT: So how much time is this going to take to

bring to conclusion?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Well, I doubt very much more time


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because, as I said in my filings, we are working on a motion

for summary judgment against the Brican Defendant based upon

the testimony you've already heard.

Now, they were excused from participating in trial.

They will need to come up with summary judgment evidence to

defeat ours, and I don't think they'll be able to.

THE COURT: But that doesn't have anything to do with

Mr. Verde.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: It does not.

THE COURT: You were saying that you are going to move

to dismiss the contribution claim. I don't want just to have

briefing on this. I want to have argument right now.

Tell me what are the grounds for dismissing the

contribution claim. Let's flesh it out right now so that, if

Mr. Verde is going to pursue it, then it's at least in the

proper pleading stage.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: May I have a minute to review what

I've done already?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Thank you, your Honor.

The first step is what the Court's already pointed out.

The Court's findings of fact and conclusion of law does not

impose any liability on NCMIC, thus NCMIC has nothing to pursue

in its counterclaims by the way of contribution.

Further, in the discovery phase of the MDL action,


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NCMIC completed discovery on some of the counterclaims, asking

some of the counterclaim Defendants what their interaction was

with the doctors they referred the program to.

THE COURT: Which Plaintiffs were those, or

Counterdefendants?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I don't remember off the top of my

head, but I can find those.

But of those that were asked, it was simply a matter

of, "I gave the salesperson names of friends of mine who were

dentists," for instance, "and she took those names. And the

contact I had with those people, if any, was simply to tell

them that she would be contacting them and they should meet

with her."

There was no interaction between the doctors where the

doctor was attempting to sell any of the Brican equipment to

the second doctor, the referred doctor.

Those were -- your Honor, you asked me who they were,

and I do have that list now. Michael Barbieri in his

deposition transcript at Page 70, Lines 5 through 21.

Dr. Peter Blauzvern. There are several portions of his

deposition: Page 21, Line 8, to Page 22, Line 2; Page 29,

Line 15, to Page 30, Line 3; Page 30, Line 17 --

THE COURT: Just list the --

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Okay. The next is Dr. Yuri Elias.

The next is Dr. Sharon Haas.


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The next is Dr. Angela Johnson.

The next is Dr. Kenneth Korpan.

THE COURT: How do you spell that?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: K-o-r-p-a-n.

The next is Dr. Donald Neumann.

And the last one is Dr. Vijay -- V-i-j-a-y -- Patel.

THE COURT: Did the Defendant choose those eight as

sort of a representative sample or did the Plaintiff provide

them as a representative sample for the counterclaim? How were

those eight chosen?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Defendants chose whom they wanted

to depose. And I believe they were chosen because those that

were -- those Plaintiffs which were deposed were initially

proposed as class representatives.

THE COURT: And, of these, which ones are still viable

Plaintiffs? Are there any on this list that have been

foreclosed because they are the three-column lease with

Versions No. 1 through 4 or No. 6?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: It'll take me a second to answer

that, but I can answer that in just a minute.

Dr. Barbieri is a one-column lease and Marketing

Version 5. So he's still a Plaintiff who has prevailed.

THE COURT: How about Blauzvern?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I believe Blauzvern is as well,

your Honor.


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THE COURT: So's a one-column.

And which version?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: That I'm finding.

It's 5. Marketing Version 5.

THE COURT: Elias?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Elias, I believe, is Mr. Charlip's

client and I -- no. I'm sorry. I do have his information

here.

One-column lease, Marketing Version 5.

THE COURT: Haas?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I believe that Sharon Haas is a

Brican Financial Plaintiff. So she is not involved at all with

NCMIC.

THE COURT: So she's out?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: No.

THE COURT: Her claim is only against Brican?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Brican Financial Services. Yes,

ma'am.

THE COURT: So she's -- as far as the Plaintiff is

concerned, they're proceeding against her?

MR. ROBERT GOSSETT: As far as the Defendants, your

Honor?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: NCMIC has no relationship to

Dr. Haas whatsoever.

THE COURT: Where did she get her loan from?


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MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Brican Financial Services.

THE COURT: And who had that?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: That was done after the cutoff of

funding --

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: -- when Brican kept selling and

used some of its money to fund --

THE COURT: So she's not really as part of -- okay.

I've got it.

Angela Johnson?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: She is a one-column lease,

Marketing Version 4.

THE COURT: Okay. Korpan?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: One-column lease, Marketing

Version 8.

THE COURT: Neumann?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Is that your client, David?

MR. CHARLIP: Yes.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I don't have the information for

Donald Neumann about that.

Do you have that handy?

MR. CHARLIP: I'll check.

One column. Version 8.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: And then the last is Vijay Patel,

who was a former Catanzarite client, now my client, and he has


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one column and Marketing Agreement 5.

THE COURT: I read a number of 50 or 60 --

19 depositions the Defendants took.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Your Honor, if I could put this in

context, we did discovery shortly after the Plaintiffs had

agreed and you had ordered this would be a paper case only.

At that point, it looked like what was being said as a

sales pitch was really not going to be relevant to this case

anymore.

And with all the 1200 Plaintiffs, it didn't make

economic sense to go out and just start deposing Plaintiffs.

This has been expensive and we were trying to control costs.

So we deposed the named -- you know, the proposed class

representatives and then we tried to get a cross-section of

some people in different locations, different states, and some

people who had done referrals. It was deeply unscientific. It

was just to get an idea of what the doctors would say.

But, again, the main thing the doctors would be

testifying about would be what they were told, heard,

understood in the sales pitch. And we were told at that point

that that was not going to be part of the case; and, so, we

limited our discovery accordingly.

And we did ask questions on those who were referrals

about the referrals, but that wasn't really the focus of the

deposition. And there are some doctors out there who got --


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who did significant referral work.

You'll recall that Dr. Castillo, who's the only

Plaintiff actually to have testified in this case, said that

another dentist -- I think it was next door or across the hall

or something -- came to him and told him how great the system

was and it was terrific and it was free.

So there is -- I don't know how much you can really

conclude from this very limited sampling. But if we're going

to go to specifics, the one doctor who testified here said that

he only became interested in this because another dentist came

to him and said, "You've really got to check this out."

THE COURT: Do you plan on continuing with your

counterclaim? Do you want to think about it?

MR. VERDE: If we could, your Honor, because there

is -- it's not purely for contribution. There's also an

equitable subrogation claim that's in there.

THE COURT: But, again, you also proceeded on the basis

that if you were found liable.

MR. VERDE: Well --

THE COURT: Because there's really nothing that you --

I mean, if you're out of pocket in legal fees and in the money

that you put forth, but you don't have to give anything else --

I mean, what's the basis for these legal theories?

MR. VERDE: Because if -- the equitable subrogation is

not purely a contribution claim, like on a tortfeasor. And


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you're correct. I believe we put that in there specifically

because, if we have suffered a loss, even if it's not a loss

within the context of the lawsuit, we have a right to get

contribution.

And if the claim here is that we do not get repaid

because we knew or should have known that this was too good to

be true, we knew or should have known that there was never --

this was not financially viable, that there was an intent never

to pay, other -- the other doctors who are out there shilling

their --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Start over again --

MR. VERDE: Sure.

THE COURT: -- just so that I'm making sure that I'm

following you.

MR. VERDE: Sure.

There is an actual loss -- there's going to be -- if

the rulings against NCMIC are upheld, there's going to be an

actual loss of money.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. VERDE: We will have put out 25,000 over -- not

getting any of it back.

THE COURT: And that's a significant hit, which I

understand.

MR. VERDE: Very significant hit.

And if the theory behind it is that we knew or should


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have known that there was never an intent to perform because of

the way this was structured, that the payments from Visl Lasic

would not possibly continue, the doctors who actually

interacted with the salesmen, who had the opportunity to ask

questions, who had the opportunity to find out -- I mean, the

classic example would be the dentist in Minnesota who happily

is receiving marketing payments for a clinic in Florida, which

would make no -- which the Court has determined makes no sense.

If that dentist then goes across the hall and tells

another dentist, "Hey, this is a great deal. You need to get

in on it," I don't know how that individual is in any better or

worse position or has any more or less information than NCMIC

had.

And NCMIC is going to suffer a loss because that other

dentist who receives the referral now doesn't have to pay on

the theory that we should have known. Equitable subrogation, I

believe, says that they should share in that pain with us.

They also were in the position to have actually --

actually in a better position than we were to have known what

was going on.

THE COURT: Which ones of the 274 do you think fit into

that category like the doctor that got Dr. Castillo involved?

MR. VERDE: Honestly, your Honor, we don't know because

we limited the deposition in reliance on this being a paper

case. So --


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THE COURT: But what you do understand -- let's do

this.

I'm going to grant their motion to amend the

counterclaim and give you an opportunity to file an amended

counterclaim, because that was filed a long time ago. A lot of

water has gone under the bridge, which would affect your theory

and how you want to go.

I would suggest that, as you are refiling it, if you

are looking on active participation under the Iqbal and Twombly

standard, especially since there is sort of an overlay or an

awareness of fraud, that you need to have some facts that

support that "active participation." You know, what does that

mean? What type of facts?

And based upon what you know now, hopefully you can be

a little bit more specific as to what -- you know, granted,

each one will be different. But, ultimately --

MR. VERDE: Your Honor, with -- we're -- I think, if I

understand, you're asking us to give specifics about Plaintiffs

we didn't depose because we were taking discovery in reliance

on an order that their testimony really was not going to be

necessary.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. But now you are seeking

recovery for them for their active participation.

MR. VERDE: Right.

THE COURT: But what do you mean by "active


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participation"? I guess that's what I need. Plead some kind

of facts that suggest what is meant by "active participation."

MR. VERDE: Okay. And you're not suggesting that we do

that individually for each of the 247 individuals?

THE COURT: Because I don't think you know now.

MR. VERDE: Right. Okay. I'm sorry. Then, I

misunderstood. Yes. I understand now.

THE COURT: Okay. But there needs to be greater --

right now you just say "active participation." What does that

mean? And did the referral -- it obviously has to go beyond

simply giving the salesperson a list of names so that the

salesperson could later call those people and say, "Your friend

referred." So that, I presume, is not what you're talking

about as "active participation."

MR. VERDE: Right. What we're talking about is some

communication of e-mail -- written, verbal, whatever -- that

says, "You really need to check this out. I bought it. You

should look at it, too."

THE COURT: But how does that then put -- you're going

to have to allege facts that that person who made that "get

involved" had an opportunity to acquire the knowledge that

NCMIC did by the time of October and November of 2008.

To me, by October and November of 2008, NCMIC was in a

position that there were opportunity for it to do an

assessment.


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What facts do you have to show that the doctors at the

time they were making the referrals had the same amount of

knowledge that NCMIC did?

MR. VERDE: Well, I don't -- I think now we're coming

back to, on an individualized basis, we don't know.

THE COURT: But -- and I understand that. We don't

know individually.

MR. VERDE: Right.

THE COURT: But you will need to show simply -- I don't

know that simply going and saying, "This is the greatest thing

since sliced bread. You should go talk to the guy" -- unless

you know that there are some additional facts that say that you

have a vested interest here or you have some inside knowledge,

I don't know that that's going to get you the active

participation that creates an equitable estoppel

MR. VERDE: Well, they were also paid for these

referrals. Even the ones that just gave the name, they were

paid $400 apiece.

So there's -- I mean, it's not simply that we're

looking to punish somebody because they told a friend about

something they thought was good at the time. They were paid to

make these referrals.

And if I follow -- if I'm following correctly the

Court's logic, in the decision that was issued, the Court said

it should have been self-evident that this was not sustainable.


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And I go back to sort of --

THE COURT: Well, what works for us should work for the

Plaintiffs.

MR. VERDE: Yes. If you're a dentist in Minnesota and

you have an opportunity to talk to the salesmen and you have

the opportunity to do your own due diligence before you sign

this and you're not a consumer, you're a business --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. VERDE: -- and you look at this and you say to

yourself, "This makes perfect sense to take all this money to

advertise a clinic in Florida" and then you start telling your

friends for $400 apiece, "You should do so, too" -- you know,

we respectfully disagree with the Court's view of what was

obvious to NCMIC at the time.

But what's good for the goose is good for the gander.

If these people had an opportunity to ask the questions and see

all the things that the Court said NCMIC should have seen, had

they bothered to inquire further, I don't see why the same

standard doesn't held to them, especially if they're getting

paid to bring other doctors into the program.

THE COURT: At $400 a pop. And I noticed on one of the

individuals in the -- I can't put my fingers on it right now --

one of Plaintiffs that was listed in somebody's papers -- when

I counted up how many referrals, $23,000 --

MR. VERDE: Correct.


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MR. RONALD GOSSETT: He was a little bit different than

the others, though, Judge.

THE COURT: Who was that? Which Plaintiff was that?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I don't remember his name. We did

depose him in Pennsylvania. Kushnevis.

MR. VERDE: He's in North Carolina, I think.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Yes. He was in Charlotte.

MR. VERDE: Right.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: And there was another in

Pennsylvania that was in the similar situation.

What Brican did was look at a geographic area where

they had an interest in opening a spa -- a med spa and then

they would recruit somebody in that area to help tell them

where they should open it, what would work in their area.

They would recruit that doctor by telling that doctor

that he will receive a certain amount of money for every

contract that is signed in his area.

So I think the one that you're looking at that received

$23,000 was Mr. Kushnevis, who received the money based upon

everybody in North Carolina that bought this package without

any contact by him to those people whatsoever.

THE COURT: But he had to give them a list of names or

something like that?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I don't believe he even did that.

I believe it was taken from the registry of dentists in


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North Carolina.

There was another -- the doctor in Pennsylvania, who

was supposed to receive the same thing, had the same contract.

It was -- there's a name to that contract. I think they called

it an independent contractor agreement or an independent

advisor agreement. He was supposed to receive the same thing,

and he didn't. He got paid only for those actual referrals

that he made.

But those were outliers. There was another one in

Texas. There were three people that were different than all

the others.

THE COURT: What were -- so those three got

23,000 plus?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: No. The one got 23,000 plus. The

one in Pennsylvania was supposed to receive similar

compensation, but he didn't. He just got paid -- I think it

was eight referrals that he made.

And then the one in Texas -- I don't remember what his

situation was because he was not somebody -- I think he was one

of your clients.

Who was the one in Texas we would bring in for the

trial?

MR. CHARLIP: I don't recall his name.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: When the Court's through with that

area, I need to add, so I'm not accused of interjecting


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something else later --

THE COURT: The bottom line is, I don't want a motion

to dismiss.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I understand.

THE COURT: I want him to know now all of the issues

that you're going to raise so that he can address them in the

amended counterclaim --

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Yes.

THE COURT: -- and we don't have to brief it.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Right. That's why I wanted to

bring this up.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: In the release that was signed in

the settlement of the lawsuit between NCMIC and Brican, there's

a very broad and general description of all the people being

released, and we believe that that release covers these doctors

to have been released from any liability.

THE COURT: What's the language that you're referring

to that releases the doctors? And how would they -- just

simply as a matter of law, how are the Plaintiffs who were

supposedly engaging in an arm's-length deal except for these

doctors that were getting little side benefits -- how are they

released? Or you're just saying the release focuses on the

274?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: No. The release was very broad,


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covered a lot more than the Plaintiffs. It covered -- I've got

the language here, but I just touched the screen and it moved.

If I could have Mr. Charlip move it back, I'll give you that

language.

I know the two words that were important in the first

motion to dismiss that was prepared was an allegation that

NCMIC made that the Plaintiffs were agents of Brican and the

release covers agents.

The release was the predecessors, successors, assigns,

affiliates, parent corporations, subsidiaries, companies,

divisions, representatives, principals, partners, officers,

members, directors, employees and attorneys.

So it was the affiliates and the representative

included in that release that we think -- and the release

specifically says that it's intended to be broad.

So we believe that those people may be brought into the

umbra of the people being released by this release. The

release cites that it's to be construed as a broad, general

comprehensive --

THE COURT: Mr. Gossett, with all due respect, sir, I

know you are a zealous advocate. I am sometimes beginning to

feel worn down by all of the new things and theories that you

come up with.

I will admit that I had -- when I sat down and went

through the evidence, although I had not expected to come out


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the way that I did, once I sat down and looked at it, I came

out the way that I did.

But if you didn't get the gist in the beginning of the

order of how frustrating it has been and expensive for both of

the parties.... But I don't think I'm going to change any of

the approaches of either side.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: What I just read, Judge, is from a

pleading I filed in April of 2011.

THE COURT: Quite frankly, I don't recall it.

So the other grounds is that you're saying that, if

they plead that they are agents or representatives or use those

words that they are --

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Covered by the release.

THE COURT: -- covered.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: In their first iteration of their

amendment, they removed the word "agent."

THE COURT: Well, if they're making money themselves,

how are they an agent?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: That was their allegation in their

first counterclaim.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Verde?

MR. VERDE: We will amend our pleadings, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's turn to the more troubling aspect of

how we deal with the reliance issues.

Given all the time and money that the parties have


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spent here, I'm feeling very guilty about dumping this on the

judge in Iowa. But I cannot think of a way to address the

reliance issues if -- other than -- this is -- I have two

thoughts.

One is that I require the Plaintiff to begin preparing

individualized affidavits -- individualized -- that set out

each -- disclosing all of the facts and circumstances -- who

was there, what was said, what they did, what facts that they

believe justify their reliance -- and to start doing it on a

rolling basis so that, over the next eight weeks, you do 75 a

week.

And then the Defendant can look at those affidavits and

appoint a series of special masters that I will welcome insight

and I will look for retired state court judges so that I'm not

incurring the private judges' fees, although I don't know if

they would do it and I don't know whether or not they would

want to do it -- that's the problem -- and arrange so that,

once the "direct examination" was all laid out -- and, if

there's any appearance that there's a boilerplate in any one of

them, they will be stricken and that Plaintiff is out -- and

then give the Defendant an opportunity to bring that -- Skype

that person in so that you don't have to travel around

everywhere and that they could then cross-examine that

particular Plaintiff and have the judge make a recommendation

as to whether or not there was justifiable reliance.


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That's one theory.

But I'd still have to pay these -- if we're going to

bring this thing to a conclusion sooner rather than later, I

would need to have a whole bunch of -- I figure, if I have six

and each one could do 110 or 106, that's a lot of findings of

facts and conclusions that those judges need to do. But you

need to tell me if you've got a better way to do it.

Or the alternative is that, before we undertake that,

we do two things: I send you all to mediation. I don't know

who you've used as a mediator in the past. I can't remember.

I don't know whether or not it would be viable.

I'm going to ask you now: Where were you in the

settlement discussions? What was the Plaintiffs' position

before I ruled on the --

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: In settlement discussions, we

had -- I had sent a letter to Mr. Verde asking him -- I did it

or Mr. Charlip did it -- asking him if NCMIC would be receptive

to a settlement that was less than 100 percent and would be

paid over some period of time. NCMIC was not receptive to

that; so, we didn't go to dollars and cents.

THE COURT: What do you mean by that, "less than

100 percent"?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Well, if a doctor owed $25,000,

for instance, on principal, then if the doctor would be willing

to pay $15,000 and pay $1,000 per month for 15 months, would


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NCMIC be amenable to that. Now, we never got to the specifics

of dollars.

THE COURT: Why not?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Because NCMIC wasn't amenable to

anything less than 100 percent.

MR. VERDE: I -- I --

THE COURT: I doubt that, Mr. Gossett. I really doubt

that.

MR. VERDE: Your Honor, if I may, we went to mediation

before Judge Politan, who's a retired federal judge from

New Jersey. He said -- we offered to compromise. He came back

and said, "Plaintiffs are demanding 100 cents on the dollar. I

can't move from that."

We then -- we made settlement offers. We offered to

basically cut this by a third -- the total amount that was owed

by a third. We actually put in a formal settlement offer so

they would be obligated to show it all to their client. We get

back, I think, a grand total of five people who accepted it.

THE COURT: So we've eliminated five at least?

MR. VERDE: We have eliminated five.

THE COURT: Good.

MR. VERDE: But -- so this idea that somehow we were

blocking this, we kept trying --

THE COURT: I truly believe you, Mr. Verde. I see it

in your face. I feel it in my bones.


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Would it be helpful if I sent you all back? Do you

want me to try and mediate? I need to get out the findings of

fact and conclusions of law before you do that.

I have to share with you, Mr. Gossett, that from the

get-go of this case, there is an element that it's too good to

be true. But I also know how -- that the package and the

proposal that Brican provided was a slick one and was pushing

and what have you.

And I agree that, by October, November, Brican was in a

better position -- I mean, NCMIC was in a better position,

probably, to protect itself and didn't avail itself and, in

fact, increased the number of loans, appearing to simply rely

on the fact that it had a hell or high water clause.

But the Plaintiffs got themselves into this pickle,

too, and the Plaintiffs are not your little naive widow lady.

So they need to accept some responsibility here.

And if they were offering that they would cut it a

third as opposed to going half and half, if your clients were

not grabbing it, then your clients should examine themselves as

to whether or not they have an unrealistic relationship with

money.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I think you misunderstood what

Mr. Verde said. He wasn't offering that they would accept a

third. They would reduce the claim by a third, leaving us to

pay two-thirds of the claim.


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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Okay? I just wanted to clarify

that.

Judge, I have absolutely no problem going to mediation,

whatever it would take --

THE COURT: If you go to mediation, I want this case

settled.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: But I don't have the ability to do

that. I don't have control over the decisions of 1,010 people.

They individually will make the decision. I will advise them,

but that doesn't mean they're going to take my advice.

It's not as easy as if it had been a class action,

where you would have nine people making --

THE COURT: But I can't do a class action. It's too

individualized.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I understand that.

But what I'm saying is there are 1,010 people making

decisions. It's not me. And I wish I could tell you that

every one of my clients in my 39 years of practicing law has

always followed my advice, but there's not true.

THE COURT: We all have been there. We just give

advice. The client makes the ultimate decision.

How do we bring this thing to conclusion in the most --

in the cheapest way?

MR. VERDE: Your Honor, I advance this with some


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trepidation because it's clear --

THE COURT: And I recognize that you want to take an

appeal and I'm, to a certain extent, somewhat in agreement with

maybe that's the best way to go.

MR. VERDE: That's exactly where I'm going.

Before we go down this path -- I mean, look, mediation,

settlement, we're happy to do that with whoever whenever. We

never received a counteroffer. We never received anything. We

were negotiating against ourselves.

So if there's some way to move that along, we're all

for it at any stage of this proceeding. But as far as that

next stage, which we agree with you that it's logistically

going to be a bear to deal with --

THE COURT: And expensive.

MR. VERDE: And expensive.

And all sorts of difficulties are going to arise very

quickly with it.

However, without rearguing a motion for

reconsideration, I think it's fair to say that the law on this

particular section of the UCC, to put it charitably, is sparse.

There's not a lot of guidance.

And there are procedural issues about whether the

Plaintiffs made their bed and should be forced to lie in it,

even whether -- even -- there's basically two levels.

Substantively, we still believe that the common law


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standard applies, and the statutes are pretty clear about that.

We also recognize, hey, in words -- in fairness to the Court --

a phrase I don't use often -- but in fairness to the Court,

there's just really not a lot of guidance here because for

whatever reason there's just been nobody arguing about this

issue. And so it's somewhat unclear what's to be done with it.

Compounding it is it's reliant upon the State. This is

a federal statute. It's different. I know the Court cited

your approval of some of the bankruptcy cases where, ironically

enough, the bankruptcy courts, trying to figure out what "good

faith" meant, said, "Well, let's see what the UCC says."

And so they actually tried to use that as one of the

bases of defining what "bankruptcy" means for 538 C cases for

the good-faith defense for fraudulent conveyances.

So it is a bit of a black hole. We understand that the

last say the Florida courts have had on this issue was back in

1986, which does seem -- well, I don't think for anybody here

actually, but it does seem somewhat like anxiety history.

But it's not like the Plaintiffs came back and said,

"No. No. No. There's all these other cases that shed light

on it." There's just been a lingering silence since 1986

through changes of the statute, et cetera.

If we're right that -- on two points -- one is that the

substantive law here that should have been applied was the

Florida common law of Close Connection Plus, or, if we're


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right, that even if that's something of a jump ball, the

Plaintiffs --

THE COURT: That's a junk ball?

MR. VERDE: "Jump ball." Basketball.

THE COURT: Oh. Jump ball.

MR. VERDE: Jump ball. Yes.

-- that it's not 100 percent clear, or, if we're right

that -- if it is a jump ball, that it's not clear.

But the Plaintiffs introduced this theory, the

Plaintiffs made it their theory of the case and the Plaintiffs

shouldn't be allowed to change it after they have agreed to

this being an issue we're trying.

And this was a 42(B) case. This was not a trial -- a

plenary trial on all the issues. This was a trial on defined

issues.

And, again, you know, the one thing -- I've chased

Plaintiffs through many theories over four years now. The one

theory I couldn't chase is one that came up after the trial.

That one is beyond me.

THE COURT: The one that came up after the trial?

MR. VERDE: In other words, the idea that we were

trying Close Connection Plus, but now we're actually trying a

statutory basis that was never raised by the Plaintiffs.

So there are two reasons here why this might stand.

And, again, I say this with some trepidation because --


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THE COURT: You've persuaded me. I cannot figure out a

way to get my arms around this case and bring to conclusion

without spending more money on both sides.

MR. VERDE: It would be terrible if we got -- if we did

that entire process and then went up on appeal only to be told,

actually, it was Close Connection Plus. Because, as we see it,

that would make all of that effort completely wasted effort.

THE COURT: Well, just a small tip after I went back

and read through all the parties' papers. Well, you'll see it

when it comes out.

MR. VERDE: Okay. But to the extent --

THE COURT: Close Connection Plus is an evidentiary

tool that is still useful with the statute.

MR. VERDE: And I'm -- again, I will stop and shut up

whenever you tell me to, your Honor. But I think where you're

heading is that, even if Close Connection is -- stands in place

of good faith, we still didn't meet the notice requirements.

THE COURT: We didn't meet the notice requirement?

MR. VERDE: The notice requirements of (D) that -- the

Subsection (D) of the statute. Or maybe I completely misread

where you were going with this.

In other words, were you saying that Close Connection

Plus basically is a test for good faith?

THE COURT: It is part -- it is a test -- it is a tool

for helping to evaluate the objective component of good faith.


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MR. VERDE: Well, okay. That's -- I think that's where

we part company because that -- there have been variations of

that definition throughout the history of the Close Connection

doctrine.

And the cases like Equico and Leasing Corp specifically

don't tie it into the use of the statute. They treat it as a

standalone test.

But --

THE COURT: If you want, you can apply the test, is

basically what I'm saying, and be consistent with the statute.

MR. VERDE: Right.

But to be fair about it, we've been through this.

We've been through the treatises. It's not a particularly

well-developed area of law, somewhat surprising.

So we understand that reasonable minds can differ on

this. But even beyond that, though, if that is what Plaintiffs

were really getting at. Remember, this was -- we were trying

apparent agency. We were briefing about an agency.

You had told them that they needed to get their

pleadings in line while Iqbal and Twombly for the apparent

agency and we got this theory.

And, Judge, we had a jugular issue where you said, "If

there's anything you have -- any theories you have that are

dependent upon NCMIC's knowledge of these -- of the

cancellation provisions, now is it." That's the point of the


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jugular issue.

We're now dealing -- we're now here on a theory that is

based upon NCMIC's knowledge. It was never raised. It was

brought up at the last minute. They used Close Connection

Plus --

THE COURT: Wait a minute.

The whole jugular issue was, "What did NCMIC know and

when did it know it?" And that was from the get-go.

MR. VERDE: And what legal -- but the actual jugular --

what legal effect did it have?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. VERDE: So if the theory now is NCMIC knew or

should have known that this was a -- that this was a -- that

there were defenses to payment of this and, therefore, as an

assignee, that blocks their ability to collect, why wasn't that

in the jugular issue?

That is precisely -- you precisely invited all of the

theories that were dependent upon NCMIC's knowledge. That's

why it was the jugular issue. It was supposed to knock out

this case.

And as a result of that, we moved away from something

that involved NCMIC's knowledge and we went to apparent agency,

which was, again, something they raised even though it wasn't

part of the jugular issue. And then we chased that rabbit for

a while and that one was knocked out.


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And in preparation for a trial on the apparent agency

issue and just the apparent agency, which was the only issue

remaining, you told them to "Clean up your pleadings because

you've not been specific enough" and we've got this brand-new

theory that has never appeared anywhere else.

When pressed on it, they said -- they said Close

Connection Plus. They were the ones who kept pushing Close

Connection Plus.

And as we got further into the case, we sat here and

you said, "I'm tired of chasing theories. Write it down.

We're going to be specific." It was memorialized in the

pretrial order.

And because it's a 42(B) case -- trial, it wasn't a

trial of all the issues when maybe you still have some wiggle

room on changing your theories, but we were trying discrete

issues. And they -- that never changed.

And it was only as we got, literally, I think, a few

weeks before trial, maybe a month before trial -- again, my own

personal commentary -- I think the light bulb went off with the

Plaintiffs that they couldn't possibly meet the issue that they

had teed up. And now suddenly we had this new wave of, "No.

No. No. It's industry standards. It's commercial standards."

Go back and look at the transcripts. This was never

argued. It was never raised. When we said -- we told the

Court we think the three issues that you were teeing up as a


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result of your decision back in February was -- were these

three issues, that's because you took their theory and said,

"Okay. Close Connection Plus, I could see why that might be a

factual issue buried there." And that's what we all agreed to

try.

The fact that they might have mentioned this or they

might have said in the weeks before trial, "No. No. No.

There's a commercial component. It's objective, subjective" --

this appeared weeks before trial.

Your Honor, given the fact -- I mean, we have sort of

the graveyard of theories that we've gone through in this case.

We've been chasing theories all over.

Our rule of thumb has been it's not something that

we're arguing about until you tell us it is because, if we just

chased every stray comment, every thought, every variation on a

theme, we'd all be here forever.

So we didn't chase any of that stuff and we had no

reason to expect it was going to be until you told us it would

be.

And because the Close Connection Plus was never changed

in the trial order, it was always the issue we were to be

trying -- there's even a moment on the last day of trial

where -- it's in the transcript -- where I said, "Your Honor,

I'm hearing all sorts of things now about this statute and

meeting the other standards of the statute. We are still


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trying Close Connection Plus, aren't we?" and you said, "I'm

not there yet."

So this -- there is a very substantial substantive

issue here that, if the Plaintiffs chose this -- and I think

that they realize that is, in fact, the right standard, which

is why they put it forward to begin with -- unless that issue

was formally changed so that we were told we were trying a

different issue -- if we just started chasing that issue in the

middle of the trial, all we'd be doing is feeding the

pathology. All we'd be doing here is sort of encouraging new

theories.

We -- this thing would have become even more protracted

than it has been. Our only -- the only guideline we've had is

for you to be the gatekeeper and tell us what's an issue and

what's not an issue.

And the actual language of the statute -- again, with

reasonable minds differing as to how it interplays with Close

Connection Plus -- was not the issue that we were trying. We

were trying just Close Connection Plus.

If we had known that there was an industry component, a

commercially reasonable standard component, that we were

trying, which is notably not at all present in Close Connection

Plus, everything we could have done would have been different.

We would have brought in our own expert to tell you

Mr. Krollfeiffer has no idea what he's talking about. He's


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been out of the business for --

THE COURT: I think you need to slow down. Lisa is

fast, but he's getting emotional.

MR. VERDE: I'm getting emotional. You're right, your

Honor.

-- that he's not been in this business. He doesn't --

there is no industry standards. We would have brought somebody

in to testify about that if there was a component of industry

standards that was at all present in the issues we were trying.

If you go back to the pretrial order, it's simply not

there.

And so there is a very substantial -- we see a

procedural issue here where, to be blunt, your Honor, we're

been penalized for playing by the rules and not trying to

change the topic and not trying to inject new issues at the

last minute and trying to keep this thing to a manageable

amount by just trying the issues you told us to try.

And so, yes, we feel somewhat aggrieved -- I have to be

honest -- because we feel we've been trying to do that and, in

the end, this idea of injecting new theories and ideas long

after they were due, after you had cut them off, has succeeded.

It's disturbing.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Judge, we are not the ones that

interjected into this case the issue of NCMIC's status as

holder in due course. That has been an issue in this case


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since the very first answer filed by NCMIC raising that

affirmative defense.

That affirmative defense was raised in every one of

their answers that they filed, including the answer filed

November 22, 2013, where they claim the waiver of defense

clause was enforceable by them.

Now, you said on January 22, 2014, a year later, in

your order granting in part and denying in part NCMIC's motion

for summary judgment the second question of material fact is

whether NCMIC was a holder in due course of the financing

agreements pursuant to Florida Statute Section 679.4031(2).

It has been their issue that they pled from day one,

and the statute that controls the enforceability of their

affirmative defense has not changed since then.

They've had the -- they should have had -- I'm sure

they did -- knowledge of what the essential elements are of

that affirmative defense since day one.

And our ability to come in -- if they were to prove

that they were a holder in due course under that statute, we

would still have the ability to come in under the Close

Connection Plus doctrine and knock it out if we could prove

that. But they first have to establish that they complied with

the statute.

What we're hearing in Mr. Verde's argument is his

continued insistence that there is a presumption because they


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paid value that they were holders in due course.

And as I stated in my submissions, that has not been

the case since the adoption of the UCC. There was a statute

under the NIL which carried with it a presumption. But when

the UCC was adopted, that -- in 1966, that statute was

abrogated.

THE COURT: The NIL? The negotiable instruments law?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: The negotiable instruments law.

And in Florida, we refer to it as the Uniform Negotiable

Instruments Act.

But as a matter of uniformity, it was referred to as

the negotiable instruments law. So he's still arguing that

he's entitled to a presumption that he's a holder in due

course, and that's not the case.

THE COURT: Can I ask a very simple question?

Why can't both sides split the baby down the middle

and the Defendants say to the Plaintiffs, "You pay half and

I'll eat the other half"? Why doesn't that work?

It recognizes sort of the responsibility of each side

getting themselves into this. I just throw it out. I mean,

the Plaintiffs' counsel would really have to start working on

its clients if the Defendant was willing to make that offer.

You don't have to say anything now. I just want you

all to think about that. And I want you all to think about how

much you have had to incur in the way of costs and legal fees


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to where we are now and to sort of look at a cost-benefit

analysis of how much do you want to spend and what do you think

you're going to get out of it for both sides. Because this is

a business dispute.

But in the meantime, what I'm going to do is I will

prepare the revision to the findings of facts and conclusions

of law. I appreciate all of the input that the parties have

given me. That should be ready to come out by the end of this

month. I had hoped we could close it down -- the case down.

Does the Defendant want -- what I suggest is that we --

I issue an order to certify it. But if you would do me a favor

and help us by -- because I think it's also beneficial for the

Plaintiff.

Is the Plaintiff objecting if I certify it?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: No. We would just request that

you certify the final judgment that you would be entering on

the summary judgment you've entered so that the other --

THE COURT: I'll send all of it up.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Okay.

THE COURT: But it would be very helpful for me if the

two sides could sort of get together and take a look at what is

the standard that the Eleventh Circuit needs for granting this

and then put it together in a joint memo for me so that I

can -- we'll do our own research and we can tweak it. Because

if we're going to do this, I want to make sure that they accept


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it.

MR. VERDE: The standard is the controlling question of

law for which substantial ground for difference of opinion,

which I think pretty much --

THE COURT: We at least have it on that. As to the

first two summary judgments, I don't --

MR. ROBERT GOSSETT: Judicial economy.

MR. VERDE: Well, it's a final judgment. In other

words, so that it's not -- the only -- this -- it would be

basically a final judgment appeal as of right going up in

conjunction with an interlocutory appeal based upon the

substantial question of law about the applicability or how to

interpret the UCC code.

THE COURT: How do I frame the judgment that I enter so

that there is a final judgment -- as to those Plaintiffs so

that there is a final judgment and then we can take care of

that one?

Just help me put it together. I don't need a brief.

What I need is sort of what I enter in the way of a final

judgment so that they can -- then that becomes an appealable

issue, but especially since -- how do we articulate who it

applies to? Those are the issues that I've been grappling

with. I'm not sure how to do it.

And I've got a brain trust that I'm looking at. So I'm

going to take advantage of it.


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MR. VERDE: We did provide a proposed order in the most

recent submission. And it's somewhat simple because it's --

this is the declaratory judgment case. This is on

Document 577-1.

THE COURT: Let's see.

MR. VERDE: 577. Yes.

THE COURT: I have 577.

MR. VERDE: Last two pages.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VERDE: And because it's a declaratory -- if this

was an actual final-final judgment, we'd have to be calculating

numbers and having fights about interest rates and what have

you.

But since it's a declaratory judgment action, which

says the declaration is no reason for them not to pay, and then

you can pass this on to the Iowa court to actually figure out

how much everyone owes and how to enforce it. So I think

that's really simple.

THE COURT: How do I save him the effort? At least I

have a law clerk. He doesn't have a law clerk.

MR. VERDE: Well, we kept this -- we just kept it --

since it's a declaratory judgment request, we kept the judgment

to exactly that, a declaration that there is no reason not for

payment.

And we thought you didn't want to get involved in --


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THE COURT: No, I don't. But I'd like to make his life

easier. I'd like to make your all's life easier.

And so is -- has -- is there a way that you can come up

with a schedule? Because --

MR. VERDE: You mean a schedule of names or a schedule

of names plus amounts?

THE COURT: Because we have here -- we have those

Plaintiffs who are identified on Schedule A annexed hereto.

And I don't remember -- was --

MR. VERDE: What -- we would rely on the Plaintiffs'

schedule because I don't think there's a disagreement as to

who --

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Right.

MR. VERDE: -- who falls into these categories.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: We have gone through -- remember,

Judge, that you had asked us to or directed us to go through

and agree on the categorizations of each Plaintiff. We have

done that.

The only error that I found in that since then was one

person who has a marketing agreement, Version 6, in print who

actually had changed the language in it.

And I got the marketing agreements out of Brican's

files so I know that that was in the -- the change was

effective as far as Brican was concerned and it changes it from

the client may request that Brican repurchase to Brican will


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repurchase.

So I'm going to give this to Mr. Nemecek in a second

and let him look at this. But he and I worked on the

schedules.

THE COURT: It sounds to me like that person is not

really in the Version No. 6, he has moved -- he or she has

moved into one of the other categories.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: But I think that Mr. Nemecek and I

can get that done promptly. We can go through the final

schedules again, making sure that we've got everything

complete. I think Mr. Charlip will be able to do that as well.

We'll work on that right away.

THE COURT: God bless you and the horses that you're

riding in on.

So the plan is by -- I'm going to be out of the country

for the next two weeks, but we're working on it now. And my

trusty law clerk, Mr. Iqbal, God willing and the creek doesn't

rise, will be able to take my musings and put it down on paper

so we can get a decision -- an amended final judgment out and,

you know, amended findings of facts and conclusions of law.

If you will give us the schedules with -- and let's use

their proposed judgment. Is there any way that we can make it

easier to read? This is a hard decision -- I mean, proposed

judgment to read, I mean, Mr. Verde.

MR. VERDE: Oh.


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THE COURT: It's a lot of type, big blocks.

MR. VERDE: We could -- instead of describing it --

describing the Plaintiffs, we'll just rely on the -- most of

that verbiage is about who we're talking about. But I suppose

we could just -- if we have the name on a schedule, we could

just rely on it that way.

THE COURT: Well, I'll sort of tweak this one.

MR. VERDE: Okay.

THE COURT: I saw the Plaintiffs' proposed -- I'm

looking at the Plaintiffs' 576-1, Page 3. I may use that

structure so that there's more white space and it's easier to

read.

I mean, it's much easier, Mr. Gossett, the way you

have -- you and Mr. Charlip have organized it because it

basically covers what you all are talking about as well,

doesn't it?

MR. VERDE: I think the only difference is they --

their punch line, if you will, the last line, is that the

claims are dismissed.

We would like a -- we suggest a more assertive

declaration that you've found that there's no basis to declare

that the financing agreements are unenforceable.

So, in other words, if it's a declaration, just saying

that it was dismissed is -- you know, the purpose of a

declaration is the -- to get a declaration of the parties'


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right.

And to help the Iowa court, I think it would be

important to let them know it's not just that you dismissed

their claims, but after four years of litigation, you found no

reason to declare the financing agreements unenforceable.

THE COURT: Well, that is true. At least none have

been raised here in this case. And now is the time to raise

them. I'll tweak it.

MR. CHARLIP: Judge, one point.

The financing agreements to -- take, for example, a

particular client did not sign it personally. Those are the

defenses that would be brought up in Iowa.

So I think the statement that there are no defenses to

the find financing agreement in a broad-brush fashion like that

goes beyond the ruling that you made and, in fact, would

potentially chill the rights of any client who has a specific

defense that would not be pertinent to the claims that were

brought in this case.

THE COURT: Well, I need to have a specific

declaration, I mean, that was -- are you saying, though,

that -- let me back up.

The Plaintiffs asked for a declaration that the lease

was not enforceable. And it was not enforceable on the one

ground that -- for the ones that were -- that summary judgment

has been entered.


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MR. CHARLIP: Correct.

THE COURT: That the two agreements were one and that

they were irreconcilable and, so, you had to interpret on --

based on the face, the cancellation clause was a specific

clause that was inconsistent and, therefore, it would trump.

And the Court found that that theory did not -- that

was the theory that was asserted and that was not --

MR. CHARLIP: Correct.

THE COURT: I'll go back and look at it. But I will

come up with some -- the language as to what I declared.

MR. VERDE: Your Honor, I just had a chilling glimpse

of my future. Because now having had an opportunity to put all

of their arguments as to why these things should be declared

unenforceable, we're not going to get a new series of claims in

Iowa?

THE COURT: I can't do that to the judge in Iowa --

MR. VERDE: No.

THE COURT: -- or to both sides.

MR. VERDE: I think they've had an opportunity to put

any defenses they had contained in here, if it's not

presented -- it's not preserved for Iowa.

MR. CHARLIP: That's not true.

THE COURT: If they had an individualized defense, I

presume they've asserted it in Iowa.

MR. CHARLIP: Correct. Correct.


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THE COURT: And so whatever defense that you have

asserted in Iowa that we did not cover here, that would still

remain.

MR. VERDE: Yes. That's correct.

THE COURT: And I think that's what he's saying.

MR. CHARLIP: Yes. Exactly.

MR. VERDE: Okay.

THE COURT: So why don't you two -- now that we have

that understanding, why don't the two of you come up with

proposed language so that I can use as to what I am declaring.

Because there needs to be more than simply a dismissal so that

it is clear as to what the -- declaration is being made.

So we need to modify your language that it is -- may

fully enforce. We can't put that language in because there may

be an individual defense there, but --

MR. VERDE: So we're clear, the concept is other than

what's already been pled in Iowa?

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. VERDE: Okay. Maybe we can use that as a basis

to --

THE COURT: But if it's pled on the defense -- or the

theory that they have articulated here --

MR. VERDE: Right.

THE COURT: -- then, that one is out. So this judgment

needs to operate as a --


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MR. VERDE: Yes. It's going to be a tricky concept.

But we understand.

THE COURT: And at least if I can have your input --

it's sort of like drafting by committee, but a thoughtful

committee, that we're not doing it just on the fly here in the

courtroom.

Give me the timetable that you all need. I have to

tell you that I was trying to close this down by the end of the

month so I can make full disclosure.

And you all can test me if my biases are coming out.

Because I have to report, because this is a four-year-old case,

and the AO is not going to be happy with me. And I wanted to

close it down because the MDL conference is in October. And I

wanted to report to the panel that we were closed.

So whatever we can do, I would be most appreciative.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Aren't you able to close the MDL?

I mean, I believe that that is something that we had discussed

that you were going to do in the past.

THE COURT: And then, when talking to the MDL folks, I

began to realize that, if the order was going to preserve the

impact to all of the Plaintiffs, maybe I should just keep it

until I can get the final findings of facts and conclusions of

law out.

So I plan on figuring out a way to close it down by --

at least with the MDL panel, by the end of this month. I've


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already told them that -- when they asked me if there were any

more tag-along cases, I told them no, that there would be no

more tag-along cases. I think you all got that.

Did you all get the notice of that?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am.

MR. VERDE: Your Honor, would it be helpful to talk now

about some sort of -- because all of this can go on and

mediation on a parallel track. They're not interdependent.

THE COURT: Do you want it to go back to the judge?

MR. VERDE: He's no longer with us, your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh, he died?

MR. VERDE: Yes. He did. A couple of years ago. Yes.

THE COURT: Oh.

MR. VERDE: I think --

THE COURT: How old was he?

MR. VERDE: He'd been ill for some time.

THE COURT: I didn't remember him as being elderly.

MR. VERDE: He was in his 80s. He had been ill. He

had been -- I think it's fair to say he was not in great health

when he was mediating our case as well.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any proposals as to

people that you would like to use as a mediator, that you all

would have confidence in as a mediator in the sense that I can

bring the mediator up to speed quickly and who is very

insightful, a good listener and has practical problem-solving


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skills?

MR. VERDE: There's two issues here. One is who will

do it, which is very important. I agree.

The second, though, is that, if we're going to go in

and go through this and -- only to be told that, you know,

there's 1100 individuals, there's no possible way to settle

this case, that's fine. I guess we can't do that.

But is there -- what I'm asking is: In this forum, is

there some way we can get past that? Because if we can't,

then, we --

THE COURT: You need to have the Plaintiffs in the room

for the mediation.

MR. VERDE: Or --

THE COURT: So let me ask you this: Is there a way to

organize the groups of Plaintiffs into a manageable group and

then do -- you really need to do a global one.

Do you have any suggestions, Mr. Gossett, how we --

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I'm thinking, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ordinarily, I require that the Plaintiffs

individually attend mediation so that they have some skin in

the game, A, and B, that they really have an opportunity to

speak and to listen and to make a decision on the spot.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: 1010 in 41 states. I just don't

know how to organize them in any manageable fashion where I'm

not embarrassed going into it by somebody holding out and


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saying, you know, "We've reached this resolution, but I've got

25 people in 15 states that say 'no,' they're not going to go

along with it."

You know, as we approached it before, it was easier

because it was before -- it was when it was a putative class

action and we were able to get authority to the class reps to

go there.

THE COURT: Well, how about if we simply look at the

only remaining class for -- I mean, the only remaining group

for settlement of the 640? So we've halved it.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: But that leaves the others that --

THE COURT: Tough bananas.

I mean, maybe you want to communicate with your --

that's a lot of e-mails coming in.

How are you communicating with them?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: We have several different

processes in place. The first and foremost, my communication

with them directly is done through a closed Google group,

closed in the sense that you have to have a specific invitation

to be able to access the group. And everybody that signs a

retainer with us has that access.

THE COURT: Does Mr. Charlip have a similar setup with

his clients?

MR. CHARLIP: No, Judge.

THE COURT: You have 69 clients. Right? Is that it?


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61?

MR. CHARLIP: Something like that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. Ronald GOSSETT: And we have a volunteer

administrator of the Google group. She probably is ruing the

day that she agreed to be administrator. But it's a dental

assistant in Jacksonville.

The doctors who then receive communication from me,

when they have a question about it, they'll send an e-mail of

that question.

My -- our paralegal is able to answer most of those

questions. So she'll respond by e-mail to the specific doctor

to answer that question.

If it's a question that we're getting from multiple

doctors, we'll send it to the group in its entirety.

There are quite a bit of efforts to stop them from

picking up the phone and calling because that's very

time-consuming and very costly, and we have curtailed that

significantly. But we still have some who will pick up the

phone and call.

Even with the communication with the Google group we

have many doctors who will say, "Oh, but I don't do e-mail" or,

"I haven't been on the group. I just need to know what's going

on."

So we have as much of herding cats as we can to keep


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them communicating by e-mail and to avoid getting on the phone.

THE COURT: Your clients are providing the poster

child for the stereotype that all doctors are not great

businesspeople and are very emotional and cannot focus in on

the laser issue.


THE COURT: You don't have to say anything.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: When you said earlier -- as you

were thinking about how to handle the issues of reliance and

materiality, you mentioned doing things on a rolling basis of

75 per week. That would be 15 per day.

My immediate thought was, "Oh, my goodness." When I

get on the phone --

THE COURT: Then you can have shared feelings with

Mr. Verde and his team.


When I get on the phone with any one of the clients, it

is seen by them as an opportunity to get all their questions

answered and spend as much time with me as they think

necessary.

THE COURT: All for the $1,000 that they've paid you.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Yes. Well, that was their initial

payment. They've each paid more than that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: And my brother has been very adept


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at getting on the phone with them to allow me to keep working

on the things that we need to get to. So he is speaking to

them as they bypass our request that they not call.

When we do individualized --

THE COURT: You owe your brother big time.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Yes, ma'am. He reminds me of

that.

When we get to the point of doing an individualized

affidavit -- and I understand that and the reason for that and

the importance of that -- I envision that doctor spending

probably 45 minutes on the phone with us, each one of them.

And then we'll have to get in writing what to do and

I've got to communicate to them and send it up there and the

number of people that don't follow directions seems to be

increasing in this group.

THE COURT: Can you put a price tag on that for each

one of your clients as to what it will cost them to proceed

forward?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: I mean, because that's -- because the same

way as the Defendant is looking at its budget going forward and

it's in a position that it can -- just has to deal with itself,

your individual Plaintiffs need to understand that they want a

Bentley service, but they're only paying for a skateboard.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I think we could break it out to


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them that they're paying me 50 cents an hour.

THE COURT: You know, the way the doctors feel about

lawyers, they may not care. Put it that way.

But if it is -- I would add that in, that, "Even at

this, it's 50 cents an hour. But here is what it's going to

cost you personally" and then say that I am encouraging the

parties to begin serious settlement discussions, that the Court

has spent four years, has expressed -- outlined the facts here

and what the law is to the best of its ability.

I'm going to send the case up on appeal, which will

mean that it's further delayed. And if they lose, more

interest is accruing. And they should, you know, figure out a

way to figure out what that sum is.

And then, if we -- the 640 prevail, we then have this

cost to go forward and it has to be a mini-trial. And we'll

try and figure out how to do it. But we're dealing with the

640.

MR. VERDE: Your Honor, would it be all right if I just

consulted with my client just for one minute?

THE COURT: Okay.

(Off the record discussion had between Mr. Verde and

his client.)

MR. VERDE: I just want to make -- I'm sorry.

I just wanted to make sure I was not going to suggest

something that was inappropriate first.


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THE COURT: Clients do appreciate that.

MR. VERDE: Yes. They do. It's still their case.

The only way I can think of this is -- you know, the

saying, if you eat an elephant starting with one mouthful -- is

maybe we get a group of 25, 30, 50 -- pick a number -- that

is -- that in one geographic location, the parties -- you know,

we would prefer that we pick them so we're not -- at random or

some other way.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VERDE: And actually have them show up at the

mediation, actually have them participate, and see if we get a

critical mass of people settling in that, whether -- this

becomes effectively a bellwether mediation -- whether this sets

the price, sets the market, if you will, for what the

settlements are worth, with the hope that other people will

say, "Well, if these folks are okay with this, maybe we're okay

with this as well."

Look, it's not -- certainly no guarantees. But at

least there's a chance that, if there's a good mediator and

it's a good session, that that number sort of becomes the

number.

And Mr. Gossett is correct. We certainly don't expect

either him or Mr. Charlip to guarantee that they're going to

get 1,010 people to agree on anything.

But, on the other hand, if we can reduce the numbers


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dramatically, you know, if we go up on appeal and if we come

back and we are proceeding with these mini-trials, everyone out

is to the good.

And if we have, you know, 10 percent or -- you know, of

holdouts and, you know, people want to fight to the bitter end,

okay. But the logistics of that are far easier than doing it

for 1,000 people.

And, honestly, you know --

THE COURT: I like that idea.

Mr. Gossett?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: That's fine with me, Judge.

THE COURT: So let's do the following: You pick --

MR. VERDE: What's a good number?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Remember when you're picking a

number that these are professionals who have booked dental

procedures or optometric procedures in the future.

So we're going to have to give them time to make sure

that whatever number he picks, that all of the number will be

able to be there that day.

THE COURT: But I can also order that they show up for

mediation and, if they chose not to show up for mediation, then

they will be dismissed from the case. Right?


If we're going into an area where he chooses 25 and we

have remote people, will they be able to participate in


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mediation by Skyping?

THE COURT: I think that that's hard to do.

MR. VERDE: I agree.

Our plan was to pick a geographic -- maybe Florida,

with there's a concentration, and just get people from that

area.

THE COURT: How about if we had 20 people? Is that too

small a group? I think that, if I make it 50, it's going to be

difficult to get a critical mass and it's not going to be

effective dynamics.

MR. VERDE: Right.

THE COURT: I would almost say that maybe you want it

to be, you know, 18. That's what I would propose.

MR. VERDE: We originally were thinking 25. But I

think somewhere in that range. And it's not -- again, not a

science. It's just what seems to --

THE COURT: See how many people you can get between

15 and 25. You pick the geographic area.

The difficulty -- do we have 25 in a particular

geographic area in Miami so that it's easy -- in the state of

Florida, I mean?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I have it broken down by state.

In the state of Florida, I have 173 clients. Mr. Charlip has

quite a number in Florida.

THE COURT: And where are they all located?


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MR. RONALD GOSSETT: All over the state, from

Jacksonville to Pensacola all the way down here.

THE COURT: Is there any particular location that is

particularly dense?

MR. VERDE: I think California and -- and New York

City, within the metropolitan area, I think there's quite a

number.

THE COURT: Then, let's do New York.

MR. VERDE: And I think you would know about it, Ron,

but I think also Los Angeles.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Los Angeles and the city -- in the

outlying boroughs, you would have at least 18, I think, in the

city and the outlying boroughs.

MR. VERDE: And there's Long Island.

THE COURT: Long Island -- it's sometimes difficult to

get from Long Island to Downtown New York City.

MR. VERDE: No. Not really.

But if we're talking about a one-day mediation -- Ron,

am I right that New York would have in the metropolitan area

some critical mass?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I think so, Mike. I know that

I've got a lot in New York. I've got 57 people in New York.

THE COURT: How many does Mr. Charlip have?

MR. CHARLIP: Judge, I don't know at this time.

THE COURT: Are all of yours in Florida?


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MR. CHARLIP: No, Judge.

THE COURT: Oh. You just don't know how many you have

in New York?

MR. CHARLIP: Correct. My computer is shut down. I

had that. I don't have access to it at the moment.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: And the number that I have, 57, is

all of my clients in New York. I haven't separated this out to

be only the 650.

But I would say that it's probably -- certainly we have

more than 20 in the surviving group in New York. I don't know

what number around the city, but it's something I can find out

and work on by tomorrow.

MR. VERDE: We also have a big concentration in San

Antonio, Texas.

THE COURT: Let's take a ten-minute recess so that we

can come up with our game plan and the deadlines of what we're

going to do by when.

But what I would like to do is enter an order requiring

mediation along the lines of what you have identified, which

would be in a particular location for a bellwether mediation,

and that I would require attendance of the individual

Plaintiffs that are designated and, if they do not show up,

they will be dismissed.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Will we have an avenue to present

to the Court a reason why they would not be there so that


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they're not dismissed just because the Defendant picked them?

THE COURT: That they need to make this a priority.


THE COURT: And unless they're at a funeral of their

spouse, their parents, they are at the wedding of their child

or grandchildren --

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Perhaps scheduled medical

procedures.

THE COURT: Or -- no. If they are undergoing a heart

transplant or something like that --

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: That's what I mean.

THE COURT: -- and it cannot be rescheduled -- I mean,

a colonoscopy does not count, although some people would think

the choice between a colonoscopy and going to mediation -- and

immovable personal -- for which they would need a doctor's note

because at this point it's very important that the Plaintiffs

show up.

Now, the question is: Who are you going to select as a

mediator? And how soon can you identify that person? And how

soon can you find out when and where that person is available

to mediate?

I'm beginning to hear, though, that this is not going

to happen before the end of October.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I think that's safe.

THE COURT: Or mid-October is more likely by the time


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you give everybody -- you're going to have to select the

mediator. There may be some trial and error until you find

somebody who is available.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Is the goal for the mediator to be

constant? That mediator will be the mediator if we're

successful here and, if we go on to another area, we want to

have that mediator persistent or do we want to have a mediator

from the geographic area that we're going to be mediating?

THE COURT: What are the pros and cons for both those

suggestions?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Number one, cost. If we have a

mediator that's going to be expected to attend every mediation

wherever we go, he or she has to travel and house them,

et cetera.

Also, knowing the personalities of the people. You

know, a mediator in Texas would know how to speak to Texans to

move them off the dime, where a mediator from New York speaking

to a Texan may not be able to do that.

THE COURT: So you're suggesting a -- selecting

different mediators, depending upon the jurisdiction that the

mediation occurs?

I think that what Mr. Verde was suggesting is

getting -- are you just going to do one mediation or were you

going to suggest doing three bellwethers?

MR. VERDE: We were just going to do the one and see


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how it goes. And then, if we make progress, let's do the other

areas of concentration and then try and knock off more and more

people.

I take Ron's point. It's a big country and local

customs do matter. But I think let's pick one location. Let's

get the people there. Let's get a local mediator there.

And depending on what the results are -- if we make

fantastic progress and we can try to do this on a much broader

basis, great.

If we think we still need to take smaller steps and do

more localized -- further bellwether mediations, we will do

that as well. But my sense is we would probably want to get a

local person to do that.

It would mean -- it's a six of one, half dozen of the

of the other. You're going to have to pay the same mediator to

travel. But on the other hand, you have to pay a new mediator

get up to speed. So there's no really good answer there.

THE COURT: How soon could you all come up with the

name of a mediator that I could appoint? Or shall we -- let's

take our ten-minute break so my court reporter, who's been

going for almost two hours, can take a break.

I don't want to leave here without a schedule of

exactly what we're going to do and when we're going to do it

by.

The things we need to do are the -- when -- you're


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going to get me the modified judgments that I can enter, when

you want to have -- when you're going to get me the suggestion

for what I need to put together for -- and it should only be

one page or two pages, max, for the Eleventh Circuit to certify

the question -- the selection of the mediator and the timing of

setting the mediation.

I'm going to leave the setting of the mediation, but

I'd like to put an outside date by which it needs to be done.

And then we have the issue as to going forward with anything

else as far as the amendment of the pleadings.

I think that we are in agreement that we will stay the

procedures on the reliance issues until after we see whether or

not the Eleventh Circuit will take the appeal and whether or

not the mediation is effective.

I think that that is the more cost-effective way.

And then I think I can close down the MDL at the end of

this month unless there is any --

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Would you continue -- well, it's

not really stayed, but you would excuse them from trial.

With respect to our claims against Brican, we'd stay

those as well?

THE COURT: I forgot about that.

What are we going to do with Brican?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Well, I am preparing a motion for

summary judgment. And, of course, as we're preparing motions


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like that, we always think very optimistically that they're the

greatest things ever written and they certainly would be

granted.

I recognize that may not happen. But I suspect that I

would have a motion for summary judgment completed a month from

now. And then, at that point, if the motion for summary

judgment is ultimately denied, we need a schedule to get us to

trial.

THE COURT: Lucky me. Lucky you.

If you will just come up with some dates. And I'll see

you back here at 12:15.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thanks.

(Thereupon a recess was taken, after which the

following proceedings were had:)

THE COURT: I just wanted to find out what your all's

proposed schedule is for the various things, and we will

depart.


We have for the modified judgment by September 19th. I

just do not have any availability next week, Judge.

THE COURT: That's okay. I won't be here. I'll be

back on the 18th.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Okay. The suggestion for

certification to the Eleventh on September 19th as well.


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THE COURT: I probably -- oh. The suggestions that

you're going to give me?


The selection of mediator we're already working on. We

should have that completed by September 30th. The reason we

need that additional time is because finding a very good

mediator -- it's unusual that they have time available for us

right away. So if we have to bypass our first choice and go to

the second one, it may take us until September 30th to have

that done.

THE COURT: That sounds reasonable to me.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: And then the outside date for

mediation, we have November 15th. And we are -- as soon as we

have the mediator selected and have the commitment from him to

be available, we're going to be working on getting that

mediation set and everybody there.

But since you asked for an outside date, we wanted to

have, you know, a couple extra weeks in case we have problems

with scheduling the mediator.

THE COURT: Again, that sounds rational.

MR. VERDE: We've selected California. Probably it'll

be Los Angeles, San Diego. They're close enough. I don't

think it's unreasonable to get people from Los Angeles to San

Diego or vice versa or, as a possibly, San Francisco, because

there seem to be two significant clusters. But it'll be one of


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the California locations.

THE COURT: Or LA.

MR. VERDE: It'll be LA or -- LA/San Diego or possibly

San Francisco, but much more likely either LA/San Diego.

THE COURT: So it'll be between San Diego and LA?

MR. VERDE: We could absolutely set it up at the midway

point.

THE COURT: Again, you'll figure it out, depending on

how many people you have from San Diego and how many people

from LA?

MR. VERDE: Right.

THE COURT: Okay. That sounds like -- you all were

very efficient in 15 minutes. You have great incentive to get

rid of this case.

Yes.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Do you want to hear the proposed

dates I have for Brican, even though we don't have Brican's

attorney here?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: The filing of the motion for

summary judgment, by December 15th, so I can focus on the

mediation and talking to all the doctors that I need to talk

to.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: A response by January 15th,


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giving, you know, credence to the fact that the last two weeks

of December are not going to be workable anyway.

Then a reply by January 30th --

THE COURT: What do they have to say at that point?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: I don't know. I don't know what

they're going to say. I don't know what they think they can

say. But they'll certainly have an opportunity.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: And I have a suggestion of a trial

date in March of 2015. That's in the Brican matter only, of

course.

THE COURT: Okay. How long do you think that trial

will take?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Two days. But I don't know what

they're going to try to raise.

THE COURT: We'll find out.


THE COURT: Mr. Verde, Mr. Nemecek and Ms. Rodriguez

will be saying, "We don't have to be there."

MR. ROBERT GOSSETT: They'll miss the music.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: That's all the dates I had down,

Judge.

THE COURT: And --

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: The amendment to the counterclaim?


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THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: We didn't have it on our last

list. That's up to Mike.

MR. VERDE: Your Honor, if we're -- I took your last

comment that we were staying procedural issues until down the

road, that everything -- because you're going to terminate the

MDL action, but keep the district court action. So --

THE COURT: Although I must admit I looked at how --

whether or not I had jurisdiction for the counterclaim. That

set me back to looking at the face of it. I went, "Huh. Do we

really have a viable cause of action here?"

MR. VERDE: We're happy to do it if it would make more

sense, though, if everything is going to be stayed pending the

interlocutory appeal, maybe -- and the mediations, we'll do it.

THE COURT: One of the things that I need for us to --

what do I tell Judge --

MR. COLE: Hubbard. He's no longer assigned this case

directly.

MR. VERDE: It used be Hubbard, but it's not now.

THE COURT: He hasn't told me that yet.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: He hasn't come back to earth yet.

He's been celebrating ever since.

THE COURT: When did he move from that division?

MR. COLE: I believe they moved him to a criminal court

now. I don't believe there's anyone directly assigned to this,


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but I'm not sure on that.

THE COURT: Because I sent him a copy of the --

MR. COLE: I'm sure he would share it with the chief

judge.

THE COURT: And he said, "Keep me advised." In sending

him a copy of the findings of facts, I told him he didn't have

to read it unless he really had an insomnia problem and it

would cure it real quick.

So what are -- what, if anything, so that I can at

least share that so that his chief judge will know what impact

it will have?

MR. VERDE: My suggestion is, since it doesn't impact

your ability to shut down the MDL and the district court case

is going to have to continue anyway, why don't we -- I thought

you had said we were going to stay other procedural issues,

which I took to include the counterclaim issues.

Effectively, we could kick the can down the road a bit

and see where we are and see if -- our thinking on this may

change if, against all odds, Brican or some of the other

individuals do show up to defend themselves.

THE COURT: So you mean if suddenly they file a

response to the motion for summary judgment?

MR. VERDE: Yes.

THE COURT: And how will that change everything?

Because then you will want to be back here.


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MR. VERDE: Well, "want" is probably not the right

word. But there's a trustee involved. And there's a trustee

for Brican, who like all bankruptcy trustees, have powers. And

I would want to make sure we're not being dragged back in

through that angle.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: My understanding --

THE COURT: That Brican may --

MR. VERDE: Right.

THE COURT: What theory would Brican have against you

guys?

MR. VERDE: I don't know. But it's a bankruptcy

trustee, and they're very creative.

Mr. Gossett -- and he's absolutely correct. We have a

release. But whether the release encompasses some other new

claims that we haven't even thought of -- well, all I'm saying

is, if the Court thinks it'll move the ball along, we'll file

these pleadings.

But I think it's better off if we're concentrating on

the interlocutory appeal and the mediation. And I don't think

it delays the case any by moving this back. If at some point

you want to set a date to see where we are --

THE COURT: The only concern I have at this point is

what are the counterclaims and the third-party claims' impact

on this case and on the Iowa case? Because I need to report to

the Iowa judge. Because what we're doing here, hopefully,


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makes his or her life easier.

MR. VERDE: Right.

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: One other consideration on the

counterclaim is if NCMIC chooses several doctors to participate

in the mediation that are counterclaim Defendants and there's

no counterclaim against them that articulates what they're

exposed to, it's hard to have them weigh their exposure.

THE COURT: That's a good point.

MR. VERDE: I think there's a lot of good reasons to

just leave that be for now. And we'll -- I mean, if we are in

a position where we have to come back to it -- I don't think it

affects anything in Iowa because that's going to be --

Mr. Gossett has indicated he's going up on appeal on the one --

I'm sorry -- on the three-column leases and we're going to have

an interlocutory appeal on the one-column leases. So Iowa is

not going to be in a position to do anything in the short term

anyway.

THE COURT: What impact does the amendment of the

counterclaim have on the mediation process that we're going

through? Are any of the Plaintiffs in California in the 274?

MR. RONALD GOSSETT: Yeah. I'm sure there are.

MR. VERDE: Statistically, it's almost a certainty.

Yes.

THE COURT: So is the plan to keep them out of the pool

that you're going to choose or is the plan to keep them in?


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MR. VERDE: The plan -- when we get to the actual names

of who we're going to choose, we'll try and choose a broad

cross-section. I don't think -- we will try and get some

people who are subject to the cross- and counterclaims in

there.

THE COURT: Then, I think that you will need -- if you

really want to have a club, you need to have the counterclaims

spelled out or else indicate that you're not proceeding with a

counterclaim.

MR. VERDE: Okay. We can do that. I don't know -- the

fact that there's a counterclaim against them, the particular

legal theories or the pointy-head lawyering language that goes

into stating that claim, I'm not sure how much difference that

will make to them, but we're certainly happy to do that.

THE COURT: Well, one of the things that the

mediator -- the tools for the mediator is -- here is

exposure --

MR. VERDE: Right.

THE COURT: -- so that they can factor in what's it

worth to have peace.

MR. VERDE: So would it make sense, then, if we restate

the claim, but then hold on the motion -- Mr. Gossett's motion

to dismiss until further down the line?

THE COURT: He's not filing a motion to dismiss.

MR. VERDE: Oh. Okay.


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THE COURT: Because you're going to rewrite the

counterclaim so that it deals with his issues to dismiss.

MR. VERDE: Right. Okay.

THE COURT: Do you think you could do that?

MR. VERDE: Certainly. We will --

THE COURT: Because I am not encouraging -- in fact,

I'm actively discouraging -- any motion to dismiss.

MR. VERDE: Okay.

THE COURT: That's why I asked him to set out all of

the grounds that he was going to argue or set out in his motion

to dismiss so that you could see what his avenues of attack are

going to be and see if you could plead your way around that.

MR. VERDE: Okay. Then, it's fair to ask us at this --

after all that's happened to restate this.

Can we -- the only thing I'd ask is: Would it be

possible for us to file this after we see the amended findings

of fact and concluded of law?

THE COURT: Certainly. So why don't we do that

September the 30th as well or I could do it mid-October as

well.

MR. VERDE: Well, it depends on when --

THE COURT: You're going to select the mediator on the

30th.

MR. VERDE: Right.

THE COURT: So you're going to start setting up -- it


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80

just needs to be done before you have -- start the mediation.

MR. VERDE: Right. I was asking if we could see your

amended opinion before.

THE COURT: Oh, yes.

MR. VERDE: So if we put a hold date of, say,

October 15th, I think that gives us time to absorb your opinion

and should be well before an actual mediation date.

THE COURT: Okay. And then all of the reliance issues

are on hold.

MR. VERDE: I think that's right.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you all very much. I think we

have a plan.

MR. VERDE: Thank you.

THE COURT: And the modified judgments will be to me by

September the 19th. Okay?


THE COURT: That will give us an incentive to have the

revision to the findings of fact and conclusions of law out the

week before September the 30th.

Thank you. We're in recess.

(Proceedings concluded.)

C E R T I F I C A T E


1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

81

I hereby certify that the foregoing is an accurate

transcription of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

____________ /s/Lisa Edwards_____DATE LISA EDWARDS, RDR, CRR

Official United States Court Reporter400 North Miami Avenue, Twelfth FloorMiami, Florida 33128(305) 523-5499


$

$1,000 [3] - 5:4,

28:25, 58:21

$14 [1] - 8:20

$15,000 [1] - 28:25

$23,000 [2] - 21:24,

22:19

$25,000 [1] - 28:23

$400 [3] - 20:18,

21:12, 21:21

'

'no [1] - 56:2

/

/s/Lisa [1] - 81:6

1

1 [2] - 1:7, 11:18

1,000 [1] - 62:7

1,010 [3] - 31:9,

31:17, 61:24

10 [1] - 62:4

10-2183MD-Seitz [1]

- 3:1

10-MD-02183-SEITZ

[1] - 1:2

100 [5] - 28:18,

28:22, 29:5, 29:12,

34:7

10022 [1] - 1:22

1010 [1] - 55:23

106 [1] - 28:5

10:00 [1] - 1:6

110 [1] - 28:5

1100 [1] - 55:6

1200 [1] - 14:10

12:15 [1] - 70:11

12:30 [1] - 1:6

15 [6] - 10:22, 28:25,

56:2, 58:11, 63:18,

72:13

15th [4] - 71:13,

72:21, 72:25, 80:6

1688 [1] - 1:24

17 [1] - 10:22

173 [1] - 63:23

17501 [1] - 1:18

18 [2] - 63:13, 64:12

18th [1] - 70:23

19 [1] - 14:3

1966 [1] - 43:5

1986 [2] - 33:17,

33:21

19th [3] - 70:20,

70:25, 80:15

2

2 [1] - 10:21

20 [2] - 63:7, 65:10

2008 [2] - 19:22,

19:23

2011 [1] - 26:8

2013 [1] - 42:5

2014 [2] - 1:5, 42:7

2015 [1] - 73:10

21 [2] - 10:19, 10:21

22 [3] - 10:21, 42:5,

42:7

23,000 [2] - 23:13,

23:14

247 [1] - 19:4

25 [6] - 56:2, 61:5,

62:24, 63:14, 63:18,

63:19

25,000 [1] - 16:20

274 [4] - 7:9, 17:21,

24:24, 77:20

29 [1] - 10:21

3

3 [2] - 10:22, 49:10

30 [3] - 10:22, 61:5

305 [2] - 2:4, 81:8

30th [6] - 71:5, 71:9,

73:3, 79:19, 79:23,

80:19

33021 [1] - 1:15

33128 [2] - 2:3, 81:8

33139 [1] - 1:25

33160 [1] - 1:19

39 [1] - 31:19

4

4 [3] - 1:5, 11:18,

13:12

400 [2] - 2:2, 81:7

41 [1] - 55:23

42(B [2] - 34:13,

38:13

45 [1] - 59:11

4700 [1] - 1:15

5

5 [6] - 10:19, 11:22,

12:4, 12:9, 14:1

50 [5] - 14:2, 60:1,

60:5, 61:5, 63:8

501 [1] - 1:18

523-5499 [2] - 2:4,

81:8

538 [1] - 33:13

57 [2] - 64:22, 65:6

57.105 [1] - 4:22

575 [1] - 1:22

576-1 [1] - 49:10

577 [2] - 46:6, 46:7

577-1 [1] - 46:4

6

6 [3] - 11:18, 47:20,

48:6

60 [1] - 14:2

61 [1] - 57:1

640 [3] - 56:10,

60:14, 60:17

650 [2] - 7:10, 65:8

679.4031(2) [1] -

42:11

69 [1] - 56:25

7

70 [1] - 10:19

75 [2] - 27:10, 58:11

8

8 [3] - 10:21, 13:15,

13:23

80s [1] - 54:18

9

900 [1] - 1:24

A

a.m [1] - 1:6

ability [6] - 31:8,

37:15, 42:18, 42:20,

60:9, 75:13

able [11] - 4:10, 9:6,

48:11, 48:18, 53:16,

56:6, 56:20, 57:11,

62:19, 62:25, 67:18

above-entitled [1] -

81:3

abrogated [1] - 43:6

absolutely [3] - 31:4,

72:6, 76:13

absorb [1] - 80:6

accept [3] - 30:16,

30:23, 44:25

accepted [1] - 29:18

access [3] - 56:20,

56:21, 65:5

accordingly [1] -

14:22

accruing [1] - 60:12

accurate [1] - 81:2

accused [1] - 23:25

acquire [1] - 19:21

Act [1] - 43:10

action [9] - 6:19,

9:25, 31:12, 31:14,

46:14, 56:6, 74:7,

74:11

active [8] - 18:9,

18:12, 18:23, 18:25,

19:2, 19:9, 19:14,

20:14

actively [1] - 79:7

actual [8] - 16:16,

16:18, 23:7, 37:9,

40:16, 46:11, 78:1,

80:7

add [2] - 23:25, 60:4

additional [3] - 3:16,

20:12, 71:6

address [2] - 24:6,

27:2

adept [1] - 58:25

administrator [2] -

57:5, 57:6

admit [2] - 25:24,

74:8

adopted [1] - 43:5

adoption [1] - 43:3

advance [1] - 31:25

advantage [1] -

45:25

advertise [1] - 21:11

advice [3] - 31:11,

31:20, 31:22

advise [1] - 31:10

advised [1] - 75:5

advisor [1] - 23:6

advocate [1] - 25:21

affect [1] - 18:6

affects [1] - 77:12

affidavit [1] - 59:9

affidavits [2] - 27:6,

27:12

affiliates [2] - 25:10,

25:13

agency [6] - 36:18,

36:21, 37:22, 38:1,

38:2

agent [2] - 26:16,

26:18

1

agents [3] - 25:7,

25:8, 26:11

aggrieved [1] - 41:18

ago [2] - 18:5, 54:12

agree [7] - 4:1, 30:9,

32:12, 47:17, 55:3,

61:24, 63:3

agreed [5] - 3:19,

14:6, 34:11, 39:4,

57:6

agreement [7] - 5:4,

23:5, 23:6, 32:3,

47:20, 50:14, 69:11

Agreement [1] - 14:1

agreements [7] -

4:20, 42:11, 47:22,

49:22, 50:5, 50:10,

51:2

al [2] - 1:14, 1:17

all's [2] - 47:2, 70:16

allegation [2] - 25:6,

26:19

allegations [1] - 6:11

allege [1] - 19:20

allow [1] - 59:1

allowed [1] - 34:11

almost [3] - 63:12,

68:21, 77:22

alternative [1] - 28:8

amenable [2] - 29:1,

29:4

amend [2] - 18:3,

26:22

amended [8] - 3:21,

4:10, 18:4, 24:7,

48:19, 48:20, 79:16,

80:3

amendment [4] -

26:16, 69:10, 73:25,

77:18

America [1] - 3:2

AMERICA [1] - 1:4

amount [5] - 5:18,

20:2, 22:16, 29:15,

41:17

amounts [1] - 47:6

analysis [2] - 3:21,

44:2

Angela [2] - 11:1,

13:10

Angeles [4] - 64:10,

64:11, 71:22, 71:23

angle [1] - 76:5

annexed [1] - 47:8

answer [8] - 5:24,

11:19, 11:20, 42:1,

42:4, 57:11, 57:13,

68:17

answered [1] - 58:19

answers [1] - 42:4


Antonio [1] - 65:14

anxiety [1] - 33:18

anyway [3] - 73:2,

75:14, 77:17

AO [1] - 53:12

apiece [2] - 20:18,

21:12

apparent [5] - 36:18,

36:20, 37:22, 38:1,

38:2

appeal [11] - 32:3,

35:5, 45:10, 45:11,

60:10, 62:1, 69:13,

74:14, 76:19, 77:13,

77:15

appealable [1] -

45:20

appearance [1] -

27:19

appearances [1] -

3:3

APPEARANCES [1] -

1:12

appeared [2] - 38:5,

39:9

appearing [1] - 30:12

applicability [1] -

45:12

applied [1] - 33:24

applies [3] - 3:19,

33:1, 45:22

apply [1] - 36:9

appoint [2] - 27:13,

68:19

appreciate [2] - 44:7,

61:1

appreciative [1] -

53:15

approached [1] -

56:4

approaches [1] -

26:6

approval [1] - 33:9

April [1] - 26:8

area [14] - 22:11,

22:13, 22:14, 22:17,

23:25, 36:14, 62:24,

63:6, 63:18, 63:20,

64:6, 64:19, 67:6,

67:8

areas [1] - 68:2

argue [1] - 79:10

argued [1] - 38:24

arguing [3] - 33:5,

39:14, 43:12

argument [3] - 3:17,

9:12, 42:24

arguments [1] -

51:13

arise [1] - 32:16

arm's [1] - 24:21

arm's-length [1] -

24:21

arms [1] - 35:2

arrange [1] - 27:17

articulate [1] - 45:21

articulated [2] - 4:2,

52:22

articulates [1] - 77:6

aspect [1] - 26:23

asserted [3] - 51:7,

51:24, 52:2

assertive [1] - 49:20

assessment [1] -

19:25

assigned [2] - 74:17,

74:25

assignee [1] - 37:15

assigns [1] - 25:9

assistant [1] - 57:7

assuming [1] - 7:25

attack [1] - 79:11

attempting [1] -

10:15

attend [2] - 55:20,

67:12

attendance [1] -

65:21

attorney [1] - 72:18

attorneys [1] - 25:12

attorneys' [5] - 4:15,

4:16, 4:18, 5:12, 6:4

authority [1] - 56:6

avail [1] - 30:11

availability [1] -

70:21

available [4] - 66:20,

67:3, 71:7, 71:15

Aventura [1] - 1:19

avenue [1] - 65:24

Avenue [4] - 1:22,

1:24, 2:2, 81:7

avenues [1] - 79:11

avoid [1] - 58:1

awareness [1] -

18:11

B

baby [1] - 43:16

ball [7] - 34:1, 34:3,

34:4, 34:5, 34:6, 34:8,

76:16

bananas [1] - 56:12

bankruptcy [5] -

33:9, 33:10, 33:13,

76:3, 76:11

Barbieri [2] - 10:18,

11:21

based [7] - 3:18, 9:2,

18:14, 22:19, 37:3,

45:11, 51:4

bases [1] - 33:13

basis [16] - 4:4, 4:5,

4:8, 4:15, 4:18, 6:10,

6:13, 15:17, 15:23,

20:5, 27:10, 34:23,

49:21, 52:19, 58:10,

68:9

basketball [1] - 34:4

Beach [1] - 1:25

bear [1] - 32:13

became [1] - 15:10

become [1] - 40:12

becomes [4] - 4:22,

45:20, 61:13, 61:20

bed [1] - 32:23

BEFORE [1] - 1:9

began [1] - 53:20

begin [3] - 27:5,

40:6, 60:7

beginning [5] - 5:6,

6:22, 25:21, 26:3,

66:22

behalf [2] - 3:4, 3:11

behind [1] - 16:25

bellwether [3] -

61:13, 65:20, 68:11

bellwethers [1] -

67:24

beneficial [1] - 44:12

benefit [1] - 44:1

benefits [2] - 6:5,

24:22

Bentley [1] - 59:24

best [2] - 32:4, 60:9

better [6] - 17:11,

17:19, 28:7, 30:10,

76:18

between [6] - 10:14,

24:14, 60:21, 63:17,

66:14, 72:5

beyond [4] - 19:10,

34:19, 36:16, 50:15

biases [1] - 53:10

big [4] - 49:1, 59:5,

65:13, 68:4

Biscayne [1] - 1:18

bit [6] - 5:21, 18:15,

22:1, 33:15, 57:16,

75:17

bitter [1] - 62:5

black [1] - 33:15

Blauzvern [5] - 3:5,

3:6, 10:20, 11:23,

11:24

BLAUZVERN [1] -

1:14

bless [1] - 48:13

blocking [1] - 29:23

blocks [2] - 37:15,

49:1

blunt [1] - 41:13

boilerplate [1] -

27:19

bones [1] - 29:25

booked [1] - 62:15

boroughs [2] -

64:12, 64:13

bothered [1] - 21:18

bottom [1] - 24:2

bought [2] - 19:17,

22:20

Boulevard [1] - 1:18

brain [1] - 45:24

brand [1] - 38:4

brand-new [1] - 38:4

bread [1] - 20:11

break [3] - 59:25,

68:20, 68:21

Brican [29] - 3:1, 8:8,

8:9, 8:10, 8:13, 8:17,

9:2, 10:15, 12:12,

12:16, 12:17, 13:1,

13:6, 22:11, 24:14,

25:7, 30:7, 30:9,

47:24, 47:25, 69:20,

69:23, 72:17, 73:10,

75:19, 76:3, 76:7,

76:9

BRICAN [1] - 1:4

Brican's [2] - 47:22,

72:17

bridge [1] - 18:6

brief [2] - 24:9, 45:18

briefing [2] - 9:12,

36:18

bring [9] - 8:24,

21:20, 23:21, 24:11,

27:21, 28:3, 31:23,

35:2, 54:24

broad [6] - 24:15,

24:25, 25:15, 25:18,

50:14, 78:2

broad-brush [1] -

50:14

broader [1] - 68:8

broken [1] - 63:22

brother [2] - 58:25,

59:5

brought [7] - 6:15,

25:16, 37:4, 40:24,

41:7, 50:12, 50:18

brush [1] - 50:14

budget [1] - 59:21

Building [1] - 1:15

bulb [1] - 38:19

bunch [1] - 28:4

burden [1] - 7:6

2

buried [1] - 39:4

business [4] - 21:7,

41:1, 41:6, 44:4

businesspeople [1] -

58:4

BY [1] - 2:1

bypass [2] - 59:3,

71:8

C

calculating [1] -

46:11

California [4] - 64:5,

71:21, 72:1, 77:20

cancellation [2] -

36:25, 51:4

cannot [5] - 8:5,

27:2, 35:1, 58:4,

66:12

care [2] - 45:16, 60:3

Caribbean [1] - 8:19

Carolina [3] - 22:6,

22:20, 23:1

carried [1] - 43:4

case [38] - 6:3, 6:16,

6:22, 14:6, 14:8,

14:21, 15:3, 17:25,

30:5, 31:6, 34:10,

34:13, 35:2, 37:20,

38:9, 38:13, 39:11,

41:24, 41:25, 43:3,

43:14, 44:9, 46:3,

50:7, 50:18, 53:11,

54:20, 55:7, 60:10,

61:2, 62:22, 71:18,

72:14, 74:17, 75:13,

76:20, 76:24

CASE [1] - 1:2

Case [1] - 3:1

cases [6] - 33:9,

33:13, 33:20, 36:5,

54:2, 54:3

Castillo [2] - 15:2,

17:22

Catanzarite [1] -

13:25

categories [2] -

47:14, 48:7

categorizations [1] -

47:17

category [1] - 17:22

Catherine [1] - 3:11

CATHERINE [1] -

1:23

cats [1] - 57:25

celebrating [1] -

74:22

cents [4] - 28:20,


29:12, 60:1, 60:5

certain [2] - 22:16,

32:3

certainly [9] - 5:9,

61:18, 61:22, 65:9,

70:2, 73:7, 78:14,

79:5, 79:18

certainty [1] - 77:22

certification [1] -

70:25

certify [5] - 44:11,

44:14, 44:16, 69:4,

81:2

cetera [2] - 33:22,

67:14

chance [1] - 61:19

change [6] - 26:5,

34:11, 41:15, 47:23,

75:19, 75:24

changed [6] - 6:23,

38:16, 39:20, 40:7,

42:14, 47:21

changes [2] - 33:22,

47:24

changing [1] - 38:15

charitably [1] - 32:20

Charlip [9] - 3:8,

25:3, 28:17, 48:11,

49:14, 56:22, 61:23,

63:23, 64:23

CHARLIP [17] - 1:17,

1:17, 3:8, 13:18,

13:22, 23:23, 50:9,

51:1, 51:8, 51:22,

51:25, 52:6, 56:24,

57:2, 64:24, 65:1,

65:4

Charlip's [1] - 12:6

Charlotte [1] - 22:7

chase [2] - 34:18,

39:17

chased [3] - 34:16,

37:24, 39:15

chasing [3] - 38:10,

39:12, 40:8

cheapest [1] - 31:24

check [3] - 13:22,

15:11, 19:17

chief [2] - 75:3,

75:10

child [2] - 58:3, 66:5

chill [1] - 50:16

chilling [1] - 51:11

choice [2] - 66:14,

71:8

choose [4] - 11:7,

77:25, 78:2

chooses [2] - 62:24,

77:4

chose [3] - 11:11,

40:4, 62:21

chosen [2] - 11:10,

11:12

Circuit [3] - 44:22,

69:4, 69:13

circumstances [1] -

27:7

cited [1] - 33:8

cites [1] - 25:18

City [2] - 64:6, 64:16

city [3] - 64:11,

64:13, 65:11

claim [18] - 4:16,

4:18, 6:11, 6:17, 7:19,

8:1, 8:10, 9:11, 9:14,

12:16, 15:16, 15:25,

16:5, 30:24, 30:25,

42:5, 78:13, 78:22

claims [8] - 6:15,

8:13, 49:19, 50:4,

50:17, 51:14, 69:20,

76:15

claims' [1] - 76:23

clarify [2] - 4:5, 31:2

class [8] - 4:17,

11:14, 14:13, 31:12,

31:14, 56:5, 56:6,

56:9

classic [1] - 17:6

clause [4] - 30:13,

42:6, 51:4, 51:5

clean [1] - 38:3

clear [6] - 32:1, 33:1,

34:7, 34:8, 52:12,

52:16

clerk [3] - 46:20,

48:17

client [11] - 12:7,

13:17, 13:25, 29:17,

31:22, 47:25, 50:11,

50:16, 60:19, 60:22

clients [14] - 5:4,

23:20, 30:18, 30:19,

31:19, 43:22, 56:23,

56:25, 58:2, 58:17,

59:17, 61:1, 63:23,

65:7

clinic [2] - 17:7,

21:11

Close [17] - 33:25,

34:22, 35:6, 35:12,

35:16, 35:22, 36:3,

37:4, 38:6, 38:7, 39:3,

39:20, 40:1, 40:17,

40:19, 40:22, 42:20

close [7] - 44:9, 53:8,

53:13, 53:16, 53:24,

69:16, 71:22

closed [3] - 53:14,

56:18, 56:19

closer [2] - 5:21,

5:25

club [1] - 78:7

clusters [1] - 71:25

co [1] - 4:6

co-filer [1] - 4:6

code [1] - 45:13

Cole [1] - 3:12

COLE [3] - 74:17,

74:24, 75:3

collect [2] - 8:17,

37:15

colonoscopy [2] -

66:13, 66:14

column [10] - 11:17,

11:21, 12:1, 12:9,

13:11, 13:14, 13:23,

14:1, 77:14, 77:15

coming [3] - 20:4,

53:10, 56:14

comment [2] - 39:15,

74:5

commentary [1] -

38:19

commercial [2] -

38:22, 39:8

commercially [1] -

40:21

commitment [1] -

71:14

committee [2] - 53:4,

53:5

common [2] - 32:25,

33:25

communicate [2] -

56:13, 59:13

communicating [2] -

56:15, 58:1

communication [4] -

19:16, 56:17, 57:8,

57:21

companies [1] -

25:10

company [1] - 36:2

compensation [1] -

23:16

complete [1] - 48:11

completed [3] - 10:1,

70:5, 71:5

completely [2] -

35:7, 35:20

complied [1] - 42:22

component [5] -

35:25, 39:8, 40:20,

40:21, 41:8

compounding [1] -

33:7

comprehensive [1] -

25:19

compromise [1] -

29:11

computer [1] - 65:4

concede [1] - 7:20

concentrating [1] -

76:18

concentration [3] -

63:5, 65:13, 68:2

concept [2] - 52:16,

53:1

concern [1] - 76:22

concerned [3] - 4:3,

12:20, 47:24

conclude [1] - 15:8

concluded [2] -

79:17, 80:21

conclusion [6] -

3:23, 8:24, 9:22, 28:3,

31:23, 35:2

conclusions [8] -

3:21, 4:9, 28:6, 30:3,

44:6, 48:20, 53:22,

80:18

CONFERENCE [1] -

1:9

conference [1] -

53:13

confidence [1] -

54:23

conjunction [1] -

45:11

Connection [17] -

33:25, 34:22, 35:6,

35:12, 35:16, 35:22,

36:3, 37:4, 38:7, 38:8,

39:3, 39:20, 40:1,

40:18, 40:19, 40:22,

42:21

cons [1] - 67:9

consideration [1] -

77:3

consistent [1] -

36:10

constant [1] - 67:5

construed [1] -

25:18

consulted [1] - 60:19

consumer [1] - 21:7

consuming [1] -

57:18

contact [2] - 10:11,

22:21

contacting [1] -

10:12

contained [1] - 51:20

context [2] - 14:5,

16:3

contingencies [1] -

8:16

continuation [1] -

6:5

3

continue [4] - 6:4,

17:3, 69:18, 75:14

continued [1] - 42:25

continuing [1] -

15:12

contract [4] - 4:16,

22:17, 23:3, 23:4

contractor [1] - 23:5

contribute [1] - 7:23

contributed [2] - 5:4,

7:23

contribution [12] -

6:10, 6:13, 7:19, 7:21,

7:22, 8:1, 9:11, 9:14,

9:24, 15:15, 15:25,

16:4

control [2] - 14:12,

31:9

controlling [1] - 45:2

controls [1] - 42:13

convey [1] - 4:4

conveyances [1] -

33:14

copy [2] - 75:2, 75:6

Corp [1] - 36:5

CORPORATION [1] -

1:21

corporations [1] -

25:10

correct [11] - 16:1,

21:25, 51:1, 51:8,

51:25, 52:4, 52:18,

61:22, 65:4, 76:13

correctly [1] - 20:23

cost [6] - 44:1,

59:17, 60:6, 60:15,

67:11, 69:15

cost-benefit [1] -

44:1

cost-effective [1] -

69:15

costly [1] - 57:18

costs [2] - 14:12,

43:25

counsel [2] - 3:3,

43:21

count [1] - 66:13

counted [1] - 21:24

counterclaim [17] -

10:2, 11:9, 15:13,

18:4, 18:5, 24:7,

26:20, 73:25, 74:9,

75:16, 77:4, 77:5,

77:6, 77:19, 78:9,

78:11, 79:2

counterclaims [6] -

6:8, 9:24, 10:1, 76:23,

78:4, 78:7

Counterdefendants

[1] - 10:5


counteroffer [1] -

32:8

country [2] - 48:15,

68:4

couple [3] - 4:12,

54:12, 71:18

course [11] - 3:20,

3:24, 6:21, 8:6, 41:25,

42:10, 42:19, 43:1,

43:14, 69:25, 73:11

COURT [227] - 1:1,

3:12, 4:23, 5:3, 5:7,

5:10, 5:16, 5:19, 6:2,

7:9, 7:13, 8:4, 8:12,

8:21, 8:23, 9:7, 9:10,

9:19, 10:4, 10:23,

11:3, 11:7, 11:15,

11:23, 12:1, 12:5,

12:10, 12:14, 12:16,

12:19, 12:25, 13:2,

13:5, 13:8, 13:13,

13:16, 14:2, 15:12,

15:17, 15:20, 16:11,

16:13, 16:19, 16:22,

17:21, 18:1, 18:22,

18:25, 19:5, 19:8,

19:19, 20:6, 20:9,

21:2, 21:8, 21:21,

22:3, 22:22, 23:12,

24:2, 24:5, 24:9,

24:12, 24:18, 25:20,

26:9, 26:14, 26:17,

26:21, 26:23, 28:21,

29:3, 29:7, 29:19,

29:21, 29:24, 31:1,

31:6, 31:14, 31:21,

32:2, 32:14, 34:3,

34:5, 34:20, 35:1,

35:8, 35:12, 35:18,

35:24, 36:9, 37:6,

37:11, 41:2, 43:7,

43:15, 44:18, 44:20,

45:5, 45:14, 46:5,

46:7, 46:9, 46:19,

47:1, 47:7, 48:5,

48:13, 49:1, 49:7,

49:9, 50:6, 50:19,

51:2, 51:9, 51:16,

51:18, 51:23, 52:1,

52:5, 52:8, 52:18,

52:21, 52:24, 53:3,

53:19, 54:9, 54:11,

54:13, 54:15, 54:17,

54:21, 55:11, 55:14,

55:19, 56:8, 56:12,

56:22, 56:25, 57:3,

58:2, 58:7, 58:14,

58:21, 58:24, 59:5,

59:16, 59:20, 60:2,

60:20, 61:1, 61:9,

62:9, 62:12, 62:20,

63:2, 63:7, 63:12,

63:17, 63:25, 64:3,

64:8, 64:15, 64:23,

64:25, 65:2, 65:15,

66:2, 66:4, 66:9,

66:12, 66:25, 67:9,

67:19, 68:18, 69:22,

70:9, 70:13, 70:16,

70:22, 71:1, 71:11,

71:20, 72:2, 72:5,

72:8, 72:12, 72:19,

72:24, 73:4, 73:8,

73:12, 73:16, 73:18,

73:21, 73:24, 74:1,

74:8, 74:15, 74:20,

74:23, 75:2, 75:5,

75:21, 75:24, 76:7,

76:9, 76:22, 77:8,

77:18, 77:24, 78:6,

78:15, 78:19, 78:24,

79:1, 79:4, 79:6, 79:9,

79:18, 79:22, 79:25,

80:4, 80:8, 80:11,

80:14, 80:17

court [7] - 27:14,

46:16, 50:2, 68:20,

74:7, 74:24, 75:13

Court [15] - 2:1, 2:2,

6:18, 17:8, 20:24,

21:17, 33:2, 33:3,

33:8, 38:25, 51:6,

60:7, 65:25, 76:16,

81:7

Court's [6] - 4:6,

9:21, 9:22, 20:24,

21:13, 23:24

courtroom [1] - 53:6

COURTROOM [1] -

3:1

courts [2] - 33:10,

33:16

cover [1] - 52:2

covered [4] - 25:1,

26:13, 26:14

covers [3] - 24:16,

25:8, 49:15

creates [1] - 20:15

creative [1] - 76:12

credence [1] - 73:1

creek [1] - 48:17

criminal [1] - 74:24

critical [3] - 61:12,

63:9, 64:20

cross [5] - 8:15,

14:14, 27:23, 78:3,

78:4

cross-examine [1] -

27:23

cross-section [2] -

14:14, 78:3

CRR [2] - 2:1, 81:6

cure [1] - 75:8

curtailed [1] - 57:18

customs [1] - 68:5

cut [3] - 29:15,

30:17, 41:21

cutoff [1] - 13:3

D

damages [2] - 6:15,

6:17

date [7] - 69:8,

71:12, 71:17, 73:10,

76:21, 80:5, 80:7

DATE [1] - 81:6

dates [3] - 70:10,

72:17, 73:22

David [2] - 3:8, 13:17

DAVID [1] - 1:17

days [1] - 73:14

deadlines [1] - 65:16

deal [5] - 17:10,

24:21, 26:24, 32:13,

59:22

dealing [3] - 6:18,

37:2, 60:16

deals [1] - 79:2

December [2] -

72:21, 73:2

decision [11] - 3:23,

4:5, 4:6, 4:10, 20:24,

31:10, 31:22, 39:1,

48:19, 48:23, 55:22

decisions [2] - 31:9,

31:18

declaration [9] -

46:15, 46:23, 49:21,

49:23, 49:25, 50:20,

50:22, 52:12

declaratory [5] -

6:19, 46:3, 46:10,

46:14, 46:22

declare [2] - 49:21,

50:5

declared [2] - 51:10,

51:13

declaring [2] - 6:19,

52:10

deeply [1] - 14:16

default [1] - 8:21

defeat [1] - 9:6

defend [1] - 75:20

Defendant [12] - 3:9,

5:19, 6:8, 8:8, 9:2,

11:7, 27:12, 27:21,

43:22, 44:10, 59:21,

66:1

Defendants [6] -

10:2, 11:11, 12:21,

14:3, 43:17, 77:5

defense [11] - 33:14,

42:2, 42:3, 42:5,

42:14, 42:17, 50:17,

51:23, 52:1, 52:15,

52:21

defenses [4] - 37:14,

50:12, 50:13, 51:20

defined [1] - 34:14

defining [1] - 33:13

definition [1] - 36:3

delayed [1] - 60:11

delays [1] - 76:20

demanding [1] -

29:12

denied [1] - 70:7

dense [1] - 64:4

dental [2] - 57:6,

62:15

dentist [7] - 15:4,

15:10, 17:6, 17:9,

17:10, 17:15, 21:4

dentists [2] - 10:10,

22:25

denying [1] - 42:8

depart [1] - 70:18

dependent [2] -

36:24, 37:18

depose [3] - 11:12,

18:19, 22:5

deposed [2] - 11:13,

14:13

deposing [1] - 14:11

deposition [4] -

10:19, 10:21, 14:25,

17:24

depositions [1] -

14:3

DEPUTY [1] - 3:1

describing [2] - 49:2,

49:3

description [1] -

24:15

designated [1] -

65:22

determined [1] -

17:8

developed [1] -

36:14

died [1] - 54:11

Diego [6] - 71:22,

71:24, 72:3, 72:4,

72:5, 72:9

differ [1] - 36:15

difference [3] - 45:3,

49:17, 78:13

different [10] - 14:15,

18:16, 22:1, 23:10,

4

33:8, 40:8, 40:23,

56:16, 67:20

differing [1] - 40:17

difficult [2] - 63:9,

64:15

difficulties [1] -

32:16

difficulty [1] - 63:19

diligence [1] - 21:6

dime [1] - 67:17

direct [1] - 27:18

directed [1] - 47:16

directions [1] - 59:14

directly [3] - 56:18,

74:18, 74:25

directors [1] - 25:12

disagree [1] - 21:13

disagreement [1] -

47:11

disclosing [1] - 27:7

disclosure [1] - 53:9

discouraging [1] -

79:7

discovery [5] - 9:25,

10:1, 14:5, 14:22,

18:19

discrete [2] - 4:13,

38:15

discussed [1] -

53:17

discussion [1] -

60:21

discussions [3] -

28:13, 28:15, 60:7

dismiss [8] - 9:11,

24:3, 25:6, 78:23,

78:24, 79:2, 79:7,

79:11

dismissal [1] - 52:11

dismissed [6] -

49:19, 49:24, 50:3,

62:22, 65:23, 66:1

dismissing [1] - 9:13

dispensed [1] - 6:25

dispute [1] - 44:4

DISTRICT [3] - 1:1,

1:1, 1:10

district [2] - 74:7,

75:13

District [1] - 2:2

disturbing [1] -

41:22

DIVISION [1] - 1:2

division [1] - 74:23

divisions [1] - 25:11

doctor [12] - 10:15,

10:16, 15:9, 17:22,

22:15, 23:2, 28:23,

28:24, 57:12, 59:10

doctor's [1] - 66:15


doctors [20] - 7:7,

10:3, 10:14, 14:17,

14:18, 14:25, 16:9,

17:3, 20:1, 21:20,

24:16, 24:19, 24:22,

57:8, 57:15, 57:22,

58:3, 60:2, 72:22,

77:4

doctrine [2] - 36:4,

42:21

Document [1] - 46:4

dollar [1] - 29:12

dollars [3] - 5:15,

28:20, 29:2

Donald [2] - 11:5,

13:20

done [12] - 7:23,

9:18, 13:3, 14:16,

33:6, 40:23, 47:18,

48:9, 56:18, 69:8,

71:10, 80:1

door [1] - 15:4

dot [1] - 8:15

doubt [3] - 8:25, 29:7

down [22] - 25:22,

25:24, 26:1, 32:6,

38:10, 41:2, 43:16,

44:9, 48:18, 53:8,

53:13, 53:24, 63:22,

64:2, 65:4, 69:16,

73:22, 74:5, 75:13,

75:17, 78:23

Downtown [1] -

64:16

dozen [1] - 68:14

Dr [11] - 10:20,

10:24, 10:25, 11:1,

11:2, 11:5, 11:6,

11:21, 12:24, 15:2,

17:22

drafting [1] - 53:4

dragged [1] - 76:4

dramatically [1] -

62:1

due [12] - 3:20, 3:24,

8:6, 8:14, 21:6, 25:20,

41:21, 41:25, 42:10,

42:19, 43:1, 43:13

dumping [1] - 27:1

dynamics [1] - 63:10

E

e-mail [5] - 19:16,

57:9, 57:12, 57:22,

58:1

e-mails [1] - 56:14

earth [1] - 74:21

easier [8] - 47:2,

48:23, 49:11, 49:13,

56:4, 62:6, 77:1

easy [2] - 31:12,

63:20

eat [2] - 43:18, 61:4

economic [1] - 14:11

economy [1] - 45:7

EDWARDS [2] - 2:1,

81:6

Edwards [1] - 81:6

effect [1] - 37:10

effective [4] - 47:24,

63:10, 69:14, 69:15

effectively [2] -

61:13, 75:17

efficient [2] - 6:21,

72:13

effort [3] - 35:7,

46:19

efforts [1] - 57:16

eight [4] - 11:7,

11:10, 23:17, 27:10

either [3] - 26:6,

61:23, 72:4

elderly [1] - 54:17

element [1] - 30:5

elements [1] - 42:16

elephant [1] - 61:4

Eleventh [4] - 44:22,

69:4, 69:13, 70:25

Elias [3] - 10:24,

12:5, 12:6

eliminated [2] -

29:19, 29:20

embarrassed [1] -

55:25

emotional [3] - 41:3,

41:4, 58:4

employees [1] -

25:12

encompasses [1] -

76:14

encouraging [3] -

40:10, 60:6, 79:6

end [10] - 4:11, 6:3,

8:16, 41:20, 44:8,

53:8, 53:25, 62:5,

66:23, 69:16

enforce [2] - 46:17,

52:14

enforceability [1] -

42:13

enforceable [3] -

42:6, 50:23

engaging [1] - 24:21

enter [4] - 45:14,

45:19, 65:18, 69:1

entered [2] - 44:17,

50:25

entering [1] - 44:16

entire [1] - 35:5

entirety [1] - 57:15

entitled [2] - 43:13,

81:3

envision [1] - 59:10

Equico [1] - 36:5

equipment [1] -

10:15

EQUIPMENT [1] -

1:5

Equipment [1] - 3:2

equitable [4] - 15:16,

15:24, 17:16, 20:15

error [2] - 47:19,

67:2

especially [3] -

18:10, 21:19, 45:21

ESQ [6] - 1:13, 1:14,

1:17, 1:20, 1:21, 1:23

essential [1] - 42:16

establish [1] - 42:22

estoppel [1] - 20:15

et [4] - 1:14, 1:17,

33:22, 67:14

evaluate [1] - 35:25

everywhere [1] -

27:23

evidence [2] - 9:5,

25:25

evident [1] - 20:25

evidentiary [1] -

35:12

exact [2] - 5:20, 6:1

exactly [4] - 32:5,

46:23, 52:6, 68:23

examination [1] -

27:18

examine [2] - 27:23,

30:19

example [2] - 17:6,

50:10

except [1] - 24:21

excuse [1] - 69:19

excused [1] - 9:4

execute [1] - 8:20

Exhibits [1] - 7:16

exist [1] - 7:19

existing [1] - 4:9

expect [2] - 39:18,

61:22

expected [3] - 6:20,

25:25, 67:12

expensive [4] -

14:12, 26:4, 32:14,

32:15

expert [1] - 40:24

exposed [1] - 77:7

exposure [2] - 77:7,

78:17

expressed [1] - 60:8

extent [2] - 32:3,

35:11

extra [1] - 71:18

F

face [3] - 29:25, 51:4,

74:10

fact [15] - 7:21, 9:22,

30:3, 30:12, 30:13,

39:6, 39:10, 40:5,

42:9, 50:15, 73:1,

78:11, 79:6, 79:17,

80:18

factor [1] - 78:19

facts [16] - 3:21, 4:9,

18:11, 18:13, 19:2,

19:20, 20:1, 20:12,

27:7, 27:8, 28:6, 44:6,

48:20, 53:22, 60:8,

75:6

factual [1] - 39:4

fair [4] - 32:19,

36:12, 54:19, 79:13

fairness [2] - 33:2,

33:3

faith [5] - 33:11,

33:14, 35:17, 35:23,

35:25

falls [1] - 47:14

fantastic [1] - 68:8

far [7] - 5:13, 12:19,

12:21, 32:11, 47:24,

62:6, 69:10

fashion [2] - 50:14,

55:24

fast [1] - 41:3

favor [1] - 44:11

February [1] - 39:1

federal [2] - 29:10,

33:8

fee [1] - 4:21

fee-shifting [1] -

4:21

feeding [1] - 40:9

feelings [1] - 58:14

fees [8] - 4:15, 4:16,

4:19, 5:13, 6:4, 15:21,

27:15, 43:25

few [1] - 38:17

fight [1] - 62:5

fights [1] - 46:12

figure [9] - 7:17,

28:4, 33:10, 35:1,

46:16, 60:12, 60:13,

60:16, 72:8

figuring [1] - 53:24

file [4] - 18:4, 75:21,

76:16, 79:16

5

filed [6] - 3:15, 18:5,

26:8, 42:1, 42:4

filer [1] - 4:6

files [1] - 47:23

filing [2] - 72:20,

78:24

filings [1] - 9:1

FILLER [1] - 1:24

final [11] - 44:16,

45:8, 45:10, 45:15,

45:16, 45:19, 46:11,

48:9, 48:19, 53:22

final-final [1] - 46:11

FINANCE [1] - 1:20

Financial [3] - 12:12,

12:17, 13:1

financially [1] - 16:8

financing [5] - 42:10,

49:22, 50:5, 50:10,

50:14

findings [11] - 3:21,

4:9, 9:22, 28:5, 30:2,

44:6, 48:20, 53:22,

75:6, 79:16, 80:18

fine [3] - 5:11, 55:7,

62:11

fingers [1] - 21:22

first [11] - 4:14, 9:21,

25:5, 26:15, 26:20,

42:1, 42:22, 45:6,

56:17, 60:25, 71:8

fit [1] - 17:21

five [4] - 5:14, 29:18,

29:19, 29:20

flesh [1] - 9:14

Floor [2] - 2:3, 81:7

FLORIDA [1] - 1:1

Florida [17] - 1:4,

1:15, 1:19, 1:25, 2:3,

17:7, 21:11, 33:16,

33:25, 42:11, 43:9,

63:4, 63:21, 63:23,

63:24, 64:25, 81:8

fly [1] - 53:5

focus [3] - 14:24,

58:4, 72:21

focuses [1] - 24:23

folks [2] - 53:19,

61:16

follow [2] - 20:23,

59:14

followed [1] - 31:20

following [4] - 16:14,

20:23, 62:12, 70:15

FOR [3] - 1:13, 1:17,

1:20

forced [1] - 32:23

foreclosed [1] -

11:17

foregoing [1] - 81:2


foremost [1] - 56:17

forever [1] - 39:16

forgot [1] - 69:22

formal [1] - 29:16

formally [1] - 40:7

former [1] - 13:25

forth [1] - 15:22

forum [1] - 55:8

forward [6] - 7:15,

40:6, 59:18, 59:21,

60:15, 69:9

four [4] - 34:17, 50:4,

53:11, 60:8

four-year-old [1] -

53:11

frame [1] - 45:14

Francisco [2] -

71:24, 72:4

frankly [1] - 26:9

fraud [1] - 18:11

fraudulent [1] -

33:14

free [1] - 15:6

friend [2] - 19:12,

20:20

friends [2] - 10:9,

21:12

frustrating [1] - 26:4

full [1] - 53:9

fully [1] - 52:14

fund [1] - 13:7

funding [1] - 13:4

funeral [1] - 66:4

future [2] - 51:12,

62:16

G

game [2] - 55:21,

65:16

gander [1] - 21:15

gatekeeper [1] -

40:14

general [2] - 24:15,

25:18

geographic [6] -

22:11, 61:6, 63:4,

63:18, 63:20, 67:8

get-go [2] - 30:5,

37:8

gist [1] - 26:3

given [3] - 26:25,

39:10, 44:8

glimpse [1] - 51:11

global [1] - 55:16

goal [1] - 67:4

God [2] - 48:13,

48:17

good-faith [1] -

33:14

goodness [1] - 58:12

Google [3] - 56:18,

57:5, 57:21

goose [1] - 21:15

Gossett [11] - 3:4,

3:6, 25:20, 29:7, 30:4,

49:13, 55:17, 61:22,

62:10, 76:13, 77:13

GOSSETT [125] -

1:13, 1:14, 1:14, 3:4,

3:6, 4:20, 5:1, 5:6,

5:9, 5:14, 5:17, 5:23,

8:18, 8:22, 8:25, 9:9,

9:17, 9:20, 10:6,

10:24, 11:4, 11:11,

11:19, 11:24, 12:3,

12:6, 12:11, 12:15,

12:17, 12:21, 12:23,

13:1, 13:3, 13:6,

13:11, 13:14, 13:17,

13:19, 13:24, 14:4,

22:1, 22:4, 22:7, 22:9,

22:24, 23:14, 23:24,

24:4, 24:8, 24:10,

24:13, 24:25, 26:7,

26:13, 26:15, 26:19,

28:15, 28:23, 29:4,

30:22, 31:2, 31:8,

31:16, 41:23, 43:8,

44:15, 44:19, 45:7,

47:13, 47:15, 48:8,

53:16, 54:5, 55:18,

55:23, 56:11, 56:16,

57:4, 58:6, 58:8,

58:16, 58:22, 58:25,

59:6, 59:19, 59:25,

62:11, 62:14, 62:23,

63:22, 64:1, 64:11,

64:21, 65:6, 65:24,

66:3, 66:7, 66:11,

66:24, 67:4, 67:11,

69:18, 69:24, 70:12,

70:19, 70:24, 71:3,

71:12, 72:16, 72:20,

72:25, 73:5, 73:9,

73:14, 73:17, 73:20,

73:22, 73:25, 74:2,

74:21, 76:6, 77:3,

77:21, 80:16

Gossett's [1] - 78:22

grabbing [1] - 30:19

grand [1] - 29:18

grandchildren [1] -

66:6

grant [1] - 18:3

granted [2] - 18:15,

70:3

granting [2] - 42:8,

44:22

grappling [1] - 45:22

graveyard [1] - 39:11

great [6] - 15:5,

17:10, 54:19, 58:3,

68:9, 72:13

greater [1] - 19:8

greatest [2] - 20:10,

70:2

ground [2] - 45:3,

50:24

grounds [3] - 9:13,

26:10, 79:10

GROUP [1] - 1:17

group [13] - 7:18,

55:15, 56:9, 56:18,

56:20, 57:5, 57:15,

57:21, 57:23, 59:15,

61:5, 63:8, 65:10

groups [1] - 55:15

guarantee [1] - 61:23

guarantees [1] -

61:18

guess [2] - 19:1,

55:7

guidance [2] - 32:21,

33:4

guideline [1] - 40:13

guilty [2] - 6:2, 27:1

guy [1] - 20:11

guys [1] - 76:10

H

Haas [4] - 10:25,

12:10, 12:11, 12:24

half [8] - 4:24, 5:2,

5:15, 30:18, 43:17,

43:18, 68:14

hall [2] - 15:4, 17:9

halved [1] - 56:10

hand [2] - 61:25,

68:16

handle [1] - 58:9

handy [1] - 13:21

happily [1] - 17:6

happy [4] - 32:7,

53:12, 74:12, 78:14

hard [3] - 48:23,

63:2, 77:7

head [2] - 10:7,

78:12

heading [1] - 35:16

health [1] - 54:19

hear [3] - 5:23,

66:22, 72:16

heard [2] - 9:3, 14:19

hearing [3] - 6:21,

39:24, 42:24

heart [1] - 66:9

held [2] - 6:12, 21:19

hell [1] - 30:13

help [4] - 22:13,

44:12, 45:18, 50:2

helpful [3] - 30:1,

44:20, 54:6

helping [1] - 35:25

herding [1] - 57:25

hereby [1] - 81:2

hereto [1] - 47:8

high [1] - 30:13

history [2] - 33:18,

36:3

hit [2] - 16:22, 16:24

hold [3] - 78:22,

80:5, 80:9

holder [7] - 3:20,

3:24, 8:6, 41:25,

42:10, 42:19, 43:13

holders [1] - 43:1

holding [1] - 55:25

holdouts [1] - 62:5

hole [1] - 33:15

Hollywood [1] - 1:15

honest [1] - 41:19

honestly [2] - 17:23,

62:8

Honor [24] - 6:14,

8:7, 9:20, 10:17,

11:25, 12:22, 14:4,

15:14, 17:23, 18:17,

26:22, 29:9, 31:25,

35:15, 39:10, 39:23,

41:5, 41:13, 51:11,

54:6, 54:10, 55:18,

60:18, 74:4

HONORABLE [1] -

1:9

hope [1] - 61:15

hoped [1] - 44:9

hopefully [2] - 18:14,

76:25

horses [1] - 48:13

hour [2] - 60:1, 60:5

hours [1] - 68:21

house [1] - 67:13

Hubbard [2] - 74:17,

74:19

I

idea [6] - 14:17,

29:22, 34:21, 40:25,

41:20, 62:9

ideas [1] - 41:20

identified [2] - 47:8,

65:19

identify [1] - 66:19

ill [2] - 54:16, 54:18

6

immediate [1] -

58:12

immovable [1] -

66:15

impact [5] - 53:21,

75:10, 75:12, 76:23,

77:18

importance [1] -

59:10

important [4] - 25:5,

50:3, 55:3, 66:16

impose [1] - 9:23

IN [1] - 1:4

inappropriate [1] -

60:25

incentive [2] - 72:13,

80:17

include [1] - 75:16

included [1] - 25:14

including [1] - 42:4

inconsistent [1] -

51:5

increased [1] - 30:12

increasing [1] -

59:15

incur [1] - 43:25

incurring [1] - 27:15

independent [2] -

23:5

indicate [1] - 78:8

indicated [1] - 77:13

individual [4] -

17:11, 52:15, 59:23,

65:21

individualized [7] -

20:5, 27:6, 31:15,

51:23, 59:4, 59:8

individually [4] -

19:4, 20:7, 31:10,

55:20

individuals [4] -

19:4, 21:22, 55:6,

75:20

industry [4] - 38:22,

40:20, 41:7, 41:8

information [3] -

12:7, 13:19, 17:12

initial [2] - 7:25,

58:22

inject [1] - 41:15

injecting [1] - 41:20

input [2] - 44:7, 53:3

inquire [1] - 21:18

inside [1] - 20:13

insight [1] - 27:13

insightful [1] - 54:25

insistence [1] -

42:25

insomnia [1] - 75:7

instance [2] - 10:10,


28:24

instead [1] - 49:2

instruments [3] -

43:7, 43:8, 43:12

Instruments [1] -

43:10

intend [1] - 4:4

intended [1] - 25:15

intent [2] - 16:8, 17:1

interacted [1] - 17:4

interaction [2] -

10:2, 10:14

interdependent [1] -

54:8

interest [4] - 20:13,

22:12, 46:12, 60:12

interested [1] - 15:10

interjected [1] -

41:24

interjecting [1] -

23:25

interlocutory [4] -

45:11, 74:14, 76:19,

77:15

interplays [1] - 40:17

interpret [2] - 45:13,

51:3

introduced [1] - 34:9

invitation [1] - 56:19

invited [1] - 37:17

involved [6] - 12:12,

17:22, 19:21, 37:22,

46:25, 76:2

Iowa [16] - 7:1, 7:3,

27:2, 46:16, 50:2,

50:12, 51:15, 51:16,

51:21, 51:24, 52:2,

52:17, 76:24, 76:25,

77:12, 77:15

Iqbal [3] - 18:9,

36:20, 48:17

ironically [1] - 33:9

irreconcilable [1] -

51:3

Island [4] - 8:19,

64:14, 64:15, 64:16

issue [31] - 3:21,

4:15, 33:6, 33:16,

34:12, 36:22, 37:1,

37:7, 37:16, 37:19,

37:24, 38:2, 38:20,

39:4, 39:21, 40:4,

40:6, 40:8, 40:14,

40:15, 40:18, 41:13,

41:24, 41:25, 42:12,

44:11, 45:21, 58:5,

69:9

issued [1] - 20:24

issues [27] - 4:13,

4:24, 6:7, 6:9, 6:25,

24:5, 26:24, 27:3,

32:22, 34:14, 34:15,

38:14, 38:16, 38:25,

39:2, 41:9, 41:15,

41:17, 45:22, 55:2,

58:9, 69:12, 74:5,

75:15, 75:16, 79:2,

80:8

it'll [6] - 11:19, 71:21,

71:25, 72:3, 72:5,

76:16

iteration [1] - 26:15

itself [4] - 8:8, 30:11,

59:22

J

Jacksonville [2] -

57:7, 64:2

January [3] - 42:7,

72:25, 73:3

Jersey [1] - 29:11

Johnson [2] - 11:1,

13:10

joint [3] - 7:20, 7:22,

44:23

judge [12] - 27:2,

27:24, 29:10, 31:4,

41:23, 50:9, 51:16,

54:9, 64:24, 75:4,

75:10, 76:25

JUDGE [1] - 1:10

Judge [12] - 4:20,

22:2, 26:7, 29:10,

36:22, 47:16, 56:24,

62:11, 65:1, 70:21,

73:23, 74:16

judges [2] - 27:14,

28:6

judges' [1] - 27:15

judgment [30] - 6:19,

7:15, 8:18, 9:2, 9:5,

42:9, 44:16, 44:17,

45:8, 45:10, 45:14,

45:15, 45:16, 45:20,

46:3, 46:11, 46:14,

46:22, 48:19, 48:22,

48:24, 50:24, 52:24,

69:25, 70:5, 70:7,

70:20, 72:21, 75:22

judgments [4] - 7:2,

45:6, 69:1, 80:14

judicial [1] - 45:7

jugular [7] - 36:22,

37:1, 37:7, 37:9,

37:16, 37:19, 37:24

jump [5] - 34:1, 34:4,

34:5, 34:6, 34:8

junk [1] - 34:3

jurisdiction [2] -

67:20, 74:9

justifiable [1] - 27:25

justify [1] - 27:9

K

K-o-r-p-a-n [1] - 11:4

KATTEN [1] - 1:21

keep [8] - 41:16,

53:21, 57:25, 59:1,

74:7, 75:5, 77:24,

77:25

keeping [1] - 5:7

Kenneth [1] - 11:2

kept [6] - 13:6,

29:23, 38:7, 46:21,

46:22

kick [1] - 75:17

kind [1] - 19:1

knock [3] - 37:19,

42:21, 68:2

knocked [1] - 37:25

knowing [1] - 67:15

knowledge [8] -

19:21, 20:3, 20:13,

36:24, 37:3, 37:18,

37:22, 42:16

known [7] - 16:6,

16:7, 17:1, 17:16,

17:19, 37:13, 40:20

Korpan [2] - 11:2,

13:13

Krollfeiffer [1] -

40:25

Kushnevis [2] - 22:5,

22:19

L

LA [4] - 72:2, 72:3,

72:5, 72:10

LA/San [2] - 72:3,

72:4

lady [1] - 30:15

laid [1] - 27:18

language [10] -

24:18, 25:2, 25:4,

40:16, 47:21, 51:10,

52:10, 52:13, 52:14,

78:12

laser [1] - 58:5

Lasic [1] - 17:2

last [11] - 11:6,

13:24, 33:16, 37:4,

39:22, 41:16, 46:8,

49:18, 73:1, 74:2,

74:4

law [25] - 3:22, 4:9,

9:22, 24:20, 30:3,

31:19, 32:19, 32:25,

33:24, 33:25, 36:14,

43:7, 43:8, 43:12,

44:7, 45:3, 45:12,

46:20, 48:17, 48:20,

53:23, 60:9, 79:17,

80:18

LAW [1] - 1:17

lawsuit [2] - 16:3,

24:14

lawyering [1] - 78:12

lawyers [2] - 8:14,

60:3

lease [7] - 4:20,

11:17, 11:21, 12:9,

13:11, 13:14, 50:22

Lease [1] - 3:2

LEASE [1] - 1:5

leases [2] - 77:14,

77:15

Leasing [1] - 36:5

least [10] - 9:15,

29:19, 45:5, 46:19,

50:6, 53:3, 53:25,

61:19, 64:12, 75:10

leave [3] - 68:22,

69:7, 77:10

leaves [1] - 56:11

leaving [1] - 30:24

legal [7] - 6:10,

15:21, 15:23, 37:9,

37:10, 43:25, 78:12

legitimate [1] - 3:20

length [1] - 24:21

less [5] - 5:1, 17:12,

28:18, 28:21, 29:5

letter [1] - 28:16

levels [1] - 32:24

liability [2] - 9:23,

24:17

liable [4] - 6:12, 8:1,

15:18

lie [1] - 32:23

life [3] - 47:1, 47:2,

77:1

light [2] - 33:20,

38:19

likely [2] - 66:25,

72:4

limited [3] - 14:22,

15:8, 17:24

Line [5] - 10:21,

10:22

line [5] - 24:2, 36:20,

49:18, 78:23

lines [1] - 65:19

Lines [1] - 10:19

lingering [1] - 33:21

Lisa [1] - 41:2

7

LISA [2] - 2:1, 81:6

list [6] - 10:18, 10:23,

11:16, 19:11, 22:22,

74:3

listed [1] - 21:23

listen [1] - 55:22

listener [1] - 54:25

literally [1] - 38:17

litigation [1] - 50:4

LITIGATION [1] - 1:5

Litigation [1] - 3:2

LLC [3] - 1:4, 1:17,

3:2

LLP [2] - 1:21, 1:24

loan [1] - 12:25

loans [1] - 30:12

local [3] - 68:4, 68:6,

68:13

localized [1] - 68:11

located [1] - 63:25

location [4] - 61:6,

64:3, 65:20, 68:5

locations [2] - 14:15,

72:1

logic [1] - 20:24

logistically [1] -

32:12

logistics [1] - 62:6

look [15] - 6:7, 8:12,

19:18, 21:9, 22:11,

27:12, 27:14, 32:6,

38:23, 44:1, 44:21,

48:3, 51:9, 56:8,

61:18

looked [5] - 6:11,

7:14, 14:7, 26:1, 74:8

looking [9] - 4:12,

7:17, 18:9, 20:20,

22:18, 45:24, 49:10,

59:21, 74:10

Los [4] - 64:10,

64:11, 71:22, 71:23

lose [1] - 60:11

loss [5] - 16:2, 16:16,

16:18, 17:14

luck [1] - 4:25

lucky [2] - 70:9

M

ma'am [14] - 5:1, 5:2,

5:6, 12:18, 54:5, 59:6,

59:19, 62:23, 66:3,

70:19, 71:3, 73:17,

80:16

Madison [1] - 1:22

mail [5] - 19:16, 57:9,

57:12, 57:22, 58:1

mails [1] - 56:14


main [1] - 14:18

manageable [3] -

41:16, 55:15, 55:24

March [1] - 73:10

market [1] - 61:14

Marketing [5] -

11:21, 12:9, 13:12,

13:14, 14:1

marketing [4] - 12:4,

17:7, 47:20, 47:22

mass [3] - 61:12,

63:9, 64:20

masters [1] - 27:13

material [1] - 42:9

materiality [1] -

58:10

matter [7] - 5:10,

10:8, 24:20, 43:11,

68:5, 73:10, 81:3

max [1] - 69:4

MDL [8] - 9:25,

53:13, 53:16, 53:19,

53:25, 69:16, 74:7,

75:13

mean [31] - 4:23,

5:18, 15:21, 15:23,

17:5, 18:13, 18:25,

19:10, 20:19, 28:21,

30:10, 31:11, 32:6,

39:10, 43:20, 47:5,

48:23, 48:24, 49:13,

50:20, 53:17, 56:9,

56:13, 59:20, 60:11,

63:21, 66:11, 66:12,

68:14, 75:21, 77:10

means [1] - 33:13

meant [2] - 19:2,

33:11

meantime [1] - 44:5

med [1] - 22:12

mediate [2] - 30:2,

66:21

mediating [2] -

54:20, 67:8

mediation [31] -

28:9, 29:9, 31:4, 31:6,

32:6, 54:8, 55:12,

55:20, 61:11, 61:13,

62:21, 63:1, 64:18,

65:19, 65:20, 66:14,

67:12, 67:21, 67:23,

69:6, 69:7, 69:14,

71:13, 71:16, 72:22,

76:19, 77:5, 77:19,

80:1, 80:7

mediations [2] -

68:11, 74:14

mediator [27] -

28:10, 54:22, 54:23,

54:24, 61:19, 66:19,

67:2, 67:4, 67:5, 67:7,

67:12, 67:16, 67:17,

68:6, 68:15, 68:16,

68:19, 69:5, 71:4,

71:7, 71:14, 71:19,

78:16, 79:22

mediators [1] - 67:20

medical [1] - 66:7

meet [4] - 10:12,

35:17, 35:18, 38:20

meeting [1] - 39:25

members [1] - 25:12

memo [1] - 44:23

memorialized [1] -

38:11

mentioned [2] - 39:6,

58:10

mentions [1] - 4:14

Meridian [1] - 1:24

metropolitan [2] -

64:6, 64:19

MIAMI [1] - 1:2

Miami [7] - 1:4, 1:25,

2:2, 2:3, 63:20, 81:7,

81:8

Michael [2] - 3:9,

10:18

MICHAEL [1] - 1:21

mid [2] - 66:25,

79:19

mid-October [2] -

66:25, 79:19

middle [2] - 40:9,

43:16

midway [1] - 72:6

might [5] - 5:21,

34:24, 39:3, 39:6,

39:7

Mike [2] - 64:21, 74:3

million [2] - 5:15,

8:20

minds [2] - 36:15,

40:17

mine [1] - 10:9

mini [2] - 60:15, 62:2

mini-trial [1] - 60:15

mini-trials [1] - 62:2

Minnesota [2] - 17:6,

21:4

minute [8] - 9:17,

11:20, 37:4, 37:6,

41:16, 60:19, 65:15,

68:20

minutes [2] - 59:11,

72:13

misread [1] - 35:20

miss [1] - 73:20

misunderstood [2] -

19:7, 30:22

modified [3] - 69:1,

70:20, 80:14

modify [1] - 52:13

moment [2] - 39:22,

65:5

money [13] - 6:15,

6:17, 7:2, 13:7, 15:21,

16:18, 21:10, 22:16,

22:19, 26:17, 26:25,

30:21, 35:3

month [8] - 4:11,

28:25, 38:18, 44:9,

53:9, 53:25, 69:17,

70:5

months [1] - 28:25

most [7] - 5:9, 7:4,

31:23, 46:1, 49:3,

53:15, 57:11

motion [17] - 3:17,

9:1, 18:3, 24:2, 25:6,

32:18, 42:8, 69:24,

70:5, 70:6, 72:20,

75:22, 78:22, 78:24,

79:7, 79:10

motions [1] - 69:25

mouthful [1] - 61:4

move [7] - 9:10,

25:3, 29:13, 32:10,

67:17, 74:23, 76:16

moved [5] - 25:2,

37:21, 48:6, 48:7,

74:24

moving [1] - 76:20

MR [263] - 3:4, 3:6,

3:8, 3:9, 3:10, 4:20,

5:1, 5:6, 5:9, 5:14,

5:17, 5:20, 5:23, 5:25,

6:14, 7:10, 8:3, 8:7,

8:18, 8:22, 8:25, 9:9,

9:17, 9:20, 10:6,

10:24, 11:4, 11:11,

11:19, 11:24, 12:3,

12:6, 12:11, 12:15,

12:17, 12:21, 12:23,

13:1, 13:3, 13:6,

13:11, 13:14, 13:17,

13:18, 13:19, 13:22,

13:24, 14:4, 15:14,

15:19, 15:24, 16:12,

16:15, 16:20, 16:24,

17:23, 18:17, 18:24,

19:3, 19:6, 19:15,

20:4, 20:8, 20:16,

21:4, 21:9, 21:25,

22:1, 22:4, 22:6, 22:7,

22:8, 22:9, 22:24,

23:14, 23:23, 23:24,

24:4, 24:8, 24:10,

24:13, 24:25, 26:7,

26:13, 26:15, 26:19,

26:22, 28:15, 28:23,

29:4, 29:6, 29:9,

29:20, 29:22, 30:22,

31:2, 31:8, 31:16,

31:25, 32:5, 32:15,

34:4, 34:6, 34:21,

35:4, 35:11, 35:14,

35:19, 36:1, 36:11,

37:9, 37:12, 41:4,

41:23, 43:8, 44:15,

44:19, 45:2, 45:7,

45:8, 46:1, 46:6, 46:8,

46:10, 46:21, 47:5,

47:10, 47:13, 47:14,

47:15, 48:8, 48:25,

49:2, 49:8, 49:17,

50:9, 51:1, 51:8,

51:11, 51:17, 51:19,

51:22, 51:25, 52:4,

52:6, 52:7, 52:16,

52:19, 52:23, 53:1,

53:16, 54:5, 54:6,

54:10, 54:12, 54:14,

54:16, 54:18, 55:2,

55:13, 55:18, 55:23,

56:11, 56:16, 56:24,

57:2, 57:4, 58:6, 58:8,

58:16, 58:22, 58:25,

59:6, 59:19, 59:25,

60:18, 60:23, 61:2,

61:10, 62:11, 62:13,

62:14, 62:23, 63:3,

63:11, 63:14, 63:22,

64:1, 64:5, 64:9,

64:11, 64:14, 64:17,

64:21, 64:24, 65:1,

65:4, 65:6, 65:13,

65:24, 66:3, 66:7,

66:11, 66:24, 67:4,

67:11, 67:25, 69:18,

69:24, 70:12, 70:19,

70:24, 71:3, 71:12,

71:21, 72:3, 72:6,

72:11, 72:16, 72:20,

72:25, 73:5, 73:9,

73:14, 73:17, 73:20,

73:22, 73:25, 74:2,

74:4, 74:12, 74:17,

74:19, 74:21, 74:24,

75:3, 75:12, 75:23,

76:1, 76:6, 76:8,

76:11, 77:2, 77:3,

77:9, 77:21, 77:22,

78:1, 78:10, 78:18,

78:21, 78:25, 79:3,

79:5, 79:8, 79:13,

79:21, 79:24, 80:2,

80:5, 80:10, 80:13,

80:16

MS [1] - 3:11

MUCHIN [1] - 1:21

multiple [1] - 57:14

8

music [1] - 73:20

musings [1] - 48:18

must [1] - 74:8

N

naive [1] - 30:15

name [6] - 20:17,

22:4, 23:4, 23:23,

49:5, 68:19

named [1] - 14:13

names [7] - 10:9,

10:10, 19:11, 22:22,

47:5, 47:6, 78:1

NCMIC [33] - 1:20,

3:9, 3:10, 3:11, 3:19,

4:21, 6:12, 9:23, 10:1,

12:13, 12:23, 16:17,

17:12, 17:14, 19:22,

19:23, 20:3, 21:14,

21:17, 24:14, 25:7,

28:17, 28:19, 29:1,

29:4, 30:10, 37:7,

37:12, 42:1, 42:10,

77:4

NCMIC's [6] - 36:24,

37:3, 37:18, 37:22,

41:24, 42:8

necessary [2] -

18:21, 58:20

need [37] - 3:16,

7:24, 9:5, 17:10,

18:11, 19:1, 19:17,

20:9, 23:25, 28:4,

28:6, 28:7, 30:2,

30:16, 41:2, 45:18,

45:19, 50:19, 52:13,

53:7, 55:11, 55:16,

57:23, 59:2, 59:23,

66:2, 66:15, 68:10,

68:25, 69:3, 70:7,

71:6, 72:22, 74:15,

76:24, 78:6, 78:7

needed [1] - 36:19

needs [6] - 19:8,

44:22, 52:11, 52:25,

69:8, 80:1

negotiable [3] - 43:7,

43:8, 43:12

Negotiable [1] - 43:9

negotiating [1] -

32:9

nEMECEK [1] - 1:20

NEMECEK [1] - 3:10

Nemecek [4] - 3:10,

48:2, 48:8, 73:18

Neumann [3] - 11:5,

13:16, 13:20

never [13] - 16:7,


16:8, 17:1, 29:1, 32:8,

34:23, 37:3, 38:5,

38:16, 38:23, 38:24,

39:20

new [9] - 25:22, 38:4,

38:21, 40:10, 41:15,

41:20, 51:14, 68:16,

76:14

New [13] - 1:22,

29:11, 64:5, 64:8,

64:16, 64:19, 64:22,

65:3, 65:7, 65:10,

67:17

next [11] - 4:12,

10:24, 10:25, 11:1,

11:2, 11:5, 15:4,

27:10, 32:12, 48:16,

70:21

NIL [2] - 43:4, 43:7

nine [1] - 31:13

NO [1] - 1:2

nobody [1] - 33:5

none [1] - 50:6

North [5] - 2:2, 22:6,

22:20, 23:1, 81:7

notably [1] - 40:22

note [1] - 66:15

nothing [2] - 9:23,

15:20

notice [4] - 35:17,

35:18, 35:19, 54:4

noticed [1] - 21:21

November [5] -

19:22, 19:23, 30:9,

42:5, 71:13

number [17] - 5:20,

6:1, 14:2, 30:12,

59:14, 61:5, 61:20,

61:21, 62:13, 62:15,

62:18, 63:24, 64:7,

65:6, 65:11, 67:11

numbers [2] - 46:12,

61:25

O

objecting [1] - 44:14

objective [2] - 35:25,

39:8

obligated [1] - 29:17

obvious [1] - 21:14

obviously [1] - 19:10

occurs [1] - 67:21

October [8] - 19:22,

19:23, 30:9, 53:13,

66:23, 66:25, 79:19,

80:6

odds [1] - 75:19

OF [1] - 1:1

offer [2] - 29:16,

43:22

offered [2] - 29:11,

29:14

offering [2] - 30:17,

30:23

offers [1] - 29:14

officers [1] - 25:11

official [1] - 2:1

Official [1] - 81:7

often [1] - 33:3

old [2] - 53:11, 54:15

once [2] - 26:1,

27:18

one [70] - 4:21, 5:4,

6:7, 6:16, 11:6, 11:21,

12:1, 12:9, 13:11,

13:14, 13:23, 14:1,

15:9, 18:16, 21:21,

21:23, 22:18, 23:9,

23:14, 23:15, 23:18,

23:19, 23:21, 27:5,

27:19, 28:1, 28:5,

30:7, 31:19, 33:12,

33:23, 34:16, 34:17,

34:18, 34:19, 34:20,

37:25, 42:3, 42:12,

42:17, 45:17, 47:19,

48:7, 49:7, 50:9,

50:23, 51:2, 52:24,

55:2, 55:16, 58:17,

59:11, 59:17, 60:19,

61:4, 61:6, 64:18,

67:11, 67:23, 67:25,

68:5, 68:14, 69:4,

71:9, 71:25, 74:15,

77:3, 77:13, 77:15,

78:15

one-column [6] -

11:21, 12:1, 12:9,

13:11, 13:14, 77:15

one-day [1] - 64:18

one-way [1] - 4:21

ones [6] - 11:15,

17:21, 20:17, 38:7,

41:23, 50:24

open [1] - 22:14

opening [1] - 22:12

operate [1] - 52:25

opinion [4] - 4:1,

45:3, 80:3, 80:6

opportunity [14] -

17:4, 17:5, 18:4,

19:21, 19:24, 21:5,

21:6, 21:16, 27:21,

51:12, 51:19, 55:21,

58:18, 73:7

opposed [1] - 30:18

optimistically [1] -

70:1

optometric [1] -

62:16

order [11] - 18:20,

26:4, 38:12, 39:21,

41:10, 42:8, 44:11,

46:1, 53:20, 62:20,

65:18

ordered [1] - 14:6

ordinarily [1] - 55:19

organize [2] - 55:15,

55:24

organized [1] - 49:14

originally [1] - 63:14

ourselves [2] - 8:11,

32:9

outliers [1] - 23:9

outlined [2] - 6:6,

60:8

outlying [2] - 64:12,

64:13

outside [3] - 69:8,

71:12, 71:17

overlay [1] - 18:10

owe [1] - 59:5

owed [2] - 28:23,

29:15

owes [1] - 46:17

own [4] - 21:6, 38:18,

40:24, 44:24

owns [1] - 8:19

P

p.m [1] - 1:6

package [2] - 22:20,

30:6

Page [7] - 10:19,

10:21, 10:22, 49:10

page [1] - 69:4

pages [2] - 46:8,

69:4

Pages [1] - 1:7

paid [11] - 8:20,

20:16, 20:18, 20:21,

21:20, 23:7, 23:16,

28:19, 43:1, 58:21,

58:23

pain [1] - 17:17

panel [2] - 53:14,

53:25

paper [3] - 14:6,

17:24, 48:18

papers [5] - 3:15,

3:16, 3:18, 21:23,

35:9

paralegal [1] - 57:11

parallel [1] - 54:8

parent [1] - 25:10

parents [1] - 66:5

part [7] - 13:8, 14:21,

35:24, 36:2, 37:24,

42:8

participate [3] -

61:11, 62:25, 77:4

participating [1] -

9:4

participation [8] -

18:9, 18:12, 18:23,

19:1, 19:2, 19:9,

19:14, 20:15

particular [8] - 3:24,

27:24, 32:20, 50:11,

63:19, 64:3, 65:20,

78:11

particularly [3] - 4:6,

36:13, 64:4

parties [7] - 4:8,

4:13, 6:20, 26:25,

44:7, 60:7, 61:6

parties' [4] - 3:18,

7:14, 35:9, 49:25

parties... [1] - 26:5

partners [1] - 25:11

party [1] - 76:23

pass [1] - 46:16

past [3] - 28:10,

53:18, 55:9

Patel [2] - 11:6,

13:24

path [1] - 32:6

pathology [1] - 40:10

PATRICIA [1] - 1:9

pay [11] - 8:1, 16:9,

17:15, 28:2, 28:25,

30:25, 43:17, 46:15,

68:15, 68:16

paying [2] - 59:24,

60:1

payment [4] - 7:24,

37:14, 46:24, 58:23

payments [2] - 17:2,

17:7

peace [1] - 78:20

penalized [1] - 41:14

pending [1] - 74:13

PENDL [1] - 1:13

Pennsylvania [4] -

22:5, 22:10, 23:2,

23:15

Pensacola [1] - 64:2

people [35] - 10:11,

14:15, 14:16, 19:12,

21:16, 22:21, 23:10,

24:15, 25:16, 25:17,

29:18, 31:9, 31:13,

31:17, 54:22, 56:2,

59:14, 61:12, 61:15,

61:24, 62:5, 62:7,

62:25, 63:5, 63:7,

9

63:17, 64:22, 66:13,

67:15, 68:3, 68:6,

71:23, 72:9, 78:4

per [3] - 28:25, 58:11

percent [5] - 28:18,

28:22, 29:5, 34:7,

62:4

perfect [1] - 21:10

perform [1] - 17:1

perhaps [1] - 66:7

period [1] - 28:19

persistent [1] - 67:7

person [7] - 19:20,

27:22, 47:20, 48:5,

66:19, 66:20, 68:13

personal [2] - 38:19,

66:15

personalities [1] -

67:15

personally [2] -

50:11, 60:6

persuaded [1] - 35:1

pertinent [1] - 50:17

PETER [1] - 1:13

Peter [1] - 10:20

phase [1] - 9:25

PHILIP [1] - 1:20

Philip [1] - 3:10

phone [7] - 57:17,

57:20, 58:1, 58:13,

58:17, 59:1, 59:11

phrase [1] - 33:3

pick [7] - 57:19, 61:5,

61:7, 62:12, 63:4,

63:18, 68:5

picked [1] - 66:1

picking [2] - 57:17,

62:14

pickle [1] - 30:14

picks [1] - 62:18

pitch [2] - 14:8,

14:20

place [2] - 35:16,

56:17

Plaintiff [18] - 4:14,

4:23, 6:9, 7:15, 8:5,

8:17, 11:8, 11:22,

12:12, 12:19, 15:3,

22:3, 27:5, 27:20,

27:24, 44:13, 44:14,

47:17

Plaintiff's [1] - 4:16

Plaintiffs [53] - 3:5,

3:7, 3:8, 3:24, 4:25,

5:14, 6:15, 6:25, 7:3,

7:5, 7:6, 7:9, 7:11,

7:18, 10:4, 11:13,

11:16, 14:5, 14:10,

14:11, 18:18, 21:3,

21:23, 24:20, 25:1,


25:7, 29:12, 30:14,

30:15, 32:23, 33:19,

34:2, 34:9, 34:10,

34:17, 34:23, 36:16,

38:20, 40:4, 43:17,

45:15, 47:8, 49:3,

50:22, 53:21, 55:11,

55:15, 55:19, 59:23,

65:22, 66:16, 77:20

Plaintiffs' [6] - 8:13,

28:13, 43:21, 47:10,

49:9, 49:10

plan [9] - 15:12,

48:15, 53:24, 63:4,

65:16, 77:24, 77:25,

78:1, 80:12

playing [1] - 41:14

plead [3] - 19:1,

26:11, 79:12

pleading [2] - 9:16,

26:8

pleadings [5] -

26:22, 36:20, 38:3,

69:10, 76:17

pled [3] - 42:12,

52:17, 52:21

plenary [1] - 34:14

plus [3] - 23:13,

23:14, 47:6

Plus [15] - 33:25,

34:22, 35:6, 35:12,

35:23, 37:5, 38:7,

38:8, 39:3, 39:20,

40:1, 40:18, 40:19,

40:23, 42:21

pocket [1] - 15:21

point [14] - 8:7, 14:7,

14:20, 36:25, 50:9,

59:8, 66:16, 68:4,

70:6, 72:7, 73:4,

76:20, 76:22, 77:8

pointed [1] - 9:21

points [2] - 3:20,

33:23

pointy [1] - 78:12

pointy-head [1] -

78:12

Politan [1] - 29:10

pool [2] - 5:5, 77:24

pop [1] - 21:21

portions [1] - 10:20

position [10] - 17:12,

17:18, 17:19, 19:24,

28:13, 30:10, 59:22,

77:11, 77:16

possible [2] - 55:6,

79:16

possibly [4] - 17:3,

38:20, 71:24, 72:3

poster [1] - 58:2

potential [1] - 7:1

potentially [1] -

50:16

powers [1] - 76:3

practical [1] - 54:25

practicing [1] - 31:19

precisely [2] - 37:17

predecessors [1] -

25:9

prefer [1] - 61:7

preparation [1] -

38:1

prepare [1] - 44:6

prepared [1] - 25:6

preparing [3] - 27:5,

69:24, 69:25

present [3] - 40:22,

41:9, 65:24

presented [1] - 51:21

preserve [1] - 53:20

preserved [1] - 51:21

pressed [1] - 38:6

presume [3] - 5:7,

19:13, 51:24

presumption [3] -

42:25, 43:4, 43:13

pretrial [2] - 38:12,

41:10

pretty [2] - 33:1, 45:4

prevail [1] - 60:14

prevailed [1] - 11:22

price [2] - 59:16,

61:14

principal [1] - 28:24

principals [1] - 25:11

print [1] - 47:20

priority [1] - 66:2

private [1] - 27:15

problem [4] - 27:17,

31:4, 54:25, 75:7

problem-solving [1]

- 54:25

problems [2] - 6:8,

71:18

procedural [4] -

32:22, 41:13, 74:5,

75:15

procedures [4] -

62:16, 66:8, 69:12

proceed [2] - 4:8,

59:17

proceeded [1] -

15:17

proceeding [4] -

12:20, 32:11, 62:2,

78:8

Proceedings [1] -

80:21

proceedings [2] -

70:15, 81:3

process [2] - 35:5,

77:19

processes [1] -

56:17

professionals [1] -

62:15

program [2] - 10:3,

21:20

progress [2] - 68:1,

68:8

promptly [1] - 48:9

proper [1] - 9:16

property [2] - 8:19,

8:20

proposal [1] - 30:7

proposals [1] - 54:21

propose [1] - 63:13

proposed [11] - 4:12,

7:15, 11:14, 14:13,

46:1, 48:22, 48:23,

49:9, 52:10, 70:17,

72:16

pros [1] - 67:9

protect [2] - 8:11,

30:11

protracted [1] -

40:12

prove [2] - 42:18,

42:21

proves [1] - 8:5

provide [3] - 8:15,

11:8, 46:1

provided [1] - 30:7

providing [1] - 58:2

provision [1] - 4:21

provisions [1] -

36:25

punch [1] - 49:18

punish [1] - 20:20

purely [2] - 15:15,

15:25

purpose [1] - 49:24

pursuant [1] - 42:11

pursue [2] - 9:15,

9:23

pushing [2] - 30:7,

38:7

put [23] - 5:11, 6:18,

6:22, 14:4, 15:22,

16:1, 16:20, 19:19,

21:22, 29:16, 32:20,

40:6, 44:23, 45:18,

48:18, 51:12, 51:19,

52:14, 59:16, 60:3,

69:3, 69:8, 80:5

putative [1] - 56:5

Q

questions [5] -

14:23, 17:5, 21:16,

57:12, 58:18

quick [1] - 75:8

quickly [2] - 32:17,

54:24

quite [4] - 26:9,

57:16, 63:24, 64:6

R

rabbit [1] - 37:24

raise [3] - 24:6, 50:7,

73:15

raised [6] - 34:23,

37:3, 37:23, 38:24,

42:3, 50:7

raising [1] - 42:1

random [1] - 61:7

range [1] - 63:15

rates [1] - 46:12

rather [2] - 7:1, 28:3

rational [1] - 71:20

RDR [2] - 2:1, 81:6

RE [1] - 1:4

reached [1] - 56:1

read [9] - 3:16, 4:1,

14:2, 26:7, 35:9,

48:23, 48:24, 49:12,

75:7

ready [1] - 44:8

real [1] - 75:8

realize [2] - 40:5,

53:20

really [22] - 13:8,

14:8, 14:24, 15:7,

15:11, 15:20, 18:20,

19:17, 29:7, 33:4,

36:17, 43:21, 46:18,

48:6, 55:16, 55:21,

64:17, 68:17, 69:19,

74:11, 75:7, 78:7

rearguing [1] - 32:18

reason [8] - 33:5,

39:18, 46:15, 46:23,

50:5, 59:9, 65:25,

71:5

reasonable [4] -

36:15, 40:17, 40:21,

71:11

reasons [2] - 34:24,

77:9

receive [5] - 22:16,

23:3, 23:6, 23:15,

57:8

received [5] - 7:7,

10

22:18, 22:19, 32:8

receives [1] - 17:15

receiving [1] - 17:7

recent [1] - 46:2

receptive [2] - 28:17,

28:19

recess [3] - 65:15,

70:14, 80:20

reciprocal [1] - 4:22

recognize [4] - 8:14,

32:2, 33:2, 70:4

recognizes [1] -

43:19

recollection [1] - 5:3

recommendation [1]

- 27:24

reconsideration [2] -

3:17, 32:19

record [3] - 3:3, 5:11,

60:21

recovery [1] - 18:23

recruit [2] - 22:13,

22:15

redraft [1] - 3:20

reduce [2] - 30:24,

61:25

refer [1] - 43:9

referral [3] - 15:1,

17:15, 19:10

referrals [11] - 7:7,

7:11, 14:16, 14:23,

14:24, 20:2, 20:17,

20:22, 21:24, 23:7,

23:17

referred [4] - 10:3,

10:16, 19:13, 43:11

referring [2] - 7:6,

24:18

refers [1] - 7:16

refiling [1] - 18:8

registry [1] - 22:25

relationship [2] -

12:23, 30:20

release [13] - 24:13,

24:16, 24:23, 24:25,

25:8, 25:9, 25:14,

25:17, 25:18, 26:13,

76:14

released [4] - 24:16,

24:17, 24:23, 25:17

releases [1] - 24:19

relevance [1] - 4:6

relevant [1] - 14:8

reliance [12] - 4:24,

6:9, 8:5, 17:24, 18:19,

26:24, 27:3, 27:9,

27:25, 58:9, 69:12,

80:8

reliant [1] - 33:7

rely [4] - 30:12,


47:10, 49:3, 49:6

remain [2] - 3:25,

52:3

remaining [3] - 38:3,

56:9

remember [9] - 10:6,

22:4, 23:18, 28:10,

36:17, 47:9, 47:15,

54:17, 62:14

reminds [1] - 59:6

remote [1] - 62:25

removed [1] - 26:16

repaid [1] - 16:5

reply [1] - 73:3

report [3] - 53:11,

53:14, 76:24

REPORTED [1] - 2:1

reporter [1] - 68:20

Reporter [2] - 2:1,

81:7

representative [3] -

11:8, 11:9, 25:13

representatives [4] -

11:14, 14:14, 25:11,

26:11

represented [1] - 8:9

reps [1] - 56:6

repurchase [2] -

47:25, 48:1

request [4] - 44:15,

46:22, 47:25, 59:3

require [3] - 27:5,

55:19, 65:21

requirement [1] -

35:18

requirements [2] -

35:17, 35:19

requiring [1] - 65:18

rescheduled [1] -

66:12

research [1] - 44:24

resolution [1] - 56:1

respect [3] - 8:14,

25:20, 69:20

respectfully [1] -

21:13

respond [1] - 57:12

response [2] - 72:25,

75:22

responsibility [2] -

30:16, 43:19

restate [2] - 78:21,

79:14

result [2] - 37:21,

39:1

results [1] - 68:7

retainer [2] - 5:3,

56:21

retired [2] - 27:14,

29:10

review [1] - 9:17

revision [2] - 44:6,

80:18

rewrite [1] - 79:1

rid [1] - 72:14

riding [1] - 48:14

rights [2] - 6:19,

50:16

rise [1] - 48:18

road [2] - 74:6, 75:17

ROBERT [5] - 1:14,

3:6, 12:21, 45:7,

73:20

Robert [1] - 3:6

RODRIGUEZ [3] -

1:23, 1:24, 3:11

Rodriguez [2] - 3:11,

73:18

rolling [2] - 27:10,

58:10

Ron [2] - 64:9, 64:18

Ron's [1] - 68:4

Ronald [2] - 3:4, 57:4

RONALD [117] -

1:13, 3:4, 4:20, 5:1,

5:6, 5:9, 5:14, 5:17,

5:23, 8:18, 8:22, 8:25,

9:9, 9:17, 9:20, 10:6,

10:24, 11:4, 11:11,

11:19, 11:24, 12:3,

12:6, 12:11, 12:15,

12:17, 12:23, 13:1,

13:3, 13:6, 13:11,

13:14, 13:17, 13:19,

13:24, 14:4, 22:1,

22:4, 22:7, 22:9,

22:24, 23:14, 23:24,

24:4, 24:8, 24:10,

24:13, 24:25, 26:7,

26:13, 26:15, 26:19,

28:15, 28:23, 29:4,

30:22, 31:2, 31:8,

31:16, 41:23, 43:8,

44:15, 44:19, 47:13,

47:15, 48:8, 53:16,

54:5, 55:18, 55:23,

56:11, 56:16, 58:6,

58:8, 58:16, 58:22,

58:25, 59:6, 59:19,

59:25, 62:11, 62:14,

62:23, 63:22, 64:1,

64:11, 64:21, 65:6,

65:24, 66:3, 66:7,

66:11, 66:24, 67:4,

67:11, 69:18, 69:24,

70:12, 70:19, 70:24,

71:3, 71:12, 72:16,

72:20, 72:25, 73:5,

73:9, 73:14, 73:17,

73:22, 73:25, 74:2,

74:21, 76:6, 77:3,

77:21, 80:16

room [2] - 38:15,

55:11

ROSENMAN [1] -

1:21

ruing [1] - 57:5

rule [1] - 39:13

ruled [1] - 28:14

rules [1] - 41:14

ruling [1] - 50:15

rulings [1] - 16:17

S

safe [1] - 66:24

sales [2] - 14:8,

14:20

salesmen [2] - 17:4,

21:5

salesperson [3] -

10:9, 19:11, 19:12

sample [2] - 11:8,

11:9

sampling [1] - 15:8

San [7] - 65:13,

71:22, 71:23, 71:24,

72:4, 72:5, 72:9

sat [3] - 25:24, 26:1,

38:9

satisfied [1] - 3:16

save [1] - 46:19

saw [2] - 4:12, 49:9

schedule [8] - 47:4,

47:5, 47:11, 49:5,

68:22, 70:7, 70:17

Schedule [1] - 47:8

scheduled [1] - 66:7

schedules [3] - 48:4,

48:10, 48:21

scheduling [1] -

71:19

science [1] - 63:16

screen [1] - 25:2

seat [1] - 3:14

second [6] - 10:16,

11:19, 42:9, 48:2,

55:4, 71:9

Section [1] - 42:11

section [3] - 14:14,

32:20, 78:3

see [28] - 3:12, 3:25,

4:3, 4:14, 4:15, 6:5,

7:19, 21:16, 21:18,

29:24, 33:11, 35:6,

35:9, 39:3, 41:12,

46:5, 61:11, 63:17,

67:25, 69:12, 70:10,

75:18, 76:21, 79:11,

79:12, 79:16, 80:2

seeking [1] - 18:22

seem [3] - 33:17,

33:18, 71:25

SEITZ [1] - 1:9

select [3] - 66:18,

67:1, 79:22

selected [2] - 71:14,

71:21

selecting [1] - 67:19

selection [2] - 69:5,

71:4

self [1] - 20:25

self-evident [1] -

20:25

sell [1] - 10:15

selling [1] - 13:6

send [6] - 28:9,

44:18, 57:9, 57:15,

59:13, 60:10

sending [1] - 75:5

sense [9] - 7:4,

14:11, 17:8, 21:10,

54:23, 56:19, 68:12,

74:13, 78:21

sent [3] - 28:16,

30:1, 75:2

separated [1] - 65:7

September [8] - 1:5,

70:20, 70:25, 71:5,

71:9, 79:19, 80:15,

80:19

series [2] - 27:13,

51:14

serious [1] - 60:7

service [1] - 59:24

Services [2] - 12:17,

13:1

session [1] - 61:20

set [7] - 27:6, 71:16,

72:6, 74:10, 76:21,

79:9, 79:10

sets [2] - 61:13,

61:14

setting [3] - 69:6,

69:7, 79:25

settle [1] - 55:6

settled [1] - 31:7

settlement [9] -

24:14, 28:13, 28:15,

28:18, 29:14, 29:16,

32:7, 56:10, 60:7

settlements [1] -

61:15

settling [1] - 61:12

setup [1] - 56:22

several [3] - 10:20,

56:16, 77:4

shall [1] - 68:19

share [4] - 17:17,

11

30:4, 75:3, 75:10

shared [1] - 58:14

Sharon [2] - 10:25,

12:11

shed [1] - 33:20

sheets [1] - 5:8

Sheridan [1] - 1:15

shifting [1] - 4:21

shilling [1] - 16:9

shocked [1] - 6:2

short [1] - 77:16

shortly [1] - 14:5

show [10] - 5:17,

20:1, 20:9, 29:17,

61:10, 62:20, 62:21,

65:22, 66:17, 75:20

shut [3] - 35:14,

65:4, 75:13

side [3] - 24:22, 26:6,

43:19

sides [6] - 5:12, 35:3,

43:16, 44:3, 44:21,

51:18

sign [2] - 21:6, 50:11

signed [2] - 22:17,

24:13

significant [5] - 6:24,

15:1, 16:22, 16:24,

71:25

significantly [1] -

57:19

signs [1] - 56:20

silence [1] - 33:21

similar [3] - 22:10,

23:15, 56:22

simple [3] - 43:15,

46:2, 46:18

simply [12] - 8:4,

10:8, 10:11, 19:11,

20:9, 20:10, 20:19,

24:20, 30:12, 41:10,

52:11, 56:8

sit [1] - 3:13

situation [2] - 22:10,

23:19

six [2] - 28:4, 68:14

skateboard [1] -

59:24

skills [1] - 55:1

skin [1] - 55:20

Skype [1] - 27:21

Skyping [1] - 63:1

sliced [1] - 20:11

slick [1] - 30:7

slips [1] - 5:17

slow [1] - 41:2

small [2] - 35:8, 63:8

smaller [1] - 68:10

so's [1] - 12:1

solving [1] - 54:25


sometimes [2] -

25:21, 64:15

somewhat [6] - 32:3,

33:6, 33:18, 36:14,

41:18, 46:2

somewhere [1] -

63:15

soon [4] - 66:19,

66:20, 68:18, 71:13

sooner [1] - 28:3

sorry [8] - 5:23, 7:11,

7:12, 12:7, 16:11,

19:6, 60:23, 77:14

sort [14] - 7:20, 11:8,

18:10, 21:1, 39:10,

40:10, 43:19, 44:1,

44:21, 45:19, 49:7,

53:4, 54:7, 61:20

sorts [2] - 32:16,

39:24

sounds [4] - 48:5,

71:11, 71:20, 72:12

SOUTHERN [1] - 1:1

spa [2] - 22:12

space [1] - 49:11

sparse [1] - 32:20

speaking [2] - 59:2,

67:17

special [1] - 27:13

specific [8] - 18:15,

38:4, 38:11, 50:16,

50:19, 51:4, 56:19,

57:12

specifically [3] -

16:1, 25:15, 36:5

specifics [3] - 15:9,

18:18, 29:1

speed [2] - 54:24,

68:17

spell [1] - 11:3

spelled [1] - 78:8

spend [3] - 6:4, 44:2,

58:19

spending [2] - 35:3,

59:10

spent [6] - 5:12,

5:14, 5:19, 5:21, 27:1,

60:8

split [1] - 43:16

spot [1] - 55:22

spouse [1] - 66:5

stage [3] - 9:16,

32:11, 32:12

stand [1] - 34:24

standalone [1] - 36:7

standard [7] - 18:10,

21:19, 33:1, 40:5,

40:21, 44:22, 45:2

standards [5] -

38:22, 39:25, 41:7,

41:9

stands [1] - 35:16

start [7] - 14:11,

16:11, 21:11, 27:9,

43:21, 79:25, 80:1

started [1] - 40:8

starting [1] - 61:4

State [1] - 33:7

state [6] - 3:3, 27:14,

63:20, 63:22, 63:23,

64:1

statement [1] - 50:13

States [2] - 2:2, 81:7

STATES [2] - 1:1,

1:10

states [3] - 14:15,

55:23, 56:2

stating [1] - 78:13

statistically [1] -

77:22

status [1] - 41:24

STATUS [1] - 1:9

statute [16] - 3:19,

4:17, 33:8, 33:22,

35:13, 35:20, 36:6,

36:10, 39:24, 39:25,

40:16, 42:13, 42:19,

42:23, 43:3, 43:5

Statute [1] - 42:11

statutes [1] - 33:1

statutory [1] - 34:23

stay [3] - 69:11,

69:20, 75:15

stayed [2] - 69:19,

74:13

staying [1] - 74:5

step [1] - 9:21

steps [3] - 4:12,

8:11, 68:10

stereotype [1] - 58:3

STEVEN [1] - 1:17

still [18] - 7:4, 7:10,

7:19, 8:8, 11:15,

11:22, 28:2, 32:25,

35:13, 35:17, 38:14,

39:25, 42:20, 43:12,

52:2, 57:19, 61:2,

68:10

stop [2] - 35:14,

57:16

stray [1] - 39:15

Street [1] - 1:15

stricken [1] - 27:20

structure [1] - 49:11

structured [1] - 17:2

stuff [1] - 39:17

subject [2] - 8:10,

78:4

subjective [1] - 39:8

submission [1] -

46:2

submissions [2] -

7:14, 43:2

subrogation [3] -

15:16, 15:24, 17:16

Subsection [1] -

35:20

subsidiaries [1] -

25:10

substantial [4] -

40:3, 41:12, 45:3,

45:12

substantive [3] -

6:23, 33:24, 40:3

substantively [1] -

32:25

succeeded [1] -

41:21

successful [1] - 67:6

successors [1] -

25:9

suddenly [2] - 38:21,

75:21

suffer [1] - 17:14

suffered [1] - 16:2

suggest [6] - 18:8,

19:2, 44:10, 49:20,

60:24, 67:24

suggesting [3] -

19:3, 67:19, 67:22

suggestion [4] -

69:2, 70:24, 73:9,

75:12

suggestions [3] -

55:17, 67:10, 71:1

Suite [2] - 1:18, 1:24

sum [1] - 60:13

summary [11] - 9:2,

9:5, 42:9, 44:17, 45:6,

50:24, 69:25, 70:5,

70:6, 72:21, 75:22

support [1] - 18:12

suppose [1] - 49:4

supposed [4] - 23:3,

23:6, 23:15, 37:19

supposedly [1] -

24:21

surprising [1] -

36:14

surviving [1] - 65:10

suspect [1] - 70:4

sustainable [1] -

20:25

system [1] - 15:5

T

tag [3] - 54:2, 54:3,

59:16

tag-along [2] - 54:2,

54:3

team [1] - 58:15

teed [1] - 38:21

teeing [1] - 38:25

ten [2] - 65:15, 68:20

ten-minute [2] -

65:15, 68:20

term [1] - 77:16

terminate [1] - 74:6

terrible [1] - 35:4

terrific [1] - 15:6

test [5] - 35:23,

35:24, 36:7, 36:9,

53:10

testified [2] - 15:3,

15:9

testify [2] - 7:5, 41:8

testifying [1] - 14:19

testimony [5] - 4:7,

6:21, 6:24, 9:3, 18:20

Texan [1] - 67:18

Texans [1] - 67:16

Texas [5] - 23:10,

23:18, 23:21, 65:14,

67:16

THE [228] - 1:9, 3:1,

3:12, 4:23, 5:3, 5:7,

5:10, 5:16, 5:19, 6:2,

7:9, 7:13, 8:4, 8:12,

8:21, 8:23, 9:7, 9:10,

9:19, 10:4, 10:23,

11:3, 11:7, 11:15,

11:23, 12:1, 12:5,

12:10, 12:14, 12:16,

12:19, 12:25, 13:2,

13:5, 13:8, 13:13,

13:16, 14:2, 15:12,

15:17, 15:20, 16:11,

16:13, 16:19, 16:22,

17:21, 18:1, 18:22,

18:25, 19:5, 19:8,

19:19, 20:6, 20:9,

21:2, 21:8, 21:21,

22:3, 22:22, 23:12,

24:2, 24:5, 24:9,

24:12, 24:18, 25:20,

26:9, 26:14, 26:17,

26:21, 26:23, 28:21,

29:3, 29:7, 29:19,

29:21, 29:24, 31:1,

31:6, 31:14, 31:21,

32:2, 32:14, 34:3,

34:5, 34:20, 35:1,

35:8, 35:12, 35:18,

35:24, 36:9, 37:6,

37:11, 41:2, 43:7,

43:15, 44:18, 44:20,

45:5, 45:14, 46:5,

46:7, 46:9, 46:19,

12

47:1, 47:7, 48:5,

48:13, 49:1, 49:7,

49:9, 50:6, 50:19,

51:2, 51:9, 51:16,

51:18, 51:23, 52:1,

52:5, 52:8, 52:18,

52:21, 52:24, 53:3,

53:19, 54:9, 54:11,

54:13, 54:15, 54:17,

54:21, 55:11, 55:14,

55:19, 56:8, 56:12,

56:22, 56:25, 57:3,

58:2, 58:7, 58:14,

58:21, 58:24, 59:5,

59:16, 59:20, 60:2,

60:20, 61:1, 61:9,

62:9, 62:12, 62:20,

63:2, 63:7, 63:12,

63:17, 63:25, 64:3,

64:8, 64:15, 64:23,

64:25, 65:2, 65:15,

66:2, 66:4, 66:9,

66:12, 66:25, 67:9,

67:19, 68:18, 69:22,

70:9, 70:13, 70:16,

70:22, 71:1, 71:11,

71:20, 72:2, 72:5,

72:8, 72:12, 72:19,

72:24, 73:4, 73:8,

73:12, 73:16, 73:18,

73:21, 73:24, 74:1,

74:8, 74:15, 74:20,

74:23, 75:2, 75:5,

75:21, 75:24, 76:7,

76:9, 76:22, 77:8,

77:18, 77:24, 78:6,

78:15, 78:19, 78:24,

79:1, 79:4, 79:6, 79:9,

79:18, 79:22, 79:25,

80:4, 80:8, 80:11,

80:14, 80:17

theme [1] - 39:16

themselves [5] -

26:17, 30:14, 30:19,

43:20, 75:20

theories [13] - 6:16,

15:23, 25:22, 34:17,

36:23, 37:18, 38:10,

38:15, 39:11, 39:12,

40:11, 41:20, 78:12

theory [16] - 16:25,

17:16, 18:6, 28:1,

34:9, 34:10, 34:18,

36:21, 37:2, 37:12,

38:5, 39:2, 51:6, 51:7,

52:22, 76:9

therefore [3] - 7:24,

37:14, 51:5

Thereupon [1] -

70:14


they've [5] - 42:15,

51:19, 51:24, 58:21,

58:23

thinking [4] - 55:18,

58:9, 63:14, 75:18

thinks [1] - 76:16

third [6] - 29:15,

29:16, 30:18, 30:24,

76:23

third-party [1] -

76:23

thirds [1] - 30:25

thoughtful [1] - 53:4

thoughts [1] - 27:4

three [10] - 5:21,

5:25, 11:17, 23:10,

23:12, 38:25, 39:2,

67:24, 77:14

three-column [2] -

11:17, 77:14

throughout [1] - 36:3

throw [1] - 43:20

thumb [1] - 39:13

tie [1] - 36:6

time-consuming [1]

- 57:18

timetable [1] - 53:7

timing [1] - 69:5

tip [1] - 35:8

tired [1] - 38:10

together [4] - 44:21,

44:23, 45:18, 69:3

tomorrow [1] - 65:12

took [5] - 10:10,

14:3, 39:2, 74:4,

75:16

tool [2] - 35:13,

35:24

tools [1] - 78:16

top [1] - 10:6

topic [1] - 41:15

tortfeasor [3] - 7:21,

7:22, 15:25

total [2] - 29:15,

29:18

touched [1] - 25:2

tough [1] - 56:12

track [1] - 54:8

transcript [2] -

10:19, 39:23

transcription [1] -

81:3

transcripts [1] -

38:23

transplant [1] -

66:10

travel [3] - 27:22,

67:13, 68:16

treat [1] - 36:6

treatises [1] - 36:13

trepidation [2] -

32:1, 34:25

trial [23] - 9:4, 23:22,

34:13, 34:14, 34:18,

34:20, 38:1, 38:13,

38:14, 38:18, 39:7,

39:9, 39:21, 39:22,

40:9, 60:15, 67:2,

69:19, 70:8, 73:9,

73:12

trials [1] - 62:2

tricky [1] - 53:1

tried [2] - 14:14,

33:12

troubling [1] - 26:23

true [5] - 16:7, 30:6,

31:20, 50:6, 51:22

truly [1] - 29:24

trump [1] - 51:5

trust [1] - 45:24

trustee [5] - 8:9,

8:10, 76:2, 76:12

trustees [1] - 76:3

trusty [1] - 48:17

try [9] - 30:2, 39:5,

41:17, 60:16, 68:2,

68:8, 73:15, 78:2,

78:3

trying [21] - 14:12,

29:23, 33:10, 34:12,

34:22, 36:17, 38:15,

39:22, 40:1, 40:7,

40:18, 40:19, 40:22,

41:9, 41:14, 41:15,

41:16, 41:17, 41:19,

53:8

Ts [1] - 8:15

turn [1] - 26:23

tweak [3] - 44:24,

49:7, 50:8

Twelfth [2] - 2:3,

81:7

two [21] - 6:7, 25:5,

27:3, 28:9, 30:25,

32:24, 33:23, 34:24,

44:21, 45:6, 46:8,

48:16, 51:2, 52:8,

52:9, 55:2, 68:21,

69:4, 71:25, 73:1,

73:14

two-thirds [1] -

30:25

Twombly [2] - 18:9,

36:20

type [2] - 18:13, 49:1

U

UCC [5] - 32:20,

33:11, 43:3, 43:5,

45:13

ultimate [2] - 3:23,

31:22

ultimately [2] -

18:16, 70:7

umbra [1] - 25:17

unclear [1] - 33:6

under [6] - 4:21,

18:6, 18:9, 42:19,

42:20, 43:4

undergoing [1] -

66:9

understood [2] - 7:7,

14:20

undertake [1] - 28:8

unenforceable [3] -

49:22, 50:5, 51:14

Uniform [1] - 43:9

uniformity [1] -

43:11

united [1] - 2:2

United [1] - 81:7

UNITED [2] - 1:1,

1:10

unless [5] - 20:11,

40:6, 66:4, 69:17,

75:7

unrealistic [1] -

30:20

unreasonable [1] -

71:23

unscientific [1] -

14:16

unusual [1] - 71:7

up [39] - 9:5, 21:24,

24:11, 25:23, 34:18,

34:20, 35:5, 35:14,

37:4, 38:3, 38:21,

38:25, 44:18, 45:10,

47:3, 50:12, 50:21,

51:10, 52:9, 54:24,

57:17, 57:19, 59:13,

60:10, 61:10, 62:1,

62:20, 62:21, 65:16,

65:22, 66:17, 68:17,

68:18, 70:10, 72:6,

74:3, 75:20, 77:13,

79:25

upheld [1] - 16:17

useful [1] - 35:13

V

value [1] - 43:1

variation [1] - 39:15

variations [1] - 36:2

various [1] - 70:17

verbal [1] - 19:16

verbiage [1] - 49:4

Verde [13] - 3:9,

6:10, 9:8, 9:15, 26:21,

28:16, 29:24, 30:23,

48:24, 58:15, 60:21,

67:22, 73:18

VERDE [124] - 1:21,

3:9, 5:20, 5:25, 6:14,

7:10, 8:3, 8:7, 15:14,

15:19, 15:24, 16:12,

16:15, 16:20, 16:24,

17:23, 18:17, 18:24,

19:3, 19:6, 19:15,

20:4, 20:8, 20:16,

21:4, 21:9, 21:25,

22:6, 22:8, 26:22,

29:6, 29:9, 29:20,

29:22, 31:25, 32:5,

32:15, 34:4, 34:6,

34:21, 35:4, 35:11,

35:14, 35:19, 36:1,

36:11, 37:9, 37:12,

41:4, 45:2, 45:8, 46:1,

46:6, 46:8, 46:10,

46:21, 47:5, 47:10,

47:14, 48:25, 49:2,

49:8, 49:17, 51:11,

51:17, 51:19, 52:4,

52:7, 52:16, 52:19,

52:23, 53:1, 54:6,

54:10, 54:12, 54:14,

54:16, 54:18, 55:2,

55:13, 60:18, 60:23,

61:2, 61:10, 62:13,

63:3, 63:11, 63:14,

64:5, 64:9, 64:14,

64:17, 65:13, 67:25,

71:21, 72:3, 72:6,

72:11, 74:4, 74:12,

74:19, 75:12, 75:23,

76:1, 76:8, 76:11,

77:2, 77:9, 77:22,

78:1, 78:10, 78:18,

78:21, 78:25, 79:3,

79:5, 79:8, 79:13,

79:21, 79:24, 80:2,

80:5, 80:10, 80:13

Verde's [1] - 42:24

versa [1] - 71:24

Version [7] - 11:22,

12:4, 12:9, 13:12,

13:15, 47:20, 48:6

version [2] - 12:2,

13:23

Versions [1] - 11:18

vested [1] - 20:13

viable [6] - 7:11, 8:8,

11:15, 16:8, 28:11,

74:11

vice [1] - 71:24

13

view [1] - 21:13

Vijay [2] - 11:6, 13:24

VIJAY [1] - 11:6

Vincent [1] - 8:19

Visl [1] - 17:2

volunteer [1] - 57:4

W

wait [1] - 37:6

waiver [1] - 42:5

wasted [1] - 35:7

water [2] - 18:6,

30:13

wave [1] - 38:21

wedding [1] - 66:5

week [4] - 27:11,

58:11, 70:21, 80:19

weeks [7] - 27:10,

38:18, 39:7, 39:9,

48:16, 71:18, 73:1

weigh [1] - 77:7

welcome [1] - 27:13

well-developed [1] -

36:14

whatsoever [2] -

12:24, 22:21

white [1] - 49:11

whole [2] - 28:4, 37:7

widow [1] - 30:15

WIGDOR [1] - 1:17

Wigdor [1] - 3:8

wiggle [1] - 38:14

willing [3] - 28:24,

43:22, 48:17

wish [1] - 31:18

word [2] - 26:16,

76:2

words [7] - 25:5,

26:12, 33:2, 34:21,

35:22, 45:9, 49:23

workable [1] - 73:2

works [1] - 21:2

worn [1] - 25:22

worse [1] - 17:12

worth [2] - 61:15,

78:20

write [1] - 38:10

writing [1] - 59:12

written [2] - 19:16,

70:2

wrote [1] - 6:14

Y

year [2] - 42:7, 53:11

years [5] - 31:19,

34:17, 50:4, 54:12,


14

60:8

York [12] - 1:22,

64:5, 64:8, 64:16,

64:19, 64:22, 65:3,

65:7, 65:10, 67:17

yourself [1] - 21:10

Yuri [1] - 10:24

Z

zealous [1] - 25:21


1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT...

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