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1 The Parmalat case and the recent bankruptcy reform Lorenzo Stanghellini Facoltà di Giurisprudenza...
Transcript of 1 The Parmalat case and the recent bankruptcy reform Lorenzo Stanghellini Facoltà di Giurisprudenza...
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The Parmalat case and the recent bankruptcy reform
Lorenzo StanghelliniFacoltà di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Firenze (*)
Colloquium IEEI, Rome, 19 maggio 2006
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Parmalat’s position in 2003
Leading Italian food group
Parent company listed 51% owned by the Tanzi family
Truly international business 32 countries, 36 operating companies, 132
locations
Fifth Italian bond issuer (€ 7.0 bn, a part of which publicly rated)
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2003: the first cracks
Balance-sheet 2002: € 3.5 bn liquidity
February: a new bond issuance (300 ml) is turned down for lack of sufficient information CFO resigns but remains on board
November: Supervising authorities ask clarifications about liquidity
Deloitte casts doubts over financial statements
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December 2003: The collapse
9th: Enrico Bondi, a turnaround specialist, is hired by Tanzi and the board
12th: Parmalat shares plunge; a € 150 ml bond is reimbursed
15th: Tanzi resigns, Bondi takes on as Parmalat’s President
19th: BOA denies Parmalat’s account with BOA holding substantial liquidity
23rd: Italian Government enacts an emergency bankruptcy law for very large firms (>1,000 empl.)
On the same day, Parmalat files for bankr. protection; Bondi is appointed commissioner
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Parmalat’s collapse:Why? How?
Why the people did it? At least for the “core” actors (Tanzi), it is
not easy to tell
How could they do it? Bad corporate governance Ineffective external checks
Stock market Auditors Incremental lenders
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A good candidate for rescue
32,000 employeesMore people and firms dependent on Parmalat’s continuing operationsBusiness in equilibrium (decision on rescue based on assets, not liab.)
Liquidation was simply not an option
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Italian insolvency law(before)
Allowed continuation of business under court supervision and protection from creditorsAllowed industrial restructuring and “super-priority” financing
Did not allow for financial restructuringOnly real option under existing law: sale of Parmalat as a going concern
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Italian insolvency law (after): d.l. 347/2003 and Law 39/2004
But:
Selling large businesses is difficult Often yields fire-sale prices
Law amended to allow financial restructuring, including debt-equity swap (Law No. 39-2004)Debt-equity swap proposed to creditors: Parmalat would be “sold” to its creditors
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Parmalat insolvency:The restructuring plan
The plan encompasses 16 companies of the Parmalat group Combined assets valued € 1.5 bn
(“enterprise value”)
Total liabilities € 25.5 bn (with duplications for intra-group guarantees and loans: net liab. around € 14 bn)
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Parmalat insolvency:The restructuring plan (2)
Following a majority vote of the creditors (August-September 2005):
Creditors’ claims have been reduced According to the asset/liability ratio of each of the
16 companies: some 100%, some almost zero
A Newco has been set up
Liabilities (reduced to € 1.5 bn to equal enterprise value) have been transferred to Newco together with assets, at no cost
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Parmalat insolvency:The restructuring plan (3)
Unsecured credits. of 16 comp. have received Newco’s shares in settlement of claims Forced debt-equity swap (creditors will receive
shares, plus 1 warrant per sh. up to the first 650)
Secured creditors (plus administr. expenses) have been fully paid in cash by Newco (€ 204 ml)
Newco has emerged with an almost all-equity financial structure
Newco has finally been listed (Oct. 2005) New Parmalat’s corporate governance according to
international best practices
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Parmalat insolvency:sheer technical complexity
Hundreds of companies in different jurisdictions Hard test for EU Reg. 1346/2000 (Eurofood
plc): ECJ decision on 2nd May 2006 Coordination of non-EU procedures (Brazil,
US)
No “consolidation” of the group The intra-group distribution of assets and
liabilities is taken as a “snapshot” No subordination of large intra-group claims
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Parmalat insolvency:sheer technical complexity (2)
Liability suits against Parmalat in US claimants bound by the plan?
Liability suits (and avoidance actions) by Parmalat against directors, auditors, and banks Potentially, a big source of recovery
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Parmalat: Any lessons to be learnt?
Availability of procedures that allow efficient financial restructuring is crucial
Distribution of value is difficult Valuation of an insolvent firm is difficult Multiple valuations are even more so
Keeping management of distressed firms is important ex-ante, but less so ex-post in large companies
“Rehabilitation”: What does it means?
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Parmalat: Any lessons to be learnt? (2)
Creditors’ committee necessary to achieve consensus Unfavourable international press (see,
e.g.,“Global Turnaround” March 2004)
A Newco necessary to get around the necessary shareholder’s vote ECJ Pafitis v. Banca Trapeza (1993)
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Parmalat case: What it does NOT tell
Parmalat needed “pruning” and turnaround
Business was profitable (albeit much less than told)
Therefore: no “tragic choice” (creditors vs. employees/suppliers) has been necessary Alitalia (more than 20.000 employees and
significant operating losses) would be a much more problematic case…
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… however, Parmalat was an “easy” case: The business was profitable
Financial statements 2002-2003 revised by PWC (press release 26 January 2004):
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The new composition procedures: (a) The “Concordato preventivo”
Decree-Law 14 March 2005, n. 35: New “concordato preventivo” Plan by the debtor to avoid the bankruptcy procedure
(“Fallimento”) through a composition with the creditors
High degree of flexibility, classes of creditors No constraints on financial restructuring proposals by
the debtor Debt for equity swap possible pursuant to a majority
vote
New Art. 160 of bankruptcy is taken almost literally from Art. 4-bis l. 39/2004 (Parmalat law)
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The new composition procedures: (b) The “Concordato fallimentare”
D.lgs. 9 January 2006, n. 5: the new “concordato fallimentare” Plan by the debtor, any creditor or third
party, to close the bankruptcy procedure (“Fallimento”)
Same potential for restructuring of the new “concordato preventivo”
New concept of “concordato”
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The legacy of ParmalatA “giant leap forward”. Now let us consolidate Reform of general bankruptcy law by
d.lgs. 9 January 2006, n. 5: an important work in progress
Generalize Parmalat: NO, thanks Creditors have been kept out of the door
Called upon at the end for a vote on a plan “take it or leave it”
The success of Parmalat turnaround is due to the business and the people who worked on it. Now it’s enough…