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The Future Air-Land Interface: A Shared Responsibility

Gp Capt AndrewJoint Air Land Organisation

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1914-1918 1942 – North Africa 1944-45

The Cold War Op GRANBY KOSOVO

ALI – Historical Context

Op TELIC Op HERRICK

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ALI Over-TimeA

LI C

apab

ility

Time

?

?

WW1WW1

BEFBEF

WW2 -WW2 -N AfricaN Africa

Cold WarCold War

KosovoKosovo

Op GRANBYOp GRANBY

Op TELIC/ Op TELIC/ HERRICKHERRICK1944-451944-45

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Project Coningham Keyes Milestones

• Op Granby/Ex SAIF SAREEA 2/Op TELIC Air-Land interoperability was not good

• Mid 02 – 1Gp supported BATUS• Jul 03 – First PC-K Policy Group Meeting• 02/3 DOC Offensive Air Audit. Confirmed

shortcomings in Air’s ability to support Land/Maritime component.

• 2007 – PC-K concludes, CK2 Starts• Mar 10 – CK2 Concludes, Institutionalising

ALI commences

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ALI Contribution to Joint Action

Fires Influence

Manoeuvre

Battlespace Management

Capability Understanding Will

CK 2 Focus

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Collective Training• MST Jt Fires package

• Campaign FORM

UK FAC Requirement• Op capability doubled

• Future capability identified

Education• Joint Training Objectives

Air ISR• Video Downlink

Danger Close• GMLRS PROCEDURES

ALI Capability at BG Level• 1 TACP per BG

• 1 FAC per Coy

Close Combat Attack• Rotary Wing CAS and CCA

Inter-Service Liaison Elements• ASOC resourced

• DAIT/GLO/ASO

Individual FAC Training• Completely revised

• New 8-week FAC cse

Equipment• FIRESTORM

• VCDS Ops Package

Coningham-Keyes 2

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ARMOUR

ENG SPT

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Op Blenheim LessonsOp Blenheim Lessons

• 100% coverage by Tornado GR4 for 45 hours.

• Air Fuel Tanker availability:– Bespoke 216 Sqn Tristar extra fuel.– GR4 refuelling at Basra.

– SH sorties fully integrated into plan • Presence and speed of Air = flexibility.• No UK Casualties!• Enabled by forward leaning individuals from

Land and Air Components & a JOINT PLAN

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Op OQAB TSUKA – Turbine Move

• Shaping Operations– ISR– Tac AT

• Decisive Operations– STRIKE – CAS– Avn – Electronic Attack– ARTY

• Sustaining Operations– Battlespace Management (BM)– Strike Support to framework operations

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SECTOR 1 - RBG(S)

(NOWHERE TOC)

SECTOR 3 -13 CSLR

(WIDOW 49)

SECTOR 2 - TF 71(JAG)

HIDACZ STIRLINGSFC-17K AMSL – BGs

17K- 22K AMSL –WWTOCRADIUS 10NM

Check-in WWTOC PM37

1

3

2

CAS HOLD GOOJERAT

CAS HOLD MERVILLE

Battlespace Management

TF RV Pt

TRP

ROZ’s removed for clarity

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Op OQAB TSUKA – Lessons

• Early Joint/Combined Planning– Ensures air capabilities are exploited

• Air for flank protection:– DETER– INFORM

• Flexibility of Air Platforms• Avn for intimate support:

– Convoy– SH resupply

• ISTAR 24 hour coverage

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Final Thought

• We can consider ALI to be institutionalised when we no longer refer to an interface, rather to seamless output that marbles capability across all environmental domains, from the lowest tactical to the highest strategic levels and into a single symbiotic effect.

Or when it just happens

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Institutionalising ALI

Fires Influence

Manoeuvre

Battlespace Management

Capability Understanding Will

CK I-ALI Focus

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Enduring Principles Survive

• Robust integrated Joint C2 from Tactical through to Theatre level.

• Greater focus on non-Kinetic Approach.• Increased exploitation of the DIGITAL arena.• Common Joint Education and Training.• Increase role and utility of ISTAR in

UNDERSTANDING

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