RULE 31 – 32 CIVIL PROCEDURE, Dean Mawis, 2-B LPU 2014

RULE 31: CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE

Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated, and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. (1)

Section 2. Separate trials. — The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues. (2a)

________METROBANK V. SANDOVAL, G.R. NO. 169677, FEBRUARY 18, 2013

Facts:

On July 17, 1987, the Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants. The action was obviously to recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents.

Among the properties subject of the action were two parcels of commercial land located in Tandang Sora (Old Balara), Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 266423 and TCT No. 266588 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City registered in the names of Spouses Andres V. Genito, Jr. and Ludivina L. Genito.

On February 5, 2001, the Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in order to implead Asian Bank (now Metrobank) as an additional defendant.

Commenting on the motion, Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on the motion until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and documentary evidence the Republic had already presented against the original defendants, and contended that it would be deprived of its day in court if a separate trial were to be held against it without having been sufficiently apprised about the evidence the Republic had adduced before it was brought in as an additional defendant.

In its reply to Asian Bank's comment, the Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was proper because its cause of action against Asian Bank was entirely distinct and independent from its cause of action against the original defendants; and that the issue with respect to Asian Bank was whether Asian Bank had actual or constructive knowledge at the time of the issuance of the TCTs for the properties in its name that such properties were the subject of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0004, while the issue as to the original defendants was whether they had "committed the acts complained of as constituting illegal or unlawful accumulation of wealth which would, as a consequence, justify forfeiture of the said properties or the satisfaction from said properties of the judgement that may be rendered in favor of the Republic.

Sandiganbayan granted motion for separate trial and denied MR of Metrobank. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:

WON Sandiganbayan committed GADALEJ?

WON the Republic is entitled to a separate Trial against Asia Bank?

Held:

The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting the Republic's motion for separate trial, but was correct in upholding its jurisdiction over the Republic's claim against Asian Bank.

The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 2.Separate trials. — The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.

The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party.

We conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was distinct and separate from that against the original defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all the issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a "single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the courts."

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RULE 31 – 32 CIVIL PROCEDURE, Dean Mawis, 2-B LPU 2014

Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.

As we see it, however, the justification of the Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial did not constitute a special or compelling reason like any of the exceptions. To begin with, the issue relevant to Asian Bank was not complicated. In that context, the separate trial would not be in furtherance of convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action against Asian Bank was necessarily connected with the cause of action against the original defendants. Should the Sandiganbayan resolve the issue against Spouses Genito in a separate trial on the basis of the evidence adduced against the original defendants, the properties would be thereby adjudged as ill-gotten and liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic without Metrobank being given the opportunity to rebut or explain its side. The outcome would surely be prejudicial towards Metrobank.

Consequently, the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over the claim against Asian Bank, for the Court has ruled in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, that "the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction not only over principal causes of action involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth, but also over all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases."

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RULE 31 – 32 CIVIL PROCEDURE, Dean Mawis, 2-B LPU 2014

RULE 32: TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER

Section 1. Reference by consent. — By written consent of both parties, the court may order any or all of the issues in a case to be referred to a commissioner to be agreed upon by the parties or to be appointed by the court. As used in these Rules, the word "commissioner" includes a referee, an auditor and an examiner. (1a, R33)

Section 2. Reference ordered on motion. — When the parties do not consent, the court may, upon the application of either or of its own motion, direct a reference to a commissioner in the following cases:

(a) When the trial of an issue of fact requires the examination of a long account on either side, in which case the commissioner may be directed to hear and report upon the whole issue or any specific question involved therein;

(b) When the taking of an account is necessary for the information of the court before judgment, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect.

(c) When a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. (2a, R33)

Section 3. Order of reference; powers of the commissioner. — When a reference is made, the clerk shall forthwith furnish the commissioner with a copy of the order of reference. The order may specify or limit the powers of the commissioner, and may direct him to report only upon particular issues, or to do or perform particular acts, or to receive and report evidence only and may fix the date for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of his report. Subject to other specifications and limitations stated in the order, the commissioner has and shall exercise the power to regulate the proceedings in every hearing before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the order. He may issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, swear witnesses, and unless otherwise provided in the order of reference, he may rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The trial or hearing before him shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before the court. (3a, R33)

Section 4. Oath of commissioner. — Before entering upon his duties the commissioner shall be sworn to a faithful and honest performance thereof. (14, R33)

Section 5. Proceedings before commissioner. — Upon receipt of the order of reference and unless otherwise provided therein, the commissioner shall forthwith set a time and place for the first meeting of the parties or their counsel to be held within ten (10) days after the date of the order of reference and shall notify the parties or their counsel. (5a, R33)

Section 6. Failure of parties to appear before commissioner. — If a party fails to appear at the time and place appointed, the commissioner may proceed ex parte or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a future day, giving notice to the absent party or his counsel of the adjournment. (6a, R33)

Section 7. Refusal of witness. — The refusal of a witness to obey a subpoena issued by the commissioner or to give evidence before him, shall be deemed a contempt of the court which appointed the commissioner. (7a R33)

Section 8. Commissioner shall avoid delays. — It is the duty of the commissioner to proceed with all reasonable diligence. Either party, on notice to the parties and commissioner, may apply to the court for an order requiring the commissioner to expedite the proceedings and to make his report. (8a, R33)

Section 9. Report of commissioner. — Upon the completion of the trial or hearing or proceeding before the commissioner, he shall file with the court his report in writing upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference. When his powers are not specified or limited, he shall set forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law in his report. He shall attach thereto all exhibits, affidavits, depositions, papers and the transcript, if any, of the testimonial evidence presented before him. (9a, R33)

Section 10. Notice to parties of the filing of report. — Upon the filing of the report, the parties shall be notified by the clerk, and they shall be allowed ten (10) days within which to signify grounds of objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire. Objections to the report based upon grounds which were available to the parties during the proceedings before the commissioner, other than objections to the findings and conclusions therein, set forth, shall not be considered by the court unless they were made before the commissioner. (10, R33)

Section 11. Hearing upon report. — Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, the report shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall issue an order adopting, modifying, or rejecting the report in whole or in part, or recommitting it with instructions, or requiring the parties to present further evidence before the commissioner or the court. (11a, R33)

Section 12. Stipulations as to findings. — When the parties stipulate that a commissioner's findings of fact shall be final, only questions of law shall thereafter be considered. (12a, R33)

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RULE 31 – 32 CIVIL PROCEDURE, Dean Mawis, 2-B LPU 2014

Section 13. Compensation of commissioner. — The court shall allow the commissioner such reasonable compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant, to be taxed as costs against the defeated party, or apportioned, as justice requires. (13, R33)

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WASSMER V. VELEZ, G.R. NO. L-20089, DECEMBER 26, 1964

Facts:

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:

Dear Bet —

"Will have to postpone wedding. My mother oppose it. Am leaving on the Convair today.

"Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.

Paquing"

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

"NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE.

PAKING"

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court

as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.09 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.

On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it out. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution.”

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before the court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendant's petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable settlement. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.

Eventually, counsel of defendant stated that chances of amicable settlement was nil. Court then denied its petition.

Issue:

WON the court erred in denying petitioner’s petition for relief from judgement?

Held:

No.

A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merit stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control". An affidavit of merits like this, stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court

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RULE 31 – 32 CIVIL PROCEDURE, Dean Mawis, 2-B LPU 2014

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. MR was also denied.

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