1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19,...
-
date post
21-Dec-2015 -
Category
Documents
-
view
219 -
download
0
Transcript of 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19,...
![Page 1: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
1
RELIABILITY ANDCOMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS
POWER Research ConferenceUC Berkeley
March 19, 2004
Paul JoskowMIT, CEEPR, CMI
and
Jean Tirole IDEI, GREMAQ, CERAS,MIT
http://web.mit.edu/pjoskow/www/
![Page 2: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
2
INTRODUCTION
capacity obligations placed on LSEs,
Despite all the talk about "deregulation“
procurement obligations placed on ISOs,
OpRes, and other ancillary service requirements,
protocols for non-price rationing and management of system emergencies,
Lack of understanding between
economists (focused on market design and evaluation), engineers (focused on reliability rules).
wholesale price caps, etc.
![Page 3: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
3
Benchmark Proposition: Competitive wholesale and retail markets “work” (second-best) despite
Our Research Program’s Structure:
Examine implications of relaxing each of the five key assumptions in two papers:
• presence of price-insensitive consumers,
• rationing
but only under five sets of key assumptions.
• This paper: Wholesale markets with price caps, capacity obligations, ISO procurement, network collapses and operating reserves.• Companion paper: Retail competition with load profiling, partially price sensitive consumers and zonal rationing.
http://web.mit.edu/pjoskow/www/
![Page 4: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
4
BASIC ELECTRICITY SYSTEM MODEL
• Uncertain demand indexed by contingent states i• Price insensitive consumers on traditional meters who are
offered two-part tariffs [A, p] by the LSE• Price sensitive consumers who see real time wholesale prices
passed through by LSE • LSE sees real time prices and may contract with customers to
be (priority) rationed in state i with a fraction i served by the LSE
• Supply side characterized by a continuum of CRS investment opportunities indexed by marginal cost of production c.
• I(c) denotes the investment costs of a plant with marginal production costs c. I′(c) < 0. ui (c) utilization rate of type c.
• Straightforward to introduce uncertainty on the supply side (e.g. probability of forced outage) but left to section on network collapses and OpRes
![Page 5: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
5
THE BENCHMARK MODEL
Continuum of states of nature
Consumers:
Price-insensitive: Demand: if no rationing
expected consumption:
gross surplus:
Price-sensitive : Demand: if no rationing
expected consumption:
gross surplus:
![Page 6: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
6
Producers: constant returns to scale: I(c) =investment cost for plant producing 1MW at MC c.
Social optimum (given price-insensitive retail consumers):
![Page 7: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
7
![Page 8: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
8
Benchmark Decentralization proposition
![Page 9: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
9
Five key assumptions
(e) Consumers are homogeneous up to a scaling factor. More complex consumer heterogeneity may lead to adverse selection and competitive screening
![Page 10: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
10
WHOLESALE PRICE DISTORTIONS; WHOLESALE
PRICE CAPS AND CAPACITY OBLIGATIONS
(As is well known) wholesale price caps
may be a response to market power or the outcome of regulatory opportunism, may lead to under-investment in peaking generation.
Capacity obligations: LSE must forward contract with generators to make their capacity available to ISO during peak demand periods yielding a « capacity price ».
Model reflects assumption that price cap is below the competitive market price in some (high) demand states (e.g. pi = VOLLi < $1000/Mwh)
![Page 11: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
11
With up to three states of nature, combination of price cap and capacity obligation (and associated capacity price) can address market power, investment, and end-use consumer price incentives provided that: All generating capacity is eligible to meet LSE capacity obligations and receive capacity payments not just peaking capacity,
all consumers, including price-sensitive ones, count for determining capacity obligations and capacity prices are passed through to all retail consumers,
forward market for capacity is competitive
With more than three states of nature, regulatory tradeoff between alleviating market power and providing proper investment incentives, unless there is market power in only onestate of nature, in which case there is no tradeoff.
![Page 12: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
12
ISO PROCUREMENT• Northeastern ISOs debating whether ISOs should
acquire peaking capacity and interruptible demand– ISO dispatching protocols?– How much should the ISO purchase?– Recovery through uplift?
• We consider impacts of ISO behavior– out-of-merit dispatching (Patton et. al. 2004)– with purchase of no more than optimal amount of peaking capacity– with purchase of more than optimal amount of peaking capacity– with different types of uplift recovery rules
• These ISO behaviors distort investment decisions, may crowd out significant amounts of private investment, and may lead to the ISO buying a lot more capacity than it may plan initially in order to balance supply and demand
• Better get ISO goals and incentives right
![Page 13: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
13
![Page 14: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
14
![Page 15: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
15
NETWORK SUPPORT SERVICES AND BLACKOUTS
Contrast:
collapse: available generation rendered useless.
rolling blackout: available generation very valuable (actually, value = VOLL),
Simple model of OpRes: States of nature
Inelastic demand Unit value v (v = VOLL).
dispatched demand : load shedding. Capacity K: investment cost IK. Marginal cost of energy : c. Availability factor
cumulative distribution function (could be state contingent).
Reserves:(cost: )
![Page 16: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
16
Timing:
● ● ● ●
Long term choiceof capacity K
Load Di
in state irealized(Day-ahead)
Choice of - dispatched load di < Di - reserves ridi
- (1+ri)di < K ready to be dispatched - rH > ri > rL
Availability λi
realized:- If λi(1+rL)di < di ,
di satisfied -If λi(1+rL)di > di, system collapses
Available generating capacity is realized after generatingcapacity is scheduled to meet “dispatched” demand
![Page 17: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
17
• The possibility of system collapses makes operating reserves a public good
• We characterize the attributes of the optimal investment in generating capacity and the prices needed to support it given the possibility of network collapses
• Absent mandatory OpRes requirements there will be underinvestment in reserves and too many system collapses
• It may be difficult to get a market to yield the optimal prices consistent with the OpRes requirement due to pricing challenges in the “reserve reduction” region
![Page 18: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
18
The socially optimal dispatch, curtailment and pricing policy involves three regimes as demand grows other things equal:
• Off peak: (di = Di < λi (1+rH)K ) and pi = MCi + rHs )
• Load-shedding: (di < Di ; di = λi(1+rL)K and pi = VOLL/(1+rL))
• Reserve reduction: (di = Di = λi (1+rr )K and pi = MCi + rrs + Z/(1+rr)) rL < rr < rH
Z = cost of increased probability of network collapse
with an increasing probability of a network collapse in each regime
![Page 19: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
19
Socially optimal policy:
Pi = MCi + rHs
Pi = MCi + rrs + Z/1+rr
Price jump?Pi = VOLLi/(1+rL)
di = Di
![Page 20: 1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,](https://reader035.fdocuments.us/reader035/viewer/2022062516/56649d6c5503460f94a4c69f/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
20
Implementation
Mandatory OpRes purchases (public good)
Off-peak: competitive price (MC). Load shedding region: price = VOLL. Reserve reduction region: price = between MC and VOLL
Difficult (knife edge) pricing problem in reserve reduction region:
- small change in reserve requirement can move price to MC or VOLL.
- but prices in this region havesignificant effects on investmentin reserves