1 RAO UES of Russia Anatoly Chubais, CEO European Policy Centre Brussels May 15, 2008 Russian Power...
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Transcript of 1 RAO UES of Russia Anatoly Chubais, CEO European Policy Centre Brussels May 15, 2008 Russian Power...
1
RAO UES of RussiaAnatoly Chubais, CEO
European Policy Centre
BrusselsMay 15, 2008
Russian Power Sector Reform:
New Market opportunities for Russia and the EU
2
Reform results Structural changes MarketsInvestmentBuilding up new markets
Post-reform risksRisk of market monopolizationRisk of price manipulation
Electric Power Sector in Russia and EU Member StatesCurrent results, problems and cooperation prospects
Contents
3
Basics of the Reform: Separation of Monopolistic and Competitive Sectors
Mo
no
po
list
ic s
ecto
rs
Dispatching
Transmission and Distribution grids
Co
mp
etit
ive
sect
ors
Supply
Generation
Private propertyand
market
Government propertyand
Government regulation
Structural changes
4
High Voltage
Grids
CentralizedDispatching
Administration
32 Federal PowerPlants
Minority Shareholders
Russian Government
52% 48%
RAO UES
73 АО-Energos
Generation
Transmission and
Distribution Grids
SupplyRegional
Dispatching Administrations
Structural changes
Pre-reform RAO UES structure
5
73 АО-energos
Generation
Wholesale and Territorial
Generation Companies
(OGKs and TGKs)
Regional Dispatching
Administrations
System Operator
Supply
Supply companies
Transmission and
Distribution grids
Federal Grid Company
(transmission grids)
Interregional distribution grid
companies(distribution grids)
АО-energo unbundling: Key element of structural changes
Structural changes
6
2000 - 2008
UES
reform
UES
reform
Key political factions in the State Duma
Certain Officials in the Government and the
President’s Administration
The majority of Senators
Conservatively-minded energy specialists
and scientists
The majority of Governors
Influential oligarchs
The majority of minority shareholders
Power Sector Reform: No objectors left
Structural changes
7
Post-reform Power Sector structure
Structural changes
Competitive market
Government property
Private property
Monopolistic sectors
System
Operator
Competitive sectors
Supply
6Wholesale Generation Companies
(OGKs)
Rosenergoatom (NPP)
14Territorial
Generation Companies (TGKs)
11Interregional Distribution Companies
(IDC)
Federal
Grid
Company
Wholesale Hydro
Generation Company Independent
GenerationCompanies
8
Market system: What is done, what is to be done
Markets
CompetitiveElectric Power
WholesaleMarket
since 1.09.2006
CompetitiveElectric Power
WholesaleMarket
since 1.09.2006
Capacity Market2008
Ancillary ServicesMarket
2008
Derivative Financial
Instruments Market
Retail Marketsince 1.09. 2006
LiberalizedTrans-border
trade2008-2009
Balancing Market2005
9 All new capacity and consumption commissioned after 2007 go to the free market
0%5%
10%15%
25%30%
50%
60%
80% 100%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Jan.1,2007
July 1,2007
Jan.1, 2008
July1,2008
Jan.1,2009
July 1,2009
Jan.1,2010
July 1,2010
Jan.1,2011
Sept. 1, 2006
~18% (Sept. 06)
~20% (Jan. 08)
Excluding Household consumption
Actual pace of liberalization (facts and estimates)
Mandatory increase of the liberalized market share
~ 25%
~35%
~40%
~60%
~70%
~90%100%
Competitive wholesale market:Pace of liberalization…
Wholesale market (NOREM)
Markets
10Source: Administrator of Trade System (ATS)
Average prices (Europe+Urals and Siberia), Euro/MWh
6
9
12
15
18
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Day (Apr 07)
6
9
12
15
18
21
01.10.07 08.10.07 15.10.07 22.10.07 29.10.07
Week and month
6
12
18
24Year
…and Supply/Demand Equation Prices
.Sept.06 Oct .06 Nov.06 Dec.06 Jan .07 Feb .07 Mar .07 Apr .07 May.07 Jun .07 Jul .07 Aug.07 Sept.07 Oct .07 Nov.07 Dec.07 Jan .08 Feb 08 Mar .07
Markets
112006
2010
2020
2030 Target concept for Development of the
Russian Power Sector until 2030
2006-2010 Investment
Programfor UES Holding
Company
5-year investment programs for energy companies
from 2008
2006 2010 2020 2030
Investment
Prospects until 2030:Target Concept, General Scheme, Investment Programs
General Scheme for allocating power capacity until 2020
12
Total : ~ 119.6 billion Euro
Expenditure by business, billion EuroSources of finance, billion Euro
39.2(34%)
36.1 (30%)
24.2(20%)
5.2(4%)
14.9(12%)
Private investments Companies’ funds
Credits and loans Other
State budget financing
Generation (thermal and hydro)Grids (transmission and distribution)
Dispatching
65.6 (54%)
48.4 (41%)
1.1 (1%)
4.5 (4%)
Far East
Investment
CAPEX 2008-2012 – over 119 bn EuroSources of finance and expenditure
13
Investments
2002-2012: Volume of financing
1.7 2 2.83.5
28.3 27.3
4.6
9.9
22.3
22.2
19.5
10
20
30
Volume of financing (generation+grids+dispatching)
2009 vs. 2002: Growth of annual investments by a factor of 17
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
billion Euros
0
Investment
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Average annual volume of generating capacity commissioning (including NPP), according to the General Scheme up to 2020. 2006-2010: 7.2 GW 2011-2015: 16.3 GW 2016-2020: 13.7 GW
0.6
2.1
11.9 1.7
1.9 2.2
5.1
12.9
13.7
10
0
4
8
12
16
ГВт
Capacity commissioning as of the years(thermal- + hydro generation)
2011 vs. 2002: Increase in annual commissioning, 23-fold
2002-2012: Volume of financing and capacity commissioning
14
Development trends: Current and emerging types of business activity
Power Sector Development
Program
Power machinery (procurements solely for OGKs and TGKs):
~ 21.6 billion Euro
Electrical equipment(procurements solely for FGC):~ 7.6 billion euro
Coal:~ 731 million tonnes
Gas:~ 848 billioncub. m.
8 - fold
4 - fold
40%
30%
Construction materials(solely expenditure on cement of TPPs and HPPs): ~ 0.3 billion Euro
R&D(solely in thermal power sector):~ 2 billion euro
Construction and installation(solely in thermal power sector):~ 9 billion Euro
4.5 - fold
4 - fold
8 - fold
(Expert estimates)
New markets
Turnkey project implementation (EPC/EPCM-contracts)~8.5 billion Euro(as of 01.03.2008)
2010 vs. 2006
15
Post-reform risks
16
Market liberalization refusal risk
0% 5%10%
15%
25%30%
50%
60%
80% 100%
Jan.1,2007
July 1,2007
Jan.1, 2008
July 1,2008
Jan.1,2009
July 1,2009
Jan.1,2010
July 1,2010
Jan.1,2011
Sept.1, 20060%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
~18% (Sept. 06)
~20% (Jan. 08)
Exclusive of Household consumption
Actual pace of liberalization (facts and estimates)
Mandatory increase in the liberalized market share
~ 25%~35%
~40%
~60%
~70%
~90% 100%
• Legal: Law on electric power bans state regulation of prices since 2011. Market liberalization schedule was introduced by the Russian Government regulation.
• Political: In fact liberalization schedule is a direct promise of the Russian Government to the Russian and foreign investors.
• Economic: Review of liberalization schedule will destroy investment program of power companies.
Annual average growth of electric power tariffs in 2005-2007: 10.7%Annual average expected growth of electric power tariffs in 2008-2011: 20.7%
Arguments against the risk
Conclusion: Risk is improbable
Risks
17
Risks
Risks of market monopolization by major player
Risk reduction instruments –Expanded special powers of antimonopoly bodies:
• Antimonopoly regulation and control in the wholesale and retail markets (in accordance with Article 25 of the Federal Law "On the Electric Power Industry") • Development of antimonopoly regulation and control rules in electric power sector (draft of Government Regulation– Q2 2008)
20%GazpromRussia
20%British Energy UK
22%VattenfallScandinavia
32%E.OnGermany
38%EndesaSpain
45%Enel Italy
82%EdFFrance
Market ShareCompany Country/Region
Generation: Internal market shares of European energy companies
As of July 1, 2008, affiliation is prohibited in the Russian competitive and monopolistic energy sectors
18
Risk of electricity price manipulationthrough fuel prices
Gazprom controls the supply of approximately 54% of fuel for Russian thermal power sector
Risk reduction instruments:
Expanded special powers of antimonopoly bodies:• Antimonopoly regulation and control in the wholesale and retail markets (in accordance with Article 25 of the Federal
Law "On the Electric Power Industry") • Development of antimonopoly regulation and control rules in electric power sector (draft of Government Regulation– Q2
2008)Existing powers of antimonopoly bodies:• Penalties (up to 10% of fuel revenue in local markets) for monopoly abuse• Behavior conditions for monopolists – as strict as possible forced sale of assets
Fuel balance structure of thermal generation in Russia
Structure of gas supplies for thermal generation in Russia
Gas68%
Coal+
fuel oil(32%)
Independent producers
21%
Gazprom structures
79%
Risks
19
Electric Power Sector in Russia and the EU:Current results, problems and cooperation prospects
20Foreign strategic investors Other strategic and portfolio investors
EU strategic investors:Participation in the IPO and competitive OGK/TGK share sale …
Russia and Europe
21.6 billion Euros is what has already been received from private sector investments as a result of IPOs and competitive sale of OGKs/TGKs shares
Billion Euro
ENEL (June 2007): • Purchase of the State’s share in ОGК-5 stocks at auction for 1.1 billion Euro.
E.ON (September – October 2007)• Purchase of additional issue of ОGК-4 stocks and purchase of State’s share in ОGК-4 stocks for 4.1 billion Euro.
Fortum (February – March 2008)• Purchase of additional issue of ТGК-10 stocks and purchase of State’s share in ТGК-10 stocks for 2 billion Euro.
14.4(67%)
7.2 (33%)
21
… and present role in the Russian Power Sector
* - As of March 2008
** - At the moment of share purchase exclusive of commissioning under investment programs until 2012
European strategic investors control companies with total capacity of 20.4 GW–
• approx. 10% of the Russia’s installed capacity• 13% of the RAO UES’ installed capacity in 2007
• 19% of all thermal OGKs and TGKs installed capacity
Total installed capacity of RAO UES power plants in 2007 -161.2 GW, including thermal OGKs and TGKs – approximately 108 GW
Russia and Europe
ENEL
Current shareholding: ~60% OGK-5 shares *
Installed capacity of OGK-5 power plants – approximately 8.7 GW**
Original shareholding: ~25% of OGK-5 shares
E.ON
Current shareholding: ~76% OGK-4 shares *
Installed capacity of OGK-4 power plants – approximately 8.6 GW**
Original shareholding: ~73% of OGK-4 shares
Fortum
Current shareholding:~76% TGK-10 shares*
Installed capacity of TGK-10 power plants – approximately 3.1 GW**
Original shareholding: ~76% of TGK-10 shares
22
Volume of orders of thermal OGKs and TGKsto power machinery and electrical equipment companies in EU countries
30
122.792.3
320.3
0
100
200
300
400
2005 2006 2007 2008
Million Euro
European companies account for approximately 27% of total volume of orders for primary equipment for thermal OGKs and TGKs
Russia and Europe
Supply of Equipment: Increase in orders from Russia
23
“Electric Power Border” between the CIS/Baltic States and Europe: Hurdle on the way to Russia-EU cooperation
Solutions: Synchronous interconnection of UCTE and IPS/UPS Power Systems
Results of the feasibility study of synchronous interconnection (April 2008):
• Synchronous interconnection project has no unsolvable problems of technical, operational or organizational character
• Synchronous interconnection – long-term prospect
• Synchronous interconnection requires major investments on both sides in the development of grid transmission capacity and improvement of system security
• Synchronous interconnection mid-term alternative– DC links (asynchronous interconnection)
Russia and Europe
24
Functional unbundling Legal unbundling Ownership unbundling
The issue is not settled yet for the majority of EU countries: Ownership unbundling of VICs and spin-off of distribution grids
EU countries
Deadline for ownership unbundling of RAO UES (Federal Law No. 250, November 4, 2007)
Russia July 1, 2008
??
Functional, Legal and Ownership Unbundling:Similarities and differences
Russia and Europe
25
Sources: EU, IMF
Russia and Europe
Ownership Unbundling:European Energy Policy Evolution
Until 1990 – unity of conservatives
Countries opposing ownership unbundling of VICs
By 2000 – Split of opinions in the EU:Liberals vs. conservatives
Countries supporting ownership unbundling of VICs
Countries unsure about the type of model
Others
2008:Russia’s position helps European liberals
26
Chemistry of the Russian reform
We do not consider this recipe the best option for Europe – Each State has its own “mix of ingredients”
But we are convinced that market values –
even in such a complicated area as the Power Sector and in such a unique setting as Russia –
are central and indispensable components
Basic principles: Market, Competition, Transparency
Best global practicein reforms
In-house know-how gained during the reform
+
+The Russian model
of Power Sector reform