1 Raiding and Signaling in the Academic Labor Market Timothy Perri.
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Transcript of 1 Raiding and Signaling in the Academic Labor Market Timothy Perri.
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Raiding and Signaling in the Academic Labor Market
Timothy Perri
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INTRODUCTION.
An inefficiently large level of research may occur even if research has direct social value.
A professor who publishes is more visible & more likely to receive an outside offer (Siow 1995, 1998). A prof’s private gain (a higher wage) may exceed the social gain from research.
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However, a prof may not spend too much time in research.
1) the more visible a prof, the higher the wage the university must pay.
Waldman (1984) found firms promote an inefficiently small # of individuals.
Schools may not reward research enough.
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2) Suppose more able individuals are also more capable in research, so publications may signal a prof’sproductivity & lead to raids.
If a prof. with an outside offer learns job satisfaction, S, at a raider, there is an option value to the prof: if S is high---quit, otherwise stay.
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For an individual of type “i”,option value = the prob. of a quit if raided (pi) the conditional
expected job satisfaction of a quitter ( ).iS
Option value is a social gain from signaling & raiding.
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Ignore any direct social value from research. Thus I understate the social gain from research.
This is similar to ignoring anyproductivity effect of education in the basic signaling model (Spence, 1974), except one social gain remains:option value.
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Michael Spence, Nobel laureate in economics 2001.
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A MODEL.
U university.
M the mkt. (2+ universities that bid in Bertrand fashion for profs).
2 types of profs: (L & H).
productivity = xi, i = L, H; xH > xL.
M will bid xH for one believed to be an H.
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Wage for those who do not signal
Those who do not signal are paid xL.WHY?
Faculty slots are scarce & M will not bid for those not known to be Hs.
Also, S may be costly to provide.
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The quit decision
An L who mimics an H would be paid xH by M.
For signaling to work, we must make sure an L would not mimican H.
Let S ~ uniformly on [-, ]; E(S) = 0. {Satisfaction = 0 @ U.}
Let m xH – xL.
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One who signals will quit if
S + xH > wage offer from U.
For an L: no counteroffer,so quit if S > -m (pL = prob. quit).
For an H: counteroffer = WC,so quit if S > WC – xH (pH = prob. quit).
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If WC > xL, pH < pL.
Assume WC > xL.
Now > &pH > pL .
for ANY continuous dist. of S.
Option value is higher for an H than for an L.
LSHS
HS LS
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0S
prob.
WC -xH-m
Fig. 1
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Assumption One./2 < m < .
This ensures pL < 1 &WC > x..
Note. No fundamental results are changed if pL = 1.
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The optimal counteroffer
Assume U max. profit .
= (xH-WC)(1-pH).
WC = xH - /2.
U does not match outside offer.
Later the model will be amendedto allow for the possibility WC > xH.
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Signaling
q = # of pubs.
y = prof’s effort in publishing.
for an H: q = by.
for an L: q = y.
b > 1.
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Effort cost for a prof = y2.
For an L, producing q pubs requireseffort = q2.
For an H, producing q pubs. requireseffort = q2/b2.
A higher “b” lowers the MCof signaling.
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Proposition One. Ignoring for now the possibility of a higher wage preempting signaling, signaling will always occur, even if b = 1.
Why can signaling occur even if an L can produce pubs. at the same cost as an H????
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IH = net return to signaling for an H.
IL = net return to signaling for an L.
As long as pH < pL, an H has a higher cutoff of S for quitting thanan L, & option value is higher for an H than for an L.
IH > IL for WC > xL (m > /2) even if b = 1.
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0S
prob.
WC -xH-m
Fig. 1
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Proposition Two. Signaling may be efficient, but is inefficient unless b is sufficiently larger than one.
Cost of signaling. Min level of q, qR, for which Ls will not mimic Hsis where IL = xL.
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If > m (pL < 1),
qR = (m+)/21/2 &
qR/ > 0.
If < m (pL = 1),
qR = m1/2.
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Each H spends (qR)2/b2,but has option value =pH . = 3/16.
If m (qR), signaling is efficient if b > 2.31.
If m /2 (qR), signaling is efficient if b > 1.73.
HS
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CAN SIGNALING BE PREEMPTED?
Let U offer WP = xL + to those who do not signal.
Since U can anticipate what H will do, U only offers WP if it believes WP will deter signaling.
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Proposition Three. There are some cases when signaling may (profitably) be preempted, but only when signaling is inefficient.
Efficient signaling occurs if b > b*.
Signaling is preempted if b < b**.
We find b** < b* (with b** < b*if there are any Ls in the population).
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EXTENSIONS.
Commitment not to match outside offers
Suppose U can commit to only pay xL to those raided.
Now an H who signals &is raided is more likely to quit,& option value.
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0S
prob.
WC -xH-m
Fig. 1
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Proposition Four. A policy of not matching outside offers makes signaling less likely to be efficient.
Now signaling is efficient ifb > b***. However b*** > b*.
For b(b*, b***], signaling is not efficient with commitment not to match, but would otherwise be efficient.
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All that occurs with a policy of not matching counteroffers is pH , so & an H’s option value .
The social gain from signaling is lower & signaling is less likely to be efficient.
HS
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Not all who signal are raided
Proposition Five. The condition for signaling to be efficient is independent of the fraction of those who signal who are raided.
Cost & (expected) benefitfrom signaling are reducedby the same %.
Net social gain or lossfrom signaling is lower.
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Costly turnover
If turnover is costly & < 0 is feasible (due to subsidies):
WC = xH + (T-)/2,
where T = turnover cost perprof @ U.
If T > , WC > xH.
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CONCLUSION.
A prof who signals productivity via publishing may receive an outside offer, & learns job satisfaction (S) at a raiding university.
S is a social benefit of signaling, so signaling may be efficient.
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When it is not efficient, signaling may be preempted by a higher wage.
Commitment to not match outside offers reduces the expected gain in job satisfaction from those who quit when raided.
A direct value for research an even larger probabilityresearch would be efficient.