LECTURE NOTES FOR “INTRODUCTION TO RELIGIOUS STUDIES”CHARLES W. ALLEN

[Note: These are lecture notes from a course I taught but did not have the liberty to design myself. The main textbook (Exploring Religion, by Roger Schmidt) was chosen by the Department of Religious Studies at IUPUI. I found it to be methodologically naïve and tried to make adjustments for that from time to time. I also found it to be not fully honest, pretending to be strictly “descriptive” while actually commending certain hunches about the ultimate sources of religious life. I found those hunches reasonable enough to present and explore in an academic setting, but they are not the only reasonable hunches, and I would have myself chosen a text or texts that reflected more diversity in approaching the study of religion. The upshot of all this is: these notes do not reflect how I would have set up an introductory course in religious studies if I had been given the opportunity to do so. They represent how I interacted with an approach imposed on all the instructors.]

STUDYING RELIGION IN AN ACADEMIC SETTINGNo view on religion (pro or con) is so obviously demonstrable or defensible that it could be

presented as the only adequate view to take on the subject in an academic setting. (Here “academic setting” means “a public institution of higher learning in a pluralistic

society.”)Many views on religion (pro and con) are defensible enough to be presented as viable

candidates for an adequate view to take on the subject in an academic setting.Total neutrality is impossible, despite claims to the contrary: many views on religion are

implicitly denied, or at least marginalized, by the very existence of religious studies in an academic setting.

Examples of denied or marginalized views: “You shouldn’t be exposed to religious convictions other than your own.” “Religion isn’t important enough to study.” “You can’t study religion without destroying it.” “Religion is too personal to be studied.” “You can’t understand a religion at all unless you are one of its followers.”There is still room for discussion of viewpoints like the above, but the setting for the

discussion (religious studies) is still not neutral.An academic setting is not the only setting in which you can improve your understanding

of religious life. “Rationality” is too elusive to be captured by the restrictions that must govern a public

institution of higher learning in a pluralistic society.People who approach religion from a more engaged perspective (pro or con) are not

necessarily less “rational” than those who remain undecided.Practitioners and skeptics often notice crucial factors that the undecided might miss.

RELIGION: SOMEPROPOSED DEFINITIONS

Things to avoid: 1) vagueness, 2) narrowness, 3) prejudice (pro or con).Religion is:

2Humankind’s quest for meaning. (vague)The service and worship of God (Webster’s Dictionary). (narrow)Belief in spiritual beings (E.B. Tylor). (narrow)The recognition of all duties as divine commands (Immanuel Kant). (narrow)The feeling of absolute dependence (Friedrich Schleiermacher). (narrow)The insistent but unrealistic wishes of humankind (Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud).

(prejudicial)Essentially the conveyor of the collective ideals of central value to society (Emile

Durkheim). (narrow)Humanity’s highest achievement. (prejudicial)A system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with the

ultimate problems of human life (Milton Yinger; cf. Tillich). (not bad)The state of being ultimately concerned (Paul Tillich). (not bad, but needs unpacking)An attitude or disposition of respect, awe, and devotion evoked by human experiences of

dependence on powers we do not create and cannot fully master (James Gustafson). (not bad)

Seeking and responding to what is experienced as holy (Roger Schmidt). (not bad)

RELIGION ACCORDING TO ROGER SCHMIDTReligion is “seeking and responding to what is experienced as holy.”Religions can be nontheistic as well as theistic.Religions have functional, formal and substantive features.Functional features: meeting human needs (emotional, social, intellectual).Formal features: displaying common forms of expression (conceptual, performative,

social).Substantive features (more controversial): having a common nature (or arising from a

common experience) not accounted for by other functions.To the religious person: There is an ultimate reality. Ultimate reality eludes ordinary categories of understanding. Ultimate reality is nevertheless experienced. The experience can disrupt people’s ordinary lives and appear threatening. But the experience also confers a sense of ultimate meaning and security on people’s day-

to-day existence.The above are all themes in the experience of “the holy.”Defining religion substantively (with Schmidt) does not require affirming or denying that

the experience of the holy is genuine. It does require taking the experience seriously. It is however doubtful that the experience could be taken seriously if its genuineness were

considered utterly indefensible.

A CLASSIFICATION OF RELIGIONS(ADAPTED FROM ROBERT BELLAH)

Religions have undergone changes reflecting the development from less complex, non-technological, oral cultures to highly complex, technological, literate cultures. (These developments must not automatically be equated with cultural or religious “progress.”)

3Primal religions are religions of ancient and contemporary oral (nonliterate) peoples. In

such cultures religion is so pervasive there may be no word for it. Every activity has religious significance. Religious leadership tends to be charismatic (cf. “shamans”)

Archaic religions were state religions of socially stratified (and usually literate) societies, such as the ancient Babylonians, Egyptians, Greeks, Romans and Aztecs. They tended to be polytheistic but admitted of both sophisticated and popular interpretations. (Some surviving religions have roots in archaic religion--e.g., Shinto, Hinduism.)

Classical religions are religions which originated in literate, complex societies in historical times: Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Taoism, Zoroastrianism. All have classic religious texts (“scriptures”), and most tend toward dualistic views of reality. Some classical religions have been primarily ethnic but others were the first universal or “conversionist” religions.

Modern religions are religions originating in modern times (Baha’i, Unification Church.) Or older religions (especially classical ones) that have adapted to conditions of modernity (science, industrialization, nationalism, pluralism, etc.).

REDUCTIONISTIC THEORIES ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION1. Animism (E.B. Tylor 1832-1917)Forces of nature are regarded as spirits endowed with human qualities.Results from failure to distinguish the living from the dead, waking from sleeping, & the

animate from the inanimate.2. Mana (R.H. Codrington 1830-1922; R.R. Marett 1866-1943) (a melanesian term)An impersonal supernatural power is thought to be made available through acquiring and

controlling certain objects (known as “fetishes”).3. Totemism (William Robertson Smith 1846-1939; Sigmund Freud 1856-1939; Emile

Durkheim 1858-1917)--An animal or plant is regarded as a member, benefactor or ancestor of a family, clan or

tribe.--Durkheim: a totem (unconsciously) represents, not the supernatural, but the binding

power of society.--The early Freud: There was a “primeval father” who wouldn’t permit his sons to commit

incest. After his resentful sons killed & ate him, they assuaged their guilt by adopting their father’s prohibition against incest (making it “taboo”), and began ritually re-enacting their crime by sacrificing and eating a “totemic” animal (which at any other time was also “taboo” and thus couldn’t be harmed).

The main point to remember about theories of the origin of religion is that there just isn’t enough evidence to justify any of the historical reconstructions of how people first came to be religious. (The classification adopted from Bellah and Kitagawa is not strictly an historical reconstruction.)

Scholars in religious studies still need to ask “What makes people religious?”There is plenty of evidence to appeal to in answering this question, but he problem is that

the evidence we have points in several directions and is likely to be influenced by whatever attitude the inquirer starts out with.

Plenty of evidence can be found to beck up the following explanations of religious activity:Ignorance of natural causes.

4Self-deception arising from fear, anxiety, frustration, resentment of others’ success, etc. “Hierophanies” (real or imagined) in which something is experienced as ultimate,

elusive (& thus disruptive), yet finally trustworthy.A self-replicating “meme.”

Since all human behavior is shaped by many influences, there is no reason to assume that only one of the above factors in explaining any religious activity. (We’ll call such an assumption “the fallacy of the single cause.)

THE HOLY“The holy” is a term first coined by Rudolf Otto in 1917 to describe a common (or at least

widespread) feature that allows us to recognize many otherwise different experiences as religious.

An experience of the holy is a sense (or “feeling”) of something unsurpassably attractive (“fascinating”) and inescapable which remains utterly astonishing and awe-inspiring (“numinous,” “mysterium tremendum,” “wholly other”) no matter how often it is experienced.

(One might say that it is an experience of an ultimate, incomprehensible “reality” that somehow makes us better able to understand and cope with all the other problems of life.)

Experience of the holy, like experience of the beautiful, cannot be adequately described to those who do not immediately recognize it; it can only be evoked, not taught.

Schmidt: the holy is both ultimate and non-ordinary. As ultimate the holy is both primary (unsurpassable, unable to be outranked) and absolute

(not just a thing among other things, but the source, ground and goal of all things). As nonordinary the holy is both an impenetrable mystery and a majestic power, both

attractive and daunting, both revealed and hidden.Hierophanies (“sacraments”) are experiences of the holy mediated through something more

familiar (i.e., certain times, places, persons, activities, sounds, expressions, objects, etc.).

While in one sense the medium of a hierophany is something found in people’s ordinary lives, on closer inspection the medium itself usually turns out to be something which, like the holy, eludes ordinary categories of understanding.

Hierophanies often occur through participation in religious symbols (including elastic language), stories, rituals, communities.

According to some theories (Schmidt’s, Eliade’s, Otto’s, Ricoeur’s) such participation can raise one’s consciousness of aspects of existence otherwise overlooked; according to other theories (Feuerbach’s, Marx’s, Nietzsche’s, Freud’s) such participation results in a kind of brainwashing.

The holy can be conceived theistically (as a personal being or several beings) or nontheistically (as a liberating truth, state of being, process or impersonal power).

Note: “The Holy” is an elastic idea invented (sort of) for comparing a variety of religious traditions, not a rigid idea for something discovered (in any strong sense), which could readily replace more traditional ideas (e.g., God, Brahman, Nirvana, the Tao).

5The holy is never encountered simply as the holy. It is encountered, if at all, only as one

aspect (and perhaps not the most important aspect) of something more specific (e.g., God, etc.).

AN EARLY THEORY OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS AND LANGUAGE(FROM ST. AUGUSTINE, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE, CA. 396 CE)

We must understand eternal (i.e., timeless) and spiritual things in terms of temporal (i.e., time-bound) and physical things.

God (read: “the Holy”) is conceived by every people as “something than which there is nothing better.”

But different cultures have different ideas of “good,” “better,” “best,” etc.People who think mostly in terms of concrete, sensible things are likely to think of God in

terms of (say) the sky, the sun, the world, light, something very large, a human being, etc.

People who think more abstractly (i.e., like Augustine) are more likely to think of God as being beyond all sensible and changeable things.

But “all agree that God is that thing which they place above all other things.”

SYMBOLISMThere is no universal agreement on exactly how the following terms are to be used:

symbol, model, analogy (& “analogue”), metaphor.All the above involve using language “elastically” or “tensively,” which makes it difficult

to specify how one term differs from the others.For our purposes, symbols are words, activities, objects, etc. that stand for and/or present

the thing symbolized (cf. Schmidt).There is no “experience-as-we-know-it” (and no knowledge of anything whatever) which is

not dependent on symbols (and there are no symbols independent of language).Representational symbols stand for (but do not present) whatever they symbolize. Their

use is determined by what seems to be arbitrary custom or convention.Most ordinary language uses representational symbols.Presentational symbols “disclose” or present whatever they symbolize (and also stand for

it). (Cf. Sacraments, hierophanies.)Presentational symbols are especially necessary for knowledge of and communication

about things we can’t “step back” from in order to describe them, e.g., language itself, time, life, ourselves, the holy (perhaps).

Presentational symbols are often “elastic” or “tensive” (stretching ordinary language to fit nonordinary contexts) and thus “multivalent” (conveying several, often contrasting meanings at once).

Signs are presentational symbols which are thought to be caused by whatever they sym-bolize (e.g., miracles, ecstatic behavior).

Analogues are presentational symbols that have an “iconic” or “metaphorical” likeness to what they symbolize.

Sacraments are symbols performed in a ritual context through which the holy is presented.

6RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

Religious language, for the most part, is ordinary language put to nonordinary uses.Religious language is double-intentional. It has two frames of reference: the ordinary and

the ultimate.Religious language is metaphorical (“elastic,” “tensive”): as “speech about the

unspeakable,” it is “speech on the edges or limits of language.” (What is metaphorical about the preceding sentence?).

Analogical language stresses similarities, but never identities, between the holy and things that people regard as most important, powerful, reliable, etc.

Paradoxes stretch language to the point that it seems self-contradictory and nonsensical, but they are meant to express a more elusive meaning (e.g., the holy is inaccessible and inescapable, utterly remote and utterly near).

Remotion is a form of negative speech, “describing” the holy by saying what it is not. (Often called the via negativa, or “way of negation,” this approach is usually counterbalanced by the via eminentiae, or “way of greatness.”)

Religious language is evaluative: it is not only language about ultimate reality but a language of ultimate concern.

Religious language is revelatory: it can yield “muted hierophanies.” (Perhaps this is because finding meaning in such peculiar language is like finding the holy present in ordinary existence.)

Religious language claims to be true in the most comprehensive sense (which is a sense of “true” that is difficult to pin down).

EXAMPLES OF “ELASTIC” USAGELight travels in waves.Light travels in particles.The universe contains everything that is.The universe is an uncaring mechanism.The universe is our home.Before the universe (as we know it) began, there was no “before” (as we know it).We are just a cosmic accident.Our existence is no accident.I know myself better than anyone else. (Think about this: How is self-knowledge different

from knowledge of anything else?)I know myself least of all.Time never stands still.We are journeying from the past through the present into the future.The present is past as soon as it arrives.“I entered into the innermost part of myself ... And I saw with my soul’s eye (such as it

was) an unchangeable light shining above my soul’s eye and above my mind ... And you beat back the weakness of my sight, blazing upon me with your rays, and I trembled in love and dread” (Augustine, 401 C.E.).

“Nirvana is unconditioned ... not made by anything. Of Nirvana one cannot say that it is produced, or unproduced, or that it should be produced; that it is past, future, or present ... [But] Nirvana is something which is” (Nagasena, 140-115 B.C.E.).

7“Other, indeed, is [Brahman] than the known, and moreover above the unknown ... It is not

understood by those who [say they] understand it. It is understood by those who [say they] understand it not” (Kena Upanishad).

“Seeing without seeing is true vision. Understanding without understanding is true understanding” (Bodhidharma, ca. 475 C.E.)

ZEN KOANSThe bridge flows, the water does not flow.What is the sound of one hand clapping?If you run away from the void, you can never be free of it; if you search for the void, you

can never reach it.What is the Buddha? Answer: A dried shit-stick.In Zen, at first, mountains are mountains, rivers are rivers, and trees are trees; then

mountains are not mountains, rivers are not rivers, and trees are not trees; finally, mountains are really mountains, rivers are really rivers, and trees are really trees.

SACRED STORIESStories/narratives are “extended metaphors” that are informative in ways that cannot be

summarized in general statements or principles. Stories portray a kind of non-systematic interconnectedness that makes systematic

reflection possible.Stories adapt repeatable elements (words, plots) to make sense of the unrepeatable. (Note

the paradox: stories portray the unrepeatable by making it at least somewhat repeatable. Why would this make them suitable media for hierophanies?)

Stories can persuade in ways that demonstrations cannot (but the persuasion is more suggestive than coercive).

Sacred stories are stories about “the sacred” and/or stories that present the sacred.Myths (for Schmidt) are sacred stories (typically originating “from time immemorial”) that

aim to portray a time beyond time as we now experience it--the nonordinary origins, grounds, and ends of ordinary existence. (Cf. Mircea Eliade: “in illo tempore.”)

(Note: origin/alienation myths, eschatological myths, cyclical time myths, hero myths.)Other theories of myth: primitive explanation, unconscious projection (concealing,

revealing or both), social legitimation, mediation of conflicts. (Could all these be compatible?)

Parables are stories that draw on examples from common, everyday experience to speak analogically about transcendence. (Schmidt)

Parables are often paradoxical to the point of subverting typical expectations. (Crossan) (In the parable of the Good Samaritan, the hearers’ religious leaders fail to do right, while the Samaritan--a foreigner and a heretic--goes beyond the call of duty.)

Sacred history is a narration of events presumed to have happened in “ordinary” time, through which “the holy” was presented (and may still be presented through re-telling).

8A FREQUENTLY OCCURRING MYTHIC THEME

UNITY ® DIFFERENTIATION ® RECONCILIATION

“The Non- ® Ordinary world ® Hierophanyordinary”

Western Theistic religions:

God before ® Creation, ® Revelation, creation Rebellion Redemption

Hinduism (Vedanta):

Brahman ® Maya, avidya, ® Brahman-Atman, separate self Moksha

Buddhism (Mahayana):

Sunyata ® Craving, ignorance ® Satori, such-(Nothingness) suffering, alienation ness, nirvana

Campbell’s Hero Myth:

Hero ® Separation, ® Return Initiation

Christian mythic pattern:

Pre-Existent ® Incarnation, ® Resurrection,Logos (Christ) Crucifixion Exaltation

WHEN ARE SACRED STORIES TRUE?Sacred stories have more than one level of meaning. For example:

Level 1: historical, scientific, literalLevel 2: mythic, symbolic/metaphorical, presentational

Sacred stories can be true on one level even if false at another.Most people regard most sacred stories as false at level 1 (because most sacred stories

belong to other people, religions, etc. and involve events that would otherwise be thought impossible).

But sacred stories can still be true at level 2, even if false at level 1.Many (All?) sacred stories convey the following message:

1. We really are related to an ultimate reality.

92. Our relationship to ultimate reality, though real, is problematic, elusive, not as it may once have been or might still be.

3. We can hope for a better relationship.In sacred stories, the believer is presented with this message, not simply told about it.Considered at level 2, the truth of the sacred story depends in large part on how effectively

it presents this message.Question: Does truth at level 2 ever depend on truth at level 1?

Many religious people have assumed that truth at one level guarantees truth at another.Many do not recognize a distinction between levels of meaning.Some religions say that truth at level 2 does depend at least partly on truth at level 1 (and often argue over how much of level 1 would need to be true).

Other religions don’t seem very interested in this question (though often truth at level 1 is taken for granted.

SCRIPTUREScriptures are those sacred traditions, whether written or oral, that are regarded as most

authoritative by a religious community.Examples of written scriptures: Hinduism--Vedas, Upanishads, Bhagavad Gita Buddhism--Tripitaka, Sutras Taoism--Tao Te Ching, Chuang Tzu Judaism--Tanak (Torah, Prophets and Writings--corresponds to Christian “Old”

Testament), Talmud (authoritative interpretations of Torah) Christianity--Bible (“Old” and “New” Testaments) Islam--Qur’an (or Koran)Scriptures can include a wide variety of literary genres: myth, sacred history, parable,

sayings, poetry/hymns, ritual instruction, moral instruction, proclamation.Scriptures are taken to be revelatory in a number of ways: as products of particularly

powerful hierophanies, as media for ongoing hierophanies, or as deposits of reliable information about “the holy.”

Though revelatory, scriptures are typically cryptic (difficult to understand), which may actually enhance their authority by making them somewhat numinous. (That may be why many people prefer archaic language for talking about God, etc.)

Scriptures are authoritative: regarded as a criterion for distinguishing reliable forms of religious experience and activity from unreliable ones. (To people who regard these traditions as authoritative, the authority is not just “heteronomous” but “hieronomous.”)

Scriptures are either loosely or strictly “canonical” (cf. “canon-within-the-canon”).

INTERPRETING SCRIPTUREPractically speaking, scriptures are no more authoritative than their interpreters.Interpreters’ authority may be religiously and/or intellectually legitimated.Interpretation combines “reading” one’s current situation in light of scripture’s enduring

teachings, and rereading those teachings in light of the situation’s most important demands. (All interpretation is reinterpretation.)

10To make sense of the diversity of scripture, interpreters have to employ a canon-within-the-

canon: what is taken to be a brief summation of scripture’s most basic teaching. (e.g., Rabbi Hillel’s golden rule, Jesus’ and Augustine’s love of God and neighbor, Martin Luther’s “What presents Christ?,” Hinduism’s mahavakyam--”the major statement.”)

Whatever in scripture appears to run counter to one’s canon-within-the-canon is then interpreted figuratively, rejected, or else “shelved” until a way can be found to reconcile it with scripture’s most basic teaching.

Interpreters often resort to allegorical or other figurative, “spiritual” or “sacramental” readings.

Literalist interpreters prefer to take texts at face value, permitting other types of readings only when the text seems to hint that such are required.

Scripture criticism is a “liberal” approach to interpreting scripture. It involves using historical and literary methods applicable to studying any human document, while making allowances for the nonordinary subject that scriptures aim to communicate. Most liberal interpreters continue to regard scriptures as authoritative in some sense.

Liberal interpreters do not necessarily rule out the occurrence of nonordinary and even miraculous events, especially if they seem part of the basic meaning of a passage. But they will tend to regard such events as fairly analogous to present religious experience.

RITUALRitual--any activity that enacts cultural and social meanings, often involving repetitive

elements.Rituals may be the most primitive form of communication.Rituals help make times and places significant.The meaning of a ritual cannot be completely translated into statements or beliefs.Rituals form and enact beliefs and convictions.Rituals unify their participants.To a significant extent, rituals “program” the way people see their world. Rituals can brainwash. Rituals can raise consciousness.

RELIGIOUS RITUALReligious ritual--a repetitive, performative and social form of activity intended to com-

memorate (or re-present) sacred events or to invoke a sacred presence.Religious rituals “dramatize” the holy.Religious rituals can be regarded as representational or presentational.Purposes and types

PurificationSacrifice: something of value is given to the holy. Purposes: propitiation, expiation, commitment, tribute, communion.

Rites of passage (cf. Arnold van Gennep, Victor Turner).Pattern: separation-liminality-incorporation (note parallel with Campbell’s Monomyth: separation-initiation-return). Purposes: coping with or celebrating transience, escape from and renewal of ordinary roles and routines, overcoming alienation from others and from the holy (cf. Communitas).

11The liminal phase is a phase that eludes ordinary categories and expectations. There can be

reversals in social rank, behavior not usually permitted, a sense of spontaneity and community. Examples: halloween, bachelor parties, honeymoons, tribal coronations.

Life-cycle rites: birth, puberty, marriage death.Calendrical rites: seasonal, periodic.Ritual vs. Anti-ritual: hoc est corpus vs. hocus pocus. Turner argues that what looks like anti-ritual could be a liminal phase in a culture’s rite of

passage.Is secularism a liminal phase in Western culture?

PATTERNS AND VARIETIES OF FAITH (Roger Schmidt)“Faith” is used by Schmidt to designate any experience of the holy (cf. “hierophany”).Faith involves a response on all levels of experience, an interplay of intellect, emotion,

will, etc.The intensity of faith varies from mild (i.e., muted hierophanies) to “ecstatic.” (“Ecstatic”

in this case means standing outside oneself.)More intense forms of faith often involve altered, extraordinary states of consciousness (cf.

“signs”).Psychomotor responsesglossolaliaVisions, dreams, trances, auditory experiences.

Are visions, etc, simply hallucinations or can they be hierophanies? (Freud vs. Jung, Eliade, Otto).

Milder forms of faith involve flashes of insight, a sense of peace, acceptance or meaning in life, being “at home” in the world, etc.

FINDINGS ON RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE FROMTHE NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER

Among young Americans50% report experiences of contact with the sacred.50% report experiences of order and purpose in life.33% report experiences of “being lifted out of oneself” (cf. “ecstasy”).70% report at least one of the above experiences.20% report having had at least one of the above experiences more than once.11% report having had at least one of the above experiences often.

RELIGION AND THE SOCIAL WORLDOrdinarily, religious life is “double-relational,” seeking to form appropriate relationships

with the holy and with other people. (Solitary religion, in the long run, may be as frustrating as solitary sex.)

(By definition, values cannot be completely private, nor can claims to truth.)Religious ideas require institutionalization if they are to survive. Too much institution-

alization, however, can deprive them of their power. (Cf. Weber’s “routinization of charisma.”)

12One’s relationship to the holy is often symbolized by family ties and political relationships:

father, mother, king (but not president). Nationalism is often tied to religious differences (as well as ethnic and cultural

differences), though sometimes nationalism takes on its own distinctive religious overtones.

Religious ideas or their interpretation often reflect class distinctions. Socially and economically privileged classes (e.g., upper and “new” classes) tend to prefer more restrained, less disruptive forms of religion.

Since Durkheim, many sociologists have assumed that religion functions to meet certain essential needs for a “healthy” society: internalizing society’s rules, reinforcing group identity, etc. This assumes, however, that a cohesive society is always healthier than one where conflict is present.

Religions also provide subcultures from which a larger society can be critiqued.Membership in religious groups can be natural (as in primal religions, Judaism, Hinduism,

Confucianism) or voluntary (as in Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, various reform and monastic movements).

IAN G. BARBOUR ON SCIENCE AND RELIGIONIan G. Barbour argues that since the late 1950s there have been significant changes in

accounts of scientific method which allow a more fruitful comparison between science and religion.

The pre-1950s account of science: positivism and naive empiricism1.Science starts from publicly observable data which can be described in a value-neutral,

precise observation-language independent of any theoretical assumptions.2.Theories can then be verified or falsified by comparison with this fixed experimental

data.3.The choice between rival theories is purely objective, in accordance with specifiable

criteria.4. Personal judgments are harmful or irrelevant.A more recent, radical account of science: Thomas S. Kuhn (early work) and Paul

Feyerabend1.All data depend on theories, and theories often depend on metaphors (or models); there is

no value-neutral, precise observation-language.2.Theories are not verified or falsified; when data conflict with an accepted theory, they are

usually set to one side as anomalies, or else auxiliary assumptions are modified.3.There are no criteria for choice between rival theories of great generality, or the world-

views they suggest, for the criteria are themselves theory-dependent.4.Arbitrary personal judgments have the last word.A more recent, moderate account of science: Thomas S. Kuhn (later work), Stephen E.

Toulmin, Michael Polanyi, Ian G. Barbour.1.All data depend on theories, and theories often depend on metaphors (or models), but the

degree of dependence varies widely. People who disagree about a theory always accept some “facts” in common.

2.Comprehensive theories are highly resistant to falsification, but observations play a significant role in assessing them.

133.There are no rules for choice between world-views, but there are shared, if adaptable,

criteria of assessment.4.Personal judgments are necessary and important, and they are helpful when they aim at

intersubjective accountability. Barbour: “Each of the ‘subjective’ features of science ... is more evident in the case of

religion: 1) the influence of interpretation on data, 2) the resistance of comprehensive theories to falsification, and 3) the absence of rules for choice among [world-views]. Each of the corresponding ‘objective’ features of science is less evident in the case of religion: 1) the presence of common data on which disputants can agree, 2) the cumulative effect of evidence for or against a theory, and 3) the existence of [shared] criteria [of assessment]. It is clear that in all three respects religion is a more ‘subjective’ enterprise than science. But in each case there is a difference of degree--not an absolute contrast between ‘objective’ science and a ‘subjective’ religion.” Myths, Models, and Paradigms (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 144-145.

ARGUMENTS FOR AN ULTIMATE REALITYA general problem with all arguments for an ultimate reality is that the harder the argument

is to refute, the harder it is to follow and, conversely, the easier the argument is to follow, the easier it is to refute.

A PRACTICAL VERSION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTIt is practically impossible to deny the reality of what actually concerns us ultimately.We can deny the reality of what we think concerns us ultimately (if in fact it doesn’t).We can verbally deny the reality of what actually concerns us ultimately, but will continue

to affirm its reality in practice (thereby contradicting ourselves).Others may be able to deny what concerns us ultimately if it does not actually concern

them ultimately. (So this isn’t a proof.)But if something actually concerns us ultimately, we cannot help regarding it as real in the

most comprehensive sense.

PROOFS AND EXPERIENCE OF “THE HOLY”Religious people of many sorts, it can at least be argued, tend to agree on this: in our

everyday existence we can sense a more elusive reality that ultimately enables and sustains our everyday existence (however threatening it may sometimes seem).

Many of the more familiar arguments for an ultimate reality will make at least some sense to people who already sense (or think they do) an extraordinary, ultimate reality in their ordinary existence. But for these people such proofs may be almost superfluous.

Such proofs are likely to remain unconvincing to people who do not sense (or think they don’t) such a reality in their ordinary existence.

So perhaps the issue comes down to: a) Do we ever sense such a reality in our ordinary existence? b) If so, do we have reason to conclude that what we sense is not an illusion (perhaps of

our own making)? (Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, etc. have argued that it is an illusion. (Richard Dawkins’s “meme” theory is simply another version of this.) Otto,

14Eliade, Tillich, Ricoeur, etc. have argued that it is not an illusion, or at least not necessarily.)

c) If it is not an illusion, can anything more specific be said about it? (Is it personal, impersonal, transpersonal? How is it related to other things?)

QUESTIONING BELIEFS ABOUT ULTIMATE REALITYSome thinkers (e.g., John Locke, Rene Descartes, David Hume, W.K. Clifford, Michael

Scriven) have insisted that we should put no more stock in a belief than the evidence for it allows. (This position has been labeled “evidentialism.” One might describe it as the view that all beliefs are “guilty until proven innocent.”)

But people are likely to differ over how strong the evidence for something actually is. What then?

Evidentialists are also unable to specify what would count as sufficient evidence for evidentialism; that is, they can’t pass their own test.

Other thinkers (especially Pragmatists), reacting to the failure of evidentialism, have argued that we should instead consider beliefs “innocent until proven guilty”: beliefs should be questioned only when we encounter sufficient reasons to question them.

Religious beliefs are easier to justify under this second approach, but insofar as they make extraordinary claims there will always be some reason to question them.

William James, a Pragmatist, argued that, even when the evidence is inconclusive, we may have no choice but to commit ourselves to one or another belief, so long as it is a “live,” “momentous” and “forced” option. (James called this, somewhat misleadingly, the “will to believe,” and argued that, in such cases, this is the most rational thing one can do.)

It is practically impossible to take one’s religious convictions seriously without asking why one holds them, not at least after becoming aware that others seem to get by without holding them.

Questioning one’s religious convictions does not require suspending them altogether (indeed, a conviction that a person could suspend altogether would not be one of that person’s religious convictions).

If, as has been argued above, people cannot seriously deny the reality of what concerns them ultimately, they have nothing to fear from honest questioning.

BELIEF IN ULTIMATE REALITY:CUMULATIVE CONDITIONS FOR ONGOING ASSESSMENT

However you understand “that than which no greater can be conceived,” you will have no reason to regard it as anything but real, practically speaking, insofar as the following conditions are met:

A. Coherence (internal and external) 1. You can offer some account of it which seems sufficiently coherent (at least not self-

contradictory). 2. The account does not contradict the most reliable information you presume to have

about your less-than-ultimate surroundings.B. “Luminosity”

15 1. The account provides a context in which certain aspects of your experience seem less

puzzling than otherwise. 2. The account makes the realization of your most inescapable values* more conceivable

than otherwise.C. Collegiality 1. The account encourages more willingness to assess your beliefs than otherwise, or at the

very least no less than otherwise. 2. You are either encouraged or not too discouraged by the extent to which the account can

be understood by other reliable people,**especially by other pertinently reliable people.***

3. You are either encouraged or not too discouraged by the extent to which your overall judgment is shared by other reliable people, especially by other pertinently reliable people.

*Your most inescapable values are those whose realization seems implied, however vaguely, in your very willingness to assess any values at all.

**Reliable people are simply any people whose judgments you might in any way rely upon in other matters.

***Pertinently reliable people are any people whose judgments you might rely upon in other sufficiently related matters.

Each of these conditions should be thought of as strands braided together into a rope, instead of links in a chain. With links in a chain it doesn’t matter whether they are linked together or not if there is even one weak link. But when individual strands in a rope may not be strong enough by themselves to support the weight they’re needed for, they may still be strong enough that, when braided together, they can provide the needed support. This is what is meant by a cumulative case. [See C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, 6 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931-35), 5:264; Basil Mitchell, The Justifi cation of Religious Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981; Donald Wayne Viney, Charles Hartshorne and the Existence of God (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985).]

There is no tidy formula which would allow you to achieve wide agreement on either the extent to which each of these conditions is being met individually, or the extent to which they together support an overall judgment. Questions of such basic importance never have been settled without ongoing controversy and probably never will be. Still, enumerating conditions like these serves to remind you of the full scope of likely disagreements and to discourage focusing on only one or another aspect of them. It also shows you the points at which you are vulnerable to criticism--which questions deserve answering, at least to your own satisfaction.

EVIL AND HUMAN DESTINYExistential breaking points (e.g., suffering, death, etc.) involve problems that cannot be

resolved by common sense or technical expertise.Existential breaking points can lead to the development of religious systems.But existential breaking points can also lead to crises in religious systems.SUFFERING

16The ubiquity of suffering can fuel religious systems of explanation (as in Western theism)

and religious systems of therapy (as in some types of Buddhism).Buddhists respond to suffering by cultivating nonattachment (resulting from insight into the

ultimate nature of things: Sunyata or “emptiness”).Buddhists have been accused of encouraging indifference to the worlds problems.Buddhists respond that nonattachment is not indifference and that it can actually encourage

non-possessive, compassionate involvement.Christians and other theists respond to suffering by encouraging trust in God.This leads to the problem of theodicy, i.e., reconciling the existence of evil with belief in

God: If evil exists, how can God be both all-powerful and good? (See notes on revisions of classical theism).

Suffering has been explained as a) the result of creatures’ misuse of freedom, b) a test of faith, and c) a means of teaching love for God and other creatures.

Christians have been accused of evading the issue.Christians respond by a) revising concepts of divine and human fulfillment and b) revising

concepts of divine power.DEATHReligions differ about what happens when we die, but tend to agree that death should be

faced, not ignored or repressed.Many religions stress belief in individual immortality:

Resurrection of the body (Pharisaic Judaism, Christianity, Islam)Immortality of the soul (Classical Greece)Reincarnation (Classical Greece, Hinduism)

“Liberals” in these traditions tend to avoid speculation about one’s state after death and simply emphasize trust in a loving God. (Some “liberals” are universalists who believe that everyone will be reconciled to God no matter how long it takes. Other “liberals” hold that creatures’ freedom may allow them to reject reconciliation with God no matter how long it is offered.)

Several ancient religions lack a clear concept of personal immortality: Ancient Mesopotamia, Homeric Greece, Ancient Israel.

Other religions regard individual immortality as ultimately undesirable: varieties of Hinduism and Buddhism.

These religions hope for release from the separateness of individuality.These religions do, however, seem to hint at some form of non-individual existence after death, although Buddhists (especially) discourage speculation about this (since Nirvana is indescribable).

Believers in life after death often take encouragement from reports from a) those who have “died” and been revived, b) mediums in contact with the dead, c) people claiming to recall past lives.

These reports do not provide irrefutable evidence, even if they may not always be easy to explain.

CAN A PERSON OR SOCIETY BE NONRELIGIOUS?

“Nonreligiousness” is a relative matter: you can’t disbelieve something without believing something else, and vice versa.

17So a believer in God might be considered an “atheist” or “agnostic” about Mana, Brahman,

Nirvana, etc.Secularism is “the conduct of public life independent of religious institutions and symbols.Secularism “privatizes” religion by declaring it to be totally a matter of private, arbitrary

preference, like a favorite hobby.Problem: It’s difficult to see how religion-turned-into-a-hobby can still be a religion.

(Can a hobby have ultimate significance and still be just a hobby?)Humanism is ultimate dedication to the betterment of human life here and now. (It is

frequently agnostic or atheistic, but not always.)According to Schmidt, if “religion” is defined functionally as “a meaning giving activity,”

then all humanists are still religious. (Only those who have said “no” to life would be nonreligious.)

According to Schmidt, if “religion” is defined substantively (or “essentially”) as “an experience of ultimacy,” then those humanists who insist that “there is nothing more to life than life itself,” are not religious.

Question: Is “ultimate dedication” (or Tillich’s phrase, “ultimate concern”) a functional or substantive feature of religion? (Schmidt is unclear.)

Question: Is it possible to continue living without being ultimately dedicated to something (or some set of goals)?