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![Page 1: 1 Hardware Security: An Emerging Threat Landscape and Possible Solutions Siddharth Garg with M. El-Massad (NYU), F. Imeson (Waterloo), and M. Tripunitara.](https://reader030.fdocuments.us/reader030/viewer/2022033106/5697bfcf1a28abf838caa1e1/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
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Hardware Security: An Emerging Threat Landscape and Possible Solutions
Siddharth Garg with
M. El-Massad (NYU), F. Imeson (Waterloo), and M. Tripunitara (Waterloo)
Electrical and Computer EngineeringNew York University
Berkeley DREAMS Seminar
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Cyber-security Landscape
~20 Billion interconnected “devices” (semiconductor ICs) Security threats: firmware, application, network (both
wired and wireless), cloud …. …..but what about the “devices”
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IC Supply Chain
module adder(x, a, b, cin); input a; input b; input cin;
Millions of LoC
Geographically dispersed design
teams
External “IP”
Source: Global Semicon. Alliance
“Fabless” manufacturing
IC circuitextraction
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Threat Model: Malicious Foundry
“As for hardware, remotely operated kill switches and hidden backdoors can be written into computer chips….”
- U.S. Department of Defense
More pernicious than a software virus Instantly affects all chips Cannot (or is hard to) patch
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Hardware Trojan Attacks Types of attacks
Private information leakage (leaking secret keys, etc.) Privilege escalation attacks [King et al., LEET’08]
Premise: targeted attack on a specific gate (or set of gates) Attacker must uniquely identify at least one gate to be
successful
Super-user bit
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Existing Solutions
Hardware Trojan detection Compare measured IC
“fingerprints” with golden IC
Reactive (not proactive)
[Source: C Ortiz, US DoD]
Trusted foundry programs “Contracts with IBM for secure,
domestic advanced semiconductor fabrication and ASIC services”
[Source: Tehranipoor and Koushanfar]
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Running Example: Full AdderRe
gula
r Inp
uts
Malicious input (trigger) to avoid detection in post-fab. testing
Malicious gate
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Hide information (wires) from the view of the attacker
Proposed Solution: Logic Obfuscation
Hidden wire
I/O labels removed
Attackers View
Original NetlistLogic obfuscation (by hiding wires) reduces the
attackers ability to correctly identify gates
[Imeson et al., USENIX Security’13, Best Paper Award]
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Hiding Wires Using 3D (2.5D) TechnologyTop Tier
(Hidden Tier)
Bottom Tier ( Obfuscated Tier)
Contains only hidden wires and all I/O
Inexpensive to manufacture
Fabricated at secure facility
Contains all gates and “unhidden” wires
Expensive Outsourced for
fabrication
2.5D IC
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2.5D and 3D ICs
2.5D Xilinx FPGA
FPGA logicInterconnect
NYU 3D Test Chip (Tezzaron 0.13 mm)
[O’Sullivan et al., ISQED’13]
“A multi-layer circuit may be divided in such a way that the function of each layer becomes obscure..….. elements can be scattered among the layers in apparently random fashion”
- Tezzaron Technologies white paper
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“Split Manufacturing” Flow
“Layout”
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Attacker Model
ObfuscatedLayout Reconstructed
Net-list
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How Does the Attacker Proceed Inputs: Graphs G and H
Attacker determines sub-graph isomorphisms
All four subgraphs of G that are isomorphic to H
Is H “4-secure” with respect to G?
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Formal Notion of Security S(w) = 2 S(v), S(x), S(u) = 2 S(y) = 1 S(H) = 1
k-secure vertex
A vertex is k-secure if there exist at least k subgraph isomorphisms each of which map to a distinct vertex in G.
k-secure graph
is k-secure (with respect to G) if every vertex in is k-secure.
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Computational Complexity Determining if is k-secure is NP-complete
Relevant from the perspective of the defender
We investigated two approaches: Reduction to subgraph isomorphism + VF2 solver Reduction to SAT + MiniSAT solver
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Cost-Security Trade-offs Cost Number of hidden wires
Minimizing cost to achieve k-security is NP-Hard
Greedy procedure to explore cost-security trade-off Start with no edges in H. Pick edge to add to H that
maximizes security. Repeat.
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Experimental Results: Cost vs. Security
Experiments on the C432 benchmark circuit, a 27-channel interrupt controller.
Max.
Avg.Min.
Gate type that appears fewest times
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Layout Randomization Gates are placed to minimize average wirelength
Proximal gates on obfuscated (bottom) tier more likely to be connected on hidden (top) tier
Solution: secure layout randomization
[Rajendran et al., DATE’13]
OTS Layout
Tool
OTS Routing
Tool
Layout tool does not know about connectivity on the hidden tier and cannot optimize for it
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Layout Randomization Results
Layout randomization effectively defeats proximity attacks 1.7x-2.1x delay overhead
Original 2D Layout Obfuscated Tier Layout Hidden Tier Layout
Original 2DObfuscated Hidden
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Case Study: DES Circuit
Symmetric key based encryption/decryption
35,000 gate implementation from OpenCores library
Attack on LSB of 14th round reveals secret key
16-secure circuit by removing only 13% of wires
[Boneh et al., Eurocrypt’97]
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Footprint of “Exhaustive” Attack
Implemented a 64-secure DES circuit
LSB of 14th round actually 255-secure
420x area overhead to attack all possible options
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Raising the Bar on the Attacker
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IC Supply Chain
module adder(x, a, b, cin); input a; input b; input cin;
Millions of LoC
Geographically dispersed design
teams
External “IP”
Source: Global Semicon. Alliance
“Fabless” manufacturing
IC circuitextraction
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IC Circuit ExtractionDe-packaging And DelayeringPackaged IC
Imaging(SEM)
Schematic!
“…project we just finished; analyzing a digital ASIC with….. embedded encryption hardware…12K gates of digital logic…”
“Now we understood the encryption, had the keys, and had full chip simulations running….”
[Source: Torrance and James, CHES’09]
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Potential Solution: IC Camouflaging Dummy contacts to
camouflage Boolean functionality [US6791191]
Attacker cannot determine functionality even after circuit extraction {XOR, NAND, NOR}
But, camouflaging comes at a cost (area/power/delay)
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Defender Vs. Attacker
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IC Camouflaging: Trade-off Camouflaging has a per-gate cost
Claim [R+,CCS’13]: If a small number of judiciously selected gates is camouflaged, => attacker needs >1000s of years to decamouflage
[R+,CCS’13] seemingly resolve cost-security trade-off
[R+,CCS’13] Rajendran, J., et al. "Security analysis of integrated circuit camouflaging,“ CCS 2013. (Best Student Paper Award)
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Which Gates…? Mindset from [R+,CCS’13]
“Justification”“Sensitization’
Observation: Efficient attack strategy if gates can be simultaneously justified and sensitized
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Non-Resolvable Gates
Claim [R+,CCS’13]: If gates cannot be simultaneously sensitized and justified, attacker must resort to brute-force attack Exponential complexity in # of camouflaged gates
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The Example, Revisited
Each input eliminates a subset of solutions (or completions)
Set of inputs sufficient to eliminate all but the right completion(s)→ discriminating set
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Discriminating Set of Inputs
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IC Decamouflaging Attack
Our Work [E+, NDSS’15]: in practice, both the query cost and computational cost of an attack are low: IC decamouflaging in minutes
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Attack Oracles
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Practical Computational Procedure
1001
1111
0010
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Am I done yet?
Add counterexample input
co-NP-complete
SAT Solver
UNSAT
Done!
SAT
What are the gate identities?
SAT Solver
NP-
com
plet
e
0001
“counterexample”
0001
Given a set of inputs…..
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Our Attack: Empirical Results
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Impact of Increasing # Camouflaged Gates
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Takeaway Cautionary note to IC designers
Appealing claims on secure IC camouflaging with low cost must be examined carefully
Mindset rooted in foundations is helpful