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Navy/USMC Small Unmanned Aircraft Navy/USMC Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Clearance ProcessSystems Flight Clearance Process

Dr. Steve CookNavy/USMC Airworthiness Office(301) 757-2473stephen.cook@navy.mil

4.0P AIRW ORTHINESS

NAT I P

NATOP S

I FCPresented to:

sUAS Certification Working Group

26 June 2008

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The Navy’s Airworthiness Office (AIR-4.0P) is responsible for the independent engineering assessment of all aircraft (manned and unmanned) and airborne weapon systems to ensure these air vehicles can be operated safely within defined operating limits.

4.0P AIRW ORTHINESS

NAT I P

NATOP S

I FC

USN/USMC Airworthiness Office Mission

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USN/USMC Flight Clearances for UAS

• A flight clearance is required for any Navy/USMC-owned or Navy/USMC-leased UAS or aerial target IAW OPNAVINST 3710.7T

• Not all UAS have to be airworthy, but all must be safe for flight!

• If UAS is deemed expendable by the owner/sponsor, a flight clearance may be issued on the assurance of safety to people and property on the ground (Safety of Flight IFC).

• Engineering requirements are tailored based on system complexity, risk to third parties, desired usage, expendability, etc. External mitigations (e.g., airspace restrictions) are typically added to the IFC to limit risk to third parties.

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The Wide Spectrum of NavyUAS IFCs Issued

• Since 2004, Over 140 UAS Airworthiness IFCs and over 100 Safety of Flight IFCs issued

• Currently supporting 24 Platforms • No reported flight-related injuries or damage to

non-program property to date

RQ-1 Predator A

Silver FoxWasp

WEIGHT

MQ-9 ReaperCO

ST RQ-7 Shadow

ScanEagle MQ-8 FireScout

N-UCAS

AquaPuma

RQ-15A Neptune

Future

Not to scale

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The Navy Flight

Clearance Process

NAVAIRINST

13034.1C

ACC/ARC/ NAT IPT/EDT ENGINEERING OWNER FLEET

REQUIREMENTIDENTIFIED 

PROGRAM INITIATED

INFORMED OF PROGRAM

FLT CLNC REQUIRED?

ATTENDEE LIST and AGENDA

FACILITATEPLANNING MEETING

ESTABLISH REVIEWERS

PLANNING MEETING

YES

NO

ESTABLISH ENGINEERING

REQUIREMENTS 

 CONCURRENCE

ENGINEERING/DATA REQUIREMENT AGREEMENT PLAN

ANALYSIS TEST & EVAL

 REQUIREMENTSMET?

YES

YES

NO

CLEARANCE DENIED

CLEARANCE REQUESTOWNER CONCUR

REQUESTASSIGNED AND

LOGGED INDRAFT CLEARANCE

REVIEW OF CLEARANCE AND

SUPPORTING DATA 

 REQUIREMENTSMET?

  QUALITY ASSURANCE &

RISK ASSESSED

YES

FLIGHT CLEARANCE

NO  MODIFIED

CLEARANCE ACCEPTABLE

NO

REVISED CLEARANCE

YES BACK TO Planning Meeting

NO

OPT

INCREASED RISK

PROBABILITY OF LOSSFLIGHT CLEARANCE

YES

NO

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Store SeparationStore Separation

System System SafetySafety

SoftwareSoftwareEE33

Store IntegrationStore Integration

PerformancePerformanceFlying Qualities/Stab & Flying Qualities/Stab & CntlCntl

Flight ControlsFlight Controls

MaterialMaterialss

StrengthStrength

Loads and Loads and DynamicsDynamics

HydraulicsHydraulics

Mechanical Mechanical SystemsSystems

PropulsioPropulsionn

Electrical PowerElectrical Power

WiringWiring

AvionicsAvionics

Human SystemsHuman Systems

Class DeskClass DeskFuel ContainmentFuel Containment

Navy/USMC Systems

Engineering Review

Weight and BalanceWeight and Balance

InstrumentationInstrumentation

Safe EscapeSafe Escape

ThermalThermal

Landing GearLanding Gear

APU & Drive SystemsAPU & Drive Systems

Core AvionicsCore Avionics

Target ControlsTarget Controls

Radar & Antenna Radar & Antenna SystemsSystems

Aviation/Ship Aviation/Ship IntegrationIntegration

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Partnerships and Ongoing Efforts

• US Army and Air Force– Tri-Service MOA for cross-Service certification support

(e.g., Shadow, Raven, Predator, ScanEagle)– MIL-HDBK-516 updates for UAS

• OSD Task Force– Standards and Interoperability sub-group

• Airspace Integration Joint IPT– FAA, Universities, OSD, Services working to identify and

close gaps in airworthiness standards for UAS• NATO FINAS (Flight in non-segregated airspace)

– STANAG 4671: CS-23 based airworthiness standard for fixed-wing military UAVs

– Standards for rotary-wing and light UAS in work

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Demonstrating Software Airworthiness in UAS via Assurance Based Cert Methodology

Key Deliverables

Goal Structuring Notation methodology Structured Safety Case Templates Methodology of implementing into NAVAIR flight clearance processes

Challenges “Off the shelf” UAS with proprietary software difficult to certify Many UAS produced by non-traditional aerospace manufacturers that have little/no experience with producing flight-critical software Many international partners are legally bound to produce safety cases for their military aircraft

Goal Structuring Notation for Software-Intensive System

University of Virginia Dr. John Knight

Closing UAS Airspace Integration Gaps Track 1: Assurance-based methodology provides a

structured argument to prove and document that software is safe within a given context for temporary approvals to fly Navy/USMC UAS in the NAS

Track 2: Application of assurance-based methodology will inform critical airworthiness criteria, processes and standards needed to account for software-intensive nature of UAS

Timeline

Phase 1 Complete pending deliverable Phase 2 ECD: November 2009

Objective Develop assurance-based certification processes and templates for software-intensive UAS

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Evidence-Based Approach to Improved Small UAV Reliability

Virginia Tech University Dr. Jim Marchman and Dr. Craig Woolsey

Key Deliverables

Dempster-Shafer Theory based methodology for incorporating reliability into small UAS design MATLAB toolboxes to inform trades of potential investments into UAS reliability Case study of impacts of designing in reliability into the VULTURE UAS

Challenges Many small UAS lack the reliability to safely fly over densely populated areas Non-traditional aviation manufacturers use components of questionable reliability, making fault tree analysis difficult Cost and capability impacts of “designing-in” reliability into a small UAS are unknown

VULTURE highly reliable small UAV

Closing UAS Airspace Integration Gaps Track 1: Application of Dempster-Shafer

methodologies as part of fault tree analysis provide a means of identifying reliability improvements for “off-the-shelf” UAS to enhance incremental access to airspace

Track 2: Identification of cost-wise component level reliability improvements will inform airworthiness standards for incorporation into MIL-HDBK-516

Timeline Phase 1 Complete (31 May 2008) Phase 2 ECD: 31 May 2009

Objective Develop methodologies/tools to identify cost-wise improvements to small UAS reliability

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Quantitative Airworthiness Scheme

North Carolina State University Dr. Chuck Hall

Key Deliverables

Report on Failure Modes and Functional Hazards for small UAS Lethality Scaling Factor for small UAS Documented Quantitative Airworthiness Scheme with user’s guide

Challenges Airworthiness standards for small UAS do not yet exist in many disciplines Lack of systematic method for substantiating the airworthiness of small UAS Documentation of safety considerations for small UAS including lethality scaling for small UAS, mitigation factors, and target level of safety

Quantitative Airworthiness Scheme

Closing UAS Airspace Integration Gaps Track 1: Application of QAS provides a means to

substantiate COA statements of airworthiness for small UAS that intend to fly over populated areas

Track 2: Identification of airworthiness standards gaps for small UAS and development of best practices to fill those gaps Timeline

Phase 1 ECD: November 2008 Phase 2 ECD: November 2009

Objective Develop quantitative scheme to assess airworthiness of small UAS

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Conclusions• Navy/USMC UAS require a flight clearances

per OPNAVINST 3710.7T• Flight clearances for “expendable” UAS can

be issued on the basis of safety-of-flight• Flight clearance requirements for UAS can

be tailored based on weight, complexity, usage spectrum, autonomy, and cost

• Partnering with DoD, FAA, NATO, industry and academia to tackle UAS certification challenges

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BACKUP

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Definition: Airworthiness

The property of an air system configuration to:

safely attain, sustain and terminate flight

IAW approved usage limits.Usage limits include: flight limits, fatigue life, maintenance, etc.

B-17

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Definition: Safety of Flight

The property of an air system configuration to

safely attain, sustain and terminate flight

within:

Prescribed and accepted limits for

injury/death to personnel and damage to equipment, property

and/or environment.

Safety of Flight identifies risks associated with use of aircraft systems and are normally identified by a Hazard Risk Analyses. These risks can be conveyed by NOTES, CAUTIONS

and/or WARNINGS.

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Sample Engineering Data Requirements Agreement Plan (EDRAP)

AIRWORTHINESS:

BASED ONMIL-HDBK-516

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Typical Navy UAS SoF IFC Data Requirements Toolset

SAFETY-OF-FLIGHT:

SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TO RCC 323-99