1. EU. European Aid and Human Rights

European Aid: Human Rights versus Bureaucratic Inertia?Author(s): Sabine C. CareySource: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 4, Special Issue on Protecting Human Rights(Jul., 2007), pp. 447-464Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27640540 .

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? 2007 Journal of Peace Research, vol. 44, no. 4, 2007, pp. 447-464 Sage Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore) http://jpr. sagepub. com DOI 10.1177/0022343307078938

European Aid: Human Rights Versus Bureaucratic Inertia?*

SABINE C. CAREY

School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham

Most studies on foreign aid and human rights have ignored the role of bureaucratic inertia in the allo cation process. By not controlling for which developing countries have received aid in the past and how much aid they have received, continuity of aid flows remains unaccounted for. Additionally, previous studies have not allowed for a possible non-linear relationship between human rights and aid. This study

investigates aid commitments from the European Commission, Germany, France, and the UK, paying attention to non-linear effects of human rights on aid commitments and the role of bureaucratic inertia.

Using data from 1978 to 2003, the study investigates how past aid commitments, the level of human

rights violations, and substantial changes in the respect for human rights influence the decision of

European donors on whom to give aid to, how to choose a new recipient country that did not receive

aid previously, and how much aid to give to countries that made it past the gatekeeping stage.

Controlling for various donor interests and recipient needs, the results show that, despite donors'

emphasis on human rights in official documents, the human rights situation in developing countries

does not consistently shape European aid commitments. Only Germany commits less aid to more

repressive countries. However, recent substantial improvements of the human rights records are

rewarded by both Germany and France when deciding whom to give aid to. Bureaucratic inertia seems

to be a major obstacle to the consistent implementation of human rights consideration in European aid

allocation.

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, developed countries have pushed for the promotion of

democracy and human rights around the world. Governments have used a variety of

tools to this end, including quiet diplomacy, termination of diplomaticties, and military interventions. Donors have identified foreign aid as one possible

means to promote democ

racy and human rights. Good governance has

become a constant feature in the debate about

* I am grateful to the guest editors, Emilie Hafner-Burton and James Ron, for their valuable comments, as well as to the three

anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions. The data used in this article can be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.

Correspondence: [email protected].

the purpose and distribution of aid. With the

collapse of the bipolar system, OECD countries have repeatedly stated that the allo

cation of foreign aid should be linked to politi cal reform and respect for basic human rights in recipient countries. As foreign aid is the

main source of external finance in an average

low-income country (World Bank, 1998),

making the allocation of such aid dependent upon the recipients human rights record

could provide a

powerful tool for the protec tion of such rights. But how much has politi cal conditionality influenced European aid commitments?

This article analyzes foreign aid of

Germany, France, Britain, and the European

Commission, taking into account a possibly

447



448 journal of Peace Research volume 441 number 41july 2007

non-linear impact of personal integrity rights on aid allocation and the role of bureaucratic

inertia. In the following, I outline findings and drawbacks of previous research. Then I

define political conditionality and highlight ways in which foreign aid can, in principle, contribute to the protection of human rights, before outlining several problems that limit the effectiveness of conditionality. Based on

the argument that the consistent application of political conditionality is crucial for the

promotion of human rights, the empirical

analysis investigates to what extent personal

integrity rights influence European aid. I conclude by highlighting the main findings.

What We (Don't) Know So Far

Most quantitative studies on human rights and

aid concentrate on US economic and military assistance (Apodaca & Stohl, 1999; Meernik,

Krueger & Poe, 1998; Poe, 1992; Poe &

Meernik, 1995). Most of them suggest that worse human rights violators are less likely to

receive aid from the United States (Apodaca &

Stohl, 1999; Meernik, Krueger & Poe, 1998; Poe & Meernik, 1995), but there is conflicting evidence on how human rights records influ

ence the amount of aid that is distributed to

those countries that receive aid from the United

States. Some conclude that human rights records did not influence the decision on how

much aid was given (Poe & Meernik, 1995), some find that worse human rights violators

received more aid (Meernik, Krueger & Poe,

1998), while others show that worse human

rights violators received less economic but not

less military aid (Apodaca & Stohl, 1999). Fewer studies analyze the impact of

human rights on aid from other donors.

Alesina & Dollar (2000) analyze foreign aid of all major European countries and others

between 1970 and 1994. They conclude that allocation is mainly determined by colonial

past and political alliances, and that political rights play only

a minor role. Berthelemy

(2006) finds some evidence that good governments' with higher respect for civil lib erties and political freedom receive more aid than others. But those two studies do not

include a measure for severe human rights

violations, such as torture and political

killings, which are investigated in this article. Research that focuses on the influence of

such personal integrity rights on European aid generally

comes to the conclusion that

human rights either do not influence the allocation of aid or that worse violators are

more likely to receive aid and are allocated

higher levels of aid than countries with better human rights records (e.g. Barratt, 2004;

Neumayer, 2003b,d; Zanger, 2000). But most studies on this topic suffer from

two drawbacks. First, they often do not

control for past aid flows (e.g. Alesina &

Dollar, 2000; Berthelemy, 2006; Cingranelli &C Pasquarello, 1985; Meernik, Krueger &

Poe, 1998; Neumayer, 2003b,c,d; Poe, 1992; Poe & Meernik, 1995; Trumbull & Wall,

1994). However, it seems unreasonable to

assume that donors make their yearly alloca

tions without considering whether and how

much aid a country received in the preceding year. Bureaucratic inertia most likely limits the amount of change in donors' aid commit

ments. Aid allocations are probably heavily influenced by bureaucratic procedures and

routines (Allison, 1971; Apodaca & Stohl,

1999). Therefore, we should reflect the

potential impact of bureaucratic inertia in our

aid models. In order to test what drives

donors to include a new country as recipient,

excluding the effect of inertia, I also analyze the onset of aid, which, to my knowledge, has

not been done before.

The second weakness of all studies, with one exception (Berthelemy, 2006), is that they treat human rights indicators as interval vari

ables, although they never are. Most studies

operationalize human rights with the Political Terror Scale (PTS), which was originally created by Michael Stohl, Mark Gibney, and



Sabine C. Carey European Aid 449

colleagues (Gibney &C Dalton, 1996; Poe &

T?te, 1994; Stohl & Carleton, 1985). It codes countries on a scale from 1 (no life integrity violations) to 5 (large-scale and indiscriminate

repression) based on the occurrence of arbi

trary imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. As with all ordinal

scales, there is no reason to assume that a shift

from 1 (no life integrity violations) to 2

(limited political imprisonment) is equivalent to a shift from 3 (extensive political imprison

ment) to 4 (murders and disappearances are

part of common life), for example. Similarly, donors might take the recipients' human

rights records into consideration, but in a

non-linear fashion. To control for this, I

decompose the original PTS into five binary variables. This allows me to test how donors

treat recipients on each level of human rights

abuse, without assuming a linear relationship.

What Is Political Conditionality?

Aid conditionality means that donors attach

conditions to aid that have to be met by the

recipient as a prerequisite for entering into an

aid agreement or for keeping up aid' (Stokke, 1995a: 11). In this sense, aid is used as a policy instrument to push for particular changes in

developing countries. A key element of condi

tionality is the use of pressure, by the donor,

in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or

actually terminating or reducing it, if condi tions are not met by the recipient' (Stokke,

1995a: 12). This concept takes advantage of

the asymmetric power relationship between

donor and recipient. It emphasizes the utility of aid, where aid becomes one of many tools

that donors can use to pursue their foreign

policy (Baehr, 1994). After a decade of economic conditionality,

which was intended to implement liberal economic reforms in recipients (Stokke,

1996), the end of the Cold War, the collapse of single-party regimes, and the emergence of

democratization movements in developing

countries legitimized the use of political condi

tionality. The goal of political conditionality was

'to establish a grip on recipient developing countries' handling of policy processes, and on

the basic manner in which government and its

constituent political processes . . . would be

structured' (Doornbos, 2001: 97). Burnell

(1997) points out that part of the reason for

political conditionality not surfacing earlier was that, during the decolonialization era, too

much emphasis was placed on national sover

eignty and on the ideological struggle between the capitalist West and other parts of the

world. Therefore, donor countries did not

push for policy issues such as democracy and human rights in the developing world.

The emergence of political conditionality can also be related to the new perception of

the state and its relationship to development

during the early 1990s. At this time, the states

centrality was back on the development

agenda, now with a focus on poor governance'

(Evans, 1992). Corruption and the absence of

transparency and accountability were identi

fied as the main reasons for poor economic

performances in developing countries. Good

governance became a crucial parameter for the

expected success of development assistance.

There are some differences between multi

lateral donors, such as the Bretton Woods insti

tutions, and bilateral donors on how they

interpret and view political conditionality and

good governance. In the eyes of the World

Bank, for example, good governance mainly refers to professional bureaucracy, transparent

processes, accountability, and strong, but

limited, government. Certain economic poli cies are also part of the label of good govern ance. Bilateral donors emphasize political

pluralism, the rule of law, respect for human

rights, and low military expenditure. Since this

study analyzes aid from European countries

and the EU, it uses the latter understanding of

political conditionality. More specifically, it concentrates on the human rights aspect of

political conditionality, focusing on the right to



450 journal ??/Peace Research volume 441 number 41 july 2007

personal integrity, which means being free from torture, political imprisonment, disappearance, and extrajudicial killings. I also investigate the

impact of democracy on aid allocations, as it is

part of the good governance concept and rep resents political rights and civil liberties.

The Question of Legitimacy

Attaching conditions - on how a country is

run ? to aid raises the question of whether this

is legitimate or whether it represents unaccept able interference with the sovereignty of devel

oping countries. If human rights were seen as

an illegitimate criterion for aid allocation, it would render foreign aid ineffective as a tool to

promote such rights. Therefore, it is important to show that several arguments support the use

of human rights as a condition for aid.

The 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human

Rights as well as the UN Charter, Articles 55 and 56, support the promotion of human

rights as a legitimate and international value.

Although these documents have virtually no enforcement power, they still proclaim that

promoting such rights is a legitimate goal, supporting the argument that aid can and

should be made conditional on the absence of severe human abuses.

Additionally, the primary purpose of

governments is arguably to protect the lives

of their citizens. If a government is unable to

do so or if it engages in violations itself, it loses its legitimacy. This further weakens state sovereignty as a barrier to the pro

motion of human rights.1 Burnell (1997: 84) argues that 'increasingly the view is being

expressed that the international community is entitled to insist on all states fulfilling certain basic responsibilities in regard to their own citizens. The claimed entitlement is

1 One could argue that, during times of threat, govern ments need to violate certain rights to maintain order and

stability. However, particularly since the end of the Cold War, donors have increasingly supported the view that

governments should refrain from using violence against their own people.

being advanced not just on moral grounds, but as a matter of prudential obligation, and as

being in the self-interest of stable and pros

perous countries like members of the DAC

Finally, making aid conditional on respect for basic human rights helps donors justify the

expense of aid to their taxpayers, as financing

repressive regimes is unlikely to find support among voters in their own countries.

The Potential of Aid

Requiring developing countries not to violate

physical integrity rights can be justified as a legitimate condition for development aid. The next question is how aid can promote and

protect human rights. To support good govern ance with political conditionality, Stokke

(1995b: x) argues that 'it is necessary for the donor to establish clear directives and pro cedures within its own administration and to

ensure solid public support of the policy'. Hence, as a first step, donors must link aid

allocation explicitly to human rights in devel

oping countries.

Since the early 1990s, respect for human

rights has consistently appeared in policy statements by OECD donors. In 1996, the

OECD identified a set of qualitative foun dations that are deemed to be essential for

achieving developmental goals, including capacity development for effective, democ

ratic and accountable governance, the pro tection of human rights and respect for the rule of law' (DAC, 1996:2).

Looking specifically at the donors ana

lyzed in this study, already in 1986 the foreign ministers of the European Community

signed a 'Declaration on Human Rights and

Foreign Policy', which was elaborated and

renewed in 1991. This declaration identifies the protection of human rights throughout the world as a

legitimate and continuous

duty. In 1992, the European Commission

adopted a human rights clause, which 'desig nated human rights

as an "essential element"



Sabine C. Carey EUROPEAN Aid 451

and which allowed either the EU or the third state concerned to take restrictive measures

which were proportionate to the gravity of

the breach of human rights standards' (Ward, 1998: 507). In a recent proposal for a joint declaration by the European Council, the

European Parliament, and the Commission,

the promotion of human rights is listed as one

of the main priorities of EU development policy (CEC, 2005). The proposal also empha sizes that the EU is based on respect for human dignity and human rights, which it affirms and promotes in its relations with the rest of the world' (CEC, 2005: 6).

In 1991, the German Minister for Economic Co-operation and Development announced five criteria for German develop

ment aid, among them respect for human

rights (BMZ, 1998: 29). Currently, the

respect for human rights is listed as the first determining factor for development aid,

'determining the nature and extent' of

Germany's cooperation.2 The document con

tinues: 'Before the Federal Republic of

Germany supports development cooperation

projects in a country, appraisals are carried

out to ascertain whether the country meets

these requirements.'3 This statement clearly attaches a crucial role to human rights in

deciding on whether a country qualifies for German development aid.

Also for Frances development policies, human rights is listed as a fundamental element.4 French development aid is linked to human rights under the commitment to

democratic governance (Minist?re des

Affaires ?trang?res, 2005). Particularly with

respect to Africa, France identifies the need

to consolidate the rule of law as an urgent 2 See http://www.bmz.de/en/principles/rules/determining Factors/index.html, accessed 29 November 2005. 3 Ibid. 4 See Ztf coop?ration fran?aise pour le d?veloppement et les droits de l'homme, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/minis tere_817/publications_827/cooperation-internationale developpement_3030/brochures-grand-public_3260/droit s-homme_3551/droits-homme_10821.html, accessed 29

November 2005.

development need.5 In 1990, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd pointed out that the

promotion of good government was part of

the goal of Britain's official development assistance (Stokke, 1995a). But it was not until

Tony Blair came into power that human rights entered aid policies more explicitly. In 1997, a

White Paper on International Development declared that the UK government shall 'give particular attention to human rights, trans

parent and accountable government and core

labour standards, building on the Govern

ments ethical approach to international

relations' (DFID, 1997: 50). The role of human rights for effective development has been repeatedly emphasized since then.6

Limitations of Aid

Major European donors emphasize the impor tance of human rights for the allocation of

their development aid in various reports, offi

cial statements, and policy documents. But

declaring human rights as a guiding principle for aid allocation is not sufficient for the pro motion of such rights. Development aid as a

tool to promote human rights works only if

political conditionality is applied rigorously and consistently across countries and regions.

Major donors admit that continued flows to

governments that pay only lip service to reform

have been a major problem' (World Bank, 1998: 4). As development aid serves multiple foreign policy purposes, the promotion of

human rights often takes a back seat in the

actual commitment of funds.

5 See 'The Urgency of Development Needs: France's Contribution to International Action, Minist?re des Affaires ?trang?res, 25 August 2005, http : //www. diplo matie.gouv.fr/en/france-priorities_l/international-organiz ations_l 100/united-nations-1945-2005-60-years-of-histor y-france-and-the-un-in-2005_2077/the-urgency-of development-needs_2079/france-contribution-to-interna tional-action-three-priorities_1639.html?var_recherche=str ategy+governance+human+rights , accessed 4 August 2006. 6 See the White Paper on International Development (DFID, 2000).



452 journal of"PEACE Research volume 441number 41july 2007

White (1974) identifies two opposing foreign aid theories, one

characterizing aid as

an instrument of international exploitation,

focusing on donors' interests, and the other

classifying aid as an instrument of the recip ients' domestic policy, focusing

on recipients' needs. Studies by McKinlay & Little (1977, 1978) were among the early work that

empirically tested the impact of donors' interests and recipients' needs on aid alloca

tion. The donor-interest model is based on

the neorealist perspective, which argues that

foreign aid should promote national security interests and strengthen friendly relation

ships with strategically important countries.

The donor-interest model is also supported

by the neoliberal school, arguing that trade

relationships shape the allocation of foreign aid. Previous research supports the argument that aid allocations are shaped by political, security, and economic interests of donor

countries (e.g. Neumayer, 2003d; Schraeder,

Hook & Taylor, 1998; Zanger, 2000). This

preferential treatment also extends to former

colonies, which have repeatedly been shown

to benefit from increased aid from their former colonial powers (e.g. Alesina &

Dollar, 2000; Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998; Zanger, 2000).

The recipient-need model is based on ide

alism, arguing that aid is given because of the moral obligation to do so (Lumsdaine, 1993). Therefore, aid must address the needs of the

recipients. This argument is reflected in the three principal motivations for aid as identi fied by the Development Assistance Com mittee (DAC): the humanitarian motive,

'enlightened self-interest', and 'solidarity of all

people with one another' (DAC, 1996: 6). Previous research has found some support for the argument that foreign aid is directed at the poorest and most needy countries (Alesina

& Dollar, 2000; McKinlay & Little, 1977; Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998; Trumbull &

Wall, 1994). Human rights considerations have to

compete with various donor interests and

recipient needs when it comes to aid

allocation. Additionally, bureaucratic inertia

can limit the usefulness of aid as a means to

protect human rights, as a continuation of past

aid flows cannot adequately reflect political developments in recipient countries. Also,

government departments responsible for the

actual aid distribution tend to spend all the

money that has been allocated to a particular

country, so that they do not risk a reduction of

their budget in the following year (Svensson, 2003). If aid allocation is substantially driven

by past flows without paying adequate atten

tion to recipients' policies, then there is little incentive for recipients to refrain from repres

sion, as they can expect that changes in how

they treat their opponents will not affect the

amount of aid they receive.

In short, bureaucratic inertia is expected to

substantially affect aid commitments. But

given donors' statements, human rights should

influence who gets aid and how much.

Additionally, based on foreign policy theories and empirical findings discussed above, both donor interests and recipient needs are

expected to shape European aid commitments.

Modeling the Impact of Human

Rights on Aid Allocation

The allocation of development aid serves

different purposes. Promoting human rights is

only one of them. As mentioned above, for

foreign aid to contribute to the protection of

personal integrity rights, political conditional

ity has to have a significant and consistent effect on the aid allocation by all donors and to all recipients. In this study, I analyze how

these different factors have influenced the distribution of aid of the main European donors: the European Commission, Germany,

France, and the UK. After the United States, the European Commission has been the largest donor of development aid in recent years.

Among EU member-states, Germany, France,

and the UK have been the largest donors. Between 1977 and 2003, those three countries




contributed on average just under 60% of bilateral European ODA, reaching almost 80% in 1980.

As 'in most donor organizations, the allo

cation and disbursement decisions are sepa

rated' (Svensson, 2003: 382), I follow previous research and separately analyze the gatekeeping

stage, where donors decide which countries

should receive aid, and the amount stage, where donors decide how much aid they commit to those countries (e.g. Barratt, 2004;

Neumayer, 2003b; Poe, 1992). But, unlike

past research, I divide aid eligibility into two

substages: in addition to analyzing who gets

aid, I also investigate the onset of aid. This part focuses on the first year a country becomes a

recipient, eliminating consecutive years of

receiving aid from the analysis. This allows me

to concentrate on the factors that influence the

donor's decision to choose a country as recipi ent in the first place, eliminating the impact of bureaucratic inertia. The sample for the gate

keeping analyses, which use logit models with robust standard errors, consists of all countries

that are eligible for ODA, based on the DAC list of ODA recipients. This list is updated every three years and includes only developing countries.7 The final part analyzes the amount

of aid committed to a particular country, using

pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis with

panel-corrected standard errors. Here, the

sample is restricted to those countries that

receive aid from a particular donor.

Operationalization

Foreign aid is operationalized as ODA com

mitments.8 While most research has used

ODA disbursements, this study uses ODA commitments as they represent a firm oblig ation expressed in writing' (OECD, 2002: 7 To determine eligible countries, I utilize the DAC

Recipient Lists from various years. 8 ODA is defined as 'those flows to developing countries and

multilateral institutions provided by official agencies . . . each transaction of which meets the following test: a) it is administered with the promotion of economic develop

ment and welfare of developing countries as its main objec tive; and b) it is concessional in character and conveys a

grant element... of at least 25 per cent' (OECD, 1997).

292). They reflect the intentions and priori ties of the donor better than the actual trans

fer of the financial resources, which are

influenced by repayments and requests by recipients (White &: McGillivray, 1995). Like Neumayer (2003a,b,e), as dependent variable I use aid commitments to a

recipient as the percentage of the total amount of aid

committed by the donor. The size of the overall aid budget is most likely predeter

mined, and relevant government agencies then decide what share of the overall pie each

country receives. The natural log is taken of

this variable owing to its skewed distribution.

In the gatekeeping, onset, and amount

analyses, I control for previous aid flows. In the

gatekeeping stage, I include a binary variable

measuring whether a country received aid

from that particular donor in the previous year. In the analysis of onset of aid, that is, the first

year a developing country receives aid from a

particular donor, I drop consecutive years of

receiving aid. If a donor discontinues aid to a

country and then includes this country later

again as a recipient, this reinclusion is also clas

sified as onset, as no aid was given in the pre vious year. The decision to reintroduce aid to

a former recipient is expected to be influenced

by when this country last received aid. Countries

that have not received aid for many years prob

ably undergo a more

thorough review than

countries whose aid was suspended only for a

few years. Donors are likely to be more

informed about the political and economic situation of a country they are

giving aid to

than about a country that does not receive aid;

the longer a country has not been on the recip

ient list, the less familiar the donor is likely to be with that particular country. Therefore, if a

donor considers giving aid to a country it has

not given aid to in the past ten years, for

example, this country probably undergoes a

more thorough review of its policies and

government practices than a country whose aid

was suspended for only one or two years. Also,

the longer a country has not been deemed a

worthy or necessary recipient of a particular



454 journal of"Peace Research volume 441number 41July 2007

donor's aid, the less likely it is that the donor will take on this country as a recipient (again).

Therefore, I expect that the longer a country

was not a recipient, the less likely it is that it becomes a recipient again. To account for this,

I include a variable counting the number of

years since the recipient last received aid from

a particular donor in the analysis of aid onset.

To generate this variable, I use ODA data,

backdating to 1960, which is the first year when ODA reports were systematically com

piled. The mean values range from 4.7 years

for Germany to 8.8 years for France. The final

analysis investigates the amount of aid given to

recipients. Here, I include a lagged dependent variable to capture the impact of bureaucratic

inertia.

To measure life integrity violations, I use

the Political Terror Scale (PTS).9 This scale has been used extensively in the quantitative literature on foreign aid and human rights (e.g. Apodaca & Stohl, 1999; Poe, 1992;

Zanger, 2000). In contrast to all previous studies using this measure, I decompose this

ordinal scale into five binary variables. The PTS consists of five levels. Level 1 indicates no

life integrity violations, Level 2 limited politi cal imprisonment, Level 3 extensive political imprisonment, Level 4 murders and disap

pearances being part of common life, and

Level 5 large-scale and indiscriminate repres

sion.10 Level 1 is used as reference category, hence all other levels are expected to carry a

negative sign, indicating that countries with at

least some violations are less likely to receive

aid ? and receive less aid ? than countries with

full respect for personal integrity rights. However, donors might

not punish 'mild' vio

lators, and therefore not all levels of human

rights violations are expected to necessarily

9 I use data based on Amnesty Reports and replace missing values with State Department reports. The two scales

closely parallel one another, although there is some evi dence of slight biases in the State Department reports during earlier years (Poe, Carey & Vasquez, 2001). 10 For the exact wording of the levels of the Political Terror Scale, see Gibney & Dalton ( 1996) or Mark Gibney s website,

http : //www. unca.edu/politicalscience/images/Colloquium/ faculty-stafr7gibney.html.

influence aid commitments. But one can

expect that countries classified as Levels 4 or 5 on the PTS are punished for their widespread violations of personal integrity rights.

I also test how substantial changes in the

respect for those rights impact aid. I use two

binary variables to capture change. The first

one identifies substantial deterioration of the human rights situation and is coded 1 for all

country-years in which a country moved two

or three points up on the PTS, 0 otherwise.

The second variable measures substantial

improvement and is coded 1 for all country

years in which a country moved two or three

points down on the PTS.11 I expect that countries that drastically increased their

levels of repression are punished with a

reduction or cutoff in aid, while countries

that substantially improved their human

rights records are rewarded with higher aid commitments or with being included in the

group of recipients (again). I also include a measure for democracy as

it reflects the level of respect for mainly politi cal rights and is part of the good governance' concept pursued by donors. I expect that

more democratic countries are more likely to

receive aid and also receive a larger share of

aid (e.g. Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Berthelemy, 2006). Democracy is measured with the

polity2 variable from Polity IV (Marshall &

Jaggers, 2002), ranging from -10 (autocratic) to +10 (democratic).

To account for the impact of donor inter

ests on aid commitments, I include a binary variable for former colonies for British and French aid and for members of the various Lom? Conventions for European and German

aid (e.g. Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998). Both Germany and the European Commission stress the special

relationship with ACP countries, and this should be reflected in the donors' aid com

mitments. To account for strategic interests,

I include weapon exports from the donor to

11 Changes of more than three points did not occur during

the observed time period.




recipient (e.g. Maizels & Nissanke, 1984).

Weapon exports are a proxy for strategically

important and politically friendly countries, which, according

to neorealist theory, are

supposed to benefit from aid.12 The data are taken from the SIPRI arms transfers database

and capture transfers of major weapons

(SIPRI, 2004). To account for the neoliberal

argument that trade relationships shape aid

disbursements, I include exports from the

donor to the recipient in the analysis (e.g.

Apodaca & Stohl, 1999), using data from Gleditsch (2002). Both the weapon and trade data are

log-transformed owing to their

skewed distribution. To capture recipient needs, I include GDP

per capita of the recipient country (e.g.

Berthelemy, 2006). Poorer countries should receive a

larger share of foreign aid than

countries with higher GDP per capita. Finally, I incorporate population size, as more popu

lous countries are expected to receive a larger

aid share than less populous countries (e.g. Alesina & Dollar, 2000). Both measures are

taken from the World Development Index and are again log-transformed. As commonly done in the aid literature, all variables apart

from the indicators for former colonies and

Lom? signatories are lagged by one year to

allow for changes in those independent vari

ables to influence donors' aid commitments.13

Gatekeeping and Onset of Aid Table I shows the results of the logit gate keeping analyses. The sample includes only countries classified as developing by DAC.14

The fit of the models is very high, classify ing between 79% and 90% of cases correctly.

12 An alternative way of capturing strategic interests would be to control for military presence of donors in developing countries. This indicator has been used in research on US

aid, but as comprehensive and reliable data for European countries are unavailable, I chose to use weapon exports instead. 13

Lagging these variables by two years did not substantially alter the results. 14 The correlation matrix and the variance inflation factors

suggest that multicollinearity does not pose a problem.

As expected, past commitments have a

substantial impact on who gets aid. Both for

EC and French aid, a country that received aid at t-\ is approximately 20 times more likely to receive aid at time t than a country that did not

pass the gatekeeping stage in the previous

year.15 A former recipient of German aid is

about 11 times more likely to receive aid again, a former recipient of UK aid about eight times.

Human rights are almost completely irrelevant

for the eligibility for European aid. The UK is even twice as likely to

give aid to a country with

widespread repression (PTS Level 5) compared with a country with no life integrity violations. But both Germany and France reward

countries that have recently improved their

human rights records. A country that substan

tially improved its respect for human rights is three times more likely to receive aid from

Germany and over four times more likely to

receive aid from France. A worsening of the

human rights situation, however, goes unpun

ished at this stage. As argued by donors, democratic countries

are more likely to receive aid, although the

substantive impact is quite small. Former

colonies are over twice as likely to receive aid

from France or Britain, while signatories of

the Lom? Conventions are eight times more

likely than non-ACP countries to receive aid

from the EC. Two-tailed tests indicate that

weapon exports do not reach any meaningful levels of statistical significance for Germany, and countries to which France exports more

weapons are slightly less likely to receive aid

from France. Economic links have also only a

minor impact, as only France is more likely to

give aid to important trading partners. The needs of the recipients, however, influ

ence aid commitments of all four donors; richer

countries are less likely to receive aid. Germany is

about 16% less likely to give aid to a country ranked on the 90th percentile of GDP per capita compared with a country on the 10th percentile; the comparable figure for British ODA is partic 15 To calculate the substantive effect, I use the odds ratio =

exp(b).



456 journal of Peace Research volume 44 / number 41 July 2007

Table I. Determinants of European Aid - Gatekeeping Stage

European Commission Germany France UK

Past recipient

PTS Level 2t_x

PTS Level 3*_i

PTS Level 4t_Y

PTS Level 5,_i

Human rights worsening t_x

Human rights

improvement t_i

Democracy^

ACP country/ former colony

Weapon export t_f

Export t_f

GDP per capita t_iA

Population

Constant

Log pseudolikelihood

X2 Pseudo R2

Correctly classified

N of recipient years N

3.062***

(0.139) 0.311

(0.286) 0.075

(0.295) 0.155

(0.332) 0.372

(0.381) -0.046

(0.542) 1.080

(0.766) 0.037***

(0.010) 2.098***

(0.242)

-0.488***

(0.066) 0.043

(0.053) 1.194

(1.030) -742.930

813.118***

0.540

89.68%

1,783

2,598

2.361***

(0.126) 0.058

(0. 202) 0.194

(0.215) -0.079

(0.267) 0.122

(0.337) -0.423

(0.373) 1.110*

(0.460) 0.019*

(O.OIO) 0.145

(0.162) -0.017

(0.041) -0.044

(0.056) -0.485***

(0.084) 0.334***

(0.075) -2.159

(1.340) -907.527

656.780***

0.347

83.92%

1,721

2,369

2.936***

(0.127) 0.102

(0.211) 0.040

(0.230) 0.314

(0.272) -0.101

(0.320) 0.207

(0.449) 1.515*

(0.613) 0.042***

(0.010) 0.891***

(0.197) -0.086*

(0.039) 0.211***

(0.053) -0.508***

(0.076) -0.062

(0.066) 2.521*

(1.261) -874.342

788.666***

0.418

1,501

2,315

2.134***

(0.118) 0.116

(0.207) 0.070

(0.218) 0.142

(0.253) 0.655*

(0.318) -0.233

(0.379) 0.005

(0.522) 0.069***

(0.009) 0.919***

(0.152)

0.083

(0.050) -0.707***

(0.074) 0.171**

(0.064) 0.663

(1.156) -1,032.238

781.156***

0.350

79.46%

1,288

2,313

Weapon exports were excluded from the analysis of British aid, owing to multicollinearity. Robust standard errors in parentheses. a Variable log-transformed. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, two-tailed tests.

ularly high at about 43%.16 Population size influ ences the gatekeeping stage only for German and

British aid, where larger countries are more likely to receive aid than smaller countries.

These results support the hypothesis on

bureaucratic inertia. Previous recipients are

16 These figures are calculated using Clarify (King, Tomz &

Wittenberg, 2000).

far more likely to receive aid again, even if

they violate human rights on a

large scale.

Repressive former recipients are overall even

slightly more likely to receive aid than less

repressive ones that did not receive aid in the

previous year. A previous EC ODA recipient with widespread life integrity violations has an 85% chance of receiving aid from the EC




again, whereas a country with no such vio

lations that had not received aid in the previ ous year has only an 18% chance of receiving aid.17 This relationship is similar for the other

donors, although slightly less extreme.18

With bureaucratic inertia having such a

substantial influence on the gatekeeping deci

sion, the question arises of how donors ini

tially choose a recipient. One might argue that

human rights guide donors' decisions on

whether to initially give aid to a particular country, but once that country has become a

recipient, human rights lose their importance. To test this argument, I repeat the above

analyses but use the onset of aid as dependent

variable, as well as a variable counting the

years since a country last received aid. The

results are shown in Table II.

As expected, the longer a country has not

received aid from a donor, the less likely it is to become a recipient (again). Looking at the

impact of the different levels of human rights violations, the results closely resemble the

gatekeeping stage (Table I). Only one of four indicators achieves statistical significance at/> < 0.1 and only for the UK, but again in the

wrong direction.19 However, recent human

rights changes have a marginally larger impact

on the onset of aid than on gatekeeping. All

donors, apart from the UK, are more likely to

choose a recipient that has recently improved its

human rights record. Germany even punishes

those that have seen a recent increase in repres

sion with lower odds of becoming a recipient.

Whereas more democratic countries are

more likely to receive aid in general, democ

racy affects the onset of aid only for France and

the UK. Surprisingly, being a former French

colony loses its significance when focusing on

the onset of French aid. But former British colonies are still more likely to become recipi

17 To calculate predicted probabilities, all other variables were set at their mean or mode. 18 Results can be obtained from the author upon request. 19 Owing to the smaller number of observations, I usep <

0.1 as cutoff point.

ents of British aid, just as ACP countries are more likely to become EC aid recipients. The volume of exports influences only the onset of

German aid, but with a negative impact.

Again, only the onset of German aid is influ

enced by the population size of the developing countries, where larger countries are more

likely than smaller ones to make it onto the

recipient list. But economic standing affects

the onset of all four donors. Richer countries

are less likely to become recipients than poorer ones. Overall, Table II shows that, apart from

the number of years since a country was last a

recipient and the level of development, no other factor has a consistent impact on the

onset of aid across all four donors.

The Amount Stage The above results show that donors generally

pay little attention to the level of human

rights violations when deciding who should receive aid. But this does not necessarily mean

that donors do not care about human rights. Luard (1992: 304) argues that aid programs may provide a means, however marginal, of

influencing the situation through the many direct contacts with result: once it is cut off,

all chance of influence is lost and the direct contacts with the population are destroyed'. Donors might be better able to influence the

protection of human rights if they do not

completely cut off the relationship with a

recipient, which would result in losing any

leverage (Baehr, 1994; Luard, 1992). The final part of the analysis tests how

human rights influence the amount of aid com

mitted to a particular country, the dependent variable being the logged percentage of the overall ODA of the particular donor. Only those countries that made it past the gatekeeping stage are part of the sample. The results of the pooled cross-sectional time series with panel-corrected standard errors are shown in Table III.

All models fit reasonably well, with R2

ranging from 0.31 for ODA from the EC to

0.72 for French aid.20 As with onset of aid,



458 journal ?/Peace Research volume 441 number 41 July 2007

Table II. Determinants of European Aid - Onset of Aid


Years since last

received aid

PTS Level 2t_x

PTS Level 3^

PTS Level At_x

PTS Level 5,_i

Human rights

worsenings Human rights

improvement^

Democracy,_!


Weapon export t_i*

Export ,_!a

GDP per capita t_f

Population3

Constant

Log pseudolikelihood

X2 Pseudo R2

Correctly classified

N of onsets

N

-0.026+

(0.013) 0.029

(0.307) -0.446

(0.337) -0.206

(0.376) 0.056

(0.430) 0.204

(0.594) 1.382+

(0.740) 0.018

(0.013) 1.102***

(0.321)

-0.476***

(0.093) -0.023

(0.066) 2.489+

(1.365) -403.104

91.767***

0.093

83.37%

165 980

-0.063***

(0.018) 0.003

(0.252) -0.178

(0.294) -0.052

(0.340) 0.273

(0.419) -1.349+

(0.800) 1.077+

(0.571) 0.006

(0.012) -0.041

(0.223) -0.036

(0.072) -0.172*

(0.066) -0.173+

(0.101) 0.248**

(0.086) -2.578

(1.624) -456.108

76.788***

0.080

74.17%

223 871

-0.025*

(0.011) -0.064

(0.296) 0.165

(0.315) 0.333

(0.354) -0.212

(0.439) 0.358

(0.492) 1.805**

(0.576) 0.033*

(0.013) 0.2223

(0.304) -0.096+

(0.055) 0.033

(0.059) -0.357***

(0.091) 0.055

(0.085) 0.264

(1.559) -482.964

65.430***

0.070

80.12%

207 1,021

-0.064***

(0.015) 0.083

(0.283) 0.019

(0.295) -0.007

(0.331) 0.674+

(0.366) 0.284

(0.366) 0.074

(0.590) 0.046***

(0.012) 0.453*

(0.231)

0.004

(0.056) -0.431***

(0.085) 0.124

(0.077) -0.159

(1.381) -575.673

106.969***

0.083

80.13%

248 1,273

Weapon exports were excluded from the analysis of British aid, owing to multicollinearity. Robust standard errors in parentheses. a Variable log-transformed. + p < 0.1, */>< 0.05, **/>< 0.01, ***/> < 0.001, two-tailed tests.

Germany pays more attention to human rights than the other donors. All four levels of

repression carry a negative sign, and all but

PTS Level 3 (extensive imprisonment, some

murders) are statistically significant. Among

20 Clearly, standard aid models are not able to explain aid

commitments of all donors equally well, and more work needs to be done to explain determinants of aid from the

European Commission.

the recipients of German ODA, countries with

worse human rights records are allocated a

smaller share of aid than those with a secure

rule of law. However, whereas both Germany and France are more likely to give aid to

countries, and choose new recipients, with

recently improved human rights records, those

two donors do not reward improvement in the

amount allocation stage. The EC, however,




Table III. Determinants of European Aid - Amount Stage


ODAMa

PTS Level 2M

PTS Level 3M

PTS Level At_x

PTS Level 5M

Human rights

worsening^! Human rights

improvement^

Democracy t_x


Weapon export t_xz

Export t_{a

GDP per capita t_ia

Population3

Constant

R2

N

0.362***

(0.064) -0.057

(0.149) 0.001

(0.156) -0.008

(0.166) -0.137

(0.189) -0.181

(0.218) 0.712**

(0.245) -0.005

(0.007) 0.440***

(0.125)

-0.189***

(0.048) 0.214***

(0.036) -2.989***

(0.681) 694.76***

0.308

1,619

0.395***

(0.059) -0.420*

(0.202) -0.376

(0.207) -0.537*

(0.241) -0.904***

(0.235) 0.059

(0.272) -0.554

(0.337) 0.006

(0.006) -0.002

(0.083) 0.008

(0.039) 0.149***

(0.042) -0.220**

(0.077) 0.227***

(0.052) -3.010**

(1.073) 896.61***

0.367

1,508

0.595***

(0.067) -0.107

(0.140) 0.033

(0.146) -0.153

(0.166) 0.055

(0.192) 0.114

(0.192) -0.229

(0.269) -0.012

(0.008) 0.830***

(0.160) 0.052*

(0.021) 0.109**

(0.036) -0.124*

(0.055) 0.161**

(0.055) -2.938**

(1.101) 1,543.69***

0.715

1,297

0.445***

(0.077) -0.202

(0.201) -0.071

(0.220) -0.113

(0.241) -0.097

(0.274) 0.464

(0.374) 0.122

(0.363) 0.012

(0.010) 0.765***

(0.139)

0.206***

(0.047) -0.420**"

(0.096) 0.133*

(0.060) -1.253

(1.046) 818.55***

0.534

1,040

Weapon exports were excluded from the analysis of British aid, owing to multicollinearity. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. a Variable log-transformed. *p< 0.05, **/>< 0.01, ***p < 0.001, two-tailed tests.

considers recent improvements when deciding how much aid to give to countries, just as this

factor influences the EC's decision to (re-) intro

duce aid flows to developing countries.

At this stage, no donor considers the level

of democracy. Colonial ties or ties to ACP countries display the same effect as during the gatekeeping stage. The EC gives more aid

to Lom? members, while France and the UK commit a

larger share of their aid to their

former colonies. Weapons exports are again

statistically significant only in the model of French aid, this time indicating that strategi

cally important countries receive slightly more aid than others. The amount stage is

also the only stage where exports play a con

sistent role across all three donor countries.

Recipients that spend more on German,

French, or British exports receive more aid

from the respective country. As expected,

poorer and more populous countries receive

more aid from all four donors.



460 journal of Peace Research volume 441'number 41July 2007

Robustness Checks To check the robustness of the results, I first

replace all PTS variables with the single PTS

scale, which has been used in previous studies.21 The PTS scale fails to reach statisti

cal significance for all four donors in the

gatekeeping and onset models. At the

amount stage, the variable is highly statisti

cally significant and negative for German ODA only, supporting the above finding that more repressive countries receive less aid

from Germany.

Second, I replace the Political Terror Scale with the CIRI Physical Integrity Index, which ranges from 0 (no respect for

physical integrity rights) to 8 (full govern ment respect for these rights) (Cingranelli &

Richards, 1999). This variable captures the same types of violations as the PTS, but fails to come close to statistical significance in

any model.

Third, I replace the CIRI index with four

separate ordinal variables from the CIRI

data, measuring the extent of extrajudicial

killings, disappearances, torture, and politi cal imprisonment. Although the variables reach conventional levels of statistical signif icance in very few instances, those results are

rather worrying. For both the EC and

France, torture is statistically significant and

negative. The more a developing country

respects the right to be free from torture, the

less likely it is to receive aid from these donors. France is also less likely to start

giving aid to a country that refrains from

using torture. This seems to support some

other findings that show that in some cases

bad behavior is rewarded (e.g. Neumayer,

2003b, and results for the UK in Tables I and II above). But this analysis also confirms that

Germany gives less aid to more repressive countries. The CIRI variable for extrajudicial killings is positive and statistically significant at p < 0.06, indicating that countries that

21 The complete results are available at http://www.prio.no/ jpr/datasets.

employ such killings less frequently receive more aid.22

Conclusion

The allocation of development aid is arguably a useful tool for encouraging developing countries to improve their respect for personal

integrity rights by rewarding good' countries with higher levels of aid and 'bad' countries with lower levels of this valuable source of

income, or no aid at all. International norms

and conventions legitimize and even encour

age such donor behavior. As foreign aid plays a significant role in the budgets of most devel

oping countries, making aid conditional on

the respect of basic human rights should foster the promotion of such rights. The biggest European donors have already taken the first

step towards promoting human rights with

their aid: official documents emphasize the

importance of human rights in order to

22 In separate robustness checks, I control for several vari ables that have been used in some previous studies on foreign aid. First, I include regional dummy variables (Fearon &

Laitin, 2003) for Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and North Africa/Middle East, using sub-Saharan Africa as refer ence category. Their inclusion does not affect the overall

explanatory power of the models very much, and the Middle East dummy is statistically insignificant in all models. Both the EC and Germany are less likely to give aid to Asia, com

pared with sub-Saharan Africa, and give less aid to Latin

America, while France gives less aid to countries from Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia compared with sub-Saharan Africa. The UK is more likely to give aid to a

country from Eastern Europe. Finally, I test whether human

rights received more attention after than during the Cold War. In the first stage, I ran all analyses separately for 1978 to 1990 and 1991 to 2003. In the second stage, following

Meernik, Krueger & Poe (1998), each independent variable enters the equation twice, once covering the time period during and once covering the time period after the Cold War. The cutoff year is based on Meernik, Krueger & Poe (1998). In both sets of analysis, the main difference is that, after

1990, the EC rewarded countries that reduced their level of

repression, whereas none of the human rights indicators achieved statistical significance during the Cold War or the

complete time period for the gatekeeping and onset of aid. I

speculate that, when countries jointly decided the European Commissions aid budget, human rights influenced aid com mitments in the 'New Era', owing to peer pressure to 'do the

right thing'. Whereas democracy affected the gatekeeping stage of all donors for the complete time period, this consis tent effect disappeared during the Cold War, when concerns about democracy in developing countries seem to have been

neglected in favor of other issues.



Sabine C. Carey EUROPEAN Aid 461

receive ODA. But this initiative is substantially weakened if the rhetoric is not followed by consistent actions.

This study tested the impact of human

rights on aid commitments of the main

European donors from 1978 to 2003, while

accounting for competing determinants of

foreign aid. Unlike previous work on this

topic, the analyses allowed for a non-linear

impact of human rights on aid commitments.

Donors might punish only countries with

widespread repression, but not those with

limited human rights violations. Past studies

that utilized a single scale to capture the degree

of human rights violations were unable to test

this argument. Additionally, the present study

investigated whether substantial changes in a

developing country's human rights record lead to changes in donors' aid commitments.

The results showed that levels of human

rights violations do not influence the decision of European donors on whether or not to give

aid to a country -

apart from the UK, which

gave more aid to the most repressive countries.

When deciding how much aid to commit to

recipients, the level of human rights violations

again hardly played a role in the considerations of the European donors, with the exception of

Germany. In general, the more repressive a

recipient was, the less aid it received from

Germany. This was a general trend in the find

ings: when deciding how to allocate aid,

Germany paid more attention to the human

rights situation in developing countries than

the other donors analyzed in this study.

While the level of human rights violations in

developing countries had almost no impact on

the decision of whom to give aid to and how

much aid to allocate, slighdy more attention was

given to countries that managed to substantially

improve their human rights records. France and

Germany were four and three times more likely to give aid to countries that had recendy

increased their respect for personal integrity

rights, while the European Commission gave more aid to countries that had substantially improved their human rights records.

The main finding with respect to democ

racy, another pillar of good governance and

representing political rights, was that all donors are more likely to choose more demo

cratic countries as recipients, but none of the

donors considered democracy when deciding

how much aid to commit to recipients. These

results highlight that the factors that influ ence a donor's decision to choose a country as recipient are not necessarily the same as

the attributes that determine how much aid is allocated to a particular recipient country.

One factor, in addition to poverty in recipi ent countries, that was shown to consistently

impact all donors' decisions at all stages of

the aid allocation process was the impact of

bureaucratic inertia. In fact, the results

suggest that one of the main obstacles for a

consistent implementation of the human

rights rhetoric on aid is bureaucratic inertia.

This study has shown that once a donor has

included a developing country on its list of

recipients, it continues to give aid to this

country without paying much attention to

its respect for personal integrity rights.

European donors are even more likely to give

aid to a repressive former recipient than to a

country that generally respects human rights but that did not receive aid in the previous year.

As bureaucratic inertia has such a strong

influence on both the gatekeeping and amount allocation stages of aid, this study also

investigated which factors influenced donors'

decisions to initially give aid to a country by

focusing on the onset of aid. The results again

showed the influence of past aid commit ments. The longer

a country had not received

aid from a donor, the less likely it was to

become a recipient (again). And as with the

gatekeeping stage, the level of human rights violations did not influence the donor's decision on whether to adopt

a developing

country as recipient. However, recent sub

stantial changes shaped the onset of aid more

consistently than any other stage of the aid

allocation process. The EC, Germany, and



462 journal of Peace Research volume 441 number 41july 2007

France were more likely to add a country that

had not received aid in the previous year to their group of recipients if it had substantially improved its human rights record. Germany

was also less likely to include a country whose

human rights situation had drastically deteri orated in the preceding year.

Overall, recent substantial improvements in

human rights records are more likely to be

rewarded by European donors than simply higher human rights standards. But bureau

cratic inertia substantially drives aid commit

ments. So far, the onset of aid commitments

has been ignored by scholars; future work should continue to help us understand how donors choose their recipients in the first place. But one message is clear: there needs to be more

consistent attention to human rights before aid

becomes an effective tool for promoting basic

human rights in developing countries.

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SABINE C. CAREY, b. 1974, PhD in Government (University of Essex, 2003);

Lecturer, Department of Politics and Inter

national Relations, University of Nottingham (2002? ). Research interests: conflict processes and human rights violations. Recent articles

published in fournal of Conflict Resolution and Political Research Quarterly and edited book

(with Steven C. Poe): Understanding Human

Rights Violations (Ashgate, 2004).



1. EU. European Aid and Human Rights

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