1 Common Criteria Ravi Sandhu Edited by Duminda Wijesekera.
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Transcript of 1 Common Criteria Ravi Sandhu Edited by Duminda Wijesekera.
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Common Criteria: 1998-present TSEC retired in 2000, CC became de-
facto standard International unification
CC v2.1 is ISO 15408 Flexibility Separation of
Functional requirements Assurance requirements
Marginally successful so far v1 1996, v2 1998, widespread use ???
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Security Functional Requirements Identification and authentication Cryptographic support, Security management, Protecting ToE access and security functions Communication, Privacy, Trusted paths, Channels, User data protection, Resource utilization Audit Forensic analysis
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Security Assurance Requirements Life cycle support,
1. Pre requirements: Guidance documents2. Requirements analysis for consistency and
completeness3. Vulnerability analysis4. Secure design5. Development6. Testing
Functional, security specifications vulnerability
7. Delivery and operations8. Maintenance
Assurance maintenance Configuration management
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CC Methodology ToE Security Policy (TSP): set of rules
regulating asset management, protection and distributed in system
ToE Security Function (TSF): HW+SW and firmware used for the correct enforcement of TSP
Protection profile (PP): set of (security) requirments
Security target (ST): set of (security) requirements to be used as a evaluation
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CC Introductory: Section 1 of 8 ST identification: precisely stated
information required to identify ST ST overview: narrative acceptable as
a a standalone description of the ST CC Conformance:
Claim: a statement of conformance to the CC.
Part 2 conformance: if using only functional requirements
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CC Product/system description: Section 2 of 8
Describes the ToE, Boundaries
Logical physical
Scope of evaluation
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CC Product/system family environment: Section 3 of 8
Assumptions of intended usage Threat and their agents Organizational security policy that
must be adhered to in providing protection
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CC Security objective: Section 4 of 8
Objectives for the product/system: Traceable to identified threats and/or organizational policy
Objectives for the environment: must be traceable to threats not completely encountered by the
system and policies or assumptions not completely met by
the system
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CC IT Security requirements: Section 5 of 8
Functional security requirements: from CC
Security assurance requirements: must be augmented by the author as addendums to the EAL
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CC Product/summary specification: Section 6 of 8
A statement of security function and how these are met as functional requirements
A statement of assurance requirements and how these are met as
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CC Rationale: Section 8 of 8 Explains various aspects of CC Security objective rationale Security requirements rationale Summary specification rationale Rationale for not meeting all
dependencies PP claims rationale: explains the
differences between objectives, requirements and conformance claims
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Seven Levels of Evaluation EAL1: functionally tested EAL2: structurally tested EAL3: methodically tested and checked EAL4: methodically designed, tested and
reviewed EAL5: semi-formally designed and tested EAL6: semi-formally designed, verified and
tested EAL7: formaly verified, designed and tested
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The evaluation process Controlled by C Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) and NIST Many labs are accredited by NIST and
charge a fee for evaluation Vendor selects a lab to evaluate the
PP The vendor and the lab negotiates the
process and a schedule and the lab issues a rating
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Evaluation and testing
Security must be designed in Security can be retrofitted
Impractical except for simplest systems
Evaluation levels Black box Gray box White box
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Future of Testing
Continues to evolve Quality of Protection (QoP): some
research efforts to measure security qualitatively.
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The SSE-CMM Model 1997-present
System Security Capability Maturity Model
A process oriented model for developing secure systems
Capability models define requirements for processes
CC and its predecessors define requirements for security
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SSE-CMM Definitions Process capability: the range of
expected results by following the process
Process performance: a measure of the actual results received
Process maturity: the extent to which a process is explicitly defined, managed, measured, controlled and effective
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Process areas of SSE-CMM Administrator controls Assess impact Asses threat Asses vulnerability Build assurance arguments Coordinate security Monitor system security posture Provide security input Specify security needs Verify and validate security
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Example: assessing threats
Identify natural threats Identify human threats Identify threat units and measures Access threat agent capability Asses threat likelihood Monitor threats and their
characteristics
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Five capability maturity levels Represents process maturity1. Performed informally: base processes are
performed2. Planned and tracked: has project-level
definition, planning and performance verification
3. Well-defined: focused on defining, refining a standard practice and coordinating across organization
4. Continuously improving: organizational capability and process effectiveness improved.