1 8 20 - Federal Bureau of Investigation

ISSN 0014-5688 USPS 383-310

Features

Departments

6 Book Review

Patrol Operations and Enforcement Tactics

14 Police Practice

Responding to Individuals with Mental Illness

Data Mining and

Value-Added Analysis

By Colleen McCue, Emily S. Stone,

and Teresa P. Gooch

Health Club

Credit Card Theft By Richard A. Ballezza

Community Corrections

and Community PolicingBy David Leitenberger, Pete

Semenyna, and Jeffrey B. Spelman

The Discovery Process and

Personnel File InformationBy Richard G. Schott

1

November 2003Volume 72Number 11

Exercise enthusiasts have begun to fallvictim to a small number of thieves whosteal credit cards from lockers at healthclubs.

Law enforcement agencies can use datamining to help them effectively examinelarge amounts of data and, ultimately, tofulfill their missions.

8

19 The Bulletin Honors

24 Bulletin Reports

DrugsVictims

32 Crime Data

Law Enforcement Fatalities

20A partnership between corrections andpolice officers can greatly enhancecommunity supervision efforts.

United StatesDepartment of Justice

Federal Bureau of InvestigationWashington, DC 20535-0001

Robert S. Mueller IIIDirector

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endorsement by the FBI for any policy,program, or service.

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The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin(ISSN-0014-5688) is published

monthly by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, 935 PennsylvaniaAvenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

20535-0001. Periodicals postage paidat Washington, D.C., and additionalmailing offices. Postmaster: Sendaddress changes to Editor, FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy,

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FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBIAcademy, Madison Building, Room

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Officers who intentionally withholdinformation that affects their credibilitydeprive defendants of their constitutionalright to due process.

25

aw enforcement agen-cies, particularly in viewof the current emphasis

We are drowning in informationbut starved for knowledge.

—John Naisbitt

Lon terrorism, increasingly facethe challenge of sorting throughlarge amounts of informationneeded to help them make in-formed decisions and success-fully fulfill their missions. At thesame time, resources, particu-larly personnel, often dwindle.Described by one agency as the“volume challenge,”1 local,state, and federal agencies alikeall struggle with an ever-increas-ing amount of information that

November 2003 / 1

Data Mining andValue-Added AnalysisBy COLLEEN McCUE, Ph.D., EMILY S. STONE, M.S.W.,and TERESA P. GOOCH, M.S.

© Adobe Image Library

2 / FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

far exceeds their ability toeffectively analyze it in a timelyfashion.

However, while these issueshave surfaced, an extremelypowerful tool has emerged fromthe business community. Thistool, used by mortgage brokersto determine credit risk, localsupermarkets to ascertain how tostrategically stock their shelves,and Internet retailers to facilitatesales, also can benefit law en-forcement personnel. Com-monly known as data mining,this powerful tool can helpinvestigators to effectively andefficiently perform such tasksas the analysis of crime and

intelligence data.2 Fortunately,because of recent developmentsin data mining, they do not haveto possess technical proficiencyto use this tool, only expertise intheir respective subject matter.

WHAT IS DATA MINING?

Data mining serves as an au-tomated tool that uses multipleadvanced computational tech-niques, including artificial intel-ligence (the use of computers toperform logical functions), tofully explore and characterizelarge data sets involving one ormore data sources, identifyingsignificant, recognizable pat-terns, trends, and relationships

not easily detected throughtraditional analytical techniquesalone.3 This information thenmay help with various purposes,such as the prediction of futureevents or behaviors.

Domain experts, or thosewith expertise in their respectivefields, must determine if infor-mation obtained through datamining holds value. For ex-ample, a strong relationshipbetween the time of day and aseries of robberies would provevaluable to a law enforcementofficer with expertise in the in-vestigation pertaining to this in-formation. On the other hand, ifinvestigators, while reviewinghistorical homicide data, noticedthat victims normally possessedlip balm, they would not, ofcourse, associate lip balm orchapped lips with an increasedrisk for death.

WHY USE DATA MININGIN LAW ENFORCEMENT?

The staggering increase inthe volume of information nowflooding into the law enforce-ment community requires the useof more advanced analyticalmethods. Because data-miningsoftware now proves user-friendly, personal-computerbased, and, thus, affordable, lawenforcement agencies at all lev-els can use it to help effectivelyhandle this increased flow ofdata.

Lieutenant Colonel Gooch serves asassistant chief of the Richmond,Virginia, Police Department.

Dr. McCue is the programmanager for the Crime AnalysisUnit of the Richmond, Virginia,Police Department and holdsfaculty appointments at VirginiaCommonwealth University.

Ms. Stone served as a crime analyst with the Richmond, Virginia,Police Department.

November 2003 / 3

The law enforcement com-munity can use data mining toeffectively analyze informationcontained in many large datasets, even those involving writ-ten narratives (which represent agreat deal of valuable law en-forcement information). Thesemay include calls for servicedata, crime or incident reports,witness statements, suspect in-terviews, tip information, tele-phone toll analysis, or Internetactivity—almost any informa-tion that law enforcement pro-fessionals encounter in thecourse of their work.4

Not only can these data setsdiffer by type but they can origi-nate from different sources,5 po-tentially giving law enforcementagencies both a more completeinformational base from whichto draw conclusions and the abil-ity to identify related informa-tion in separate databases or in-vestigations. For example, thismay prove valuable in the area ofillegal narcotics enforcement.The law enforcement commu-nity frequently gathers informa-tion regarding markets, trends,and patterns, while medicaland social services personnelstore information concerningsubstance use and abuse on theindividual level. In instanceswhere appropriate, the opportu-nity to combine these data re-sources can give investigators amore complete picture and canhelp address various narcotics

problems more rapidly, poten-tially saving both lives andresources.

Law enforcement agenciescan consider exploring the use ofdata-mining applications to as-sist them in a variety of areas.Some examples include tacticalcrime analysis, deployment, riskassessment, behavioral analysis,DNA analysis, homeland secu-rity, and Internet/infrastructureprotection.

Tactical Crime Analysis

Data mining offers law en-forcement agencies potentialbenefits in the area of tacticalcrime analysis. For example, be-cause agencies can use data min-ing for such purposes as to morequickly and effectively identifyrelationships and similaritiesbetween crimes and to forecastfuture events based on historicalbehavioral patterns, they candevelop investigative leads andeffective action plans more

rapidly.6 Major case investiga-tions, which frequently presentnot only large volumes of infor-mation but also demands forrapid case resolution, serve asgood examples of how law en-forcement agencies can benefitfrom data mining in this regard.

Deployment

Law enforcement agenciescan use data-mining technologyto help them deploy their re-sources, including personnel,more effectively and proactively.For instance, data mining canhelp them identify such key ele-ments in a case or series ofevents as patterns of time andlocation—by forecasting futureevents based on this historicaldata, agencies potentially couldanticipate strategic locations fordeployment.

Data mining also allowsagencies to consider multiplevariables at one time and to addmore weight to those consideredmost important to the decision athand. For example, patrol offic-ers, who generally respond to in-cidents with quick turnaroundrates, may answer to numerouscalls for service and effect manyarrests in a relatively shortamount of time. On the otherhand, death investigations canrequire multiple officers’ entireshifts just to maintain the crimescene perimeter; as a result, ho-micide investigators generallymay handle considerably fewer

”

“Because data-miningsoftware now

proves user-friendly...and, thus, affordable,

law enforcementagencies at all levels

can use it....


incidents and arrests. To thisend, by weighing heavily suchfactors as the type and durationof these incidents, law enforce-ment agencies can develop effec-tive deployment strategies.

By using data mining, lawenforcement personnel, for pur-poses of analysis, also can linkincidents, crimes, or changes incrime trends to other types ofevents in making deploymentdecisions. For example, anagency historically may havenoticed relationships betweenmajor weather events, such assnowstorms or hurricanes, anddecreases in street crimes. Also,they may have seen how the ar-rests of key players in organizedcrime or drug distribution ringsseem to result in increased vio-lence as informants are soughtand identified and as new leadersemerge during reorganization.As another example, they mayassociate increased apprehen-sion rates and a strong economywith decreases in propertycrimes.7 By using data mining toconsider such relationships, lawenforcement agencies then candeploy their personnel as theydeem necessary.

Risk Assessment

Much like lenders and creditcompanies use data mining togreat effect in assessing the fi-nancial gamble involved withlending money or extendingcredit to individuals or groups,law enforcement agencies can

use it to characterize the risk in-volved in various incidents. Forexample, agency personnel canexplore the use of data mining toidentify common characteristicsof armed robberies that ended inassaults; doing so then can helpidentify those that may escalateinto assaults in the future. Simi-larly, in the past, certain types of

use data mining to identify com-mon behavioral characteristicsin different cases. Even when notidentifying a specific offender,investigators may find it possibleto gain some insight into whattype of offender may prove re-lated to a particular incident. Re-search in this area, for example,has resulted in the use of datamining to efficiently link serioussexual assault cases based onsimilar offender behaviors.9

DNA Analysis

Law enforcement agenciesalso can benefit from the use ofdata mining when examiningDNA evidence. For example,when DNA links a new suspectto an old case, investigators logi-cally may wonder what othercases the suspect may be linkedto. Given the amount of informa-tion involved, law enforcementpersonnel can find it virtuallyimpossible to efficiently andcompletely search old case fileseach time they identify a newsuspect. To this end, compilingDNA information into a search-able database gives law enforce-ment agencies a powerful tool tohelp identify, and potentiallyclose, additional linked cases.

Homeland Security

Processing and gainingmeaningful insight from thestaggering amount of datacritical to homeland security hasproven difficult.10 Law enforce-ment agencies can use data

property crimes have proven re-lated to subsequent strangerrapes.8 The ability to character-ize property crimes as similar tothose previously associated withsubsequent sexual assaults canalert investigators to focus oncertain cases and develop effec-tive action plans, perhaps pre-venting many similar situationsfrom occurring in the future.

Behavioral Analysis

The behavioral analysis ofviolent crime represents anotherarea with significant potentialfor data mining. For instance,law enforcement agencies can

© PhotoDisc

November 2003 / 5

mining to help them face thischallenge.

For instance, investigatorswould like to anticipate, andthereby prevent, acts of terror-ism. By using data mining toidentify relevant historical pat-terns, trends, and relationshipsinvolving terrorists, they couldaccomplish this objective moreeffectively.

Also, because data miningallows law enforcement agenciesto evaluate information in variedformats and from various data-bases and agencies, it can enablethem to effectively and effi-ciently analyze a wide range ofinformation that potentiallycould shed light on terroristactivity. For example, by analyz-ing information from multiplehealth-related data sources, lawenforcement agencies couldrecognize significant patternsof illness that may indicatebioterrorism activity or the use ofother weapons of mass destruc-tion.11 Agencies also can use thiscapability to associate generalcrimes with terrorist activity bylinking them with additional in-telligence—recent informationsuggesting links between ciga-rette smuggling and terroristfinancing12 serves as a validexample.

Internet/InfrastructureProtection

The law enforcement com-munity may find that thecapability of data mining in

characterizing and monitoringnormal activity, as well as identi-fying irregular or suspicious ac-tivity, proves applicable in thearea of Internet and infrastruc-ture protection. For example, therecognition of suspicious pat-terns of Web site activity notonly can help in the area of tradi-tional intrusion protection butalso can serve as an importantwarning about the release of in-formation. The FBI’s NationalInfrastructure Protection Center(NIPC) recently underscored the

materials, may prove useful toentities with malicious intent.

CONCLUSION

Law enforcement agenciesface an ever-increasing flood ofinformation that threatens tooverwhelm them; this will re-quire a change in how theyprocess and analyze data. Data-mining technology represents apowerful, user-friendly, and ac-cessible new tool that agenciescan use to help them in facingthis challenge as they seek to ful-fill their missions—ultimately,to ensure the safety and welfareof the public.

Endnotes

1 Tabassum Zakaria, “CIA Turns toData Mining”; retrieved on April 10, 2003,from http://www.parallaxresearch.com/

news/2001/0309/cia_turns_to.html.2 The authors based this article largely

on their experience with and research onthe subject of data mining.

3 Bruce Moxon, “Defining DataMining”; retrieved on April 10, 2003, fromhttp://www.dbmsmag.com/9608d53.html.

4 Law enforcement agencies mustaddress appropriate constitutional andlegal concerns if using public source datafor law enforcement purposes.

5 Law enforcement agencies, whencollecting information from differentsources, must decide how they will addressthe issue of cleaning the data, or preparingdata for data-mining activities.

6 Donald Brown, “The Regional CrimeAnalysis Program (RECAP): A Frame-work for Mining Data to Catch Criminals”;retrieved on April 10, 2003, from http://vijis.sys.virginia.edu/publication/

RECAP.pdf.7 Ayse Imrohoroglu, Anthony Merlo,

and Peter Rupert, “What Accounts for theDecline in Crime?”; retrieved on April 10,

”

“Law enforcementagencies can consider

exploring the useof data-mining

applications to assistthem in a variety

of areas.

importance of reviewing allInternet materials currentlyavailable, as well as thoseconsidered for release, for poten-tial threats to critical infrastruc-ture and homeland security.13

This warning comes as manymunicipal Web sites are receiv-ing suspicious activity andinterest.14 This information par-ticularly includes that which, ei-ther on its own merits or in com-bination with other open-source


2003, from http://www.clev.frb.org/

Research/workpaper/2000/wp0008.pdf.8 Colleen McCue, Georgia Smith,

Robyn Diehl, Deanne Dabbs, JamesMcDonough, and Paul Ferrara, “WhyDNA Databases Should Include AllFelons,” Police Chief, October 2001,94-100.

9 Richard Adderley and PeterMusgrove, “Data Mining Case Study:Modelling the Behaviour of OffendersWho Commit Serious Sexual Assaults,” inProceedings of the Seventh Association for

Computing Machinery (ACM) Special

Interest Group on Knowledge Discovery in

Data (SIGKDD) International Conference

on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining

Held in San Francisco 26-29 August 2001,(New York NY: ACM Press, 2001), 215-220.

10 Supra note 1; and Eric Chabrow,“The FBI Must Overhaul Its IT Infrastruc-ture to Fulfill a New Mandate of FightingTerrorism, Cyberattacks”; retrieved onApril 10, 2003, from http://www.

informationweek.com/story/

IWK20020602S0004; and Walter Pincusand Dana Priest, “NSA Intercepts on Eveof 9/11 Sent Warning”; retrieved on April10, 2003, from http://www.secretpolicy.

com/archives/00000073.html.11 Steve Bunk, “Early Warning: U.S.

Scientists Counter Bioterrorism with NewElectronic Sentinel Systems”; retrieved on

April 10, 2003, from http://www.scenpro.

com/press%2009%20leaders.html.12 Paul Nowell, “Hezbollah in North

Carolina?”; retrieved on April 10, 2003,from http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/

us/dailynews/hezbollah010328.html.13 National Center for Infrastructure

Protection (NIPC), Highlights, Issue 11-

01, December 7, 2001; retrieved on April10, 2003, from http://www.nipc.gov/

publications/highlights/2001/highlight-01-

11.htm.14 Barton Gellman, “Cyber-Attacks by

Al Qaeda Feared”; retrieved on April 10,2003, from http://www.washingtonpost.

com/wp-dyn/articles/A50765-2002

Jun26.html.

Book Review

Patrol Operations and EnforcementTactics by George T. Payton and MichaelAmaral, Criminal Justice Services, San Jose,California, 1996.

Patrol Operations and EnforcementTactics is a comprehensive, straightforwardbook involving current law enforcementactivities. Both authors are experts in thefields of patrol operations, procedures,tactics, and officer survival. Besides havingwritten numerous other related books andarticles, they teach extensively at localcolleges and universities and providetraining for many officers throughout theUnited States. Each has received muchrecognition from peers and various profes-sional organizations.

They comment that their book is not the“gospel of patrol operations,” but when readby those with law enforcement experience,

including those aspiring for participation inacademics, such readers will be impressedwith the book’s depth, practicality, compre-hensiveness, and application to their jobs andpositions. It is a well-designed and re-searched effort that contains experiences offrontline uniform and plainclothes officerslaced with invaluable critical personalopinions.

It covers most of the latest professionaltechniques and methods of operation andknowledge coupled with skills for the newrecruit, officers with limited experience, aswell as veteran law enforcement personnel.As a book, it lends itself to the safety andsurvival of officers facing grave situationsand assists them in enhancing the lesseningof officer-induced errors and mistakes.

A snapshot of the book’s content revealsa law enforcement code of ethics and a police

code of conduct, detailed preventive andselective enforcement operations, and typesof patrols ranging from foot to air patrolscoupled with computer-directed enforcementlocations and techniques. The book alsoincludes the use of forward-looking infraredsystems on air patrols and the advantagesand disadvantages of practical law enforce-ment communications. The authors addressstate and local automated networks, NCIC,and criminal justice information control,each involving enforcement operations andtactics. They also include an interestingchapter on observation and perceptiontechniques required by officers with 17identified and proven “attention getters” thatofficers should employ in detecting andcatching criminals. An explanation exists toassist officers in their approach to citizensand criminals, as well as safety concerns ofthose officers being approached by others.

The book offers four compelling pointsamong a wide variety of information. First,it has a major overall professional depth,practical application, and thoroughness.Next, it contains an extensive critical list of88 questions, consisting of the who, what,when, where, how, and why of operationsand tactics. These questions prove outstand-ing for both the experienced and inexperi-enced officer and can enhance patrol investi-gative report documentation and courttestimony when applied. Third, for thepromotional examination and the departmententrance exam challenger, the book lists 855study questions relevant to law enforcementoperations. Finally, the book contains someuseful checklist items that will help maintainan officer’s effectiveness, competency, andreadiness for duty. These include itemsofficers should consider when preparing todepart their residences for duty, leaving their

locker rooms (even what officers should keepin their lockers), handling preparation re-quirements prior to leaving the squad room,obtaining necessary information for patrolduty, and checking out the patrol vehicle andits care prior to and after departing the garagearea.

The book also covers the latest informa-tion on conducting standard and emergencyhigh-risk vehicle stops, pursuit considerationsand effective alternatives, legal and practicalaspects of firearms use, safety and liability,and special studies involving police weaponsand their applications. In addition, it includesplanning for emergency incidents and officersafety countermeasures when confrontingspecific threats.

Patrol Operations and EnforcementTactics is a valuable resource book for stateand local law enforcement departments toupgrade their operating procedures andpolicies and their academies. It can providematerial for the commissions on peace offi-cers standards and training, departmental in-service training programs, assessment centerselections and various examinations fordifferent officer skill levels, and merit promo-tion boards. The book also could help thoseofficers looking for a self-study professionalenhancement that they can complete duringshift breaks or at their residences and cansupport their specific college academiccourses. It is a must read for all departmentalpatrol officers and investigative personnel,including supervisors and managers.

Reviewed byLarry R. Moore

Certified Emergency ManagerInternational Associationof Emergency Managers

Knoxville, Tennessee

November 2003 / 7


uring the FBI’s investi-gation of the Yugosla-vian, Albanian, Croa-D

tian, and Serbian (YACS)commercial safe burglar groups,1

investigators discovered a spe-cialized theft crime problem per-petrated by some of these offend-ers. The crime pattern involvedthe theft of credit cards from thelockers of unsuspecting healthclub members while they exer-cised. Victims included bothmen and women. The thievesthen used the stolen credit cards,sometimes within hours of thetheft, to obtain cash at casinos.

An examination of this crimeproblem, which persists today,can help investigators under-stand the modus operandi (MO)of these unique credit cardthieves and offer some recom-mendations to help preventthefts in the future.

Overview

Beginning in the early to mid1990s, those law enforcementagencies principally involvedwith investigations of criminalactivity inside casinos began no-ticing an increase in the use ofstolen credit cards to obtain cash

from the cash-advance mer-chants in the casinos. The inter-esting common denominator inthese investigations was thatmany of the credit cards used inthe scam had been stolen fromhealth club lockers. Investigatorsnoted that the persons caughtpassing the cards were primarilyof Yugoslavian or Albanian de-scent. The thieves’ chance forsuccessfully avoiding capturewas aided by the fact thatcardholders often did not noticethe theft of the card until theyreceived the monthly billingstatement weeks after the actual

Health Club Credit Card TheftA National Crime ProblemBy RICHARD A. BALLEZZA

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November 2003 / 9

“

”

The crime patterninvolved the theft

of credit cardsfrom the lockers of

unsuspecting healthclub members....

Special Agent Ballezza serves in the Hudson Valleyresident agency of the FBI’s New York office.

theft. Victims would check theirwallets and notice, for the firsttime, the credit card missing, butwould be uncertain as to when orwhere the theft occurred. For ex-ample, a businessperson fromFlorida on a trip to New Yorkstays at a hotel in Bergen County,New Jersey. The hotel recom-mends a local health club that theperson uses for a workout. Thebusinessperson signs in as a day-use guest, and, during that time,someone steals a credit cardfrom the person’s wallet. After-ward, the businessperson re-turns to Florida and, severalweeks later, discovers unautho-rized charges on one credit card.This represents the typical situa-tion that confronts victims ofthese thefts as they report it toauthorities.

Modus Operandi

Law enforcement reports,postarrest interviews, analysis ofevidence obtained from searchwarrants, and intelligence gath-ering have made it possible todescribe a typical health clubcredit card theft scenario. Agroup of between four to sixthieves goes to a health club. Atleast one of them will be a mem-ber, sometimes under an alias, ofthe club the group targeted forlocker thefts. Other coconspira-tors may sign in as guests of themember or may sign in on a day-use basis. These thieves also tar-get health clubs offering 1-weekfree, trial memberships. While

the thieves usually do not all en-ter at the same time, they prob-ably find the sign-in proceduresfamiliar through previous sur-veillance. Undoubtedly, all ofthe thieves possess counterfeitidentification in a fictitious nameso as not to arouse suspicion if ahealth club employee asks foridentification. Moreover, be-cause guests entering healthclubs also may have to sign aguest book or log, thieves oftenpay the nominal day-use fee incash. They believe that healthclub employees keep this fee forpersonal use and do not recordwhen guests come to use thefacilities.

Once the thieves enter thelocker room, they separate intoprearranged roles. At least oneperson will act as a “blocker”and lookout at the main entranceto the locker room. Other thieves

will target certain lockers andwill carry various “shims”—ex-tremely thin pieces of metal cutto a small size—to “shim” openthe combination padlocks on thelockers. A skilled “shimmer” canopen these padlocks faster than aperson who uses the combina-tion. The shimmer may have theadditional assistance of anotherblocker who may use the lockernext to the targeted one to furtherscreen the shimmer’s efforts.The shims are so sharp thatthieves usually wear bandages orpieces of tape to protect theirfingers.

After opening the lock, thethieves carefully avoid disturb-ing the contents in the locker,looking only into the member’swallet to find any credit cards.They remove one or two of thecredit cards, preferably from awallet with many credit cards,


and note the name, address, anddate of birth on the driver’s li-cense, but never take any cash.They replace the wallet exactlyas they found it to avoid arousingany suspicion when the memberreturns to the locker. Thievesnormally target several lockers atthe health club, and more thanone person usually shims at thesame time. Thieves generallysteal 15 to 20 credit cards eitherfrom one health club or frommultiple health clubs beforemoving to the next phase of thescam.

Counterfeit IdentificationManufacture

The next phase involves thethieves producing counterfeitidentification to match the nameon the credit card. In the earlyvintage of this scheme, thievesmost commonly made counter-feit, nonphoto New Jerseydriver’s licenses to use at Atlan-tic City casinos. They employedthese nonphoto licenses asbackup identification (ID) thatthey would show inside the casi-nos to tellers who requested IDbefore providing cash to the per-son holding the credit card. Morerecent trends involve makingcounterfeit, color photo driver’slicenses from different states.Thieves modified their MO afterthe casinos became aware of thenonphoto New Jersey licensesand began requiring photo ID asbackup identification. Also, thethieves expanded their target

area to include health clubs lo-cated in states without casinos.This required the thieves tomanufacture counterfeit driver’slicenses from many states.

The thieves always mustknow in advance exactly whichperson will serve as the “signer”inside the casino. Obviously,that same person’s photo mustappear on the counterfeit driver’slicense. Laptop computers, color

scanners, and color printers havefacilitated the production of suchcounterfeit documents.2 Thethieves usually complete thematching ID within a short timeand then plan their travel to thecasinos. If the casinos arenearby, they generally travel bycar or van. If the casino is faraway, the thieves, using aliases,fly on commercial aircraft. Theynever use stolen credit cards topurchase airline tickets whenthey fly to a distant location tosteal or to pass credit cards.

The Casino Connection

Before using the cards at thecasinos, the thieves, now a group

of 10 to15 people, make sure thatthe health club members havenot reported the theft of thecards. To accomplish this, thethieves typically stop at a gas sta-tion/convenience store and buy afew gallons of gas at a self-ser-vice pump or make a small pur-chase at a gift shop in or near thecasino.3 If a problem arises, thethieves feign any knowledge andpurchase the gas or gift with cashand then destroy the card. Thethieves check all stolen cardsprior to entering a casino.

The large group of thievesnow breaks into smaller teamsto begin passing the cardsinside the casinos. This reducesthe risk of detection by casinogaming commission law en-forcement authorities or by pri-vate security personnel inside theestablishment.

Casinos use different mer-chants to provide the cash-ad-vance service. Essentially, a cardholder uses the machine by in-serting or swiping the credit cardand then entering the desiredamount of money. The serviceadds a small fee to that amountand, as long as sufficient creditremains on that credit card, gen-erates a receipt. The card holdertakes the receipt to a nearby tellerwindow where the teller has re-ceived a similar approval for thetransaction. The teller matches itwith the receipt handed by thecustomer and asks to see thecredit card, as well as backup ID,before giving the requested

”

Once the thievesenter the locker

room, they separateinto prearranged

roles.

“

November 2003 / 11

money, less the fee, to thecustomer.

The health club lockerthieves who use the same serviceat the casino, but with stolencredit cards, do not know howmuch credit is available on a par-ticular card. The thief may haveto try different amounts, reduc-ing the amount requested eachtime, before obtaining approval.Investigators can retrieve com-puterized records regardingthese transactions and usuallywill find multiple attempts to ob-tain cash. Thieves may use thesame card at different casinosuntil they reach the credit limitfor that card. During this phase,the thieves maintain contact witheach other through pagers andcell phones.

The Profit Split

The thieves split the profitsin thirds: the person who stealsthe card, the one who makes thecounterfeit ID, and the “signer,”or the person who passes thecard, each receive one-third ofthe profits. If a thief fulfills twoof the roles, that person will gettwo shares. Groups of more than10 persons using 20 to 30 stolencards have made $60,000 to$100,000 in only 1 weekend inLas Vegas. Thieves involved inthis criminal activity are well or-ganized and experienced inter-state criminals. After completingthe scam, the thieves return tothe New York metropolitan area.

Recent Trends

While stealing thousands ofcredit cards and reaping millionsof dollars worth of currency,some thieves appeared repeat-edly in the same casinos. As lawenforcement became more awareof the identity of the knowncredit card thieves, new perpe-trators, or “fresh faces,” have be-gun to actually pass the cards in

primarily from New Jersey andNew York in the early stages ofthese crimes, the theft of cardsfrom health clubs in states allacross America has blossomed.In addition, more and more statesare establishing casinos withintheir borders, and it is only aquestion of time before these ca-sinos become victimized as well.

Detection Problems

Detection problems fall intothree basic categories: healthclub, credit card company, andcasino. Health club securitymeasures vary greatly. Theyrarely have any videotape torecord persons entering theclub and, for obvious reasons,employ no closed-captionedtelevision inside the lockerrooms. Some fitness centers donot use photo membership cardsto identify their members. Othersmerely ask members to say theirfour-digit number upon enteringthe club. Some may not requireday guests or trial members toshow photo identification to gainadmittance to the club. Severalclubs have no small, secure valu-ables lockers (located behind thefront desk) for use by memberswho then, because of a lack ofthese type of lockers, have tostore their wallets in a typicallocker in an unsupervised lockerroom.

Credit card companies varyin their internal controls and“flags” programmed into their

the casinos. The known thievesusually are nearby, but not at theteller window with the conspira-tor who is obtaining the cash.Currently, the Yugoslavians andAlbanians in these schemes ap-pear to be using Romanianswithout arrest records to passthe cards. Further, even thoughthe greater travel distance toLas Vegas can be a risk to thethieves from New York, LasVegas offers many more casinoscompared with Atlantic Cityand, therefore, proves enticingto the credit card thieves. Al-though credit cards were stolen

© Digital Stock


computer software. One con-victed thief admitted that hegenerally stayed away fromone credit card because thecompany’s employees moni-tored the use of the cards moreclosely and were apt to call acardholder if unusual activity oc-curred, even if the card was notreported stolen. Such preventiveaction could derail the scam be-cause the delay in the discoveryof the theft of the card providesthe thief with a greater windowof opportunity to exploit what-ever credit remains on a particu-lar card.

The delay in the discovery ofthe theft of the card also has thedetrimental spillover effect ofhampering investigators as theytry to find evidence of the personwho used the card in the casino.Companies who operate thecash-advance service in the casi-nos may only keep their tellerwindow videotapes for 1 or 2weeks at a time before recordingover them. Investigators foundthat in some cases, the video-taped transaction, which wouldclearly show who passed the sto-len credit card, had been eraseddue to the passage of 4 to 6weeks since the actual theft oc-curred. It is possible that thieveswho know which cash-advancecompanies maintain the video-tapes for the shortest period oftime actually may target thosecompanies when passing the sto-len credit cards. Further, thieves

also have used the assistance ofemployees who work behind theteller window area while theypass the credit cards.

Countermeasures

Prospective members tour-ing a health club consider thefitness equipment, programs,and cost of membership beforedeciding to join. However, they

manager how the club handlesday-use guests, such as guestsfrom local hotels or conventionsor other visitors. They should de-termine if guests are required toshow a photo ID and if the frontdesk makes a copy of the ID. Ifpeople already belong to a clubthat does not offer lockers nearthe front desk, they should try toget in the habit of quickly check-ing their wallets immediately af-ter getting dressed before leavingthe health club, making sure thatall credit cards are present, par-ticularly those cards that are to-ward the back of the stack ofcards. If one is missing, theyshould immediately notify localpolice and the credit card com-pany. The credit card companymay be able to help police appre-hend the thieves should thethieves try to use the card. Thecredit card company should re-main especially alert for any at-tempt to use the card to obtain acash advance at a casino.

In addition, the managementat the health club needs to knowabout the theft because othermembers undoubtedly had creditcards stolen at the same time. Ifthe health club has a computer-ized system, such as a bar-codedID card shown on the way intothe club, the manager may beable to contact other membersand advise them to check theirwallets.

Because a relatively smallgroup of criminals is responsible

also should assess the securityfeatures at the facility. The pres-ence of the small valuables lock-ers, located immediately behindor next to the front desk, for thestorage of a wallet and keys canreduce the chance of any creditcard theft. A convicted thiefadvised that if the health clubhad those small valuables lock-ers near the front desk, his groupdid not even try to steal anycredit cards from the lockerroom. The thieves just went to adifferent health club that did notuse those type of lockers. Per-sons should ask the health club

”

Thieves mayuse the same cardat different casinos

until they reachthe credit limitfor that card.

“

November 2003 / 13

for the majority of this nationalcrime problem, law enforcementagencies, particularly those thatrecently have made their first ar-rests of persons involved in thesetype of thefts, should contact lawenforcement agencies coveringAtlantic City and Las Vegas ca-sinos. Agencies new to thesescams can e-mail a color arrestphoto to those law enforcementagencies having more experi-ence with these credit cardthieves. This prompt networkingmay help correctly identify thearrestee who could be assuminga false identity. If this contact isdone quickly, the arrestee’s cor-rect identity could be known be-fore arraignment. Also, someagencies have photos of indi-viduals who have passed stolencards but do not know their iden-tities. Therefore, the recent arrestin one jurisdiction may identifythe unknown suspect in anotheragency’s theft case.

Local crime prevention of-ficers should take time to meetwith health club managerswithin their jurisdictions to ad-vise them of this criminal patternand to discuss their clubs’ secu-rity measures. Police respondingto any suspicious person or ve-hicle call in the parking lot of ahealth club should consider thepossibility that the suspiciousperson or vehicle may participatein these type of thefts. Police of-ficers should note any bandagesor tape on the suspicious

person’s fingers and the exist-ence of any “shims,” credit cardsnot in the name of the person, ora “prop” gym bag that containsdry clothing because thesethieves do not exercise or showerat the targeted facility.

Conclusion

As more health clubs openand as additional states begin li-censing casinos, health clubcredit card thieves will continueto have ample opportunity to per-petrate their interstate fraud. Theenticement to make thousands ofdollars will keep a steady flowof interested recruits into thisunique criminal specialty.

However, small changes inthe personal habits of membersfollowing workouts, along withimprovements in security both atfitness centers and at the cash-advance merchants inside casi-nos, could help prevent thefts or,with prompt discovery of the

theft, could help thwart thesuccessful passing of the cardinside a casino. Further, in-creased vigilance by credit cardcompany watchdogs lookingfor suspicious credit card activitycoupled with enhanced network-ing by those law enforcementagencies principally involved ininvestigating crime within thecasinos ultimately could lead toa dramatic reduction in profitsfor these interstate criminalgangs.

Endnotes1 For additional information, see

Richard A. Ballezza, “YACS CrimeGroups: An FBI Major Crime Initiative,”FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, November1998, 7-12.

2 Evidence seized after execution offederal search warrants in the New Yorkarea corroborate the thieves’ use of thesetechniques.

3 Reports have surfaced that somethieves even have a toll-free telephonenumber similar to those used by merchantscalling to check on a particular credit card.

Credit card thieves use different thicknesses of sheetmetal to cut open padlocks on health club lockers.


Moving Past What to How—The Next Step in Responding toIndividuals with Mental IllnessBy Douglas Gentz, Ph.D., and William S. Goree

L

Police Practice

aw enforcement officers accept the needfor firearms instruction before going to

the range to practice what they have learned.After they have the necessary education onweapons, their training time can be more effec-tively spent on the range. Perhaps, trainingofficers to improve the skills used to respond tocitizens with mental illness can be enhanced witha similar approach—a high priority on practice.

Tulsa, Oklahoma, like most other communi-ties across the country, has long experienced thedifficulties of the increasing pressure on individu-als with mental illness and their families as aresult of state funding problems and constantchanges in mental health care delivery systems.

Most of the responsibility for providing servicesto those seriously ill or less able to pay for ser-vices has shifted from one agency to another,sometimes more than once. Because of thischallenge, the Tulsa Police Department’s (TPD)apprentice police officer (APO) academy traininghas included a component similar to the “Mem-phis Model”1 since 1988. Integrating front-linemental health professionals into the broad,multidisciplinary training given to APOs foralmost 15 years has helped TPD field officersbecome proficient in the task of respondingeffectively to individuals with mental illness.

To answer a growing need, the TPD resolvedto go beyond refresher classes for incumbentofficers and, instead, committed to developing anadvanced mental health response officer school.The school was designed to help police andmental health professionals work in a collabora-tive partnership as both instructors and students.2

THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE

The guiding principle for the school’s devel-opment, the “operational triangle,” represents amodel the TPD has used for many years to in-struct APOs. The foundation of the operationaltriangle is safety. Ensuring safety is the first stepin all interactions between officers and citizens.Only after this is established and maintainedshould an officer focus on using communicationskills to form an effective relationship with asubject. Officers first must have a safe environ-ment before they can apply interpersonal skillsdirected toward possible problem solving.

Once officers establish a state of safety, theyare tempted to move directly to problem solving.Yielding to this temptation means skipping themiddle section of the triangle and, often, resultsin ineffectiveness. Increasing officers’ confidencein their abilities to effectively use interpersonalcommunication skills improves the likelihoodthat they will incorporate each section of theoperational triangle.

© Comstock Images

November 2003 / 15

Over the last 20 years, the law enforcementprofession has made huge strides in raisingofficers’ awareness and competence in the areasof citizen and officer safety. Agencies shoulddevote attention to increasing officers’ awarenessof the essential step between safety and problemsolving. These human relation skills, like officersafety skills, improve with practice. Enhancedinterpersonal skills will amplify the ability ofofficers to project a powerful influence withcitizens they serve, especially those with mentalhealth issues.

THE INSTRUCTIONAL OBJECTIVE

The school’s mission is to assist peoplein need of mental health services in a waythat secures the safety of all concerned,respects the dignity of the person inneed of attention, and increases thechances of a good outcome withmental health service providersfollowing the law enforcementcontact. This statement definesthe instructional objective ofmaximizing the time spentconducting collaborativecross training betweenlaw enforcementofficers and mentalhealth professionalsmost likely to have direct contact with individualsin need of mental health services. Minimal timeexpended on reviewing mental health knowledge(e.g. facts, diagnostic categories, mental disorderdescriptions) in lecture-type presentations allowsinstructors to spend more time on practicalapplications of interpersonal communication andintervention skills.

CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

Various departments of the TPD and themental health community designed the school’s40-hour curriculum in the spring of 2002 over a

6-month period. Classes are limited to 20 policeofficers and 5 mental health professionals. At-tendees are divided into smaller groups composedof four officers and one mental health profes-sional with a TPD special operations team crisisnegotiator acting as facilitator/instructor becauseof this person’s experience and expertise.

Upon completion of the school, sworn lawenforcement graduates earn department certifica-tion as advanced mental health response (AMHR)officers. Further, mental health professionalgraduates are certified AMHR responders andcan receive continuing education credits aswell.

CURRICULUM

Day 1

The entire first day centers on themiddle section of the operationaltriangle—effective interpersonalcommunication skills—dividedinto five segments. The firstsegment reviews basic activelistening, then focuses onmore advanced verbalconcepts in the secondsegment. Both arefollowed by an exer-cise requiring students

to use active listening skills, as well as the addi-tional verbal skills, in a role-play situation wherean observer evaluates performance and providesfeedback.

The third segment concentrates on nonverbalcomponents of communication followed by anexercise requiring students to deliberately add thenonverbal component to the rapport-buildingprocess. The relationship between autonomic (i.e.,involuntary) nervous system arousal levels (de-gree of physical and psychological tension) andthe ability to effectively use interpersonal com-munication skills also is discussed. Instructors

Problemsolving

Interpersonalcommunication

skills that build arelationship

Safety


emphasize that functioning effectively from thebottom level of the operational triangle (safety)requires a relatively higher level of autonomicarousal. Functioning effectively from the middlesection (interpersonal communication skillsaimed at rapport building) requires a relativelylower level of autonomic arousal. Instructors alsoexamine potential safety problems inherent innegotiators lowering their arousal levels enoughto engage in rapport building. A subsequentexercise helps attendees reviewand practice a simple relaxationtechnique that leads to a de-crease in arousal level.

Next, students receive alesson on understanding, appre-ciating, and applying the ideathat power can be divided intotwo subtypes: authority andinfluence. In this model, au-thority is the ability to makethings happen by force, whileinfluence gets its power fromthe strength of a relationship.The tactics of authority strate-gies range from a uniformpresence to deadly force interventions. Authoritystrategies generally call for functioning from thebottom or top level of the operational triangle.Influence strategies focus on the rapport estab-lished with a subject and call for functioningfrom the middle of the operational triangle. Thelesson concludes with a very challenging role-play exercise requiring students to demonstrateboth authority and influence strategies in thecontext of a simulated possible emergency orderof detention (EOD) call.3

Day 2

The second day consists of a field trip to alocal juvenile inpatient facility that receivesindividuals taken into protective custody under anEOD. Presentations and practical exercises are

given later on various topics, such as psychotro-pic medications, chemical dependency, andbipolar disorder.

Day 3

One of the most valuable experiences, accord-ing to students, is a “virtual hallucination”4

exercise. Each group member listens to a short,commercially produced audiotape simulating theexperience of auditory hallucinations while beinginterviewed by group members. Presentations on

the medications and illnessescommonly seen regardinghomeless individuals followthis exercise.

Next, the Tulsa MentalHealth Association, a panel ofmental health consumers, andtheir family members lead apresentation and open paneldiscussion to humanize theschool’s objectives. Followingthe discussion is a presentationof the “third criteria,” whichprovides an option for EODsubjects to be taken into protec-

tive custody if they have a history of seriousmental illness, currently demonstrate worseningsymptoms, and it is reasonably believed thattreatment will prevent a progressively moredebilitating mental impairment. Clearly, theoption proves a very positive choice in somesituations and, in others, may provide fertileground for disagreement between police officers,mental health professionals, and individuals withmental illness.

Day 4

Because mental health consumers often areincarcerated, students tour the county jail’sdiversion program. The program seeks to appro-priately identify and provide a basic level of carefor persons with mental illness while in the

““

”

Most of theresponsibility for

providing services tothose seriously ill orless able to pay forservices has shiftedfrom one agency to

another....

November 2003 / 17

facility. Because health professionals and policeofficers have different experiences and percep-tions regarding suicidal subjects, students alsohear a presentation on suicide prevention. Mentalhealth professionals often are more aware of thepassive, depressive symptoms that developgradually over time. In most cases, when officershave contact with a suicidal subject, the personlikely has shifted to an angry, ambivalent, andpossibly violent state of mind, which calls for analert approach.

Next, attendees complete a practical exerciseto use polished interpersonal skills, combinedwith information from the presentation, to inter-vene with a suicidal subject in a role-play

scenario. Observations on safety, interpersonalskills, and problem solving follow each scenario.The day ends with presentations on developmen-tal disabilities and dementia.

Day 5

On the final day, the TPD’s psychologistpresents a lecture on personality disordersfollowed by a presentation and open class discus-sion on violence and threat assessment. A finalpractical exercise challenges students to applyskills and knowledge gained throughout theweek. Nonclass member mental health profes-sionals are recruited from the community to role-play the parts of mental health consumers in a

Day 1

Active Listening Skills

Advanced Verbal Concepts

Nonverbal Components

Autonomic Nervous SystemArousal Levels

Interpersonal CommunicationSkills

Power Subtypes

Day 2

Juvenile Inpatient Facility Tour

Psychotropic Medications

Chemical Dependency

Bipolar Disorder

Training Curriculum

Day 3

“Virtual Hallucination”

Schizophrenia

Open Panel Discussion

The “Third Criteria”

Day 4

County Jail’s Diversion Program Tour

Suicide Intervention

Developmental Disabilities

Dementia

Day 5

Personality Disorders

Violence and Threat Assessment

Role-Playing Scenario

Evaluation


variety of scenarios. Instructors provide observa-tions and feedback to each student on safetyissues, interpersonal skills, and problem solvingthroughout the course of the exercise.

Finally, all class members and crisis negotia-tors participate in an evaluation and discussionsession. Although the school’s organizers place avery high priority on small group practical exer-cises, students usually feel that even more time infuture classes should be dedicated to practicalapplication activities. Further, one student sug-gested that a standing commit-tee composed of selected gradu-ates of the school, crisisnegotiators, other appropriatemental health professionals, andTulsa Police Department admin-istrators be formed and meetquarterly to advise on ongoingchanges in the community’smental health environment.

CONCLUSION

Two interwoven key factorshave contributed to the successof the advanced mental healthresponse officer school. First,the inclusion of mental health professionals asstudents and instructors helps build a collabora-tive partnership between law enforcement profes-sionals and individuals in the mental health caresystem. Equally important is the decision to placea higher value on how to intervene with individu-als with mental illness than on academic presen-tations about mental health knowledge.

The small group exercises accomplish threevery important functions. First, they help studentspolish their interpersonal communication skills inthe context of interacting safely and effectivelywith individuals with mental illness. Second,both a police and a mental health perspective are

present. Finally, and perhaps most important,officers and mental health professionals aretogether in a cooperative educational setting thatencourages the development of positive, personalrelationships and a genuine appreciation for thedifferences and similarities in both jobs. Combin-ing all of these factors helps ensure that lawenforcement officers receive the best possibletraining to respond effectively to individuals withmental illness.

For additional information, contact CaptainTracie Crocker, Tulsa Police Department, at

918-596-1105 or [email protected].

Endnotes1 For more information, visit the

Memphis, Tennessee, Police Department’sWeb site at www.memphispolice.org

2 The authors acknowledge ChiefDavid Been whose interest, involvement,and insistence on excellence in officerresponse to individuals in the mentalhealth system ensured the developmentand implementation of this school. Theyalso acknowledge retired Tulsa, Okla-homa, Police Officer Charles V. Millerwho served as the first special operations

crisis negotiator team leader, as an academy instructor, and as themajor influence that prepared officers to receive, and crisisnegotiators to provide, the most valuable portion of the trainingthat takes place in this school.

3 An EOD occurs when individuals need treatment becausethey are considered a danger to themselves or others.

4 Virtual Hallucination, Janssen Pharmaceutics, April 1997,cassette.

““

”

Agencies shoulddevote attention toincreasing officers’awareness of the

essential step betweensafety and problem

solving.

Dr. Gentz provides psychological counseling, consulting,and training for Tulsa, Oklahoma, Police and Fire Depart-ment employees.Sergeant Goree currently is a field supervisor and thespecial operations crisis negotiator team leader for theTulsa, Oklahoma, Police Department and formerly servedas the department’s training supervisor.

November 2003 / 19

The Alaska State Trooperspresent this law enforcementmemorial located in Anchorage,Alaska, in front of the agency’sScientific Crime DetectionLaboratory. This statue wasformally dedicated on June 9,1986, to law enforcement offi-cers who have lost their lives inthe line of duty. It consists of abronze figure of a police officer,identified on his name plate as“A Friend,” holding a small girlin his arms and standing on ablack marble pedestal containingindividual name plates for eachof the officers killed in Alaskasince statehood.

Nominations for The Bulletin Honors should include at least one color 5x7 or 8x10 photograph (slides also areaccepted) of a law enforcement memorial along with a short description (maximum of 200 words). Contributorsshould send submissions to the Editor, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, FBI Academy, Madison Building, Room209, Quantico, VA 22135.

The Alaska StateTroopers Memorial

The Bulletin Honors


ooperation between cri-minal justice agenciescan draw on the strengthsC

of all entities involved to effec-tively accomplish common ob-jectives. In Richland County,Ohio, community correctionsand community policing haveformed a partnership that hasseen enhanced corrections ef-forts, as evidenced by a reducednumber of new crimes by con-victed offenders under adult su-pervision services within thecounty.

Partnership andEnhanced Supervision

Enacted on July 1, 1996,Ohio Senate Bill 2, also knownas the “truth-in-sentencing”law, eliminated indeterminatesentences1 and parole in Ohio infavor of a system of deter-minate sentences2 and post-release control (PRC),3 or super-vision of an offender after thecompletion of a court-orderedsentence. This focus on PRCchallenged the criminal jus-tice community to develop new

community-oriented correctionsprograms. Richland Countyformed a community correctionsboard, composed of citizens andrepresentatives from the courtsystem, law enforcement agen-cies, local government organiza-tions, social service agencies,and victim services, to study cur-rent supervision and treatmentmethods and criminal offenderprofiles in Richland County todetermine how best to safely andeffectively supervise correc-tional clients in the community.

Community Correctionsand Community PolicingA Perfect MatchBy DAVID LEITENBERGER, PETE SEMENYNA,

and JEFFREY B. SPELMAN, Ph.D.

November 2003 / 21

Mr. Semenyna serves assupervisor of the RichlandCounty, Ohio, Adult CourtServices.

Chief Leitenberger heads theRichland County, Ohio, AdultCourt Services.

Dr. Spelman is an assistantprofessor at AshlandUniversity in Ashland, Ohio.

In response to this need forenhanced community supervi-sion standards, in 1998, officersfrom the Richland County AdultProbation Office initiated a part-nership with officers of theRichland County Sheriff’s De-partment, the Mansfield PoliceDepartment, the MansfieldAdult Probation Department,and the regional office of theState Parole Authority. Interestin community corrections andcommunity policing cooperationbegan with the idea that collabo-ration might compliment thepower of each office, thus in-creasing public protection.

This new partnership madepossible the intensive supervi-sion program (ISP), which em-ploys electronic monitoringbracelets that allow any police or

corrections officer equippedwith a drive-by or hand-held unitto identify and closely monitoroffenders. This program alsouses a system of sanctions andincentives and follows a step-down and step-up approach (adecrease or increase of controls,depending on client behavior).Not only does the ISP offer moreeffective surveillance and safercommunities but it also allowsofficers to identify clients thatmay need treatment or otherservices.

The ISP improved in 2001with the implementation ofthe first felony reentry court inOhio, a partnership betweenRichland County and state au-thorities. Out of this partnershipcame the creation and incorpora-tion of a single set of community

supervision standards that be-came applicable to all personsunder adult supervision inRichland County, whether sub-ject to county community controlor state probation, parole (forthose sentenced prior to July 1,1996), or postrelease control.

Under these standards, par-ticipants must seek and maintainemployment, obey curfew, makerestitution to victims, submit tofrequent random drug and alco-hol testing and maintain treat-ment requirements, avoid barsand high drug-trafficking loca-tions, refrain from carrying cellphones or pagers, and shun gangor other criminal associations.Officers enforce these conditionsthrough a more flexible supervi-sion system in which they moni-tor clients on a 24-hour-per-day,


7-day-per-week basis; have 33percent of their contacts with cli-ents during evenings and week-ends; and make sufficient con-tacts with treatment providers,employers, and appropriate gov-ernment agencies.

Cooperation and Success

The interaction between cor-rections and police officers hasserved the enhanced supervisionin Richland County well; theirassignments facilitate this im-portant relationship. Communitypolice handle specific clients;this contact enhances police fa-miliarity with supervised offend-ers and allows them to take anactive part in supervision. Like-wise, corrections officers gener-ally supervise offenders in thepolice department zone wherethey reside; consequently,they already have considerableknowledge of both the citizenry

and the neighborhood of their as-signed zone. Assigning commu-nity police and corrections offic-ers in this way helps them towork together effectively.

Officers from each agencyinvolved also meet regularly toshare information. This informa-tion sharing has helped commu-nity police officers to investigateand solve crimes, to identify cli-ents with community supervi-sion status and unique supervi-sion conditions, and to recognizepersons who have abscondedfrom community supervision.Likewise, information sharingassists community correctionsofficers. They more quickly be-come aware of clients and otherswith outstanding arrest warrants,local gang involvement, specificcrime problems, and criminalassociations.

The cooperation betweencommunity corrections and

community policing has madethe partnership a success. For ex-ample, the Richland CountyCommunity Policing and Com-munity Corrections PartnershipProgram received the 1999Governor’s Award of Excel-lence of the state of Ohio. Thisaward honors a partnership thathas seen lower crime rates for thecitizens it serves through the ISPand great success in its majorjoint operations.

Statistics seem to support theassertion of Richland County au-thorities that unified supervisionprograms result in lower crimerates. Local crime statistics re-leased by the Richland CountySheriff’s Office for 2000 and2001 showed a 4.5 percent re-duction in violent and propertycrime within its primary policingjurisdiction and a 13 percent re-duction in Madison Township,served jointly by the Richland

MONTHLY MINIMUM SUPERVISION STANDARDS

Home Visit Office Visit Other Treatment Total Drug Tests

Intensive 3/mo. 1/mo. 1/mo. 2/mo. 6+/mo. 8+/mo. (2/week)

High 2/mo. 1/mo. 1/mo. 1/mo. 5+/mo. 4/mo. (1/week)& 1 R/mo.

Medium 1/mo. 1/mo. 1/mo. 1/mo. 4+/mo. 1/mo. & 2 R/mo.

Note: R= random drug testing

November 2003 / 23

County Sheriff’s Office and theMansfield Police Departmentwith a special emphasis on thepolice-corrections partnership.Data furnished by the RichlandCounty Court Services Depart-ment indicated that in 2000, theRichland County ISP case fail-ure4 rate was 8.5 percent, wellbelow the 37 percent new arrestaverage for a 1-year period forISP programs.5

Teams of community polic-ing and community correctionsofficers have conducted four ma-jor joint operations since 1999with great success. These fouroperations and their results afterthe first 3 years include Sam andCharles Night Out, in whichjoint inspections of local bars re-sulted in the arrests of over 143violators; Lights Out, in whichjoint searches for curfew viola-tors found over 211 persons onprobation status in violation ofcurfew (these curfew violationshave since decreased); FugitiveSurveillance, in which jointsearches for clients of the ISP,electronic monitoring, or housearrest programs who have ab-sconded from supervision re-sulted in 252 arrests; and Dayand Night Ride Along, which in-volved a total of 2,625 joint vis-its of client homes or places ofemployment.

Future Expectations

In 2002, corrections officersjoined police officers to perform

many new community policinginitiatives. Local criminal jus-tice administrators would like toincrease the number of partici-pating agencies in these pro-grams. Some examples includebicycle patrols, park-and-walkpatrols, public speeches, andcrime prevention training. An-other partnership initiative nowin the planning stages, a fugitiveresponse unit, aims to capturespecific violators who present ahigh risk of violence to thecommunity.

Conclusion

Effectively and safely super-vising correctional clients in thecommunity can prove difficultfor criminal justice agencies.Drawing on the strengths of bothcommunity corrections and com-munity policing, this uniquepartnership in Richland County,Ohio, has successfully addressedthis challenge. For other locali-ties willing to unite correctionsand police officers in this regard,such cooperation can help pro-vide effective offender supervi-sion and a lower crime rate intheir communities.

Endnotes1 In an indeterminate sentencing

system, a judge sets a minimum and amaximum amount of time for an offenderto serve; the exact length of the sentence islargely dependent on parole.

2 In a determinate sentencing system, ajudge sets a fixed sentence prescribed bylaw.

3 Postrelease control is mandatory ordiscretionary, depending on the type ofoffense or felony level.

4 Offender arrests or violations ofsupervision rules.

5 Joan Petersilia and Susan Turner,U.S. Department of Justice, NationalInstitute of Justice, Evaluating IntensiveSupervision Probation/Parole: Results of

a Nationwide Experiment (NCJ 141637)(Washington, DC, 1993), 5.

”

...cooperation beganwith the idea that

collaborationmight complimentthe power of each

office....

“Richland County also wants

to expand its partnership andoperations into neighboring cit-ies and counties. For example,officers have teamed up withAshland County’s police, mu-nicipal court probation, andstate officers to help identify pro-bationers and parolees fromRichland County who have beenpatronizing Ashland County barsto avoid detection by authorities.


Bulletin Reports

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) presentsAn Evaluation of the COPS Office Methamphetamine Initiative, a COPS-funded study conducted by the Institute for Law and Justice and 21stCentury Solutions that evaluates COPS’ first six methamphetaminegrants. The COPS office provided funding to agencies in six cities (Phoe-nix, AZ; Salt Lake City, UT; Dallas, TX; Oklahoma City, OK; LittleRock, AR; and Minneapolis, MN) to combat the production, distribution,and use of methamphetamines. These grants encouraged law enforcementagencies to respond to methamphetamine problems with advanced tech-nologies and creative problem-solving strategies. This evaluation focuseson the histories of the methamphetamine problems in these cities andincludes detailed process evaluations of each grant’s implementation. Thisreport provides insight into the ways in which these agencies responded totheir methamphetamineproblems and should beof great interest to thosedealing with similar drugproblems in their jurisdic-tions. This publication isonly available electroni-cally at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Open=True&Item=848.

Drugs

When Your Child Is Missing: A Family Survival Guideprovides parents with helpful insights into what familiesshould do when a child is missing. This Office of JuvenileJustice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) guide waswritten by parents and family members who have experi-enced the disappearance of a child. It contains their adviceabout what to expect when a child is missing, what needs tobe done, and where to go for help. It also explains the rolesthat various agencies and organizations play in the search fora missing child. This guide is available from the NationalCriminal Justice Reference Service at 800-851-3420 and canbe accessed electronically at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/missingsum.html#170022.

Victims

Bulletin Reports is an edited collection of criminal justice studies, reports, andproject findings. Send your material for consideration to: FBI Law EnforcementBulletin, Room 209, Madison Building, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA 22135. (NOTE:The material in this section is intended to be strictly an information source andshould not be considered an endorsement by the FBI for any product or service.)

November 2003 / 25

aw enforcement agen-cies go to great lengthsto ensure that they hire

with their positions of trust. Asingle lie can taint an officer’scredibility forever and renderthe officer virtually useless asa courtroom witness. An ex-ample is the recent release ofseveral convicted defendants in asweeping drug investigation inTulia, Texas. Texas Judge RonChapman concluded that theinvestigator involved in thecase had “falsified reports, mis-represented the nature and extentof his investigative work, andmisidentified various defendantsduring his investigation.”1 As aresult, all 38 convictions in the

case likely will be vacated. It ishard to imagine the officer in-volved ever testifying as a pros-ecution witness again after thisfinding.

The reason officers withcredibility problems lose theirviability as witnesses is based onthe constitutional principle thatevery criminal defendant in thiscountry is entitled to a fair trial.2

The notion of due process, orfundamental fairness, is a basicright guaranteed by the Fifth andFourteenth Amendments of theConstitution.3 This article exam-ines how the due process clause

Lindividuals of good characterand with backgrounds contain-ing no, or minimal, negative in-formation. In this regard, policeemployers are no different fromother employers: they hope tohire people who will present thefewest personnel issues withwhich to deal. However, law en-forcement employers have an-other important reason to screenpotential hires, and to ensure thattheir employees conduct them-selves in a manner consistent

The Discovery Processand Personnel File

InformationBy RICHARD G. SCHOTT, J.D.

Legal Digest

© Image Club Graphics


impacts the judicial discoveryprocess and adversely affectspolice officers with credibilityproblems.

The DiscoveryProcess in General

The goal of the Americancriminal justice system is to al-low the truth to prevail. One waythat courts endeavor to find thetruth is through pretrial discov-ery. During discovery, the pros-ecution and defense disclose toeach other certain evidence theyintend to use at trial. With suchdisclosure, the parties canprepare in advance to test thatevidence through cross-exami-nation or expert testimony, en-suring that the judge or jury hearsall sides of the case before theydecide guilt or innocence.Avoiding trial by surprise is asurer route to the truth.

Although “there is nogeneral constitutional right to

discovery in a criminal case,”4

criminal procedure rules dictatethe type of information that mustbe shared by the adversaries inany criminal proceeding. For ex-ample, Rule 16 of the FederalRules of Criminal Procedureoutlines what material the gov-ernment shall provide to the de-fense and, likewise, what mate-rial the defense shall provide tothe government.5 However, theFederal Rules of Criminal Proce-dure and the Federal Rules ofEvidence6 are silent regardinginformation relating to the cred-ibility of witnesses, includinglaw enforcement witnesses. Thisis where the notion of “funda-mental fairness,” or due pro-cess,7 comes into play.

From Napue to Brady

In 1959, the U.S. SupremeCourt decided the case of Napuev. Illinois.8 In the case, a witnessfalsely testified at trial that he

had received no consideration inreturn for his testimony. In fact,he had received considerationfrom the state, but the prosecutordid nothing at trial to correct thefalsehood. Napue was convictedof murder, but appealed his con-viction when he discovered thefalse testimony. Not surpris-ingly, the Supreme Court de-cided that the government’s usefalse evidence at trial of violatedthe due process clause of theFourteenth Amendment. It didnot matter to the Court that thefalsehood related only to thecredibility of the government’switness. The Court emphasizedthat the “truthfulness and reli-ability of a given witness maywell be determinative of guilt orinnocence, and it is upon suchsubtle factors as the possibleinterest of the witness in testify-ing falsely that a defendant’slife or liberty may depend.”9

This recognition of the impor-tance of witness credibility setthe stage for a series of SupremeCourt decisions regarding thegovernment’s obligations con-cerning witness credibility dur-ing discovery.

In 1963, the U.S. SupremeCourt decided that constitutionaldue process guarantees the ac-cused the right to discoverexculpatory evidence in thepossession of the government.Exculpatory evidence is any evi-dence that is favorable to theaccused and material to eitherguilt or punishment. In Brady v.

“

”Special Agent Schott is a legal instructor at the FBI Academy.

...constitutional dueprocess guarantees

the accused the rightto discover

exculpatory evidencein the possession of

the government.

November 2003 / 27

Maryland,10 John Brady wasconvicted of first-degree murderand sentenced to death. Bradytestified at his trial about his par-ticipation in the crime, but statedthat his companion was the ac-tual murderer. Before trial,Brady requested statements pro-vided to the government by thecompanion. The government de-livered some statements, butfailed to provide the statementin which the second individualadmitted actually killing thevictim.

Brady learned of the exist-ence of this statement after hewas convicted and sentenced todeath. The Supreme Court de-cided that Brady’s convictionshould stand, but that he was en-titled to present his accomplice’sstatement in an effort to avoidthe death sentence. The courtfound that “suppression [ofevidence] by the prosecu-tion...violates due process wherethe evidence is material either toguilt or to punishment....”11 Thewell-known obligation of thegovernment to provide the de-fense with exculpatory evidence,or “Brady material,” came fromthis landmark decision.

Extending Brady toImpeachment Material:Giglio and Henthorn

As noted previously, the Su-preme Court recognized in theNapue case that guilt or inno-cence of an accused may turn onthe credibility of witnesses at

their trial. Given the importanceof witness credibility, it was ashort step for the Supreme Courtto take to decide that due processrequires the government to dis-close to a defendant informationregarding witness credibilityprior to trial. The Court took thatshort step in Giglio v. UnitedStates.12

information regarding the earlierpromise should have been re-vealed to the defense.14

The Brady-Giglio require-ment that the government dis-close to the defense any informa-tion regarding the credibility ofwitnesses obviously extends topolice officers called by the gov-ernment to testify. What type ofinformation contained in person-nel files of law enforcement of-ficers is required to be releasedto the defense pursuant to Brady-Giglio and the due processrequirement of fundamentalfairness?

The Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals confronted this issue inUnited States v. Henthorn.15

Donald Gene Henthorn was con-victed of conspiring to importand possess cocaine with intentto distribute and for travel in in-terstate and foreign commerce inaid of racketeering enterprises.Prior to his trial, Henthorn’s at-torney asked the prosecution “toproduce the personnel files ofall law enforcement witnesseswhom it intends to call at thetrial...for evidence of perjuriousconduct or other like dishonesty,in camera, to determine if thoseportions of the officers’ person-nel files ought to be made avail-able to the defense counsel forimpeachment purposes.”16 Thegovernment objected, saying “ithad no obligation to examine thepersonnel files absent a showingby the defendant that they con-tained information material to

In Giglio, the assistant U.S.attorney (AUSA) who presentedthe case to the grand jury madea promise of leniency to a keywitness. The prosecuting AUSAwas unaware of the promise.The witness testified at trial thathe had not received anything(including the promise of le-niency) for his testimony. Afterbeing convicted, Giglio ap-pealed, arguing that the promiseto the witness should have beenrevealed to the jury for their con-sideration of his credibility.Based on its decision in Napue,13

the Supreme Court found that the

”

“Upon receipt of thisinformation, theprosecutor mustdecide whether

disclosure is required,or should be reviewedby the presiding judge.


his defense.”17 The district courtdenied Henthorn’s request be-cause he had not identified spe-cific wrongdoing on the part ofthe law enforcement witnesses.

The Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals reversed the districtcourt decision and remanded thecase. The appellate court foundthe government to be “incorrectin its assertion that it is thedefendant’s burden to make aninitial showing of materiality.The obligation to examine thefiles arises by virtue of themaking of a demand for theirproduction.”18

It should be noted that theinitial request for records doesnot obligate the government toturn over information containedin law enforcement witness per-sonnel files. Rather, the requestmerely obligates the governmentto review the files. The files, orinformation contained therein,“need not be furnished to thedefendant or the court unlessthey contain information thatis or may be material to thedefendant’s case.”19 Ironically,following remand to the districtcourt, it was determined that thefiles contained nothing bearingon Henthorn’s case. In fact, theycontained numerous commenda-tions, but nothing indicating dis-honesty or perjurious conduct.20

In light of Henthorn, manyprosecutors and law enforcementagencies implemented proce-dures to ensure compliance withthe notion of fundamental fair-ness required by due process. For

example, in 1996, the attorneygeneral issued a U.S. Depart-ment of Justice (DOJ) policy re-garding the disclosure of poten-tial impeachment material for allDOJ investigative agencies. Thepolicy obligated each investiga-tive agency employee to informprosecutors of potential im-peachment material as early aspossible prior to providing a

fulfilled.21 It is then incumbentupon the government attorney todetermine whether the informa-tion should be provided to thedefense or reviewed by the judgepresiding over the matter tomake that determination.

Because the parameters ofpotential impeachment informa-tion are not easily identifiable,the DOJ policy gives concreteguidance regarding the type ofinformation that investigativeagencies must provide to pros-ecutors. The following must bedisclosed:

• substantiated allegations—any finding of misconductdemonstrating bias or lackof candor or truthfulness;

• pending investigations orallegations—any credibleallegation of misconductthat reflects upon the truth-fulness or possible bias ofthe employee who is thesubject of a pendinginvestigation;

• criminal charges—any pastor pending criminal chargeagainst the employee; and

• allegations that are unsub-stantiated, not credible, orhave resulted in exonera-tion—when the allegations(unsubstantiated, not cred-ible, or which resulted inexoneration) can be saidto go to the truthfulness ofthe employee, even theymust be revealed to theprosecutor under certaincircumstances.

sworn statement or testimony inany criminal investigation orcase. Putting this obligation onthe investigative agency em-ployee relieves governmentprosecutors from searching forsuch material. It does not, how-ever, change the fact that locat-ing and producing materialevidence contained in a law en-forcement witness’ personnelfile is the obligation of the entiregovernment prosecution team.When the investigative agencyemployee notifies the prosecutorof potentially incriminatingmaterial, his duty has been

© Corbis

November 2003 / 29

Upon receipt of this informa-tion, the prosecutor must decidewhether disclosure is required orshould be reviewed by the pre-siding judge.

Limitationson Discovery

Naturally, judges or jurorswho consider the testimony ofwitnesses should be aware of is-sues affecting credibility. Thereare, however, limits on what de-fendants (and subsequent triers-of-fact) are entitled to learnabout law enforcement wit-nesses, notwithstanding the factthat the information relates to thewitnesses’ veracity.

Even when information ex-ists that clearly could be consid-ered Brady material, due processmay not require its disclosure.For example, in Pennsylvania v.Ritchie,22 the U.S. SupremeCourt stated that “[e]vidence ismaterial only if there is a reason-able probability that had theevidence been disclosed to thedefense, the result of the pro-ceeding would have been differ-ent. A ‘reasonable probability’ isa probability sufficient to under-mine confidence in the out-come.”23 Determining this mate-riality is vital because, as theCourt reiterated in Ritchie, “thegovernment has the obligation toturn over evidence in its posses-sion that is both favorable to theaccused and material to guilt orpunishment.”24 Of course, thedifficult question is determining

what information is reasonablyprobable to change the result of aproceeding. In fact, after the pre-ceding discussion in the Ritchiecase, the Supreme Court ruledthat Ritchie was entitled to a re-mand so that the file in questioncould be “reviewed by the trialcourt to determine whether itcontain[ed] information thatprobably would have changedthe outcome of his trial.”25 This

with the time element involved.The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-peals has examined when im-peachment material becomesstale. In Harrison v. Lockyer,27

Jewel Harrison was charged withattempted armed robbery, pos-session of a firearm by a felon,assault with a firearm, and dis-charging a firearm at an occupiedmotor vehicle. Harrison soughtdiscovery of police departmentrecords for impeachment infor-mation regarding his arrestingofficer, including records ofcomplaints involving events oc-curring more than 5 years beforethe incident at issue, and alldocuments in another officer’spersonnel file.28

Relying on California evi-dentiary statutes,29 the trial courtdenied discovery of records pre-dating the incident by more than5 years. Harrison appealed, con-tending that the 5-year cutoffviolated his due process rights toa fair trial. Based on a decision ofthe California Supreme Courtfrom an analogous case ques-tioning the constitutionality ofthe 5-year cutoff,30 the NinthCircuit Court of Appeals heldthat “despite the statutory cut-off, citizen complaints againstofficers are subject to disclosureif they are ‘exculpatory.’”31

The statutory 5-year cutoff,however, was not deemedunconstitutional.

While examining the statuteat issue in the state case,32

the California Supreme Court

difficulty in determining justwhat is “material to guilt or pun-ishment” has caused many inves-tigative agencies to err on theside of caution and at leastprovide potentially material in-formation to prosecutors so thatthey (and possibly the judge incamera) can make the final deci-sion as to dissemination.26

Another factor affectingwhether potential Brady materialconcerning a law enforcementwitness is discoverable has to do

”

“...locating andproducing material

evidence contained ina law enforcement

witness’ personnel fileis the obligation of the

entire governmentprosecution team.


addressed whether the prosecu-tion has an obligation to retainevidence (including impeach-ment material in an officer’s per-sonnel file) for an indefinite pe-riod of time. Citing the fact that“[m]any if not most law enforce-ment agencies have a policy ofroutinely destroying citizencomplaints after 5 years,”33 thecourt held that “[a] law enforce-ment agency’s destruction of acitizen’s complaint violates adefendant’s right to due processonly when the complaint’s ex-culpatory value to a particularcriminal case is readily apparentbefore its destruction.”34 In al-lowing the destruction of 5-year-old records except in the “readilyapparent” situation, the Califor-nia Supreme Court acknowl-edged that “after 5 years acitizen’s complaint of officermisconduct has lost considerablerelevance.”35 Law enforcementagencies should consider theseissues of timeliness and materi-ality when deciding what, ifany, information to purge fromemployee personnel files.

Ramificationsof Nondisclosure

The Supreme Court relied onthe constitutional provisionof due process in renderingits Brady decision. If the require-ment of disclosing informationmaterial to a defendant’s guiltor innocence, or his sentencing,is violated, the governmenthas violated that defendant’s

Brady when they turn exculpa-tory and impeachment evidenceover to the prosecutor.”37 Be-cause this type of informationhad not been provided to theprosecutor in the case, the threeindividuals were not entitled toqualified immunity. Rather, therelevant case law “clearly estab-lished that an accused’s due pro-cess rights are violated when thepolice conceal exculpatory orimpeachment evidence.”38 Whenofficers intentionally withholdBrady material from the pros-ecutors with whom they work,they are clearly subjecting them-selves to personal liability forviolating a defendant’s constitu-tional rights to due process.

Related Issues ConcerningRelease of PersonnelFile Information

A defense attorney in a re-cent drug conspiracy case madean interesting request for infor-mation. In Kallstrom v. City ofColumbus,39 a group of under-cover police officers involved ina federal investigation of a vio-lent gang in Columbus, Ohio,objected to the release of per-sonal information contained intheir departmental personnelfiles. Unfortunately, by the timeof their suit against the city ofColumbus, the information hadbeen released to the attorney.Consequently, the officerssought compensatory damagesand an injunction to preventfurther dissemination of their

constitutional right to a fair trial.The denial may result in a con-viction being overturned, a sen-tence being vacated, the prosecu-tion having to conduct a secondcostly and time-consuming trial,or the decision to pursue a differ-ent remedy against the aggrieveddefendant. The constitutionalviolation also may have severeconsequences for the law en-forcement officer who intention-ally withholds Brady material.

In McMillian v. Johnson,36

Walter McMillian sued the sher-iff, an investigator for the districtattorney, and an Alabama Bu-reau of Investigation agent for,among other allegations, with-holding exculpatory and im-peachment evidence during hismurder trial. In deciding whetherthe law enforcement officialswere entitled to qualified immu-nity from the lawsuit for a consti-tutional violation, the EleventhCircuit Court of Appeals recog-nized that “[i]nvestigators sat-isfy their obligations under

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November 2003 / 31

personal information. It shouldbe noted that the attorney whoreceived the information fromthe city did so pursuant to a re-quest under the Ohio PublicRecords Act,40 not as part of thediscovery process involved inthe criminal trial. Nevertheless,the officers claimed that the cityof Columbus violated their rightsto privacy as guaranteed by theFourteenth Amendment of theConstitution.

The Sixth Circuit Court ofAppeals, while refusing to pro-vide the officers with a “blanketprohibition against the future re-lease of information contained intheir personnel files,”41 did rulethat a party could avoid disclo-sure of highly personal informa-tion if releasing the requestedprivate information would place“an individual at substantial riskof serious bodily harm, possiblyeven death, from a perceivedlikely threat,”42 and the court de-termines that the individual’sprivacy interest outweighs thepublic’s need for disclosure.43

Clearly, the requirements ofBrady and due process do notrequire the release of highly per-sonal, nonmaterial informationrelating to police officers.

Conclusion

Law enforcement officerstake an oath to support theU.S. Constitution.44 If an officerfails to provide information fa-vorable to a criminal defen-dant—regarding either guiltor sentencing—that officer has

violated the defendant’s right todue process. Information reflect-ing upon the credibility of a gov-ernment witness is informationthat a defendant is entitled tohave his trier-of-fact (whetherjudge or jury) consider. This ruleapplies when the governmentwitness is a law enforcementofficer. Officers who intention-ally withhold information that

that the person is not a viablewitness would be both frustrat-ing and costly. It is equally im-portant to provide training tocurrent employees so that theyunderstand the potentially far-reaching ramifications of a baddecision that affects their cred-ibility. That single mistake injudgment will affect them fortheir entire law enforcementcareer.

Endnotes

1 Lee Hockstader, “For Tulia, ‘It FeelsSo Good’: Texas Inmates Freed After FourYears in Prison on Suspect Charges,” TheWashington Post, June 17, 2003, p. A1.

2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ensures that“In all criminal prosecutions, the accusedshall enjoy the right to a speedy and publictrial, by an impartial jury....”

3 U.S. CONST. amend. V, whichpertains to the federal government,prohibits the deprivation of life, liberty, orproperty without due process of law. U.S.CONST. amend. XIV provides, “...norshall any State deprive any person of life,liberty, or property, without due process oflaw.”

4 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545,559 (1977).

5 All states have rules dictating theirdiscovery process similar to those found inthe federal system.

6 Rule 402 of the Federal Rules ofEvidence provides that “[a]ll relevantevidence is admissible,” while “[e]videncewhich is not relevant is not admissible.

7 Supra note 3.8 360 U.S. 264 (1959).9 360 U.S. at 269.10 373 U.S. 83 (1963).11 Id. at 87 (emphasis added).12 405 U.S. 150 (1972).13 Supra note 8.14 405 U.S. at 155.15 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.

denied, 503 U.S. 972 (1992).16 Id. at 30.

”

A single lie cantaint that officer’s

credibility forever andrender the officer

virtually useless as acourtroom witness.

“affects their credibility deprivedefendants of their constitutionalright to due process. No matterhow destructive to the prosecu-tion, or personally embarrassingthe information may be, it mustbe disclosed at least to the gov-ernment prosecutor. Only thencan the prosecutor determinewhether the information shouldbe disseminated to the defense orreviewed by a judge in camerafor making that determination.

Clearly, law enforcementagencies are justified in going togreat lengths when they conductextensive background checks onprospective employees. Hiringsomeone only to discover later


17 Id.18 Id. at 31.19 Id.20 United States v. Henthorn, 985 F.2d

575 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished opinion).21 See, e.g., McMillian v. Johnson, 88

F.3d 1554 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,521 U.S. 1121 (1997).

22 480 U.S. 39 (1987).23 Id. at 57, citing United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion ofBlackmun, J.).

24 Id. at 57 (emphasis added).25 Id. at 58.26 See, e.g., the DOJ’s policy discussed

in this article regarding the sharing withgovernment prosecutors of potentialimpeachment information.

27 316 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003).

Law enforcement officers of other thanfederal jurisdiction who are interestedin this article should consult their legaladvisors. Some police proceduresruled permissible under federalconstitutional law are of questionablelegality under state law or are notpermitted at all.

28 Id. at 1065.29 Cal. Evid. Code Sects. 1043 and

1045.30 City of Los Angeles v. Superior

Court, 52 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2002).31 Supra note 27 at 1066.32 Supra note 30.33 Supra note 30 at 135 (citing People

v. Jackson, 920 P.2d 1254 fn. 10 (Cal.1996)).

34 Supra at 135-136 (citing California

v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984)).35 Supra at 135.36 Supra note 21.37 88 F.3d at 1567.38 Id. at 1569.39 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998), on

remand, 165 F. Supp. 2d 686 (S.D. Ohio2001).

40 Ohio Rev. Code Section 149.43. TheOhio General Assembly subsequentlyamended this law to limit access to peaceofficer records. The amendments tookeffect in December 1999.

41 136 F.3d at 1067.42 Id. at 1064.43 Id. at 1064-1065.44 U.S. CONST. art. VI.

Crime Data

n the year 2002, 147 law enforcement officers across the nation were killed in the line ofduty, well below the decade-long average of 165 deaths annually and a major drop from

Law Enforcement Fatalities, 2002

I2001, when 230 officers were killed (including 72 officers in the September 11 attacks).

According to preliminary figures released by the National Law Enforcement OfficersMemorial Fund (NLEOMF) and the Concerns of Police Survivors (COPS), the states thatsuffered the most fatalities were Texas (15), South Carolina (9), California (8), North Caro-lina (7), Maryland (6), New York (6), Arizona (5), Florida (5), Illinois (5), and Missouri (5).The figures also include 10 federal law enforcement fatalities.

Of the 147 officers killed during 2002, 55 were shot to death, 44 died in automobileaccidents, 14 were struck by automobiles while on duty outside their vehicles, 8 succumbedto job-related illnesses, 7 died in motorcycle accidents, 7 were killed in aircraft accidents, 3drowned, 2 were struck by a train, 2 were beaten to death, 2 were stabbed to death, 1 waskilled in a bomb-related incident, 1 was killed by a falling object, and 1 was killed in anaccident involving a horse. Fourteen of the officers were women, which tied the record hightotal set in 1998 for female officer deaths.

Additional information is available through the NLEOMF Web site at http://www.nleomf.com/media.

The Bulletin Notes

Law enforcement officers are challenged daily in the performance of their duties; they face eachchallenge freely and unselfishly while answering the call to duty. In certain instances, their actionswarrant special attention from their respective departments. The Bulletin also wants to recognizethose situations that transcend the normal rigors of the law enforcement profession.

Sergeant Baker Deputy Nettles

Responding to a call ofalleged trespassers and a strongodor of propane gas in a vacanthouse, Sergeant Sam Baker andDeputies James Nettles andJaime Swetich of the White PineCounty, Nevada, Sheriff’s Officearrived at the house. The indi-vidual who reported the informa-tion advised that he had turnedoff the propane gas, but when

returning from calling the sheriff’s office, someone had turned the gas on again. After thedeputies shut off the gas, a cursory search of the house located two men huddled in the base-ment. The young men were not breathing but still had light pulses. The young men were takenoutside where their breathing returned to normal before other emergency personnel arrived. Itwas determined that the two young men were intent on committing suicide, but the quick anddecisive actions of Sergeant Baker and Deputies Nettles and Swetich saved their lives.

Deputy Swetich

Officer Tuckman

Early one morning, while refueling his vehicle, Officer Earl Tuckmanof the Kenilworth, Illinois, Police Department witnessed smoke billow-ing from a nearby home. Officer Tuckman rushed to the burning estab-lishment and was able to wake up the sleeping mother, father, and threechildren. Once making sure the family was safe from the fire, OfficerTuckman helped the family secure lodging for the evening and removepersonal effects from the home. Officer Tuckman’s courage and compas-sion helped save the lives of an entire family and helped them cope withtheir tragedy.

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