Sagrada Orden vs. Nacoco (KEITH)

Facts:

1. On Jan 4, 1942, during the Japanese occupation, Taiwan Tekkosho (Japanese corporation) acquired the plaintiffs property (land with warehouse in Pandacan, Manila) for Php140K2. On April 4, 1946, after the liberation, the US took control and custody of the aforementioned enemys land under Sect 12 of the Trading with the Enemy Act3. In the same year, the Copra Export Management Company occupied the property under custodianship agreement with the United States Alien Property Custodian4. In August 1946, when the Copra Export Management Co. vacated the property, the National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), the defendant, occupied it next5. Sagrada Orden (plaintiff) files claims on the property with the Court of First Instance of Manila and against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator6. Plaintiff petitions that the sale of the property to Taiwan Tekkosho should be declared null and void as it was executed under duress, that the interest of the Alien Property Custodian be cancelled, and that NACOCO be given until February 28, 1949 to recover its equipment form the property and vacate the premise7. The Republic of the Philippines is allowed to intervene8. CFI: the defendant (Philippine Alien Property Administrator) and the intervenor (RP) are released from any liability but the plaintiff may reserve the right to recover from NACOCO reasonable rentals for the use and occupation of the premises9. The sale of the property to the Taiwan Takkesho was declared void and the plaintiff was given the right to recover Php3,000/month as reasonable rental from August 1946 (date when NACOCO occupied property) to the date NACOCO vacates the premises10. the judgment is appealed to the SC

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant is liable to pay rent for occupying the property in question?

Held: No.

Ratio:

Obligations can only arise from four sources: law, contracts or quasi-contracts, crime, or negligence (Art 1089, Spanish Civil Code).

There were no laws or an express agreement between the defendant or the Alien Property Custodian with the plaintiff regarding payment of rent. The property was acquired by the Alien Property Administrator through law (Trading with the Enemy Act) on the seizure of alien property and not as a successor to the interests of the latter. There was no contract of rental b/w them and Taiwan Takkesho. NACOCO entered possession of the property from the Alien Property Custodian without any expectation of liability for its use. NACOCO did not commit any negligence or offense, and there was no contract, implied or otherwise, entered into, that can be used as basis for claiming rent on the property before the plaintiff obtained the judgment annulling the sale to Taiwan Takkesho. The plaintiff has no right to claim rent from NACOCO.

Navales v Rias (keith)

Facts:

Vicente Navales filed a complaint with the CFI of Cebu against Eulogia et.al, claiming the latter should be sentenced to pay him the sum of 1,200 pesos as damages, together with the costs and such other expenses as the court might consider just and equitable. The claim was due because of the order of pulling down and destruction of the house erected in Daan buangan, town of Naga, Island of Cebu.Breakdown for damages: P1,000 amount of construction and P200 - amount prejudicial to him because no reimbursement was made.Defendant denied such allegation. The judge rendered its decision declaring that the decision was illegal, and that the action of the deputy sheriff Bacayo was illegal, hence they are liable for the damage caused to the plaintiff worth P500

Issue:

Whether or not defendant is liable for damages?

Held:

No

Ratio:

Assuming that the order for execution of final judgment was issued in accordance with the law, and in view of the fact that it has not been alleged nor proven that the sheriff when complying with the same had committed trespass or exceeded his functions, it must be presumed according to section 334 (14) of the said Code of Procedure, that the official duty was regularly performed. Therefore, it is not possible to impute liability to the plaintiff who obtained the judgment and the execution thereof, when the same was not disputed nor alleged to be null or illegal, and much less to compel the payment of damages to the person who was defeated in the action and sentenced to be ejected from the land which he improperly occupied with his house.

No proof has been submitted that a contract had been entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants, or that the latter had committed illegal acts or omissions or incurred in any kind of fault or negligence, from any of which an obligation might have arisen on the part of the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff. For this reason, the claim for indemnity, on account of acts performed by the sheriff while enforcing a judgment, cannot under any consideration be sustained. (Art. 1089, Civil Code.)

The illegality of the judgment of the justice of the peace, that of the writ of execution thereunder, or of the acts performed by the sheriff for the enforcement of the judgment, has not been shown. Therefore, for the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the complaint for damages filed by Vicente Navales against Eulogia Rias and Maximo Requiroso is dismissed without special ruling as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, vs.THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant:

AUTHOR: NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS: (chronological order)The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground

They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power.After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises, nor how long they had been there when the boys found them. It appears, however, that some months before the accident, during the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as those found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the power plant near the place where the caps were found; and it also appears that at or about the time when these caps were found, similarly caps were in use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort William McKinley

Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen

We think also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried out of the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the company or some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public, including children at play, where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play

ISSUE(S): Is defendant liable for damages?

No. The proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries is his own actions.

RATIO: We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:(1) Damages to the plaintiff.(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in the cases of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction than in that wherein those cases originated. Children here are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whateverBut while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case."In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances the immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

004 Philippine National Construction Corp. vs. CA G.R. No. 159270 PONENTE: Callejo, J.AUTHOR: Pat*PASUDECO: Pampanga Sugar Development Company*TRB: Toll Regulatory Board*PNCC: Philippine National Construction Corporation

FACTS: 1. Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national bridges, so PASUDECO requested permission from the TRB for its trucks to pass through NLEX.2. The TRB furnished the PNCC (the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways) with a copy of the said request for it to comment thereon. Eventually, PNCC allowed.3. TRB and PASUDECO entered into a MOA, where the latter was allowed to enter and pass through the NLEX 4. At around 2:30 a.m., Alex Sendin, the PNCC security supervisor, and his co-employees Ducusin and Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going north of the NLEX. They saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle portion of the north and southbound lanes of the road.They placed lit cans with diesel oil in the north and southbound lanes, including lane dividers with reflectorized markings, to warn motorists of the obstruction. 5. They proceeded to the PASUDECO office, believing that the pile of sugarcane belonged to it since it was the only milling company in the area. 6. They requested for a payloader or grader to clear the area. However, Engineer Mallari, PASUDECOs equipment supervisor and transportation superintendent, told them that no equipment operator was available as it was still very early.Nonetheless, Mallari told them that he would send someone to clear the affected area.7. Sendin and company went back to Km. 72 and manned the traffic. At around 4:00 a.m., 5 PASUDECO men arrived, and started clearing the highway of the sugarcane. They stacked the sugarcane at the side of the road. The men left the area at around 5:40 a.m., leaving a few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As the bulk of the sugarcanes had been piled and transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a need to man the traffic. 8. As dawn was already approaching, Sendin and company removed the lighted cans and lane dividers.Sendin went to his office in Bulacan, and made the necessary report.9. 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, a certified mechanic and marketing manager of JETTY Marketing, Inc., was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla with plate number FAG 961 along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers per hour. He was with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend Ricardo Generalao; they were on their way to Baguio to attend their grandmothers first death anniversary. As the vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from the scattered sugarcane.10. Police Investigator Arcilla investigated the matter and saw black and white sugarcanes on the road, on both lanes, which appeared to be flattened11. Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a complaintfor damages against PASUDECO and PNCC They alleged:a) that through its negligence, PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX safe for motorists when it allowed PASUDECO trucks with uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass through it; b) that PASUDECO negligently spilled sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to put up emergency devices to sufficiently warn approaching motorists of the existence of such spillage; and c) that the combined gross negligence of PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Latagan and the damage to Arnaizs car.12. PNCC admitted that it was under contract to manage the NLEX, to keep it safe for motorists. It averred that the mishap was due to the "unreasonable speed" at which Arnaizs car was running, causing it to turn turtle when it passed over some pieces of flattened sugarcane. It claimed that the proximate cause of the mishap was PASUDECOs gross negligence in spilling the sugarcane, and its failure to clear and mop up the area completely. It also alleged that Arnaiz was guilty of contributory negligence in driving his car at such speed.13. The PNCC interposed a compulsory counterclaimagainst the plaintiffs and cross-claimagainst its co-defendant PASUDECO.14. PASUDECO alleged there were other sugarcane mills in the area, andit was only through the expressway that a vehicle could access these 3 sugar centrals; and PASUDECO was obligated to clear spillages whether the planters truck which caused the spillage was bound for PASUDECO, ARCAM or Central Azucarera.15. PNCC adduced evidence that only planters trucks with "PSD" markings were allowed to use the tollway;that all such trucks would surely enter the PASUDECO compound. Thus, the truck which spilled sugarcane in January 1993 in Km. 72 was on its way to the PASUDECO compound. 16. RTC: rendered decisionin favor of Latagan. It dismissing that of Arnaiz and Generalao for insufficiency of evidence and dismissed that as to defendant PNCC. 17. CA: affirmed the RTC decision with modification. a) Arnaiz was negligent in driving his car, but that such negligence was merely contributory to the cause of the mishap,i.e.,PASUDECOs failure to properly supervise its men in clearing the affected area.b) Its supervisor, Mallari, admitted that he was at his house while their men were clearing Km. 72. Thus, the appellate court held both PASUDECO and PNCC, jointly and severally, liable to Latagan. 18. Petitioners (PNCC) contentions:a) that PASUDECO should be held liable for the mishap, since it had assumed such responsibility based on the MOA b) that it had done its part in clearing the expressway of sugarcane piles, and that a few scattered sugarcanes flattened by the passing motorists were left. c) Any liability arising from any mishap related to the spilled sugarcanes should be borne by PASUDECO, in accordance with the MOA which provides that "accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activity related to this approval shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO."d) the proximate and immediate cause was respondent Arnaizs reckless imprudence or gross negligence

ISSUE(S): 1. WON PNCC failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. YES2. WON PNCC and PASUDECO are jointly and severally liable. YES3. WON resp. Arnaizs negligience in driving his car is only contributory. YESHELD:1. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The highway was still wet from the juice of the flattened sugarcanes.It should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists. PNCC is the grantee of a franchise, giving it the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities covering the expressways.2. a) PNCC cannot escape liability under the MOA between PASUDECO and TRB, since resp. Latagan was not a party thereto. PNCC declared the area free from obstruction since there were nopilesof sugarcane, but evidence shows there were still pieces of sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists. There must be an observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. There should have been sufficient warning devices considering that there were scattered sugarcane stalks still left along the tollway. b) PASUDECOs negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagans injuries.c) With PASUDECOs and the petitioners successive negligent acts, they are joint tortfeasors who are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code.3. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.Even the petitioner itself described Arnaizs negligence as contributory.

RATIO:1. The MOA refersto accidents or damages to the toll facilities. It does not cover damages to property or injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the MOA.

2. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. ...

3. InFar Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,the Court declared that the liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary: It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.

4. There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination with the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

5. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. It also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstance justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.

6. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreetpaterfamiliasof the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

7. The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

005 Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. CA 269 SCRA 695TOPIC: PONENTE: Hermosisima Jr, J.AUTHOR: LCVNOTE: Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care.In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family.

FACTS: 1. The case stemmed from a complaint filed by the private respondent Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC for brevity), represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana, to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC for brevity), now absorbed by the Philippine Commercial International Bank, the sum of P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with said bank but which were not credited to its account, and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank.2. RMC maintained two (2) separate current accounts, Current Account Nos. 53-01980-3 and 53-01748-7, with the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances 3. In the ordinary and usual course of banking operations, current account deposits are accepted by the bank on the basis of deposit slips prepared and signed by the depositor, or the latter's agent or representative, who indicates therein the current account number to which the deposit is to be credited, the name of the depositor or current account holder, the date of the deposit, and the amount of the deposit either in cash or checks. The deposit slip has an upper portion or stub, which is detached and given to the depositor or his agent; the lower portion is retained by the bank. In some instances, however, the deposit slips are prepared in duplicate by the depositor. The original of the deposit slip is retained by the bank, while the duplicate copy is returned or given to the depositor.4. From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out, however, that these deposits, on all occasions, were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with the same bank.. During this period, petitioner bank had, however, been regularly furnishing private respondent with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances. Unfortunately, it had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank.5. Irene Yabut's modus operandi is far from complicated. She would accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon, which is that of her husband's, and make it appear to be RMC's account number, i.e., C.A. No. 53-01980-3. With the daily remittance records also prepared by Ms. Yabut and submitted to private respondent RMC together with the validated duplicate slips with the latter's name and account number, she made her company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when, in truth and in fact, they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. This went on in a span of more than one (1) year without private respondent's knowledge.6. Rommels Marketing Corporatiop (RMC), represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana filed a case against PBCom to recover a sum of money representing various deposits it made with the latter. 7. Such amounts were not credited to its account and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the Gross and inexcusable negligence of the bank.8. Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash to his secretary, Yabut. He said that Yabut was to deposit such amount to PBCom. 9. However, what the secretary did was to deposit it in the account of his husband and only wrote RMCs account number in the duplicate copy of the deposit slips.10. This happened for a year without RMC knowing. When it found out about the scam, it filed a collection suit against PBCom.11. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money, but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a collection suit before the RTC Br. 160. The trial court found petitioner bank negligent and ruled as follows: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendant Philippine Bank of Commerce, now absorbed by defendant Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, and defendant Azucena Mabayad to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, and without prejudice to any criminal action which may be instituted if found warranted: 1. The sum of P304,979.72, representing plaintiff's lost deposit, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint;2. A sum equivalent to 14% thereof, as exemplary damages;3. A sum equivalent to 25% of the total amount due, as and for attorney's fees; and4. Costs.12. CA Affirmed decision with modification. The awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees specified therein are eliminated and instead, appellants are ordered to pay plaintiff, in addition to the principal sum of P304,979.74 representing plaintiff's lost deposit plus legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint, P25,000.00 attorney's fees and costs in the lower court as well as in this Court."

ISSUE: Whether or not the Proximate Cause of the loss is the negligence of respondent RMC and Romeo LipanaHELD: The Proximate Cause of the loss is the negligence of PBCom through its teller in validating the deposit slips notwithstanding that the duplicate copy is not completely accomplished.SC: Petition has no merit.

RATIO:Under the last clear chance doctrine, petitioner bank is the liable party. The doctrine states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of he one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or, when it is impossible to determine whose fault it should be attributed to, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Petitioner bank thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self- imposed validation procedure.

It appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself, thus:" Q: Now in the handling of current account deposits of bank clients, could you tell us the procedure you follow? A: The client or depositor or the authorized representative prepares a deposit slip by filling up the deposit slip with the name, the account number, the date, the cash breakdown, if it is deposited for cash, and the check number, the amount and then he signs the deposit slip. Q: Now what do you do upon presentment of the deposit slip by the depositor or the depositor's authorized representative? A: We see to it that the deposit slip [9] is properly accomplished and then we count the money and then we tally it with the deposit slip sir. Q: Now is the depositor's stub which you issued to your clients validated? A: Yes, sir. "[10] [Emphasis ours.]

Clearly, Ms. Mabayad failed to observe this very important procedure. The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information -- that of the name of the account holder -- should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook, line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record, she would simply fill up the blank space later on. A "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" would not have given credence to such explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation. Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent.

Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. This was exemplified in the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures.

While it is true that had private respondent checked the monthly statements of account sent by the petitioner bank to RMC, the latter would have discovered the loss early on, such cannot be used by the petitioners to escape liability. This omission on the part of the private respondent does not change the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of the petitioners' employee in validating the incomplete duplicate deposit slips presented by Ms. Irene Yabut, the loss would not have occurred. Considering, however, that the fraud was committed in a span of more than one (1) year covering various deposits, common human experience dictates that the same would not have been possible without any form of collusion between Ms. Yabut and bank teller Mabayad. Ms. Mabayad was negligent in the performance of her duties as bank teller nonetheless. Thus, the petitioners are entitled to claim reimbursement from her for whatever they shall be ordered to pay in this case.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The one who had a last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.

Elements of a Quasi-delict.There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a)damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The seventy-eight (78)-year old, yet still relevant, case of Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case which may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, reiterated in the case of Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Court of Appeals, defines proximate cause as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. x x x. In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance: (also referred to, at times as supervening negligence or as dis-covered peril), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure.

007 VICENTE VERGARA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and AMADEO AZARCON, respondents.[G.R. No. 77679 September 30, 1987]TOPIC: NegligencePONENTE: PADILLA, J.AUTHOR:

FACTS:1. This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 of the Civil Code) filed by private respondent against petitioner.2. A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979 in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-residence of the private respondent, causing damages thereto which were inventoried and assessed at P53,024.22.3. Petitioner argued that his driver Martin Belmonte operated said cargo truck in a very diligent and careful manner; that the steering wheel refused to respond to his effort and as a result of a blown-out tire and despite application of his brakes, the said cargo truck hit the store-residence of private respondent and that the said accident was an act of God for which he cannot be held liable.4. The trial court rendered decision in favor of private respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, the insurer of petitioners truck.5. The CA affirmed the decision in toto; hence, this instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict.

HELD: YES. It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar.

RATIO: These following requisites of quasi-delict have been satisfied: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. The fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the private respondent. According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of negligence on his part in the selection and supervision of his driver.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Requisites of quasi-delict: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.

008 HEIRS OF TAYAG SR. VS. ALCANTARA[G.R. NUMBER L-50959; DATE: July 23, 1980]TOPIC: NEGLIGENCEPONENTE: CONCEPCION JR., J.

AUTHOR: CARAG, J.R.NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. The petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr. filed a case for damages against the private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa - alleging among others that while Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway when he was bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his instantaneous death.2. Private Respondents filed to motion to suspend trial on the ground that the criminal case was still pending in said court, and that Section 3, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of the civil action until the criminal action is terminated. The respondent Judge, Fernando Alcantara, granted the motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing3. Respondent Judge, in the criminal case, acquitted Romeo Villa for the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Based on the acquittal in the criminal case, Private Respondents filed a motion to dismiss in the civil case for lack of cause of action; which Respondent Judge granted.4. Petitioner filed for certiorari directly to the Supreme Court

ISSUE(S): Whether or Not Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion HELD: YES, Petition is meritorious. Acquittal in the criminal case does not bar prosecution of a civil case if based on a quasi-delict

RATIO:1. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter2. The allegations of Petitioner are clearly based on a quasi-delict, as all its elements are present:(1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or ommission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties3. Section 3, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court refers only to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only, and not as a crime, is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused4. The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver is not a bar to the prosecution of the civil case

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver is not a bar to the prosecution of the civil case

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

009 Gregorio v. CA, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., and EMMA J. DATUING.R. No. 179446, 10 January 2011TOPIC: PONENTE: Nachura, J.

AUTHOR: Sarah NOTES: Emma Datuin, Lawyer of Sansio, falsely filed a crim case against Gregorio. Upon dismissal of the crim case, Gregorio filed a civ case against Emma and Sansio for damages.

FACTS:1. Emma J. Datuin, as Officer-in-Charge of the Accounts Receivables Department, and upon authority of Sansio Philippines, Inc. filed an Affidavit of Complaintfor violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against Zenaida R. Gregorio and one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of Alvi Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio.2. As the address stated in the complaint was incorrect, Gregorio was unable to controvert the charges against her.3. She was indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.4. The MeTC issued a warrant5for her arrest, and it was served upon her by the armed operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).4.1 Gregorio was brought to the PARAC-DILG Office where she was subjected to fingerprinting and mug shots and was detained. 4.2 She was released in the afternoon of the same upon posting a bond.5. Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation.5.1 She alleged that she could not have issued the bounced checks, since she did not even have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn. 5.2 She also alleged that her signature was patently and radically different from the signatures appearing on the bounced checks.6. Motion of Arraignment and Reinvestigation was granted.6.1 MeTC found that Gregorio was not one of the signatories of the bounced checks subject of prosecution.6.2 Case was dimissed. 7. Now, Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin. 7.1 Datuin while acting under authority of SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., she falsely accused Gregorio of estafa or violation of BP 22. 7.2 By and large, defendants fault or, at the very least, their reckless imprudence or negligence, in filing the three (3) criminal cases against the plaintiff unequivocally caused damage to the latter and because of defendants baseless and unjustified accusations, plaintiff was constrained to retain the services of a lawyer to represent her.8. Sansio filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint.9. RTC: ruled in favor of gregorio. Complaint was one for damages based on quasi-delict and not on malicious prosecution. 10. CA: dismissed the damage suit of Gregorio.

ISSUE(S):1. Whether the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution.HELD:1. Quasi-delict.

RATIO:1. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.2. On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.3. A scrutiny of Gregorios civil complaint reveals that the averments thereof, taken together, fulfill the elements of Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code. It appears that Gregorios rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Because she was not able to refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was never found at No. 76 Pearanda St., Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her city residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family. She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee Datuin.4. Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorios complaint is based on malicious prosecution. In an action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and established that Sansio and Datuin were impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating an action against Gregorio, knowing that the charges were false and groundless, intending to vex and humiliate her. As previously mentioned, Gregorio did not allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the fact that she prayed for moral damages did not change the nature of her action based on quasi-delict. She might have acted on the mistaken notion that she was entitled to moral damages, considering that she suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation on account of her indictment and her sudden arrest.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

010 Corinthian Gardens Association vs. TanjangcoG.R. No. 160795, June 27, 2008PONENTE: NATCHURA, J.AUTHOR: De Guzman, Bien

FACTS: 1. Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69, located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other hand, respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos lots.2. Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary. As Geodetic Engineer Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), operating under the business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying, conducted all the previous surveys for the subdivision's developer, Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before, during and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian. Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C.B. Paraz & Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as builder, their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot 69 by 87 square meters.3. No amicable settlement was reached between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages.4. Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios. a. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. b. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without verifying their accuracy and in making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also be held answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of such construction.5. On March 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. It, however, ruled that the Cuasos were builders in good faith, and gave the Tanjangcos the option to sell and the Cuasos the option to buy the encroaching portion of the land, at a price to be agreed upon by the parties within sixty (60) days from receipt of the said Decision. In the event that the Cuasos were unable and unwilling to purchase the said portion, the perimeter wall should be demolished at the latters expense. The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly negligent in not taking into account the correct boundaries of Cuasos lot when it constructed the house. It, thus, ordered C.B. Paraz to pay moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees to the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. The third-party complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De Dios, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of cause of action.6. CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. It held that the Cuasos acted in bad faith in land-grabbing the 87 square meter-portion of Lot 69 as of April 5, 1989. Correlatively, the CA allowed the Tanjangcos right to demand the demolition of the offending perimeter wall after reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for the preservation of the encroached area. On the third-party complaints, Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found negligent in performing their respective duties.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in ruling that Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found negligent in performing their respective duties?HELD: No, Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

RATIO:A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor's position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.

The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias in Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines liability according to that standard.

By this test, we find Corinthian negligent. Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through its representative, in the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections of on-going construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls, which in this case is the subject of dispute between the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. It is not just or equitable to relieve Corinthian of any liability when, by its very own rules, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that "no new construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the Association and the appropriate cash bond and pre-construction fees are paid." Moreover, Corinthian can impose sanctions for violating these rules.

Thus, the proposition that the inspection is merely a "table inspection" and, therefore, should exempt Corinthian from liability, is unacceptable. After all, if the supposed inspection is merely a "table inspection" and the approval granted to every member is a mere formality, then the purpose of the rules would be defeated. Compliance therewith would not be mandatory, and sanctions imposed for violations could be disregarded. Corinthian's imprimatur on the construction of the Cuasos' perimeter wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything was in order.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:In every tort case filed under this provision, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

011 NGO SIN SING and TICIA DY NGO,petitioners, vs.LI SENG GIAP & SONS, INC., and CONTECH CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 170596 November 28, 2008

TOPIC:

PONENTE: Nachura, J.

AUTHOR: RikkiNOTES:

FACTS: 1. Petitioner spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo owned a lot at 745 Caballero St., Binondo. In 1978, they decided to construct a 5-storey concrete building thereon, the NSS Building, and for this project, they contracted the services of Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation (Contech) as their General Contractor.2. Adjacent to their lot is a semi-concrete building known as the Li Seng Giap Building (LSG Building), owned by Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. (respondent). During the construction of the NSS Building, the respondent, through its general manager, John T. Lee, received complaints from their tenants about defects in the building. There were cracks appearing on the floors, the steel door was bent, and concrete slabs of the walls were falling apart.3. An inspection of the premises revealed that the excavation made by Contech on petitioners' land was close to the common boundary, exposing the foundation of the LSG Building (respondents building).4. As a gesture of goodwill to their neighbors, the petitioners assured the respondent that repairs would be undertaken by their contractor. In December 1979, Contech announced that it had completed repairs on the LSG Building. Notwithstanding this assurance, more defects in the LSG Building appeared, i.e., tilted floors, cracks in the columns and beams, distorted window frames. 5. The LSG Building was continuously sagging and the respondent felt that it was no longer safe to occupy the building.6. Respondents hired building consultants to assess the situation. The consultants concluded that the structural failure of the LSG Building resulted from the differential settlement caused by the excavation during the construction of the NSS Building (in short, it was due to petitioners fault). 7. Consultants advised the building be demolished. Respondents acquiesced and reconstructed the same. The respondents demanded that the petitioners rebuild the LSG Building or pay the cost of the same, which the petitioners refused.8. Thus, a complaint for sum of money was filed against Ngo Sin Sing, Ticia Dy Ngo and Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 83-19367, praying that the petitioners and Contech be ordered to, jointly and severally the expenses. 9. PETITIONERs arguments: (1) the respondent's building had been structurally unstable and deficient since incipiency, having been constructed in 1966 without the appropriate provision to vouchsafe its structural integrity including differential settlements during its economic life; and (2) the structural defects and failure were traceable not necessarily due to soil erosion but to a number of external forces constantly working upon the building including earthquakes and improper maintenance. Petitioners filed a cross-claim against Contech averring that pursuant to their construction contract, all claims of third parties should be answered by said corporation.10. TC ruled that the NSS (petitioners) owners were negligent. It found that the excavation made on petitioner's lot was near the common boundary, and that soil erosion would not have taken place if wood sheet piles were properly put in place along the common boundary. However, the trial court also stated that the respondent was likewise not without fault. The trial court noted that the LSG Building (respondent was originally a 2-storey building and the plaintiff added two more floors without providing the necessary foundation and reinforcement causing the building to sag. The trial court held that it was but fair for the respondent to assume its share of the faults and defects of its property in this case.11. The respondent disagreed with the trial court's finding that it was guilty of contributory negligence and that it must share in the cost of the reconstruction of the LSG Building. It claimed that the LSG Building never exhibited any sign of structural distress from the time it was completely constructed in 1968, despite the fact that Manila was rocked by several earthquakes, the most violent of which was in 1969. The defects were experienced only when excavation and construction of the NSS Building started.

ISSUE(S): Who should be ultimately liable in the damage done to respondents building?

HELD: COMTECH (the construction company of petitioner). WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED with the modification that Contech Construction Technology Development Corporation, alone, is ORDERED to pay respondent Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., the sum of P4,010,843.50.

RATIO: In 1966, the LSG building was burned. Thereafter, it was rebuilt with two floors added to the original 2-storey building. (so naging 4-storey building siya). The foundation of the LSG Building which was good to support only two floors remained the same and could not support the weight of the present 4-storey building. This only goes to show that the additional two floors put up on the LSG Building could have overburdened the foundation's load-bearing capacity and contributed to the sagging of the building. The possibility of settlement due to weak foundation cannot, therefore, be discounted. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. In this case, considering that respondent's negligence must have necessarily contributed to the sagging of the LSG Building, a reduction of the award is warranted. We, therefore, agree with the trial court that respondent should likewise share in the cost of the restructuring of its building. This is more in keeping with justice and equity. LIABILITY OF CONTECH - Contech committed to undertake the construction of the NSS Building, providing labor and equipment for the project. Work included excavation for foundation, formworks, steel works, etc. Construction would be completed after 365 days. It was also provided that the petitioners were "released and relieved of any and all liabilities and responsibilities for any injury to the workers and laborers employed in the work contracted for, as well as for third-party liabilities." As it turned out in the course of the construction of the NSS Building, Contech failed to observe the proper procedure prior to excavation. Clearly, defendant Contech failed to observe his procedure of providing lateral and subjacent support prior to excavation. Under the doctrine of "supervening negligence" which states that where both parties are negligent but the negligence of one is appreciably later in time than of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Negligence of Contech caused the damages sustained by the building, which did not discharge its duty of excavating eight (8) inches away from the boundary line from the lot of plaintiff with insufficient lateral and subjacent support. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions The tortious act was the excavation done without observing the proper safeguards. It may be stated as a general rule that joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The persons injured may sue all of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damages caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of the others. x x x Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. There is basis to re-examine the court's disposition in this case as to the liability of the petitioner in the light of the judgment rendered (1) holding the petitioner and Contech jointly and severally liable, and (2) giving the right to the petitioner to be reimbursed for whatever amount it shall pay the respondent.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:The requisites of quasi-delict are the following:(a) There must be an act or omission;(b) Such act or omission causes damage to another;(c) Such act or omission is caused by fault or negligence; and(d) There is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

Chan Jr vs Iglesia ni Cristo GR No. 160283KC

1. The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by the petitioner and bounded on the south by a chapel of the respondent.2. The gasoline station supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms.3. In view of this, the services of Dioscoro Ely Yoro (Yoro), was procured by petitioner, as the former was allegedly a construction contractor in the locality.4. Petitioner and Yoro executed a Memorandum of Agreement5. Diggings thereafter commenced. After some time, petitioner was informed by the members of the respondent that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter.6. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent.7. On 18 April 1995, a Complaint against petitioner and a certain Teofilo Oller, petitioners engineer, was filed by the respondent.8. Petitioner and Oller filed an Answer with Third-Party Complaint impleading Yoro as third-party defendant.9. Petitioner avers that no liability should attach to him by laying the blame solely on Yoro. He argues that the MOA executed between him and Yoro is the law between them and must be given weight by the courts.10. Petitioner relies heavily in Paragraph 4 of the MOA,4. Any damage within or outside the property of the FIRST PARTY incurred during the digging shall be borne by the SECOND PARTY.11. An Amended and Supplemental Complaint was later filed by the respondent already naming Yoro as a party-defendant.12. RTC: diggings were not intended for the construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to construct tunnels to find hidden treasure. The trial court adjudged the petitioner and Yoro solidarily liable to the respondent on a 35%-65% basis (the petitioner liable for the 35%), and absolving Oller from any liability.13. CA: It affirmed the trial court but with modifications.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PETITIONER AND YORO HAS THE EFFECT OF MAKING THE LATTERSOLELYRESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENT

HELD: No,This written contract, according to the respondent, clearly shows that the intention of the parties therein was to search for hidden treasure.

1. The aim of the petitioner and Yoro to intrude and surreptitiously hunt for hidden treasure in the respondents premises should make both parties liable2. All the requisites of article 2176 are present in this case3. The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to the respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation on respondents premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other.4. For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.5. As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.6. Petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any is found within or outside petitioners property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so declared as liable.

013 PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM V. JOHN BORDMANG.R. No. 159831, October 14, 2005TOPIC: PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J

AUTHOR: NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Pilipinas Shell is a corporation engaged in the business of refining and processing petroleum products. The invoicing of the products was made by Pilipinas Shell, but delivery was effected through Arabay, Inc., its sole distributor at the time material to the present case.2. From 1955 to 1975, Respondent John Bordman Ltd. of Iloilo, Inc. (John Bordman) purchased bunker oil in drums from Arabay. When Arabay ceased its operations in 1975, Pilipinas Shell took over and directly marketed its products to John Bordman.3. August 20, 1980: John Bordman filed against Pilipinas Shell a civil case for specific performance. The former demanded the latters short deliveries of fuel oil since 1955; as well as the payment of exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit. (for instance, Pilipinas Shell and Arabay had billed it at 210 liters per drum, while other oil companies operating in Bacolod had billed their customers at 200 liters per drum. When representatives from John Bordman and Arabay conducted a volumetric test to determine the quantity of fuel oil actually delivered, the drum used could only fill up to 190 liters, instead of 210 liters, or a short delivery rate of 9.5%)4. Pilipinas Shell and Arabays answer: denied that fuel oil deliveries had been less than those billed, the drums used in the volumetric tests were allegedly not representative of the ones used in the actual deliveries, John Bordman had no cause of action against them (If any existed, it had been waived or extinguished; or otherwise barred by prescription, laches, and estoppel.5. RTC in favor of Bordman because he had fully paid their contract price at 210 liters per drum, then the petitioner should deliver to the respondent the undelivered volume of fuel oil from 1955 to 1974, which is 20 liters per drum; and 10 liters per drum from 1974 to 1977.6. CA upheld RTCs ruling

ISSUE(S): Whether respondent Bordmans claims of alleged short deliveries for the period 1955 to 1976 were already barred by prescription?

HELD: No. Any action to enforce a breach of that Contract prescribes in ten years from the occurrence of breach.

RATIO:

1. Petitioner avers that respondents action -- a claim for damages as a result of over-billing -- has already prescribed. Respondents claim supposedly constitutes a quasi-delict, which prescribes in four years.2. It is elementary that a quasi-delict, as a source of an obligation, occurs only when there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. The action of respondent for specific performance was founded on short deliveries, which had arisen from its Contract of Sale with petitioner, and from which resulted the formers obligation in the present case. Any action to enforce a breach of that Contract prescribes in ten years.3. Actions based upon a written contract should be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. This accrual refers to the cause of action, which is defined as the act or the omission by which a party violates the right of another.4. A cause of action in a contract arises upon its breach or violation. Therefore, the period of prescription commences, not from the date of the execution of the contract, but from the occurrence of the breach.5. The cause of action in the present case arose on July 24, 1974, when respondent discovered the short deliveries with certainty. Prior to the discovery, the latter had no indication that it was not getting what it was paying for. There was yet no issue to speak of; thus, it could not have brought an action against petitioner. It was only after the discovery of the short deliveries that respondent got into a position to bring an action for specific performance. Evidently then, that action was brought within the prescriptive period when it was filed on August 20, 1980.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

014 PETER PAUL PATRICK LUCAS, FATIMA GLADYS LUCAS, ABBEYGAIL LUCAS AND GILLIAN LUCAS, Petitioners, vs.DR. PROSPERO MA. C. TUAO, Respondent.[G.R. No. 178763 April 21, 2009]TOPIC: PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

AUTHOR: KikoyNOTES: Sorry Mahaba, mahaba talaga yung case.

FACTS: Sometime in August 1988, petitioner Peter Paul Patrick Lucas (Peter) contracted "sore eyes" in his right eye. Peter consulted respondent, Dr. Prospero Ma. C. Tuano, M.D. (Dr. Tuano), an ophthalmologist at St. Luke's Medical Center, for an eye consult. Upon consultation with Dr. Tuano, Peter narrated that it had been nine (9) days since the problem with his right eye began; and that he was already taking Maxitrol to address the problem in his eye. On that particular consultation, Dr. Tuano diagnosed that Peter was suffering from conjunctivitis or "sore eyes". Dr. Tuano then prescribed Spersacet-C eye drops for Peter and told the latter to return for follow-up after one week. As instructed, Peter went back to Dr. Tuano on 9 September 1988. Upon examination, Dr. Tuano told Peter that the "sore eyes" in the latter's right eye had already cleared up and he could discontinue the Spersacet-C. However, the same eye developed Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis (EKC), a viral infection. To address the new problem with Peter's right eye, Dr. Tuano prescribed to the former a steroid-based eye drop called Maxitrol, a dosage of six (6) drops per day. To recall, Peter had already been using Maxitrol prior to his consult with Dr. Tuano. On 21 September 1988, Peter saw Dr. Tuano for a follow-up consultation. After examining both of Peter's eyes, Dr. Tuano instructed the former to taper down the dosage of Maxitrol, because the EKC in his right eye had already resolved. Dr. Tuano specifically cautioned Peter that, being a steroid, Maxitrol had to be withdrawn gradually; otherwise, the EKC might recur. Complaining of feeling as if there was something in his eyes, Peter returned to Dr. Tuano for another check-up on 6 October 1988. Dr. Tuano examined Peter's eyes and found that the right eye had once more developed EKC. So, Dr. Tuano instructed Peter to resume the use of Maxitrol at six (6) drops per day. On his way home, Peter was unable to get a hold of Maxitrol, as it was out of stock. Consequently, Peter was told by Dr. Tuano to take, instead, Blephamide, another steroid-based medication, but with a lower concentration, as substitute for the unavailable Maxitrol, to be used three (3) times a day for five (5) days; two (2) times a day for five (5) days; and then just once a day . Several days later, on 18 October 1988, Peter went to see Dr. Tuano at his clinic, alleging severe eye pain, feeling as if his eyes were about to "pop-out", a headache and blurred vision. Dr. Tuano examined Peter's eyes and discovered that the EKC was again present in his right eye. As a result, Dr. Tuano told Peter to resume the maximum dosage of Blephamide. To cut the long story short since madaming beses pa sila bumalik sa doctor, nagkaglaucoma si Peter due to the use of the steroid based eyedrops prescribed by Dr. Tuano. Note that Glaucoma is a side effect of the said eyedrops. Due to the inconvenience Peter went to see another doctor for a second opinion. Peter went to Dr. Mario V. Aquino, M.D. (Dr. Aquino), another ophthalmologist who specializes in the treatment of glaucoma and who could undertake the long term care of Peter's eyes. According to petitioners, after Dr. Aquino conducted an extensive evaluation of Peter's eyes, the said doctor informed Peter that his eyes were relatively normal, though the right one sometimes manifested maximum borderline tension. Dr. Aquino also confirmed Dr. Tuano's diagnosis of tubular vision in Peter's right eye. Petitioners claimed that Dr. Aquino essentially told Peter that the latter's condition would require lifetime medication and follow-ups. In May 1990 and June 1991, Peter underwent two (2) procedures of laser trabeculoplasty to attempt to control the high IOP of his right eye. Claiming to have steroid-induced glaucoma and blaming Dr. Tuano for the same, petitioner sued Dr. Tuano. RTC dismissed the case, CA likewise denied the appeal of petitioners.

ISSUE(S): Was Dr. Tuano negligent in prescribing the steroid based eyedrops?HELD: NO

RATIO:Petitioners' position, in sum, is that Peter's glaucoma is the direct result of Dr. Tuano's negligence in his improper administration of the drug Maxitrol; "thus, [the latter] should be liable for all the damages suffered and to be suffered by [petitioners]". Clearly, the present controversy is a classic illustration of a medical negligence case against a physician based on the latter's professional negligence. In this type of suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to prevail, is required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill, care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a proximate result of such failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages. For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence committed by members of the medical profession, such claim for damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which states that: ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi- delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-patient relationship between the doctor and the victim. But just like any other proceeding for damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation, 76 must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in order to find the physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages. There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this] constitutes the actionable malpractice. Proof of such breach must likewise rest upon the testimony of an expert witness that the treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the standard level of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. Even so, proof of breach of duty on the part of the attending physician is insufficient, for there must be a causal connection between said breach and the resulting injury sustained by the patient. Put in another way, in order that there may be a recovery for an injury, it must be shown that the "injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes"; that is, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. And the proximate cause of an in