PCTR071 PCTR 13 EOriginal: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

SECURITY IN THE HIGH NORTH: NATO’S ROLE

DRAFT REPORT*

Jadwiga ZAKRZEWSKA (Poland)Rapporteur

Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations

www.nato-pa.int 28 March 2013

* Until this document has been approved by the Political Committee, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION: THE ARCTIC REGION 1

II. THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE ARCTIC 1

III. SECURITY DYNAMICS IN THE ARCTIC – POLICIES OF ARCTIC PLAYERS 3A. CANADA.............................................................................................................4B. DENMARK..........................................................................................................4C. ICELAND.............................................................................................................4D. NORWAY............................................................................................................5E. RUSSIA...............................................................................................................5F. THE UNITED STATES........................................................................................6G. OTHER ARCTIC COUNCIL MEMBER STATES.................................................6H. OTHER PARTICIPANTS.....................................................................................6

1. Asian States................................................................................................62. The European Union (EU)..........................................................................7

IV. ARCTIC SECURITY ISSUES – THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 7A. THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA.........................................7B. THE ARCTIC COUNCIL......................................................................................8

V. NATO IN THE ARCTIC 8

VI. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS: A GREATER ROLE FOR NATO IN THE ARCTIC? 10

BIBLIOGRAPHY 11

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MAP OF POSSIBLE SHIPPING ROUTES IN THE ARCTIC

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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ARCTIC REGION

1. The Arctic, usually defined as the area north of the Arctic Circle (66°33´N), comprising parts of Canada, Greenland (which is part of the Kingdom of Denmark), Russia, the United States, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland, is going through a profound transformation. What was previously a remote, barren region is now experiencing increasing levels of human activity. Paradoxically, climate change which can be observed in the region is going to make the Arctic more accessible in terms of mineral resource exploitation as well as maritime trade is thus transforming its geopolitical status.

2. The Arctic was high on the security agenda during the Cold War, but its significance was greatly reduced after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the slow but continuous change in the region’s climate has put it back high on the political agenda of both regional states and the international community as a whole. The melting of the polar ice cap will open new opportunities for the extraction of raw materials and the opening of new shipping routes. The rising activity will change the region’s geostrategic dynamics and significance and in the long term it could possibly present a great deal of promising opportunities as well as challenges to the Arctic littoral states and NATO member states.

3. Thus, as the Arctic becomes more accessible and as its potential economic value is increasingly recognised, it could once again become an arena for strategic rivalry and possible militarisation. The report looks at the impact of the consequences of global warming on the Arctic, particularly at the aspects related to security and analyses if there is a need for a more active engagement of the Alliance in the region. The report notes that there is no “rush for the Arctic” and that all Arctic players emphasise their desire to co-operate closely to solve territorial disputes by diplomatic means. However, as the impact of climate change also touches upon the economic, environmental and security interests of NATO Allies and the military presence in the region is likely to increase NATO Allies should consider a greater involvement of the Alliance in the Arctic.

4. The NATO PA has paid attention to Arctic developments for several years. This policy paper follows earlier activities of the Assembly on this issue, particularly the Rose Roth seminars in Helsinki, Finland, in 2010 and in Tromsø, Norway, in 2011 as well as the 2010 report of the Defence and Security Committee [213 DSCTC 10 E] and the 2012 report of the Economics and Security Committee [148 ESCTER 12 E rev.1]. This report will be updated for the Assembly’s Annual session in Dubrovnik, Croatia, in October 2013.

II. THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE ARCTIC

5. Climate change has a visible impact on the Arctic, where temperatures have been increasing at about twice the global average rate over the last decades. This has resulted in a decline of the Arctic Ocean ice cover during the warm time of the year, which has surpassed previous scientific projections. Since the beginning of monitoring the Arctic Ocean ice extent in 1979, the annual minimum extent has shrunk by more than half, and even greater amounts of ice have been lost in the corresponding thinning of the ice cover, according to the US National Snow and Ice Data Centre (NSIDC). As reported by the NSIDC, Arctic Ocean ice melted to a record low in September 2012, when ice covered just 24% of the Arctic Ocean, in comparison to the data recorded three decades ago, which presented at least twice that amount. At one point in the summer of 2012, 97% of the surface of Greenland’s massive ice sheet was melting. Multi-year ice, the kind of ice that is virtually impassable for ships, now comprises less than 20% of the Arctic ice pack – compared to 90% in 1981. Scientists anticipate that Arctic waters could be ice-

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free during summer months by the end of the decade if temperatures continue to rise at the current rate.

6. Due to the fact that the Arctic region itself is a very fragile environment, the impact of climate change will be multipronged: it will make the Arctic’s abundant energy and mineral resources more accessible; it will open new maritime routes which promise to save substantial transit time and fuel costs; and it will change fishing patterns in the Arctic waters. Moreover, the increased international attention and activity could lead to the region becoming the subject of intensive negotiations. There is also the risk of confrontation if the Arctic littoral states cannot agree on how to manage the impact of climate change and their resulting - and partially conflicting - interests.

7. The Arctic region is considered to hold rich amounts of untapped energy and mineral resources. Estimates suggest that the Arctic zone may contain up to 25% of the world’s oil and gas reserves. In 2009, a United States Geological Survey report estimated that the Arctic may hold 90 billion barrels of oil (or some 13% of the world’s known reserves), approximately 1,700 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas (an equivalent of 30% of the world’s reserves), and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. The area is also rich in minerals, such as gold, zinc, iron, copper, diamonds, rubies and several rare earth elements. Most of the projected reserves appear to fall within littoral States’ undisputed Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). The impact of climate change on the Arctic, technological improvements in offshore extraction and rising energy costs could make extraction of these resources more attractive.

8. The fact that the Northwest Passage (the route north of Canada between the North Atlantic and the Pacific) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR - or North East Passage: the maritime route from the Atlantic to the Pacific along the northern coastline of Siberia from Novaya Zemlya to the Bering Strait) are becoming more accessible is likely to have a ground breaking impact on global shipping by opening new sea routes between Europe and Asia. For example, the NSR would reduce the travel time from Europe to Asia by almost 40%, while the North West Passage would reduce the travel distance between Rotterdam to Seattle by 25%. Experts estimate that the Arctic Ocean could be ice free for about a month per year as early as sometime between 2035 and 2040. In addition to saving considerable travel time and reducing shipping costs, the opening of Arctic shipping routes would reduce greenhouse gas emissions, ease pressure on congested transcontinental navigation and avoid the dangers posed by pirates, terrorists or political instability.  

9. Some of the world’s richest fishing stocks lie in the Arctic. They form a highly valued resource that may become increasingly available for exploitation as water temperatures change and Arctic ice cover recedes.  Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic, including in the Barents and Norwegian Seas north of Europe, the Central North Atlantic off Greenland and Iceland, and the Newfoundland and Labrador Seas, off north-eastern Canada.  The decline of summertime sea ice is expected to expand areas suitable for fishing and to allow a northward migration of species of fish not previously found in the region, potentially attracting both sanctioned and ‘rogue’ fishermen. The risk of over-fishing in the Arctic is real and according to a study by the University of British Columbia1 fisheries catches in the Arctic totalled 950,000 tonnes from 1950 to 2006, almost 75 times the amount reported to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) during this period.

10. Despite the optimistic predictions of available energy and mineral resources in the High North, there remains considerable uncertainty over the pace of climatic changes in the region. The Arctic has thus far been the subject of only little actual exploitation; oil and gas

1 “Arctic fisheries catches 75 times higher than previous reports: UBC research”, Media Release, The University of British Columbia, 4 February 2001, http://www.publicaffairs.ubc.ca/2011/02/04/arctic-fisheries-catches-75-times-higher-than-previous-reports-ubc-research/

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companies are still largely exploring the region in order to formulate precise exploitation strategies. For now, the technical challenges and costs of operating in such extreme conditions make extraction an uncertain enterprise. Therefore, the exploration of natural resources in the Arctic still remains complex, costly, and dangerous. Moreover, developing energy resources in the Arctic is fraught with considerable risks for the environment. Environmental disasters, such as the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, would be much more problematic if they appeared in the High North. A severe spill in the Arctic could have catastrophic consequences, both for the fragile environment and for the livelihood of the communities in the High North.

11. An important factor determining the pace of extraction is the price of commodities. Significant changes in global energy markets, primarily caused by the increasing availability of shale gas, may not necessarily make Arctic energy resource extraction a profitable investment in the short term. For example, the ambitious Shtokman gas production scheme in the Barents Sea has been postponed indefinitely as the anticipated profitability of resource exploitation has been drastically reduced by the North American shale gas "revolution" which has led to a significant fall in commodity prices. Therefore, the topic of exploitation of Arctic energy resources, as high on the national political agendas as it might be, may actually result in the will to establish extraction zones protected by international law.

12. Moreover, new shipping opportunities provided by the Northwest Passage and the NSR are unlikely to be commercially viable in the short term or even the medium term. Transportation in the region is not only determined by the extent of the ice; factors such as lack of adequate infrastructure, reliable navigational maps and capable vessels also play a role. Establishing commercial, cost-efficient logistics will be difficult and will be a long term development, partly because the open sailing season will be short and unlikely to reach half a year even by the end of the century, as Paal Hilde, Associate Professor, Head of Department, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies informed participants of the NATO PA’s 77th Rose-Roth Seminar in Tromsø, Norway. In addition, many of the shipping lanes currently used in the Arctic are a considerable distance from search and rescue (SAR) facilities. Conditions can become even more dangerous for shipping as ice breaks up and starts moving. Thus, the extension of the SAR network would be crucial in the context of reducing the potentially negative and dangerous impact of the expected increase of maritime movement in the region. 13. However, despite these uncertainties, it is clear that the effects of climate change in the Arctic will at some point unlock the region’s huge economic potential which will have significant geopolitical implications. Therefore, Arctic countries, as well as other international participants, are likely to seek to secure their potential long-term economic and security interests.

III. SECURITY DYNAMICS IN THE ARCTIC – POLICIES OF ARCTIC PLAYERS2

14. The increasing accessibility of the High North has led all the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States) to re-examine their policies towards the region. In this context, governments of the littoral states are advocating a more visible and capable presence in the Arctic. As a result, they are also expanding their military capabilities and presence in the Arctic region by, among others, procuring new naval assets and infrastructure, and increasing the frequency of patrols.

15. All Arctic states emphasise their desire to co-operate closely with each other. However, several of them have stated that they will defend their national interests in the region if necessary and there are still some unresolved territorial disputes among the Arctic littoral states:, Canada , Denmark (Greenland) and Russia claim that the Lomonosov ridge which runs from Greenland to

2 This section provides snapshots of the policies of the five Arctic littoral states as well as the EU and Asian countries, particularly China. It will be expanded for the autumn session.

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Russia is an extension of their country's continental shelf. The United States and Canada have a dispute over the Northwest Passage, which the former views as an international strait through which any ship has the right of free passage while the latter argues that it has sovereignty over it. Both countries also disagree on the setting of the boundaries in the Beaufort Sea. On the other hand, the United States and Russia also have conflicting claims over an area in the Bering Sea. Denmark and Canada have to resolve sovereignty issues over the Hans Island, a small unpopulated island of 1.3 km2 and where the control line should be drawn in the strait between Greenland and Ellesmere Island. There is also the question of the legal status of the NSR which the United States considers to be an international waterway while Russia regards it as one single shipping route under its complete jurisdiction. As economic interests in the exploitation of the region’s vast energy and mineral resources grows, these territorial disputes could take on greater significance than even before and need to be taken under utmost consideration.

A. CANADA

16. Canada’s Arctic region makes up a large part of its territory; its Arctic policy is shaped by its commitments to national sovereignty and global concerns regarding the future prosperity and sustainability of the High North. Ottawa’s Northern Strategy identifies four priorities for its Arctic policy: exercising sovereignty; promoting economic and social development; environmental protection; and improving and devolving Northern governance.

17. Canada, which has assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council3 in 2013, continues to upgrade its military capabilities in order to expand its ability to operate in the Arctic. For example, Canada plans several large investments in military bases and materiel in Nunavut, including 6-8 Arctic patrol ships, a docking and refuelling facility in Nanisivik, and a Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay. Canada is also replacing ageing aircraft with 17 new SAR aircraft over the next several years. Canada does not anticipate any military challenges in the Arctic and believes that the region is well managed through existing institutions, particularly the Arctic Council. Therefore, Canada supports strengthening co-operation between Arctic littoral states in the framework of the Arctic Council. Canada does not see the need for a more prominent role of the Alliance in the High North.

B. DENMARK

18. Denmark’s main objectives in the Arctic concern sustainability and social development. The government also strives to prevent conflicts and avoid the militarisation of the Arctic. At the same time, Copenhagen has announced that it wants to strengthen military capabilities in the Arctic. A defence plan for the period 2013–2017 was approved in November 2012. Reflecting its increased focus on the Arctic region, Denmark reorganised its Faroe Islands and Greenland commands into the joint military Arctic Command in October 2012 which includes a rapid reaction force. The Kingdom also seeks to strengthen the role of the Arctic Council, especially on social issues. Copenhagen would like to increase the Council’s impact on Arctic peoples and aims to have the body move from “decision-shaping” to “decision-making.” Overall, Denmark has shown an interest in Arctic affairs, but has, thus far, only initiated limited concrete action.

C. ICELAND

19. Currently not considered to be an Arctic coastal state, Iceland aims to be recognised as such. The High North is one of the key priority areas of Iceland’s foreign policy. Iceland favours the strengthening of the Arctic Council as a forum for regional co-operation on Arctic matters. Given the country’s geographic location, Iceland is likely to benefit economically from the increased human presence in the High North, by becoming a major hub for shipping and resource movement for example. Icelandic policy priorities for the region are environmentally sustainable

3 See section IV. B

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resource development, preparedness against environmental disasters in Arctic waters as well as improving SAR capabilities. Furthermore, Reykjavik would like to increase international consultation and co-operation on Arctic issues to secure increased knowledge on the status of the Arctic.

D. NORWAY

20. ‘The High North’ is one of the key priorities of Norway’s security policy, reflecting the country’s geographical position and vast oil and natural gas reserves located in the area. From a Norwegian perspective, it is crucial that NATO be used as provider of stability in the Arctic region. Furthermore, Norway has repeatedly stressed that specific challenges facing the Arctic should be dealt with through extensive multilateral co-operation and cross-border dialogue.

21. In 2010 Russia and Norway found a solution to their disagreement over the Barents Sea by signing the treaty on maritime delimitation and co-operation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. With this treaty Norway and Russia set an example for the Arctic and the world of how delimitation disputes can be resolved peacefully, in accordance with international law. The treaty is also unique in the sense that it contains provisions that ensure that the extensive and fruitful Norwegian-Russian fisheries co-operation is continued, as well as provisions concerning co-operation on the exploitation of any hydrocarbon deposits that might extend across the delimitation line.

E. RUSSIA

22. Russia is one of the most engaged Arctic players reflecting the region’s importance for the country’s economy. It is estimated that the Arctic holds 80% of Russia’s natural gas reserves, 90% of its nickel and cobalt reserves and 60% of its copper. Moreover, according to former Russian President Medvedev, approximately 20% of Russia’s GDP and 22% of its exports is generated above the Arctic Circle. The importance of Russia’s High North is likely to increase, as the Russian energy strategy until 2030 stresses that the resources located in the Arctic area and in the northern regions of Russia could compensate for its shrinking Western Siberian deposits. Russia’s Arctic strategy, published on the Russian Security Council’s website in late March 2009, highlights the Arctic’s relevance for Russia’s economy and identifies the transformation of the Arctic into Russia’s top strategic base for natural resources by 2020 as a main goal. Moreover, the development of the transport and communication infrastructure in the region, particularly connected to the NSR as a national transportation route and a central element in maritime connections between Europe and Asia, is a main priority for Russia. Although Russia does not consider that there is a direct threat to Russia’s Arctic interests, the General Staff in June 2009 described the “struggle for energy resources in the Arctic” as one the most important challenges.

23. The Arctic Northwest is an important home base for the Russian navy, in particular for its most powerful part, the Northern Fleet and the sea-based component of the Russian nuclear triad. The nuclear deterrent remains central to Russia’s military strategy because its conventional forces continue to suffer from years of underinvestment. Russia has been steadily expanding its military activities in the Arctic region. Since August 2007, Russia renewed training sorties of strategic bombers over the Arctic (across the Barents Sea into the Norwegian and North Seas) that had been suspended after the end of the Cold War.  Since the departure of the US military from Iceland in September 2006, there has been an increased incursion of Russian military planes into the airspace of Arctic neighbours, particularly into Iceland and Norway, sometimes without following the rules of international airspace such as prior notifications of flight plans. Russia has also developed its coastal defence infrastructure and enhanced its technological capabilities, (including satellites and radars).

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24. Although Russian officials have sometimes used assertive and even aggressive rhetoric about its legal claim to the Arctic, Moscow has generally emphasised the need for good relations with its Arctic neighbours and the importance of preserving the Arctic as a zone of peace and co-operation. Russia’s increased military activity may be a result of the normalisation of Russian military training after a long period of stagnation. Government officials have also underlined that the main purpose of the improvement of Russia’s military capabilities in the Arctic is to combat terrorism at sea, smuggling, illegal immigration, and unsustainable use of aquatic and biological resources. Russia devotes much attention to the development of SAR capabilities, surveillance and navigation systems. One must never forget though, that the growing military potential of one of the region’s participants is always high of great political interest to the others, making them observe this process and react accordingly.

25. Overall, Russia’s plans for the Arctic are very ambitious. However, as a result of the continuing financial crisis, coupled with relatively low energy prices, the implementation of Moscow’s declared intentions to improve Arctic infrastructures and expand its capabilities for energy extraction as well as its military capabilities in the region is likely to be slower than planned.

F. THE UNITED STATES

26. The United States has shown some interest in Arctic affairs, but has taken little concrete action. The United States Arctic Region Policy, published in January 2009, focuses primarily on security and calls for increased infrastructure and security assets in the region. Accordingly, security concerns, such as missile defence and early warning and regional deployments of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence and maritime security operations are Washington’s main concerns for the Arctic. The US Northern Command has gained responsibility for looking into capability needs in general for the US military. However, the US Arctic Region Policy also refers to boundary issues, scientific research, transportation, energy and environmental protection and the United States has put considerable effort into studying the effects of climate change in the Arctic, resulting in the US Navy Arctic Road Map. The United States emphasises the freedom of the seas, including transit through the Northwest Passage. The United States has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but the past four US administrations have supported the Convention and the United States abides by all of its provisions, with the exception of deep-sea mining provisions. The Obama Administration is campaigning to urge ratification of the treaty by the US Senate.

G. OTHER ARCTIC COUNCIL MEMBER STATES

27. Their Arctic Council membership makes Finland and Sweden important regional participants who take substantial part in the geopolitical transition of the whole region. Neither of them has a territorial dispute with any of the Arctic littoral states. The lack of direct resource-focused interest enables them to focus on the threat-prediction in terms of growing human activity in the Arctic and on establishing sufficient and effective crisis-management solutions. Their objectivity and reliable risk awareness are substantial in the context of preparing the region for different situations that its current geopolitical transformation might bring in the foreseeable future.

28. All Arctic states emphasise the need for close co-operation to tackle the challenges caused by the impact of climate change on the region. At the same time, the Arctic states have begun to rebuild and modernise their military capabilities in the High North in recent years in response to growing accessibly to the region owed largely to climate change. Overall, however, the build-up of Arctic military capabilities is limited and predominantly focused on the improvement of surveillance and crisis management capabilities of those states.

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H. OTHER PARTICIPANTS

1. Asian states

29. The effects of climate change as well as the potential for new shipping lanes and for resource exploitation have put the Arctic on the agenda of “Arctic stakeholders”, particularly in Asia. Amongst all Asian participants of Arctic geopolitical transformation, China is considered to be the most important and simultaneously the most dedicated to play a role in this process. Even if the Arctic region may not seem to be a priority for China’s foreign policy, Beijing might still be in the process of developing its regional strategy. However, the Chinese Government has a clear view of the multi-contextual changes which have arisen in the region. Over the past five years, China has taken steps to protect its interests in the High North which include, both securing access to Arctic shipping routes as well as strengthening China’s ability as a non-Arctic state to access Arctic mineral resources and fishing waters.

30. Similarly, other Asian states, such as India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are also aware of the growing importance of the Arctic region. Reflecting their interests, they have applied for permanent observer status in the Arctic Council in the hope that their views will be recognised. However, most of the countries have not formulated an Arctic policy and it remains to be seen how their interests evolve as the Arctic changes.

2. The European Union (EU)

31. The EU has also shown an interest in the Arctic and has applied for permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. In July 2012, the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a Joint Communication – the most recent Arctic policy document – to the European Parliament and the European Council on the development of a coherent and comprehensive European Union policy towards the Arctic region. Accordingly, the EU pursues an approach which supports research and knowledge to address environmental and climate challenges in the region, and emphasises the need for responsible action to exploit available resources in a sustainable manner. The EU also wants to increase its constructive engagement and dialogue with Arctic states.

IV. ARCTIC SECURITY ISSUES – THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS

A. THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS)

32. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which entered into force in 1994, and its two implementation agreements on deep-sea mining and fish stocks, are the cornerstone of the legal framework of the Arctic Ocean and of current international law of the sea in general. UNCLOS governs all aspects of ocean space, such as delimitation, environmental protection, marine scientific research, economic and commercial activities, transfer of technology and the settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters.

33. UNCLOS outlines countries’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) which give coastal states sovereign jurisdiction over the resources within an area of 200 nautical miles (nm) extending from their coastline. Under the terms of UNCLOS, coastal states can submit claims to extend their continental shelf by up to 350 nm. Following a state’s ratification of UNCLOS, a state has 10 years to submit any extension claim to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), which is tasked with reviewing such claims and recommending outer limits to each coastal state’s continental shelf.

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34. The use of international law in the context of Arctic territorial disputes has so far been the most predominant solution on the basis of which many states have decided to resolve their current regional conflicts. It is up to UNCLOS to help particular Arctic states preserve their national interests in terms of future resource exploitation and the use and control of regional maritime waterways. Nevertheless, despite the growing popularity of UN-based possible conflict resolution, not all parties are able to make political use of it. Of the five Arctic littoral states, the United States has not yet ratified UNCLOS, even though the US administration has been abiding by it. However, the growing role of international law in the regional geopolitical transformation may convince Washington to finally ratify UNCLOS.

B. THE ARCTIC COUNCIL

35. The Arctic Council, established in September 1996, is a high-level intergovernmental forum for co-operation, co-ordination, and interaction that includes Canada, Denmark (Greenland, Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States; moreover, six indigenous people’s organisations have the status of permanent participants. Six non-arctic countries have been admitted as observers to the Arctic Council: France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Sixteen countries and organisations are currently applying for permanent observer status and will be considered at the Council’s 2013 ministerial meeting. The eight member states of the Arctic Council control 80% of the known Arctic resources within their EEZs. While the Council has working groups it is not a governance body that supersedes national sovereignty. With few exceptions, it does not produce any binding declarations. The Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement of 2011 which co-ordinates international SAR coverage and response in the region is the first and thus far only binding agreement negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council.

36. In their 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, the five Arctic littoral states affirm their commitment to resolve any conflicting territorial claims under the existing framework of international law, including UNCLOS. In the declaration, the “Arctic 5” reject the need for “a new comprehensive legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean” and commit to take steps, both nationally and in co-operation among the five “and other interested parties” to ensure the protection of the Arctic marine environment, and specifically to strengthen measures for the safety of shipping and the reduction of vessel-based pollution. The Arctic Council has limited its focus on security challenges of a non-military nature and until now, does not include military security in its policy deliberations. Only once, in April 2012, have Chiefs of Defence and senior military officials from the member states of the Arctic Council discussed common safety and security issues pertaining to the North.

V. NATO IN THE ARCTIC

37. During the Cold War, the Arctic was a primary concern for NATO, related to a possible nuclear exchange across the Arctic and the naval balance of power in the North Atlantic. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the West’s transformation of its relations with Russia, NATO’s focus dramatically shifted away from the Arctic. Subsequently, apart from NATO’s air policing activities in Iceland, NATO has drastically reduced its military footprint by withdrawing in-theatre forces, closing bases and cutting down on exercises. The ‘Icelandic Air Policing and Surveillance’ (ISLAPS) where NATO countries periodically deploy a limited air defence capability to Iceland remain in Keflavik as a NATO activity.

38. Instead, NATO has assumed a low-key role by which it primarily monitors military activity in the Arctic and co-ordinates joint training exercises which help building confidence, enhance co-operation, and improve capabilities and interoperability. At the same time, NATO has tried to keep pace with the growing security complexity of the Arctic. For example, NATO and the government of Iceland organised a conference in January 2009 on security prospects in the

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High North to initiate a dialogue on the vast array of security challenges that will invariably arise in the Arctic. Large-scale military exercises have been conducted in northern Norway in partnership with other NATO member states.

39. The increased human activity in the Arctic, the potential opening of new international shipping routes across the Arctic, increased offshore activity, and mass tourism has led to a renewed focus of NATO member countries on the Arctic. In October 2009 NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Admiral James Stavridis described the High North as an area of growing strategic concern, and in the same year the then-NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Schaffer called for a greater role of the Alliance in the Arctic.

40. However, there is no consensus among Arctic NATO Member states over whether the Alliance should become more engaged in the High North. Canada strongly opposes any significant NATO involvement in the region while other NATO members are concerned with negative Russian reactions. Norway, on the other hand, has actively taken the lead in calling for the increased engagement of NATO in the High North by arguing for more emphasis on the Alliance’s core functions. The lack of consensus on a larger role for the Alliance in the Arctic also explains why NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, which acknowledges new security challenges such as cyber and energy security, does not refer to Arctic security, and neither did the 2012 Chicago NATO summit declaration.

41. The growing human presence and activity is likely to increase the risk of man-made disasters like oil spills and ship accidents and the consequent need for appropriate response and rescue capabilities. The harsh climatic conditions in the Arctic, the lack of infrastructure and long geographic distances require surveillance and reconnaissance by air and sea – and it is often military forces which fulfil these tasks, as well as conducting SAR operations. Moreover, about 50% of the territory surrounding the Arctic Sea is the territory of a NATO member state, and four out of five Arctic coastal states are NATO Members. The Arctic also plays an important role in the national security priorities of Canada, Norway, Denmark, and, albeit to a lesser extent, the United States. The Alliance already plays an inherent role in the High North as Article 5 of the Washington treaty assures the Arctic member states of the Alliance support in case of an attack. In addition, as new shipping opportunities gradually evolve, NATO Allies can ill afford to neglect the Arctic’s increasing strategic importance. Therefore, situational awareness above the Arctic Circle is of vital importance to the Allies and, as the Rapporteur wants to underline, also to NATO partner countries in the region.

42. Consequently, NATO and NATO member states need to put a higher priority on the evolving security landscape of the High North. As the Arctic Council is limited to deal with non-military security challenges, NATO could serve as a forum for dialogue on military issues as well as others, such as SAR operations, maritime disaster response and consequence management. As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen pointed out at the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, in 2009 the demand upon the military to be “first responder to natural disasters” is likely to grow as a result of the increasing impact of climate change. An enlarged role in the Arctic would therefore have NATO provide resources and expertise which it has acquired. NATO could provide capabilities in surveillance and monitoring, co-ordinate SAR preparations and run disaster relief exercises. For example, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC) has the necessary extensive experience to co-ordinate any relief effort, and support SAR operations.

43. In addition, NATO could serve as a forum for dialogue and information sharing to conduct contingency planning for disaster relief and air and sea rescue. An increased NATO engagement would be limited to building situational awareness and knowledge among Allies and partner countries particularly Russia, Sweden and Finland. What is more, a stronger NATO engagement in the High North could also provide an opportunity to improve NATO-Russia relations. Co-operation between the Alliance and Russia is fraught with a number of difficult issues,

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including first and foremost missile defence. NATO involvement in the Arctic presents an opportunity for co-operative action with Russia and for building non-military capabilities through joint training. In 1996, within the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, exercise Arctic-Sarex 96, organised by the Russian Ministry of Defence and sponsored by NATO's Civil Emergency Planning Directorate, was held to improve emergency preparedness and response.

44. The Rapporteur wants to emphasise that NATO’s contribution to the safety and security of the Arctic region would complement, and certainly not replace or duplicate existing regional co-operation.

VI. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS: A GREATER ROLE FOR NATO IN THE ARCTIC?

45. Climate change will have important security implications for the Arctic. Regardless of the pace of the changes the region’s geostrategic importance will inevitably grow. The Arctic littoral states will be the most directly affected, but the impact of climate change also touches upon the economic, environmental and security interests of NATO Allies as well as of the international community as a whole.

46. There is no ‘rush for the Arctic’ and longstanding territorial disputes are likely to be settled by diplomatic means. At present, the threat of armed conflict in the Arctic is very low and the main challenges in the region are related to human security and the environment. However, harsh climate conditions and the increasing need for security will lead to an increase in military involvement in the Arctic as it is often military capability that is required to provide SAR and natural disaster response. Search and Rescue, disaster response and marine safety are also areas in which Russia welcomes international co-operation. The Arctic Council, which will remain the main venue for policy co-ordination among its member states, focuses primarily on non-military co-operation. There is no, or very little, exchange on military security among the Arctic Five and the members of the Arctic Council. This is why, in the view of your Rapporteur, NATO Allies should consider a greater involvement of the Alliance in the Arctic. As outlined above, NATO’s role in the region would be limited and would complement already existing structures, not substitute them. A greater role for NATO would provide greater transparency over increasing military investments in the High North, thereby contributing to building confidence among Arctic stakeholders.

47. Taking into account previous conclusions, it is in NATO’s deepest interest that its involvement in the Arctic issues be dedicated to the realisation of three separate activities: undertaking joint and multilateral exercises focused on boosting the emergency situational awareness/SAR readiness; collecting and exchanging crucial information concerning data gathered by satellite, aerial or maritime surveillance techniques; establishing a regional crisis reaction centre that allows close co-operation among Allies and partners.

48. Thus far, NATO member states have not agreed on NATO’s role in the region. This may not pose a problem as long as the Arctic’s geostrategic role remains limited. At the very least, NATO Allies should put the Arctic on the political agenda of the North Atlantic Council. The Arctic should become an area of enhanced co-operation between the states of Northern Europe and North America and – in a wider context – between NATO and Russia (‘High North, low tension’ - as phrased by former Norwegian Minister of Defence Thorvald Stoltenberg). It should neither be a place of competition nor of potential military confrontation. This short report is meant to initiate a debate among the members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on NATO’s future role in the Arctic during the Assembly’s upcoming 2013 spring session. It will be updated for the autumn session of the Assembly. The update will elaborate on how NATO’s activities in the Arctic could positively influence the relationship between the Alliance and Russia as well as with the Nordic partners of the Alliance.

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