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    Transatlantic Nations and Global Security:Pivoting and Partnerships

    Franklin D. Kramer

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    Transatlantic Nations and GlobalSecurity: Pivoting and PartnershipsFranklin D. KramerBoard Director, Atlantic Council

    2011 The Atlantic Council o the United States. All rights reserved. No part o this publication may be reproduced ortransmitted in any orm or by any means without permission in writing rom the Atlantic Council, except in the case o briequotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to:

    Atlantic Council1101 15th Street NW, 11th FloorWashington, DC 20005

    ISBN: 978-1-61977-003-4

    March 2012

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    About the Author

    The Honorable Franklin Kramer is a national security and international a airs expert and holds multiple appointments,including as an Atlantic Council Distinguished Fellow, member o the Atlantic Council Board o Directors, and member o its

    Strategic Advisors Group. Mr. Kramer has been a senior political appointee in two administrations, including as assistantsecretary o de ense or international security a airs or President Clinton, and previously as principal deputy assistantsecretary o de ense or international security a airs.

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    AcknowledgementsThis report is a core e ort o the Atlantic Councils work to shape the transatlantic policy debate prior to the May 2012 NATOsummit in Chicago. Its conclusions were in ormed by a series o joint workshops conducted by the Councils InternationalSecurity Program, its Ra k Hariri Center or the Middle East, and the National De ense University.

    For many years, the Councils International Security Program had shaped and infuenced the debate on international securityby acilitating dialogue through critical analysis and policy-relevant programming concerning the greatest security challenges

    acing the United States and the transatlantic community. On the occasion o the Councils 50th anniversary, the InternationalSecurity Program will o cially be renamed the Brent Scowcro t Center on International Security and will expand the breadthand depth o programming and expertise to address the new array o security challenges and opportunities acing thetransatlantic community. The Scowcro t Center will build on the Atlantic Councils rich transatlantic heritage by developingstrategies or the United States and its European allies to strengthen and broaden their security relationships with key alliesand partners rom outside the Atlantic area to best address both traditional and non-traditional security challenges.

    For more in ormation, contact Director-designate o the Brent Scowcro t Center on International Security Barry Pavel( [email protected] ), or Deputy Director Je Light oot ( [email protected] ).

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    ForewordWhen NATO member states signed up to the idea o a NATOsummit to be held in Chicago in the spring o 2012, their goalwas to implement the decisions taken at the Lisbon NATOsummit in November 2010. But when these leaders agreed

    to the summit over a year and a hal ago, they could scarcelyhave imagined the shock waves that would soon bu et thetransatlantic community and overshadow their plans andvision or the summit.

    Since Lisbon, a series o revolts and political transitions havetrans ormed the political landscape o the Middle East andNorth A rica, even as tensions between the internationalcommunity and Iran have worsened. De ense austerity inEurope has reached such depths that outgoing Secretary oDe ense warned o a dim and dismal uture or the Alliancein his arewell remarks last summer. These challenges acing

    the transatlantic community were compounded in early 2012when the Obama administration announced a new de ensestrategy that prioritizes security in Asia and the MiddleEast, leaving some allies wondering how the transatlanticpartnership ts into uture US de ense objectives.

    These changesi le t unaddressed by the Atlantic alliancerisk producing a dangerous dri t between the United Statesand its partners within the transatlantic community. Thisreport seeks to avoid this outcome by outlining the missingagenda items or this Mays NATO summit. It o ers a serieso concrete policy initiatives that would ensure a strategicconvergence between NATO and the new United Statesde ense strategy. The report correctly emphasizes that themost undamental challenges o the twenty- rst centurynow lie beyond the transatlantic area in the Greater MiddleEast and in the cyber realm. I NATO is to remain relevant inaddressing these threats, the allies will need to develop amore sophisticated set o interoperable allied capabilities,even in the ace o signi cant budgetary pressures.

    I am especially grate ul to Atlantic Council DistinguishedFellow Franklin D. Kramer, whose vast experience andexpertise in transatlantic security policy have served as atremendous resource to the Atlantic Council on this project

    and many other e orts over the last decade.

    This publication is a fagship e ort o the Atlantic CouncilsInternational Security Programably led by Barry Pavelwhich will soon be o cially named the Brent Scowcro tCenter on International Security. We are thank ul or thee orts o Assistant Director Simona Kordosova in executingthe workshops that in ormed the substance o this report.

    This project aims to refect the emergent Scowcro t Centersambitions to work collaboratively with other Councilprograms and outside institutes. We are grate ul or thee orts o Dr. Michele Dunne, Director o the Atlantic CouncilsRa k Hariri Center or Middle East, and Jason Healey,Director o the Councils Cyber State Cra t Initiative, ortheir contributions to this project. The reports conclusionswere in ormed by a series o joint workshops conducted inconjunction with these three Council programs and centersand the Center or Transatlantic Security Studies at theNational De ense University.

    We hope that this report will make an important contributionto shaping the policy debate at the Chicago summit byo ering concrete initiatives that will ensure the enduringrelevance o the transatlantic partnership or aglobalized world.

    Frederick KempePresident & CEO

    Atlantic Council

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    Executive Summary

    The new United States de ense guidance hassubstantial implications or transatlantic nationsthat must be addressed at the NATO Summit in

    May. Speci cally, how does the longstanding transatlanticsecurity bargain apply in this globalized world? What arethe key security challenges at this strategic turning point?How should those challenges be met in a time o nancialconstraint? And what are the key actions the transatlanticnations should undertake?

    The report makes our recommendations. First, NATOshould create a Strategic Consultative Group to establish alonger term strategy or the Greater Middle East, includingthe areas rom Syria to Pakistan and North A rica. Second,NATO should work with the North A rican countries onissues o the role o the military in a democracy. Third, NATOshould ocus on cyber as a global issue and help organizethe establishment o a Cyber Security Board which cangenerate both military and critical in rastructure standards.Fourth, NATO should enhance its capabilities by expandingits special operations orces and undertaking an advancedresearch and development program.

    Undertaking these actions would bring NATO strategyinto congruence with the new United States de enseguidance and make clear that the undamental nature o thetransatlantic bargain includes critical global issues includingthe Greater Middle East and cyber, and the necessarycapabilities to deal with such issues.

    Strategic Congruence and the Greater Middle East. A critical element o the transatlantic bargain is or there to be

    undamental congruence between United States and NATOstrategy. The dynamic nature o the Greater Middle Eastand the new United States de ense strategy have raised keyquestions about whether this remains the case. To achievecongruence at the strategic level, a rst action would be to

    tie NATO and US strategies together at the NATO summitwith an appropriate political declaration. The Alliance shouldcreate a Strategic Consultative Group to ormulate a longerterm strategy utilizing all elements o national power or theGreater Middle East, and particularly two arenas where thealliance or its member nations are most heavily engagedthe theater involving A ghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central

    Asian countries; and the Iranian problem and the issues odeterrence, and proli eration in the Gul .

    North Africa and Military Reform. A second set oinitiatives that should be undertaken involves North A ricaand the role o the military in a democracy. An importantprerequisite or worthwhile help by the transatlanticnations will be meaning ul consultations with the countriestoward whom assistance is directed so that the e ort is apartnership approach and demand-driven. A multichannelactivity utilizing governmental and nongovernmental entitiesmight have a broader appeal than pure government-to-government dialogues.

    In the dynamic situation Tunisia aces, a national strategymay be emergent over timebut it will nonetheless beimportant to articulate and decide key issues includingthe mission o the military; its relationship to other securityorganizations such as police or border control; the size,budgeting, and personnel requirements or the military; howto organize the ministry o de ense within the government;how to deal with a civilian parliament; and how to createappropriate transparency or the population.

    For Libya, the rst, most important e ort by thetransatlantic nations should be to establish a diplomaticapproach through which the Libyans choose to engagein programmatic e orts o value. Assuming that there isagreement to consult on questions surrounding the military,an obvious and highly important issue acing Libya will be

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    the role o the militiasthe critical question will be how tobring the militias within the governance structure.

    The Egyptian military currently presents the most di cultcase or the transatlantic countries since broad acceptanceo the principle o civilian control appears to remain a

    undamental issue in Egypt. Given those uncertainties,it is probably premature or the transatlantic countriesto undertake new programs or Egypt. The immediatee ort should ocus on dialogue and one key aspect o theconversation should be with the civilian groups, the electedparliamentarians, the Muslim Brotherhood, and otherpower ul political elements within the country.

    Cyber as a Global Security Issue. NATO and thetransatlantic nations need to engage on critical globalsecurity matters and no issue is more important than cybersecurity. A key point is to recognize the need or resiliency

    understanding that attackers may breach computer andnetwork de enses but that operations must nonethelesssuccess ully continue.

    NATO networks themselves are only a small part o NATOscapabilities. National military networks also need resilience.I national militaries are a source o malware and other cyberissues, those networks would have to be cut o rom NATOoperationsand that would undercut NATOs greateststrength, its interoperability.

    A military ocus is not enough since it will be impossibleto assure security in the absence o electricity ortelecommunications. Accordingly, those criticalin rastructures must also have resilience capabilities.

    Establishing the ramework or such a coordinated cyberapproach is a critical step or the transatlantic nations. Forcyber there needs to be established a joint standards group

    with appropriate military and civilian authorities in Europe,the United States, and Canada. Such a stepthe creation oan international Cyber Security Boardwould be invaluablein achieving e ective cyber security.

    Creating Leveraging Military Capabilities. Force will

    continue to be a actor in the uture global world butdiminished resources call or highly leveraged capabilities.Two high value areas are special operations orces (SOF)and advanced research and development.

    SOF t well into an age o austerity because theirresources requirements are relatively less substantial.

    A NATO initiative to signi cantly expand nations SOFcapabilities would have important bene ts includingenhancing NATOs capacity to undertake e ectivepartnerships with non-NATO countries. It would be doablein the context o the resources the NATO nations are likely to

    devote to their militaries and would maintain throughout the Alliance a very important land-based sharp end o the stick.

    Advanced research and development supports the concepto leveraging capabilities especially since it can haveboth military and civilian applications. While there canbe no certainty that any military-oriented research anddevelopment program will have civilian application, thathas happened enoughsatellites, GPS, the Internetthat an expectation o bene ts which could also enhanceprivate sector competitiveness in the global economy isnot unreasonable.

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    Transatlantic Relations and GlobalSecurity: Pivoting and Partnerships

    The most undamental security challenges o thetwenty- rst century lie beyond both the geography

    o transatlantic nations and the classic unctions omilitaries. The upheavals in North A rica and the continuingchallenges o the greater Middle East and southwest andcentral Asia; the insecurity o the cyber realm on which mucho globalization depends; the arrival o an age o transatlanticde ense austerity when other actors may be lessconstrained; and the signi cant and growing importance othe Asia-Paci c all pose key issues or uture security e orts.

    The United States recent de ense strategy emphasizes astrategic turning point 1 and a broader range o challengesand opportunities. 2 President Obamas introduction

    re erences the Asia-Paci c and the Middle East and North A rica, and the Secretary o De ense states that the UnitedStates military will have global presence emphasizingthe Asia-Paci c and the Middle East while still ensuringour ability to maintain de ense commitments to Europe,and strengthening alliances and commitments across allregions. 3 In the strategy itsel , early on the guidance is thatwhile the US military will continue to contribute to securityglobally, we will o necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacifc region .4

    This article ocuses on the implications o the new United

    States strategy or the transatlantic nations and, speci cally,how does the longstanding transatlantic security bargain, asexempli ed by NATO, apply in this global world? What arethe key security challenges at this strategic turning point?

    How should those challenges be met in a time o nancialconstraint? And what are the key actions the transatlantic

    nations should undertake?

    The May 2012 NATO Summit will o er the transatlanticcountries a rst opportunity to respond and two keyelements will be pivotingexpanding the ocus onthe larger world beyond the European continentandpartneringenhancing the ability to work with multipleentities in partnership.

    The new United States strategy underscores both o thoseapproaches. But the United States cannot accomplish itssecurity ends on its own; engaging the transatlantic nations

    will be a key element i the strategy is to be e ective. A transatlantic e ort by countries with a close association bothby values and in institutions such as NATO, the G-8, andG-20 o ers an opportunity to develop new approaches andto act e ectively on global security.

    The discussion herein there ore seeks to look orwardso beyond the ongoing operations in A ghanistan, thepreviously taken key decisions such as missile de ense, andthe existing dialogue (or, perhaps, argument might be thebetter phrase) with Russia. The ocus instead is on newlyemergent issues where strategic approaches can at leastinitially be put in place at the NATO Summit (though therewill also be bilateral and multilateral e orts which take placeother than through the NATO ambit). Three key areas are:

    1 Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities or 21st Century De ense (January 2012)(President Obama introduction message).2 Id. (Secretary o De ense Panetta opening message).3 Id.4 Id. At p.2.

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    7 North A rica: The Military in a Democracy

    7 Global Challenge: Cyber and the Need orNew Approaches

    7 De ense Austerity and the Development o Capabilities

    North A rica o ers great promise and is tied by geographyand economics to Europe but the success o therevolutions there is ar rom certain and the role o thetransatlantic nations currently lacks strategic direction.The global commons has come to depend heavily oncyber or prosperity, security, and social relations yetcyber is under continuous attacka threat well-knownbut more commented on than responded to. The ongoing

    nancial crisis has meant that military capabilities must besigni cantly rethought.

    Precedent to all those questions, however, the discussionconsiders what should be the undamental nature o thetransatlantic bargain, including not only the challengeso North A rica, cyber, and de ense austerity but alsothe problems o instability in the Greater Middle East,Southwest, and South Asia. Those latter areas present amultitude o threatening circumstances but the engagemento the transatlantic nations is wildly inconsistentsometimesstrong, sometimes notand key capabilities or dealing withinstability are ar less e ective than desirable.

    Each o these arenas poses both risks and opportunitiesor the transatlantic nations. Understanding the risks and

    establishing means to take advantage o the opportunitieswill be crucial to an e ective security strategy.

    1. The Transatlantic Bargain and theGreater Middle East

    The transatlantic bargain between the North American andEuropean countries o NATO has always rested on threekey pillars: mutual interest, common approaches, and ane ective strategy. In each o NATOs rst two phasestheCold War and the subsequent period o enlargementthese

    were continuously achieved, albeit subject to some notablecontentious dialogues.

    In the post-9/11 era, however, meeting the criteria hasbeen ar more di cult. The United States and Europe havenot always seen eye to eye regarding strategic interests;commonality o approach has been undercut by di erentviews as to the e cacy o orce; and the strategies pursuedin places like A ghanistan or the Balkans, while perhaps the

    best available, have not resulted in what most people woulddeem highly desirable results.

    So there are questions on both sides o the Atlantic. Fromthe European perspective, does the United States as thetransatlantic leader have a strategic approach that will be

    e ective in the new global world/ and rom the United Statesperspective, does Europe have an interest and the capabilityto engage in and shape the new security environment?

    This question is raised most clearly in the context o the verydi cult security environment the NATO nations ace to theirsoutheast. The Pentagons new de ense strategy makesclear the importance o this part o the world or the UnitedStates. Functionally, when the de ense strategy ocuseson counter-terrorism, violent extremism and destabilizingthreats, including nuclear proli eration, its geographiccontext is clear: The primary loci o these threats are South

    Asia and the Middle East; US policy will emphasize Gulsecurity; and the United States will continue to place apremium on US and allied military presence in and supporto partner nations in and around this region.

    It could hardly be clearer where the United States will centerits e orts and a undamental issue or the transatlanticnations is whether this pivot will become an enduring part othe transatlantic security bargain.

    There are good reasons or the Alliance to orient its activitiesin this direction. One NATO countryTurkey aces animmediate, very complicated security environment on itsborders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Likewise, A ghanistan is anobvious continuing high priority or the Alliance. But thereality is that the entire region rom Syria to Pakistan is acauldron o instability, including energy and maritimesecurity in the Arabian Gul ; nuclear proli eration rom Iran;the Israeli-Palestinian problem; internal instability in Iraq;insurgency and civil war in Syria; and, as noted, A ghanistanplus Pakistan, presenting overlapping but di erentiatedchallenges. In terms o active threat, right here, right now,it is the issues o instability in the Greater Middle East thatpresent the most clear set o problems to Alliance countries.

    It would be air comment by at least some European nationsthat these issues have not been overlooked. There hasbeen serious engagement in A ghanistan, multiple nationsparticipated in the Libya operation, Iraq has bene tted romthe NATO training mission, the Alliance has agreed to missilede ense (and its members to economic sanctions) in light oIranian actions, and multiple countries par ticipate in navaltask orces in and around the Gul . But, while those points

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    are entirely valid, the real issue is the utureboth withrespect to intentions and capabilitiesand, on this score,there is a great deal o skepticism in the United States asto Europes staying power with respect to the region, andin Europe, as to whether the United States can propose astrategy that is more e ective and less costly in terms otime, resources, and lives toward accomplishing its endsthan has been the case in, or example, Iraq or A ghanistan.

    The NATO Summit o ers an opportunity to solidi y thetransatlantic bargain or this part o the world. In theory, thishas already been done. The NATO Strategic Concept agreedto at Lisbon provides a ramework on which a transatlantice ort in the Greater Middle East can be built. The conceptprovides that the Alliance is a ected by, and can a ect,political and security developments beyond its borders [and] will engage actively through partnership with relevantcountries. 5 It goes on to state that Instability or confictbeyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security,including by ostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities. 6

    The words o the Strategic Concept are entirely congruentwith, though not as explicit as, the United States de ensestrategy. But just as the earlier Cold War concept o fexibleresponse needed periodic enhancement, the words o thecurrent Strategic Conceptwhile only sixteen months oldare no longer enough. It will be important to establishthat NATO and United States de ense strategies are,in act, congruent.

    Three steps should be taken in that regard.

    The rst action would be to tie the two together at the NATOSummit with an appropriate political declaration. In e ect,Europe should de nitize the language o the StrategicConcept which is geography ree and be explicit about theneed or continued involvement in the region. A Summitdeclaration should be undertaken to this e ect.

    Second, since words alone are not enough, as a mechanismto give substantive strategic content to the declaration,the Alliance should support the ormation o a StrategicConsultative Group or the region. The value o a StrategicConsultative Group will depend in great part on three

    actors. First, it will need to look at the whole regionand be willing to do so periodically with a regional lensrather than dealing with each di erent problem as a sorto encapsulated issue. There is overlap among issuesconcerning, or example, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Strait oHormuz. Second, it will need to analyze and recommenda ull spectrum o approachespolitical, diplomatic,economic, intelligence, in ormation, and military. The Iranianproblem, or example, deserves a multi actor approach evenbeyond the current economic sanctions and no options othe table. Third, it will need to include partners who havecapabilities and understandings beyond those within theNATO amily. Most obviously, the European Union shouldbe engaged on the political and economic ront, the GulCooperation Council on virtually all issues, and the ArabLeague may be a potential partner as in Libya, and perhaps

    or the uture, in Syria.

    A Strategic Consultative Group will not displace bilateralactivities nor would it be the only multilateral venue. What itwould do, however, is ocus the Alliance on a key theater inwhich its interests are at risk. It would make NATO strategymore congruent with United States strategy. And it wouldbe an a rmation o the transatlantic bargain in the contexto the most immediate challenges or both Europe and theUnited States.

    Third, the Strategic Consultative Group can be tasked bythe Summit to propose a longer term strategy utilizing allelements o national power or the two arenas where the

    Alliance or its member nations are most heavily engagedthe theater involving A ghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central

    Asian countries; and the Iranian problem and the issueso deterrence and potential containment in the Gul .

    Additionally, it should consider the issues raised by Syria.

    On the rst, it is true enough that the 2010 Lisbon Summitset orth an overall strategy o transition or A ghanistanbut recent developments have made the implementation othat strategy quite uncertain. Moreover, that strategy is verymuch just an A ghanistan strategy, not a regional oneandit is a regional approach that would be highly valuable. 7 On

    Iran, this is an area in which European nations have longcontributed, not only with respect to nuclear negotiations

    5 Strategic Concept or the De ense and Secur ity o the Members o the Nor th Atlantic Treaty Organization (2010), at para. 4(c).6 Id. at para. 11.7 To be sure, the Summit will have to deal with certain ver y important A ghanistan-speci c issues. Most particularly, there needs to be settled the issues o the timing

    o withdrawal o NATO orces, raised rst by the French president but now a key question or many; the question o whether the NATO orces can work e ectivelywith the A ghan orces, raised by the spate o k illings o NATO personnel by A ghans in uni orm as well as by the riots caused by the burn ing o copies o the Koran;and the issue o the nancial support or the A ghan security orces raised both by the very limited capability o the A ghan government to generate tax revenues tosupport the orces and by the high degree o corruption in A ghanistan.

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    but in the maritime arena alsoonly recently, French andBritish ships moved through the Strait o Hormuz alongwith an American carrier. Nonetheless, the Iranian issuedeserves much urther considerationand the Gul nationsmust be included in those considerations. Finally, Syria isan immediate issue or one NATO memberTurkeyand itraises important issues o stability or the Alliance as a whole.

    As a nal point, it might be noted that a StrategicConsultative Group would not have to operate at 28. Thereis great value o ten in smaller e orts and a working group othe Secretary General and ministers o oreign a airs o somekey countries could be a device to undertake signi cant highlevel consultations. E ective working level e or ts likewisecould be led by, or example, the Deputy Secretary Generalor the Assistant Secretary General or Political A airs andsome national counterparts. The point here is that, i theStrategic Consultative Group is to be e ective, the ull table,every country speaks at every meeting approach needs tobe avoided as the general methodology in avor a nimbler,more adaptive e ort. This is particularly important, in order toe ectively engage in consultations with countries and entitiesoutside the Alliance.

    A decision by the Alliance to create a Strategic ConsultativeGroup will go part way to creating an e ective securitypivot or the transatlantic nations. Three urther actions willmake that pivot highly signi cant. Those are: ocusing onNorth A rica, enhancing cyber security, and developing keyde ense capabilities.

    2. North AfricaThe Military ina Democracy

    In 2002, the authors o the Arab Human Development Report,all themselves citizens o the Middle Eastern countries,decried the ailure o that part o the world to progress,stating the Arab region is hobbled by a di erent kind opovertypoverty o capabilities and poverty o opportunities.These have their roots in three de cits: reedom, womensempowerment, and knowledge. Growth alone will neither

    bridge these gaps nor set the region on the road tosustainable development. 8 Subsequent reports

    have continued these themes and added the concept ohuman security. 9

    Today, however, the dramatic revolutions in Tunisia, Libya,and Egypt and the un nished business in Syria and otherparts o the region o er the prospect or the reedom,

    knowledge, womens empowerment, and human securityalong with the growth, prosperity, and democracy that the

    Arab Human Development Report authors have sought. Butrevolutions can go wrong as well as right. It is very much inthe interest o the transatlantic nations or these revolutionsto succeed and building security will be one key elemento success.

    To those ends, multiple steps can be taken. A set o initiativesregarding the role o the military in a democracy could bea valuable contribution to the success o the North A ricancountries. 10 Both the institutions and the culture o their

    militaries need to be developed. There is no single requiredormula, though a critical element is the primacy o civilian

    control within the duly constituted government.

    An important prerequisite or worthwhile help will bemeaning ul consultations with the countries toward whomassistance is directed. As King Abdullah o Jordan has said,I think everybody is wary o dealing with the West. 11

    Any transatlantic e ort will work only i it is a partnershipapproach and demand-driven, seen as valuable to thecountry in question. O course, there are multiple ongoingcontacts already but expanding and coordinating them so

    there might be a generally common set o approaches couldbe highly valuableand that is an e ort that could be set inplace at the May NATO Summit.

    The importance o appropriate consultations cannot beoverstated and an important issue will be whether a relativelysmaller contact group should be utilized or whether there isvalue in NATO taking the lead. It should be recognized thatprior NATO initiatives such as the Mediterranean Dialogueand the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative have not been greatsuccesses. A more tailored set o e orts is in order, andNATO as a ull institution might do best to do no more

    than to help in coordination and potentially to provideresources i requestedwith meetings at 28 nations plusgenerally to be avoided.

    8 Arab Human Development Report (2002), at pp. 1-2.9 Arab Human Development Repor ts 2003 (knowledge society), 2004 ( reedom), 2005 (womens empowerment), and 2009 (human secur ity).10 This could be part o larger initiative regarding democracy, market capitalism, and security sector re orm which would then include US civilian agencies and also

    European civilian agencies, perhaps led on European side by the European Union.11 Washington Post, October 24, 2011.

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    One approach that should be considered is how to engageall elements o society, not just the ormal security brancheso governmentthough those are, o course, critical players.

    An e ort utilizing governmental and nongovernmentalentities, including appropriate think tanks, might have abroader appeal than pure government-to-governmentdialogues. Ultimately, there likely should be multiplechannelsand governmental e orts will be indispensablebut processes that will engage broader societycivil societyplus a ull range o government including parliamentariansshould be a key aspect o the overall approach.

    Whichever consultative mechanism is utilizedand this isdiscussed urther below in the context o each countrythe importance o Turkeys position should be recognized.Turkey has moved rom a military-dominated state to acivilian government and while there are issues as a result othis transition, Turkey is not only prosperous but has to datemaintained a generally secular approach to governing in aMuslim society. 12 Turkey is, o course, already active in theMiddle East in general and with the North A rica countries inparticular and should have insights and judgments that willbe valuable to its transatlantic partners. 13

    One key added value that the transatlantic countries canbring on the security side is to help the North A rican statesdevelop the appropriate role o a military in a democracy. Ingoing orward with such an e ort, it would seem to air tosay that the military establishments o Tunisia, Libya, andEgypt each have signi cantly di erent issues and the internalpolitics o each will be an important actor. One size will not

    t all but some preliminary thoughts can be o ered:

    Tunisia : The Tunisian militarys unwillingness to continueto support the old regime was a key actor in the successo the revolution in that country. The undamental needthere is how to organize the military within the context othe emerging democratic institutions. This is, o course,up to the Tunisians but the experience o the transatlanticnations in assisting the transition o the Central and EasternEuropean countries may have worthwhile relevance.

    An important starting point or any country is to understandand de ne its national security strategy. From thoseconclusions, a de ense strategyand the role o themilitarycan ollow. National strategy can be enshrinedin a document but this is not a necessity, particularly at

    a nascent stage. Much more important is an e ectiveconsensus between and among the government, keygroups, and the populace as a whole as to the broad intento the strategy. In a necessarily dynamic situation as Tunisia

    aces, a national strategy may be emergent over time ratherthan delivered whole clothbut it will nonetheless beimportant to articulate and decide key issues. The de ensestrategy also likely will emerge over time but there are crucialquestions that will have to be wrestled with , including themission o the military; its relationship to other securityorganizations such as police or border control (includingwhether, or example, a quasi-military element such as theItalian carabinieri should be created); the size, budgeting,and personnel requirements or the military; how to organizethe ministry o de ense within the government; how to dealwith a civilian parliament; and how to create appropriatetransparency or the population.

    The transatlantic nations can provide assistancethrough a variety o mechanisms, both multilateral andbilateral. Those include strategic dialogues, advisory andorganizational consultations, education and training e orts,

    joint operations, resource provision, and potentially overtime ormal mechanisms such as treaties or partnershipagreements. To underscore what was noted above, suchinteractions need to be with a broad range o societyandneed not all be governmental led.

    In the development o the role o the militaries or thecountries o Central and Eastern Europe, the transatlantic

    e ort included both bilateral and multilateral actions,including signi cant e orts through NATO. It is important tonote, however, that not all actions ran through NATO. TheUnited States, the United Kingdom, and France, amongothers, all undertook signi cant bilateral e ortsandthis was particularly true with respect to the provision oresources, whether in unding or in the provision o in-kind assistance (such as training and advisory e orts).NATO did, o course play a key role, and especially NATOsPartnership or Peace activities were ocused toward thisendand NATO was used to provide a clearinghouse to helpcoordinate e orts by nations.

    The North A rican arena in 2012 is di erent rom that oCentral and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, and care should betaken not simply to mimic what worked once and to assumethat it will work equally well in an entirely di erent context. To

    12 This is not to overlook signi cant issues o ree speech and due process that have arisen in the context o , among others, Turkish journalists and the military accusedo crimes.

    13 The current US Administration has developed close contacts with the Turkish government with mutually bene cia l results; the suggestion here is to make Turkishinsights and judgments more broadly available and to recognize the leadership that Turkey can provide.

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    be sure, in generic terms, bilateral and multilateral assistancewill be available at some levels. Various NATO and nationalinstitutions such as the NATO De ense College and the USMarshall Center, Near East South Asia Center or StrategicStudies, and the A rica Center or Strategic Studies canplay worthwhile roles. But, as underscored above, it will becritically important to consult with the Tunisians on what theywould like to accomplish and how they would like to do it.

    What the NATO Summit can do is to endorse the roleo NATO and the NATO countries in undertaking suchactionsand endorse and authorize the development oprograms in consultation with the Tunisians. What shouldbe avoided is automatically giving the lead position to theall-too- requently very cumbersome NATO bureaucraticapproach. The reality is that not all NATO nations will want to

    ocus on North A rican issues and any such e ort o ten willmuch better be undertaken by a smaller group o interestedcountriesand potentially nongovernmental groupsreadyto provide consequential assistance. Utilizing such a smallgroup or groups and in ull consultations with the Tunisians,an agenda could be established, and then appropriate taskscould be undertaken on some combination o a national orNATO basis.

    Libya : The o cial Libyan military, o course, resistedthe revolution, and it was the militia groups that weresuccess ul with the assistance o NATO and its partners.The governance situation in Libya is ar less settled than itis in Tunisia and the role o the militias is likewise unsettled.Public order remains an issue, there are border issuesparticularly in the south, and the uture shape and role o themilitary is ar rom concluded.

    It is not at all clear that NATO or the transatlantic nationswill be welcome, at least in the near term, in the Libyanenvironment notwithstanding the role NATO and a number oits member countries played in ending the Qadda regime.

    And it is equally unclear, given the uncertain governancesituation, just what role outsiders could e ectively play.

    The rst, most important e ort by the transatlantic nations

    should be to establish a diplomatic approach which willauthorize over time programmatic e orts o value to Libya.Some such e orts are ongoing and they will be criticalto dealing with the speci c issues noted below. As notedabove, there may be important actions that can be takenby both governmental and nongovernmental actors.But allowance o an appropriate amount o time to letinternal issues be resolved may be an important elemento diplomacy.

    Assuming that there is agreement to consult on questionssurrounding the military, an obvious and highly importantissue acing Libya will be the role o the militias. The NATOnations have experience in dealing with such matters in asdiverse places as Kosovo, Iraq, A ghanistan and several

    A rican countriesbut not all those experiences havebeen positive. Dealing with armed groups in an uncertaingovernance situation is highly complicated. It is airly easyto state as a general principle that the central governmentought to have a monopoly o violence within a countrybutin practice that calls or an e ective central government toexist and or it to have airly broad allegiance romthe population.

    In the current circumstances in Libya, the ocus o thetransatlantic nations ought to be on assisting governancebut it does appear that establishing governance willrequire creating some order in connection with the militias.Depending on how the Libyans themselves establishtheir governance mechanisms, there can be a variety oapproaches to the militiasbut there are a number ocautions in this regard. Most importantly, the militias arenot insurgentsat least not at this time. They are, in act,the winning army (or parts thereo ). Moreover, there arepotentially signi cant divisions within the country and themilitias to some extent refect those divisions. None o this isto suggest that the ongoing public disorder is in the slightestbit appropriatebut it is to say that resolving the problem ismuch more political than it is technical.

    A potential use ul way to approach the militias would be tobring them within the governance structure but preciselyhow to do this will be a key question. In Kosovo, the KosovoLiberation Army was transitioned to a Kosovo ProtectionCorps. In other situations, militias have become part osecurity sector activities, sometimes with their links to local,rather than central, government. But key questions willremain. One previous analysis noted:

    Where militias . . . play a role in generating a secureenvironment, several key issues must be addressed, all owhich go ultimately to the issues o control and the longer-

    term existence o these types o orces. At the broadestlevel, it will be important to establish the relationshipbetween non-state security actors . . . and the host nation[central] government, including host nation security orces.That set o relationships likely will be created in signi cantpart by several prior considerations. First, what bene ts dothe orces potentially bring, and, can they be demobilizedwithout signi cant downsides? Second, i they are to

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    continue to exist, how will their roles inter ace with actorsin the ormal host nation security sector or external security

    orces? Who will advise the non-state security actors, whatmandates and authorities will those advisors exercise, andwho will direct those advisors? Third, who will pay the non-state security actors, and what will be their compensation? 14

    I the governance issues are to be resolved, Libya will haveto ace much the same type o issues as does Tunisia.Establishing the appropriate role o the military will likewisemean creating an agreed understanding o its missions andthen working out a structure to accomplish those missions.But even more so than in Tunisia, Libyas strategic analysismay need to be an emergent e ort over time. For example, avariety o orce structure models would be possible, ranging

    rom a land-dominated standing orce to a reserve-basedorceany o which could incorporate the militias in a variety

    o waysbut it will likely be the political environment whichwill determine what will be best or the country, at least inthe near and probably medium term. Political issues alsowill actor heavily into matters such as the amount o thebudget to be devoted to the military, questions o educationand training, as well as the relationship o the military to theparliament and to the population. All these issues need to bedecided not only at the technical level but, most importantlyat the broad governanceor one could say, politicallevel.

    In that connection, the Libyan governance structures willhave to determine which, i any, o the activities mentionedwould use ully be undertaken with the assistance ooutsiders. In the past, the United States has undertaken

    ull-fedged strategic analyses o military requirements witha number o countries, and done so in a partnership modelwhere the country was ully engaged. Training and educatione orts have been accomplished by multiple nations, and,o course, by NATO. But whether and how those e ortswill t the Libyan environment needs to be evaluated. Onceagain, a small consultative group (or groups) working withappropriate Libya leaders would be a use ul way to organizethe right kind o e ort.

    The Egyptian military currently presents the most di cult

    case or the transatlantic countries. As o this writing, theactual course o the revolution has not been resolved asonly the parliamentary elections have been concluded, andthe writing o a constitution and presidential elections areyet to come. Unlike Tunisia and Libya where there seems tobe a broad acceptance o the principle o civilian control,

    that appears to remain a undamental issue in Egypt.Given those very substantial uncertainties, it is probablypremature or the transatlantic countries to undertake newprograms or Egypt. Moreover, even existing programs arevery much in question, especially given the charges broughtagainst several democratically- ocused non-governmentalorganizations and their employees, including a numbero Americans.

    The United States has had ongoing and very signi cantcontacts with all elements within Egypt. The issue o theNGOs currently tops the immediate agenda and there is highuncertainty as to how that will be resolved and whether thelong-standing American aid program will continue and, i so,in what orm. Given this turmoil, until there is some resolutionthe most worthwhile e orts will probably be maintaining acontinued dialogue.

    In that connection, it is worth underscoring the point thatone key aspect o the conversation should be with thecivilian groups who have important roles in Egypt. Thatwould include the elected parliamentarians, the MuslimBrotherhood, and other political elements within the country.The channels to the military are well-known but discussionwith the non-military side needs emphasis. As an example,it might be valuable or the transatlantic countries to o erto the new parliament opportunities to discuss key issueso civilian control including how to think about determiningthe missions o the military, its size, and the budgetary andacquisition processes. As discussed above, those e orts

    can be in governmental and non-governmental channels. And while it is premature to determine what those missionsmight be, it is worth noting that, given Egypts economicconcerns, a military partially directed to Corps o Engineerin rastructure projects as well as other economic projectsmight have high value. The Egyptian military is alreadyheavily involved in business activities and while that normallywould be quite undesirable, it may be that such involvementcould be creatively used to help the economy move orward.

    3. Cyber Security and the Need forNew Approaches

    Cyber as a critical acilitator o the global world is wellrecognized and the concomitant importance o a sa eand secure cyber system is equally understood. But thecontinued and highly success ul attacks on cyber systems

    14 Kramer, Dempsey, Gregoire, Megahan, and Merrill, Succeeding in Ir regular Confict: E ective Civil Operations, in Civil Power in Irregular Confict (2010),at pp. 20-21.

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    in recent years have undercut any sense o real security.Just to state a ew: the US Department o De ense haspublicly acknowledged intrusion into secure systems; themost knowledgeable in ormation technology companieslike Google have been success ully at tacked; and key cybersecurity rms like RSA have similarly been penetrated.Critical in rastructure, such as the electric grid, has hadits vulnerability demonstrated by the STUXNET virus, andWIKILEAKS has shown the power o the so-calledinsider threat.

    In response to the very critical nature o the problem, NATOleaders to their credit have identi ed cyber as a key issue,most notably in the 2010 Lisbon Summit declaration and in2011 the Alliance adopted a revised cyber security conceptand associated action plan. 15 But rather than develop aresponse that meets the magnitude o the issues, theNATO e ort thus ar has been bureaucratic and essentiallyine ective. It has these limitations or three reasons: itsprincipal ocus is on the NATO networks, which areonly a small portion o the networks on which the national

    orces that comprise NATOs military arm rely; it undertakesto develop only minimal requirements or the nationalsystems that constitute almost the entirety o the NATOmilitary capability; and it o ers to assist only i requestednations with respect to key critical in rastructure systems,such as the electric grid and telecommunications, thatare as critical to military readiness as weapons systemsand personnel.

    This is a problem that can be xed but it will take leadershipand new methods o action. It will require changes intechnical approaches to hardware and so tware as well aschanges in organization, processes and personnel. It willrequire overcoming the technologists inclination to say theproblem lies in the governance and organization o the cyberrealm and the governance authorities tendency to look ora technological silver bullet. Both are required, and both areentirely doable. Speci cally:

    On the technical side, NATO needs to establish standardsor resiliencythat is, the understanding that attackers may

    breach computer and network de enses but that operationsmust nonetheless success ully continue. There is no doubtthat breaches must be anticipatedthe vulnerabilities

    discussed above underscore the point. Resiliencemeans that the networks can operate well enough despitesuch breaches.

    From a technical perspective, there are existing techniquesthat can be deployed to accomplish resilience. These

    include methods, among others, o integrity assurance,redundancy, non-persistence, sa e languages, andencryption. 16 Requiring NATO networks to utilize machinesand so tware with such capabilities is an imperative and anecessary prerequisite to cyber resilience.

    But, as noted above, NATO networks themselves are only asmall part o NATOs capabilities. National military networks(including hardware and so tware in host machines andservers) also need to meet the much more signi cantstandards that are required or resilience. I the nationalnetworks do not meet such standards, they will be a

    source o cyber attack and can be utilized to de eatNATO capabilities.

    I national militaries cannot meet such standards and are asource o malware and other cyber issues, those networkswould have to be cut o rom NATO operationsand thatwould undercut NATOs greatest strength, its interoperability.In the recent Libyan operation, aircra t rom Belgium,Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, the UnitedKingdom, and the United States few together but i one ormore o those countrys networks had been in ected, thosenations could not have been included in NATOs combined

    air operations unless resilience capabilities were present.

    To achieve adequate resiliency will require going beyond thehardware and so tware o the host machines and servers.It will require that the networks themselves contribute toresiliency. Network operators have great understanding owhat fows over their networks and the capacity to a ectthose fows. Accordingly, the Internet service providersthatis, the telecommunications companiesneed to be part othe resiliency solution.

    Moreover, since it will be impossible to assure security in theabsence o electricity or telecommunications, those criticalin rastructures must also have resilience capabilities. Thetelecommunications companies are, o course, the Internet

    15 See De ending the Networks: The NATO Policy on Cyber De ense, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pd /pd _2011_09/20111004_110914-policy-cyberde ence.pd

    16 In Building Secure, Resilient Architectures or Cyber Mission Assurance (2010), Harriet Goldman lists the ollowing capabilities valuable or creating re silience:diversity, redundancy, integrity, isolation/segmentation/containment, detection/monitoring, least privilege, non-persistence, distributedness and moving targetde ense, adaptive management and response, randomness and unpredictability, and deception.

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    service providers noted above but the multiplicity o electricpower generators, transmitters and distributors is a vast andcomplex set o entities. Understanding the critical nature othese entities to security and their particular vulnerability tocyber attack underscores the need or a new paradigm toprovide resilient security. Rather than a purely governmental

    ocus, what will be necessary is a partnership between andamong governments and private entities. Most obviously,since these sectors are not in any way under NATOsguidance, there needs to be established a joint standardsgroup with appropriate military and civilian authorities inEurope, the United States, and Canada.

    Organizing the capacities o network operators and electricpower entities to contribute to resilience is a new task. It hasbeen discussed in numerous ora; various companies havetaken such measures as they deem appropriate; and someuse ul but nonetheless insu cient standards have beendeveloped such as by the North American Reliability Councilin the United States which is the sel -regulating group oelectric transmission operators. None o these meets themagnitude o the problem.

    However, to go beyond current e orts and achieve adequateresilience will require coordinated regulation by the NATOcountries ar beyond current approaches. It should beclearly recognized that the required legislative and regulatoryauthorities do not exist or the most part. 17 And, beyond theauthorities themselves, no concept o operations has beendeveloped that meets both security needs and private sectorrequirements. All o this means that a new approach to cybersecurity will be necessary, one that is much more inclusiveand require a combination o military, civilian governmentaland private industry actions. The necessary rules extendbeyond NATOs authorities and will require national actionentwined in an international governance approach.

    Establishing the ramework or such a coordinated cyberapproach is a critical step or the transatlantic nations,and e ective implementation will require continued highlevel attention. This will not be an easy task, but there areinstances or example the Basel accords in the nancial

    arenawhere such agreements have been created thata ect both governmental and private operations. Such astepcall it the creation o an international Cyber SecurityBoardneeds to be undertaken in the cyber arena also.

    4. Defense Austerity and theDevelopment of Capabilities

    Military capabilities have long been used by the transatlanticnations to create a context to support democracy andprosperity. The development o the European Unionoccurred under the security umbrella o NATO and the morerecent Libyan action by NATO is in support o a nascentdemocratic e ort. E ective militaries require adequateresources and the transatlantic nations ace economicchallenges that will make more di cult the provision o suchresources. Former Secretary o De ense Robert Gates well-known concerns and the gaps in European smart munitions;intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacities;helicopters; and logistics as demonstrated in Libya and

    A ghanistan underscore the need or adequate top-lineunding. But within that context, there will be high value in

    developing capabilities that meet the austerity criterion buthave high leveraging capacity. The Alliance has discussed asmart de ense e ort heavily reliant on pooling capabilities.That could be highly use ul, but two approaches that wouldprovide high leveraging e ect that have not been ocusedon are expanded special operations orces and advancedresearch and development.

    A. Special Operations Initiative. NATO nations havespecial operations orces (SOF) capabilities and NATOitsel has a Special Operations Headquarters. However, thecampaigns in Libya and A ghanistan, the desire to enhance

    preventative capacities (sometimes called phase zero),and potential bene ts rom training and supporting hostnation militaries all underscore the value o expanded SOF.

    SOF has very high leveraging value. In their classic roleso supporting less well-trained and resourced local orces,they have historically generated results ar in excess otheir numerical involvement. Those results derive rom acombination o their very high ghting skills, excellence astrainers, and cross-cultural expertise. Their cross-culturalcapabilities have made them excellent orces to utilizein preventative and phase zero approaches. But such

    outstanding results can also occur under conditions o waror in a less-than-war confict environment and SOF there orehave high value in counter-terror, counter-insurgency, andconventional e orts.

    17 The proposed cyber legislation in the United States would be a use ul step orward, but it alls short o what will be necessary to protect the electric grid.

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    Beyond their unctional capabilities, SOF t well into anage o austerity budget approach because their resourcesrequirements are relatively less substantial. That is becauseboth o their leveraging approachi.e. ewer orces arenecessaryand because they have relatively ewer highlyexpensive equipment demands.

    A NATO initiative to signi cantly expand in size nations SOFcapabilities and to continue to improve their capabilitiesto work together would have important bene ts. Such aninitiative would support NATOs capacity to undertakee ective partnerships with non-NATO. It would look

    orward to the more likely types o conficts that NATOmight be engaged in. It would be doable in the context othe resources the NATO nations are likely to devote to theirmilitaries in the near and medium term and would maintainthroughout the Alliance a very important land-based sharpend o the stick. This last is a critical to equitable risksharing, which is an underlying principle o the Alliance.

    B. Advanced Research and Development. One o thegreat advantages o the transatlantic countries has been theapplication o advanced technology to military operations.There are numerous examples: stealth; precision-guidedmunitions; usion o intelligence and operational data;and space. But one o the undamental issues or thetransatlantic nations generally is whether they will continueto be the center o technological innovation that has beentrue essentially or the West or the past 600 years.

    Advanced research and development supported by de ensebudgets can have both military and civilian applications.Satellites were initially a military endeavor but space now isan integral element o everyday li e as communications andnavigation systems, such as GPS, demonstrate. Likewise,it is by now a clich but still entirely true that the Internetsinception was a de ense-driven e ort and this was similarlytrue or much o the early work on computers themselves.

    In an age o de ense austerity, advanced research anddevelopment that supports the concept o leveragingcapabilities or creating new ones is a highly e cient use o

    unds. Moreover, while there can be no certainty that any

    military-oriented R&D program will have civilian application,that has happened enough that an expectation o bene tsis not unreasonable, especially in new arenas suchas nanotechnology.

    It has always been the case that cooperative production

    programs have been di cult to undertake on a transatlanticbasis. While some have succeeded, both competitive andpolitical issues have o ten led to di culties or such e orts.Research and development is somewhat more easilyundertaken on a cooperative basis since the larger industrialquestions usually are not in the ore ront. That is particularlytrue when the issues are at the cutting edge o technology.

    A major transatlantic advanced research and developmente ort could t the budgets o the NATO nations andi success ul, could also enhance private sectorcompetitiveness in the global economy. It is the type o

    partnership that the US De ense Advanced ResearchProjects Agency has long undertaken and a model theUS has extended to the intelligence community and otherarenas. It is the type o new partnership or the twenty- rstcentury that would support the transatlantic nations in aglobalized world.

    Conclusion A reinvigorated transatlantic bargain should be the ocuso the May NATO Summit. New e orts such as a StrategicConsultative Group, assistance to the North A ricancountries, enhanced cyber capabilities and processesincluding a Cyber Security Board, and ocus on specialoperations orces and advanced research and developmentall would be valuable. Undertaking such actions will go along way toward ensuring that the transatlantic nations aree ective producers o security in the twenty- rst century.

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    The Atlantic Councils Board of DirectorsCHAIRMAN*Chuck Hagel

    CHAIRMAN,INTERNATIONAL

    ADVISORY BOARDBrent Scowcroft

    PRESIDENT AND CEO*Frederick Kempe

    VICE CHAIRS*Robert J. Abernethy*Richard Edelman*C. Boyden Gray*Brian C. McK. Henderson*Richard L. Lawson*Virginia A. Mulberger

    *W. DeVier Pierson

    TREASURERS*Ronald M. Freeman*John D. Macomber

    SECRETARY *Walter B. Slocombe

    DIRECTORSOdeh AburdeneTimothy D. AdamsCarol C. Adelman

    Herbert M. Allison, Jr.Michael A. Almond*Michael AnsariRichard L. Armitage Adrienne Arsht*David D. Aufhauser Ziad BabaRalph BahnaLisa B. Barry*Thomas L. Blair Julia Chang BlochDan W. Burns

    R. Nicholas Burns*Richard R. BurtMichael CalveyJames E. CartwrightDaniel W. ChristmanWesley K. ClarkJohn CraddockDavid W. CraigTom Craren*Ralph D. Crosby, Jr.

    Thomas M. CulliganGregory R. DahlbergBrian D. Dailey*Paula DobrianskyMarkus DohleLacey Neuhaus DornConrado Dornier Patrick J. DurkinEric S. EdelmanThomas J. EdelmanThomas J. Egan, Jr.Stuart E. EizenstatDan-ke EnstedtJulie FinleyLawrence P. Fisher, IIBarbara Hackman Franklin*Chas W. FreemanJacques S. Gansler *Robert GelbardRichard L. Gelfond*Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr.*Sherri W. GoodmanJohn A. Gordon*Stephen J. HadleyMikael HagstrmIan HagueRita E. Hauser Annette Heuser Marten H.A. van Heuven*Mary L. HowellBenjamin Huberman*Robert E. Hunter Robert L. HutchingsWolfgang Ischinger Robert Jeffrey*James L. Jones, Jr.George A. JoulwanStephen R. KappesFrancis J. KellyL. Kevin KellyZalmay KhalilzadRobert M. KimmittRoger KirkHenry A. Kissinger Franklin D. Kramer Philip Lader David LevyHenrik Liljegren*Jan M. LodalGeorge Lund

    Izzat MajeedWendy W. MakinsWilliam E. Mayer Barry R. McCaffreyEric D.K. MelbyRich MerskiFranklin C. Miller *Judith A. Miller *Alexander V. MirtchevObie Moore*George E. MooseGeorgette Mosbacher Bruce Mosler Sean OKeefeHilda Ochoa-BrillembourgPhilip A. Odeen Ahmet Oren Ana PalacioTorkel L. Patterson*Thomas R. Pickering*Andrew Prozes Arnold L. PunaroKirk A. RadkeJoseph W. RalstonTeresa M. ResselJeffrey A. RosenCharles O. RossottiStanley RothMichael L. RyanHarry SachinisMarjorie M. ScardinoWilliam O. Schmieder John P. SchmitzJill A. Schuker Kiron K. Skinner Anne-Marie Slaughter Alan SpenceJohn M. Spratt, Jr.Richard J.A. SteeleJames B. SteinbergPhilip Stephenson*Paula SternJohn StudzinskiWilliam H. Taft, IVJohn S. Tanner Peter J. Tanous*Ellen O. Tauscher Paul TwomeyHenry G. Ulrich, IIIEnzo Viscusi

    Charles F. WaldJay Walker Michael WalshMark R. Warner

    J. Robinson WestJohn C. WhiteheadDavid A. WilsonMaciej WituckiR. James WoolseyDov S. Zakheim Anthony C. Zinni

    HONORARY DIRECTORSDavid C. AchesonMadeleine K. AlbrightJames A. Baker, IIIHarold BrownFrank C. Carlucci, IIIWilliam J. PerryColin L. PowellCondoleezza RiceEdward L. RownyJames R. Schlesinger George P. ShultzJohn Warner William H. Webster

    LIFETIME DIRECTORSLucy Wilson Benson

    Daniel J. Callahan, IIIKenneth W. DamStanley Ebner Carlton W. Fulford, Jr.Geraldine S. Kunstadter James P. McCarthyJack N. MerrittSteven Muller Stanley R. Resor William Y. SmithHelmut SonnenfeldtRonald P. Verdicchio

    Carl E. VuonoTogo D. West, Jr.

    *Members of the Executive CommitteeList as of March 7, 2012

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