000092 Soviet Decision to Pact With Hitler

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The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany

Geoffrey Roberts

Soviet Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1. (1992), pp. 57-78.

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The Soviet Decision for a Pact with NaziGermanyGEOFFREY ROBERTS

THISARTICLE SETS OUT to answer three qu estions.( I ) Wh en d id the U SSR decide to em bark on poli tica l negot ia t ions wi th Nazi

Germ any with a view to securing a German-Soviet dktente?(2) How , from Moscow's point of view, did these negotiations progress fro m theirgeneral inc eption to the actual non-aggression treaty a nd spheres of influenceagreement emb odied in the Nazi-Soviet pact of 23 August 1939?(3) W hat was the nature of the Soviet foreign policy decision represented by thepact with Nazi Germany?The art icle is based prim arily o n a new collection of diploma tic docum ents fromSoviet foreign policy archives: G od krzzzsa, 193 8-193 9.' These docu m ents furnisha com prehensive (thoug h no t co mplete) diploma tic record of Soviet relations withthe Nazi regime in 1939-reports of meetings with the Ger m ans , instruction s toSoviet diplomats, and the correspondence between Moscow and i ts Berlinembassy. For the first time it is possible to trace the evolution of Soviet policytowards Ge rma ny in 1939 through M oscow's eyes.Before the publication of this new evidence historians were largely reliant onBerlin's record of Soviet-German relations for their interpretation of the Moscoworigins of the Nazi-Sokiet pact . While Ge rm an docum ents supplied an invaluablerecord of form al diplom atic relations between the two states, their rel iabili ty as asource of Soviet at t i tudes was questionable. German reports and memorandainevitably reflected Ge rm an assessments of Soviet policy a nd G erm an objectivesin relation t o the U SSR. A few quotation s from M oscow's archives were availablein the w ritings of Soviet historians, m ainly fragments from the despatches of theSoviet Charg e d'Affaires in Berlin, George i Astak hov. It was possible to constr uctfrom these an account of Soviet-German relation^,^ but i t was one open to theobjection that beyond the officially selected fragments there lay an entirelydifferent s tory. Given the inadequacy of both these sets of sources, historicalinterpretation of the Soviet pact with Nazi Germany was, i t seemed, destined toremain locked in a realm of speculation.Th e publication in the wake of the glasnost'revolu tion of God krzzzsa ma rks thebeginning of a new phase in the historiography of the Nazi-Soviet pact . A num berof contentious issues concerning the t iming a nd circumstances of the Soviet pactwi th Nazi Germany can now be se t t led. Contrary to the or thodoxy of mostW estern historians, i t can now be shown , beyond reasonable dou bt, that th e Soviet


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GEOF F R EY R OB ER TS decision for a pact with Nazi Germ any was taken later rather tha n sooner and thatthe pact was a co nsequenc e, not a cause, of the breakdow n in August 1939 of theAnglo-Soviet-French triple alliance negotiations. Equally, the diplo ma tic docu-ments in this collection do not provide definitive answers to all the questionsabout the pact tha t have vexed historians for the past 50 years. In particular, theabsence of evidence from political sources on the internal deliberations of theSoviet leadership m akes it difficult to rec onstruct, except by inference, the precisemotivations a nd calculations of their policy towards Ge rman y.Perhap s mo re impo rtant than the sett lement of longstanding disputes, however,are the indications in the new evidence of the need to shift the parame ters of thehistorical debate. T he overarching interpretation of the Soviet decision for a pactwith the Nazis has been in terms of a cool and calculated foreign policyma noe uvre with definite objectives-a mirror-im age, in fact, of the interp retatio nof the Ge rm an decision for a pact with the USSR. Nazi Ge rman y began its questfor a pact with the USS R in the spring of 1939 and fro m the outset pursued twoclear goals: the prevention of an Anglo-Soviet-French alliance an d Sovietneutrali ty in the event of a Polish-German war. In the case of the USSR th eassump tion has been that there was a com men surate process of policy shift andgoal adoption. This article will seek to challenge that perception by emphasisingthe contingent and makeshift nature of the process that led to the pact. On theSoviet side the pact emerged from a process of short-term crisis management inwhich the Soviet leadership (primarily Stalin and Molotov) responded to theinitiatives an d actions of others. The picture tha t emerges from the new evidenceis tha t the pac t was mo re a p rodu ct of accide nt tha n design, a result of policy driftrather tha n goal-oriented policy direc tion, the conseq uence not of strategiccalculation but of a series of tactical shifts and adjustments. This picture isreinforced by evidence from Western sources and from a number of recentlypublished Soviet secondary accounts which throw additional l ight on the ques-tions addressed by this article.

Th e decision to negotiateIn a widely cited essay published in 1974 D. C. Watt identified three schools ofthought am ong Western historians as to when Moscow init iated the negotiationswhich culminated in the Nazi-Soviet pact. The se he dubbed the 'Molotov','Potemkin' an d 'Stalin speech' hypo these^.^The 'Molotov' hypothesis refers specifically to a conciliatory speech on Ger-many by the Soviet Prem ier to the Central Executive Com mittee of the Supre meSoviet in January 1936. More generally, it refers to a whole series of Sovietapproaches to the G erm ans in 1935-36. most famously those by the Soviet traderepresentative in B erlin, David Kandelaki. W att rejects this hypothesis on thegrounds that i t is ' too general to explain the how and the why of the decisionswhich resulted in the Nazi-Soviet pact ' a nd considers that i t 'at best indicates aninclination among the Soviet leadership. . . o treat Nazi Germany as a possibleassociate'.


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59H E SOVIET-NAZI PACTT o Watt's objections to the Molotov hypothesis can be adde d the criticism thati t involves a fundam ental m isinterpretation of Soviet policy towards G erma ny in1935-36. Moscow's diplomatic soundings in Berlin at this time were, arguably,not aimed at securing an agreement with Nazi Germ any per sebut at developing a

relationship with elem ents of a perceived opp osition to Hitler's a nti-Soviet foreignp01icy.~The 'Potemkin' hypothesis takes as its starting point the reported rem ark of theDepu ty People's C omm issar for Foreign Affairs to Robert C oulondre, the FrenchAmbassador in Moscow, shortly after Munich: 'My poor friend, what have youdone? For us I see no other way out than a fourth parti t ion of Poland'. Theauthenticity of this particular stateme nt by P otemk in (recorded by Coulondre inhis mem oirs published in 1950) is less imp ortan t than the atte nda nt interpretationthat the apogee of Anglo-French appease men t at Munich mark ed both the finaldefeat of Litvinov's anti- Ge rm an policy of collective security an d the beginningsof Moscow's search for rapprochem ent with Berlin.In favour of this interpretation is the fact that in Decem ber 1938 the USSRsigned a new trade agreement with G erman y a nd subsequently agreed to negotia-tions on a new credit agreement. It seems likely tha t M oscow h ad at least one eyeon the polit ical impact of these renewed economic contact^.^ However, as Wattsays, ' i f the Soviet authorit ies had been intent on anything more than simplymen ding their fences with Germ any, they would certainly have removed L itvinovfrom office'.Th e 'Stalin speech' hyp othesis is probably the best known acc ount of the genesisof the Nazi-Soviet negotiations. Nu me rous writers have interpre ted Stalin'sattack on Western appease ment policies in a speech to the XVIII party congress inMarch 1939 as a signal to B erlin that Moscow was ready to d o business with it.6Often cited in support of this hypothesis is Molotov's toast to Stalin on theoccasion of the signature of the Nazi-Soviet pact tha t it was the Soviet leader'sspeech the previous M arch that had brought abou t a reversal in polit ical relations.However, as Watt indicates, the substance of Stalin's speech was a declarationof non-involvement in intercapitalist qu arrels. Only with hindsight can the speechbe read in any othe r way. Certainly, as Wa tt points out, if the speech was intendedto foreshadow a German-Soviet agreement then most diploma ts in Moscowmissed the message. M oreover, the speech was delivered at the tim e of a peculiarlylow ebb in Soviet-German relations. The credit negotiations between the twostates begun earlier in the year had fizzled out and the Soviet side was stillsmarting from the very public cancellation of a special visit to Moscow by KarlSchnurre, the German Foreign Ministry official responsible for trade with theUS SR. It seem s unlikely, to say the least, tha t Moscow would have chosen such anunpropitious m ome nt for a public political overture to Berlin.Watt 's own theory about the Soviet decision to open negotiations with the Nazismight be called the 'Mere kalov/Litvinov' hypothesis. I n his view the first sign tha tMoscow w as interested in a serious political dgtente with Ge rman y was the 'quasi-formal statement' by Aleksei Merekalov, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, that' there w as no reason why Soviet-German relations should not be put on a norma lfooting and "o ut of norm al relations could grow increasingly improv ed relations" '.


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60 GEOF F R EY R OB ERTSThis statement was reputedly delivered at a meeting with Ernst Weizsacker,State Secretary in the G erm an Foreign Ministry, on 17 April 1939. Therefollowed, in W att's view. a series of Ge rm an signals of goodwill, including Hitler'sspeech of 28 April which om itted any attack on the U SSR. W att also speculatesthat during tha t last fortnight of April there m ay have been secret Soviet-Germancontacts that we sti ll d o not know about. At any rate, on 4 May the Soviet Unionissued a m assive public signal of its inten tions by replacing Litv inov with M olotovas People's Com missar for Foreign A ffairs. Watt sum marises:Litvinov's dismissal and M o lo to ? '~ ccession were followed by a series of visi ts to theGe rm an Foreign M inistry by Geo rgi Astakhov [Soviet Charge in Berlin] on 5 May and 9M a y . . . and then again on 17 M a y . . .T h e Soviet decision had clearly been taken .7How ever, had the Soviet decision been taken? W att, like successive generationsof historians of the Nazi-Soviet pac t, was labouring unde r the hand icap of access

only to Ge rm an d ocum ents on relations between the two states. His interpretationof Soviet policy was perforce based on essentially second-hand accounts-accounts tainted by Ge rm an preoccupations, perceptions a nd policy objectives. Itshould com e as no surprise that quite a different picture of Soviet policy toward sGerm any emerges from Moscow's own records of i ts relations with B erlin.The most glaring example of this discrepancy between Soviet and Germandiplomatic records concerns that infamous meeting between Merekalov andWeizsacker on 17 April 1939. Merekalov's report of the m eeting makes it clear tha tthe ostensible purpose of the meeting-to com plain abo ut the non-fulfilment ofSoviet contracts with the Skoda arm s factory in G erman-occupied Czechoslovakia-was the real one. H e records no political rema rks of his own, let alone thedram atic w ords attributed to him by Weizsacker. Indeed, according to Merekalov'saccount it was W eizsacker who d id all the talking abou t politics, concluding withthe 'quasi-formal statemen t ' th at 'Germany has differences of polit ical principlewith the USS R. All the sam e it wants to develop economic relations with it '.8Fro m Moscow's poin t of view, therefore, the signals for detente emanat ing fromthe M erekalov-Weizsacker meeting were, if any, coming from the Ge rm an side,not the Soviet. Did the Soviet side interpret W eizsacker's remar ks in that way?Wa s the absence of an anti-Bolshevik tirade in Hitler's speech on 28 April perhap staken as a further sign of Ge rm an overtures for rapproch emen t? Was the sackingof Litvinov on 4 May Moscow's reply?Th at Moscow would interp ret Weizsacker's insipid c omm ents in such a way isunlikely, to say the least . The om ission of an anti-com munist attack by Hitler wasunusual, but i t was not unique. Moreover, the Nazi dictator 's ire o n this occasionwas directed elsewhere: against Po land in his denunciation of the 1934 Germ an-Polish non-aggression agreement, and against Roosevelt, who a fortnight earlierhad had the temerity to ask Hitler if he planned to attack any other countries,following the G erm an occupation of Prague in March 1939.9With regard to Litvinov the full story of his dismissal has yet to emerge.However, there is a good case for reading his departure from office as the resultof a com bination of internal polit ics and a desire by the USSR to signal to theBritish and French, who were dragging their feet over Soviet proposals for an


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TH E SOVIET-NAZI PACT 6 1an t i-German coa li tion . tha t Moscow should be t aken more se r i o u ~ l y . ~ ~oreimportantly, i t is clear that whatever the reasons for Litvinov's dismissal i theralded no im me diate change in Soviet policy toward s Ge rma ny. As we shall see,that policy change did not occur until the end of July 1939 at the very earliest.Until then Moscow remained both sceptical and impassive in the face ofnumerous at tempts by the Germans to in i t ia te d iscuss ions about improvingpolitical relations between the two countries-and thereby drive a wedge betwee nthe U SSR an d the Western powers, who they knew were engaged in negotiationsabout an anti-Hitler coalit ion.Ge rm an efforts to woo the USSR away from its projected all iance with Britainand France began, from the Soviet point of view. on 5 May when Schnurreinforme d Astakhov that Soviet contracts with Skoda would be honoured. l l Fourdays later Astakhov-in charge of' the Soviet embassy in Berlin followingMerekalov's recall to Moscow in April12-met Baron von Stu m m , dep uty hea d ofthe G erma n Foreign M inistry 's press departm ent. T he occasion was the introduc-tion of the new Tass representative in Berlin but, according to Astakhov's reportof the meeting, Stum m took the opp ortunity to raise the question of improv ingGerman-Soviet relations, pointing ou t that the Ge rm ans had already mad e anumber of efforts in this direction. Astakhov replied:

To al l [Stumm's] arguments I made corresponding object ions, point ing out that theGerm an side openly an d on i t s own ini t iat ive had caused the deteriorat ion of German-Soviet relations, a nd th at thei r improvem ent dep ended mainly on them . The Soviet s idehas never shunned an improvement in relat ions provided there was a basis for i t . Asregards the sym ptoms of improvem ent that [Stumm ] spoke about . dismissing or at leastdoubt ing the majori ty of them, I noted that . . .we had not yet any grounds for takingthem seriously, beyond the l imits of a sho rt-term tactical manoeuvre.13Astakhov's stated scepticism about G erm an policy-a stance he ma intain ed forthe next three months-was the public face of an att i tud e that in private verged onthe scornful. In a letter to Potemkin on 12 May Astakhov offered the followingassessment of the position in the wake sf Litvinov's dismissal:

Fro m my telegraph reports and diary notes you may have not iced tha t the Germ ans arest r iving to create the impression of an impending or even al ready achieved improvem entin German -Soviet relat ions. Throwing aside all the absurd rum ours fabricated by theGermans or by idle foreign correspondents. only one thing can be stated as certainfact-this is a noticeable change in the tone of the Ger m an press in relation to u s . . . Butwhile noting these instances, we cannot, of course, close our eyes to i ts exceptionalsuperficial i ty. and to thei r non-commit tal nature. . . It is only too obvious what themot ives behind this change in the Germ an at t i tude towards us are, and for the present i tdoes not warrant any serious considerat ion.

I think, therefore. th at you will not object that in response to advances by the Ger ma nsan d those close to them I replied that for the present we have n o grounds for trusting theseriousness of this 'change', althoug h we are always prep ared to meet halfway when itcomes to improving relat ions.I4On 15 May Astakhov m et Sc hnurre to discuss changes in the legal status of theSoviet trade mission in Prague. In accordance with the sentiments he had


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6 2 GEOF F R EY R OB ER TSexpressed in his letter to Potemkin a few days earlier Astakhov's response toSchnurre's enquiry about the prospects for improving Soviet-German relationswas both restrained an d low-key. Apart from a change in the tone of the Ge rm anpress towards the USSR there was no evidence of German desire for such animprovement , A stakhov to ld Schnurre . On the o ther hand, the USSR had neverexcluded the possibil ity of an improv eme nt in relations with G erma ny, providedBerlin could demonstrate th at that was what i t wan ted.The above summ ary of the 15 May meeting is based on Astakhov's report toMoscow on his conversation with Schnurre. ls Turning to Schnurre's report of thesame meeting, however, we get a completely different picture of what transpired.There is no m ention of the fact that (according to Astakhov) i t was Schnurre whoraised the question of improving Soviet-German relations, emphasising, too, thedesirabili ty of such a d evelopm ent. Moreover, according to Schnurre, Astakhov'referred in great detail to the development of Soviet-German relations ' an d'stated in detail that there were no conflicts in foreign policy between Germanyand Soviet Russia, and th at therefore there was no reason for any enmity betweenthe two countr ies . . . T o su bstantiate his opinion concerning the possibili ty of achange in Germ an-Soviet relations, Astakhov repeatedly referred to Italy'.16 No neof this figures in Astakhov's repo rt.Which account of the meeting is more accurate is less impo rtan t than the factthat if Astakhov did say the things attributed t o him by Sc hnurre he could not bebothered to report them to M oscow. If Astakhov was expressing anything morethan diplomatic niceties he was certainly not acting under instructions fromMoscow. However, whatever the provenance and significance of Astakhov'sreported rem arks to Schnurre (at this and other meetings), he certainly impressedBerlin, which shortly launched a major diplomatic init iative to improve Ger-man-Soviet relations.O n 20 May Schulenburg , the Germ an A mbassador, approached Molotov with aproposal that the negotiations for a new credit treaty should be resumed a nd tha tSchnurre should come to Moscow for that purpose. Molotov's reply was anunequivocal rejection of the proposal:

I told the Ambassador that this was not the first time we had heard about Schnurre's tripto Moscow. Schnurre was to leave for Moscow, but his train had been cancelled.Economic negotiations with Germany during the recent period had begun more thanonce without result. I further stated that we had gained the impression that the Germangovernment was playing some sort of game instead of conducting business-like economicnegotiations; and that for such a game it should have looked for its partner in anothercountry and not the government of the USSR. The USSR was not going to participate insuch a game.

'Throughout the whole discussion', Molotov further noted in his report, 'it wasevident tha t for the Ambassador my statemen t was most unexpected'.17Berlin was dismayed by this response, but not for long. Th e Ge rm ans took heartfrom Schulenburg's report that Molotov had said that ' the Soviet Governmentcould only agree to a resumption of the [economic] negotiations if the necessary


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TH E SOVIET-NAZI PACT 63"political basis" for them had been co n ~ tr uc te d' . ' ~ olotov's own version of thisremark makes it clear that this was not, as the Ger ma ns hoped, an invitation topolitical discussions but a harking back to the earlier experience of the cancelledSchnurre visit:

We h ad c om e to the conclusion tha t for the success of the econom ic negotiations i t wasnecessary to c reate a correspo nding political basis. With ou t such a basis, as shown by theexperience of negotiations with Germany, i t is not possible to sett le economic ques-tions.I9

Berlin, nevertheless, resume d its approaches o n 30 May when W eizsacker invitedAstakhov to his office for further discussions about improving Soviet-Germanrelations. The basis for a normalisation of relations existed already, Weizsackertold Astakhov. In the G erm an shop there were many 'goods' for the Soviet Unionto choose from.20To Moscow Astakhov reported that Weizsacker's aim in themeeting had been to explore 'the possibility of talks about improving relationswith us an d to restrain our rapproch eme nt with England. It is typical, however,that they refrained from committing themselves to any agreement'.2'The day after the Weizsacker-Astakhov meeting Molotov made a keynotespeech on the international situation to the Suprem e Soviet. At the heart of thespeech was an account of Soviet negotiations with Britain and France for atrilateral security pact, but Molotov also announced that credit negotiations withGerm any might soon be resumed.22 In fact mo re tha n six weeks were to passbefore Moscow formally agreed to negotiate a new trade a nd credit agree ment. Inthe interim economic discussions between the two states were confined to ' talksabo ut talks'.23 O n the political fro nt the S oviet side was even m ore dilatory,responding not at all to further German suggestions about improving politicalrelations.O n 17 June Astakhov me t Schulenburg, who was on leave in Berlin. Astakhovwas told that the Ge rm ans were sti ll awaiting a reply to Weizsacker's approac h of30 May.24O n 28 Jun e Schulenburg, back in Moscow, met Molotov to convey bothHitler 's and Ribbentrop's desire for improv ed relations with the USSR. Schulen-burg pointed to the recent non-aggression treaties with Latvia and Estonia asproof of G erma ny's intentions towards the USSR . In reply, Molotov argued thatthese non-aggression treaties were concluded on Germany's own account and notout of friendship towards the USSR. H e also drew attention to Germ any's recentabrogation of i ts non-aggression pact with Poland, and to the Anti-CominternPact a nd to the P act of Steel with Italy.The best th at could be said of Molotov's response was that he was ready to hearwhat Schulenburg had to say. However, since the German Ambassador had nodefinite proposals to make the meeting ended on a generally negative note.2sMolotov's rebuff of Schulenbu rg was followed by a month-lon g lull in Ger m anadvances to the Soviet Union. As Astakhov noted in a letter to Molotov on 19July, while the Germans continued to drop indirect hints of a willingness tochange their policy towards the USSR they were afraid to continue their directapproaches of a few weeks earlier.26O n 24 July, however, these approac hes didresume. At a meeting with Astakhov, Schnurre proposed a three-stage program me


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64 GEOFFREY ROBERTSfor the normalisation of Soviet-German relations: completion of the trade an dcredit talks; improvements in cultural relations; and political discussion^.^^O n 26 July Astakhov met Schnurre again. Insisting that he spoke for Ribben tropand Hitler, Schnurre stated that Germany was serious about the normalisationand improvement of relations with the USSR. When Astakhov queried whetherthis was the case. Sch nurre replied: 'Tell me what proof you want? We are ready todemonstrate the possibility of reaching agreement on any question, to give anyguarantees '. La ter in the conversation Schnurre said that Germ any had renouncedany aspirations in the U kraine a nd was prepared to treat the B altic countries in thesam e way. At this point Astakho v began to feel the conversation was going too farand he decided to divert the discussion to more general themes-the currentstatus of Hitler 's plans for eastern expansion outlined in Mein Kampf and issuesconnected to Polish-German, Anglo-German and German-Japanese relations.The meeting concluded with A stakhov promising to report hom e, but stating alsotha t he was no t sure tha t Moscow would take such novel ideas s e r i o u ~ l y . ~ ~Moscow's reply was trans mitte d to Astakh ov in two stages. O n 28 July Molotovtelegraphed Astakhov that 'in restricting yourself to hearing out Schnurre'sstatemen ts an d promising to pass them on to M oscow you did the right thing'.29This one-line telegram was, app arently, the first polit ical instruction that Molo tovsent to Astakhov in the su mm er of 1939.30The next day, in a further telegram toAstakhov, Molotov stated Moscow's position. The full text reads:

Political relations between the U SSR and Germany may improve, o f course, with animprovement in economic relations. In this regard Schnurre is, generally speaking, right.But only the Germans can say concretely how political relations should improve. Unti lrecently the Germans did nothing but curse the USS R, did not want any improvement inpolitical relations with it and refused to participate in any conferences where the US SRwas represented. I f the Germans are now sincerely changing course and really want toimprove political relations with the USSR, they are obliged to state what this improve-ment represents in concrete terms. Not long ago I was with Schulenburg who also spokeabout improving relations, but did not want to propose anything concrete or intelligible.Here the matter depends entirely on the Germans. W e would, of course, welcome anyimprovement in political relations between the two countries."With this grudging response Moscow had finally opened the doo r to polit ical

dktente with B erlin. It was no t so m uch a decision to negotiate as the first real signof a readiness to listen to an d consider what the Ge rm ans had to say. However,why now, at the end of July rather than in May or June? The answer to thisquestion remains unclear but i t may have been connected to the triple alliancenegotiations with the British and Fren ch.All along Moscow ha d suspected t ha t Berlin's appro ach es were part of somekind of petit jeu aim ed at disrupting the Anglo-Soviet-French triple alliancenegotiations launched by Litvinov in April. By the end of July, however, thenegotiations o n the political part of the security pact the Soviet authoritie s wantedwere more or less complete and the Western powers had also agreed to beginmilitary talks.32 With these co mm itments in the bag the danger of G erma nmischief-making was minimal and Moscow could feel more confident about


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65HE SOVIET-NAZI PACTplaying the G erm an card as part of i ts own pressure tactics in relation to L ondonan d Paris. Furtherm ore, the experience of negotiating w ith the Brit ish and Fren chhad not exactly been encouraging. From Moscow's point of view London andParis had dragged their feet throughout the triple alliance negotiations. On 17July, for exam ple, Mo lotov described the Anglo-French negotiators as 'crooks an dcheats ' an d expressed d oubt that an acceptable agreement would be reached.33 nthis l ight the German offers of detente undoubtedly warranted more attentiontha n previously, particularly when the evidence was accumulating tha t the crisis inGerman-Polish relations over Danzig was about to break.34 With w ar on theirdoo rstep pe rhap s only days away the Soviet leadership clearly felt the need t o keepall their options open .While calculations such as these may have been behind the adjustme nt in Sovietpolicy towards G erma ny a t the end of July, too much should not be mad e of them.Molotov's statem ent of Soviet policy on 29 July indicates a lack of calculation andthat Moscow did not really know what to do about Berlin's offer of politicaldiscussions.At the root of Molotov's curiously passive response to Schnurre's hints of aSoviet-German condom inium in Eastern Europe was uncertainty ab out Hitler 'sintentions and about the final outcome of the Polish crisis . Was Hitler 's aim thetotal subjugation of Poland or a new 'Munich'? Would the Brit ish and Frenchstand a nd fight alongside Poland ? Fo r how long and how successfully could Po landresist a German invasion? Above all, what would be the length and nature of the'breathing space' that the Nazis seemed to be offering the Soviet state? Suchquestions c ontin ued to be a sou rce of indecisiveness in Moscow's policy right upuntil the very eve of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Inde ed, the lingering dou bts that theygenerated persisted for som e time after the pact.There is also a rather more mundane factor to be taken into account whenconsidering Soviet policy towards G erma ny in the sum me r of 1939. Molotov wasa new foreign minister a nd fo r the first three m onth s of his tenure in office he ha dhis hands full negotiating a complex and contentious treaty of alliance with theBritish and French. He also headed an organisation that had been wracked byyears of successive purges, most recently including a major assault on thepersonnel of its central apparatus in M ay 1939. In ad dition, Molotov retained hisresponsibilities as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Quitesimply, it is likely that Molotov had little spare t ime and energy to devote totactics in relation t o Berlin a nd , given the com mitm ent to a triple all iance withBritain and France, not much inclination. This may help to explain why it wasthat between May and July 1939 Moscow pursued (or rather did not pursue) a'non-policy '35 towards Germ any. T his co ntention is borne o ut by evidence,presented below, that until the e nd of July 1939 Astakho v, Moscow's ma in pointof contact with B erlin, was left largely to his own devices-with no instructions onhow to respond to num erous at tempts by the G erma ns to involve the USSR indiscussions abo ut political detente.One result of Moscow's non-policy was that no decision to embark onnegotiations for a political detente with Germany was ever taken; at least not adecision that can be clearly demarcated from the process that led to the


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66 GE OFFR E Y R OB E R T Sagreem ents embo died in the Nazi-Soviet pact. As we shall see in the next section,this was a process not so mu ch of conscious political barga ining as of policy drift,which was in tu rn an effect of a stream of events, perceptions a nd pressures thatbuffeted Moscow along to the final outc om e of the Nazi-Soviet pact.

Towards the Nazi-Soviet pactWhile Moscow was dithering about w hat to do, Astakhov in Berlin was beginningto formu late a m ore definite game-plan. In a letter to Potem kin at the end of Julyhe argued that Ge rm an efforts at improving relations with the USSR had taken ona persistent character an d that:

I have no doubt that i f we wanted to we could involve the G erm ans in far -reachingnegotiations an d get from th em assurances about the questions tha t interest us. Of course,what the va lue of these assurances would be is anothe r question .In any case this readiness of the Germans to talk to us about improving relationsshould be taken into account and , perhaps, we ought to give them some encouragement,in ord er to retain in o ur han ds a tru mp card which we could use in the event of necessity.Fro m this point of view it would, perhaps, b e useful to say something, to pose them som equestions, in order not to let go of the thread that they have placed in our hands andwhich, handled carefully, can hardly do us any harm .36

It is worth pausing briefly to consider the significance of this letter to Moscowfrom Astakhov-the m an wh o has gone dow n in history as the go-between of theNazi-Soviet negotiations of 1939. Tw o points emerge from the passage quo tedabove. Firstly, as late as the end of July 1939 Astakhov was evidently not evenauthorised to encourage Berlin 's soundings of him , let alone enter into negotia-tions with the Germans. Secondly, Astakhov was obviously keen to explore whatthe Ge rm ans had to offer. Over the next two weeks this inclination was to developint o a barely disguised enth usia sm fo r a deal w ith B erlin. As we shall see, Moscowwas much more hesitant in its response to Berlin's overtures than was Astakhov,but his increasingly positive reports about his discussions with the Ge rm ans musthave had a considerable impact back home.Astakhov's immediate game-plan was to give the Germans some encourage-me nt in or der to keep going the thread of his discussions in Berlin. Before Moscowcould respond to his proposal, however, the Germans once again took theinitiative. On 2 August Ribbentrop himself told Astakhov that 'we consider thatthere are no essential contradictions (protivorechii) between our countries fromthe Black Sea t o the Baltic. O n all problem s it is possible to reach agre emen t; if theSoviet government shares these premises we can exchange views in m ore concreteterms'.37The next day Schulenburg, in a meeting with Molotov, followed up thisoverture, proposing an improvement in relations in three stages: (a) the conclu-sions of an economic agreement; (b) better press relations; (c) the developm ent ofcultural and scientific cooperation. These would lay the basis for an impro vem entin political relations. Schulenburg stressed the new course in German foreignpolicy, in particular tha t there were no political contradic tions between Germ any


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TH E SOVIET-NAZI PACT an d the USSR in the B alt ic a nd that Berl in had no plans that ran counter to Sovietinterests in Poland .Molotov's response was more posit ive than on previous occasions, but s t i l lguarded. On the one han d, he s ta ted that ' the Soviet government has a favourableview of the German government 's desire for an improvement in relations ' .However , on the other hand, he cont inued to cas t doubt on German pol icytowards the USSR, rehashing old arguments about the Ant i -Comintern Pact ,Germany 's a t t i tud e to the USSR in internation al affairs , and so on.38O n 4 August Molotov telegraphed instructions to Astakhov to the effect thatSoviet policy was to contin ue with the exchange of views in general terms bu t tha tmo re con crete discussions depend on th e o utcom e of the trade-credit talks.39 Thisnon-committal posit ion was one that Moscow maintained for the next twoweeks-despite mo unting diplom atic pressure by the Germ ans and a stream ofreports f rom A stakhov that lef t no doubt about what Berl in h ad in min d.

Significantly, this period of continu ed wavering coincided with the arriv al of theAnglo-French military delegation in Mo scow (on 10 August), the beginning ofjoint discussions (on 12 August), a nd the effective breakd ow n of the talks (14- 17August) over the issue of Polish and Romanian consent to the passage of Sovietforces across their terri tory. The available evidence is that the Soviet s ideembarked on these negotiations intent on reaching agreement on a mili taryconvention to resist Germ an expansionism. However, that agreement had t o be awatert ight one-which left no room for ma noeu vre by the 'appeasers ' in Lon donand Paris and which secured for the USSR practical and worthwhile mili tarysupport in the event of war wi th Germ any. At the same t ime Moscow h ad ser iousdou bts abou t the l ikelihood of success. The experience of poli tical negotiationswith L ondon and Paris did no t augur well nor did the di la tory behaviour of theAnglo-French military de legation which instead of flying to Moscow cam e by sea.Th en there was the relatively low rank an d statu s of the Anglo-French mili tarynegotiators and, i t soon became obvious, the fact that they had no detailedstrategic or ope rational plans for a joint war against Ge rma ny. It m ay also be thatthe Soviet authorit ies were privy to the secret instruction s given to the Brit ishdelegation tha t they were to sp in ou t the negotiations for as long as possible.40As Moscow's dou bts abo ut the triple al l iance project grew, so the d oo r to anagreement wi th G ermany was opened wider . However , not unt i l the mom ent ofthe final breakdown of the mili tary negotiations with B ritain and Franc e were theGerm ans invi ted across the threshold.O n 5 August Astakhov telegraphed Moscow that Schnurre had suggested theidea of a 'secret protocol ' at tached to any credit agreement th at might be signed.41Molotov replied on 7 August, s tat ing that i t was not appropriate to sign such aprotocol un der a t rade t reaty.42This was the firs t mentio n of som e kind of secretSoviet-German deal.In a le tter to Molotov o n 8August Astakhov sum me d up the stage reached in the'negotiations ' between the two states. W hat the G erm an s were proposing, wroteAstakhov, was the updating of Rapallo and oth er German-Sov iet poli t ical treatiesby a new treaty or 'some protocol ' . Discussions around this and related topicswere no t excluded even in the e vent of a successful conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet


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6 8 GEOF F R EY R OB ERTS-French negotiations. However, the real interest of the G erm ans was in thesettlement of a num ber of territorial-political issues in Eastern Europe. In returnfor Soviet disinterestedness in the fate of Danzig and former 'German Poland',Berlin would renounce any a spirations in the Ukra ine and , in effect, would givethe USSR a free hand in 'Russian P oland', Bessarabia an d the Baltic States (exceptfor L ithuania). In conclusion Astakhov wrote:

It goes without saying that I am not i n any way c l aiming th a t . . . t he G ermans wouldmaintain a serious and long-term observat ion of the eventual com mitments. I think onlythat in the immediate future they consider i t conceivable to come to a certainunders t anding . . . in o rder t o neutralise us in the eve nt of war with Po land. As regards thefuture, then the ma tter would, of course, dep end no t on these obligations but on the newsituation which would result and that I cannot foresee at the moment .43Molotov replied to Astakhov on 1 1 August. Moscow was interested in the po ints

made in his letter but such discussions required preparation and a period oftransit ion from the trade a nd credit agreement to other problems.44This was thefirst sign that Moscow was seriously considering a wide-ranging deal with Berlin.However, a further week was to elapse before Moscow was ready to grasp thenettle of a pact w ith the Nazis. T hat week was the same one in which the triplealliance negotiations finally collapsed with the failure (from Moscow's point ofview) of the Anglo-Soviet-French military talks. Howev er, in the me antim eMoscow continued to hedge its bets.Fro m Berlin Astakhov continued to nudge Moscow towards a decisive move.O n 12 August he wrote to M olotov that events were moving quickly an d that inview of the coming conflict with Poland the Germans did not want to dwell onsecondary issues; they wanted t o discuss political-territorial problem s. Astakhov'spero ration in th is letter was his last contrib ution to the making of the Nazi-Sovietpact. The G erma ns, he reported, were:obviously worried by our negotiat ions with the British and Fr ench m ili tary an d they hav ebecome unsparing in their arguments and promises in order to prevent a mili taryagreement. For the sake of this they are now ready, I believe, to make the kind ofdeclarations an d gestures that would have been inconceivable six months ago. Th e Baltic,Bessarabia, Eastern Poland (n ot to speak of the Ukraine)-at the present t ime this is theminim um they would give up wi thout m uch discussion in order to secure a promise fromus not to intervene in their conflict with Poland.45Astakhov's evident enthusiasm for a deal notwithstanding, M oscow continuedto tread carefully. On 1 5 August Schulenburg met Molotov and proposed thatRibben trop should visit M oscow for face to face negotiations. M olotov welcomedSchulenburg's reaffirmation of previous G erm an statem ents of political good will,but insisted tha t prior to a visit by Ribben trop there would have to be clarificationof a numb er of matters. One would have thought that th e Germ ans could hardlyhave m ade the ir intentions clearer. Yet at this meeting M olotov chose a curiouslyindirect way to probe for the details of the kind of deal on offer. H e referred to adespatch from the Soviet embassy in Rom e at the en d of Jun e which reported theexistence of a 'Schulenburg Plan' for improving Soviet-German relations. The


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TH E SOVIET-NAZI PACT plan proposed Germ an intercession in Soviet-Japanese conflicts in the Far East; anon-aggression pact between G erma ny a nd the US SR an d a joint guarantee of theBaltic states; and the conclusion of a wide-ranging economic agreement betweenthe two countries. Molotov wanted to know whether the Schulenburg Planrepresented the basis for further negotiations and, in particular, the Germangovernment's attitude to the idea of a non-aggression treaty.Schulenburg was embarrassed, for the 'plan ' that bore his na me was a myth, theresult , he said, of rumours emanating from conversations between himelf andRosso, the Italian Ambassador in Moscow. Schulenburg nevertheless promised toconvey to Berlin Molotov's interest in the p oints of the so-called plan.46Molotov's roundab out probing of Germ an intentions can be interpreted purelyan d simply as a negotiating tactic: Moscow w anted Berlin to mak e its offer beforerevealing its own hand. However, there was also, perhaps, a deeper motiveunderlying Russian reluctance t o emb ark on explicit negotiations a bout a Soviet--German condominium in Eastern Europe: Moscow sti l l lacked a new strategicagenda fo r action. H ither to th e operational objectives of Soviet foreign policy ha drevolved aro un d the project of a triple alliance with Britain a nd Franc e. By 15August tha t project was in the latter stages of its disintegration. H owev er, Moscowhad yet to form ulate a new strategic-political agenda to take its place; an d was notfinally to d o so un til the eve of the Red A rmy's invasion of Eastern Poland on 1 7Septem ber. T he only clear goal of Soviet foreign policy from m id-August to mid -Septem ber 1939 was that of avoiding a war with N azi Ger many in Eastern Europewhile Britain an d F ranc e stood on the sidelines. A new policy of security throughstrategic-political expansion a nd cooperation with Hitler was foreshadow ed in theNazi-Soviet pac t, but its actualisation was slow and hesitant, a n effect of a seriesof ad hoc responses a nd reactions to the dynam ic of events rather th an the result ofprior decision or planned policy.Moscow's lack o f a new strategy was certainly evident at M olotov's next meetingwith Schulenburg on 1 7 August. At this meeting Molotov h and ed Schulenburg aformal writ ten statemen t proposing a non-aggression pact between the two states(or a reaffirmation of the Soviet-Ge rman neutrality treaty of 1926), together witha 'special protocol' which would form an 'integral' part of that pact.Th e m ome nt of Stalin 's decision to deal with Hitler rather than the British orFrench had finally arrived-but what kind of deal? Here the position rema inedunclear. Schulenburg had a formal statement to make too. Picking up onMolotov's earlier enquiries about the 'Schulenburg Plan', Berlin proposed a non-aggression treaty, a joint guarantee of the Baltic states, an d Ge rm an help inimproving Soviet-Japanese relations. In response all Mo lotov would say was tha tthe new Ge rm an proposals would have to be studied. Schulenburg attempted todraw Molotov on w hat M oscow envisaged w ould be the content of this proposed"special protocol'. How ever, all Molotov w ould say was tha t both sides ha d tothink about what the content of the protocol should be. He resisted, too, allSchulenburg's repre sentations t ha t Ribb entro p should fly to Moscow immediatelyfor direct negotiation^.^'Molotov's reticence abou t the co nten t of the proposed 'special protocol' an d hisrefusal to set a da te for Ribbentrop 's arrival in Moscow were linked. At a furth er


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GEOF F R EY R OB ER TSmeeting with Schulenburg on 19 August Molotov made it clear that beforeRibbentrop came to Moscow it had to be certain that an agreement would bereached an d this m eant that t he matter of the special protocol had to be clarifiedfirst . The matter of the protocol was a serious one, he told Schulenburg, an d it wasup to B erlin to think about i ts content.Schulenburg's meeting with M olotov ended at abo ut 3.00 p.m. However, theGerm an Am bassador was summ oned back to the Kremlin for a further meet ing at4.30 p.m . where he was told that the Soviet government agreed that R ibbentropcould com e to Moscow on 26-27 August. N o reasons were given for this change ofpolicy and S chulenburg assumed, probab ly correctly, tha t Stalin ha d i n t e r ~ e n e d . ~ ~Presumably, the Soviet calculation was that during the coming week the ma tterof the 'special protocol' could be clarified. It is also possible that S talin had n otentirely given u p o n the Brit ish and F rench an d agreed to Ribbentrop's visit with aview to strengthening his hand in those negotiations, which had not yet formallyended.49 n any event this sudden change in tactics was i llustrative of how in thesecritical days Soviet foreign policy was being ma de o n the hoof. A furthe r exam pleof the reactive and makeshift nature of Soviet diplomacy on the eve of the pactwith Nazi G erma ny was to occur two days later.On 21 August Sch ulenburg presented M olotov with a n urgent personal messagefrom Hitler t o Stalin. Th e substance of the message was an urgent plea tha t in viewof the international si tuation (i .e. the Polish-German crisis over Danzig) Ribben-trop should visit Moscow in the next cou ple of days to sign a non-aggression pactand to negotiate the 'supplementary protocol ' . Two hours later, in a letter toHitler, S talin replied personally, agreeing tha t Ribben trop arr ive in Moscow on 23August.50Th e Nazi-Soviet pact of non-aggression, together with its 'Secret Ad dition alProtocol', was signed within a few hours of Ribbentrop 's arriv al in Moscow on 23August 1939. The protocols dividing North Eastern Europe into Soviet andGerman spheres of influence consti tute one of the most famous documents indiploma tic history:

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundasy of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U SS R. . . 2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula and

What remain mysterious, however, are the details of how the specifics of thisnotorious agreement were hammered out and the meaning attached to i t by thetwo sides.On the Soviet side, the last piece of documentary evidence is a postscript to aSoviet draft of the proposed non-aggression treaty handed to Schulenburg on 19August:The present pact shall only be valid if a special protocol is signed simultaneously, covering the points in which the contracting parties are interested in the field of foreign policy. The protocol shall be an integral part of the pact.52


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TH E SOVIET-NAZI PACT We also know that the Russian originals of the secret protocols, together withassociated documents, were transferred out of the archives of the Ministsy ofForeign Affairs in 1946 and placed in the hands of one of Molotov's aides. Theyhave not been foun d since. In retrospec t at least, Stalin an d Mo lotov were plainlyembarrassed by the pact.53 t also appears tha t the existence an d content of theprotocols was a secret officially known only by Stalin and Molotov. The othermem bers of the Politbureau were not told abou t them .54 Finally, i t should berecalled th at in all the official exchanges between M oscow an d Berlin in the r un-u pto the pact th e talk was of a 'special' o r 'supplementary', not a secret protocol. Itmay be, therefore, tha t initially th ere was no intention, on the Soviet side, to havea secret part of the pact an d tha t this idea evolve d in the course of the face-to-facen eg otia tio ns w ith R i b b e n t ~ o p . ~ ~O n the Ge rm an side there is also a dearth of documen tation on the period from21-23 There is available some mem oir material which provides someclues as to the nature of the deal struck in the Kremlin between Ribbentrop,Molotov a nd Stalin, but this evidence is fragmentary at best and has to be treatedwith som e caution, particularly when dealing with the Soviet side of the equation.Th e only clear po int tha t emerges from this evidence with regard to Soviet policyis that Stalin was keen on an explicit spheres of influence agreement in Eastern

In tru th we know very l i t t le abo ut the precise m otives an d intentions of Stalinand M olotov and H itler and Ribb entrop, save for the obvious fact that in returnfor staying neutral in the coming German-Polish war the USSR was promised asphere of influence in the Baltic and in Eastern Poland.Th is is not the generally ac cepted view of the Nazi-Soviet pac t, which positsthat on 23 August 1939 there was a definite agreement to partition Polandbetween Germany and the USSR and to allow Soviet subjugation of the Balticstates. The evidence for this view is quite simply that this is what subsequentlyhappen ed. How ever, that fact is no proof of any prior com mi tme nt. Th e evidence,at least on the Soviet side, is that there was no such plan, agreement or definiteintention. In signing the pact with Nazi Germany Stalin finally abandoned thepolicy of collective security and opted for safeguarding Soviet interests vianeutrali ty and independent manoeuvring. Beyond that the new foreign policyembodied in the pact remained fluid. A strategy of terri torial expansion intoEastern Europe was only one of the possibil i t ies present at the moment of thesigning of the pact; and whether or not i t should be the chosen course of actionwould depend on the circumstances. After all, on 23 August 1939 nothing wascertain. Would Hitler really attack Poland? Would the Poles fight back and howsuccessful would they be? What would Britain and France do? What were thechances of another 'Munich'? What would be the consequences of any fonvardSoviet strategy in Eastern Europe? U ntil these a nd many other quan daries wereresolved there could be no question of any precipitate action. In the meantimeSoviet foreign strategy was kept in a state of abeyance. Only an analysis alongthese lines can explain the surprising ambiguity, hesitancy and uncertainty thatcharacterised Soviet foreign policy in the days and weeks immediately followingthe conclusion of the pact with Nazi Germ any.


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72 GEOF F R EY R OB ER TSSoviet foreign policy and the pact

With the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact the USSR had executed the moststunning volte-face in diploma tic history. 'The sinister news broke up on th e worldlike an explosion', Church ill wrote later.18 Yet th e imm edia te dipl om atic fall-outfrom t he pact, as far as Soviet foreign policy was concerned, was curiously m ute d.Tr ue , the pact had wrecked the Anglo-Soviet-French military negotiations an dthe USSR had nailed i ts colours to the mast of neutrali ty in the event of war, butapart from that ( admittedly, very large m atters) i t was business as usual.When the Chinese Ambassador met Lozovsky, Soviet Deputy People's Com-missar fo r Foreign A ffairs, on 26 August he was told th at the pact, like other non -aggression treaties signed by the USSR in the past, was a contribution to thestruggle for peace. Moreover, that although the negotiations with Britain andFra nce had been broken off they could be re sumed a nd there was still a possibilityof reaching agreement.19Lozovsky, of course, was not privy to the Soviet-G erman discussions of 23August nor to the conten t of the secret protocol. Th e same was true of Sharonov ,the Soviet Ambassador in W arsaw, but presumably he was acting on instructionswhen he told Foreign Minister Beck on 26 August tha t the non-aggression treatywith Ge rma ny did not affect Polish-Soviet relations.60Certainly, Soviet DefenseCommissar Voroshilov's hint in a newspaper interview the next day that theUSSR might be prepared to supply Poland with raw materials and mili taryequipm ent in the event of a G erm an attack6' must have been cleared with Stalinand Molotov. The day after Poland was attacked Sharonov is reported to haveasked Beck why no Polish request for such aid had been f o r t h c ~ m i n g . ~ ~heseindications of goodwill continued at a friendly meeting between M olotov an d thePolish Am bassador on 3 S e ~ t e m b e r . ~ ~Moscow's benign att i tude tow ards P oland d uring this period was not dissimula-tion but a sign of the indecision that gripped Soviet foreign policy while Stalinwaited t o see how the intern ational si tuation developed. A new, neutralist coursefor Soviet foreign policy h ad been charted by the pact with N azi G erma ny, an dthis was publicly spelt out by Molotov in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on 31However, a neutralist stance was one thing, an active foreign policystrategy to secure Soviet interests was quite another. T hat w ould depend on theresult of the coming Germ an-Polish war.A window on Stalin's w ait an d see policy is also provided by the decisions an ddiscussions of the Com intern during this period.65For the first two weeks afte r thepact the Comintern leadership in Moscow was left to i ts own devices informulating policy for the communist movement in the new situation. Theposition they ad opted w as broadly similar to tha t spontaneously arrived at by thecommunist parties abroad, i .e. support for the Soviet diplomatic manoeuvre insigning the pact w ith Nazi G erm any but a con tinua tion of the anti-fascist struggleat home an d abroad. Nazi Germ any cont inued to be ident ifed as the main enemyof the working class, n o more so than after the invasion of Poland o n 1 September.This l ine was maintained until 7 September when Dimitrov , the Cominternleader, had a meeting with Stalin, Molotov a nd Z hdanov. At this meeting Stalin


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TH E SOVIET-NAZI PACT reportedly told D imit rov that 'we would have preferred an agreement with the so-called dem ocra tic countries, hence we entered neg otiations with them , but Britainand France wanted us to be their h i red h a n d . . . a n d without pay '.66 Moreimportan tly, Stalin set out a new line for the Com intern based o n the idea that thewar was an inter-imperialist one and there was no reason why the working classshould side with Britain, France a nd Poland against G erma ny. In effect, Stalindecreed the end of the anti-fascist policy the C om inter n h ad followed since its 7thWorld Congress in 1935. Th e new line was accepted by the Co mintern 's leadersand adopted by the rest of the communist movement over the next month.Stalin's in terve ntion in Com intern affairs in early Septem ber signalled a second,decisive turn in Soviet foreign policy. Th e essence of this shift in policy, which w asat least on a par w ith that re presented by th e Nazi-Soviet pact, was, firstly, adecision to invade eastern Poland an d to occupy mili tari ly the sphere of influenceallocated to i t on 23 August and , secondly, a d iplomatic a nd political realignmentof the USSR alongside Ge rman y.Contrar y to historical orthodoxy, this turn in Soviet policy was no t a planned orautomatic consequence of the pact with Nazi Germany. There was no specificagreement or intention o n 23 August to parti t ion Po land. This assertion cannot bedefinitively proven b ut there ar e a num ber of docum entary clues which suppo rt i t .Firstly, there is the fact tha t the first clause of the secret addition al protocol tothe pact concerned not Poland bu t S oviet-German spheres of influence in theBaltic. This was a curious textual order of priorities for two states that had justdecided to carve up between them another m ajor state. It makes much m ore senseto posit tha t there was no such agreement and t o assume that what was agreed on23 August was an eastern l imit of Germ an mili tary expansion into Poland.

Secondly, there is a w hole series of messages from Berlin to its Moscow emb assyduring the last week in August concerning press reports that R ed Army units hadbeen withdrawn from the Soviet-Polish bord er. Schulenburg was urgently in-structed t o app roach Molotov w ith a view to securing a public de nial that this wasthe case.67 O n the eve of their planned attack on Poland, Berlin was concerned tokeep up the pressure o n the Poles. In none of this correspondence was there anyhint of a Soviet-German parti t ion agreement concluded on 23 August. Ha d therebeen such a n ag reeme nt then surely Berlin's response to these press reports and itsrepresentations in Moscow would have been much stronger?The foregoing evidence can also be read as demonstrating German anxietyabout w hether the Soviet Un ion would keep to i ts side of the parti t ion bargain.However, and this is the third documentary clue, on 3 September Ribbentroptelegraphed the following instructi on to Schulenburg:We definitely expect to have beaten the Polish army decisively in a few weeks. We

would then keep the territory that was fixed at Moscow as a German sphere of interestunder military occupation. We would naturally, however. for military reasons, also haveto proceed further against such Polish military forces as are at that time located in thePolish area belonging to the Russian sphere of interest.

Please discuss this a t once with Molotov and see if the Soviet Union does not considerit desirable for Russian forces to move at the proper time against Polish forces in theRussian sphere of interest and, for their part, to occupy this territory. In our estimation


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GEOF F R EY R OB ER TS this would not only be a relief for us, but also, in the sense of the Moscow agreements, inthe Soviet interest as

Clearer evidence that there was no explicit prior agreement to parti t ion Polandmilitari ly would be difficult to find. What other explanation can there be forRibben trop's evident need to interpret the 'sense' of the Moscow agreeme nts of 23August?The parti t ion of Poland in September 1939 was not the direct result of theNazi-Soviet pact but of the unforeseen ra pidity of the Polish military collapse.This was the circumstance in which Berlin offered and Moscow opportunisticallyaccepted a share of the spoils of war.The Soviet decision to invade eastern Poland, relayed to the Germans on 9S e ~ t e m b e r , ~ ~as a fateful one. It marked the beginning of a new S oviet strategy ofterritorial an d political expansion in to Eastern Europ e unde r the aegis of the pactwith Naz i G erma ny. Th e Soviet invasion of Poland in Septem ber was followed inOctob er by the enforced establishmen t of Soviet military bases in the Baltic states.At the end of Novem ber the US SR launched a n attack on Finland with the aim ofsecuring territorial concessions designed to enhance the defensive position ofLeningrad. O n the political-diplomatic front, Germa ny an d the USSR signed afriendship treaty on 28 Septem ber (which included a secret agreement transferringLithuan ia to the Soviet sphere of influence) an d in October Stalin joined Hitler 'sso-called 'peace offensive' against the West.70

ConclusionFor more than 50 years the historical interp reta tion of the Nazi-Soviet pact hasbeen an ideological an d political battleground on which two polarised ve rsions ofthe truth have vied with each other. On the one side, there have been thosehistorians who argued that the operational objective of Soviet foreign policy in1939 was an alliance with the Western powers against Germany. Only at the lastmom ent, w hen Moscow had failed, in i ts own terms, to achieve this goal did Stalinturn to a pact with Hitler. O n the other side have been those who argued that aSoviet-Western alliance was, at b est, a secondary goal of Moscow's foreign policy.Fr om th e spring of 1939 at the very latest the prim ary trajectory of Soviet foreignpolicy was towards a pact with the Nazis.In terms of this debate, I have tried to show that the new docum entary evidencefrom the Soviet archives demonstrates the untenabili ty of the latter view. TheSoviet turn to G erma ny d id n ot begin until the end of July 1939 and only began togather real mo me ntum in the m iddle of August when the triple all iance negotia-tions with B ritain an d Fran ce finally broke dow n.The other theme of the article has been Moscow's passivity and indecisivenessin the diplomatic prelude to World War 11, not least in the critical days of Augustand September 1939. The argu men t has been th at the Soviet decision for a pactwith Nazi Germany can best be conceptualised in terms of a process of politicaland diploma tic policy drift . Within this conception the pact appears not so much adazzlingly bold a nd cynical stroke but a more mund anely hesitant an d ambiguous


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TH E SOVIET-NAZI PACT 7 5step towards a strategy of security through coopera tion with Nazi G erma ny. Thegreat turning point in Soviet foreign policy was, arguably, not the pact but thedecision in early September 1939 to join in the attack on P oland. W ith thisdecision the faltering process of realigning the USSR alongside Germany, whichhad begun a t the end o f July, was finally ~ o m p l e t e d . ~ ~London

God krizisa, 1938-1 939: Dolcur?zmty i ~llaterialy, Vols. (Moscow 1990) (hereafter Godkrizisa). Th e collection consists of over 600 do cume nts drawn fro m Soviet and foreign archivesand published sources. 150 of the do cum ents are newly pu blished from Soviet archives. Of these.50 docum ents concern Soviet-German relations in 1939. Extensive extracts from the docum entsin this collection dealing with Sovie t-Germ an relations in 1939 are quote d by V. Ya. Sipols. 'Zaneskol'ko mesyatsev d o 23 Avgusta 1939 goda', iMezhdunarodnaya zhizn', May 1989 (Englishtranslation: 'A Few Months Before August 23, 1939', International.4,ffairs, Jun e 1989). A few ofthe docu men ts are translated in full in 'Around the Non-Aggression Pact (Docum ents ofSoviet-German Relations in 1939)'; International Affaairs, October 1989. According to LevBezymensky, New Tirnes, 3 (1991), p. 13, the collection was assembled in 1988.For an interpretation based on this material see G. R oberts, T h e Crnholy.411iance: Sta lin 'sPact with Hitler (London, I . B Tauris, 1989), chap. 8.D . C. Watt, 'The Initiation of the Negotiations Leading to the Nazi-Soviet Pact: AHistorical Problem', in C. Abramsky, ed., Essays zsn Honour 0f E. H . Carr (London, Macmillan,1974)." O n Soviet policy towards Germany in 1935-36 see Roberts. Th e CrnholyAlliance,chap. 5 .Also: 'Zapiska M.M. Litvinova I.V. Stalinu, 3 Dekabrya 19358'. Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 2 (1990).which p rovides som e confirmation of the author 's hy pothesis that Soviet policy during this periodwas tactical in nature, but also reveals that Litvinov disagreed with it.In conn ection with Soviet-German political relations in the early part of 1939 manyhistorians have speculated about the significance and conten t of a discussion between Hitler a ndMerekalov, the Soviet ambassador. at a reception on 12 January 1939. However, according toMerekalov's report of the discussion (God krizisa, vol. 1, do c. 110) an exchange of pleasantr ieswas all tha t occurred. Further. Soviet reports of trade negotiations with the G erm ans (God krizisa,vol. 1, docs 101. 104, 109. 124 an d 126) betray n o evide nce of any political game being played byMoscow. However, the political spin-off from enhancing trade relations with Germany wasprobably so obvious as not to m erit explicit mentio n. Certainly, when the economic negotiationsbroke down at the end of January Moscow's awareness of the negative political effects of thisdevelopment was only too obvious.For a recent interpretat ion which traces the origins of the Nazi-Soviet pact to Stalin'sspeech of 10 Marc h 1939 see R.C. Tucker, Stal in in Power: Th e Re~ ~o li i t io nror?z Above,1928-1941 (N ew York, W.W. Norto n, 1991).Watt, p. 164. In Hoiv Mar Carne: Th e Irnmediate Origins o f t h e Second W orld Wa r(Lon don, Heinem ann, 1989), Watt 's interpretation of the timing of the Soviet decision tonegotiate with N azi G erm any is mo re guarded tha n in the earlier essay. See especially chapters 13and 14.

God knzi sa, vol. 1, doc. 279. Merekalov was acting on instructions telegraphed byL i t \ ~ i n o \ ~n 5 April 1939 (vol. 1 doc. 252). According to the Soviet historian V. Ya. Sipols thiswas the only instruction sent to Merekalov during the period preceding the meeting withWeizsacker ('Kruglyi stol; Vtoray a Miro vaya Voina-Istoki i prichiny', Vopro sy istorii, 6 (1 989).p. 26). F or Weizsacker's version of the discussio n see hhzi-Soviet Relations 1939-1 94 1 (hereafterNSR ) (New York, Didier 1 948). pp. 1-2 an d Docur?zents on Gerrnan Foreign Policy (hereafterD GF P) , series D, vol. 6, doc. 2 17. Th e whole episode is examined in mo re detail in G. Roberts.'Infamo us E ncoun ter? Th e Merekalov-Weizsacker Meeting of 17 April 1939', Th e H istoricalJournal, December 199 1.Fo r Hitler's speeches see N. H . Baynes, ed., The Speeches ofAd ol fHi t ler (London, RoyalInstitute of International Affairs, 1942).l o On L i t \~ ino \~ ' sismissal see G. Roberts, 'The Fall of Litvinov', Journal o f Conternporarj)History, forthcoming 1992.l 1 NSR, p. 3. Astakhov's report o n his 5 May meeting with the Ge rma ns has yet to be


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published, although an extract from his report is contained in the notes to God krizisa (vol. 2,n. 98, p. 391).l 2 Merekalov returned to Moscow on 21 April and was subsequently a victim of the purgethat engulfed the Narkomindel central appara tus around the time of Litvinov's sacking in early

May. See Roberts, The Lrnholj~4lliance, p. 127.l 3 God krizisa, vol. 1, doc. 329. Stumm's report of the meeting is in NSR, pp. 3-4. See alsothe memoirs of I. F. Filippov, Zapisk i o Tret'ern Reikhe, Moscow, 1966, pp. 30-3 1; Filippov wasthe Tass journalist being introduced by Astakhov.l 4 God kririsa, vol. 1, doc. 341. Among the rumours Astakhov was referring to in this letterwas an AP report of 8 May 1939 that a Russo-German pact was imminent. See Docur?zentsDiplornatiques Francais, 2nd series, vol. 16, doc. 105.God lcrizisa, vol. 1, doc. 349.l 6 NSR, pp. 4-5. Schnurre dates the meeting as 17 rather than 15 May.l 7 God krizisa, vol. 1, doc. 362. Schulenburg's account of the meeting is in NSR, pp. 5-9.IS NSR, p. 6.l 9 God lcrizisa, vol. 1 pp. 482-483.20 Ibid. doc. 384. For Weizsacker's report see NSR, pp. 12-17.2 i Cited by M. I. Pankrashova, 'V kanun vtoroi mirovoi voiny, 1939g', Novaya i noveishayaistoriya, 5 (1985), p. 118.22 J. Degras, ed., Soviet Docurnents on Foreign Policy, vol. 3 (London, Oxford UniversityPress, 1953), pp. 332-340.23 On the German-Soviet economic negotiations see DGFP , series D, vol. 6 passim. AlsoGod krlzisa, vol. 2, docs 388 and 412.24 God kririsa, vol. 2, doc. 4 13. Another meeting of Astakhov's around this time should bementioned here. On 14 June Astakhov met Draganov, the Bulgarian ambassador in Berlin. Thenext day the Bulgarian spoke to Ernst Woermann, head of the political division of the GermanForeign Office. According to Woermann's memorandum of his conversation with Draganov,Astakhov had told the Bulgarian that a 'rapprochement with Ge rm an y. . .was closest to thedesires of the Soviet Union'. Further, that Astakhov had stated that 'if Germany would declarethat she would not attack the Soviet Union or that she would conclude a non-aggression pact withher, the Soviet Union would probably refrain from concluding a treaty with England. . .Severalcircumstances also spoke for [continuing] to conduct the pact negotiations with England in adilatory manner. In this case the Soviet Union would continue to have a free hand in any conflict

which might break out'. (NSR, p. 21). Not surprisingly, those historians who argue that Moscowwanted a deal with Berlin all along-notwithstanding the triple alliance negotia tions with Britainand France being conducted at this time-have seized on this report as evidence for their views.However, we now have Astakhov's version of his conversation with Draganov (God kririsa, Vol.2, doc. 403). According to Astakhov's diary entry on the meeting the conversation went asfollows. Draganov expressed the view that Germany would only start a war if a pact between theUSSR and Britain were concluded, but that if there were no pact then the problem of Danzig andthe Polish corridor would be resolved without war. Further, that if there were an Anglo-Soviet-French pact then the Poles would provoke a conflict. 'You would do better to spin out thenegotiations', Astakhov quotes Draganov as saying, 'if you are worried about the appearance ofGermans in the Baltic, Bessarabia, etc., you can make an agreement with the Germa ns who wouldreadily enter into the broadest exchange of views on these questions'. Astakhov concluded hisreport with an aside that on this occasion Draganov was much more frankly an apologist for theGerman line than previously.25 Ibid. doc. 442. Schulenburg's account of the meeting, which puts a more optimistic glosson it than Molotov's, is in NSR, pp. 26-30.26 God lcrizisa, vol. 2, doc. 485.27 Ibid. doc. 494.28 Ibid. doc. 503. Also present at the meeting was E. Babarin, Soviet trade representative inBerlin. For Schnurre's account, which appears to conflate the meetings on 24 and 26 July; seeNSR, pp. 32-36.29 God lcrizisa, vol. 2, doc. 510.30 See 193 9 god: CTroki storii (Moscow, 1990), p. 447.3 1 God lcrizisa, vol. 2, doc. 5 1 1.32 See Roberts, The C'nho1.v Alliance, chapter 7. The Soviet documentation on the triplealliance talks with Britain and France was first published in SS SR v borbe za m ir nakan une vtoroir?zirovoi v oin y (Moscow, 197 1) (English transla tion: Soviet Peace Ejjorts o n the Eve o f World Wa r11, 2 vols., Moscow 1973). Some additional documents are reproduced in God krizisa.


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T H E S O V IE T -N A Z I P A C T 7733 SSSR v borbe za rnir.. ., doc. 376. With regard to the triple alliance negotiations oneshould also bear in mind that Stalin and Molotov may have had intelligence information onAnglo-French foreign policy, including on Lon don's own confidential contacts with Berlin, whichwould have revealed the British and French private dou bts and internal divisions about the triplealliance project. On this point see Alexander Yakovlev's report from the special commission onthe Nazi-Soviet pact set up by the Congress of People's Dep uties in Ju ne 1989.The report waspublished in Pravda, 24 December 1989. (Hereafter referred to as the Yakovlev Report). Thenature an d source of this information remains unclear. bu t one of the sources may have been aforeign office clerk. Joh n H erbert King. See 11.C. W att, ' [John] Herbert King: A Soviet Source inthe Foreign Office', Intelligence and h htio na l Security, October 1988.34 In this connection the Yakovlev Report refers to the Soviet leadership's access tointelligence information that Germ any planned to attack Po land in AugustISeptember. O ne of thesources was the reported remarks of Kleist, a Ribbentrop aide. in early May 1939. These werepassed on t o Stalin. who wrote a note on the report asking for the n ame of the source. See IzvestiyaTsK KPSS. 3 (1990 ), pp. 216-219.35 The use of the term 'non-policy' is inspired by G. Lundestad, T h e Ar?zerican Nan-PolicyTowards Eastern Europe, 1943-1947 (New York, Hum anities Press, 1975), but the meaning inthe present context differs from that o f Lundestad.36 God krizisa. vol. 2, doc. 504. Astakhov's letter to P otem kin is dated 27 July. but was notreceived in Moscow until 3 1 July.37 Ibid. , doc. 523. For Ribbentrop's report of the meeting see NSR. pp. 37-39.3 8 God krizisa, vol. 2. doc. 525. For Schulenburg's report of the meetin g see NSR , pp. 39-41,where he concludes that 'my overall impression is that the Soviet Government is at presentdeterm ined to sign with England a nd France if they fulfil all Soviet wishes' and th at it would 'takea considerable effort on our part to cause the Soviet government to swing about' .39 God krizisa, vol. 2 , doc. 528.40 On the Anglo-Soviet-French military negotiation s see Rob erts, Th e Crnholy Alliance,chapter 7 and p. 154. Dim itrii Volkogonov in his biography of Stalin (Triurn f i tragediya, vol. 2 ,part 1 (Moscow, 1989), p. 20) refers to the written instructions given to Voroshilov, the head ofthe Soviet military delegation: 'Considerations on the Negotiations with England and France'.This document apparently outlined the military options for an agreement between the threestates-options which were subsequently presented to the British and French during the actualnegotiations. O f interest too are the m emoirs of Alexander Po nom arev ( Tirnes, 34 (1989)),

who acted as an interpreter at the talks. Finally, there is a telegram from Molotov to the Sovietambassador in Turkey on 2 August (see God krizisa, vol. 2. doc . 5 17). In this telegram Mo lotovinformed the ambassador abou t the talks with the British and French and, in view of these.instructed him to approach the Turks abou t the possibility of a linked Soviet-Turkish mutu alassistance treaty. On 2 August at least Moscow was still hoping for a successful outcome to theAnglo-Soviet-French negotiations.4 ' God krizisa, vol. 2 , doc. 529.42 Ibid. doc. 532.43 Ibid. doc. 534.4 4 Ibid. doc. 540. According to the Yakovlev Revort. 11 August was also the day of aPolitbureau meeting which decized to enter into offic&l discussions with Germ any. ~ a k o v l e vdoe s not give the source of this informatio n, how ever. Bezymensky (see note 1) indicates that thesource may be a report from the American embassy which was in turn based on confidentialinformation passed to it by a contact in the Germ an embassy in Moscow.45 God krizisa, vol. 2, doc. 541. Astakhov was recalled to Moscow in S eptem ber 1939. He wassubsequently purged and died in a labour cam p in 1942.46 Ibid. doc. 556 . Fo r Schulenburg's report of the meeting see NSR , pp. 52-57. Th e telegramfrom the Soviet embassy in Rom e at the end of June reporting on the so-called 'Schulenburg Plan'is doc. 437 in God krizisa, vol. 2. The origin of these rumours concerning the Schulenburg Planappears to have been Han s von Herwarth, Second Secretary of the German embassy in Moscow,who was passing confidential information about Soviet-German discussions to a contact in theItalian embassy. F rom there it found its way back to Ro me a nd the n, via the Soviet embassy, backto Moscow. See H. von Hem arth , Against Tw o Evils (London, Collins, 1981).47 God krizisa. vol. 2, doc. 570. Schulenburg's report is in NSR, pp. 59-61.4 8 God krizisa, vol. 2, doc. 572. Schulenburg's report is in NSR. pp. 64-65.49 Th e suggestion that Stalin initially invited R ibben trop to Moscow with a view to forcingthe British and French to come to term s is put foward by Alexander Y akovlev in his interview inPravda, 18 August 1989. Yakovlev offers no evidence, however.


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j0 God krizzsa. vol. 2, docs 582 and 583. For the German record of the Stalin-Hitlerexchanges see NSR, pp. 66-69.5 1 NSR, p. 78. The Russian text of the secret protocols, reproduced from Soviet foreignpolicy archive copies of the original, is in God k r i z~sa , ol. 2, doc. 603. According to Bezymensky

(see note l) , the decision to include this text was only taken o n the eve of publication in 1990.j2 God krizisa, vol. 2, p. 278.j3 See 'Vnov' o dogovore 1939 goda', in Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 28February 1990, which reproduces a photocopy of the internal minu te (p. 59) on the transfer of theoriginals of the secret protocols.j4 See, for example, Alexander Yakovlev's interview in Pravda, 18 August 1989 for one ofmany assertions in the Soviet media tha t only Stalin and M olotov knew about the secret protocol.5 5 This is the suggestion of the Yakovlev Report.j6 The only extant German diplomatic document on the conversations of 23 August is amem orand um of a conversation between Stalin, Molotov and Rib bentro p immediately after theconclusion of the pact (see NSR, pp. 72-76). This reveals nothing ab out the negotiations thatpreceded the pact nor anything about the agreement the participants thought they had concluded.j7 For a sum mary of the negotiations of 23 August based on the available Germ an m emo irmaterial see A. Read & D. Fisher , The Deadly Em brace: Hitler, Stalin and th e Nazi-S olslet Pact1939-1941 (Lond on, Michael Joseph, 1988), chapter 23 and W att, H O I L .W a r C a m e , chapter 24.j8 W. S. Churchill, Th e Gathering Storm (Lo ndo n, Cassell, 1964 ), p. 346.j9 S S S R Y borbe za mir. . ., doc. 445.60 Telegram from Beck to Grzybowski in W. Jedrzejewicz, ed., Diplomat in Berlin1933-1939 (New York, Colum bia U niversity Press, 1968). See also Documents Diplomat iq~iesFrancais, 2nd series, vol. 18, doc. 37 4.6 1 Degras, pp. 361-362.Se e Documents on Polish-Solslet Relations, 1939-1945, vol. 1 (Lon don, Hein eman n,1961), doc. 36; Documents on British Foreign Pol~cy, rd series, vol. 7, doc. 694; and ForeignRelations of the United States 1939, vol. 1, pp. 348-349.Th e Polish W hit e Book: Ofic ial D oc un ~e nt s oncerning Polish-German and Polish-SolszetRelat ions 1933-1939 (Lon don, Hutchinson, 1940), p. 209.6 4 Degras, pp. 363-371.6 5 The treatment of Comintern policy is based on material from the Comintern archivesreproduced in 'Komintern i Sovetsko-Germanskii dogovor o nenapadenii ' , I z~~e s t i y asK K PSS,

12 (1989). See also the essay by the British scholar Monty Johnstone, who was given access toCom intern archives for the same period: ' Introduction' to F. King & G . Matthews, eds., AboutTurn: The C om n~ un ls t ar ty and the Outbreak of he Second World W ar (London, Lawrence &Wishart, 1990).66 Cited by Alexander Yakovlev in this interview in Pravda, 18 August 1989 .6 7 DG FP , series D , vol. 7 docs. 360, 382, 383, 387, 388, 413, 414, 424.6 8 NSR, p. 86 See also Ribbentrop's telegram to Schulenburg on 15 September (NSR, pp.93-94) and Schulenburg's report of 20 September that 'Molotov hinted that the originalinclination entertain ed by the Soviet government and Stalin personally to permit the existence ofa residual Poland had given way to the inclination to partition Poland' . (NSR , p. 101).69 NSR , pp. 90-91.70 On Soviet foreign policy after the pact see Roberts, The Unholy .4lliance, chapters 9-1 5.7 1 On the question of the decision to p artition Poland, the West Germ an historian IngeborgFleischhauer has unearthed from the personal archives of Schulenburg, the Germ an am bassad orin Moscow from 1934-1941, some hitherto unknown transcripts of the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Stalin conversations in Moscow at the end of September 1939. The main interest of thesedocu men ts lies in the light which they throw on Soviet policy towards the Baltic States in autu mn1939. However, one of the docum ents records the following stateme nt from Rib bentro p whichconfirms the hypothesis t hat no decision on partitioning Poland was taken on 23 August 1939:"One question th at remained unresolved during the Moscow negotiations of August 23, 1939 wasthat of creating an indep enden t Poland. Since then the idea of a clear partition of Poland seemedto have become nearer to the Soviet government's understanding as well. The Germangovernment had appreciated this point of view and decided on a clear delimitation". (SeeInternational dffa irs (.Mosco~v),August 1991 , pp. 1 14-1 29, p. 11 9 for the quote.) Fleischh auer isalso the au thor of a very imp ortant b ook o n Soviet-German relations in 1939, recently publishedin Russian translation: Pakt: Gitler, Stalin i initsiativa germanskoi diplomatii, 1938-1939(Moscow 1991). Th e book's inte rpretation s and con clusions on Soviet policy are broadly similarto those argued in the present article, and it provides by far the best account of the course ofGerm an foreign policy in the period leading up to the pact.

000092 Soviet Decision to Pact With Hitler

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Transcript of 000092 Soviet Decision to Pact With Hitler