Trans-scalar embeddedness and governance deficits in global

production networks: crisis in South African fruit

Abstract

The governance of labour in global production networks (GPNs) has become a critical area

of concern amongst academics and policymakers alike. To date, GPN research has focused

on the role of private company codes and multi-stakeholder ethical initiatives primarily driven

by lead-firms. Other GPN studies highlight the critical role of civil society organisations

(CSOs) in challenging lead-firm purchasing practices and shaping regulatory outcomes at

local production sites. However, GPN research has not sufficiently incorporated the role of

nation states in regulating work through legislative frameworks and enforcement regimes,

often referred to in the literature as ‘state’ or ‘public’ governance. This is despite a ‘regulatory

renaissance’ taking place across certain developing countries, seeking to strengthen their

national regulatory labour institutions (Piore and Schrank, 2008:1).

The GPN framework provides an analytical lens through which to conceptualise cross-

cutting strands of trans-scalar governance regimes, involving complex networks of state,

private and civil society actors operating at multiple scales. Notions of territorial and societal

embeddedness are used to elucidate how global ethical standards derived from particular

country contexts become enmeshed in national regulatory frameworks and local societal

relations, shaping governance outcomes for precarious workers incorporated into GPNs.

The paper draws attention to the ‘trans-scalar embeddedness’ of labour governance regimes

which interact across geographical scales and, in the case of South African fruit, reflect a

‘trans-scalar governance deficit’ for precarious workers. It is argued that the influence of

national regulatory regimes should be more fully incorporated into analytical frameworks for

understanding governance outcomes in GPNs.

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Keywords: global production networks, trans-scalar, embeddedness, governance, labour,

precarious

Word count: 8996

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1. Introduction

This paper provides a theoretically grounded analysis of the role of nation-states in

governing work in global production networks (GPNs). It does so by taking a specifically

geographical approach to locate national regulatory frameworks in the broader context of

trans-scalar state, private, public-private and civil society governance initiatives. This line of

enquiry is undertaken both to reflect the recent acknowledgement that nation states play a

key role in shaping the governance of labour, and demonstrate that the significance of state

governance needs to receive greater analytical attention in GPN analysis than has been the

case thus far.

The paper makes two principle contributions. Firstly, it elucidates the critical role of national

laws and regulations in interacting with global corporate practices and civil society strategies

across geographical scales to shape governance outcomes for labour in GPNs. Secondly, it

develops a theoretically grounded notion of national regulatory frameworks that accounts for

the trans-scalar dynamics of labour governance processes, drawing upon Smith’s (2015)

strategic-relational understanding of the state1. In exploring these two ideas, the paper

proposes that conceptualisations of state governance in GPNs can benefit from engagement

with notions of embeddedness. In this respect, the paper utilises and develops concepts of

territorial and societal embeddedness to understand how trans-scalar governance strategies

are derived from particular contexts and play out for different groups of workers incorporated

into GPNs. The paper advances these concepts by drawing attention to the ‘trans-scalar

embeddedness’ of labour governance regimes which interact across geographical scales

and, in the case of South African fruit, reflect a ‘trans-scalar governance deficit’ for

precarious2 members of a variegated workforce incorporated into GPNs. 1 In this paper, I refer specifically to Smith’s (2015) understanding and application of the state’s strategic-relational role in the context of broader GPNs. It is important to note that Smith (2015) draws upon Jessop’s (1990, 2008) original strategic-relational conceptualisation of the state.2 ‘Precarious’ work is adopted here as a generic term encompassing more insecure forms of employment including temporary and seasonal work on short-term contracts. This refers to workers increasingly employed through third party labour brokers and migrant labour (Theron et al., 2005).

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Against a backdrop of de-regulation and trade liberalisation, numerous commentators have

argued that the spread of global production has contributed to deteriorating labour

conditions, particularly in developing countries. A key dimension highlighted is lead firm

purchasing practices, which pressurise suppliers into producing high quality, low cost

products with short lead times (Barrientos, 2013; Kaplinsky, 1998). This has driven a

process of labour force casualization, associated with poor wages and insecure employment

arrangements (Burawoy, 1983; Sengenberger, 2002). Consequently, improving labour

conditions in global production has become a significant agenda for firms, governments and

civil society organisations, prompting a plethora of geographically dispersed governance

strategies (Bartley, 2011; Nadvi, 2008; Posthuma and Nathan, 2010; Locke, 2013).

However, theorisation and empirical investigation of labour governance has varied

significantly between different bodies of literature. An emerging strand of political science

research has acknowledged and prioritised the role of national state regulatory frameworks

in addressing labour standards and compliance rates in global production (Pires, 2008; Piore

and Schrank, 2008; Amengual, 2010; Coslovsky, 2011; Locke, 2013). Whereas, research

into the governance of transnational trading networks undertaken in the GPN domain has a

tendency to relegate the state’s regulatory influence and focus on global corporate

strategies, such as private company codes and public-private ethical initiatives, along with

the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in shaping governance outcomes across

geographical scales.

The first section of this article reviews how governance of labour has been treated by GPN

theorists - an influential analytical frame for understanding the spatiality and inter-

connectivity of transnational production networks. The discussion outlines that nation-state

based governance strategies remain under-theorised and investigated in much existing GPN

literature, with a predominant focus on corporate and civil society strategies. With that in

mind, I draw upon Smith’s (2015) strategic-relational framework to help conceptualise and

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locate the nation-state’s regulatory role in the broader architecture of GPN governance.

Notions of embeddedness (territorial and societal) are discussed, which help account for the

diversity of trans-scalar governance strategies derived from, and shaped by geographically

dispersed social and institutional contexts.

The second section then explores the trans-scalar governance of labour on thirteen

commercial fruit farms located in Ceres, South Africa connected to GPNs. This case serves

to underline the central role of national state governance in determining labour outcomes in

the context of global corporate and localised civil society strategies. Concepts of societal and

territorial embeddedness are drawn upon to highlight how commercially driven networks are

embedded in, and constrained by, particular social and institutional contexts at global,

national and local scales. In particular, the discussion highlights how GPNs are embedded

in, and governed by global corporate and public-private strategies such as the Ethical

Trading Initiative (ETI) base code, national regulatory frameworks and cross-cutting civil

society activity. Such an approach serves to elucidate how complex combinations of codes,

standards and laws derive from particular contexts and interact across geographical scales.

Moreover, the case highlights an inability of trans-scalar governance to address the

commercial pressures and power asymmetries inherent in GPNs, resulting in a trans-scalar

governance deficit for precarious members of an increasingly variegated workforce

incorporated into fruit GPNs.

Section three examines in depth a labour crisis which occurred in the case study location

and spread throughout the Western Cape fruit sector, serving to illuminate an inherent

tension in the state’s strategic-relational role in the wider GPN, trans-scalar governance

interactions across spatial scales and the resulting deficit facing precarious workers. The

concluding section further unpacks the notion of trans-scalar embeddedness of diverse

governance strategies in GPNs, and considers the conceptual and policy implications of this

case.

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This paper is based on fieldwork data obtained for a broader research project undertaken in

2012/2013. The primary research location was Ceres, a town located approximately 160km

northeast of Cape Town and at the heart of South Africa’s fruit export industry. The research

involved GPN mapping and in-depth case study of thirteen commercial farming units

producing deciduous fruit (apples, pears, peaches, apricots, plums) for export to lead firm

European supermarkets via integrated global production networks. In total, the research

involved 117 semi-structured interviews with farmworkers, government, civil society and

commercial actors, along with four focus group discussions with 21 farmworkers (Alford,

2015). An additional and extended period of key informant interviews and secondary

research was undertaken to document the labour crisis in the Western Cape fruit sector in

2012/2013. The objective of this phase of research was to investigate how tensions within

and between state, private (firm; industry associations), civil society (trade unions; NGOs)

actors and farmworkers operating in fruit GPNs played out over the labour crisis, and the

implications for trans-scalar governance of labour.

2. Global production networks and the trans-scalar governance of labour:

acknowledging the centrality of the state and processes of embeddedness

i) GPN analysis and embeddedness

Whilst numerous and varied frameworks abound through which to understand the

functioning of global supply networks (for further discussion, refer to Henderson et al., 2002;

Gereffi et al., 2005; Coe et al., 2008), this paper outlines and draws upon the global

production network (GPN) framework as a specifically geographical approach. In particular,

attention is placed on the explanatory power of the GPN approach with reference to the

governance of labour. As observed by others, the GPN approach is influenced by global

commodity chains (GCCs) and global value chains (GVCs) frameworks emanating from

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economic sociology and development studies. However, as will be elaborated in further

detail below, the GPN framework’s geographical underpinning facilitates analysis of the

spatiality and embeddedness of trans-scalar governance strategies.

GPNs are understood as ‘the globally organised nexus of interconnected functions and

operations by firms and non-firm institutions through which goods and services are produced

and distributed’ (Coe et al., 2004:471; Dicken et al., 2001; Henderson et al., 2002; Coe et al.,

2008). The notion of the network is used to account for the ‘nexus of inter-connected

functions, operations and transactions’ between states, firms, civil society organisations,

labour and consumers operating at multiple geographical scales (Coe et al., 2008:272). A

key focus is on the social interactions between these various actors that comprise the

production network architecture and the degree to which cross-border trade is driven by

powerful multi-national corporations (MNCs), whilst accounting for the embeddedness of

production network dynamics in different locations and the importance of trans-scalar

governance processes (Henderson et al., 2002). In this sense, the GPN approach

constructed by economic geographers highlights ‘the interplay of power, value, and

embeddedness dynamics at and across different spatial scales’ (Coe and Hess, 2005:457).

The reference to power resounds with ‘the more specific notion of chain governance

advanced by GVC scholars’ (Hughes et al., 2008:348), defined as ‘the process of organising

activities with the purpose of achieving a certain functional division of labour along the chain

– resulting in specific allocations of resources and distributions of gains’ (Ponte and Gibbon,

2005:3, cited in Hughes et al., 2008:348). More critical strands of this literature have

highlighted the ability of lead-firms to obtain economic rents through technologically

advanced sourcing strategies, economies of scale and branding, placing them in an

oligopolistic position relative to their fragmented supplier base located in developing

countries (Nathan and Kalpana, 2007; Milberg and Winkler, 2013). This enables lead firms to

increase profits through pressurising suppliers to reduce production costs, whilst demanding

that suppliers adhere to increasingly stringent quality, environmental and ethical standards.

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Within this ‘catch 22’, suppliers are driven to flexibilise their labour force to reduce both wage

and non-wage costs (e.g. social insurance, housing costs) associated with regular

employment contracts (Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2004; Kaplinsky, 2005). In this sense, the

commercial drivers inherent in global production networks contribute to an increased usage

of precarious workers, employed on insecure contracts and with limited access to civil

society representation (Kidder and Raworth, 2004; Standing, 1999).

A number of studies have drawn attention to a ‘governance deficit’ facing a growing army of

precarious workers operating in GVCs/GPNs. Here, the term ‘governance deficit’ refers to a

lack of regulatory and social protection for precarious workers incorporated into

GVCs/GPNs, in contrast to permanent workers employed on formal contracts. Some have

used gender analysis of GVCs and GPNs to highlight the commercial drivers of production

and limitations of private governance, including codes of conduct, in protecting precarious

labour (of which women constitute a significant percentage) (Barrientos, 2008; Hale and

Wills, 2005; Kidder and Raworth, 2004). Other studies highlight that even where legislation

and codes are formally sanctioned at the base of global production networks, enforcement is

often weak, especially for more precarious and vulnerable workers including women and

migrants (Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2004; O’Rourke, 2006; Schrank, 2009). Additional

research highlights a lack of civil society protection and representation afforded to precarious

workers incorporated into GPNs (Barrientos, 2013), contributing further to the governance

deficit facing this increasingly vulnerable and transient component of the workforce.

However, whilst precarious workers occupy the weakest bargaining position in production

networks (Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2004), the GPN approach draws attention to embedded

social, institutional and governance frameworks which mediate the economic activities of

private firms along the value chain. Such processes are referred to more specifically in the

GPN literature as ‘territorial’ and ‘societal’ embeddedness. As per one of the founding

versions of the GPN framework, the ‘first form, territorial, deals with the various GPN firms

“anchoring” in different places (from the nation-state to the local level), which affects the

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prospects for the development of those locations’ (Henderson et al., 2002:452, emphasis in

original version). Subsequently, Hess (2004:176) draws upon the work of Karl Polanyi (1944)

and advances the notion of ‘societal embeddedness’, referring to the ‘genetic code’ of both

firm and non-firm actors, shaped by the societal contexts from which they originate or are

based, and the influence this has on their actions and/or priorities in GPNs.

Such forms of territorial and societal embeddedness have been most commonly considered

at national and local sites of production in GPN studies, reminding us that ‘economic

actors…are always embedded in dense social and institutional networks of relations

(including labour relations and state regulations)’ (Bair, 2005:169, citing Smith et al., 2002).

This can include civil society (trade union and NGO) activity in mediating the employer-

employee relationship, as well as national regulatory frameworks and localised enforcement

agencies tasked with implementing local labour laws. However, more recent studies have

shown territorial and societal embeddedness can also apply to spaces of retail and

consumption at the global scale (Hughes et al., 2008; Hughes et al., 2013). For instance,

Hughes et al. (2008) show how societal and territorial forms of embeddedness play a central

role in determining ethical trading strategies of lead firms based in the UK and US, through

complex processes of civil society campaigning, media and consumer activity.

Consequently, a trans-scalar perspective is central to GPN analysis in helping to understand

complex linkages between commercial and social networks of embedded actors and

institutions across geographical scales (Henderson et al., 2002; Coe et al., 2008). This has

significant implications for our understanding of how labour is governed by a diversity of

actors in GPNs, and the interactions across various governance strands.

ii) Governing labour in GPNs: a trans-scalar perspective

A central and well explored dimension of labour governance refers to global corporate

strategies and ethical trade initiatives, characterised by the application of social codes and

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standards driven by lead-firm supermarkets as a condition of supply (Henson and Humphrey

2010). Such voluntary interventions have proliferated in light of the lack of global

enforcement of ILO conventions and adequate WTO social clauses. These global corporate

strategies come in the form of private company codes and public-private initiatives, such as

the ETI base code, which is shaped by a broader range of ‘corporations, NGOs, trade

unions, national government representatives and consumer groups’ (Hughes et al.,

2008:354). These global private and public-private strategies have become key tools in the

governance of labour in GPNs.

An additional strand of GPN research has highlighted the critical role of civil society

organisations in shaping the labour governance process across multiple geographical

scales. At the global scale, civil society activity includes challenging corporate/ethical

strategies and lead-firm approaches to labour standards (Cumbers et al., 2008). Hughes et

al. (2008) usefully point out that lead-firm driven ethical strategies are shaped both by their

corporate culture and institutional environment (societal embeddedness) and the influence of

CSOs in challenging lead-firm behaviour, which varies across particular spaces and country

contexts (territorial embeddedness). At national and local scales, GPNs become embedded

in particular civil society configurations, which play a key role in influencing governance

outcomes at local sites of production. This can be through mediating the employer-employee

relationship and monitoring the enforcement and compliance of labour standards (Castree et

al., 2004; Padmanabhan, 2012; Jordhus-Lier, 2012). However, the role of state regulatory

institutions in governing labour in global production has been largely ignored in GPN

research thus far.

The reasons for this neglect can be attributed to the origins of the GCC and GVC literatures,

which have strongly informed subsequent GPN scholarship and emerged in the late 1980s

when state regulatory structures were retreating and private firms were more actively

engaging in transnational exchange relations. A core argument of this emerging literature

was that governance, a term previously restricted to the role of the state in political activity,

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could be applied to economic relations coordinated by and between private companies. This

led to Gereffi’s (1994) seminal distinction between buyer and producer driven chains and

numerous adaptations have been proposed since, to better understand how private firms are

able to govern economic transactions and downstream suppliers (Gereffi et al., 2005). Whilst

informative, this analytical and empirical preoccupation with private governance has resulted

in GCC, GVC and GPN theorists downplaying state regulatory mechanisms.

A separate body of political science literature has acknowledged the critical role of national

laws and regulations, referred to here as ‘state governance’, as constituting a revitalised

form of labour governance in certain developing and emerging country contexts (Coslovsky,

2011; Pires, 2008; Piore and Schrank, 2008:1). This work suggests a renewed role for state

governance has the potential to improve the enforcement of, and compliance with labour

standards in developing countries integrated into global production. Subsequent research

has acknowledged that national labour regulations and enforcement agencies can effectively

complement private codes, resulting in improved labour conditions in supply chains

(Amengual, 2010; Bartley, 2011; Locke, 2013). However, this research tends to lack a wider

appreciation of the broader commercial dynamics of global production which shape

governance outcomes for different groups of labour incorporated into GPNs.

Whilst this paper recognises the need to reinsert the state into analysis of labour governance

in GPNs, it goes a step further and advances a more rigorous conceptualisation of state

governance in the context of global production networks. This builds upon Smith’s (2015)

claims that despite GPN research acknowledging that institutional context matters, there

remains a lack of theorisation of the state in GPN research (Smith 2015). Drawing upon

Smith’s (2015:298) recent theorisation of the state in global production, this paper adopts a

strategic-relational approach for understanding state frameworks ‘not simply as a functionary

of capitalism’, but one which recognises internal struggles within the state (at different

scales) and wider social forces, as well as the ‘evolving multi-scalar sites of state

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regulation…which are so central to the operation of GPNs across global and macro-regional

spaces’.

Though I am in agreement with Smith that understanding integration of nation-states into

world markets requires an appreciation of ‘multi-scalar state-to-state intersections’, I would

add that it demands an understanding of trans-scalar interactions across inter-state (ILO;

national laws and regulations), private (company codes of conduct), public-private (i.e.

Ethical Trading Initiative) and civil society (NGOs and trade unions operating at multiple

geographical scales) actors and regimes. To clarify, this requires locating national state

regulation of labour in the broader context of globalised production and new scales of state

and public-private governance, at global/multi-lateral levels (e.g. the ILO; Ethical Trading

Initiative). It also requires accounting for social forces such as civil society, which operate

across global, national and local geographical scales and contest and challenge labour

governance outcomes in important ways.

This study draws upon the GPN approach to account for governance initiatives shaped by a

diversity of state, private and civil society actors that cross-cut geographical scales in the

South African fruit GPN. The GPN framework’s notion of territorial and societal

embeddedness provides a framework for conceptualising how lead-firm commercial

practices and private labour standards are shaped by and originate from particular host-

country locations, and become enmeshed in national regulatory frameworks, local labour

agencies and civil society configurations at sites of production. This study combines previous

analysis of governance and territorial/societal embeddedness, to conceptualise the ‘trans-

scalar embeddedness’ of labour governance in South African fruit GPNs. This helps account

for the diversity of dispersed and yet cross-cutting governance strands which originate from,

and become embedded in particular places of retail and production. This is complemented

with a more thorough conceptualisation of state governance, drawing upon Smith’s (2015)

strategic relational framework to locate state regulatory frameworks in the wider GPN.

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3. Trans-scalar governance of labour in South African fruit GPNs: a

geographical perspective

The commercial dynamics of South African fruit transformed dramatically following

agricultural de-regulation in 1997. During the reign of the previous apartheid regime, high

levels of state support were afforded to the commercial fruit and wider agriculture sector,

including research and design, interest rate subsidies and price supports through a highly

regulated marketing system (Williams et al., 1998). This system of price provisions resulted

in the Marketing Act of 1937, prompting the formulation of producer dominated marketing

boards and the control of various aspects of the production process, including the

movement, price setting, quality standards, sale and distribution of agricultural products.

Contrary to popular critiques, the post-apartheid agricultural policy was not simply a neo-

liberal vision (see Terreblanche, 2002), but involved a mixed approach of regulating labour

conditions alongside an extensive programme of agricultural market de-regulation (Ewert

and Du Toit, 2005). Despite ongoing and conflicting debates in the post-apartheid era about

the future direction of the country’s economic policy amongst both academic and

government officials,, the state opted for ‘an orthodox “Washington consensus” style

macroeconomic framework’, which involved a process of neo-liberal oriented market

restructuring and trade liberalization (Mather and Greenberg, 2003:393). This included the

abolition of the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS), an export subsidy that had

benefited numerous agricultural export products; the tariffication of agricultural import

restrictions in terms of South Africa’s World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments; and

the de-regulation of agricultural markets through the repeal of the Marketing Act and its

replacement by the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act (Du Toit, 2004b).

Following de-regulation, fruit producers were opened up to increasingly concentrated and

co-ordinated European supermarket buyers either directly or via intermediary agents (Mather

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and Greenberg, 2003; Kritzinger et al., 2004). Previous studies have drawn attention to the

ability of supermarket buyers in the commercial fruit sector to control production without

direct ownership of the production process (Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2004; Dolan and

Humphrey, 2000). This has been achieved through the proliferation of private standards

enforced by lead firm supermarkets, which govern the quality and safety of fruit produced,

best-practice agricultural processes and ethical practices on farms. The ensuing commercial

pressures facing fruit producers relative to lead-firm supermarkets, combined with increasing

labour and production costs, have exacerbated ongoing restructuring of the agricultural farm

workforce in South Africa (Hortgro, 2012).

Subsequently, the increased use of precarious labour is highly evident in the fruit sector, with

an overall decrease in the number of permanent workers relative to seasonal workers. In the

table grape sector, permanent workers reduced from only 28 percent of the total table grape

workforce in 2007 to as little as 20 percent in 2010/2011 (SATI, 2011). More broadly,

employment statistics suggest that prior to de-regulation the agricultural workforce was

primarily comprised of permanent labour who resided on the farm, whereas from 2002

onwards roughly an equal number of permanent (on farm) and seasonal (on and off-farm)

farmworkers are operating in commercial agriculture (Stats SA, 2002, 2007, 2011). The use

of seasonal labour enables producers to manage increasingly stringent supermarket

demands; reduce spiralling wage and non-wage costs (such as social insurance and

housing) associated with regular contracts; and respond to market and climatic conditions

(semi-structured interviews, fruit producers; key informants). The transition from secure and

regular to more transient, seasonal contracts represents a shift towards precarious work and

heightened insecurity.

As per the GPN approach, these commercial pressures and transforming labour dynamics

are embedded in trans-scalar governance frameworks which mediate the economic activities

of private firms along the value chain. Such initiatives have emerged following significant

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transformations in governance dynamics in South African fruit since democratisation in the

mid-1990s, which ran parallel to agricultural de-regulation.

At the global scale, European supermarkets sourcing South African fruit responded to civil

society and consumer pressure by introducing private company codes of conduct designed

to ensure ethical labour practices within their supply chains (Friedberg, 2003; Tallontire et

al., 2005; Barrientos and Smith, 2007). A highly significant development in the South African

fruit sector has been the introduction of the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) base code in 1998

(ETI, 2005). The ETI base code includes a comprehensive set of criteria relating to working

conditions and has been adopted by most UK supermarkets sourcing fruit from South Africa

(Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Tallontire et al., 2005; Barrientos, 2008; Hughes et al., 2008;

Hughes et al., 2013). In contrast to individual company codes, the ETI code is a public-

private initiative developed by a broader range of state, private and civil society actors

including lead firm supermarkets, NGOs and trade union organisations, and based on core

ILO principles of decent work (Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2004; Dolan and Humphrey, 2000;

Tallontire et al., 2005; Barrientos and Smith, 2007). Analysis by Hughes et al. (2008) has

drawn attention to the significance of societal (‘genetic code’ of UK supermarket corporate

approaches, reflected by relational approaches to labour standards and multi-stakeholder

engagement with civil society actors) and territorial (ethical complex of civil society and

consumer strategies in the UK, placing pressure on lead firms to improve labour standards)

embeddedness in shaping lead-supermarkets’ adoption of the ETI base code in their

production networks.

At the national scale, fruit GPNs have become territorially embedded in the post-apartheid

state regulatory and institutional framework. Alongside processes of de-regulation, the state

strengthened labour regulatory institutions and introduced a raft of legislation which sought

to transform agricultural employment relations, with the overarching goal of strengthening

workers’ rights and eroding exploitative, paternalistic employer-employee relationships (Du

Toit, 2004a; Ewert and Du Toit, 2005). This can be attributed to the ‘societal embeddedness’

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or ‘genetic code’ of the post-apartheid state, formed by the societal context from which it

originated in an era of political transformation and socio-economic reform.

In brief, these include the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA), providing

farmworkers with a minimum set of standards relating to more tangible aspects of working

conditions, such as working hours, paid leave and formalising contracts; the agricultural

Sectoral Determination, establishing minimum wages and working conditions specific to

agricultural employment; the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA), designed to

ensure safe working conditions for farmworkers; the Extension of Security and Tenure Act

(ESTA) which increased farm workers’ tenure security rights; and the Labour Relations Act

(LRA), which extended farmworkers operating on South African fruit and agricultural farms

the right to trade union representation at local farm level (Barrientos et al., 2004; Theron et

al., 2007; Pons-Vignon and Ward, 2009; Benjamin, 2011).

These territorially embedded state and public-private governance strands have provided the

regulatory space for localised civil society organisations to protect and represent

farmworkers in the employer-employee bargaining relationship. Subsequently, horticultural

GPNs have become embedded in national and local networks of established CSOs such as

the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU), the agricultural branch of the Congress of

South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and smaller grassroots organisations such as

Sikhula Sonke (established by the NGO Women on Farms). These CSOs have taken steps

to gain access and represent farmworkers operating on fruit export farms in the Western

Cape (Ewert and Hamman, 1996; Mather and Adelzadeh, 1998; White, 2009; NALEDI,

2011). As will be described in further detail below, the ability of CSOs to access and protect

farmworkers incorporated into GPNs is shaped by a complex combination of global

commercial pressures driving workforce casualisation and societally embedded tensions

between fruit producers and CSOs.

Despite these trans-scalar governance initiatives which have emerged since the mid-1990s,

conditions are poor for a growing body of precarious farmworkers incorporated into fruit

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GPNs. Academic and civil society publications continue to document the increasing

vulnerability and insecurity of precarious farmworkers, who face low wages, restricted

access to social services, poor housing and limited rights relative to those in secure, regular

employment (Du Toit, 2004a; Barrientos et al., 2003; Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2004;

Devereux and Solomon, 2011; ActionAid, 2007; Oxfam, 2004; SANPERI, 2008; Human

Rights Watch, 2011). The remainder of this section will explore in further detail the extent to

which trans-scalar governance has addressed labour conditions for increasing numbers of

precarious workers incorporated into commercially driven fruit GPNs. In doing so, the study

provides unique insights into the dynamics of trans-scalar governance in GPNs and the

central role of embedded national regulatory frameworks in this broader architecture.

3.1 Trans-scalar governance of labour in South African fruit: case study

findings

On all thirteen farms under study, fruit producers had responded to a combination of global

commercial pressures and increased labour and production costs, by flexibilising their

workforce. This was reflected by the fact that the average ratio of seasonal relative to

permanent workers found across all of the sites was 68 to 32 per cent respectively during

high season.3 As stated above, these commercial processes become territorially embedded

in, and mediated by complex combinations of trans-scalar governance initiatives which will

be explored in the remainder of this sub-section.

High levels of compliance were observed with nation-state governance standards such as

minimum wage levels; basic conditions of employment (working hours; paid leave; contract

3 Increased levels of flexibilisation were generally found on the larger commercial fruit farms (in terms of production volume), whereby seasonal workers constituted as much as 68– 83 per cent of the overall workforce during high season, whereas on certain smaller farming units the seasonal component remained at only 38 – 43 per cent (semi-structured interviews, fruit producers and HR managers across thirteen farming units).

17

and record keeping); health and safety legislation and Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF)

payments. Furthermore, national laws and regulations set a higher standard than private

company codes and public-private ethical codes of conduct, meaning they comprised the

benchmark in terms of the baseline requirements for this set of working conditions. However,

this study found a ‘trans-scalar governance deficit’ facing precarious workers, at the core of

which lies a nation-state governance deficit, characterised by minimum wages insufficient to

meet living costs and compounded by a lack of trade union representation.

Precarious workers occupied the lowest skilled and paid functions, receiving wages that

were set at either the minimum wage or slightly above, depending on the category of

employee. In stark contrast, regular workers tended to occupy more skilled positions and

resided on the farm, receiving wages significantly higher than the legally determined

minimum benchmark4, along with decent on-farm housing; subsidised electricity and water;

funeral and provident funds5 on top of their standard cash wage. Table 1 provides an

indication of the varying remuneration levels afforded to regular, skilled workers and

precarious workers performing more manual ‘general’ tasks such as pruning, picking, sorting

and clearing6.

Table 1. Variations in wages paid to workers depending on skill grade (data collated

across 13 farming units)

Job description Wage range (per day) % more than

2012 minimum

wage of R69.42

4 Regular workers across all thirteen farms under study received between 22% - 203% more than the minimum wage of R69.42 per day during the time of research (August 2012). 5 All of the thirteen farms under study provided permanent workers with a provident fund, with the exception of FM1. 6 Table 1 indicates wage ranges within each job level, taking into account overlapping grades depending on experience, tenure and training of individual employees.

18

per day

Specialized equipment

operators and extra heavy

lorry drivers; transporters of

seasonal workers*; storeman;

builder; mechanic; supervisor

of large teams; stock check

duties.

R160 - R210 (all farms) 130% - 203%

Housekeeper; spray drivers;

tractor drivers; supervisors;

machine operators; crèche

teachers

R110 – R160 (all farms) 58% - 130%

Seasonal supervisors (who did

not perform this function

throughout the year); field

monitors and crèche

assistants; permanent female

pack-shed supervisors**.

Specialised third-party

contract workers operating in

teams.

R90 – R110 (all farms) 37% - 58%

Regularly employed irrigators

and domestic workers.

R85 – R90 (all farms) 22% - 37%

‘General’ farmworkers (regular

and seasonal): manual tasks

such as pruning, picking,

R85 (FM9, FM10, FM12) 22%

R75 (FM2, FM8, FM13) 8%

19

sorting, clearing etc. R72 (FM1, FM11) 4%

R69.42 (FM3, FM4, FM5, FM6, FM7) 0%

* This category of employee was not present on FM6, FM9, FM10, FM11, FM12, FM13

** This category of employee was not present on FM6 or FM7

Source: (semi-structured interviews, fruit producers and HR managers across thirteen

farming units under study)

The following statements reflect the perceptions held by precarious farmworkers operating at

the bottom of the pay-scale, regarding minimum wage levels being insufficient to meet living

costs:

‘69 rand a day is not enough, everything is too expensive now. You can’t have a 12kg

mealie-meal on that 69 rand.’ (semi-structured interview, seasonal farmworker, Ceres).

‘I have a problem with the minimum wage system, I can’t afford living expenses because the

farmer only actually pays the minimum wage, and I can’t afford to live with that kind of

money. I have children to support and I myself must live on that kind of money.’ (focus

group, seasonal farmworker, Ceres).

However, an additional layer of public-private governance protection was afforded to

farmworkers, due to the fact that the majority of fruit produced was exported to global

markets via co-ordinated GPNs, with the UK and continental Europe the primary export

destination of fruit produced. A combination of societal (genetic code of UK supermarket

corporate strategies) and territorial (civil society and consumer pressure) embeddedness at

the global scale has contributed to the adoption of the public-private ETI base code by lead

UK supermarkets. Consequently, in order to maintain contracts with UK lead firms, fruit

producers had to comply with the ETI base code. This study found that whilst the ETI base

code did increase enforcement levels of labour standards, it was not able to address the

governance deficit facing precarious workers. This was due to the fact that national laws and

20

regulations provided the higher benchmark for minimum wage payments which private

codes layered onto. This has resulted in a subsequent public-private governance deficit for

precarious workers, due to an inability of the ETI base code to address minimum wage

levels insufficient to meet everyday living costs. This observation reflects the trans-scalar

interactions between lead-firm driven public-private and national state-governance regimes,

along with their inability to address the governance deficit facing precarious farmworkers

operating on South African farms supplying European supermarkets.

On paper, nation-state (Labour Relations Act) and public-private (ETI base code 27)

governance standards extended farmworkers regulatory access to territorially embedded

networks of localised civil society protection. However, this has not materialised due to a

complex combination of global commercial pressures driving workforce casualisation and

societally embedded tensions between fruit producers and civil society organisations, further

restricting trade union access to farmworkers.

Fruit producers expressed the opinion that trade unions operating in the Western Cape fruit

sector, such as FAWU, Women on Farms and Sikhula Sonke, were politicised due to their

close associations with the ANC government, which they believed to hold a wider agenda

against a predominantly white commercial farming community. These historicised political

tensions between ANC affiliated trade unions and white commercial farmers date back to the

apartheid era, when white commercial farmers received high levels of economic support and

protection from the previous National Party (NP) government (Du Toit, 2004a). Following the

democratic transition and government withdrawal of economic subsidisation to commercial

fruit farmers, political tensions emerged as the newly elected ANC government sought to

redress previous regimes of labour exploitation via the raft of state governance protection

aimed at modernising labour relations on fruit farms in the Western Cape and across South

Africa. Consequently, these deeply embedded socio-political tensions between fruit

7 ETI base code 2: Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are respected

21

producers and ANC affiliated trade unions created barriers to worker organising on

commercial fruit farms in Ceres.

In addition, fruit producers repeatedly stated that rather than having a positive influence on

working conditions and the employer-employee negotiation process, trade unions served to

disrupt the close and paternalistic relationship between themselves and permanent

farmworkers, which existed on the farms and had formed over time8. Specifically, fruit

producers explained that the presence of external agencies such as trade unions served to

break this relationship, or as one employer put it, ‘drive an employee and an employer in

different ways’ (semi-structured interview, fruit producer). In this sense, societally embedded

paternalistic labour relations between fruit producers and permanent farmworkers had driven

tensions between producers and trade unions seeking to disrupt this pre-existing on-farm

dynamic.

As a result of these tensions between producers and trade unions and embedded

paternalistic practices, farmworkers were under extreme social pressures to refrain from

seeking external trade union representation. Permanent farmworkers received greater state

governance protection, combined with non-contractual social benefits associated with the

paternalistic employer-employee relationship. Consequently, permanent workers expressed

little desire or motivation to seek external trade union representation and risk disrupting their

employer-employee relationship.

In contrast, casual employees received significantly less state governance and paternalistic

protection and as a consequence, expressed views that trade unions could play an important

role in representing them in employer negotiations and improving their working conditions.

However, they felt this was unattainable due to the lack of trade union presence in Ceres,

along with their transient and vulnerable socio-economic status on the farms. Such a

8 Rather than constituting a benign and mutually beneficial relationship, paternalistic practices have been historically characterised by a dynamic of dependency and control, with farmworkers bound to the service of predominantly white landowners through complex systems of tied housing and the infamous ‘tot’ system (Du Toit, 2004a).

22

viewpoint was expressed during a semi-structured interview with a casual farmworker from

the Eastern Cape, on the topic of trade unions on commercial farms in Ceres:

‘There is no such thing that you hear about that. I would like to join one so they can look

after the way that I’m working and salary, and the housing conditions. But even that time

when we came here from the Eastern Cape and then we had the meeting with management,

they didn’t tell us about that stuff so we don’t mind about that, you just work….But maybe a

trade union can also cause a problem to us, because we stay far from our homes and we’re

here just for work and we came here like this and it’s a long time that the farm’s going on like

this, so we can’t just come and change it, so it’s not so easy for us’. (semi-structured

interview, casual farmworker, Eastern Cape).

Interviews with trade union organisers at three organisations (FAWU; Sikhula Sonke; BAWSI

and Allied Workers Union of South Africa (BAWUSA)) active in the Ceres area highlighted

the particular challenges of recruiting and representing migrant and contract labour, which

they perceived to be the most vulnerable group of precarious worker as opposed to locally

based on and off-farm casual labourers employed directly by the farm. With regards to

migrant labour, this was due to the transient and temporary nature of their employment. In

the case of third-party contracted labour, an inability to identify their ultimate employer

presented a significant obstacle to organising this category of casual farmworker. These

challenges to migrant and contract worker organising are indicated in the following extracts

from two trade union organisers operating on fruit farms in the Ceres area:

‘Casual and migrant workers have no security, they move from farm to farm depending on

where they can find a job. Labour contractor workers are also very difficult to organise,

because you don’t know who their employer is’ (semi-structured interview, trade union

organiser).

‘There is very little that unions can do for these migrant workers. Because it seems to me

like they are just like sheep, you just take them in and put him there and the days goes on

23

and when they are finished working, they just put them on the taxi or on a bus and they’re

gone’ (semi-structured interview, trade union organiser).

These various challenges to organising precarious workers were reflected by the fact that

none of the farms under study were unionised, and no farmworkers interviewed on these

farming units were represented by external agencies. Such an observation is reflected in the

wider literature on this topic, with previous case studies highlighting a lack of trade union

representation for workers on informal and insecure contracts incorporated into GPNs

(Barrientos and Smith, 2007; Barrientos et al., 2011; Locke, 2013). The absence of external

trade union representation on South African fruit farms has particularly stark consequences

for precarious workers, due to the lack of national regulatory and/or ETI governance

protection afforded to this transient group of employee, relative to on-farm workers in secure,

regular employment. This has resulted in a subsequent deficit of localised civil society

protection for precarious workers incorporated into South African fruit GPNs.

In summary, the empirical findings emanating from this case study have drawn attention to

the trans-scalar embeddedness of horticultural GPNs, reflected by a complex combination of

public-private, state and civil society governance regimes that transcend geographical scales

and combine in different ways to produce particular outcomes for different groups of a

flexibilised workforce. Moreover, the empirical findings indicate a ‘trans-scalar governance

deficit’ for precarious workers, characterised by minimum wages insufficient to meet living

costs and compounded by a lack of civil society protection. However, this governance deficit

must be understood in the broader context of the global commercial pressures facing local

producers which, combined with increased labour and production costs, has driven

increased use of precarious work on fruit farms connected to GPNs. It is argued that a

combination of global commercial pressure driving precarious work and an inadequate

response from a combination of public, private and CSO actors, has contributed to the trans-

scalar governance deficit facing precarious farmworkers. In turn, these combined pressures

contributed to a widespread labour crisis in 2012/2013, which spread throughout the

24

Western Cape fruit sector. The following section will turn to discuss this event, which served

to further elucidate trans-scalar governance interactions across spatial scales and the

ensuing deficit facing precarious farmworkers as the crisis unfolded.

4. Trans-scalar governance deficit and crisis in South African fruit

A unique aspect of this study is that almost immediately following the fieldwork period, the

primary research location, Ceres, was at the centre of a widespread labour uprising which

advanced throughout the Western Cape. This singular event served to elucidate the trans-

scalar governance deficit facing precarious workers operating in South African fruit export.

The labour crisis was initiated by unorganised precarious farmworkers at local level, who

targeted their grievances towards their employers. As the crisis escalated, they turned their

objections towards civil society organisations for failing to represent their interests, and

national government agencies for providing inadequate regulatory protection. A key demand

was that the existing minimum wage of R69 per day be significantly increased to R150,

along with greater protection and representation from national public governance institutions

and civil society organisations. Fruit producers and industry associations responded to the

crisis by highlighting the broader commercial pressures they were under to cut production

costs, which was then acknowledged by government institutions as a root cause of the

labour unrest. The following discussion uses a trans-scalar perspective to analyse how the

governance deficit played out over the crisis, and the implications for precarious workers

operating in the South African fruit sector.

In the early stages of the unrest, localised strikes broke out on two farms in De Doorns, as

seasonal farmworkers demanded increased remuneration and improved working conditions

from their employers (Knoetze, 2012; Washinyira, 2012). These initial strikes soon spread

throughout farming communities in the Western Cape, due to a combination of geographical

25

proximity and pre-existing networks of off-farm labour, enhanced communication channels

and shared frustrations amongst precarious workers regarding their working conditions and

lack of adequate governance protection. What was notable about this widespread phase of

community mobilisation, was the lack of civil society involvement. The majority of precarious

off-farm workers involved in the strikes were not unionised and most trade union and NGO

organisations operating in the region failed to anticipate the labour crisis (Davis, 2013).

As the crisis unfolded, various civil society organisations such as COSATU and FAWU

sought to intervene in proceedings by recruiting striking farmworkers as members and

negotiating with public governance institutions, employers and fruit industry bodies on their

behalf. As a result, tensions emerged between striking farmworkers and trade unions over

the course of the labour crisis, with the former questioning the legitimacy of the latter in

speaking on their behalf due to the previously absent role of trade unions operating in the

Western Cape fruit sector. The strains between these two sets of actors became highly

evident at a particular moment during the crisis, when protesting farmworkers expressed

anger towards COSATU and FAWU following a farm-level wage negotiation referred to as

the ‘Clanwilliam deal’. These negotiations between trade unions and fruit producers resulted

in a minimum wage concession of R105 per day between farmers and workers on a

collection of horticultural farming units located in Clanwilliam, Western Cape. The following

statement in response to these negotiations, illustrates the underlying tensions between

precarious farmworkers and trade unions seeking to represent them:

‘Cosatu is not our boss! We are the people who suffer, not Cosatu! We are not happy with

R105. We are not happy with what Clanwilliam is happy with!’ (casual farmworker, cited in

Davis, 2013).

It is argued here that these tensions between protesting farmworkers and trade unions which

emerged at various points during the crisis, reflect the deficit of localised civil society

protection experienced by precarious workers, characterised by a lack of external trade

union representation in the employer-employee relationship. As described in the previous

26

section, this localised deficit of civil society protection stems from a complex combination of

commercial pressures driving workforce casualization and societally embedded tensions

between horticultural farmers and civil society organisations. This deficit of civil society

protection has had particularly stark consequences for precarious farmworkers who have

received insufficient state (laws and regulations) and public-private (ETI base code)

governance protection relative to skilled, regular workers, in the form of wages below living

costs and a lack of non-wage contractual benefits.

As the crisis spread throughout the Western Cape, precarious farmworkers up-scaled their

protests to the national scale, challenging regulatory institutions and labour legislation

determining minimum wage levels and working conditions (Knoetze, 2012; Washinyira,

2012). A central demand issued by striking farmworkers was for a significant increase in the

agricultural minimum wage from R69 to R150 for the lowest paid workers in line with

escalating living costs, and vocal opposition to increased levels of precarious work taking

place on farming units at the epicentre of the unrest. In particular, farmworkers protested

against the Sectoral Determination review process in which non-union workers had no

representation, referring to existing minimum wage levels as a ‘hunger loan’ and demanding

an immediate increase (BFAP, 2012; Fogel, 2012).

This aspect of the unrest serves to reaffirm the case study findings reported in the previous

section, regarding minimum wages being insufficient for low-paid, precarious workers to live

on. In this sense, the tensions between precarious farmworkers and national regulatory

institutions, which became highly evident during the labour crisis, serve to further illuminate

the nation-state governance deficit. This reflects the intrinsic tension in the state’s strategic-

relational role in ‘building institutions designed to structure the behaviour of their citizens, to

simultaneously reproduce state power and guarantee the process of capital accumulation

based on the sale of labour power to capital’ (Selwyn, 2012:217). Using a strategic-relational

reading of the state draws attention to the configuration of social forces (labour agency and

civil society) that contest particular state regulatory policies and projects (such as the post-

27

apartheid de-regulation and liberalisation of the horticulture sector). For increasing numbers

of precarious workers operating in South African fruit, the resulting legislative framework has

failed ‘to protect the most vulnerable: the informal, the marginal and the casual’ (Cheadle,

2005:5 cited in Clarke, 2008:189), in the form of wages insufficient to meet living costs.

As outlined previously, public-private ethical codes stem from particular territorial and

societally embedded contexts, and have been implemented by lead firm supermarkets as a

means of ensuring civil society actors and consumers that decent labour practices exist on

fruit farms connected to their supply chains. Consequently, private actors argued that decent

working conditions could be assured on farms in compliance with the ETI base code, which

comprised the vast majority of commercial fruit operations in the Western Cape. The

following statement by the Hex Valley Table Grape Association chairperson encapsulates

this notion, which was made in order to stem the unrest and calm escalating tensions:

‘Our buyers, in the UK and elsewhere, know that our house is in order in terms of the ethical

treatment of farm workers because farmers are compliant with a host of ethical audits,

including the ethical treatment of farm workers, required by the supermarkets, before they

qualify to export their products’ (Hex Valley Table Grape Association chairperson, cited in

Erasmus, 2013).

These statements were contrary to the realities of the escalating labour crisis which

stemmed from farmworker dissatisfaction with wages and employment arrangements on fruit

export farms in the Western Cape. The ETI base code relies on national labour laws and

regulations to provide a minimum standard for wage levels and contractual arrangements for

farmworkers. Therefore, whilst public-private codes have contributed to increased levels of

compliance to these standards via more frequent ethical audits and producer incentives to

maintain contracts with lead firms, their presence has failed to address the governance

deficit facing precarious workers operating on fruit farms connected to GPNs. As the crisis

progressed, this limitation of public-private governance was reflected in a statement made by

the director of ethical trading for a major UK supermarket. The director stated that lead firm

28

supermarkets and the ETI base code were not positioned to influence the national Sectoral

Determination review process, or dictate wage levels on South African fruit export farms:

‘It is not for us as a company to dictate to a foreign country that ‘you must pay X’. I think the

African National Congress government would query us for saying such a thing’ (Ethical

Trading Director for UK Supermarket, cited in Smith, 2013).

Therefore, despite the ETI base code being present on South African fruit export farms at

the centre of the labour crisis, its reliance on national state regulations has rendered the ETI

unable to secure adequate wages and working conditions for precarious farmworkers. This

has contributed to a subsequent public-private governance deficit facing precarious workers.

The trans-scalar governance deficit facing precarious workers elucidated throughout the

labour crisis, must be understood in the context of broader commercial pressures inherent in

global production networks. As discussed previously, GVC/GPN research into the

commercial dynamics of fruit GPNs highlights the ability of lead firm supermarkets to drive

down costs by lowering prices for producers whilst demanding high quality products. As the

labour crisis unfolded and increasing economic and social pressure was placed on fruit

producers, their response was to highlight their lack of bargaining power relative to global

supermarkets. At the peak of the labour crisis, such pressures to cut costs without

jeopardising fruit quality led one commercial producer to state that ‘I have absolutely no

room for negotiation with supermarket buyers…I have an income determined by what the

market is prepared to pay’ (fruit producer, cited in Davis, 2013).

Significantly, these commercial GPNs become embedded within the South African state

institutional framework, which as the crisis escalated prompted a re-articulated market

facilitation strategy in response to pressure from social forces (labour and CSOs). In

particular, national government institutions acknowledged that the global commercial

dynamics of fruit GPN insertion are intertwined with increased flexibilisation and challenges

to the governance of labour. On this basis, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)

29

recognised the need to challenge lead firm purchasing practices, promote value capture at

national and local territorial scales and elevate South Africa’s position in the value chain.

Accordingly, the DTI Minister issued policy proposals focused on capturing the value of

agricultural production at the local scale of production, by adopting a more assertive stance

with lead-firm supermarket buyers; and encouraging fruit producers to integrate into

agricultural GPNs on improved terms and conditions to ensure a higher percentage of value

was captured for themselves and their employees (Crotty, 2012; Davies, 2013). As

acknowledged by the DTI Minister, such proposals are made on the basis that ‘a huge part

of the production here in South Africa is ending up in somebody else's pocket’ (DTI Minister,

cited in Davies, 2013), though the extent to which these policy initiatives will translate into

concrete actions remains unclear.

However, this position taken by the South African government was mitigated by a parallel

strategy of mediation by government institutions with fruit producers, industry bodies, trade

unions, NGOs and protesting farmworkers to resolve the strikes. This parallel government

strategy was partially fuelled by a narrative asserted by fruit industry associations regarding

the economic threat to the South African fruit sector, amid global competition from South

hemisphere fruit producing countries such as Chile and New Zealand (Sherry, 2013 citing

Fruit Producers Export Forum).

This internal tension in the South African state’s policy orientation resulted in a fairly diluted

governance outcome for workers, with national regulatory institutions increasing the

minimum wage from R69 to R105. Whilst this brought about limited gains for the most

vulnerable workers, in terms of increased agricultural wage levels for which the ETI base

code can layer onto, taking a GPN perspective highlights that it does little to challenge the

underlying global commercial pressures driving precarious work. From a strategic-relational

perspective, this internal tension within the South African state apparatus reflects an ongoing

struggle in terms of market facilitation and export-oriented policies of accumulation on the

30

one hand, versus socially-oriented policies such as labour regulation and localised value

capture on the other.

This case highlights the integral role of state-governance in determining labour outcomes,

which are themselves the product of struggles within the state apparatus and beyond,

including wider social forces. It also demonstrates that the globalisation of production has

meant that trans-scalar modes of labour governance have emerged from particular territorial

locations, and interact with nation-state strategies to regulate labour, albeit with variable

outcomes for a diversified workforce. The following concluding section will now turn to

consider the conceptual and policy implications of this case.

5. Trans-scalar governance of labour in GPNs: concluding observations

In the opening discussion, the GPN approach was drawn upon to locate nation-state

regulatory frameworks in the broader context of trans-scalar governance of labour in global

production networks. In particular, territorial and societal forms of embeddedness were

shown to play a key role in shaping public-private (ETI base code); nation-state (laws and

regulations) and civil society (NGO and trade union activity) governance across geographical

scales. The case study demonstrated how fruit GPNs become territorially embedded in

public-private initiatives at the scale of retail and consumption, in the form of UK lead-firm

adoption of the ETI base code; post-apartheid state labour regulatory frameworks; and

localised networks of civil society actors. Importantly, notions of societal embeddedness help

to reveal how trans-scalar governance strands are formed by the particular societal contexts

from which they are based. At the global scale, the public-private ETI base code was shaped

by a variety of state, private and civil society actors, and stemmed from the corporate culture

and institutional environment of UK lead firms. At the national scale, the post-apartheid

labour regulatory framework originated from a particular political and socio-economic state

31

agenda designed to redress exploitative agricultural labour relations. Locally, networks of

civil society organisations emerged from complex combinations of public-private and state

governance initiatives opening the regulatory space for trade union and NGO access, whose

actions are influenced by pre-existing tensions with agricultural employers and a strategic

tendency towards protection of formal as opposed to flexible workers. Interestingly, similar

forms of differentiation are observable across other sectors in South Africa such as mining,

whereby COSATU and other unions tend to represent better-paid permanent as opposed to

flexible and contract workers on low-wage, insecure contracts (Alexander 2013). This lack of

precarious worker voice has been highlighted as a key factor precipitating the Marikana

strikes9, and draws attention to cross-sectoral challenges facing civil society in a context of

increasing flexibility and insecurity.

This study builds upon the notion of territorial and societal embeddedness, by elucidating the

trans-scalar embeddedness of labour governance in GPNs. This refers to the fact that GPNs

become territorially anchored in public-private, state and civil society governance regimes

which themselves stem from particular societally embedded contexts, and interact across

geographical scales to produce particular outcomes for labour incorporated into GPNs.

Moreover, in this complex architecture of trans-scalar governance, the integral role of nation-

state governance in mediating GPNs and determining labour outcomes is evident. The direct

influence of national laws and regulations on working conditions such as wage levels is

clear, which then interact with public-private initiatives resulting in differential protection for

different groups of a variegated labour force. GPN pressures and societally embedded

relations also work to restrict civil society protection for precarious members of the

workforce, despite GPNs being territorially embedded in public-private and national-state

governance regimes which grant legal access to trade unions and NGOs on paper.

Subsequently, in the case of South African fruit the trans-scalar embeddedness of labour

9 The Marikana strikes began as a wildcat strike at a mine owned by Lonmin in the Marikana area, South Africa. Thousands of mineworkers protested for increased wages during the strikes, which received international attention following widespread violence and the deaths of 34 striking mineworkers, who were killed by police forces (Alexander 2013).

32

governance reflects a trans-scalar governance deficit facing precarious workers incorporated

into GPNs.

The paper also provides insights into the strategic-relational role of the state, and how global

production networks become territorially and societally embedded within particular regimes

of market facilitation and capital accumulation, with the nature and form of state-governance

of labour an outcome of struggles within the state and external social forces (civil society and

labour agency). These internal and external struggles were acutely illustrated through the

case of South African fruit, whereby the state was shown to respond to external social forces

through the implementation of wage increases alongside a discourse of opposition to lead-

firm value capture. However, this was mitigated by a strategy of reconciliation and mediation

following fear of capital flight in the context of global competitive pressures, resulting in a

marginal wage increase for the most vulnerable precarious workers.

This acknowledgement of state-governance of labour as part of a broader and relational

state strategy is important, as it facilitates a deeper understanding of the multiple roles of the

state in the GPN and the internal/external tensions that surround the state-governance of

labour. Overall, this paper suggests that nation-state governance of labour needs to be given

greater significance in GPN analysis. In the context of existing GPN research which tends to

marginalise the central role of the state in the labour governance process, this paper argues

that its influence deserves greater consideration. Specifically, this article emphasises the

role of the state in shaping governance at the intersection of trans-scalar public-private and

civil society governance initiatives. This finding responds to Smith’s (2015:300) demand for

an appreciation of ‘multi-scalar state-to-state intersections’ in GPNs, and extends

understanding of this area by highlighting a need to account for trans-scalar interactions

across state (ILO; national laws and regulations), private (company codes of conduct),

public-private (i.e. Ethical Trading Initiative) and civil society (NGOs and trade unions

operating at multiple geographical scales) actors and regimes in the labour governance

process. This is achieved by drawing upon and advancing GPN notions of territorial and

33

societal embeddedness, and highlighting the trans-scalar embeddedness of the labour

governance process.

Finally, this case has generated important insights into the role and challenges facing state

governance regimes in addressing the trans-scalar governance deficit facing precarious

workers. Clearly state regulatory regimes have a key role to play in setting standards such

as minimum wage levels, which stem from particular societal and territorially embedded

contexts and interact across spatial scales with public-private and civil society initiatives, to

determine levels of baseline protection for precarious workers in GPNs. But these state

regulatory strategies are constrained by internal and external forces in the context of global

competitive pressures, significantly limiting their ability to increase regulatory protection for

precarious workers operating in GPNs. Forming a more sustained response to address the

underlying cause of the trans-scalar governance deficit demands balancing the dominant

state-strategy of market facilitation and capital accumulation in the context of global

competitive pressures, with more socially-oriented forms of regulatory protection.

Notions of trans-scalar embeddedness help elucidate the spatially diverse set of state,

private and civil society actors and leverage points that provide an opportunity for

challenging dominant modes of GPN governance, framed by the social and institutional

context from which they originate and are based. For increased regulatory protection to be

sustainable, nation-states are required to take a more assertive stance in negotiating lead-

firm access to local production locations, both through national policy and engagement with

trans-scalar state, private and civil society actors positioned to shape and influence global

production and governance outcomes. Transnational collaboration between nation-states

competing for commercial investment in the same sector is also needed, to assert ‘collective’

and ‘countervailing’ power to hold lead firms accountable and push for systemic change in

GPNs (Henderson et al., 2002; Seidman, 2007). However, it remains to be seen whether

internal and external struggles within and beyond the state will achieve success in realising

such a strategy in the face of dominant modes of GPN governance.

34

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