,. TF

~Sl ~rLn, me \911 rnOluooft n •• OD IMay to November) the NVN "C.lan to move their Mil

aircrait louth into more threat.niDa location.. SAM_ ami antiaircraIt wen .. menace to US

alrcTait aU year and cODcenuaUonl of thea. weapons incre •• ed al tM wu:.ter months approached

in an apparttDt atten.pt DOt oDly to protect the NVN LOG but also to .hoot clowa B .. 5Z.. On"

OC'tober tben ...... an attempt by .. Mi.ll: aircn.1t to intercept .. 5 .. 52 cell of three bomber •• but

the attack faU.d. In rtJv.mber two more Mi,1 attempted UAlucc ... fully to iAtercept B ... 52.

and the pattern continued, .till WIolucc •• dully. lr December. l~ wa. attaclu luch a. thea.,

plus adcHtional SAM £iriDal on unarmed reconnai ... nc~2 .. ircr.ft. that cau.ed the dramatic

uP.url_ in US "protective re_etlon" strik •• into NVN.

COMMANDO HUNT

IS) With the bombinl of NVN halted i.n 1968, the air em.phasis .hifted to ~.ftt.rdictinl the

enemy'. oyer Land 10Ii.tic. route. the Ho Chi Minh trail. Seasonal weather condition. over

tbe entire area made it expedient to break I.Ip tbe a.ria.l effort into .emi_a.nnual campai,ns.

code named COMMANDO HUNT. The Urlt operation WIId_r this name bel&n in November

1968 and r&D throuJh April 1 ?69. roulhly .quivalezat to the dry •••• ott.. COMMANDO HUNT

III followed duriDI the dry .... on of 1969 • 1970 &Dd COMMANDO HUNT V covered. the 1970.

1971 period. TACAlR .triku. lunahip" 5·57 bomben :'Ad 8·52 ARC UCHT .triku com.

bined to .eriou.ly r.atrict the flow of .uppU ••• outhw'-rd, thereby pre.,.ntin, the enen:.y from

mountin, any •• riou. ,rOWld offensive durine th ••• y.an. F1Hre Vl.13 indicate. the eradually

mcre •• inl effectlvene •• of the COMMANDO HU~T ail' effort. ~ _

(5) The projected moyement of IUPPU" from. North Vietnam into .oathern Lao. durinl

the dry •••• on 1970 • 1971 .. a. utimated to be lar,er ~n that of previoua yean. Paradox.

icaUy. the US .ir eilort. dl.le to redeployment and a limitation (If fichter-attack .ertie. to

14,000 per month (50 perc.nt below that &.uthorised in COMMANDO HUNT m). w&. ,mat~er

t:haA that for previous campai,n.. The iDer •••• in the AC·}3:) force a. w.ll •• the addition

of the B.57C;. IHatly enh.&nc.d the truck._itillinl capabiUty of the USAF. 54

(S) COMMANDO H'.JNT V wa. baaed upon 7AF Operation Plan '715. It beg.n 10 Oct 70

and ended ]0 Apr 71. Its ~.ic objective _ •• twofold: to reduce the now of men a.nd material

into RVN .and Ca.mbodia .. tad to make the enemy pay an Lncr ••• in.ly Ireater coat for hi •• tumpts

to d.ominate SEA. Seventy percent (9.800) of the .~thori&ed 1"'. 000 TACAIR .ort1 .. were

aUoc.ted to the interd.iction a.rea. COMUSMACV direeted that moat of tJ.e 1. 000 ARC UGHT

aortiea pel' MCUth would be mad. avai1a.bl. to hit the entry point. froft} NVN into the STEEL

nGElt. are ••

(5) COMMANDO HUNT VI, openinl phase waa the •• turation bonlhinc of the entry pointS

Irom NVN into STEEl- nGElt.. Chiefly the.e route. were the Mu Gi •• Ban Karai. and Ban

Ra.Yinl pa .... and the _ .. tern ed,e of the DMZ. BombiDl belu ou 10 October in .n .Hort to

be.t the enemy moyement. through thele cboke pointa. B-528 lupported by F-l05 IRON

HAND a.nd EB_66a for SAM protectioD did moat of the nturation work. In .ddition. F--4 air­

craft provid"d !l&lt .uppre •• ion a.nd fle_ high_a.ltitude cover for other aircraft in cas. Mig

aircra.lt were aigbted (Mil-CAP). Ea.ch of the entry POlftt. w.s delignated a target box. an

area generaUy 1 by 2 kilometers in Ib.e •• ufiiclently larae to coYer .ny exiating sl.lpply routea

plus any loc.tionl _here bypall rout .. could conceiv&bly be con.tructed. Mo.t of the bombing

took ,lace durinl hour. of darkne .. when mo.t of _the en.my truck. activity took pl.ce. The

opening pha.e .. a. considered .ucce.dul in that it uFut the enemy timetable. forcinl him to

expend extra effort. to rebuild hit road ••

VI-Z9

.. ~,

--WitEkl

ESTIMATED SUPPLY INPUT VS OUTPUT LAOS PANHANDLE

10.000

10,000

10.000

'HI-II"

COMMANDO "UNT

I

SOUllel: P.ACAF: SUIIMAII' 0' Alit 0".,

7AF ~ COIiIfAJIDO HUNT V RI'T

, ..... ,t70

COMMANDO "UNT lit

_INPUT = OUTPUT

, • .,0 -1.7, CO .... ANDO

HUNT

:It

/ "OU •• "if _,13

,

(I) Aher" •• 'l'1wwKlctioa cune til, trv.u.kUUIl1 pU. ••• t1u.taa ,,"!aU ••• allhl time • truck.lr.lIIlq .... _ •• 'l1Ie AC.II9 .... AC·1l0 (SUU.aE "ACKACE, _ •• ~..tp," _\lit 00_ .GAI aM lInpro ..... .,or ., .. Mm. mel"dina alpt o'b •• r .... tio ..... Ie ........ upt lewel TV (LLLTV). t1M AC-ll'lC alrcr.ft (there .. re U lalU.Uy) me_ted 20mm ._., ro ..... ,...iookla&

. lairav. eFta) .... on .... aiaht ob'.rft"", ."b.t. n. a.l1'o ..... ,.., .. a ... :.a .... -pld04 IoOC-IZ bomb. "'" .... ~.lpp04 .... tIo Ll.L TV .... FU •• 10.. Doarlq" .. ,U,M """'. ft.btal' aad attack. .ll'crall patrolled De road. M ~t .. , tnlf1c ',oDed.

(S) ftlie C:)M)oUIItlO itl1NT .onpIIa.lo04 tIoo STEEL nCE ...... '0 ,. .. _ ...... rtle. we" pl.aDDH lor elM ,.malad ... "lEA. lD Cam.,,"la eM primary .Uort ... _ ._y fr~ .f _ .. _at to tIoo _m, ..... 'I ""Ix It "lOlbl. T"Pa'. 'be .. ' .. ' .up Ibm,,) lbe 'HmO of f C-·~.,...J______ !'

~S) At tt. coacba.,l_ COMWAJfDO HUNT V ... c-..ld.,..t a •• ce.... .Al~ .. aU ~mmaa1at •• "u ....... laterdJ.cted .... Mmy lo,l.tlc •• Uort .a •• duMatl, 1lll:NptIIHI Ie

PHveal &Dy major attack. from oce'lltrw,. tb'"bf ... ietlA. the Vl.taam1 .. Uoa '"Iram. thlriAI tlae eaU. COMMANDO IrJMT V optJradoa 10,92' 'ru.k ••• re ... ur.,.. 01' Amal" widl 1M peak moDdl coaUac la A,..U U'U .Ua S.'" •• " n,o"," la OIM ......... c&IIItl0ri ••• Marda .... eM "ak moatk for .. rial .orti .. , partl, ..... LAM .,N '71' .,.rado ..... 1M tollowlal .HID, WW •• p aM u.ck CDOnawaU to compea .. c..for .. LAW SON flUnptloa. CONIoUND!) HUNT v ... tIoo .... ja. US ... AlI1o' .1. oll.rt .rom October 1970 • April 1911 a. e"' •• KM 'D,. me "' ..... below:

•

IO"'TlES FLOWN IEA/STEEL nCE"''' (Oct TO • Ap. 71)

•

.. , -' .

(') AlthDu,1a CO).lWANDO HUNT V urm.1.aatH SO Apr 71 •• 11' .trik ....... atill 'trK'" .. awt tt.e eRd •• 1 CommW'L.t IOpp1, efton.. n. tollow __ all' aeU.i.ty ........ 11_'" • •• paret. campa'I •• COMM4NOO HUNT VI .h.1c.Ja M.a. 11 war 11 ,7AF Operatlo .. P&a8 'no,. "011.100 •• ea,ber ,re" •• t.d the •• teot of activity ~t ha4 be •• e.perl.Dced '\lriD. tIM .ry •••• 0 •• wt the mi. .. lo. ud IllACd,o .. of bot.b .t4 .. remal_etIi 1.".raU, IlDCM ..... 0. J No. 11 COMMANDO HUNT VU for 1'11 _ 19n N ...... moatit..later thaa it. 1910 dry •••••• pre4ece .. or. COMMANDO HUNT v. tI •• to ..... , ral •• e.,. .. leaced IA Oc .. be ...

COMMANDO twNl vn

CS) COa.utANDO HUNT va ... tbe TAr ,laA for tM air lDterdlctloa campal •• La _ .. lb. I'D

1.&0_ tor tlw 1911-'71 dr, ..... A. A. "'itit. p,..,,1 ... campaLJa •• ·lIo. major 10&1 ....... ra.trLct the now 01 mea &Ad '.,pU .. y, me COfft.ftMAi.t '.re" la LAo •• (.arntltodl •• aad aVN. hC.Il" ., the r".cti •• La US lote •• La R\t'N. the allLDlber.' 'trlk ••• rti ..... r.dYC.d ~ almo_t SO ,.rc.ftt 'rem CONWAI'IDO HUNT V wlUl. e".my rOo" !IIetwork. Md N.a wre.,H Z7 perc'a, IA the late,..."lA. ,.ar. A. kt.,., tJae priDeLpal _"ort Of the campa" •••• co •• atra'" La lb. STEEL netE. •• re. of tIM Lao. paaha.n4lle. ..

V1-3/

. ./

_v 98>

JET AIR ORDER OF BATTLE NORTH VIETNAM

III goo 70

HCIA LAC

\ ~ '- J_~-1e/17

"'" DOlle suo"' =IA::I~TH:.:U~O::N:.:G:.-__ ..!...__ ~ U,A 2 ~ _~- 1 S MI,-II

_: Toll'; Cirl· STATUS APT' USAI\ AIR OPNS RlEVIEW

,. .. 1II -14

•

• r

(Sl Then wen three JlIhaa •• ~o the ,',;"t1.72 c:.ampalln. Pha.e 1 waa directeci "I&&.x.t!he ~Jor .ntry ro~t •• or pal.e. tb.rouab the mOUntal!l' in a.n .. ttempt to dellY' tM "!Demy accta. to Lao. aDd dll'by the loaUtica iftput. Ph& .. U belan with a.tta.ck. On th •• tepped_up U'uc:lc. traffic ilUlf. majot empha.i. beinl pLu:ed OD the louthern pa .... and entry point. to fGzce tn. eumy to u •• the lon,lr DOrtherll pt. .. route.. The aim of ~ha •• U was to de.troy truck. and ItO rage area.. Pb& .. m .a. plaDDed. to hit the Isit auu of th. LOC Ul an effort to force the enemy to .xpo.e hu dfort. more. prior to the onUt of the 1972 rainy •••• on..

(5) De'pite the fact wt USAF fore .. were ,maUer. D .... ,. techDololY •• ,Uted in cloaiD, the lap. La .. r-cuided bomb. (deUv,red ~y F ...... l"\at •• d of only B .. S"', a. Ul CO).Q(ANDC HtTNT V). a better II'O\md .. baud "n'OI' .y.tem lilnition activated equ:w detectors (E~£TSl and commADdable micropboDu). &Dd DeW bomb mwu,tions (the CBU.5Z &Dd CBU.55) were intro_ duced. All AC.l30 Ilmamp. were conlilured witt. LLLTV. improved infrantd "nsors. las. I' Lll'lmiAatol'l •• nd. PA VE MACE: be.~n (oU.et i.lJlition .y.tem detection) ca.,..biUty. Externally the AC_130. bad .1e::troDic CO\1Dtermeuure (ECM) pod. to inhibit enemy radar detection..

(5) The p1a.n for Pun m of COMMANDO HUNT vn called for increa.ed participation in the interdiction attack .ortie. by the- VNAT. By ... umina a portion of ~ illterdlction role with their A.1E. and A_37 •• pilla an ever.iDerea.ma role in the TACAIR eUort in llYN. the VNAT .-orked clour to .ell-.u.Uiciency and freed US aircraft for interdiction and for eveDtual r.deploy_ rae;.t,. 57

AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM

(5) Sinc. the bombiDa: balt in November 1968, US aerial activity over North Vietnam b. been limited .eneraUy to recolm&i .. a.nce by SR_7l (ClANT SCALE), U_Z (CIANT NAIL), BUTFAl.D HUNTER drones, a.nd RT.- .. aircraft. The North Vietnam ••• mo..a their Mil air. craft .outhward durinl the ,ear to ba ... in .outhern NVN from where they openly chaUenled US aircralt on several occ:ui.Ons. Mo.t of the Mi, attack. took place over the penhandle border area between Lao. and NVN. Tbe .. Mi, attack. increa.ed with the advent of the dry .ea.on. which caused more US ai.r acti..-ity in Operation COMMANDO HUNT VU.

(5) The North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) had at lea.t 90 Mil-H, 34 Mig_}9. aM over 130 Mia.1S/I7 aircnlt ba.ed at ten airfields within NVN duritsa 19"1 (aee Filure VI .. 14). Bai. Thuona, Vinh. and Quanl Lana. thoa ... base. neare.t to the DMZ, .ere u.ed •• operatin, location. durinl the la.t 6 month. of 1971 UIId it appe. red that the NV AT intended to make the runway at Dong HOi jet-capable. Mi ... 21 aircraft launched from any of the •• field. were capable of peDetratina the DMZ area in Ie .. thaD 17 minute •• The NVAF, by ita action' durina the latter part of 1911. indicated an increa.ed willingne •• to condu.ct ail' operation. beyond NVN border •• S8

(5) One obvious tarlet of the Mil aircraft wa. the B.5Z. and the bomber. reported several lighting. of Mil aircralt durinl November and December. In addition to Mi, lightinal and attack •• DOne of which were '"ce .. ful. SAM activity increa.ed noticeably. a trend that had been developina throu.ghout the ye~r. The miaaile .ite., normally moved aonhward. during the rai.ny .ea.on. were in.tead left in place and additional mia.ile. brought louthward UIId placed, along the LOC. The fr.:Kluency of trading. by the TANSONG radar .y.tem of the SAM .ite., followed­by SAM firinal at US UD&rmed reconnaiu&n-=. aircraft on authorized. minions over North "Vi.et_ nam. lraw alarminaly. This latter chaUen,e. coupled with the Mil 'i,htin,l. broulht about "protective reaction" strike. by US aircralt a.ain.t theu- .ite •• airfield. •• and. other military tarlet.. Normally these reaction strike. were limited to the SAM site. aDd adjoining radar .ite_ which were detected preparing to fire mi .. il •• at reconnai •• ance or TACAIR plane.. From the tim .. of the bomhing h.lt in NovlPrnhe?' 1968 until 30 Nov ~~ there were 692 protective reaction _trike. made asaiD£t mia.ile and AAA sites. S9

4!2··~THIS PAGE REGP.AOEO UNClASSIFIED Order Sec Army By OAIM per

VI.33 841

- .

R~in1orc~d Protecttv~ R~actton Strike.

IS) A f .... of theae protecti .... e nactioQ atrike. wer~ preplanned and runfo"c:ed. both in .ize aM tarlet .cope. The.e "aida, fiown throua:hout the year, lame red cansidenble intere.t ill. the US and world pr.... The strik .. were planned by MACV and 7AF and &pproved by the JCS. The lnit1a.l ona. Wel"! aL...."ad almoet as.clueive!y at SAM .itee. Mi, &ttack. in NoVO!:mber and December 1971 clt.Iol •• d a bw,denina of the tar,at .eope durinS the .. montha. 60

(S) 'rh. fir.t of the reinforced .trik ... the 7AF Op.ration LOUISVILLE SLUOGER, be,an on 10 jan 71. The operation initially e-ntaile-d reconnai .. ance aircraft fiyina alonl :rpecifled LOC in North Vietnam accompanied by two escnrt a.1rcralt and a "Ca.t FAC" Fo04. When SAM radar sita. wa,.. detected, pre. trike photography waa accomplbhed by the recoil plane which then returned to ba... The FAC identified the location and. with the two e.carts, lelt the area lor refueling. Thi. accnmpUshed, the FAC, uvinl provided M ... carta infarm...t!on on the tar.et while refueliD,. returDed to the tar,et where the .. earu proceeded with the .trlke. Due to poor weather and. a lack of target dEhUn •• , .trik .. in thil firat reinforced protective reaction .trike of 1971 .. ere mad.e On only 3 daya: ZO, 21. and 28 Februa!"y. The &7 .trike .ortias d ....

h 61 troyed or damage.:! Un SA_Z miune •• 15 SA .. Z transporta,.. and 14 ve iel •••

(S) While the obj.ctives of LOUISVILLE SLUGGER were achieved, it did Dot prevent the Commwrl.ta from conttnuin, the SAM attack. an Alli.d. aircra.ft La. Laoa. 011 14 March &Jl

Auatrallan (llAAF) C&llb.rra bomber was hit by an SA.Z ml .. ile n.ar the DMZ. Five days lat.r a USAF F-4 waa alao hit by an SA-Z av.r Tchepo:le. ao. but it was able to return to bas •• Shortty theredter B_5Za supporting LAM SON 719 .iahted two SA-Z minUe. fired at thet:l; both mined. With thi. clear evidence that the enemy intended to continue u.inl his AAA atld ml .. U. capabilities to di.rupt Allied interdiction in the STEEL nGER area, a reinforced protective reaction .trike W&l 1&Wlched. FRACTURE CROSS ALPHA w;u conducted on 21 and ZZ Mar 71. A total of 234 atrike and 30 armed recannat.sance .orties were flown by the USAF &Ad US Navy destroying eight S~-2a. two SA-l tran.porten. one FANSONG ra.da.r, aix control vans, 64-buildings, and 45 trucks. 62 - .

IS) As the rainy .ea.on approached, during the .pring and summer montha. Allied aerial ill.ctivity t.uened. reducing SAM firing. accardinaly. By Septe-mber 1911, however, as the approaching dry season pe,mitted more aerial activity, it was clear that the Communist. intended to contest the Allled plane. to a greater de,ne than in previ.ous ye&n. Thi. led to the MACV­directed Operation PRIZE BULL flown on 21 5.p 71 again.t taraets ' .. ithin 35 nautical mil .. of the DMZ. In this one operation 200 combat .0J:tles were flawn in North Vietnam. aver only th't'ee tar,et.: the Thu. Thu. An Be, and Xuan Duc petroleum .toraie areas ju.t .auth of Dong Hoi. poor weather made PRIZE BULL the fir'.t alloOinatrument .trike of such ma.gnitud. ever conducted I1sm. the LORAN bombini .y.tem exclusively. Oe.pite the poor bombing conditions Thu Thu was 40 percent deatroyad. An So 7S percent and Xuan Duc Z5 to 50 perce.nt d •• troyed. A total at eighty-three 5. 000 gallon and eight 7.000 gallon .torage tank. were d.stroyed or damaged. which wu utimated to have had a major effect upon the enemy's 1911.n dry .ea.on logi.tic effort. The entire .trike force of over 200 lortie •• uffered no lo •• es a..nd no battle d .. ma, •• b3

r;;-Once again, in late December. MACV obtain.d authority to) hit targr:'" in NVN as 5A~ atta~k_. ~ncrea.ed in int.neity. One additional factor rr.&de the new Oper-.tio.n PROU,D DEEP ALPHA important __ the increased .i.ghtings and occa.ional attacks by Mig aircraft against

, ,B_52 and TACAIR aircraft. Betwe.n Z6 and 30 Dec 71. USAF and USN TACAIR planes new 1, 025 .trike sortie. aga.La.st varie-d targets in NVN below 20 de-grees north. making PROUD DEEP ALPHA the biggelt attack and de.pest penetration since the bombing halt in November 1968. We-ather was persistently poor throuihout the 5 day. 'of the limited durati~n oper ... tion necellitating all-weather bombing systems for a majority of the targe-t.o The target. conal. ted chiefly of POL dump •• tran.portation points. barrack., and airfields. Three airclaft. one USAF F-4. O:1e USN F-4, and one A-& were downed with one of the two.man crew of the A_6

Ccued. All three aircraft were lost due to SAM •. OJ THIS !'l.GE REGR!D~!)~~NC';"SSIFIEO \.. r 'OfQer~"'I'IJ .... ii.tAil pe .... '""t~~ VI_34

8 41~. 2 4 ~:

AIR FORC;: ADVISORY GROUP IAFCP)

IUl COMUSMACV continued to ex. rd •• command Over the Air Ft',rce Advuory Group

(A FOP) wIth operational control v .. led in 7AF. AFCiP team ••• t&.t~oDed at .ilbt dWereDlalT

ba ... within RVN were char.ed with ... i.tinl and .dvillA, the VNAF a. it ,1' ...... Dd wid!

improvift, the quality of it. combat readin ....

IS1 It wa. the d·J.ty of the AFCiP to conduct the ConMUdated Republic of Vietnam. Improve­

ment and Moderni&ation Proaram (CRIMP) .. it .ppUed .. 0 the VNAF. The ultimate loal wa.

a .. U .. aulficient and combat. ready VNAF. By •• rly 1971 five VNAF air dlVhior..1 were activated

with u.t:l.ts ba.ed at Tan SoD Nhu.t. Ple1ku.. Oa ~nl. Nha Trani. Bt.en Heat BlAh TbuY. and Soc

Tranl.lSee Fil"r. VI .. 4.) In addition to improvUl& the VNAF equipment by .u.bUituUnI new ud

hiaher pertormance aircraft for older equ.ipment, the AFOP bel.n in 19'71 to pha •• ou.t the

trainiDI of VNAF personnel in the US. Thi. ofbhore tnielDl. iJlyolylnl lanluale .cbool1.l11 a.

weH. •• a •• low and kept the VNAF dependent upon USAF faciUtie •• Accordillll,. a major

effort w:u mad. durina the ,.al' to tran.late t.chnical o1'de n !.tate "';i.eUl&me.e &Doll con.truct

trainiD, ald. '0 that trainml could be accomplhhed within the aVN. ).tobUe traintDa team.

were .ent from t1w US with .ptcl&lly .. buUt trainina aid. to expedite the te.chine 01 VNAF

maintenance pereonnel. All heUcopter pilot tramin; for VNAF .tudea.U wa •• hlfted to RVN in

1..me 1971, '.avina only 110 fixed wina .• tudent pilote enterm, trainina in the ~S. Th. le .. on

wa. clear that in.tead of the .spenli .. aDd tLme .. conlwrUn.a effort of·traiAinl fonian national.

in the US. the mo.t prod"U .. method. iD the 10111 run wa. to train a few in.tructor. 14 the US

and eltabU.h a .cbool I.n.cf>'lDtry. teachina in the .tuden.u' nati .. taDauaae.65

IS) Tht: IrowUla role of the VNAF in clo .. air .upport .al a conyiJlciD, indication of

VNAF capability. With the reductioD of USAF .quadron. the ,rowinl VNAF w •• able to a .. ume

an increallDI pcortion of the attack lortie. flown in RVN durin, 1971. Preparation, We1'.

underway to l1'adually inc rea •• the VNA r role·in COMMANDO HUNT VU durin, 1972.

CONCLUSION

(U) In .ranuary 1971 alt.., hil return from a trip to SEA. SECDEF Laird. ... ted to the pre ..

that the I'emaininl air .nd Ie. r.'o"rc" 01 the US in SEA would be u." to protect 1M: l1ye' of

the men who remained duri.tll the phalldoWll. The Si:CDEF .tated:

We .Ul ... e at.rpower. and al lonl a. I am .erviDI iD thil job, 1 will recom_

mend that we "Ie airpower to lupplement the South Vll1tname.e lorc •• ~ •••

to reduce Americ&n call1alU •• and prot~ct American live. a ..... continue to

withdra. and redue. the American pre .. ne. in Southee .• t A.ta and particularly

in Vietnam; abo

(U) While the phaudown du.rinl 1971 .evenly nduced USAF .trike capablUty. a .IlfHeient

lorce remalned in SEA to carry ou.t the expre .. ed wi.he. 01 the SECDEF.

VI.lS

•

! I

I J

·.a······ ' .. ~~-.... - ...

j

UNCLA.SSIFIED

AIR. OPE.R.ATIONS 1." SEA .. C~pt.r V:

1. Rpt IS/NF), PACAF I lan .. Oec 71. S"bj: Swnmary o£ Ail' Operations 3EA (U).

Z. Rpt IS/NF\ .res. Jan 72, Subj: ACtlOD Office,..' Data Boo'- OD Vletnami&i.na the War IUl. p 8 .. 40. Op.3: Rpt (Sl,OCS/USA. 19 Jan 72. Sut-j: .. ·.rmy Aetivitiu Rpt. S;EA (U). ~ H. Op .... Rpt (S'l. ATOP. Dec: 71. Subj: VNAF Statua ae',iew (U), p B .. 2. Cp-•.

3. Rpt (U). Fleet Marine Foree, Paelilc. Subj: Operatiolle 01 the US MariAe Fore ... "iet­nam (U). 1971. P 19.

to Same.e n. pp 29, 31. 33.

5. Rpt IC),Royal AuetraUan Force, Vietnam. Seoj: Brie! Hbtory AuetraU&n Force in Vlet .. DAm (U).' Dec 71, p Iff.

fI, Rpt {C),MACFWMAO. Subj: Mont'11y H18toric&l aeport (U) ... Dec 71, Thai i.ncL.

7. apt (5). AFOP. Sl,Ibj: VNAF Statu. Review. (U). Dec 71, p F-IO, Gp-4.

8. l.bl (SlrClNCPAC to COMUSMACV. 152238Z Jul 71, 5ubj: Au Operataa Authoritiu, Cp-l.

9. Same a. 11; .apt (S), 7AF, Dec: 71, 5u.bj: Command Staw • .Boolc. (U), P B-Z, Qp .. 3.

10. Ma, (5), CINCPAC to COMU5MAC" 050310Z Allg 71, Su.bj: C-130 Requ.lrementa va CapabiUty (11), Op-".

11. Ltr (U). COMUSMACV to CO 7AF. 3 Dec 71, Su.bj: Commea.datio4 for Outstandin. Servi( (11).

lZ. Ma. (C), COMUSTDC to CINCPAC. Z20!500Z Dec: 71, Subj: PubUc: Affaire Ciuici&nc:e SEA (U)" Cip-Not .tat~d.

13. Star. and Stripes, 19 Ju.l 71, p 7; MACV Command Hiatory, 1970, Vol I (S/NFl, pp VI_ 60 ... 61, Cip_l.

1". Same a. '9. p 8 ... 4.

15. Draft M •• (5), COMU.3MACV to CINCPAC, 1 Apr 71, Su.bj: PSYOP Exploitation ot ARC UCH!" (11), Cpo3.

lb. Ltr (5). C5 MACV to CS JCiS, 24 Ju.l 70, Su.bj: Not atated, Gp-Not atated; Mag (5). COMUSMACV to ALCOMS, Zll159Z Sep 70. Su.bj: ARC UCHT Operationa Security, Gp_

17. Ltr (S/NF), MACV CoiS to Dilt. Su.bj: MACV OPSEC Working Crou.p ARC UCHT Report October 1971 (U), 1 Nov 71. Gp ... 4. and inc:lo .. d report: Ltr (C), MACV CoiS to Comdr. 7AF. 2 Sep 71, Su.bj: ARC UGHT OperatiolU (t]), Cp-4.

18. Memo (Ul. HQ lOla! Airborne Division (An.bl) AVDG-AC. ZO Mar 71, Su.bj: Airmobile Operation. in Su.pport of LAM SON 719 (U), pp 1_16.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Allt OPEAA ::'ONS IN SEA ... ,Chapter v:

19. apt (SINF~ 7AF, M.y 1971, Subj: COMMANDO HUNT V, pp &&_85, Cp-l.

20. Rpt '5). PACAF. 1 Oct 71, Subj: CHECa Report, Aerial Protection of MekoDI River CODYOY. in Cambodia (U), pp 1_4, 6-9. Ib, 17. Op-l.

21. W.ahinlton ~I 17 ~c 7i t P 35.

21. ~r (5). MACJ3 .. 06, 25 Oct 71. Sub;: MiDu.te" Clee W •• tina 19 Oct 71, Se. text, 1ncll2. p 2, Gp .. Not stated

23. Same.a 'Z2. 21 Nov 71, pp 2_6; l"ha (5). COMUSMACV to ClNCPAC. 1911+4L Jan n, Subj: VNAF Part.;.cipatioD in COMMANDO HUNT vu. tU). (ip_4.

24. P\an (5), Tactical Air CommaAd, U Nov 71. SlJ.bj: CIU:.DlBLE CHASE Detailed Teat Plall (Ul. pp 1_11 and Annex. C. Cip..4; Sri.fin, (5), WACJ3.043, Dec 71: Rpt IS/NF). HQ USAF. TrencJ..lzldicatou aDd ADalysi., JUDe 71 (U), Subj: PAVE COIN, pp I, 15. 17, Op.3: M'I (5), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC. 220335Z Dec 71. Sl.lbj: CREDIBLE CHASE Tnt, Op-"'. Ltr (5). MACJ3 .. 06, Z8 S@p 71, kbj: Mingle" ClCC Meetin, ZS Sep 71 (U). Gp-Not .tated. .

Z5. M'a (~). COMUSMACV to CO 7AF, Z41150Z Feb 7Z, Su.bj: CREDIBLE CHASE Combat EvallJ&ti.on (U). Gp- •.

20. Rpt IS/NF}. He USAF, Air Operationl Review, Vol liS, Alia 71 (0). P v, Gp_3; and Vol

9, Sel" 71, p V, Gp .. 1.

27. Memo (5), MACSA to COMCSMACV. 8 Dec: 71, Subj: P"VE AEClS, Cip ....

Z8. M'I IS/NF), MACJZll. 1105:2Z Dec 71, SUbj: Low Level BUFFALO HUNTER Require­meD.tJ (U), Cip-1.

Z9. M'I (5). CINCPAC to TAFAGPP. 030034Z JI,lD 71. Subj: USAF FAC UtiUzatioD (U). Cp-4.

30. Same .. IZ6, Vol 9. Sep 71, pp 1_Z3.

31. M'I (S). CINCPAC to JCS. 120· ... 00Z Feb 71. Subj: U •• of Riot Control Alent CS in Combat Alrcrew Recovery (U). Gp-4.

32.. M'I (C). ('G 10ht Abn Div (Ambl) to CO 7AF. 241033Z Au, 71. SUbj: Me ... ,e oi AppreciatioD (U).

33, Rpt (S),JCS. Jan 72. Subj: ActioD Oifieen' nata Poak. lo'P B_45 and 51. Gp .. 3.

34. M.g (S), SEeDEF to COMUSMACV; 2000lZZ Feb 71. Subj: Pre •• Relea .. on Terntination of Crop Oe.tructio:D Prcolram (S). Cip .. ~ot .tated. [Note: .O\1rce not c:lasaified alter

relea .. ]

•

UNCLASSIFIED

VI_37

" ; • ~ t

i , • ~ , , t , , ~ j

~ ·

, , , , ~

• , , " " " "

l::VCLASSIFIED

AIR OPEAA noNS IN SEA - Chap ... VI

35. Mig IS}. CINCPAC to COMUSMACV. 040Z40Z Apr 71, Subj; Policy Re.ardlD, U,. 01 M.rbicLde. It]). Gp .... ; MIl (5). COMUSMACV to CINCPAC. 021050Z May 71. Subj: 0.", of Herbicide. IU). Cp-"'.

36. M'I (5), COMUSMACV to CINC.PAC. 041155ZAu,71. $l.&bj: U •• of Herbi.cide. (U). 0P-4; M'I (5). leS to CINCPAC ZSZ217Z J\m 71, Subj: PoUey RegardiDg U .. of Herbicide. Il'l, Gp_4,

37. Pro.pc,ctu. (tn. F. ,sa, SUbj: Herbicides and Mi.litary Operation.a. Pro'peeN. for Study (Ul, undated.: &.f., (5). COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 241008Z JUD 71. ~bj: Pre .. Query on U .. of Herbicide. (U). CP-4: Mig (S). Am.m~Sailon to CINCPAC. 10071ZZ Aug 71, S\lbj: Detell" Dept Plan for Viet:nam.UaUoD of Herbicide. (tt), Gp-Not .tated.

38. M., (5), Amemb, $ailon to CINCPAC 100712Z Au.g 71. Subj: D.fen •• Dept PL&n for V1.tD&mizatioZl. of Herb1cidoa (0), Op-4.

39. MI, (S), 5ECSTATE to Amemb. Saigon (CINCPAC &Dd. COMOSMACV) 202037Z All, 71. Subj: 01. of Herbicid •• (U), OpooNot ltated. •

.f.O. MI, (S), CINCPAC to JC5, 291124Z Sep 71, Subj: U •• of Herbicide. (U). Gp.4.

41. M.I (5). CSAF to CINCPAC 011724Z Oct 71, Subj: DlapoliUon of th. Herbicide Orange (U). Op_4; PaciIlc ~!!!2 Stripes, 11 Jul 71, P 7.

42. Mig (S). CQMUSMACV to ClNCPAC. 060734Z Mar 71, Sllbj: CS On in Laos (S). Op-4.

43. Msg (5), CINCPAC to JCS, 060407Z Mar 71. 5ubj: 5upporti.."\g RYN with Riot Control Agentl and Herbicidu/OeloUants (U), Gp-4.

44. Msg (5), JC5 to CINCPAC. 26Z020Z Mar 71. Subj: Congressional Inquiry on CS Use (C). Op .. 3.

45. MACV Directive 525 .. 13 (e), 1 May 71, (u amend.ed, 12 Aug 71), Rulel of Engalement for the Employment of Firepower ill RVN, para 6d(2), p 4, Op .. 4.

46. MSI (5), COMUSMACV to DEPCOM THD BTY, 1703l0Z Jan 71, Subj: Rulel of Engage .. ment for Air Interdiction in Cambodia (S)' Op-4; Mig (5). COMUSMACV to CO 7AF, 301126Z Allg 71. Subj: Cla.rification of R;.J.les of Engagement (U), Op .. 3.

47. Same iU '1. Jan_Dec 11. Cambodian sections oleach mo:ath'. report form the ba.ta for this section except a.s otherwi.e noted.

48. MFR (C) J3061, Z1 Mar 72, Subj: Extract from COMUSMACV meuage (U) Gp-Not .tated.

49. Same aa f1, Jan-Dec 71. Above information i_ compiled from these report. except as otherwi.e noted.

50. Same u 1111, Feb-Mar 71.

UNCLASSIFIED

VI-J8

C:NCLASSiFIED

A:R OPERA nc:\s r:-: SEA .. Chaptet Vl

51. Same ... "lQ. Cbapter.U-V.

52. Same as U. Oct 71, pp 1~lZ..

53. Same •• ~ 19. pp 1_3.

54. Same as "19. pp 3-4.

55. Same ... ~19. pp 111-113.

56. Same ... *19. pp 159. !bO.

57. Dziefinl (5). iAF. b Nov 71, SloIbj: COMMANDO HUNT VII. Op-Not .tated.

58. Ma. (5). 7AF to CINCPACAF. 151000Z Au,?l. SUbj: TActical Air Control Center •• North Sector (U). Op .. ".

59. Maa IS). CINCPAC to Jes. 05Z2ZSZ Jut "1, Subj: Protective Reaction (U). Op ... ".

60. M'I (Ol. COMUSM,ACY' to COMSEV£N FLT. 240245Z Mar 71, Sllbj: Protective Reaction 21 and ZZ Mar 71 (0). Op .. Not Uated.

61. Sa.me a. 119. pp 100. 101.

62. Same a. 119. pp 101, 102.

63. Fact Sheet (5). MACJ3 .. 0n, Jan 72 .. Op-Not atated.

64. Same &I '63; Brieiinl (S)' MACJ3-0b. 1 Jan 72

65. Rpt (S/NF),PACAF. 8 Oct 71. Sllbj: CHECO Report. Vietnam.izatioo of the Air War 1970-

71 tU). pp ! .. ZO. Gp-l.

66. Ms. (U). SEC~EF to ALCOMS. ZlOZ.o\3Z Jan 71. Su.bj: New. Brief'nl by SECDEF M. R. Laird at Pentaloo. 20 J~l\ 71 (U).

UNCLASSIFIED

VI_39

ijCit;; "'10414t4" .<,'(4.' £4'<'< .<t*3fE .<F t '.< ~4.(3.(4'P,< .< .<~<. ( _Q .C.< .S~t(§(,(. E .. <tZ.,,(,{( X (,(0.'< ))3 .. N .. 4

UNCLASSIFIED

"And the children ,hall inherit.. ..

UNCLASSIFIED

t',\'CLltSSIFIED

CHAPTER VII

RVN DEFENSE AND DEVELOPJlElVT

INTRODUC TION

IU) PacificatioD chan,ed H. emph ..... dl,lrUl, 1971. 1D pa.l yean thc patifie.tion ellort bad Men cODe.rned alma.t totally with increa.lna the .ec\uity of the town., via" ••• &Ad hamlet. in South Vietnam. tt..reby pro)vidina the people with. mon •• cyrll environment 1ft wbleb to Uve and work. Total .ecurity wa. not reall.ed durin, 1971. bllt ,"uCicient area. 'ere •• cured '0 that \he thr"lt of the .Uort could be diverted iDlo the complex ta.k of nation bIJUdlna. Tbh mu.nt that more attention could bt paid to the economic. lociat, aDd political development of the nation .­vital problema wbich hitherto had been forced to yield priorltv to development of .ccurilY.

(U) Development became the watchword lor 1971, &nd .ell nUance .::..!! egOftl .... the theme. Throuahout the year anat .tride. were made toward the loal of •• 1I •• uUici."cy 1."1 eCODOn-..ic mat. ten, iJl political activitin. and iJl th •• ocial ,....ll .. beiD' of th. i~divid..aal South Vl.t:nameu ci.Uz~n. EcoDOmicaUy the CiVN .ou,ht to uablllae critical pricu on food.tuffl alld lD..tituud wale reform. aff.ctina a larle uam.nt of the military and civilian population. The Ciovernment init~ted .oci .. l welfare prolrar.1.I benditinl war veteran. and victim ••• ducational iD.titution •• ethnic minoritie •• and pu~lic health. Politically then wa. Ie •• reform bue exiltin, Itru.CNre .... re ta.ted twice in natiorul election. and found to be at lea.t .atidactory to achieve th. d.'il'ed aim •• 1

(U) SiDe. 1967 MACV .upport to the pacification elfort had been implemented thrwlh the Civil Operation. and Rilral Development Sllpport (CORDS) .taU and advisory .tructure. C '"'RDS dfortl hiid included pianninl the MACV participation. deyelopina .y.tem. to carry out the prolum, mea.uriDl pro Ire .. and monitoriDI re.u.lu, .upplyin, and admini.terinl material 'Ilpport to Covernment of Vietn.am tCiVNl a,enele •• and. in ,eneI'd. bearina much of the re.ponaibility for the entire pacification effort. A. the CiVN .tabilized and be~am. more capable. the MACv CORDS function chana.d. With the th.me of .eU·relianc. domin.atinl the OVlIl &lfort in 1971. the CORDS function becam .. increa.i.nlly advisQry.

(Ul Mo.t 'ilnilieantly. in lormu1atinl the 1971 pacilication and development program, the Vietr.ame.e demonstrated an increa.ed de.ire and cap.ability to develop and carry out their own plan •. Self· reliance encouraged improvement in .eU ... aovernment. one of 1971'. ba.i.c objectiye •. Advancement of •• If.def.n''e came about throuah improvement in Territorial Force. and the National Police; while .,roaram ... ucb a. land reform. more rural bank., estended credit. and public work. demon. trued the increa.ed effort. at .eU .. development.

Orlani.~ation for Pacification

IU) SeU.nlianq, .tarted with the leader.hip. GVN emphasi. on 8tronler leader.hip wa. made evident by the intereat and activity .hOWD by all oHidal. from the Preaident throuah the miniurie •• provlnce leader., and all the way down to the local level.

IU) The OVN'. Central Pacification and Development <.-ouneil (CPDC) had the ultimate r"upon.ibility for paclficaU;,n efforll and for coordination of the national plan. Pre.ident Thieu he-aded the CPDC and provided leadeuhip {or thol!' many OVN tnini.triell and agende. involved.

UNCLltSSIFIED

VU·I

< 11 • N

~ ... ~ ~

ORGANIZATION FOR COMMUNITY DEFENSE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT

I PRESIDENT AMBASSADOR I "'UYI~V" ,

CPDC I RELATIONSHIP i

MACV/CORDS ,- -I

GVN us

I I MINISTRIES AND DIRECTORATES

AGENCIES

MILITARY REGION • DEPUTY FOR CORDS COMMANDER & RPDC •

I I PROVINCE CHIEF . PROVINCE SENIOR

AND PPDC • I ADVISOR

1 I DISTRICT SENIOR

DISTRICT CHIEf • lIP ADVISOR

I VILLAGE AND

neil

Guncil HAMLET CHIEf

PPDC Provincial Pacification and Oevelop .. enl Council

Source: IlACCOIIDS ,.... 1IIl-1

•

~ ~ =Oi

fJ

•

G\'". p't!

The .ubordinate Region and Province Paclficali.O,. and Dpvelop:nrnt (.,cul)"c.h provir .. ~ the local officials with an exprditlOU' Foute for brinlpn" tnI'll' proalem. 10 tbe attenU.,o of tn .. Pre'ldent and the Prime Minbter. By 1971 mOre and more (.of the problem. were belnl lolved at III. lower level by coordination between the provincL&~ .erviee. and the Provlncial PacUic&tion and Develop_ m~nt Council.. To advi.e the QVN at each level of the pacificatioQ .tl"\lCtu.re. CORDS bad the paraUel advisory o.J',&ni::r.&tion .hown iD Filure VU.I.

(U) COMUSMACV ....... CAaried with the US civil and military responlibility for the CVN pacification dloTt. und«J' the oyeraUauthorlt}' DC the US Amba ... civr. (NlACV responlibiLities and (Wlehon. au' diacu .. ed huther iA C.baptu II.) Under the Deputy to ":'OMUSMAC'I tor CORDS, the AeolS CORDS continued to luptrvue the MACV pacification and development effort i.n 1971. 2 AI the planninl. Iu-pport. and implementation 01 lecurity and developrneAt proaraml became more and more a Vietnamele function. MACV CORDS advi.ory a'lutance wal reduced.

Vietnamization of Pacification Effort

(U) One realOIl that CORDS advisory penoMel could be reduced ....... that pacuic.tion ?rolraml had Ihown remarkable improvement in ncurir., the countryaidif. Belituling with the cro .. -border opifrationl into Cambodia In June 1970. leU_delenle activity increa.ed within the Vietnanele C".overnme"lt al ,.,.11 aa amon, the people. Thil hei,htened intere.t hurt the enemy infr •• tructure and belped to Itreft&then the .ecurity of the country. By early 1971 increa.ed ."cce.1 in providinl lecurity lparked .Uort. throu.lbout all tbe developmental p:rograml and provided tbe enthulialm which carried over '0 lucce.sfully ilIto the year', activitie •.

Ie} In terma of transferrinl manalement technique I and prOlram iDzaovationl to the GVN. Vietnamizatioll bal been underway ,ince MACV CORDS' inception in 1967. Thh tr&.Dlier hAd followed a con,lltent pattern: firlt. development 01 an awarenel' within the GVN leaderlhip of the ICOpe of it. responlibilities followed by establilhment within the GVN of the requ.isite programl and management tooll. I"'pported by combined US and aVN fundinJ. The eventl.l&l objec.j.ve waa complete GVN control and ot'lani&&tion of the proJrama with 100 percent GVN funding.

(C) Reduction in US advilol'l. The accelerated US drawdown .peeded the proce .. of Vletnamization. MACV underwent a reduction in adviaory atrenltha from the FY70 peak perlon­nellevellj ho",·ever. by end ... 197 1 thil reduction aflected the advisorl' method at operation more than it aHected the prolrama themlelve.. Between) Mar and 31 Dec 71. the reductionl occurred m .. inly among military personnel ,.,bo adviled the varioul .. cur-ity prolu.ma. Thil change in the number of CORDS military advilol'l i. indicated below:

Authorized A .. ig:"l.ed

)0 Jun 67

339 NA

• 11 Jul 71

30 Jun 68

5.943 NA

30 J~ &9

6. iSf S.951

30 Jun 70

.,87. b .... bS

30 Jun 71

4.752 .... 92 ....

)1 nec 71

3.201 2.671

IC) The greatelt reduction of military advisors occurred at the diltrict level and in the Mo~i1e Advi.ory Team. (MAT). Some diatrict teaml were eliminated, l.avin, only a \i._i.OD officer in the province. In other casel only a one_ or two ... man advisory t.am remained in the! district. In the more contelted areas. where .ecurity remained .. probl~m. teama were main­~i.ned pendinl further force reduction requirements. While the siz. 01 prOvince and di.trict teams decrealed. the quality of the advisory effort did not aeriously diminish. In lome casea,

""'c!lly .. ,!II ••• IW.IZIIs PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Order Sec Army By DAIM per

VII ... )

........... , ..... • 00,; •• > - • - - •••• ~ • ....... .) ... ~ .,

Although prim&rily a defensive force and not expected to entage the enemy deciai.vely,

PSDF wUu do patrol actively.

Checkinl tra£Iic that enter. a. villalle i. part of the job oi the PSD:'.

UNCLASSIFIED

VIl_-4

,

·ma .. :pl' t •• ,.... tr •• d s.nl~r ad.t.or. frum b\lr'1l1r.o~ admln.nratl'll'. du., •• allO'"lnl them to

'pt'nd muTt' .. ~me U\ lb. h.ld.

IC) The MAT ... ere r.duced from 487 On 1 Mar to tit .. on 11 Dec 71. wUh \heir tA.ks .hiltina lrad\o\ally from traiDut.1 of W\iU to ~.alnlnl th.,," V,etnam'" MAT coW\terpart •• Thil r.dl,lct1on (orced c&llcelLauon o( pLul. to utiU •• U~ MA T. 10 uPlr.d. PSOF ultH ••

Ie) The ct..,lia,' .dviaory eUort .... reduced aloftl .. ,th the mllitary a. ,howa below:

30 Jun 67 30 Jun 6P )n ]un ~Q )0 Jun 70 30 Jun 71 )1 0.. 71

Au. \.bo r 1&.d I, ~~~ J. b8l I. 1:. 1. ~ 98 I.Ull 7.7

J5 Mal 6'7 1 M.r 68 19 Jun f'9 16 Jan 70 30 Jun '71 6 Jan n AUi,ned 8Z9· 1.112_ 1. l.'l 1. 121 744 728

• Number of .uI.ned DOD c1".liaA. Dot a •• iLable; only" .ere authoriaed •

(C) 1D .cneral. tbe,..at a tendency to con.oUdat. the advleory effort at • bllb.r command lev. 1. A. D re.\lIt. th.re wa. a ,Mft In fWlction. 01 advi.or. lrom clo ... uper.hion and technical advic. for on_loin. activitie. to prolram manitoI'm, and broader rranalerial advice. This .hilt r.sulted iD .~me red'.Jction ot tilc:hAical .upport; the "ithdr.wal 01 m.dlcal adviaor •• for examplil. curfaU.d the r.l.dlcal clvie action prolram IMEDCAP) lor the r",ral popul.Uon and .nd.d the monitorina of medical suppU •• LD di.trict and .illa,a dilpen •• ri.~.

IC} I>UiD, 1,71 ruSPAO ph ... d out ita adviaory 1'01. to the Vi.tnam Wormatton Service (VIS). and a. a con.aq",ance. the military adv,aory aflort 1ncrea •• d. Province PSYOP. POLWAR. Civic Action. and VIS a4vlaon nUed the void. The maiD thru.t of their .Uorta wa. directed more toward advisory ... btanc. to military POLWAR activitiu t.haft to dvillaa VIS lWlctions.

IC) Evaluation and reportinB. T!u reduc.tlon of milItary and civilian COROS personnel in the field had an irr.pact Od the .val\o\ation and reportina '''-rouah US dana. 1. of variou, 1971 del.n'iI and d.v.lopment prolraml. CORDS' capability to provide independent pvaluation of pro.raml ...... 1JnLlicantly curtailed at all1.· .. ell •• inca aom. reporta .ilre Vi.eu.amia.d and other. elirn.i.Aat.d. Further reductionl 1:l reporta would be n.c •••• ry a. CORDS manpower 'ilia. further reduced.

(e) Th. Vlemami ... ,tion 01 the Ham1.t Evaluation Sy.tem (liES) "beIU OD 1 Jul 71 when thil CVN took oy.r from US advhora the nportina for 39 dhtrictl. A. of 31 Ope 71. 103 diatrich .... re reported on by Vi.alLam.a. liES ollice,.. GeneraUy. It appilar.d that the Vletname •• wc.r. reportin. concUtiona r.,UlticaUy. althouah thp!'. wa,. bolated inatane •• of mieunder ... atandlaK of HES que.tiona. CPOC and the Military Reaion Pacificanon 'nd Dev.lopment Council. r.acted promptly to dlacrepalloci •• rooted. and initiat.d corr.ctive actiOD to lnaure the lnt'lrlly 01 the ay.t.m. •

Ie) In •• rly 19"70 the GVN and US Go'Vernment cOftc\uded that a third_.eneration computer Cilnt.,. .boll1d be •• tabU.bed so that the CVN cOl,lld prepatll to taltl; over data proceuinalor 11 CORDS and 9 USAID jo1.nt_Il •• m&JlA..emilnt information .yatem •• a function th&t wa. formerly accompli.hed by th_ MACV Data Manaailment Alency and the USAJD Information Sy.tl:ma Center. Durlnl 1971 this ,roup complet.~ it. pLanNn.aftd work be.an for autotnatin, a program mana.e­rI,,,,ent .ystem. Some train1n, took pU.Cil durin •• 971 b",t formalaar •• ment betwe.n the US and CVN for lundin. the project wa. not ,.ach.d unbl early 1972.

~IS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Order Sec Army By DAIM per

___________ B~~a~J~4~2~4~ ___ ··_~ ... ·~ vu·~

PACIFICA nON PLANNING

(C) Slnce the au.cC." of tM Accelerated PacUication Campailft LD Lata 1968. paei!lcatJon pl&n.nlng In Vietnam had demonstrated two characteristic.: evolutionary development and incr •••• d C;VN direction and. initiative. With each ne ... pbn the luee ••• of prevtolu plan. was consolidated and .. etlon. taken to overcome ••• kn ••••

Ie) Pad£l.:a.tion eltort. lD 1971 were launche3 in the optim.i'tic wake at the 1970 momentu.m. The 1970 ploCram had been mal'lc..d by d,nilicant improvement in the IeCUf'lty eit.ation and in the GVN'. handling oC various poUtical, loctal, &:ld economic programs. Enemy initi.a.tiv •• had been for .. talled throuabout the country. GVN poUticallrowth ..... evident at aU leveb. By the end of 1970. 9S percent oC aU vilLa, .. a.nd hamlet. bad eLected officiat.. and the •• offici.&l .. were being made more effective by,,-" a'luulye traininl pl'ogram. All pro\ inca. had elected pro .. vince council_. who .... re participatinl in deciaion ma.lda.1_ Money to complete development project. which had been. decided upon by the villagers. was re .. ching tn. viUase •• People ...... ere movinS about freely a. they lainfld confidence- in th~ n.w atmo.ph.eu of ... lety. 3

(C) In an effort to complete 1970', unfinished bu..ine .. and to make a .mooth transition !rom the 1970 to the 1971 plaD. ... Supplementary Pacific .. tion and Development Camp&ilD. wa. devi.ed to cover the period from 1 Nov 7~ to %8 Feb 11. Thi ....... ould permit a new aJUlual pla.nnina cycle. c:oi..n.cjdin, with the Vietname.e lunar year. The .upplemen.tary ca.mpai,ft focused on £ive .pecial Latereat prolram. which required additional attentioD..

n Destruction of the VC in1ra.tructure (VCI) through the Phung Hoang Program. Result. were not entirely .ucce .. ful •• inee the enemy'. penetration capability rema.ined.

_ .. A .pecid ~!:!2!. campaigD. ......... launched to induce lZ. 100 more enemy .oldier. to change .ide.. The loal wa. not reached. due in p&rt to reduced military activity.

The identification card program proved to have too a.mbitiou. a goal. By 28 Feb 11, only 61. 3 percent of tho.e per.On. regi.terable countrywide Were actually regt-tered. a.nd ID cards had been lilued to 53. S percent of thou estimated to be regi.terable. The import&nce of the ID ca.rd prolram la.y in the i.olation of the VCl and the tiahter control it gave the Oovernment Over the popu1&tion.

The 'pecial information program .uUered from lack of interest by local officiala. and thus did not achieve its purpose of .timulating the various prearam. through publicity.

The program to eliminate VC controlled hamlets wa. the most ,ucce .. ful of the special intere.t programs. By a.signing Territorial Forces to the V category evc controlled) hamleu. 160 of Z06 hamlets were upgraded. lea.ving only 46 V hamlet. as compared to 602 the year be(ore.

(C) The last Z month. of the Supplementary Campaign were notable for the emph.a,i, placed on preparing the 1971 province pacification plans; heretofore the TET holiday period had been marked by a general letdown in ~ciiicatien activity. The GYN wa •• lao active tn upgrading leadership throughout the country: 12 changes were made in province chief. a.nd mayor. in January. At the .ame time the National Police Directorate was upgraded to a. National Police Comm.a.nd at the mi.oi8teriaL level: a new. aggreuive Director Ceneral was named; and 15.915 additional men recruited during January and February. Overall. the 1970 Supplementary Camyai&:l provided the impetus to complete the 970 goah and prepare for implernentation of the 1971 p1&n. 4

THIS PAGE REGRADeD Ut!CLASSIFIEO Order Sec Arm18Y DA!M per ,~ 2

------S~1~1~4~2~4~ ___ ~~. f 7

5

VII .. 6

o

•

, .... Filure VU-Z a\lm.m&l'iz..a the reaulu of th. Supplementary Ca.npa1ID.

SUPPU".u:NTARY CAMPAICN RESULTS (1 Nov 70 to 28 Feb 71)

Prosram

Territorial $ecur;+y

Protection from Terrorbm

PSDF

Local Adminbtration

~~Program

Sri,hter Life for War Victim.

Land Reform

Miracle Rice Cultivation

Rural Bank.

Rural Credit

Supplementary Plan Gw.l

Upgnde 160 VC controlled hamleu

Neutra lise 7. ZOO Vel

AttaiAmeDt End February

Z06

b.676

RO)duce Terrorbt incident. to .. .m&.X1lnWD 1. <&32 2.972

Expand NP !orce to 108. 000 103,875

Orlanise and train 1, SOO, 000 combat forces

lU\1e 600. 000 arms to province lo,i.tice centers

Form 14.290 Key lDter_teaftu

Elect Z. lSI villa •• IOyernmetr.u

Elect 10. 52Z hamlet loverflmenu

Rally 12.10: ~~

Pay benefits in place to 2»3.681 victim.

Pay return-to-villas_ benefita to 373.514 victim.

Diatribuu ZOO. 000 ha of land to farmer. WIder Land.to·the ... Tiller prolram

1.329.375

602,5.7

13,576.

2,09.

10,235

9,560

146,16Z

408.126

ZlS. 638 lui.

Di.tribute ~9. 650 ba of .qutter l&Dd to the people 27.150 ba

Su.rvey a.Dd dbtri~te 40.000 lui. of land to

MOJitallDarlh 38.569 ha

Pl&Dt 500. 000 ba of mirac 1e rice 508,000 ba

E.tablbh ~9 rural bank. 5

Craut $VN6. 6 bil ill ADB loan. $VN6. ~ bit

Source: MACCOR.DS Rpt to CtNCPAC Figu.re Vll ... Z

T~e }971 Community DdeD.e and Local Development Plan

(U) PlaluUn& for the 1971 pacification and development campaign had t.eIWl early in 1970. For the fint time the CVN had taken the lead in preparing the plan. while MACV CORDS urved increadngly in an advhory role. In a time pha.ing which permitted a natQrE.I integration with the Vietname.e lu.na.r year and the realitie. of the GVN budgetary proee .. , the plan covered the period 1 Mar 71 to 28 Feb 72. The 1971 (.omm",nity Defenn ~nd Local Development Plan (CD

........ ; "Hl~S PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Order Sec Army By OAIM per

VU.7 ------~8~4r+144~2~4~---·

•

,

!~t~ ;~,~ "

/;',.', •

< I:: • ..

<::

~ :0-tt.>

~

COMMUNITY DEFENSE AND LOCAL DEVElOPMENT·1971

LOCALSELF __ ------r _ OEFENSE GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT

If UITOR I.AL SE CURIT Y

PEOPLE S SElF OEFENSE FORCE

PHUNG HO.ANG

N.ATlON.AL POLICE

CHIEU HOI

PEOPLE'S .ADMINISTRATION

PEOPLE'S INFORMATION

PEOPLE S ORGANI ZA TlONS

YOUTH

SPECIAL .. ROGRAMS

• URBAN PROGRAM

• ETHNIC MINORITIES PROGRAM

~: MACCOHS

LAND REFORM

AGRICULTURE AND FISHERY

RURAL CREDIT

VILLAGE SElF-DEVElOPMENT

LOCAL ECONO""IC Dh'ElOP.\\ENT

WAP VETERANS

WAR VICTIMS

EDUCATION

PUBLIC HEALTH

PI ..... 'III-S

t'!

~ tt.>

"" ~

., .. '

I .I

and l.!> p~alll ..... t .c~u"Hv p>.;b,un.d 1 month. 1D adva"c:. of .1' eUec!,,,. a.'" _0 .i.~o_ tun. tor .ubordiAat. plant ~o '" ,.,,1,.,., All dlalr1buted OD 7 Jan 71. d'W C\":'. p •• r. ..... rr ... d .... ,lit. ll1.ha

'lro", aDdo,..em."1 0' COMl:SMACV. 'Who req .. auad Jull '''poor, lA IU U'''Ipi..me''&atlOA.

IC) Paruupauon oj a111he people wa. lb" ke""",e. a..aid",. upon lbe .... <t ••••• oJ lh. pa ••• lb. 1971 CD aDd .L.D Plan d.voted atldltloaal .... tHlrc •• to a4hance &b. 'rCK. ... of .. U.tleJID.e • •• U ... o.ernment, and I.Uood",velopm.nt. Tb. .. lbe plan .mphau •• d loc. •••• ."ppo •• d to uuoMl im.u..n.e. re'Ollli.unl the lac: thai lh. CV!\ had ea •• ruled co.,uol 0:"." ,..,fly '.~ oj the popula .. tiOIl and popu~at.~ ...... of V'PIMm. A Ir •• t lha,.. of tn. tM..rd.a 0' c"Jen'" .... to M bortle loc;aUy. Th.t.,.m ··,.clfic.uon·· ••• drupped hom t!M plab lule, .1 ....... ;>a .... !.Iica ... OD ia U. or'.iDal .e,..e or wn.ttn. the pop"lace frllm en.my control bad praen.;."y be ••• c.hlo ••• d. The form.r prolram of pacUtc..tiOft .nd de.elopment had ad •• nced LDto • iar "nore cornpl •• 4e.,.10p. lnent .tal" The .971 pLan ,..necl.d •• allt in .m~.l. to the poUc<: .. :. ICClAt ..... economlc .Uonll .... d.d to conloUda,. lo.erame.t cODtrol.

(C) The .,.,: CD.nd W Plan wa •• lm,Wi." b,. replacu'lth •• llhr ob,.c:IY" of 1910 -idt. thre. ~rO&d ob;'cU ... : Seu-Det ••••• SeU .. Go"rameat. aDd leU.Developm.nt; " •• Fil"'" VD.). Uncl.r the .. b~o:l obJ.cti ... Wtl,.. • cumber oJ u"hvLcha •• prol,.m •• iachad.lAI certain IMW Obe'. The prosr.m. w.re orlanl.ed WMI., the thr •• ob,)ect.lv •• itt. 01'11.1' \0 .;1 •• 1'1,. p1&c. foc". on the ta,... primal',. p""po". of tbe enUre effort. 1 •••• malat .... DC. of. permanent .. cu,.ity Jor the po",laUon. p.arUcipaUon of the pop"LaUOD iA lo •• rnm. .... Dd d •• .Ilopm.nt of .. bene I' W. for .U the popuLaUoa •

•• The .oat for tIa. J.,o.c.' SeU.D.fen •• obJ.ctive we. to pro.1de •• clarit,. to .U 1M popu,La. tion of the J,VN .nd prodlKe ... nv1roameat la wb.it'.b aU .. tir.D&l pro,raml ."lei be ."cce.lluU,. compl.t.d.

The leM' 01 the Loca. SeUooGovUAm.nt obj.ctive ••• to lac,.. ••• the .U.cU •• ne .. of local .dm1nlltr.Uon thro~.b bar..,. orl.ai..aUOA .ad m&Aa.emaa, aAIllDcrea".d •• a,... M" of the m.aAi.ac of democraey.

rhe third ohjacUv •• Loc.l Self .. o.v.loprnout. re.t.d. Oft Lb •• chie •• mentl of the military, t.be peopl •• c.dre. aACI otf~cial. throu,h tlw pa" y •• n. It • .nwd at committint .u tb. peop.e to the .(fort of de".lop1". tbe .couomy .nd the .oci.,,. .0 tbat prolr ... tow.rd •• U •• d1lc:l.nc,. CCMlld M obt&laed.

-r-o ",.ci.l ,rolre.m •• the lJrbaa Prolram aad tbt £tDlc ),UDOI'1ty Pro,ram, ..... dictated by reeolAition of the f&.ct tbat popu,laUoa we. lacre •• ln. La dw ar"' •• r ••• &Ad Dac .... ry impro ... lnentl would be requir.d 1a the li.iA. coDditioDa 01 1.ba •• peopl.. The probl.rna of the ethnic minortU •• ..,.,.. to be baadl.d th,.o",h .ped.1 d •• alopm.Dt pro.r.m. wbich wo,,14 De balld on tJwt tr.ditional cv..tom ••• w.U •• oa the .pecLeI charact.,.i.tic. 01 the parHcuLar 3:·OQP.

CU, Fi.\&r. VU., .how. the or.ani.Alio. of U. uwU .. iC;;Q&l pro,r.m. WMler the th.· •• bro.d obJ.ctive. which th., ."pport.ct. S",b •• q"e,,' •• CUOD. o{ thu cAap,.r d •• crib.- •• ch oJ the pro ... • r.m •• ad prol,.. .. mad. ia 1971. S

PlaftAlnl lor ..... Fut1olr.

(U) Ever .lace the CVl'f prodyc:.d III Ilr.t .""ul P.cUlc.tioD .Dd Developm.nt PlaD in 19h,. tha .. plaD' bad He. d •• eloped for only the e",.,,1ft, ,. •• 1'. Thu wa.. ,...liltic in the r.pidly chan,tn, .1t\&&tioD wblch mark.d the •• rly ,...... B, 1971 the .hQAtioft had .tabiliaed tC' thfo

polnt wbere 101101." ran •• planni"', w •• both f •• lible and ... e .... ry. R.co.nizi ... thi •• the GVN ..... n d.velopla, • ro",. .. y •• r plan. La which the-y iftlrodUoced &A incr ••• Ln. amou.nt oJ 'beir ow.,.

orialnal ~La:u:UAa. The r"Il1taAt FOllr. Year e;)mmWlity Deienle and Loc.a.l Oevelopmt.nt Plan (:972.1975) continued the three broad oblectivu of the ~reviolls 1971 CD &nd LD Plan: Local Sell.Oeien ••• Local Sell_Qc,verrunent, and Local Self-Development. Of the Z9 indlvtdllal progral which f.U under th •• e bro.d objecun •• nve ."'re entirely new: Administrative Security, Local ReY.nue lmpro"ment, Finance, Er&d.icatic.n of Social Evils, and Administrative Reform.

(U) 1Altial plaruUnl begali w:tA pre1.i.rn.1n&ry dbcuuion. in May 1971. and. proll .... d throug Out the year. Moat of th. programs were completed by February 197Z, but the official start 01 the 4.y.ar prolram 90'''' h.Ld in abeyance by the datayed i .. uance of Presidttntial iuiata.nce. Neverthele .. the plan. began to be implemented in March 1972 ... the provinc.s began !,roducing their ptaAs.

LOCAL SELF-OEFENSE

Local SeLf-Delenn Programs

(e) Th. tint of the three ba.lc objectlv .. in the OVN 1971 Community Delen .. and Local Development Plan was Local Sell-D.lens.. Ita 10&1 wu to· provide •• curity 1,.0 all the population of the aVN so that an environment would .sbt in which all national prolrams could b •• ucce .... fully completed. Local Sell_Oefen .. con.dsted of flve progra.ms.

(e) Territorial $ecllrity. U.Lng :.:tVNAF .. ad civil forces to the best advantage, the goa. was to provide A and B category (,enerdly adlKlua.te) .ecurity to 95 percent ot the total popllla­tion in hamlets and to eliminate all V category ha.mle~ J. Additional goala were to deny the enem u.e of roads. national manpower. ~I'ld materiel; develop fully manned. wen equipped, trained, and aggr ... ive Regional Forces units; and reduce the divisional tacti.:a.l areas of re.ponsibility '0 as to inerease mooility ot major units.

(e) People's Self-Defenae Forces. The ucond 01 the 1971 security_related programs was improvement of the People" Self_Defense Force (PSDF), which along with the National Pollce provided the Lnternal delen .. 01 populated hamleta. A strong training program wa. planned, and the .trength of combat PSDF wal to be increa •• d t8 1.500,000 combat PSDF memb (this .trength U\cr'!aaed the bardcore PSDF memb4'u'to 1.001), 000 plus the 500.000 regular corr membera). Tr~e or.e million. hal"deore PSDF. were to b. eqllipped with 500. 000 weapons in varyi ratio. based on local requirements, and would be g:ouped Lnto IS, JOO b&rdcore Inter_Teams, e~

.upported by a Development Inter-Team 011 a one_far_one basis. In a.ddition to the internal d.efen •• of popula.ted hamlets. PSDF mem'beu were to actively participate in the campaign agail: the Vel, in. the People'J Information Program.and the Youth Program.

(C) li!l!2!!!t Polic..!.' The key tt Ierne nt in the light against the VCl and in reduction of terrorism a.r:d sabotage waSt to be the National Potice with the .upport of the- PSDF. T~ cany out this program. manpow,..-, operational e!fectiveness. and individual motivation would have to be improved. The general goals set for the N .. tlonal Police were to increa .. e per.onnel strengtl: to lZZ. DOD, provide furthel" training for .all policemen, including political education; and sub. stantially incre&se p~r.onnel in village potice stations.

(el Phung Hoang Program. The majol" eCfort in protecting the people Crom terroe i.sm was the Phung Hoang Program, de.igned to elim.in.a.te the VC infrastructure. The main abjectiv oC this continuing program was to neutralize Communist cadre in categories A (Com.."nunist part" members) and B (probationary members -and cadre in posi _ ons oC leadership). Priority targets were listed a. key VCl elements, especially finance/economy, sapper, communication/liaison, and troop pro.elyting elements, and those organizations subordin .. te to the Communist provisior

THIS PAGE REGfiADED UNCLASSIFIED Order Sec Army By DAiM p~r ,j ----'IlSt-"42t""11t-44-i2iH4k----• ., VII_tO

&overnment. Photolraphs of coalirmed vel were to be ct.:'ected and post.d promiDea.tly. E!fective implementau.on of the program was to be achievee througll accurate ... rg_tin. of .u.pecu. however the procra.m" e!(iciency wa. to be maint&1Jled only within ~e framework of the law.

(C) Chieu Hoi Program. The final major program whicb would belp achieve the Local Sell-Oefen.e objective was the Chieu Hoi Program. 1!9 pllrpose wa. twofold: w decrea.e the enemy'. potential alld to i.ncr.a;;-th&tor the RVN. R.J.Jlie,.. wOIlLd be u.ed ill operations attacltina the VCI &nd abo exploited £01' information. b

Territorial Security Prolram

(C) The underlyinl principle of territori&l security, accordinl to the CD and LO Plan. was th&t the mo.t eUective way of a.surinl .ecurity was to keep e",emy force. away from the Viet_ nam ••• people and neutralize the vel. All of the orlanised aDd .. :med forces of the GVN. assisted by FWMAF. were to conduct operations to develop and maintain .tability and security required for the .ucce .. of the CO and LO Plan. The Regiona! Force. (RF). Popular Force. (PF). and National Police (NP) were the primary Corcn rnponsible Cor terrltori&l security. 1

(C) The miuion of the RVNAF/FWMAF continuUy moved away from the .tatic local .ecurity a",ociated with pacification. IX.ring 1971, re,utar Corce "lpport to pacification continued in the traininl of Territoriat Forces. clearini operation. into the la.t of the VC .tronlhold. and major ba.e area •• and interdiction of enemy .upply rou,el. By preventinK an enemy larle U!lit threat. the.e operation. made it pouible Cor territorial a.Dd local force. to maintain local .ecur­ity con.btent with the "area .ecurity concept. II

(U) Tr'!nd. in Territorial Security. The area .. curity concept and the role of civil and miUtary force. i. de.cribed in Annex H. "Trend. in Territorial SeC\lrlty." Thi. annex .. 1.0 discu •••• achievements in security by force &-nd military region.

ec) Territoria.l Forr. .. A .. e .. me'lt. SilnLficant prQlre .. wa. made durin, 1971 in the redeplo~ent of exce •• force. from secure ";rea. to in.ecure ar.... I'hi. wac the dominant theme ill Territorial Force. improvement durinl the year. To provide better information on a.cur1ty reqirements and deployment of forcel, a computeriz.ed .y.tem was intro.duced. The data were u.ed to stimulate command attention to area. of potential mi.employrnent of RF/PF unit •• A. operationa became routine and le .. enthu.h.tic. the RFJPF stati.tic. aenerally reflected .ome de.ree of .tagnation among the •• force ••

(C) Regional Force. operation. Crom M&rch to De-cember 1971 shO\\o·ed an overal~ decline in the percentage of operation. with conta.ct.· although the number of RF operation. did increaae durina the period. The enerr.y to friendly KIA ratio dropped from 4.5:1 in January to 2..8: 1 in December. The weapon. exchange ratio varied with an average of 4.7:1 for the year; this repre.ented a decre •• e when compared with the 1970 avera,e oC 5.4:1. The percentale of Popular Force. operation. with contact rem.&ined con. latently low. The number of PF operation. decreand d'.lring the fir.t S month. of the year and then increased .harply during the next f.

month.. The avera,e enemy to Cr~endly KIA ratio and weapon. exchange continued to decline Crom a high point reached in May.

eel The objective of providin, A and B category security to 95 percent of to:. total population in hamlet. and khom. (urban .ubdivhionl was not met, but gains made were neverthele ... signifi­cant. a •• hown 1:ii""'i\'Mex H. Countrywide the percentage oC population Uvi::.g i.e. har:11et. rated A or B Igenerally adequate .ecurity) was 84.3 by the end ot 1171. compared with 73.9 in January 1971. The reduction of VC ccntrolled hamlet. and the reduction in the attack.-by-Ci.re (ABF) 3nd

...... I!!!!I!~HIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Order Sec Army By DAIM per

B 4 1 4 2 4"d'~ ----------~~~~~-~-----~

j UWJQiJI'.' •. " .. e"1WN ........ 1'JiWJlUt ••• W .. ::c .. <'CY .. C:U;."(Ni< .... t<2h~<.<. W;;C < 4Ft. ( (f'''<1e~t9( .. ·.5* ........ c .... "!,.. .. 1\

.i t

cerrodam alao atte.ted to improved aecur1ty. Only 10 ve ~leu remaLne'd cowurYWlcle a. of 31 Oec 71, with. the e1iml.nation of all ve hAmletl by Z? F.i.. 72, a. re .. l pouLbiUty. The ioale of reducin. ABF below 2,000 by 29 Feb 72 wal abo attaia.&bLe, dnce there .. ere only 1,049 by the ye .. rl. end. 9

People" Se\l.Defen .. Force Prolram

'(e) Th~ P<e'!lpl.'. Sell_Oefen •• Forc. (PSDF) 1.nc:re ... d In import&Jlce durinl 1971 due both to the elT'.pha.h on .. If_def.nGe in the CD &Ad LD Plan .. nd on the r.allocation o£ £orc... The PSDF ......... mllltia lorce made up of men and. boy. above or below ci-rut ale, a..nd women. All _.re UDp&id Uld .. rved on a part-time ba.ta in delenae of their own haml.tt. Improvement 01

the PSDF wa. to be .. chieved Wld.er the 1971 CO and LD Pla.n through a .tronl trai.nin, prolram. and an i.nc:rea •• in peraonnel. Atta.tinl to the increa.in, OVN intereat in PSDF wae the Lower He"e approval 01 $VNl. 070-.8Z6, 000 lor the PSDF prolram, twO and one_hall tim .. the 1970 II.ppropriation.

(e) The 1971 CD a" LD P.lan e.tabU.hed quantitative ,o .. le lor PSDF; it aLto required improvement in the quaUty of traiJ:J.n1 for Keylnter-Team. (taT) (the core element of PSDF orlaniu.tion); orla.ni:&&tioD. and. tl'&lninl of .. d.ditioaal combat: team. to aUlment !<IT; and ol'lanization of .upport PSDF into Oevelopm.nt 1l1ter-Teams (DIT). In 1971. PSDF in conjWlctioQ. -.lth the National Police a.nd Popu.lar Force ...... wn.d reapondbility for .ecurity in 4. 8ll A. B. and C hamlets or 40 perc'!1t 01 the HE~ hamlet ba... Ad.litionaL mAjor empba.i •• a. placed on development of PSDF youth. prolrams. coc.ceAtratinl on a.thletic., c .. mperee. &Dd ra11l.l ... nd on PSDF participation in the People't Information and Local Sell_Developm.nt program ••

(C) Of 14.879 orlanis.d Key Inter-Team •• 14,365 or 96 percent had been trained by the eAd of 1971. Of the 14.214 DIT ol'la.ni:&eci. 66 perceAt h.a.d recl!ived .ome tr .. inUl,. However. due to the provilionl 01 Minhterial CLl'culal' No. 1196, dated 2 Sep 71, a problem evolved in meeting the requiren18nt. of the CO and LD Plan for KIT le .. de,... The circular provided for draltinl all eligible PSDF memberl and apecifically lorbade the training of 17 y.ar aIda a. KIT l.adera. To help m£intaita the KIT In,de''lhip through the •• nd of the ye .. r, an agreement betwe4lon the Ministry of Defen.e ane the Miniatry"l Int~rior Vial reached. allowing for deferm.nt 0165,000 of the training KIT l".den !.lD.til laD.Urf 1972. In the opinion of the Miniatry 01 Interior, the provisions of Circular No. 1196 .eriou.ly Urnited the nwnber of peraolU available to be('om. Inter- Team leader. and tb. aireement did na1: .alve thi. problem. Con.equently durinSthe 1a.t quarter 01 the year, leader training declined &nd onLy 47 perc.nt (49. 551) of the 1971 tnining 10&1 (106. OZ2) Via. reached. Th. overall trainin. statu. of the PSDF waa ••• hown below.

Nwnber Percent Nwnber Percent

22!! Ors:anized Attained Trained Attained

Combat PSDF 1,500,000 1,393,156 93 1. 3ZZ. 500 88 S_pport PSDF 2,500,000 3.035.980 III 2,508,101 101 Key [.nter_Team. lS.OI)O 14,869 99 14. loS 96 Development of Inter_ Team. 15.000 14.Z14 95 9.966 66 PSDF Leade,.. 106,02Z 49.551 47

(e) Youth received. iner.a.ed attention within the PSDF progra.m. A. 01 31 December. the Directorate General of Youth conducted Z3, 153 youth meetings a.nd held 4, UZ youth ca.mpout. and raIUe.. By the end of the ye .. r Z.470 youth council. existed. A Youth Council 1i&ndbook wa. pubU.hed in Vietnamese and EngUlh. 10

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Order Sec.Army By DAIM per

1341424 -

(Cl PSDF operatioual Z'e."lta Cor the veal' are ahewn in Ti,\lZ'. Vtt-4.

1971

~

J.,. Fob ),!&r Apr May Jon J_l A_I Sep Oct Nov Do.

Source:

PEOPLE'S SELl" DEFENSE FORCE EFFECnvENESS (aa of 31 Dec 71)

ED Fr En to Tr En Wpn Fr "PD. ED. to Tr Wpn ~ ~ KIA Ratio' .b:2!!!.!. Cae:tured ~ .. Ratio

90 197 0.4b,1 b3 118 0.18,1 110 99 1.11,1 bb 111 0.31,1 89 94 0.95,1 b) IlZ 0.48,1 NA NA HA NA NA NA 71 110 0.b5,1 35 178 0.13,1 89 158 0.5b,1 779 113 3.49,1 33 54 O. bl:l 39 55 0.71:1 89 138 O. b4,1 8b 153 0.5b,1 70 90 0.78,1 54 lZ8 0.41,1 47 58 0.81,1 34 lZO 0.18,1 71 b8 1.04,1 11 111 0.10,1 31 51 O.bO,1 33 31 1.0b,1

MACn. Meaaurement of Prolre •• TIpI'. Vtt·"

Natioual Pollce Prolram

(U) Natioaal Pollee (NP) contribution. to the lmprovemeD.t of .. cur1ty extended throu&ho"t the COWlib'}' reaching each villag.. The Local Sell_Delen .. objectiY. oC the 1971 CD and LD Plan apecified that the NadoA&l Police. in it .. ociation with the RT and. PF, wOllld become the force reaponaible for !naurinl territorial lecurity and eUmiDacion of the VCI. Specific d"ties I1Dder the CD and LO Plaza weI'. to:

I • __ ConaoUdate law enforcement and mainten&nce of order in both cities and rural areaa in

order to protect the pf'ople'. live. and property .

... _ Play the main role in the neutralization of the VCI with the '''pport of the ARVN. RT, fiT and PSOT in order to improye territorial .. curity.

__ In coordi.n.a.tion wi th the PSDF, a •• ume re.pon.ibUity for the protection of completely pacified area. ao a. to releau RF and PF for operation. in the outer perimeter of tho .. areal. 11

(U) Natioaal Pollce organization. The National Pollce 'Maa a .. t&ned re.ponsibiLity throuJhout RVN for law enforcement: maintenance of aec:urity and public: order. crime· prevention, detection. aDd inYt'stilation. and detention 0' oUenclera: collection of aU infonnat:'o.l con.idered detrimental to nat10nal security; and di •• ater reLieC. The National Police Command (NPC) comprised the tollowini levelt':

... _ A National Police Command heac!quartera at the central level..

.... Relional Pollee command. and a Capital Police Command headquartera .

... ··!!!!!!!!!I-~~HIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

VU_13 _o_rd_e_'_S_._C_A_r~t"rY~B~Y~O~A~I~~~,pe~r~ ___ ._" __ :_ •• :_"~" __ ~41424 ~

~ • :;:

~ ;..

I S·I 5'2 S·l S·'

NATIONAL POLICE COMMAND

INSPECTOR GENE PAL DIRECTORm

COMMlNOER

DEPUTY COMMANDER

OfFICE Of THE COMMANDER

IUOGII , ACCOUNTING SVC 'SYO.S , .UILIC IIUTIOIS Oil

Dfe Of III DI'UTY COll1lD11

IICHMleAL DIUCTDIAII IIlICDI SIIVICI

"I 1 1 'LA.NING S IIUL AffAllS SVC t-----'1-----~-1_ DAtA IAUGIIUI elllll

HEADQUARIIIS eOllAMOUI 111II.0L

r -IISOIIll

115 , 'LUS

CllIllm

IIMIGIA TlON

OP~S 'LIG I 'C 'UG t' -""'

- O.IS CII IIIU POliCI .llS .1" ~ IAlIII 'Olltl I. HOS.Il11

t 'UIOL/llAllie

IIG POLICI HallS

I PlOV POllet NQllS

I DISI POLICI HaIlS

• POLIti SlIIiONS

AClOllle IIG IN" I' l,eADII' 14SIt IIG ell

LOG 'LIG ~U"LY IRAIS , IAIIl IIAL ISIAlI lEtH INS' " nOD til

PIICllCl POLICI Mans I

[ '01lC( SUIIOIS J

r -'tWN5 ~ L _"~"! .J t.~ID

'LAIIIIG

::S~ltll"~1I •

10111 lUI

I AUG 1971 IRlVISEDI

,.., .. : IlACCORI>S '1 .... D-D

~ ~ ~ :;;; ~

-;

• •

· .: ·

,

" .

l;.vCLAS-VIFIED

Pr".1'Yince, city. di.urict, vlllai". a:\d pre"Ulct comm.and, Wlcier tneir r •• pect,;,ve area headquarter.. 12

(U) Since iu iDeepaoD in 19b2. the Nau.oa,al Pollce orlaDia.tioD bad 11'0W'n from .. force le\'.1 'Of 20,900 to 113, bSb on ) 1 Dec 71. ::lurin, ita brief hitltory, the NP bad been .ubject to •• yeral ,.eorl,,-nizationl in r'lponte to emerlency "I'.1c. ,.equirameDtl, but c»nael bad neve:r been. 10 Iweepln, a. duriJIl 1171, .... h.n there w.re m.any tnIIojor chan, •• 1D the are". of reor,anl .. cauon. peuonnel. and eXp&DIlon. The orJa.n~¥.ti.on of the National Pollce Command a. oC end-197) II .hown In Filure VD.5. AdcUtion&l :tUnor chan, .. were expected dUl'inl 1972.

(U'l Particularly nlponlible for eCla1 •• dAK CVN thiDldJlI on Qe orlaniaacion of the ~c.tioD&l Pohee ,,'a, Sir Robert Thomplon', "Report Olio th. National PoUc •• aepublic of Viemam," which wa. band oa a .tudy coftuni .. ionec! by Pruid.eat Nixon and financed by USAID. S~r Robert. a recoan1zed expert on couater ... in,,:,uleacy 'becau. •• of hb experi'nce in MaJayaia. vialted Vietnam Wlth a .tUG/CrouP betweea Ja.nuary aad March 1971. The Iroup'. flMl report wa. mad. avall­able to tne CiVN. MACV. uui the Amerlc..,. Err..ba .. y on 29 Mar 71;..n1li iu 157 recommeDd&tionl carefully Icrutinbeci. Althouab all of the propoI.lI were not conlidered feaslew, the studI proyed valuable in the CiVN reevaluatioa of the NP. ar.d to the related US advbory effort. 1

(0) The Thompaoa report reco,JUsed certain baaic facte coocerDiDl the Deed. of South Viet .. nam ill the tranlition period lletween de.tructive war and workiD, pt.a'!.. A majority of the recommendationl were not new, nor were the problema they repTe •• nted. The report recolnized the need for cbanlina emphasb toward rebuildinl the cll.c1pliDe aDd moral fiber of the nation. and noted the licniCicanC"e of the police in thh endeavor. In hi. leuer to Prime Minhter Kbiem. Sir Robert pointed out that the police, who are in dailv COntact with the people. lhould btl the . ltarUnl POint for buUdinl dilc1pUne and correctin&: the moral erolio." cau •• d by the war. The mOlt important recommendationl were .u.m.m&rised, in the rcporta .1:

.... Mald.nl the NatioD&l Pollce role oI law emorcement independent from poUtical influence;

... - Makina the pollce .talion the baaic wt of the Pollce Forc.;

... lDlurin, intelrity oI command from top to bottom, aDd. full a""Pport for t:A. inciividual policemen;

_. lmproYilll pel'loJU1el quality, inciadinl a lmaUer traiJled proI ••• ional core;

... Auuminl total CiVN tnternal lecurity intelU,ence relpo:n.aibiUtlel. 14

(0) The National Police Command W&I Iorm,.ct in March 1971 with the aboUlhment of the Pollce Directorate ~neral. On 12 Ja.n 71, the NP had received a I'\8W cornma:n.der. MCi 'Iran Thanh Phonl. He wal replaced on .. September by Col Neuyen Khat Sinh. an experie:u:ed intellilence ollic.; who had been head of the Vietnam .. e CID.

(0) Command/control matters fer the new NPC were oriented throua!l the Prim. Mini.ter. On 1 June the Pr .. ident approved and directed the reoraanizatioD of the NPC Lato a more viable inatitutional atructure and one better able to handle the <oil&nlLnI talka of the pollce throutlbout the nation. In the Ju..,e reorganisation wa. a requirement for eltabU.hrnent of Police operation centers at the national. re'ior .... l. prOvincial, and diltrlct le".II. The Capital and the National Police Command opera.tion centera were inaulurated in S~pt.mber. and belan to develop fully operational centera at the relional leYel.

UNCLASSIFIED

VU_15

ii; K.o.S.J.9.9.l)' J .'1)6 ....... 9.)3

UNCLASSIFIED

National Police contingent welcome. delegate. to Tan Phu Trung to! mlet..

UNCLASSIFIED

Vll_lb

•• - ~ J:",' .'"

(U) The JlUle .norlani&.tion actioD' in.c~ea .. d both the capabilitiu and prutige of the Nl-'C and permiLted lmprovemenu in centn.Uzed .upport to all .ubordlJl&te pollee headqu.arten and patrolmen. One major chance a!lectina: rl\ch member of the NPC wa. the pollee r.nk con~ veuion decree of ZZ Jun 71. which provided fur the more familiar military-type r.nk in.ignia. merit promotions, and 10lic.l progrellion of .alary incre.see. Lateral entl'y into the IXJlice .ervice .... ould be permitt.d only at the .ecund lieutenant atad lowe.t patrolmen level •. In .enerat, the rank cODversion was ded,ned to benefit aU members of the NPC in term. of pay, statu., and public .cceptance.

(U) After .everal year. of manpower ltarvation. the NPC wa. I~ven the opportunity on a one .. time bali •• to recruit 34.000 penon. LA early 1971. For the lint nm. the police could recruit draIt.a.e person.. Thi. wal t&ntamount to draft esemption. and recru.itment had to be halted in April alter approximately Z8.000 new recruits were recelved. UoU'ortunately, few quality recruit. were available aince oaly perlonl with Ie .. tba:. 11 y.ar. of formal education cou~d be recruited. M&AY recruits had a. littl. a. S ye.rs ot formal educ.tion. The NP t.ced • major trainiDJ probl.m in d.velopinl quality trom qunlity. 15

IC) Evaloation of the National Pollce Command. aecau.-e ot its importan..::e to the tuture .tabillty ot the GVN. a year_end ev.luation at the NPC by MAC V CORDS is of interut.

(C) Organization. A1thoulh th~ change in the NPC and late 1971 preoccupation with the election ••• rl< fadon that tended to delay .chievinl viability in the new com.ma.nd, reporta Irorn the r.a:ion. conc.rnin. villa,. polic. operation. and the implementation of toot and mobile p.trol. indlc.te that directiv.I were reachi..nl the villa.,e level. and compUance w •• noted. The l&c~ ot competent .taU and lin. oUlcera throu,hout the NPC indicated that de.,.loprr..ent of overall or8an~ i:tanon and oper.tional eUectivene •• would be .low.

(C) Leadersbip. lA.del'lhip in the NPC wa. w.ak. p..rticularly .t the mIddle .nd lower level. "f the organiz.tion. Where competent le.derlhlp ,txbted .nd men adeq~oi.tely tr.ined and equipped, per!ormance wa. aenerally .uitable. Tb'4 late 197) intu.ion at SO field arade officillr. into the NPC staff and commend .tructure, .rK 484 company gr.de officp.r. into field oper.tion. and command position., proved helptul. The NPC w.s .uthol"ized to ablorb bb5 .dditional company arade ARVN c~ficers durinl 197Z, .nd espected to lain 1.000 police officer" through civil.1&n recruitment and by ar.ntm, commi •• ions to quahfied potic"" .ergean_ts .and .ergeant-majou. Thh w •• especled to have. major impact aD .tr.n;thenma NPC leadership. but not \lDtU • u.eful level of .lEpe~ence had been accrued. The 428 police cadet. who entered traininl in June 1971 were lra'-uated on lZ J.n 7Z aa police aeCODd Ueutenant.. Thele officers repre.ented the firlt group. lince the .doption ot the new r.nk .tructure, to be sel.cted from the ranks by .peci.l e'll&mination G.nd tr.ined •• police commi.sioned oUie'ers.

(C) Police performance. Th.re were m.jor problem. other than lac~ ot competent le.derahip which aUected police perlort:l&nce. Poor lecurity in remote .re •• and ••• ianment of polic. to po.ta diltant from home re.ulted in poor performan"e .nd a sub.tantial n.umber of de.ertioa.. Another f.ctor aUecting mol'. Ie, .nd con.equently pertorm.nce. w •• the arrog.nce dilpl.yed by RVN military pel'lonnel towa.rd the police. In many c •••• the police were reluctant to investilate per.on. who werf', or app~a:red to be. RVN per.onnel. even though many deserter .. draft dudEer., and common criminals ,·ere known to don the RVN unitorm for criminal or other rea."n ••

tC} Training. The ma"'ve tr&ininl effort to .upport the .udden .nd major inerea.e i.n NP .trenlth in 1971 wa. ~mpr •• siv~. but the low educational level of recruitl. size.:;,f the ela •• e., .nd quality of the in.tructor c.che left much to be de.ired. Tr.ininl would be empha.ized in 1972 in Qrd.r to develop quality from qu~ntity. Of .pecial interut durin. 1971 w •• the training of police repreaentina ethr minoritie.. The Ur.t ~etachment of lZl, Montagn.rd recruit., out

••••• .. ·'THIS PAGe: REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Ortler ~c J..rmy S~ OAIM per

vn .. 17 ~4:' 424

i~'lj,~.

NATIONAL POLICE

Thousands 12 5 iir.N· ... I!ITllII!oIll!NII!I ... ~LiIII!Ipi!o·LlllicI!E·sI!TI!I!!R I

100

~ C':l < t 75 I-l ,

~ Oi

... ~

50

25

o 63 . 64 . 65 . 66 . 67 . 68 • 69 • ,0

1971

....... , 1UCC0R0S

NP BRANCH COMPOSITION

fiELD ,OUCE

15"

SP£CIAL ~IANCH

17"

M1QIMI n.

UNifORMED POLIC

66"

'~TII-.

.'

,

c:: .. .' -"-<"l

t , ~ :; -.., ... t!o1 , c::, , .

;,p

• & .W"!5b 01 & toLaI or 000, "Ilter.e tr.ln1na at Pit'UlI.I 1ft Al.llu.t 1971. ' .. be lraini"'K Yo., 'Jiven in the MOD_ Lalr.t.rd I .............. and thf' .ueee •• ful Iradu&u. weI'. to be a.dln.d relu,ar ;:tOilce duties in their OWft local .re.~ •.

Ie) ~ploymenl. The NK wa. convinced that the police .hould bfo broulht cionI' to

the people in both r"rai and "rMn area., U civil security was to be .chie".d ~d mafntained. Prolre •• durinl 1971 wa •• ncollralinl, a •• "b.t&nUal numbers 01 police were a •• ilned to the villale •• and the NPC .howed an increalin, interelt in e.tabU.hlDI loot aDd. mobile patro~. 111

r" .. ~ yilla.e. aad hamleu, a. well a. In the cltie •• lb

• (Cl I.chievemenl of 1971 ,oal •• Th. 1971 CO and LD Plan .. t .'")ou,h .taDetarelior the

performance of the National Police. Moreoyer, it encoura,ed cooperauon between the police and other orwamzation.. The NP were to "prom,:,te and maintain a 'firit of ::)Operstion ilmonl the people, between the people and the lover!lmerot, an:! amon, IOY.!'JVIl.nt aioende •• " Another .ignificant .lement of the NP Pro,ram wa. employmel1t of the villa, •• and hAmlet. "a. the foundahon lor the improvement and con'oUd.tion 01 .ecurity and order for the enlorcement 01 national law •• t. Clearly, the ~P w.re an important lillk betw •• n the Government aDd the people.

(C) Statistical l0ai. itll 1971 lor the NaUoul Poli.;e wen pr .. cribec11.n th. CD and LD Plan a. foUow.:

-_ aecruit 30,000 ad~itional p.rsonn.l to brUtI total NP penonnel .trenlth in 1971 to 122.000;. recruitment priority will ao to local inhabltaDU, lnc:ludinl the ethnic minorities •••.

__ Strenlthen the or,aniution and per.onnel of 2. OS) exbtlD, villa._ NP .ub.tation. additional villaae NP ."b.tation. will be .et up within 45 rtays of villase ~lection ••

__ In compari.on. with 1970, terroriam aJl;d .aboLa,e incident ...... to be =-educed by 50 percent in are •• underloin. pacification aDd by 75 percent in .ecur. area ••

-- Complete the i •• unce of 3,ln.4891D caro. to citben. aged IS aJl;~ older. Priority to MR 4.

(!l) .Ac~ievement toward attainia, loa1. was mixed. The desired end_atrenlth of 122,000 by 29 Feb 72 W(,ould not be "ached, priL.l.:ipally becau.e the authority to hi:. h'ld beeu t .. rminated tn April 1971. NP Itren,th a. of end_Dec.mber 1971 wa. :"13.686. EDd of the year development. were mol'. promblni, "Yith. r.cl'ultment of an additioul 5.000 men authori&ed on 1 Jan 72 and 485 ARVN oificen detached for duty with the Nrc. National poac.e .trena:th •• ince 1963 are shown in Filure VO-6.

(tI) Th.re ~d bc!en a 'i,nificil.nt increa.e in. villale police atrenlths durinl 1971, with 31,618 at y.ar'. end. Anoth.n of the NP 10&1. bad been to establish police .ub.tation. in every vi1~I' that had an elected lonrnment. Followia, are yeu_end re.ults by MR:

MR 1 MR Z MR 3 MR 4

• Oakta1 number

VillaR ••

46Z 613 348 754*

Villase Police S~tiona

461 508 + 19 .ub.tabon. 314 7S9

'6 ••••• IIIJ155 PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIf1£D Order Se: Army By 9A1M per

vn.19 84]424

'L :::0

Also .trena:thenmc the .,illa,e poi.lc:e wu the face that in certain .elected vill.&cu in MR. I, Z and 4. the province chie!. had appointed vill .. ae pollce I,;hi.C. to the additional respon.ibility of deputy villale chief for secllrity. and pl&c.t"t... the PSOF IInder police operational controi for civil .ecurlty matter ••

tU) The NP was &1.0 active i.1 the war again.t the Vel and terroriam. Operations with o~r military forc •• inereautl. but the number of VC/VCleli.miAated decreased markedly due to r decreaae in the Dumber of velvet target. au lined to the Field Police by the Phung Hoans Pro­,um. The important National Identity Relbtration prolram, which helped I.loLa.te the Vel. neared completion at the end of 1971. Io. shown below.

NA TIONAL IDENTITY RECtsTRA nON PROCRAM (as of 1 Jan 72,

Resilterable Reli.tered ~

MR I 1,347,452, 1,353,2.22 1.268,142. MR Z 1,573,083 1,594.380 1.544.051 MR 3 1.973.351 1.981,038 1.938.703 MR 4 3.234.253 3,47b,893 3.300.910 Saigon 1,034,91b 989,595 9731 193

Total 9.127.655 9.395.1Z8 9.024.999

(U) In general National Police achievements during 1971 con.ined of .trengthinll the NPC organization. a •• uming inerea.ed re'pon.ibility [or local .ecurlty under the "[orce tran.ition concept" (de.cribed in Annex H). improving the law eruot'cement 'y.tem, increasi.ng activitie. in drui suppre.sion an~ apprehen'lon o[ draft evade rat and improving the NP image and prestige. 18

Security Related Program.

(e) Terrori.m wa. ODe o[ the mo.t important and effective tactic. in the Communi.t e[fort to take over South Vietnam. The GVNI. ability to protect the people [rom tert'ori.m therefore was a mea..urable indicator o[ prolr ••• in security, e.peclally ... the war gradually pha.ed into a more .ubdued and protractlul .truig1e. The ~ecrea.e in terrori.m in 1971 ... ;a. attributable to the increa.ed efficiency in the GVN effort In counter-luerrill&/anti-vel activities. Stati.tic. comparing terrori.m incident. between end_1970 a.nd enJ-1971 are .hown below:

TERRORISM I~ RVN: 1970 _ 197119

1970 1971 1970 1971 Wk.l:z:: Av . Wkly Av ~ Total

Incident. ZZ) 171 11.600 8,899 Killed 114 77(19"') 5.924 4,038(992*) Wounded HZ 148 IZ,59) 7, on Abducted 131 105 &.836 5.338

THIS PAGE R Ord~r Sec ,EGRAOED UNCLASSI

By Dr'I:" ,FlED

-__ ~4: ..:.:41r~4~~' VII_lO

,

•

(U) The decl.i.ning trend in terrorbt l.oCi;l..Qt. LA popu.lated aI'''''' ..,as aignilicant. In; '1b9, 31:1. 1 percent ot the populatien lived withl..a .:. ic.m of a terroriat lDcident; in 1 ~bOI lZ. b percent; and in 1971. ~8. 5 percent. (Filur.a are 101' .acont! quarter each CY. the &.IUlul peak period). Thh downward trend w •• true in .11 reliona exeept Mll 1 where terrorism uu:reaud duri..ng 1971. particularly in Qunl Nam. Quans N.ai. a.nd Thua Thlep proville.a. MR 2 showed .. decline in terrorbm. with .. allbat:a.ntive decr •••• over 1970. even though the trouble.ome proVlAcu of Binb Dirah &.Dd Phu Yen continued to have .. hilh incident rate. MR 3 continued to have the lo ..... t iAcideDt rate. probably reflectiDl the la.rae OVN pruence in and around the capitaL The moat dramatic deere ••• iA terrorbm. in. 1971 occurred ill MR 4. There the proportion of people Uvinl cl0 •• to a terrariat incident was only 17 perc.nt, compared to a countrywide avera.e of Z8 percent. ZO

Phung Hoang Pros ram

(C) A key CVN prosram for 1971 waa the Phl1llS Hoans Program, designed to protect the people from terrorism. The 1971 CD &Dd LD PlaD. preacr'.bed that firat priority .. as to be liven to the Phl1lls Hoang Prolram which waa deatltled "to coordinate, auide. and aa.per·,iae aU effort. of military and civiJiaD intelUgence and operational aleneies in the neu.tralbation ':Jf the VCl." Operations direc.ted againat the VCl included identi!yina and confirming VCl mem'.>era; collec.t:i.n, intelligence on them. and. indu.cing the .. members to abandon aUegiance to the Vr; and rally to the CiVN under the Chieu Hoi Pro,ram; and capturiDl Or detaining luspected VCl and. brmlml them before provinC'e""i'eCUrIiy committees Cr miUtary courtJI for lepl prace.dinss. Phuhs Hoang traininlemphaaiaed the de.irabillty 01 obta~1 VCl member. aUve aince they represented valuable SC'.lrc., of information. Zl

(C) Monthly VCl neutralization reault. sbowed •• teady decline during 1971 even though the yearly goal wa. exceeded, with 17.690 neutralized compared with the calendar year loal of 15.600. The 1971 CD and LD Plan goal (March 71 thr.:lulh February 1972) wal 14,400, of which lZ, 000 wa. for the 10 month period March throulh December 1971. Neutralizationl by MR !':Ir thil period were:

~ Neutralized

MR 1 3, (,}O 2.301 MR 2 2.000 Z,438 MR 3 Z,OOO 1.824 MR. 5.000 ...hill

Total 12.000 13, 188

The relultl by month in term. of typel of neutr&lization •• with :::omparilon to 1970 totab. are Ibown in Filure VU-? 22

(C) Empha.t. wa. plac.ed on quality rather than quantity in prescribing _the goall. VCI wen counted a. neutra.Uzed when they rallied, were captured and .entenc.ed for a period of at lealt 1 year, or were ltiUed. It should be Doted that the CO and LD Plan provided that SO percent of the total neutraUzation goal 'Wa. to be compoled of lentenced VC1. To .timulate improved collection of information on the VCI. a 10&1 wa. let to identify 30 percent of tJ"e estimated VCI by na:ne. 23 In recolnition of the weaknel. of the quantitive ,oal IYltem uled in 1971, plan. were drawn up for 197Z implementation of .. GI1&Utative. VCI neutraUzation loal .y.tem. A concentrated e!l.f,r wa. to be placed on neutraUzinl key VCI cadre by u.iDl 'pecific targetinl more extenaively •

.. ,0112 ______ '1'1 HIS PAGE REGR~,9ED UNCl4,SSIFIED Order Sec J..r~'J 8y iJ,o'Hvt per

- __ ~8-'4. .... 1.L..14-,,2....:4:11..-_'''''''_:·_~. VU-2l

i L

VCI NEUTRAUZAnONS (1971 compared to 19701

Totally Pere.lll Cbtl'lct

~ !!.!!!!.! Sentenced ~ Ne"t.·ahzed LA .. I or HlltMr

Jar. 672 IS59) 789 ( 64) 761 (595) l.U2 (I.ZlS' 2l.4 (24.0)

Feb 855 (536) 557 I 84) 868 1523) 1. i80 (1. l·U) 24.8 IH. 2)

Mar 684 (565) 508 13H) 7301595) 1,9H 11,482) l8.8 (24.0)

Apr 377 (574) 531 (4l3) 640 (694) I,Sol8 (l,691) 26.5 (H.O)

May H9 (667) 4Z1 1508) 653 (610) 1.40) «1,715) 24.9 Ill. 3)

I .... 393 1699) H2 (759) 541 (699) l,l76 (2,157) 27.1 (27.7)

lui 459 (577) 529 (510' 479 (542) 1,061 (1,629) 20. 3 (26. I)

Ao. 46. (138) 316 (1,141) 609 (660) 1,387 (2,539) 21.6 (23.1)

Sep 396 17Z5) 388 (~95) 549 (708) 1.3.)] CZ,02:8) z.. I (23.0)

Oct 260 (7Z2) 266 1514) 461 (864 981 (2,100) 26.0 127.2)

No. 427 1672) 180 (484) 383 (816) 990 (1,974) H.1 (23.3)

Dec 307 ,7091 185 p, 001! 383 ,8851 175 1l,595! U.O 125.41

Total S. 621(8, 417) 5,012 (7.194) 7,057 (8,952) 17,690 (H. 563) 23.9 (24.9)

Note: Fllurea 1n par.nth .. i. are 1970 t1lur ..

So\ll'ce: MACCORDS Fll\lU VU-7

PERCENTACE OF VCI NEUTRAUZATIONS

BY FORCE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANTI_VCI ACTIVnu;s

~ RF/PF ~ ~1i2! .!:!!! !!E ~

Mar • • • • • • Apr

. 50.2 5.5 14.4 7.6 17.4 4.9

May 48.9 7.5 15.0 7.4 14.6 6. b

Ion 47.8 8.0 13.7 7.9 20.5 5. 1

Ju1 49.8 5.5 19.2 5.8 15.7 4.0

Ao. -107.1 6.3 14.7 6.0 19.2 6.7

Sop "". " 10. 1 17. 1 4.0 11.3 7. 1

Oct 48.7 7.5 U.S 5.5 17.8 5.9

Nuv 44.1 9.2 20.0 4.8 17. S 4. 1

Dec ~ .!.!..:..2. ~ ~ .!!.:l ~

Av to nate 47.1 7.8 16.5 6. 1 17. '"' 5.4

• Oata not reported due to inaccuracy of Cl,ure.

Source: MACCCRDS Fiau.re VU-8

IirOi:: e z .,.

vn .. zz

te. !'tMo f-hu .... Hoan, Prolra~ !'elula~!y e" .(~('"'.: .!1.I'u.al np.l,ltrahz.atlon loal. but th~ q .... hOft of ... ac.. !'\&1 abl.lity to w.ak-In the Vel ..... never m ••• ",.abl.. Enemy docu.ments inOl_ ca.ad thAt the proiram w •• detrimental; on the .. the, !)and ... tack of qualified aDd trustworthy ,.uo""el d~ permit 10m. corruptivn in th. Iy.tem.. Z!) '!'h .. proa,am did receive conli.de:-.able criUc1am from ",ariov.l loure •• duriD,1971. parti~"larly~. Hi,h Valu· Reward. Pro.ram. ).LACV maintah,ed ftO direc:t control over thl pro,ram, but lued i.n in1'll,lencI throu,b the US Ph",", Hoan, .dvlaor. , .. bo extend.d to dhtrict 1.,'.,0 t~ lm.prove the proaram'. efficiency and dlICOUf., .. IoIAlawfl.ll. immoral. or iDhuman conchact i.n cOnA.ction with the pro'Tam. MACV Dir-1-.:ti"l ~2S ... 1b. l!!'~ Hoan, Opu.lioDe. dated S !'icY ':'1. ;"rucribe-d the 'I.al aDd moral co~.tr.int. and lperlficaUy prohibUed eAlalin. ill ...... iAauon. '0 ... ny other .ct. in \'iolation of the ru.~ •• of ),aftd waria,..." .ad to object to that kiAd of behaVior by the VietDa.me.e and to report .u.ch to hi,ber US au.thority. 26

fC/NF) The Hl,h Value ll .... rd. Pro,ram fHVRP}, deailned to improve the Phung Ho.ng Prolr.m .a. implemented a. II. pilot proaram ill Qu..an. NAm. Binb Dinh. Bien Hea, Vinh BiDh, UMt Vinh Lonl proviAcu. R. ..... rd. from SVNl to SVN3 million ... ere to be oUered for information leadinl to t:h. loeat10D of aelected k.ey VCI: th .. e t'lere to be AOaUuted by eAch provUlce for rev!", &JMI Im.l •• lection by the PbUD' Hoanl bloc. To bei,hteD oper.tioll&l inten.t and. effect­h.M ... a 'lMci.l lDcentive award .... a ... tabU.h.d under HVR.P which would pay up to $VN_ ZOIl, 000 to the Wlit which compUed the inlo.rmation and captured the t&r,e~e~ VCI.. Initial fundinl

, lor tlw prolram wa. to be proyt-:.d by MACV, dnce DO lource of fWlld. was currently available within the C;VN. U .uccudul, the GVN planned to include allow&llCe. in future budlet. for a HVRP. The prolram w .. to have beeD implemeDted in July 1971, but wa. po.tponed I.UlUl .. Nov 71 due to InabiUty of neld elem"nt. to meet critarLa eatabU.bed fOr the I.lection of candid~t ... th.trinl thi. delay, th_ CORDS Phung Hoanl Oirecwrate attempted to advise and a .. ilt the C;VN in perfecUn, adminiltratt.,. detail. involved in the pro,ramj however, llVN radio and TV broa.dca.t. lDlormiDa the RVN citi&en. of HVRP were noted by the internatioul pre .. and by US CUDlre .. mcn. ::."c.-al ~avorable articles .ppeared L, US pre .. rele.ses caUin, the proll"&.nl a "bounty 'f.tem." •• v.ral US Coaan •• m.D voiced their concerD., and one Con,re .. ional inquiry \Va. received. It shou.ld be DOted, however. that to prevent HVllP from becominl a boWlity pro­gram. only one_half the reward would be paid it a tar.eted VCI were kilbd. HVRP wal desiped primarily to obtain informatioD from merceDari •• who profite.:i from and worked lor the Vel to vol"'Dte.r inform.atio.r:., or to loyal C;VN citizens who would !ace probable death by volunteering information but would do 10 knowUlI that their families would be economically .ecure.' Durina a La.t minute1MACV/Emba .. y poUCy review of HVRP it wa. deciced that ope:-ational and political realon. mlUtated a.ain3t .:Iirect US fiD&Dcial involvement ill HVPr' ,Ad ('au..equentiy US fiD&Dcial .uppart was withdraWD-. Thu.. the HVRP ended before it wa. l.Qlf .cmented. Dis­cUI.loDS witb GVN officials indicated their intereat in implementinl a modified ver.ion at the H"Id~P, but du.e to bud,etinl limitation. the C;VN could not do ao in 1971. Neverthel .... there .va. a pouibiUty that !he C;VN would implement this prolram on a mode.t a.::ale iD the tuture. Z7

(e) ADOther attempt at lmj)l'ovin, the PhUAB Hoang Program .role from a MACV (C':JRDS) reevaw.tian .tudy ot ~ ~....I.' Conducted in connection with the V .. tttamization of .lte pro­Iram the ltudy, entitled "Phuns Ho.nB Re_Examill&tion Study (PHREEX)", cited the .hort_camines of the pro,ram lurtunarized a. followl:

.... The Ph~ HoaDB committees &.nd centeu e.tabUshed trom national to di.trict lev. 1 do DOt .e~·v. a. &.D ;:Hective coordination :;-,<tchani.nl.

C:;VN perlonnel a .. ilned to the Phung Huang centeZ'l are lenerally poorly c..~liIied and poorly motiva.ted.

The ~~ Hoang Center i. not a secure repo.itory fol" hteUigence lnfonnation ... hi. {act r~aults in a t.iah probability for compromiae of .en •• tive ,ourcea .nd lnfornation makes "lender reil1ctant to lhare intellijence ",itb the center •

••• 2 .... ."r~,!ls PAG~ REGRA~oO UNClASSIFIED Order S3C i":-:r.y By DAIM per"

vn.23 841424 ------~~~~---.

i !

.z .2.2.~3 . ..4~.~.e($ ... t.t .QU.}S"S.4. j '. to" ','S?;.!, t: ;.G. ,. s .. 1. (Sk .l.( .. J S. j 2j (. iJ'.(C.3 .• 4fo3.414tt Attl4(4tE)t4.4

-

---

" ... Iila ·Xi • • _ A direct line of &Ilthonty and ruponsibility (or lmplem.efttinl tt.e prolram bas not been

firmly utabU.hed.

aecau..e of the.e Undlft,a th. MACCORDS Itudy ncomm.nd.d:

.... Tr&n~(.rrinl nationall.vel re.ponaibLUty (or the (ull &ftti.VCI mL4Sion~., the NPC, on

& tim._phas.d, provlnct.by.provtnce basis dlolrinl CY72.

__ ProvidlAl the NPC with an lrnp'C'o ..... d. "!lore dficient LntelU,ence coordination syet.m

devoid or the ~J. Hoans committee. and e;entert.

_. Increalinl the etrlphasla on the anti-VCl rupcnlibillti .. or the provillce and dbtrie;t

chi.t. .",thin their respecdve area'.

__ UtiLizini the NationAl Police .. the prUnary operational element £Or the attack on the

VCl c")mmeuurate with their cApability.

Withdrawi.:1a US military advisory .u.pport to this pre-,ram a. the NPC aUllm.s opera­

tiona 1 r .. ponalbiUty.

The recommendations of the plaa were pruented to approved by COMUSMACV on ZJ Sep 71 a.n.d

Amb ... ador Bu.nker on 6 Oct 71.

Ie) As a result of a 19 Nov 71 brie(ln,. the Prime Minister. who acted as Secnatry General

of the Central Pacification and Development Council (ePDC). iuued directive No. 37J8/PTL/

DDPT/KH 7 on 2 Oec 11 to aU MRs. provinces. and cities. Thl. directiYe. entitled "Implemen_

tation 01 the Phung Hoang Miuion. 11 representing the GVN rupon .. to the MACV recommend.tion.

did not incorporate all of the recommended caan,e. but did produce certai.n beneficial modification.

The key points of the directive were:

.... The Phung Hoang centers and committees will be retained •

... In 1972 the National Police will .. sume overall responsibility for the Ph-un, Hoans

Prolram •

... Special empba.i. on the Phuns Hoans Prolram mu.t QC applied at all echelon ••

•• Wide and active pu.blicity of the Phung Hoang Program mu.t b. made .0 that the people

clearly understand ~e lmportance of their su.pport to the GVN.

Ie) Followif11 the i.uu..nce of the GVN directive. a re',iled US position basad on. and con. is.

tent with the PHR££X Study and the guida.nce of the Prime Minister wa. reached and two new

propo.al. were pre.ented to him by CORDS' Phung Hoang Directorate 011 27 Oec 71. The two

new recommendations were:

.... To strenathen aVN Phung Hoang Committee. at dl levet. (national to dbtrict). Thi.

would be accomplished by modifyini the committee membership and by euabIhhing an

exec·.ltive with a small administrative staff to perform day. to_day management of the

program. The .·ole of the executive would be to monitor the program and .•• t.o enlorce

interagency cooperatior. and coordination and to bri.ng command empba..i. tD bear where

nece .. ary. -!', Diurict PhUng Hoang Committee would be uta.bli.hed .•

To consolidate the {unction. of the Province I.nd Di,trict Intelligence and Operation.

Coordinating Centeu (PIOCCS/OIOCeS) with the Pc:lice Operations Centers (PCC) as

THIS PAGE REGRADE!) U~JCLASSIFIED "'\ % Order Sec Arr;1Y Sy DA;,;I per c::

___ B.o...;;4u....l :!4.l2t;4L' _.....:..'~;

, the latt~1' become. operati?nal. The poe wLui"l ~ c:h&rll~d with day-to_day policlr .cuon~ &4,&lD.t an .ubVel'llVe and l.~lel. elemenu. lftCludin& tn. Vel.

The Prime "'~nilter agreed with tJu: US proponta and implementation pla.ftnina be.an immediat.ly. 29

flUe" Hoi Pro,n.m

(U) ConUnuina one of the mOlt ,uC'ceuful of the pacilication prolraml. the CO and LD Plan ntabU.hed ~e f:hieu Hoi (Open Arm.) Prolram a,one of the major mean. of .chieviDa the Local SeU.Oef.;;;-;-bjective. The plan nt .. y.arly loal of 25.000 Hoi Chanh, (ratU.ra). or 2.083 per month, and prucribed riYe ba.ic objectivu: 30 ------

.... Publicize the ~ ~ pollcy and urle enemy cadre and .oldierl to rally •

.. _ ExpLoit information on the enemy volunteered by ralliera.

_e Help ralller. to ereate .. new UI. and to be lully roin.tated lD. the national COmnlllnity.

__ Motivate and provide opportunity for ralUerr to contribute their abiUtie. to allti ... Communiet etrugale and to nation building •

..... Ciuaraatee raIU~r ... curLty.

(0) Since Lt. inception in 1963, the ~!!.2! amnelty proaram lenerated over 195.000 rallier. to the .ide o( the CiVN. The proaram employed exten.ive 1,1 •• of p.ycholoaicall)peration. to induce the enemy to raUy. Once ramed., they receiYed 6 to 8 week .. rebabiUtatioD training at one of the nation,' 51 centers be(ore beinll reiDtearated into lociety. In addition to the raltiers. a .. lec:.ted Iroup o( war prhonen 13.741) ot South Vietname •• birth. at their own reque.t. were giyen rallier .tabl. durinl the year.

(0) The benelit. 01 th. proar&m were many oyer the year.. B*.id •• weakeniDI the enemy'. combat .trenath. the returne-e. provided a.n excellent·.ource of intelliaence .t a minima! co.t in manpower and reloure. .... The, were also a rouree oC recruit. (or the Vietnam •• e armed (orce •• In the paramlUtary a.r~a. ~ Luong 66 (Kit Carson Scoutl) and Armed Propaaanda Team •• aU . ex-returnee •• utilized Hoi C .... nh knowledle DC er.emy tactic. and propala.nda. method. to neutral­ize thai,. tormer comr&cie..The' Kit Carlon Scout •• , ... ho operated with Free World Force. a.d.tinaln the collection o( intellilence and working •• l\lidel , were decr~a.ed ill number d\lrinl 1971 due to the redeployment of parent uniu. Thou who remained continued to proYide valuable aervice with the Allied unlta. The Armed Propaga.nda Team-' (APT) pri.Jn&ry miuion wa. neutralization of the VC and VCl tbroulh rallying. The APT ,,\Irked closely with the PhunK Hoan f

j Program; each province had APT. a"'lned Cor indl,lcement operation. directed at taraeted Vel. 1

(U) Deapite inten .. PSYOP efforts on the part ot the CVN MWltry of Chieu Hoi and related ag~nciCl, the fh!!.2. ~ total for 1971 (2(1. 3S7) W&l le .. thaI'I previo\la yeau'; in 1%9 there had been 47,023 ret\lrneell and in 1970.47.02.3; the 1971 de-cline came after the third month of the year and continued to the Octol>er tnw (8&9). At Mid ... ye.r the originalaoal IC!t by the CD and LD Plan wa. reYiaed from ZS, COO to 2.0,000, a re.li.tic and .ttains.ble loaL 32,

(U) Part of the rea.on fOL the decUne wa. i.."'e decre •• e in number <OJ( enemy ba.e a.real. In pa.t y" ..... friendly military opera.tion. into be .. ~real had generated large number. of Hoi ~. Since the tranlier of population rna.ae. away from the VC area. alowed to a atop-,­another traditional aource of returne .. ~ried up during 1971. The Communiat.' ahift of t&ctic. from military to politica.l initiativ .. le .. ened the number of military t 'nt&cta which normally

'. .'. ................ J'J •••••.• ~ ...... ". ...................... - ..... , .. ... '. . .' ... ' ..

•

•

UNCLASSIFIED

li2!. 9!!!!h IUlde r tbe ~ ~ pros ram

learn to be mechanit: •• t the itadoctrin&ti.an

center l.a. Oa ~!Lnl.

Boy Scout le.den l.a. di..cu •• ion. with a­

Rural Development officer at a rally i.n

Phan Rang •

Canh An villager» in Binh Dinh Pr")vince build a bridge, a project made posslble through JOi.nt financid efforts oC the GV~ a.nd the villagers themselves.

UNCLASSIFIED

VII_l6

71 ega lenerated r'llaler': b~.:dC'. flpWeT opportuni" •• £01' the e~ .. !'n\' • .:. rally, the <;uaa.tlty DC lower

~"v.~ VCr'VC: <N1\i.ch mad" <1p the primary~!i2! potenua~ h&~ tr'!'Jltly deerea.ed d~e to

attrition _r.d the lack of npu.c:ement. The reO'f"AlAin, VC 1\:=1 were ~.:rd core a.nd difficult to

rally. F·lrthet. troop replacemenu were mo"e lr"'lue~t.ly trom the '"'VA. who baa alway. been

reluc~.."t::o rally. unce it would .eem to pre-elud. their .ventu.~ nturn to their CamHie •• nc'

villain.

IU) The accuracy DC cla .. ~lyini and. uparatina !!2!.~ \.mp::oved ~\H'1.ft1 1«}71. and the

criterla for attaininl !!2! ~n&tu. wa. mere rla1di thn re6.aceci t~e Iota! number to .ome

delree. Ti.-:bter enemy controL over potential deCector. had .... 0 cor:tr.i.huted to lowerin, the

Chieu Hoi rate. On the other band •• U ••• tid.etlan amolla '010" .x.r.Ua~ry cadre, who had

;;n-a:;;rtched to poUtical function. or tranafe1"ud to iiU v.ca,,,:i ••• t'~er ech.lon position.

produced aOr."J,e raUien. 33

IC) There wa. aome difference of opinion between the US £mballY in SaiioD and th. US

SlUe Departmenl.a to the amoUDt of inJ'ormatioD/PSYOP support liven the ~~ inducement

phase, with the US Minion politiOD 'oein, tb.1.t the in.form&tion support bad been maintained d\lrin g

t .. e year. Preoccupation with the electoral campaign had only. minOr eHec,;t on thia a.pect of

the CVN performance. 3"

(1.1) Filure VU-9 ahowa the mO:lthly relulu of the Chieu Hoi Prolr&Jn and. comp.riaon of

a\-era,ea for 1970 and 1971. Trenda aince 1968 arl'! ab~flaure Vll-IO.

NUMBER OF CIIlEU HOI RALLIERS (Jan _ Dec 1971)

~ !:!!.2. ~ ~ ~ .!2.!!! Jan 367 Z91 162 909 1.7Z9

Fob Z.S 27Z Z.S 2.30a 3.070

Mar 194 I.S 174 2.100 Z,&13

Apr 08 I.S 121 7~6 1, 130

May 3Z 133 127 837 I, lZ9

Jon 36 269 136 1.14S 1,586

Jul Z3 176 110 1.073 1,382:

AUI Z4 211 12Z 69. 1. OS3

Sop 19 119 11. 617 869

Oct 9 76 S55(a) a'Z(b) 1.48Z

Nov 206 40Z 974 1,800 3.38"2(e)

Dec 19 89 90 73. 932

1.2:4l 2.3lS Z";'9'3O l~ ZO, 357·

Year Y •• "ly Aveni_ Nation-wide

mT 10. 193 244 I, ISS 1,69&

1970 383 208 493 1,631 Z.121

(a) lncl'.ldea 444 prisonera of war who ~d been ,ranted returnee .tatu. early in the:

year but who had not been l)!£iciaUy docwnent;ed until October.

(b) Includes 270 Hoa Hoa who ma.a_rallied in Ch&u Doc: Province.

(e) Include. 2. 297 ~risoDer. of war who have beeoa ,ranted amnesty and entered the

Chieu Hoi Proara.m (MR. 1 197, MR 2 ZS6, Mil 3 813. an.d MR .. 971).

SOUrce: CORDS _C~ Filure VU-9

CSiii THIS PAGE REGflAOED UNCLASSIi'IED Order Se~ A,my By DAIM ~r

. . . • "". 0 • _, .'. _" " " •• _ ..... "" • 0 •• . ' ..... "- .

llNCLASSlnED

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

Local Self.Covernment Program!,

(U) One 01 the p:'~m&ry pl.lrpo ... of the • ."Ure (iVN effort wa. participation Qf the INopl. l.n lovernment. Tht. concept. Local SeU_Go," .. mn.nt •• a. embodied as .. ba"lc: objective DE the 1971 CD and LO Plan. SuUdinl on the Fro.r~ .. mad. dlU'~ 19'10, the CiVN planned. to lnen ... the .ffeetiy.n ... of local admlnl.u'aUon throuah better Ol'auU&&tion &Ad m&D&1.merlt. nu, would be achiev.d by dev.lapinl "U_lov.rnm..nt capabiUU .. iA the &dmlnbtraUve, 'COrlOmlC. and C:nancl.l n.ld.. Thl.u the Local S.lf-Oov'l'l'lm.nt objective .Dcompa ... d fo,,"!' prolram.: Peopl.'. Adminhtration. Peopl.'11 Wormatlon. People" Or,al1i.zation. and the Youth Proaram.

(U) People" Adminhtr.Uon. The k.y m.'&Il' of Lmprovlnl local lev'. 1 adrnlAutration .... to b. better trainLn, ot oitieiaL.. Thb. combined. with el"etlon. ill 100 percent at the villa ... &!ld hamlet. and adequate ltaUln,. wou.lcl make lor more e!fectiv., better organized, village acimini.tration. One tool to aId .elt-rnan&,ement wa. to be the Villa,. Management Book. a CiVN .. pu.bli.hed Iluide to vilI&.e admini.tration. A fu.rth.r mun. of lmprovin. &dminiatration .",uld be development of better re.,enlle_raL.ilI. methodl. with the villa.e retainilll more of the taXe. collected.

(U) People" lllformation Program. The millioD oC the People'l Wormati~n Prolram .. a. to motivate am: edu.c:ate the people to build. .troD, n .. tionall.t anti_Commllft.lIt conviction •• The program wa. duign.ed mainly .. a c:ollD.ter to the enerq'" political oUen.ive. and upecially Illpported pc.Utical edllcation. Phung Hoans. and the PSOF prolr&ml. It wal expected to rai .. the morale of the pe:::lple, vigoroully develop community awarenesa, and .ain active participation in .ovu'nment prolln,m" It wa. hoped that the program would create a .trona: feeling ot conti­d~nce in the GVN'I ability to brina oIt.bout lenui.n.e and Laltinl peace with complete uc~rity. free_ dClm, and pro'perity, A. expLainl'!d in the CD and .L.D P1&.a, pa.t efforh ..... ould be continued " . , • to make the people lully aware of the benent. and re.pon.ibi.litie. of a citizen, .0 that they are eaaer to participate ita the objective. of .,If_defen.e, .ell_lovernment and leLf_develop_ ment."

(U) People t• Organization Prosram.. T~ People'. Organiz.aUon Program wa. an

il"!'lportant part of thl'! Locl'.l SeU.Covernment objective in that it wa. de.tgned to .trengthen the development of a healthier aociety, makinl the people clearly underatand their reaponliailiti •• to the village, di.trict, ar.d province. The intent of the prolram WIL. to provide the people with the opportunity and means to undertak. ta.k. that would be in the common intere.t and would lenerate .ocial awarene •• and a .en •• of community re.pon.ibility. People" organization. could a •• tat in. all area. of local dttvelopment: for eumple, fll.rmera' cooperative. would join individuall to work tOlether to .olv. their common problema.

(U) Youth Program. Originally begu., in 1971>, the Youth Program'. purpoae wu to providE a new go!neration ol aware and uleful citizen. who could contribute to the ruLtion-building proces •. Be.ide. encouraging sporta program. and youthjfganization" t.~e 1971 Youth Pro­Il'am wa. to emphalize educational and technical training.

Progre .. in Local Self-Government

(U) With the atimulu. of the CD and LD Plan, progn .. wu made in the Local Self-Govern_ me.,t objective dudng 1971, parHcul,.rly in local adminiatration. Elections were held lor the Low1!T Hou.e and Presidency, with .ome 79 pucent of the eligible voters ca.,ting their bolllot. in the HOUle election and a turnout of almo.t 88 percent of the regi.tered voter'! in the presidential

UNCLASSIFIED

VU-Z8

UNCLASSIFIED

re{~re'ndum. By the end of th .. year {Ult .-1 .. etlon. bad be .. n held I.n QS "'I'c .. <\t of tn. .. villa ..... but prolre .. h'B 1bart of the planned loal.. Flut tLme election. could not be- conducted in the ''''amber oC vill&a'" planned beeau •• of tbe Wlc.ertaiD .ec'U'ity Illu.tica lJl the ar ••• concerned! by end_December only 12 (Ol,lt of a 10&1 DC 31) villa._. and 203 tout 01328, hamlet. had held eh'ction. for the fi!'.t ume. Ree).:('uon. were prolramed to be conducted ia 13 villa, •• and 216 bamlet., but then were actually completed In only one villa._ and 203 hamlets.

(U) Trainina to iMprove local aUnUni.traU.on moved .b.ad dUI'Ln, 1011. :'he Satioaal Cadre TralniDI Center (NC TC) at Vw:l.1 T.", [caned the National Trainin. Ce!'!t.=- iN':'C. prior to July 1971] completed tralninalor aD additional 13.623 yUki_ and hamlet O!llcia!a. cieapi" ~ceU&tion of .. "eral trainina eyde. to permit tJ'aini.D,la.atead of 24. 117 National poace. NCTC lraiDe .. in aU catc,ories totalled 47.242 for the calendar year 1971. _hU. an additional S,OOO attended apecLal abort umift&n. US advilon "'ere withdra"'D from the National TraUuIll Center on 30 JWl 71. All .talf employee aalarie. were theA adjlutec!. to the lower CVN aeale., and local procurement replaced former US direct .upply chaMela. Me .. and hou.i.A, .ian.ard. decUned. which a!'ll~cted both .tafl an.d atuder.t morale. 'By 31 Dec 71 the NCTC bad been totally Vietnam_ ized. with aU .upport in 1972 to come from the OVN national budl.t.

(U) lncreaainl emphaau duriD, 1971 upon province in_aervice tralninl centera expanded both the capa.city &lid eUectivene .. of tralnin, at this level. Some 46. 1Zl tl'alnee. oC a planned loal of.52.31S completed cour ... in province centera in 1971. Since US air tran.port for NCTC cea .. d at the end of 1971. it "'a. anticipated that the trend toward local (province) trainin, would continue. The National Monta,nard Train1n, C:enter at Pleiku trained 4,672 .tudent. in 1971. exceediD, the 4,400 ,oal. FaciUtie. a.nd .taU tbel" were .bein, uPlraded.

(0) A .ilnifieant factor in improved villa,. and hamlet ,overnment were the Province Mobile A .. iltance Team. (PMAT) which emeraed durinl the latter ball of 1971. The PMAT concept had lint been developed in 1970 in An Cilan. Province. MR 4, a. an eUort by the province chief and tha CORDS province t.am to IItructure ami malte more eUective the -vidt. by province oUiciala to their villale.. Thi. concept was .xt.nded to each. Delta province, IlpoD direction' of the MR "commander. and in April 1971 the CPOC directed tba. PMAT. be eatab_ U.hed nationwide, MR Z publi.hed a PMAT directive later in 1971. The 1972 CD and. LO Plan wa. to conl.&in a detailed lection on the PMATa.

(0) Operational lell-Iwficiency soala .. tabUlhed for villages In 1971 encountered many difficulti... Ths CD and. LD Plan oriainally aimed. '\t achieviDl d.elre •• of •• U.swflciency ranain, lrom Z; to 100 percent 1n 1,000 villa.e.: by mid-year the ,oal had to be adju.ted. downward to 900. Of the .. 900, 627 viUa,eI lucceeded: 175 ol the 206 planned, achieved 100 percent sell-Iufficiency; 181of Z71 plarmed. SO percent .elt-.wficiency; and 271of 4%3 planned. ZS percent aell-.ufficiency.

(U) Improvement of tax collection and pubUc knewiedae of Dud,.t ...... r. additional ta.k. in the Local Admini.tration Prolram. In order to put a.n .nd to c.:.rruption azul economic .peculation. the people were to be kept informed of ,overrunent&l prolram., projects. and their villase budaet. For thh purpou. po.tera wOl,1ld be put up in pubUc buildin,s and co~mun1ty centeu and newl bulletina po.ted announcinllovermnent activiti.e •. One Ii,nificant achievement in the local incomr improvement proaram wa. the trainin, oC tax collection cadre completed during the war. and .ctiot:. w •• underway to update tax roll. and incre •• e tax level. in 1972.

(U) The People'. information Prolram improved in 1971 but ...,a. cenerally viewed overall .. a failure. The pro,ram wa. deaianed to .upport .U s.ctions of the 1971 CD and LD Plan. with priority to the Phung Hoang. PSDF. Land .. to-the-Tiller. Cbleu Hoi, and Veteran. and Wa, Victim. p,.ogram.. Election divenion. hindered the attalnmentOf PTOaram l0al.; for example, People'. Information trainin" eouuea we7.'e delayed by the election. and pf 148 course. planned,

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VIl-29

UNCLASSIFIED

Citizen. oC Binh Nhut hamlet in 1..0"8 An Province ca.t ballots for their own hamlet chid and councillor ••

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VU.30

U!VCLASSIFIED

only lib cOl.lld ~ completed by year" end. A tct.&l oj 11.121 uuormation. <:.adre ... ·er. T~cruu.d durin, thr year, but the performance of hamlet cadre wa. marilnal and furtAer recruiting wa. dt.couraaed. '0 that the loal of 14, ObS> ..... not reached.

IU) In the People'. Organi&ati.on Program. the people .... ere encouraged to or.anize at an dlfferent leveh. from villa,. to province, in prlV.te a •• oeiation. free from dlrect government control. All tYpe. of ,roup. were .nvi,.,.d~ economic ... oeiation., IrO"p' loined by avoca_ tiOD', culture .. education. entertainment. etc. Duri.n, 1971 there w.u .. thr .... fold inc rea •• over 1970 in the number of pe?ple'. orlan1zaUon.. Thou,h no loat. were "'t. b~' ye.r' ..... !1d S. b7b or.ani.ationa exined with 1.666.883 members. A GVN Ordinance ,.10) bindered the prolr&m d~rinl the year by makin, it lIxce .. lvely cwnbenome to or.&nbe and ie.aUz._ orlani&ationa.

(U) The Yl>llth Prolram, whicb wal Iimi1&r in nat~re. did weU d1.:rina 11~71 with &11 ,0&11 expecud to be reached by the tmd of th~ CO &net 1..0 Plan.i. e •• 29 Feb 72. The end.December !laur .. Ibowed 2. 166 villa,e YOllth cOllncill il1 exiuence. out ot a ,oal at 2, 2S8. 257 di.trict COWlCUI. of a 2b3 loa 1: and ,17 out of the 48 province COWlC:i1 10&1 for provinco. and autonomoll. citiel. 3b

Relional Variation.

(U) MR 1. Prolre .. in local •• U-,overnment was evident in MR 1 durL!l1 1971. Some 1&r,e 1m.prov;m;;t. ~~re made in local admini.tration and in RD cadre activitiea. accordin& to Hamlet Evaluation Sy.tem (HES) meUllrementl. Law enforcement raud. hiah althollgh terrori.m ltill pla,lled certain &real. HES ratm,1 lbowed a decline in uuormation :..Dd PSYOP activity even thou,h leveral new radio ltatioDI had been eltabU.hed. Political mobilization and control in the populated areal improved. but organized VC commllDitiea remained in the rural areal of we.tern Quana: Nam and Quan, Ngai.

(U) An lDdication oi the prolre .. in local leU_lovernment wal the number of elected village COWlCU. and ha.mlet chiefa; there were ,U6 electll:d councih out at the 462 \lifidal villages. and 1.939 elected hamlet duels in the 1.958 hamletl. An indication of healthy political ltability was .Pffrent in the Lower House electionl when opposition ca.l1didatel won 19 of 24 .vailable lea.t.. 7

(U) MR 2. MOlt local aeU.IQvernment proluma lhowed improvem.,nt in MR 2 during 1971. bllt the re&ign wal plalued by a Lack of trained hamlet aud villa.e oUicah. pa.rtic\llarl)' in the Hi,hland relionl. Candidate. were reluct&nt to run for politionl ft'''1de vaca.nt by terrori.t a •••• aina.tion. in Binh Dinh Provillce. Oenerally throulhout the region vac.ncie. were filled by elections •• 1 reqllired by the CD and LD PlaA. RD cadre activities elpecia.lly improved. even thoua:h thele were .till insufficient. The Vietna.m Information Service increaled a.ctivity. and 1&te in the ye.r the YOllth Program became more active upeci.lly with ethnic minoritie., In meetift& the loa1 of attamina 100 percent b\ldletary aeU-suUiciency for 16 targeted villa.gu. I\lCC"1 w •• relatively 10od; 13 out of the 16 re.ched the 100 percent level. Loc.l revenlle. were aHected by the 10 .. of revenue from village land appropriated under the Land-to-the-Tiller law. 38 •

{U) ~ Loc.l self-government had prolreued .ignificantly in MR 3 to the point tru..t VC interference in local elections was ra.re in 1971. Village and hamlet .dminiltration and law enforcement in M.R 3 were the mOlt elfective in Vi.etnam; nearly 100 percent of the villagel .nd hamlet. had ele :ted governments and the.e .... ere almolt 100 percent sta.f£ed by year_end. Trainina of local oliiciall ...... cloae to schedule. contributing gre.tly to the qll.lity of local .dministr.tion, :;.. provided in the CD and L!) Plan. In the latter half of the 'lear the People'. 1n1ormation Program w.s diverted to election a.ctivitle. in MR 3 a. ehewhere in the country,

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VU.31

UNCLASSIFIED

_ .. -~. - •. --

Th. People'. Orl&nization Pro,ram a.nd the ~outh Prolram d~d not prolHl1 .. ell due to lack of luppart &J1d clear dl.rec:ion. 19

(U) .!!!!...i. Con.iderabl .. prolre .. In local .eU-lo .... rnm.nt •• , made in MR " durin. 1971. AI of 3l Decemb.r. 7<48 of 754 vUla ... (99 percent) and 4.111 of 4.241 (97 perunt) had elected lovernm.entl. There nad be.n fou.r villa.e and 14 hamlet .l.ction. in Hi.u Le Dlltrlct. Kien Cl&tlll Proviaee. :2ftCe W heartiud of VC .trenlth in the northern U Minh Forut. The traininl prolram for village/hamlet oUlcial. wa. 8S percent complete by 31 Dec n, with the pro.pect of meehng CO and LD planned 10&18 by Z9 Feb 12. Virtu.ally all of thevillal.' targeted for 100 percent budlet .. U ... u!lici.ency achieved their ,01.1. and by December tho .. villa,u tarseted (or 50 and l5 percent budlet •• U-.u!!1ciency were 94 and 98. 5 p.rc.nt .u.cce .. -ful. re.pectively. Local adminhtration, accordinl to HES ratinl" wa. v.ry load with larle ,.In. made du.rin" the year in I.&w enforcement and poUtical mobilization. The Ir.ate.t improve­ment wa. in Rural Development cadre. while the Ireate.t hindrance to prolre •• in local .elf­lovernment "I.. the targetina of local oUic1&l. by tM enemy.

(U) An npecially prombing area in MR 4 "'1.' the People" Information Proaram ... hich proved to be v.ry .ctive a.nd caective durinl 1971. Th. prolram concentrated On informinl thc , people &bout the Land-te-the- TIlI.r, ~ ~I and PhU1S Hoans Programa, a.nd 'peeilically on expanng 100 percent of the eonfirm.d vel. The prolram 1.110 worked to improve the morale and rr..otivation of the RF/PF in an eUOrt to improve their .Uectiv.n .... Aft.r a ,ood atart. the Youth Proaram ran into problema when ruponaibility for it .. a. turned over to the PSDF Direc­torate in Sailon, .ince the GVN had been conc.rned ov.r PSDF'unita' lack of coop. ration in .om. a.rlta •. A. in other MR •• the People'. Organization 6'rogram achieved only minhna.l lucce'l due to burden lome ad.m.iniatrativ:_ requir.menu. 4

LOCAL SELF_DEVELOPMENT

Laca.l Self_Development Progra.m.

('0) The third and mo.t comprehen.ive of the "three .. U." of the 1971 CD and LD Pla.n "aa Local Self_Development, the dev.lopm.nt of a better life for the people. A wide variety of progr.m. were .imed committing all the people in the dfort to develop the economy and .ociety: La.nd Reform, Agriculture and Fi.~ery. Local Economic Oevelopm.nt. War Veterana, A Brighter Lile for War Victim., Public Hea~th, Education. Manpower Development. Public Work •• Po.t and Communica.tion •• Rural Cr,dit, Province/MWlicipal D.velopment Program, and the Village Sell-Development Program.

('0) La.nd Reform Program. The key program for land reform wal the La.Ad .. to .. the .. Tiller Program continued from 1970. This program. which provided that land worked but not owned by the farmer ...... ould be given to bim. WI., con.idered most important as & syntbol of government policy. Indicative of the GVN interHt in ethnic minoritiea was the program of land lurvey for Montag:l&rd people. designed to give ~h. Montagn.a.rds a legal claim to the lane! they occupied and to prevent mis'&ppropriation of these lands. A third program called for the dhtri­bution of 1£nd to people in r~.cttlement camp.. Land reform wouLd also be achieved through the regularization of the st:a.tua of squattera tilling government land.

(U) Agriculture ~nd Fi.,hery Pros ram. Improvement in food production .. as an impor­tant element of the self.development program.. The Agriculture .nd Fish.ry Program was designed to Itimula.te and improve the production ot rice, sorghum, earn, livestock. and !ish to meet load consumption needs, to provide an agricultural surplus for export. and at the .a.me time improve the farmers' sta.ndard of living. The key to increiL.ing rice production was the

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Vu ... 3Z

l'.'liCLASSIFI!W

",eTt •• eo u. ... 01 mlrad. rice parucl.llarly. Seed ....... re to be !'T\ad. readily avail.ole 03n loaD to ,. la"mer., a ...... ;.i a. fertlli&er a.nd ina • ..:tiClde •• An an1mal n,.ub.l.ndry proaram wa. pl.lnned ) inciude tralnJnl •• eminar •• in.truction il'l method. oS lmprovina aniJT1&l 'breed.. T:w program )r inc,..au"I.l the .. nnual li.h yield included lnland n.h and Ihrimp breedin,. lea tbbUlI equip .. lent UTJ.prove_"'nent and modernization, creation of cold .t.ora,. faclliti.l. and dr.dllnl river l.outh .. (or .a.), pa' •• ae or thmna beau.

It:) t,.ocal Economic Development Pros ram. tJnder tbe dluction of the MiA&.try ot :conomy. the lAcal Economic Deyelopment Prolram provided the lar._ ~tl0El.! :f'vel iDlt1&tiV'. ) .tim.,l,lMe the economy and thereby &.fleet local economic devplopment. Thb iDc!ud.d step. to tabili& .. tAe loc.l COlt of livin,. expedlte iDer .... of per.oDaI income. {or the loca~ people. arry Out an . 'appropriate" rice policy, Irant .pecific Support to an induatr~l devele-pment rOlram relativlt to the .griculture and filhery indlutry, and actively lupport th .. mini.trie. and elated alen,i ... in local development.

ttl') War Veteranl and War Victiu'II Prolraml. To lupport war Yeteranl, disabled oldieI'. and ...... 1' widows and orpha.n., the War Veteran. Prolram provided for pay and aUowancea, by.ic'll and locial reha.billtation for invalid.; medical care, education, and he!p with employ .. "ent; and houl1n, or conltruction material to disabled .olciiers. The Brighter Life for War 'Lctim. Prolrun aimed toward providin, relief .nd oaerml new opportunitiet for refugees, ,idow. and orphan •• famiUe, who lulfered ca.ualties or darnale to bome., and other war victim ••

tU) Public Health Program. "CommWlity cooperation" "'a. to be the ,uidln, prindple )1' the Public Health Progr.m. an. extenaive and detailed pro,ram which contained many projecta )1' preyentive medicine. environmental .anitation. he.lth education. mother and child protection, nd eradication of malaria. venere.l dl.e •••• tuben:ulo.ia, and leprolY.

(U) Edcational Prosram. Baled on pro,r .... durinl 1970, the Miniltry of EducatioD eve loped an Educational Pro,ram deallned to improve technical .nd vo.:.tiona1Iuidance pro­ram., which would thUI r.ise the productive capacity of the nation. Special attenUon would .. liven to veteranl, refugees, and ethnic mino1-iUea.

(U) Manpower Development Pro8ram. The problem. of underemployment. unemploy_ ~ent, and the labor lupply in a develepin, economy were addrelsed in the Manpower Df>velopment )rolram. Task. were to monitor employment need.., disleminate Wormatioa to the l&bor forces, .elp regul.te the l.bor market, improve l&bor relation., and develop improved vocational educa­ion. Indicative of the need for the program was the CD and LD Plan statement that the perc en .. age of technic.l and profea.ional ",orkerl wal very low. and the percentale of Ikilled worker. Z.7 percent compa.red with Z9. 4 percent of unlkilled work.n. The lauer represented the jVN'. Ireatelt employment problem.

(U) Public Workl Progr.m. The 1971 Public Work. Plan wal duigned to improve he ltandard of livina, with long_ranle objective. of helping achieve n.tional leU_Iufficiency .nd leU_development. The Ministry of PubUc Work. ",al to eacoura,e the local population to ake private action .u.ch al offering loanl for houlinl conltruction an~ helping form electricity .Dd water cenlumers' cooperative.. The Mini.try of Public Workl would undertake projects 'hich were beyond local meanl.

(U) POlt and Communications Program. Several area. were covered in the Post and ;ommunicationl Program: ltate_controlled railroads; dredling activiti.l; and. oolt, telephone, .nd telegraph.

(U) Rural Credit Program. Much r:-! the lucce .. in agriculture development ruted on . gcod rural credit program. There were three 10ur.::el 'Of rural credits; money provided under

UNCLASSIFIED

VU.33

uu , '.

the VUla.e S~U.O.v.lopm.nt Prolram. ""lch would be availabl. lor loan. omdlr SVN~O.OOO. *h,l. th. rural banlt. and the AlI;n(.ultural Clvelopment Bank lADS) would proYlde lar •• r 10aru. Si.nCI the amount ot lund. avallabl, iot loan. (rom the ADB had prlvloluly tMen lna"flicient, In 1~11 the bank .... u to concer.trate on creaHon oladdltlonal capital. Th. ADB total 1971 loan fund or ~Sl. 900 mUllan would be dhtrlbuted lor loan. lor production of miracl. ricI, .upport to Land reform operation., m.ecbanl&&tion of •• rl.c"ltur. and nlbery Indu..tn .... pureha,. of a..ricul. tural material and equipment. and .imilar dl:,elopmerual achviU •••

(U) Province/Municipal and Vllta.1 SeU.Oevelopment Pro, ram •• The Province/ Municipal Df-vltopment PrOll"am and the VillA., Sell-D.v.lopm.nt IVSD, Prolram were .iml.1ar in that they both provided fund. to 10callov.rnm.nu to help carry out local developm.nt prolram •• They dUfered in the ty~. at proj.ct. tunded. The Province D.velopment Prolr .. m centered "round l .. r,e, contr .. cted con.truction prcjecta; the Munh:lpal D.velopment Pro,ram empha.Lsed .. ll.help. urb .. n Lmprovem.:nt projects; and the VSD Prolram accomplbh.d .man local projeC'u throulh the Rurd Devel,opment Credlt PI'\-Iram and local. voluntary labor. Under the Province I Municipal Dev.lopment Prolram two tWl:h we,.. made available: the National Fund tor Local Oevelopment, which Hnancad .ucb proJacu aa improvement of th. hllhway ay.tem. lrd,ation project., education prolrama. and the .upport of other development proJecu •• uch aa the a.ricultural proaram; .. nd the Province Developm.nt Fund. under which capital. province ... nd city counclla prope .. d and voted on proi.~ta to tJ. financed by thb fund. A related pro,ram, the VSO Prolram, wa. de.laned to .Umul.6te local initiatiVe for .. U.development In til. rural .. re .... 41

Evolution of Rural Development CadI'''

{U} Rural dev.lopment (RD) cadre had lonl been a key ora .. ni&ation In Implementinl the GVN'. rural development prolum. The c .. dr. w.r. formed In 19b5 .. nd in January 1966 they were orlanlzed alonl paramiUcary line. into S9 .. man Iroup •• Th. objective w ... to motiv .. te and or ... nize the ~ople to take c .. re of their own delen., .. ,ain.t the Viet Coni and. to rai.e livin, .landard. of viUase., with .ome a.li.tance from the lov.rnment.

IU) In early 1969 RD cadre w.,.. reor ... nbed into 10_m .. n ,roup' .. ".d a .. iined to work I.lnd.r the direction of the vULaae chie" in .. bout 1.400 contuted vilLaI", Their .. ctiviti .. mainly empha..iud dele"'e and mUitaty traininl of vllLagera. The political 1'01, of the RD cadre wa. re.tored in 197Q, und.r the Pacillcat10n and Oevelopment Pian. a. increa.ed empha." wa • • hifted to ... inina m .. ximum popular .uppart for and .. ctiv, p .. rticipation in the Villa,c Seu_ Development Pros ram. 4Z

(ll) In 1971, becau..e of improved .ecu.rlly in rur .. l .. rea., the RD cadre w.,.. a,ain reorlanb~d into .maller unitl. A Pruldential decree that at l .... t SO percent of the villa 'c. throu,hout RVN mu.t be auiat,d by the RD cadre prompted the Minhtry of Rural Development to r.orllanize the )O.m&n Iroup. lnto 10-lTUn Iroul", e!lective 1 Mar 71. Und.r the leade r.hip of the villale chiel, the ... new .maller irouP' a •• i.ted the village and hamlet admini.trativ. committee. in carryins out aovernment pros ram. for th" three 1971 national objectiv" •• leU_delen.e, .. Lt­lovernment, and .elf-development. More .mphall. wa. placed on development.al prolram • • uch a. Villalo Sell-Development. Land Relorm, R,.cttl.ment of Reful ...... nd War Victim •. Th. n ..... 'matl'r team. proved to be very ellective in 1971.

IC) Total RD cadI'. urenlth had been .t.adily r.duced .ince 1969. and US .upport for the pro,ram w ... to be pha .. d out by the end o! Fy7 ... StarUnl with an initial reduction on 1 Jul ';'1, US .upport would b. reduced in yearly Lnerement. of ZS percent. Confronted with thia pha .. _ down and ultimate end in, of US ,upport, the CVN recosnized the need to contin',e a modified pro .. ItAm and by end.1971 had planned to continue .. permanent RO cad ... program at ... trength of Ib,400. The r.ductlon of US .upport on 1 lui 71 h .. d reduced .. uthorized .trenlth. of ~8, 80", RD

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED st it Order Sec Army By OAIM per

S.1 1 424 ,~~, -----~-4...l~wt.:!.. ___ .:·~,~ ; .... U.J4 ....

dre to )':".250, and tnt • .1ontalnard 150ft Thon) cadre ir",m 7.800 to ~. ZOO: hmdUli was red.uced c;ordl1!.8h ... J

Ie) Son Thon Rural Development Cadu. At tb~ time the RD cadre wen fonned in 1965. t ~ ~ RD cadn (STROC) were formed to brina itO .upport to lh. Monuln&rda. Thi. dre ,ave the Mlniltry for Development of Ethnic Minorities the mechAnism for lmplemeDtine fN proln,ma aUeCliDa ethnic minoriU... lA March 1971 the Mini-ltl'Y reorsanu.ed the STRDe )m lO_man Iro"p. 1n\0 10_. 20. or 3D_man ,roup., d.-pendent upon the need. ot :hair ••• tIDed, Ua •••• a revealed by '.heir liES ratinas. ne intent .as to con"ert the the cadre from para. Ill"!'y troop. to df!velopmental cadr •• with iJwhVldual cadre becominl ".~ci&U.u" _ith .. • elIle role, e .•.• medlc. economi~. i.alormation, a. well a. ('ontuuun. tM •• curity &Dd telliaence role. Few cadre bad ever receiv.d other t.h.uI ba.ie traimn,. and little luidance I' prOvided. Morale reacbed a low point in May, e.peeially .ince the STRO cadre We" aware luture reduction.. Condition. improved later in the year with the rcopenin, ot the Nation..el )nta,baJ'd Trabun, Cer:ter and the or,azUzation 01 province or local traa.nin,. With cha.nae. in hn\c Minority Servicel at proviDc. and minhtry level, leade,..hip improved and by la.te 1971 I .pproximately 5,000 rema.ininl STRD cadre were pertorminl creditably.

fe) Speclfic.2£!!. ~ RI) t:adu accompUshmeDu were their .ucce .. in a .. latin, many OIDtalnard. lJl re.ettlement aDd return to villale move.; in or,anir:iD, local d.len •• force', d a •• latina in nwn.rou •• ucee .. lul delenalve actiC1D.; undertakinl innumerable civil action d development project., lncludin, participation in the Villa,e Self_Development Pror-ram: d lmprovinl local health and .ducatioD. All thia reaulted In Illnilicant chan, •• in the ethnic Lnority people. They voted, orlam.ed committe .. , cooperated within the v!llale. to protect d advance them.elve •• aDd lenerally became active and concerned. movinl clo.er to beiDI rt 01 the CiVN.

(e) Althoulh reduction in US upport .a. nec .... ry. the CiVN, at MACV' •• ulce.tion. ,an to provide for a more .ophhticated aDd permanent STRD program. Thi. reflected the ct that the GVN, by the end 011971, recolniaed the ~~ cadre .. potentially the me.t '!'

able 'frce amonl ethnic minoritie' to further the aim. 01 the people .nd loab of the lovern .. snt.

(C) One of the key Local_Sell_Oevelopment Prolram., Land Reform, made Ii,nilicant 'Olre .. in 1971. The Land_to .. the_Tiller Prolram •• thered particular momentum. Durin. e plan year the CiVN chan,ed the indicator lor evaluaUnt proln .. ; inat_ad of the number of 'plication., a mol'. reaU.tic mea.ure of aucce.a would be the number 01 bectare .. (ha) of land I' which titi .. wer_ di.tributed. From 1 Mar to 31 Dec 71, title. were diltrlbuted lor 312.345 , compared to the loal 01 400. OCIO. It .a. eatimated that the loal would not be met until April 172. due partly to the lact that a con.iderable number ot titl .. wo",ld Dot be di.tributed until .rmer'. Day. 2& March. The number of landlord. compenaated tor land expropriation under • act increa.ed durin. tbe la.t month. of the year. Throulh 31 December. campen.ation wa. ,~d to 12.014 claimant. lor 119. 928 h& of land.

Ie) In the pro, ram for land .urvey for Montalnard people. the Montagnard Hamlet Identili_ ,tiO.l Proir.m lot off to a .low .tart in 1971. Thi. wa. cau.ed by Laack of awarene •• of the 'olram by the Montalnard •• a. well a. inexperienced manalement and ditlicultie. in coorrtina­)n. The.e problem .. were beinl .oked. and by the end 01 December, maiA livinl area. had len l~entilied for 2 .. of the planned 379 vUlalea. The loal 01 20.000 he-ctar .. of individual ott planned tor I!lnvey wa. conaidered attainable by 29 Feb n .i."1ce 15.5",,2 ba bad been .ur­Iyed at year'. end. 45

~HIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED Order Sec Army By OI,IM p"r .

vn.35 S 4 J 4 2 4 •

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a • ... ~ :;....=.-=---.::...:::...:::....-·--------01 ~ d ~ E:+-----------------~

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VU_3&

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I I I , 'J

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" ..: I

lei One of the l..aAd Rdorm Pro,ram •• land claun ari ... anc •• , pn .. nted problem. which MACV CORDS. i.n coop~:,atl0n .... ith USAl!) land rdorm ex~"., wu .. I:le to help .olv~ by Jeveloplnl procedure. frr handling ,rievance. 1n t..'1e Vllla,e Land Commlttee. and in the land courU.

te) The diatributlon of land ill reuttlerr..ent campa a.ud land deyelopment center. pro,re .. ed •• U durinl the year . .Between 1 Mar and 31 Dec 71. 11.0Z7 plot.. totalin, 8,567 hi. were diatri. ktea. Since the beainninl ot the prolram in. 1907. L 1. 137 plota or a total of 58.430 ba bad been dUt!'lbut~d. In. the Iquatter !'e,IIlarization pro,:am.. WblCh ,ave Iquatterl on lovenunent land le,al Utle to the laad they till, 7.5'2 ba of the 10. DOe.. ~ 1°&' had be .. ::). &C,tLlved by Ylar" end. nul l&nd waa apportioned into 5,418 plot.. The Cwrllllatin tou.l •• iDee the atart of the program were 35.938 plot. and ZI, 372 ha ot land. 4b

Alricllltllre &Dd Fi.heriu

(U) Con.i.tent with it. objectiv .. to .timulatl ADd diveraily farm production, tbe a.ricultllral pro,ram p:oved very .ucc •• dlll dU::'in, 1971. Rice productloD increase,) throughout Vietnam and the Delta bad the mo., pro.perou. year in it. hi.tory. Planting of miracle rice !eU .hort of the 151.000 ba ,oal, with a year.end .tatu. of 588.813 ha The .hortIaU ruulted largely Irom the prefc1"encr of the larmer. to ,row local rice, whicb WI.. preferred by Vietnameu con.\ltnere and cogld be .old lor a higher pri":e. Local rice WI.. expected to m.et or aurpa •• the 2,039,713 ba goal •• ince 1.941, 20S hi. had ~en planted by 31 December. Becau .. the rice .eaaon did not. corrllpond with the plluutin, year. the actual yield from the 1971 planting periud would not be known until April or May. Figure 'VU_IO .how. the relation.hip between rice production and the level needed lor ull •• u1fici."cy.

(U) Corn and .orghum production reached the CD and LD go&10 with over Z,OOO hectare. of ,ratA .or,hum bar" .. ated in 1971. Enough improved .. ed corn wa. produced to plant 10,000 hectare. in 1972. The corn harvuted in 1972 would be u.ed maiDly tor feed ,rain. In. the area 01 crop diver'i!ication. legume. and oil crop. provide an exceUent potential both to .upplement the farmer" income and to meet incre ... d national demazllb. Mo.t of the DAtural .eed_oil need. w ... met :.n 1971 through importation, since the larEe •• cale producnon pro,ram was ju.t beiinnir.g. However, the increa.ed demand lor .eed oil meal in leed mixture. lor the commercial .... ine anoi poultry i.ndu.trie. WI.. expected to be met _ithin .. fe. year. by the expanded production of peanut. and .oybean •• About 8,000 ba of .oybean. were ,rown durin, 1971, mo.t of which w •• u.ed for human con.wnption. 47

(0) The animal hll.bandry project. _ere laraely 'l.1cce.sIul: training .. minar. were com_ pleted In JS prOvinces of Mlb 1, 2 and 3 and were continuin, in MR 4. Til., Lmprovement of ani.mal breed. and protection 01 dorneltic animal. prtlject. were alia in.tituted in .ome area •. The planned national lin.tock trainin" cent"r failed to materialize due to a delay in con.truction. A problem • .... ith biddinl OD the project .::aund tho: delay. kt money had been a.ppropriated.

(0) The tilhert .. project. did not pro,re .. a. expected. Durinl the year four ne .... Japaneae trawle,.. were acqu.ired with the aid of ADB loan., and fOllr additional ahips were on order from th~ US. ADB loan. were made available for modernization of the Vietnamese fishing fleet, howeyer at the end 01 th., year, bids l..d Dot been taken for the purcha.e of the nece.sary equip­ment. Land n.hinl projects did not lenerate much intere.t. and inland .hrimp breeding proved l,ln.ucceulul. The Federat Repllblic 01 Cermany made .ome money available for con.truction of cold .torage and ice makinl fadUtie. but the bids were .till pendinao Orecl.ling of Ninl, Thuan harbor w ... nearing completioD by the end of '.:he year, with work .cheduled to begin on Phan Thiet Harb(lr immediately therealter. To pay for the projects $VN60, 000. 000 ($VN40, 000. ~OO provided by the GVN and $VN20, 000. 000 provided by the fishermen themaelvea) was .pent. 48

••• ~I'tIIIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED - - OrDer Sec Army By DAIM per

vn .. 37

Tht8 modernized equipmel'lt was obtained with Agriculture Devel. opment Bank loans.

An Agricultural Development Bank borrower fiU. the hold oi hl. boat with a. liubatanhal anchovy ca':ch which will be made into ~c;.-~ £ish •• '.lee.

U:VCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

vn .. 38

A Vietnamese fa.mily enj:lY· ...

filb. dinner.