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Transcript of ® National Security Policy Survey of the Literature INTELLIGENCE Robert David Steele OSS CEO...
®
National Security Policy Survey of the Literature
INTELLIGENCE
Robert David SteeleOSS CEO
Updated 19 August 2002
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Plan of the Brief
• You have 150 books in the lecture handout.
• Will only cover 50 or so of them now.
• Complete text reviews for over 350 books are at OSS.Net, at Amazon, and in the red and green books
• Information• Intelligence• Emerging Threats• Strategy & Structure• Blowback, Dissent &
International Relations• US Politics, Leadership
& the Future of Life
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Relevant Readings on Intelligence
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Fuld on Business Intelligence
• Discipline of business intelligence knows more than we do about economic “open sources & methods”
• They don’t understand the process of intelligence, nor are they expert at cultural intelligence
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Klavans & Ashton on S&T
• Private sector intelligence efforts are “fragmented” and in their infancy
• Too few know how to find the patterns and they do not get much help from technology
• We are missing the boat in terms of following foreign R&D
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Gilad on Blindspots
• All top managers tend to get information that is late, filtered, incomplete, or biased
• It is possible to create a professional intelligence system in the private sector, using only open sources.
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Australian Best Practices
• Analytic tradecraft is alive and well in some sectors.
• Australians have some best practices in both strategic and tactical intelligence that can improve government analysis.
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Cleveland on Higher Education
• Intelligence can be, should be, a form of “higher education” for both policy makers and the public
• A comprehensive strategic view is vital, both in and out of government, and that is what should be higher about higher education.
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Kerr on University
• Per Alfred North Whitehead, any society that "does not value trained intelligence is doomed”
• University should elevate lower education, rationalize IT to link business with knowledge, create distance learning, and nurture mid-career, continuing education
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Alvarez on Spies in Vatican
• Religions “do” intelligence and counterintelligence
• Some do this better than others
• Governments need to penetrate and understand all religions
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Allen on Lesson of Viet-Nam
• Intelligence generally got it right (strategic, tactical)
• Ambassadors and Generals in Saigon cooked the books
• Policymakers in DC refused to listen to intelligence inconsistent with their beliefs
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Herrington on Traitors Among Us
• Civilian “mafia” within Army often undercuts intelligence effectiveness
• We do have traitors, it is very difficult to first pet them and then catch them in the act overseas
• Interagency cooperation does produce results
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Levine on DEA Failures
• “Suits” assure the failure of effective street operations
• Inter-agency rivalry’s do great damage
• CIA creates monsters as it works fringes of drug networks
• State & White House let Mexico run rampant
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Reibling on FBI-CIA Rivalry
• War between FBI and CIA goes back to Hoover era
• Refusing to share information is a deeply embedded two-way street
• Congress undermines counterintelligence (Barney Frank example)
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Trulock on Failed Labs
• Energy labs are giving up all our advanced nuclear and other secrets
• Political interference is preventing proper counterintelligence
• Our “friends” are the worst offenders
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Baer on Clandestine Failure
• We do not have a global clandestine infrastructure against terrorism
• Too reliant on liaison• Don’t have the
languages• Culture diluted down
to office bureaucrats
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Gertz on 9-11 Breakdown
• Administrations ignored the earlier attacks
• DIA: bureaucracy• CIA: politically correct• FBI: lost its way• Congress: destructive• America not serious
about terrorism
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Godson on Covert Action & CI
• Covert Action and Counterintelligence are neglected elements of intelligence
• Covert action offers a range of policy options
• Counterintelligence is offensive defense
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Matthias on Mind-Sets
• Mind-sets are killing us--military mind-set focusing on technology; policy mind-set focusing on traditional state threat; intelligence mind-set focusing on secrecy and loyalty instead of accuracy and relevance
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Wheaton on Warning• Warning solution includes
– Casting wide early net
– Surging on potential hotspots
– Getting senior’s attention
• Options decrease as conflict escalates--seniors need to focus on crisis prevention rather than crisis management
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Scales on Firepower-Intelligence
• Inaccurate maps mean inaccurate fire
• Naval fire support a lost art--and new platforms not configured for shore fires
• Firepower advantage is meaningless if intelligence cannot find and fix locations fast and correctly
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Beesly on OpIntel “Plots”
• 24/7 “plot” allows for on the fly evaluation of sources in real-time ops context
• Submarine behavior can be predicted (terrorists like subs?)
• Negative reports matter greatly
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Bamford on OPSEC• Those that practice OPSEC can
defeat our technical collection systems across the board
• We do not practice OPSEC and our opponents know how to exploit this every single day
• NSA still does not have a computer that can beat a human brain in weight, energy needs, and calculation speed
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Berkowitz & Goodman on Truth• Non-state actors and their
issues need more attention• Must focus on priorities,
minimize hardware investments, draw on private sector to fullest extent possible
• Must abandon bureaucratic model in favor of virtual community model
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Johnson on New Targets• Community does not exist--
only an archipelago of isolated fragments
• Intelligence producers and intelligence producers have lost touch with real world open sources
• 20% of the IC budget could be cut (Woolsey said this too)
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Treverton on Public Intelligence
• New intelligence paradigm must focus on filtering vast quantities of open source information, and on analysis
• Spies must focus very narrowly on vital secrets
• Most intelligence should be public and shared
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Odom on Fixing Intelligence
• DCI does not understand details of the various agencies
• NRO can give up $6B• CIA and DIA should
be eliminated (do not agree but must address his concerns)
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Herman on War & Peace
• components and boundaries, effects, accuracy, and evaluation
• long-term intelligence (mostly open sources, improve state behavior)
• short-term espionage (tends to be intrusive and inspire target state's hostility)
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Herman on Information Age
• "The best test of an intelligence system is the all-source memory it builds up..."
• "The problems of counter-terrorist intelligence cannot be solved just by throwing money at them."
• Sub-state targets, multi-lateral cooperation, open sources...
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Steele on Redirection
• Comprehensive review of shortfalls at strategic, operational, tactical, and technical levels
• Identifies $11.6 billion a year in necessary cuts
• Would restore that money for new initiatives--change will not happen without hit
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Steele on New Craft
• Reality requires public appreciation if public action is to be correct
• Public must demand intelligence and be able to create its own intelligence
• Most intelligence can be done with open sources & methods
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Peacekeeping Intelligence
• Can’t do peacekeeping without intelligence
• UN continues to be against intelligence
• There are success stories, and obstacles
• US benefits if it helps UN with coalition intelligence endeavors