Perek X . 90b 49 . ט יפ דב צ:

mishna One who stores a seed for sowing,H or as a sample, or for medicinal purposes and

carried it out on Shabbat is liable for carrying out any amount. By storing that measure, he indicates that it is significant to him. Therefore, he is liable for carrying it, despite the fact that what he carried out is less than the halakhic measure that determines liabil-ity for that item. And any other person is only liable for carrying it out on Shabbat if he carries out its measure for liability. If one stored the seed, carried it out, and then brought it back in, with no intention to utilize it for the specific purpose for which he stored it, he is only liable if he brought in its measure for liability (Rav Shmuel Strashun).

gemara The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna teach: One who stores a seed for a spe-

cific purpose and carried it out? Let the mishna simply teach: One who carries out a seed for planting, or as a sample, or for me-dicinal purposes is liable for carrying out any amount. One is not liable for storing the seed. He is liable for carrying out less than the measure that determines liability because he attributed significance to that measure. Abaye said: With what we are dealing here? We are dealing with a case where one stored it for a specific purpose and forgot why he stored it,HN and now he carries it out for no specific purpose.

Lest you say that in doing so his original intention is completely nullified, since when he carries it out he is no longer conscious of the reason that he stored it, the tanna of the mishna teaches us that anyone who performs an action with an object with which he had dealings in the past, performs the action with the original inten-tion in mind.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Meir deemed liable one who carried out even a single wheat seed for sowing on Shab-bat. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. We learned in the mishna that the measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for sowing on Shabbat is any amount. Since the principle is that an unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, clearly Rabbi Meir would deem him liable for carrying out one seed. He would even deem him liable for carrying out less than one seed. The Gemara answers that Shmuel’s statement was necessary. Lest you say that when the mishna employs the term any amount it is to exclude the standard measure for carrying out food on Shabbat, a dried fig-bulk; and actually one is only liable if there is at least an olive-bulk of whatever he is carrying out. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that any amount refers to even a single seed. Rav Yitzĥak the son of Rav Yehuda strongly objects to this: But now, based on the approach that the measure of liabil-ity depends solely on the intention of the person carrying out the object and not on objective measures, one who planned to carry out the contents of his entire house at once, so too, is he only li-able when he carries it out at once? The Gemara answers: There is no comparison. There, with regard to a person who plans to carry out the contents of his entire house, his intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people,N as most people do not conduct themselves in that manner.

צ:

Perek XDaf 90 Amud b

ולדוגמא לזטע צניע המ מתניפ כל ת – חייב ב ב ש ולט ואה והוציאו בא הוא, וכל אדם אין חייב עליו אל שחייב אינו – והכניסו חזט יעוטוד ש כ

יעוטוד ש א כ אל

צניע״? “המ למיתני ליה ה למ גמפ ולדוגמא לזטע “המוציא ליתני אמט הוא״! ש כל ב חייב ולט ואה גון כ – עס ינן מאי ב הכא יי: אבא ת ה הצניעו, והש כח למ הצניעו, וש ש

י ליה סתמאד א מ

NOTESAnd forgot why he stored it – ה הצניעו כח למ The Gemara means :ושthat one remembers that he stored it for a specific purpose but forgot what that purpose was. If one forgot entirely that he had stored the object, all authorities agree that he is no different from anyone else (Tosefot Rid).

HALAKHAOne who stores a seed for sowing – צניע לזטע One who stores :המseeds for sowing, for medicinal purposes, or as a sample is liable for carrying out any amount of those seeds for those purposes on Shabbat. However, others are liable only if they carried out the halakhic measure that determines liability for carrying out seeds on Shabbat (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 18:20).

Where one stored it and forgot why he stored it – ,הצניעו ש גון כה הצניעו כח למ If one stored less than the measure that determines :ושliability of a certain object, forgot why he stored it, and carried it out on Shabbat, he is liable for carrying out any amount because when he carried it out, he had in mind the intention that he had when he stored it (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 18:21).

צאד

Perek XDaf 91 Amud a

בתו, טלה מחש טולי ב תימא: ב מהו דעת ה – על ד ל העוש מע לן: כ א מש

הד טאשונה הוא עוש

מואל: מחייב אמט טב יהודה אמט שה אחת מוציא חט י מאיט אב ב היה טבנן! מהו הואפ ת ל ש יטא, ‘כ ש לזטיעהד טוגטת, הוא – לא ו י מג ל ש תימא: כ דמע זית, א מש א כ איכ ולעולם עד דטב ד טיה ב יצח טב לה מת יב לןד להוציא ב חיש ה, מעת א אל יהודה: עד מיחייב לא ד נמי הכי – יתו ב ל כעתו טלה ד יה?! התם – ב י לכול מ ד

ל אדםד אצל כ

One who stores a seed for sowing – לזטע צניע One :המwho stores seeds for sowing, for medicinal purposes, or as a sample is liable for carrying out any amount of those seeds for those purposes on Shabbat. However, others are liable only if they carried out the halakhic measure that deter-mines liability for carrying out seeds on Shabbat (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 18:20).

Where one stored it and forgot why he stored it – גון כה הצניעו כח למ הצניעו, וש -If one stored less than the mea :שsure that determines liability of a certain object, forgot why he stored it, and carried it out on Shabbat, he is liable for carrying out any amount, because when he carried it out, he had in mind the intention that he had when he stored it (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 18:21).

HALAKHA

And forgot why he stored it – ה הצניעו כח למ -The Ge :ושmara means that one remembers that he stored it for a specific purpose but forgot what that purpose was. If one forgot entirely that he had stored the object, all authorities agree that he is no different from anyone else (Tosefot Rid ).

NOTES

His intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people – ל אדם עתו אצל כ ד טלה One’s intentions :בare capable of according significance to an object even when most others do not consider the item significant. However, one cannot say that the set halakhic measure that determines liability is insignificant to him. In that case, his opinion is irrelevant (Ramban, Rashba, and see Tosafot).

NOTES

50 Perek X . 91a . ט יפ דב צאד

We also learned in the mishna: And any other person is only liable for carrying it out on Shabbat if he carries out its measure for liability. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is not fit to be stored, and therefore people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit for storage by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out the object that was stored, that person, who carried it out, is rendered liable by the thought of this person, who stored it.

Rava said that Rav Naĥman said: If one carried out on Shabbat a dried fig-bulk of seeds for eating, and along the way he reconsidered and decided to use them for sowing; or, alternatively, if one intended to carry them out for sowing and reconsidered and decided to use them for eating, he is liable. The Gemara wonders: This is obvious. Which-ever way you view this case, he is clearly liable. Go here and examine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability. The Gemara replies that Rav Naĥman’s statement teaches a novel concept. Lest you say that in order to be deemed liable for carrying out an object on Shabbat, we require that the lifting and placing of the object be performed with a single, identical, intention, and that is not the situation here, i.e., that the change in his intention transforms his action into two separate half-labors, therefore Rav Naĥman teaches us that it is considered a single prohibited act, and the person who performed it is liable.

On the basis of this halakha, Rava raised a dilemma: With regard to one who carried out half a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of sowing, which is less than the measure that determines liability, and in the mean-time the seeds became moist and expandedH to a dried fig-bulk, and he reconsidered his plans for the dried fig-bulk of seeds and decided to use it for eating, what is the halakha? The two sides of the dilemma are: If you say that there, in the first case, he is liable because go here and ex-amine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability; but here, in this case, since at the time that he car-ried it out there was not a measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for the purpose of eating, then he is not liable. Or, perhaps, since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, then now too, he is liable because, even based on his reconsidered intention, he completed the prohibited labor of carrying out.

And if you say that since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, now too, he is liable, if he carried out seeds in the measure of a dried fig-bulk for the purpose of eating, and they shriveledH until there was less than that measure, and he reconsid-ered and decided to use them for the purpose of sowing, then what is the halakha? Here, certainly had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, for the original intention he is not liable because there remains less than the measure for liability; or perhaps we follow his intention at present and he is liable. And if you say that we follow his intention at present, and he is liable, the dilemma arises: If one carried out a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of eating, and it shriveled until there was less than that measure, and then it expandedH to a fig-bulk, what is the halakha? Is there disqualificationN with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat? Since at a certain point there was less than the measure that determines liability, he can no longer be held liable for carrying it out even if it expands. Or, perhaps there is no disqualification with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. The crucial moments that deter-mine liability for carrying an object are the moment that it is lifted and the moment that it is placed. At both of those junctures, the measure for liability was whole. No resolution was found to any of these dilemmas. Therefore, let them stand unresolved.

א אל עליו חייבין אין אדם “וכל מעון ש י טב כ לא ד מתניתין יעוטו״ד ש כמעון י ש לל אמט טב תניא, כ ן אלעזטד ד בלהצניע, ט ש כ אינו ש כל אלעזט: ן בלזה ט והוכש מוהו, כ מצניעין ואין נתחייב – והוציא אחט ובא והצניעו,

ל זהד בתו ש מחש זה ב

טוגטת ג אמט טבא אמט טב נחמן: הוציא כלאכילה, ונמלך עליה לזטיעה, אי נמי, חייבד לאכילה עליה ונמלך לזטיעה יעוטא, וזיל א ש יטא, זיל הכא – איכ ש תימא: ד מהו יעוטא! ש א איכ – הכא בה, מחש חדא ב חה והנ ע יטה עינן ב

מע לןד א, א מש והא ליכ

לזטיעה, טוגטת ג חצי טבא: הוציא עי בות חה, ונמלך עליה לאכילה מהו? אם זיל מיחייב – ד מצי לומט: התם הוא ד תא וזיל הכא איכ יעוטא, ש א הכא איכ ה א נא ד בעיד יון ד יעוטא; הכא, כ שלא – אכילה יעוט ש יה ב הוה לא י ת אילו איש יון ד ילמא: כ מיחייב; או דבה חש אמ מיחייב – עליה יב חש ולא

א נמי מיחייבד ת זטיעה, הש ד

י ת איש אילו ד יון כ מצי לומט: ת ואם בה חש אמ מיחייב עליה יב חש ולא הוציא מיחייב; נמי א ת הש זטיעה, דטוגטת לאכילה וצמ ה, ונמלך עליה ג כי ת איש י כ אי וד הכא מהו? לזטיעה, או מיחייב, לא – ייתא מ בה חש אמא אזלינן, ומיחייב? ת תט הש ילמא: ב דאזלינן, א ת הש תט ב מצי לומט: ת ואם לאכילה, טוגטת ג כ הוציא ומיחייב; יחוי וצמ ה וחזטה ות חה, מהו? יש דת? ב יחוי לענין ש ת, או אין ד ב לענין ש

י וד ת

Less than a dried fig-bulk that expanded – חות ת חה טוגטת ש If one carried out less than a dried :מגfig-bulk of seeds for planting, and they expanded, and he reconsidered and decided to eat them, he is liable because even according to his original intention, the measure was sufficient to render him liable. The halakha was ruled in accordance with the first instance of: If you say, in the Gemara, as per the ruling of the Rambam (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 18:26).

A dried fig-bulk that shriveled – צמ ה טוגטת ש If :גone carried out a dried fig-bulk of seeds for food, and they shriveled, and he reconsidered and de-cided to plant them, he is liable due to his ultimate intention, in accordance with the suggestion of: If you say, in the Gemara (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 18:26).

It shriveled and then it expanded – וצמ ה וחזטה If one carried out a dried fig-bulk of seeds :ות חהfor food, and they shriveled and then expanded again, it is uncertain whether or not he is liable. This dilemma was not resolved by the Gemara (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 18:27).

HALAKHA

Disqualification – יחוי The question of whether :דor not an object is disqualified is raised in the Tal-mud with regard to various halakhot. The funda-mental question is as follows: Does the halakhic designation of an object, e.g., prohibition, con-secration, blessing, require that the object always have been fit for that designation? Or, can desig-nation take effect even if there were temporary interruptions in the fitness of the object for that designation?

NOTES

Perek X . 91b 51 . ט יפ דב צא:

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naĥman: If one threw an olive-bulk of teruma into an impure house,H what is the halakha? The Gemara attempts to clarify the question. With regard to what matter was this dilemma raised? If it was raised with regard to Shabbat, the measure that we require to determine liability for carrying out is a dried fig-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that. And if it was raised with regard to ritual impurity, the mea-sure that we require to determine impurity for food is at least an egg-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that as well. The Ge-mara answers: Actually, this dilemma was raised with regard to Shabbat. And it is referring to a case where there is less than an egg-bulk of food in the house, and this olive-bulk that was thrown into the house completes the measure of the food in the house to an egg-bulk. The dilemma is: What is the halakha in that case? Is it from the fact that the olive-bulk joins together with the food in the house with regard to ritual impurityN that he is also liable with regard to Shabbat? Or perhaps, all matters concerning carrying out on Shabbat require a dried fig-bulk in order to be liable. Rav Naĥman said to him: We already learned the resolu-tion to that dilemma in a baraita: Abba Shaul says: The measure that determines liability for carrying out the wave-offering of the two loaves of bread and the showbread that were in the Temple is a dried fig-bulk. The Gemara asks: And why is that their mea-sure? Let us say: From the fact that with regard to the matter of

disqualification of consecrated items due to leaving the Temple courtyard,N the significant measure is an olive-bulk, as one who eats that measure of disqualified consecrated items is liable; with regard to Shabbat, its measure for liability should also be an olive-bulk. The Gemara rejects this: How can you make that comparison? There, in the case of the consecrated items, from the moment that he took it beyond the courtyard wall it was disqualified due to the prohibition of leaving. However, with regard to Shabbat, he is only liable when he takes it into the public domain, which is far beyond the courtyard walls. Here, in the case where one threw teruma into the house on Shabbat, the prohibition of Shabbat and the impurity of the teruma come simultaneously. Since the olive-bulk is significant in terms of impurity, it is similarly significant with regard to Shabbat.

We learned in the mishna: If one stored the seed, carried it out, and then brought it back in, he is only liable if he brought in its measure for liability. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. By bring-ing it back into the house he indicates that he no longer considers it significant, and the object then assumes the legal status of an object belonging to anyone else. Abaye said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he threw it into the storehouse and its place is clearly discernible to the one who threw it, in that he knows where it landed. Lest you say that be-cause its location is discernible it maintains its original status, the mishna teaches us that from the fact that he threw it into the storehouse, he indicated that he nullified the object’s previous significance.

זית יה טבא מטב נחמן: זט כ עא מינ באי למאי? מהו? טמא לבית טומה תאי עינן, ב טוגטת ג כ – ת ב ש לענין עינן! יצה אוכלין ב ב לענין טומאה – כחות א איכ ת, וכגון ד ב לעולם לענין שלימו לביצהד יצה אוכלין, והאי מש ב מכמצטטב לענין טומאה – מיחייב מאי, מדלענין כל ילמא: ד ת, או ב ש לענין נמי ליה: אמט עינן? ב טוגטת ג כ – ת ב שחם י הל ת אול אומט: ש א ש ניתוה, אב תאי? טוגטתד ואמ ג יעוטן כ נים ש ולחם ה

לענין לימא: מד

NOTESHis intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people – ל אדם כ עתו אצל ד טלה One’s intentions are capable of :בaccording significance to an object even when most others do not consider the item significant. However, one cannot say that the set halakhic measure that determines liability is insignificant to him. In that case, his opinion is irrelevant (Ramban, Rashba, and see Tosafot).

Disqualification – יחוי The question of whether or not an object is :דdisqualified is raised in the Talmud with regard to various halakhot. The fundamental question is as follows: Does the halakhic designation of an object, e.g., prohibition, consecration, blessing, require that the object always have been fit for that designation? Or, can designation take effect even if there were temporary interruptions in the fitness of the object for that designation?

From the fact that the olive-bulk joins together with the food in the house with regard to ritual impurity, etc. – מצטטב לענין טומאה מד The fundamental question here is: Are the halakhic measures that :וכופdetermine liability for carrying out different items on Shabbat tied to the essence of those items, and consequently all food items have a fixed measure that applies at all times? Or, are the measures listed with

regard to Shabbat, measures of halakhic significance, and therefore liability for carrying out would apply to other measures of general halakhic significance, e.g., an olive-bulk, with regard to joining together with other food to comprise the measure for ritual impurity? Therefore, Rava’s dilemma is clear. The olive-bulk of food that was thrown is insig-nificant in and of itself in terms of the halakhot of ritual impurity, until it combines with other food to comprise an egg-bulk of food. However, even much smaller measures that are halakhically significant, e.g., minute fragments of sacred objects, are universally deemed significant in terms of establishing liability for carrying out on Shabbat.

HALAKHALess than a dried fig-bulk that expanded – ת חה טוגטת ש חות מג : If one carried out less than a dried fig-bulk of seeds for planting, and they expanded, and he reconsidered and decided to eat them, he is liable because even according to his original intention, the measure was suf-ficient to render him liable. The halakha was ruled in accordance with the first instance of: If you say, in the Gemara, as per the ruling of the Rambam (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 18:26).

A dried fig-bulk that shriveled – צמ ה טוגטת ש If one carried out a :ג

dried fig-bulk of seeds for food, and they shriveled, and he reconsid-ered and decided to plant them, he is liable due to his ultimate inten-tion, in accordance with the suggestion of: If you say, in the Gemara (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 18:26).

It shriveled and then it expanded – וחזטה ות חה -If one car :וצמ ה ried out a dried fig-bulk of seeds for food, and they shriveled and then expanded again, it is uncertain whether or not he is liable. This dilemma was not resolved by the Gemara (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 18:27).

One threw an olive-bulk of teruma into an impure house – זית זט כטומה לבית טמא If one threw an olive-bulk of food into an impure :תhouse, and this olive-bulk brought the measure of the food inside of the house to an egg-bulk, it is uncertain whether or not he is liable for carrying. Although the olive-bulk is considered to have joined together with the food in the house in terms of impurity, its status vis-à-vis carry-ing was not resolved in the Gemara. The Ramban and the Rashba hold that the dilemma was raised with regard to an olive-bulk of teruma, whose impurity prohibits it in that measure. However, one is certainly exempt for throwing an olive-bulk of non-sacred food (Maggid Mishne; Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 18:27).

צא:

Perek XDaf 91 Amud b

כזיתד ב נמי ת ב ש לענין כזית, ב יוצא חוץ יה א מד – התם א! ת הש הכי יוצא, ב ליה אי סיל העזטה לחומת ליה י מ ד עד מיחייב לא ת ב אשת וטומאה ב יםד הכא – ש לטשות הטב

הדי הדדי אתייןד ב

א אל חייב אינו והכניסו “חזט הכא יי: אב אמט יטא! ש יעוטו״ד ש כלאוצט זט ו ש גון כ – עס ינן מאי במ ומו יון ד תימא: כ טד מהו ד ומ ומו ניכ א אי, ייתא מ תיה מיל ב – ט ניכטולי ב – לאוצט זט יה מד לן: מע מש

טליהד ב

One threw an olive-bulk of teruma into an impure house – טומה לבית טמא זית ת If one threw an olive-bulk of food :זט כinto an impure house, and this olive-bulk brought the mea-sure of the food inside of the house to an egg-bulk, it is uncertain whether or not he is liable for carrying. Although the olive-bulk is considered to have joined together with the food in the house in terms of impurity, its status vis-à-vis carrying was not resolved in the Gemara. The Ramban and the Rashba hold that the dilemma was raised with regard to an olive-bulk of teruma, whose impurity prohibits it in that measure. However, one is certainly exempt for throwing an olive-bulk of non-sacred food (Maggid Mishne; Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 18:27).

HALAKHA

From the fact that the olive-bulk joins together with the food in the house with regard to ritual impurity, etc. – מצטטב לענין טומאה וכופ The fundamental question here :מדis: Are the halakhic measures that determine liability for carrying out different items on Shabbat tied to the essence of those items, and consequently all food items have a fixed measure that applies at all times? Or, are the measures listed with regard to Shabbat, measures of halakhic significance, and therefore liability for carrying out would apply to other measures of general halakhic significance, e.g., an olive-bulk, with regard to joining together with other food to comprise the measure for ritual impurity? Therefore, Rava’s dilemma is clear. The olive-bulk of food that was thrown is insignificant in and of itself in terms of the halakhot of ritual impurity, until it combines with other food to comprise an egg-bulk of food. However, even much smaller measures that are hala-khically significant, e.g., minute fragments of sacred objects, are universally deemed significant in terms of establishing liability for carrying out on Shabbat.

NOTES

Leaving the Temple courtyard – יוצא: Sacrificial offer-ings and other sacred gifts must remain within certain designated boundaries. Some items must remain within the walls of Jerusalem, others must remain on the Temple

Mount, and yet others must remain within the Temple courtyard. Any consecrated item that is taken beyond its permitted boundary is immediately disqualified and requires burning.

NOTES

52 Perek X . 91b . :ט יפ דב צא

mishna One who carries out food from his house on Shabbat and placed it on the thresholdH of the

door, whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the pub-lic domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt because he did not perform his prohibited labor of carrying from domain to domain all at once. Similarly, if one placed a basket that is fullH of fruit on the outer threshold, which is in the public domain, and part of the basket remained inside, even though most of the fruit is outside in the public domain, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket.

gemara The Gemara begins by asking: What is the nature of this threshold in terms of Shabbat? If

you say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the public domain, in that it does not extend above nine handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths, and it is suitable for use by the multitudes, why is he exempt? Didn’t he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain? Rather, say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the private domain, in that it extends above ten handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths. In that case, why does the mishna say: Whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt? Why should he be exempt? Didn’t he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain?

Rather, the mishna is referring to a threshold that is a karmelit. And it teaches us the following: The reason that he is exempt is due to the fact that the object came to rest in a karmelit. However, if the object did not come to rest in a karmelit, he is liable even if it passed through a karmelit. This comes to teach that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of ben Azzai, as it was taught in a baraita: One who carries out an object from a store, which is a private domain, to a plaza, which is a public domain, via a colonnade, which is a karmelit, is liable because he lifted the object in a private domain and placed it in a public domain. And ben Azzai deems him exempt because, in his opinion, an exempt domain separates between the private and public domains.

We learned in the mishna: If one placed a basket that is full of fruit on the outer threshold, he is only liable if he carries out the entire basket. Ĥizkiya said: They only taught this halakha with regard to a basket full of cucumbers and gourds, both of which are long. Part of each fruit remains inside even when most of the basket is in the public domain. However, if the basket was full of mustard seeds, he is liable for carry-ing out a measure of individual mustard seeds to the public domain. The Gemara concludes: Apparently, he holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion. Even though sev-eral objects are in a single basket, they do not have the legal status of a single unit. And Rabbi Yoĥanan said: Even if the basket were full of mustard seeds, he is exempt. Apparently, he holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion.

Rabbi Zeira said: The language of the mishna does not precisely cor-respond with the opinion of Ĥizkiya, and it does not precisely corre-spond with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan. The Gemara explains: It does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Ĥizkiya, as the mishna taught: Until he carries out the entire basket. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is liable is because he carried out the entire basket. However, if part of the basket remained inside, even if he carried out all the fruit, he is exempt. Apparently, the mishna holds that fu-sion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion. Since the vessel fuses the fruit into one entity, when part of the basket remains inside, by extension its fruit is also considered to have remained inside. And it does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan, as the mishna taught: Even though most of the fruit is out-side. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is exempt is because only most of the fruit is outside. However, if all the fruit were outside, then even though part of the basket remains bound inside, he is liable. Ap-parently, the mishna holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion.

על ונתנן אוכלין המוציא מתניפ ין ב והוציאן, חזט ש ין ב ה, האס ו ה לא עש ני ש טוט, מ הוציאן אחט – שהיא מליאה ה ש בת אחתד ו מלאכתו בה החיצונה, אב יטות ונתנה על אס ו עד טוט, – חוץ מב יטות טוב ש י על

הד ל ה ו יוציא את כ ש

אילימא מאי? ה אס ו האי גמפ הא טוט?! ים, הטב לטשות ה אס ו ים! י מטשות היחיד לטשות הטב א מ חזט ין ש ה טשות היחיד, “ב א: אס ו אלטוט״? הא הוציאן אחט ש ין ב והוציאן ים! י מטשות היחיד לטשות הטב א מ

מע טמליתד והא א מש ה כ א: אס ו אלכטמלית, הא לא נח ב נח ד לן: טעמא – בן כ לא ד מתניתין מיחייבד – כטמלית בל לטיא מחנות המוציא תניא: ד עזאי,

טך סטיו – חייב, ובן עזאי וטטד ד

היא מליאה כופ״ד אמט חז יה: ה ש “ ו ואין יש מליאה ה ב ו א אל נו ש לא חייבד – ל חטד מליאה אבל ודלועין, אגדד מיה ש לא לי כ אגד סבט: אלמא ל חטד מליאה א ילו אמט: יוחנן י וטבמיה ש לי כ אגד סבט: אלמא טוטד

אגדד

חז יה כ לא ד מתניתין זיטא: י טב אמט חז יה כ י אד ד יוחנן י טב כ ודלא י א, דל יוציא את כ תני: “עד ש י א – ד לא דל כ הא ה, ה ו כל ד – טעמא ה״ ה ו לי טוט, אלמא סבט: אגד כ יטות – ה תני: י א, ד י יוחנן לא ד טב מיה אגדד כ ש – טעמא חוץ, ב יטות טוב ש י על אב ב ג על אב יטות ל כ הא יטות, טוב דאלמא חייב, – מגואי ה אגידא ו ד

מיה אגדד לי לא ש סבט: אגד כ

And placed it on the threshold – על ונתנן ה -One who transfers an object from a pri :האס ו vate domain to a public domain, or vice versa, and places the object in a karmelit that separates the two domains is exempt (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 14:14).

A basket that is full – מליאה היא ש ה One : ו who carries a basket full of objects, even if they are small, like mustard seeds, is only liable if he carries the entire basket out of the domain. This is because fusion of several objects within a single vessel is considered fusion. The halakha is in accor-dance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan. This is also Rava’s opinion, and in disputes with Abaye the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava (Maggid Mishne; Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 12:11).

HALAKHA

Perek X . 91b 53 . ט יפ דב צא:

The Gemara asks: However, that is difficult. The inferences of the mishna are contradictory. The Gemara explains: Ĥizkiya resolves the contradiction in accordance with his reasoning, and Rabbi Yoĥanan resolves the contradiction in accordance with his reason-ing. The Gemara elaborates: According to both of the Sages, the mishna is referring to two distinct cases. Ĥizkiya resolves the con-tradiction according to his reasoning. The phrase: Until he carries out the entire basket; in what case is this statement said? It is said in the case of a basket full of cucumbers and gourds. However, in the case of a basket full of mustard seeds, he becomes as one who carried out the entire basket, and he is liable for carrying out the mustard seeds. And Rabbi Yoĥanan resolves the contradiction according to his reasoning: When we learned: Even though most of the fruit is outside, he is exempt; and that ruling is true not only if he carried out most of the fruit, but even if he carried out all the fruit he is also exempt, until he carries out the entire basket.

The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a baraita: One who carries out the merchant’s basket on Shabbat that contains different items, primarily spices, and placed it on the outer threshold of the house, even though most of the types of items in the basket are outside, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket. It might enter your mind to say that this is refer-ring to a basket full of bundles of different spices. That is difficult according to the opinion of Ĥizkiya, as even though most of the bundles entered the public domain, he is exempt. The Gemara an-swers: Ĥizkiya could have said to you: With what are we dealing here? With stalks [urnasei].L The spices are in the form of stalks that fill the entire length of the basket. As long as part of the basket remains inside, part of each stalk remains inside as well.

And Rav Beivai bar Abaye also raised an objection from that which we learned: One who steals a purseB on ShabbatH is liable for the theft. Based on the principle that one who is liable to receive two punishments receives the greater of the two,N in this case one should be exempt from payment for the theft, since performing a prohib-ited labor on Shabbat is punishable by stoning. However, this case is different because he was already liable for theftN as soon as he lifted the purse. This took place before he came to violate the pro-hibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying it into the public domain. However, if he did not lift the purse, but was dragging it on the ground and exitingH the private domain, he is exempt from paying for the theft, as in that case, he is only liable for the theft when he drags the purse out of the owner’s property into the public domain. The prohibition of theft and the prohibi-tion of Shabbat are violated all at once. For the purposes of this discussion: And if it enters your mind to say that fusion of several objects within a single vessel is considered fusion, in this case the prohibition of theft precedes the prohibition of Shabbat. At the moment that the mouth of the purse enters the public domain, he is liable for theft because it is as if the money inside had been carried out. With regard to Shabbat, he would not be liable until the entire purse entered the public domain.

לטעמיה, מתטץ חז יה יא! ש א ואלי יוחנן מתטץ לטעמיהד חז יה מתטץ וטבה, ל ה ו כ יוציא את לטעמיה: עד שה מליאה בטים אמוטים – ב ו ה ד מ בל – ואין ודלועין, אבל מליאה חטד ישה, ה ו ל כ את הוציא ש מי כ ה נעשי יוחנן מתטץ לטעמיה: אב על וחייבד טביטות חוץ, ולא טוב יטות ב טוב י ש טוט, יטות – ל כ א ילו א אל לבד ב

הד ל ה ו יוציא את כ עד ש

ת הטוכלין ונתנה מיתיבי: המוציא ו טוב י ש ה החיצונה, אב על על אס ו ל יוציא את כ טוט, עד ש חוץ – מינין ביא צטטי, ש עתך ב ה, א סל א ד ה ו מאי ב חז יה: הכא לך לחז יה! אמט

אוטנסיד עס ינן – ב

יס כ הגונב יי: אב ט ב יבי ב טב מתיב גניבה בט נתחייב ב כ ת – חייב, ש ב ש בהיה תד ב ש איסוט לידי יבא ש ודם ניבה הטי איסוט ג טוט, ש מגטט ויוצא – אחדד ואי סל א אין כ ת ב ב ואיסוט שמיה אגד – דים ליה לי ש עתך אגד כ ד

ת! ב ניבה לאיסוט ש איסוט ג

Stalks [urnasei] – אוטנסי: From the Arabic عرناس, ‘irnās (Arukh). According to the interpretation of the ge’onim, urnasei are sticks or reeds around which people wrap string and wool.

LANGUAGE

Purse – יס A money purse can hang from a beam by :כmeans of the laces wound around its opening.

Illustration of a money purse from the time of bar Kokheva

BACKGROUND

One who steals a purse on Shabbat – ת ב ש יס ב :הגונב כOne who lifts an object in a private domain with the in-tention of stealing it and carries it into a public domain on Shabbat is required to repay the owner for the stolen object, even though he is also liable for performing labor on Shabbat. The halakha is ruled in this way because the transgressor was liable for the theft when he lifted the ob-ject, but he did not perform the prohibited labor until he carried the object out into the public domain (Rambam Sefer Nezikin, Hilkhot Geneiva 3:2; Shulĥan Arukh, Ĥoshen Mishpat 351).

He was dragging it on the ground and exiting – היה If the thief did not lift the object that he was :מגטט ויוצאstealing in the private domain, but dragged it into the public domain, the prohibition of theft and the prohibited labor were performed simultaneously. In that case, he is exempt from repaying the owner for the stolen object because he is liable to receive a more severe punishment for the prohibited labor. This exemption only applies if the stolen object was lost or destroyed immediately after carrying it into the public domain. Some commentaries deem him exempt even if he lost it at a later point (Rema based on Rashi and the Rambam). However, if the object is in its original form, the thief is obligated to return it to its owner in any case, as per the conclusion of the Gemara in tractate Sanhedrin (Rambam Sefer Nezikin, Hilkhot Geneiva 3:2; Shulĥan Arukh, Ĥoshen Mishpat 351).

HALAKHA

One who violates two prohibitions simultaneously with regard to punishment – לענין עונש אחת כ י עביטות ת ש :העובט There is a halakhic principle that one is not punished twice for performing a single act, even if two people were harmed by that transgression. However, if one transgression preceded the other even slightly, he may be punished for both actions. Once the liability for the first transgression is established, it remains in-tact. Nevertheless, when one is liable to receive both lashes and capital punishment, he is executed and not flogged due to the principle that one receives the greater of the two punishments. However, fundamentally, liability to receive the first punishment

remains. Indeed, in a case where one is liable to be flogged and to pay restitution, he is required to pay the restitution if, for some reason, the lashes cannot be administered.

Because he was already liable for theft – גניבה ב For :נתחייב one to be liable for theft, two criteria must be met. First, the thief must intend to take an object that belonged to another for himself. Second, he must transfer the object into his possession by means of a valid transaction. Only by means of acquiring the object does he perform the transgression. This acquisition can be accomplished by means of lifting the object or, alternatively, by taking it out of the owner’s property without lifting it.

NOTES

54 Perek X . 92a . ט יפ דב צבד

The Gemara explains: If this is referring to a case where he carried it out by way of its mouth, indeed that is so, he would be liable for theft. How-ever, with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he carried it out by the underside of the purse. Since none of the money is accessible until the entire purse is in the public domain, he violated the prohibitions simultaneously. The Gemara asks: Isn’t there the area of the seam? He could gain access to the money even if he dragged out the purse by way of its underside,

for if he wishes, he can tear the seam and take the money. The Gemara answers: Here, it is referring to long metal strips. As long as the entire purse is not in the public domain, he did not acquire any of the long strips, and he is not liable for theft. The Gemara asks: And since the purse has laces to close its opening, to be liable for theft it is sufficient that he carry it out so that its mouth is in the public domain, as he can untie the straps and remove the contents of the purse. And since the laces remain bound inside the private domain, he is not yet liable for violating the prohibition of Shabbat. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case where the purse does not have laces. And if you wish, say instead that it is referring to a case where it has laces, and the laces are wound around the purse.

There is a dispute between Abaye and Rava that parallels the dispute be-tween Ĥizkiya and Rabbi Yoĥanan. And, so too, Rava said: They only taught in the mishna that one is exempt with regard to carrying out a basket full of cucumbers and gourds. However, for carrying out a basket full of mustard seeds, he is liable. Apparently, Rava holds: fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion. Abaye said: Even if the basket is full of mustard seeds, he is exempt. Apparently, Abaye holds: Fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion. The Gemara comments: Abaye later assumed the opinion of Rava, and Rava assumed the opinion of Abaye. And a contradiction is raised between one statement of Abaye and another statement of Abaye; and a contradiction is raised between one statement of Rava and an-other statement of Rava.

As it was stated that they disputed the matter of one who carries out fruit into the public domain. Abaye said: If he carried them out in his hand,H he is liable even if the rest of his body remained in the private domain because fusion of several objects in his hand is not considered fusion. However, if he carried them out in a vessel, and part of the vessel re-mained in the private domain, he is exempt. And Rava said: If he carried them out in his hand, he is exempt because the legal status of his hand is determined by the status of the rest of the body. However, if he carried them out in a vessel, he is liable.

These are contrary to their opinions stated above. The Gemara answers: Reverse the opinions,N and say that Rava was the one who said: If he carried it out in his hand, he is liable. The Gemara raises an objection. Didn’t we learn in the mishna: In a case where the homeowner ex-tended his hand into the public domain, and either the poor person took an object from the homeowner’s hand and placed it in the public domain, or the poor person placed an object into the homeowner’s hand and the homeowner carried the object into the private domain, both are exempt. Apparently, one is not liable if he merely moved an object in his hand into the public domain. The Gemara answers: There, in the mishna, it is referring to a case where his hand was above three handbreadthsH from the ground. The object in his hand, therefore, does not have the legal status of having been placed on the ground, and he is exempt. Here, it is referring to a case where his hand was below three handbreadths off the ground. Anything that is within three handbreadths off the ground has the legal status of having been placed on the ground.

יו – הכי נמי, הכא טך יה ד א אי דשוליוד טך ד יה א ד עס ינן מאי ב

א מ ום חלמה, NOTESוהאיכLeaving the Temple courtyard – יוצא: Sacrificial offerings and other sacred gifts must remain within certain designated boundaries. Some items must remain within the walls of Jerusalem, others must remain on the Temple Mount, and yet others must remain within the Temple courtyard. Any consecrated item that is taken beyond its permitted boundary is immediately disqualified and requires burning.

One who violates two prohibitions simultaneously with regard to punishment – אחת לענין עונש י עביטות כ ת There is a halakhic :העובט שprinciple that one is not punished twice for performing a single act, even if two people were harmed by that transgression. However, if one transgression preceded the other even slightly, he may be punished for both actions. Once the liability for the first transgression is estab-lished, it remains intact. Nevertheless, when one is liable to receive both lashes and capital punishment, he is executed and not flogged due to the principle that one receives the greater of the two punish-ments. However, fundamentally, liability to receive the first punishment remains. Indeed, in a case where one is liable to be flogged and to pay restitution, he is required to pay the restitution if, for some reason, the lashes cannot be administered.

Because he was already liable for theft – גניבה ב For one :נתחייב to be liable for theft, two criteria must be met. First, the thief must intend to take an object that belonged to another for himself. Second, he must transfer the object into his possession by means of a valid transaction. Only by means of acquiring the object does he perform the transgression. This acquisition can be accomplished by means of lifting the object or, alternatively, by taking it out of the owner’s property without lifting it.

HALAKHAAnd placed it on the threshold – ה One who transfers :ונתנן על האס ו an object from a private domain to a public domain, or vice versa, and places the object in a karmelit that separates the two domains is exempt (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 14:14).

A basket that is full – היא מליאה ה ש One who carries a basket full : ו of objects, even if they are small, like mustard seeds, is only liable if he carries the entire basket out of the domain. This is because fusion of several objects within a single vessel is considered fusion. The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan. This is also Rava’s opinion, and in disputes with Abaye the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava (Maggid Mishne; Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 12:11).

One who steals a purse on Shabbat – ת ב ש יס ב One who lifts :הגונב כan object in a private domain with the intention of stealing it and car-ries it into a public domain on Shabbat is required to repay the owner for the stolen object, even though he is also liable for performing labor on Shabbat. The halakha is ruled in this way because the transgres-sor was liable for the theft when he lifted the object, but he did not perform the prohibited labor until he carried the object out into the public domain (Rambam Sefer Nezikin, Hilkhot Geneiva 3:2; Shulĥan Arukh, Ĥoshen Mishpat 351).

He was dragging it on the ground and exiting – היה מגטט ויוצא: If the thief did not lift the object that he was stealing in the private domain, but dragged it into the public domain, the prohibition of theft and the prohibited labor were performed simultaneously. In that case, he is exempt from repaying the owner for the stolen object because he is liable to receive a more severe punishment for the prohibited labor. This exemption only applies if the stolen object was lost or destroyed immediately after carrying it into the public domain. Some commen-taries deem him exempt even if he lost it at a later point (Rema based on Rashi and the Rambam). However, if the object is in its original form, the thief is obligated to return it to its owner in any case, as per the conclusion of the Gemara in tractate Sanhedrin (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 14:14).

LANGUAGEStalks [urnasei] – אוטנסי: According to the interpretation of the ge’onim, urnasei are sticks or reeds around which people wrap string and wool. According to the Arukh, it is from the Arabic arnasi.

BACKGROUNDPurse – יס A money purse can hang from a beam by means of the :כlaces wound around its opening.

Reproduction of a money purse from the time of bar Kokheva

צבד

Perek XDaf 92 Amud a

נסכאד יל! ב עי מ ע ליה וש אי ב דעד ליה י מ נצין, ש א איכ ד וכיון אגידי נצין וש יל וש טי וש ומיה, עית ואיב נציןד ש א ליכ ד אי! ו מגויהד טכי עיל אית ליה, ומכ אימא: ד

ה א ב ו נו אל וכן אמט טבא: לא שואין ודלועין, אבל מלאה מלאה ישאגד סבט: אלמא חייבד – ל חטדאמט: יי אב אגדד מיה ש לא לי כטוטד אלמא ל – א ילו מלאה חטדיי מיה אגדד ם אב לי ש סבט: אגד כתיה יט ש טבא, ם טבא ב תיה ד יט ש בוטמי יי אב אד יי אב ד וטמי יי, אב ד

טבאד טבא אד ד

לטשות יטות המוציא מט: אית דחייב, – יד ב אמט: יי אב ים, הטב – יד ב אמט: וטבא טוטד – לי כ ב

לי – חייב! כ טוט, ב

על ט ב ש יד חייבד והתנן: אי וך: בהעני ונטל לחוץ, ידו את ית הב – והכניס לתוכה תן נ ש או מתוכה ה, לש טוטין! התם למעלה מש ניהן ש

הד לש ה מש הכא – למט

One who carries out…in his hand – יד :המוציא…בOne who carries fruit from one domain to another on Shabbat is liable if he carried it in his hand; however, if he carried it in a vessel he is exempt (Maggid Mishne). This is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as the halakha is ruled in accordance with his opinion in dis-putes with Abaye (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 13:6).

Above three handbreadths – ה לש If one :למעלה משcarries an object in his hand from one domain to an-other on Shabbat, the object is considered attached to the ground [lavud] and placed on the ground if his hand is within three handbreadths of the ground. In that case, he is liable (Rambam Sefer Zemanim, Hilkhot Shabbat 13:6).

HALAKHA

Reverse the opinions – אי וך: Some commentaries explain that the opinions of Rava and Abaye are only partially reversed. The conclusion is that Abaye said: Whether one carries out the fruit by hand or in a ves-sel, he is liable. Rava said: Whether one carries out the fruit by hand or in a vessel, he is exempt. Therefore, the difficulty raised in the Gemara is only with regard to Abaye’s opinion (Ramban; Rashba).

NOTES