The Westinghouse Aviation Gas Turbine (AGT)Division pioneered the development of aircraftgas turbine engines in the United States. Despitethe support of the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronauticsfor most of its twenty-year existence, theWestinghouse AGT Division failed to maintain itsposition as a leader in the aircraft engine indus-try. Repeated failures to manufacture satisfactoryengines led to the gradual withdrawal of Navysupport. In 1960 the division disbanded andWestinghouse withdrew from the industry.

The failure of the Westinghouse AGT Division isshown to be the result of the inability of the engi-neers and managers to develop a suite of skillsand resources — what Alfred Chandler terms“organizational capabilities” — sufficient for themanufacture and marketing of a new product thatsignificantly affected the aircraft engine market.

Chandler’s concept is a powerful explanatory toolwhich is used to develop an analytical frameworkaround the history of the Westinghouse AGTDivision. The case study demonstrates that suc-cess in the aircraft gas turbine engine industry in1950-1960 depended on the engine manufacturer’sability to adapt certain of its Chandlerian organi-zational capabilities to keep pace with rapidchanges within the industry, namely: 1) financialinvestment in research, development, and pro-duction; 2) initiative in developing new enginesand customers; and 3) adaptive management andengineering practices. This case study demon-strates the importance of organizational capabili-ties by demonstrating how the absence of certainskills, management practices, and organizationalroutines negatively affects the outcome of anattempt at technological innovation.

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Abstract

Title of Thesis: The Westinghouse Aviation Gas Turbine Division 1950-1960: A Case Study in the Role of Failure in Technology and Business

Degree candidate: Paul D. Lagasse

Degree and year: Master of Arts in American History/Master of Library Science

Thesis directed by Professor Robert FriedelDepartment of History

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The Westinghouse Aviation Gas Turbine Division 1950-1960: A Case Study in the Role of Failure in Technology and Business

byPaul D. Lagasse

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School ofthe University of Maryland at College Park

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree ofMaster of Arts in American History

1997

Advisory Committee:

Professor Robert Friedel, ChairProfessor David Sicilia

Professor John Anderson

© Copyright byPaul Lagasse

1997

Over the many years I have been researching the history ofthe Westinghouse AGT Division, I have incurred the debt ofmany people; I here formally express my gratitude. The the-sis originated as a research paper for Dr. Anne Millbrooke,who has over the years steadfastly encouraged my efforts asan historian-in-training and who provided invaluable editori-al suggestions right up to the final draft. Staff at the variousmuseums, archives, and libraries that contain material relatedto the history of the AGT Division all helped me work withtheir priceless collections; Barry Zerby and Sandy Smith ofthe Military Reference Branch of the National Archives;Marjorie G. McNinch of the Archives & ManusciptsDepartment, Hagley Museum and Library; Betsy Hall of theHistorical Electronics Museum, Inc.; Rick Leyes, PropulsionCurator in the Aeronautics Department, National Air andSpace Museum, Smithsonian Institution; Lauren Lyon,Research Librarian at the Kansas City Star Information Store;Dave Lindsey, International Gas Turbine Institute; CharlesRuch, Westinghouse Electric historian; Ed Reis of the GeorgeWestinghouse Museum; and Frank A. Zabrosky of theArchives of Industrial Society, University of Pittsburgh.

Former Westinghouse AGT Division employees Reinout P.Kroon, Oliver Rodgers, Robert L. Wells, Chet Kelley, Dr.Stewart Way, and Harold L. Hildestad kindly answered myquestions, provided documents from their personal collec-tions, and helped me develop the human side of the AGTDivision story. I know they would disagree with many of myarguments and conclusions, which are solely my own. MaryJo Lazun provided editorial assistance, offered valuable sug-gestions for every aspect of the final product, and kept me ontrack throughout the writing process. I would also like tothank my thesis advisory committee, Dr. Robert Friedel, Dr.David Sicilia, and Dr. John Anderson for their help, support,and interest throughout the entire thesis project.

Throughout the thesis I refer to aircraft gas turbine enginesof United States manufacture, and those of foreign manufac-ture that were used by the United States military, by theirUnited States military designations. For the sake of c1arity, Ichose this consistent and comparatively straightforwardidentification method over the unique designations used bythe different engine manufacturers. For an explanation of thisdesignation system, and a comparative listing of engineswith their manufacturer designations, see Appendix I,Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine Designation Standards, follow-ing the text.

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Acknowledgements and Note

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements and Note i

Introduction: Determinants of Success and Failure in the Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine Industry 1

Historiographical Grounding: the Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine as Disruptive Technology 1

Thesis Statement 2The Case Study 3Historical Significance 4

Development of the Westinghouse Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine to 1950 5

A Case Study of the Role of Failure in Technology and Business: Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Corporation, Aviation Gas Turbine Division, 1950-1960 15

Part I: “Faster Than You Think”: Expansion, 1950-1953 18Part 2: “If You’re Not In Trouble, You’re Not In Aviation”:

Transitions, Scandals and Cancellations, 1954-1956 26Part 3: “Dreaming Over the Lunch Table”:

Withdrawal, 1957-1960 36Conclusion 41

Appendix I: Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine Designation Standards 44Military Designations 44Company In-House Designations 44

Appendix II: List of Aircraft Gas Turbine Engines 45

Appendix III: Organizational Structure of the Engineering Department of the Westinghouse Aviation Gas Turbine Division, 1955 46

Bibliography 47Primary Sources 47Secondary Sources: Books 47Secondary Sources: Periodicals 48Secondary Sources: Newspapers 48Secondary Sources: Miscellaneous 48

Notes 49

Nothing that Westinghouse did in its entire war history has hadsuch far-reaching influence upon [its] future engineering as thesuccessful gas turbine which resulted from this splendid chal-lenge.[1]

”Westinghouse pioneers something and then lets G.E. walk inand take the market away. And the credit for pioneering it, too.”[2]

In the decade and a half following the end of World WarII, the aircraft gas turbine — “jet” — engine rose to domi-nance over the traditional aircraft piston engine.Westinghouse Electric was one of the first major manufac-turing firms to enter the nascent jet engine industry. In 1941,Westinghouse’s jet engine program appeared to have all theelements to ensure success: the economic support of a largeand well-established firm, a ready customer in the UnitedStates Navy, and experience derived from the design andmanufacture of an apparently closely-related technology,the steam turbine engine. However, Westinghouse failed tokeep pace with the rapid growth of the jet engine industryand withdrew in 1960. This thesis identifies the reasons forthe failure of Westinghouse in the industry, and explainsthe significance of those reasons in terms of how AlfredChandler’s concept of “organizational capabilities” can beused to understand the role of innovation in successfulbusiness operations.

There has been no analysis in the literature of aviation his-tory as to why the Westinghouse AGT Division failed tomaintain its position as a major aircraft gas turbine enginemanufacturer. Most sources, if they discuss Westinghouse atall, simply mention the fact that Westinghouse engines suf-fered developmental problems which caused them to beunreliable and underpowered.[3] Historians of aviationagree that Westinghouse engines were consistently less pow-erful — that is, they provided fewer pounds of propulsivethrust obtained from the combustion of compressed air andvaporized fuel — than the contemporary engines of itsrivals, General Electric and Pratt & Whitney Aircraft.[4] It isnecessary but insufficient to say that Westinghouse Electricfailed to maintain its position as a leader in the aircraft gasturbine engine industry because its engines failed to be com-petitive. The reasons why Westinghouse engines were con-sistently inferior in reliability and performance, and whythose reasons are important to historians who study failurein technology-oriented businesses, are the topic of this thesis.

Historiographical Grounding: the Aircraft Gas TurbineEngine as Disruptive Technology

Historians of business and technology are increasinglyinterested in the mechanisms by which innovation, tradi-tionally defined as the introduction of an invention into thecommercial market,[5] appear to directly affect the successor failure of manufacturers in an industry. The successfulintroduction of the gas turbine engine into the aircraft

engine market required new approaches by companies toproject funding, marketing, and engineering in order tomarket the engine successfully and competitively. Historianand business analyst Clayton Christensen has labeled aninnovation that requires such changes in business practicesa “disruptive technology.”[6]. I posit that the WestinghouseAGT Division failed to maintain its position as a majormanufacturer of such engines because it was too slow inrecognizing the need for the financial, marketing, and engi-neering changes required by the disruptive technology ofthe aircraft gas turbine engine.

The ability — or inability – of a company to deploy itsskills and resources successfully in order to maximize itschances for success in the manufacture of a technologicalproduct is determined by what historian Alfred Chandlerhas termed the “organizational capabilities” of that compa-ny. In his book Scale and Scope, Chandler broadly definesorganizational capabilities as a combination of the skills andresources possessed by a company.

The combined capabilities of top and middle manage-ment can be considered the skills of the organization itself.These skills were the most valuable of all those that madeup the organizational capabilities of the new modern indus-trial enterprise ... . These organizational capabilitiesincluded, in addition to the skills of middle and top man-agement, those of lower management and the work force.They also included the facilities for production and distri-bution acquired to exploit fully the economies of scale andscope. [emphasis in original][7]

Chandler does not break his broad concept of organiza-tional capabilities down into specific skills and facilities.Nor was Chandler the first business historian to recognizethe key roles played by knowledge, skills, and resources inthe successful manufacture of new technologies.[8]Chandler did, however, explicitly treat organizational capa-bilities as a quantifiable and manageable resource, andlocated them specifically within individual companiesrather than attaching them to the larger industries or tech-nologies. This treatment has the effect of placing the respon-sibility for the development and maintenance of organiza-tional capabilities on the companies themselves.

Chandler considers organizational capabilities to be a stat-ic resource. He claims that once the organizational capabili-ties of a company are created and established, they must bemaintained. However, he warns, the advent of new tech-nologies, and accompanying new markets, constantlythreaten to make organizational capabilities obsolete.[9]According to this model, the ability of a company to suc-cessfully diversify into new or disruptive technology mar-kets is therefore limited, determined by whether the newmarket is “based on [existing] organizational capabilities,that is, product-specific facilities and skills.”[10]

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Introduction: Determinants of Success and Failure in the Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine Industry

Other historians who have expanded on the idea of firm-specific organizational capabilities have discussed the abili-ty of companies to learn to adapt their organizational capa-bilities to disruptive technology markets. Chandler’s con-cept of organizational capabilities is essentially similar tothe concept of “competence,” which is defined by Dosi,Teece, and Winter as “a set of differentiated technologicalskills, complementary assets, and organizational routinesand capacities that provide the basis for a firm’s competitivecapacities in a particular business ... . In essence, compe-tence is a measure of a firm’s ability to solve both technicaland organizational problems.”[11] According to Dosi, et al.,the presence of competences, both organizational and tech-nical in nature, is necessary for the competitive success of afirm. Like Chandler, they do not identify specific organiza-tional capabilities/competences that a company can employto solve its problems. The authors present the theory ofcompetence as part of a larger theoretical model which wasat the time still being developed and evolved by theauthors.

The competences identified by Dosi, et al. differ fromChandler’s organizational capabilities in that capabilities areseen to be dynamic; the result is an inversion of the relation-ship between organizational capabilities and technologies asidentified by Chandler. According to Dosi, et al., the impor-tance of learning is central to the development or adaptationof successful organizational capabilities. Learning, they con-tend, can be affected by “differences in the human skill baseas well as differences in managerial and organizational sys-tems.”[12] The role of learning in a firm is demonstrated bythe development of successful “organizational routines,”defined as “patterns of interactions which represent success-ful solutions to particular problems,” and by advantagestaken by the firm of opportunities represented by new tech-nologies.”[13] The presence of such routines and opportuni-ties are necessary for the development of what the authorsterm “corporate coherence” for a firm, which occurs “whenits lines of business are related, in the sense that there arecertain technological and market characteristics common toeach.”[14] The expansion of a company into a new technolo-gy market, therefore, is not dependent on whether the prod-uct fits with the existing organizational capabilities of thecompany, as Chandler would have it, but on whether thoseorganizational capabilities can be adapted to accommodatethe new technology. The historical events presented in thiscase study favor the latter interpretation of the central roleplayed by organizational capabilities in determining thesuccess or failure of an attempt at technological innovation.

A case study of a failed attempt to manufacture a disrup-tive technology offers historians an opportunity to elaborateon the concept of organizational capabilities by demonstrat-ing how the absence of certain skills, management practices,and organizational routines affects the outcome of anattempt at technological innovation. Chandler, Dosi, Teece,and Winter all recognize the importance of the role playedby organizational capabilities in successful diversification

by companies into disruptive technology markets.However, though Dosi, et al. go some distance toward elab-orating broadly-distinguished categories of compe-tences,[15] other historians appear not to have placed specif-ic business activities and decision-making strategies underthe umbrella concept of organizational capabilities. Thiscase study suggests that, for the Westinghouse AGTDivision, the absence of a defined set of particular businessactivities and decision-making strategies, which can be clas-sified as part of the organizational capabilities of theDivision, directly affected its efforts to manufacture aircraftgas turbine engines.

Thesis StatementSuccess in the aircraft gas turbine engine industry in 1950-

1960 depended on the engine manufacturer’s ability toadapt certain of its Chandlerian organizational capabilitiesto keep pace with rapid changes within the developingindustry, namely: 1) financial investment in facilities forresearch and development and for production; 2) initiativein developing new engines and customers; and 3) adaptivemanagement and engineering practices. Failure byWestinghouse to adapt these capabilities to the changingdemands of the industry resulted in the company beingunable to maintain its position as one of the major aircraftgas turbine engine manufacturers in the United States.

To varying degrees, the three organizational capabilitiesoutlined above have already been individually recognizedas distinct and significant concepts by historians of businessand technology. They have not, however, been treated col-lectively as specific organizational capabilities. This casestudy suggests that at least under certain circumstancesthey may be so treated, at least in part because of their con-tribution to the failure, rather than to the success, of theWestinghouse AGT Division. Specific organizational capa-bilities are harder to isolate using only case studies of suc-cessful development and manufacture of disruptive tech-nologies because such case studies provide little opportuni-ty to compare the relative contributions of specific capabili-ties to the overall success of the company. In this case study,where the failure of the Westinghouse AGT Division can becompared to the successes of its competitors GeneralElectric and Pratt & Whitney, the roles played by financialsupport of R&D, initiative in the development by compa-nies of new engine designs, and adaptation of engineeringand management practices can be comparatively testedbetween the three firms.

Financial support for facilities, staff, and products demonstratedthat a company had a stake in the long-term success of its engineprogram and desired to keep abreast of the latest technologicaldevelopments in the field. In their analysis of the interplay oftechnology and economics, Richard Nelson, Merton Peckand Edward Kalachek observe that “new technology oftenneeds new capital.”[16] The aircraft gas turbine enginerequired significant amounts of financial investment in the1941-1960 period in support of research and development

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(R&D), and since the primary customer for that productwas the military services, during those years the Air Forceand the Navy provided most of the R&D funding. In theyears following World War II, the federal government,especially the military, became the biggest financial sponsorof industrial R&D.[17] Over 65% of government R&D sup-port went specifically to the development of new technolo-gies for production.[18]

Nevertheless, historians of economics and business agreethat if a company does not ultimately invest a significantamount of its own funding in support of a new technologi-cal product, that product may fail to compete successful-ly.[19] In the case of aircraft gas turbine engines, the mili-tary services expected that engine manufacturers wouldinvest company funds for the development of long-terminfrastructure in support of future R&D and production, aswell as continue to accept development contracts funded bythe military. Christensen’s research into disruptive tech-nologies led him to conclude that “[i]nnovation proposalsthat get the funding and manpower they require may suc-ceed; those given lower priority, whether formally or defacto, will starve for lack of resources and have little chanceof success.”[20]

A successful aircraft gas turbine engine manufacturerdemonstrated its growing confidence in the technology byintroducing improved engines on its own initiative, invert-ing the manufacturer-customer relationship of the earlyyears of the industry, and in so doing broadening its cus-tomer base. Until the early and mid-1950s, aircraft gas tur-bine engine technology was tightly controlled by the mili-tary services, which required engine manufacturers to waitfor the military to issue production contracts for engineswith specific performance criteria. However, HermanStekler noted in his 1965 analysis of the aerospace industry,beginning in the late 1950s the military services turnedincreasingly to design competitions for new aircraft andengines, requiring the firms to put forward designs of theirown rather than simply manufacture products that slavishlycopied military specifications.[21] Richard Nelson equatedinitiative with the importance of in-house R&D. "In anindustry where innovation is an important aspect of compe-tition, the ability of a firm to survive depends on the effec-tiveness of its [own] research and development laboratories,on its ability to exploit its innovations and protect them, orto quickly match anything that its competitors do."[22]

An adaptive corporate culture permitted the management andengineering staff of a successful engine manufacturer to keep ordiscard customs and practices based on whether or not they pro-vided for the most efficient and effective development and produc-tion of the engine. Historian Walter Vincenti succinctlyobserved that “what engineers do ... depends on what theyknow.”[23] For Vincenti, the generation of new engineeringknowledge can be generated through a wide variety ofinteractions with existing scientific and engineering knowl-edge, and through research, production, and experimenta-tion; in other words, through learning. Dosi, et al. also iden-

tify learning as a key component for a successful compa-ny.[24] In his analysis of inter-firm sharing of R&D knowl-edge, David C. Mowery cautions that, without the develop-ment of knowledge about new technologies, companies candevelop institutional “blinders” that eventually preventthem from identifying and seizing opportunities presentedby new or disruptive technologies.[25]

The Case StudyThis thesis examines the ten years the Westinghouse

Aviation Gas Turbine (AGT) Division manufactured aircraftgas turbine engines in Kansas City, Missouri during a peri-od of rapid change and growth within the aircraft gas tur-bine engine industry. The case study illustrates the conse-quences of Westinghouse’s attempt to enter and maintainits presence in the industry without the dedicated financialsupport, the gradual development of a broad product andcustomer base, and the willingness to adapt engineeringand management practices that would permit the companyto best respond to the changing needs of the industry.

Westinghouse management preferred to rely almost solelyon large subsidies provided by the Navy for facilities,equipment, and engine development, and made little effortto invest company funds in the engine program. Customerrequirements of the jet engine industry in the 1950s necessi-tated that companies develop new engine designs to a levelof production readiness in a short time, which in turnrequired lavish financial support, which Westinghouse didnot provide. Consequently, when the Navy began to with-draw financial support in the mid-1950s the AGT Divisiondid not receive adequate financial resources from its parent,Westinghouse Electric, to compensate for the lost R&Dfunding. In early 1955 one aircraft gas turbine engine indus-try observer noted:

Considering its technological headstart, Westinghouse shouldhave become the No. 1 or No. 2 producer, whereas today it isonly about fifth in size. The company dragged its heels after thewar and waited for the government to guarantee orders insteadof plunging into production with its own money as G.E. andother makers did. Westinghouse finally did pour millions into jetengines, but too late. Its engines were not mechanical failures;they were, as a Defense Department official comments, five yearstoo late.[26]

The Navy Bureau of Aeronautics’ monopsony falselyencouraged the Westinghouse AGT Division to buildengines solely to Navy specifications, rather than to developnew engines for a wider variety of airframe applications.The main rivals of the Westinghouse AGT Division, GeneralElectric and Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, succeeded not just indeveloping significant R&D facilities and resources but inusing those facilities and resources to produce productswhich were one step ahead of the requirements of its cus-tomers. This action permitted the military services to go for-ward with the development of a wider range of airframeapplications for these new engines; it also helped spur the

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development of nonmilitary gas turbine engine-poweredaircraft, thus broadening the customer base of the enginemanufacturers. The Westinghouse AGT Division displayedlittle initiative in developing its own engine designs, andmissed the resulting opportunities to broaden its marketcoverage.

Westinghouse management and engineering staff wereloath to establish a separate aircraft gas turbine engine divi-sion or develop engineering practices suitable for the newand disruptive technology, but instead stubbornly persistedin manufacturing aircraft gas turbine engines with the sameengineering approach used for industrial steam turbineengines. Westinghouse management, encouraged by its pastengineering experience, considered the aircraft gas turbineengine to be an evolution of existing technology, but not adisruptive one; the company believed that the techniquesfor successfully manufacturing and marketing jet engines,therefore, could be drawn from the company’s past engi-neering experience, especially from steam turbine engineer-ing. Westinghouse failed to realize that the engineeringrequirements for the successful manufacturing of aircraftgas turbine engines differed from those required for steamturbine manufacturing by requiring experience with mass-production instead of individual production, interchange-ability and uniformity of component parts rather than cus-tomized, hand-crafted components, and exponentialimprovement of performance derived from theoreticalresearch, instead of incremental improvement arrived atthrough hands-on “tweaking.”

Historical SignificanceThis historical case study provides an analytical elabora-

tion of Alfred Chandler’s concept of organizational capabili-ties suggested in his book Scale and Scope and suggests ananalytical methodology applicable to other cases of successand failure in industries where disruptive technologies areintroduced. The three particular organizational capabilitiesidentified in this case study might be directly applicable toother case studies of both successes and failures in othertechnology-oriented industries. More broadly, by identify-ing specific organizational capabilities possessed by success-ful manufacturing firms which were not possessed by thosefirms which failed, a historian has an opportunity to there-by identify, and test the relative significance of, certainorganizational capabilities for companies involved in themanufacture of a specific disruptive technology.

This thesis is also the first historical study of theWestinghouse Aviation Gas Turbine Division. It should not,however, be interpreted as a comprehensive history of theDivision. This thesis is rather a selective history, cast in themold of the specific interpretive and analytical frameworkoutlined above. Events and personalities are discussed tothe extent that they furnish the reader with a general under-standing of the Division’s history, while at the same timedemonstrating the validity of the thesis statement. Specificevents were excluded from discussion due to constraintssuch as immediate relevance, redundancy, and space.Though a definitive history of the Westinghouse AGTDivision has yet to be written, it is sincerely hoped that thisthesis might serve to suggest the broader scope such a his-tory might embody.

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Westinghouse Model 19XB-2B Turbojet Engine (Air Force Historical Research Agency)

The early history of aircraft gas turbine engines in theUnited States is a story of constant adaptation by manufac-turers to rapidly changing business and technological envi-ronments. Success and failure in the nascent industry dur-ing this time was determined primarily by the organization-al capabilities of the manufacturers — an imprecise cocktailin which is combined, added, and changed the skills andresponsibilities of both the management and the work force,and also the available R&D and production facilities of thefirm.[27] According to Alfred Chandler, who first suggestedthe term “organizational capabilities” in his book Scale andScope, a successful manufacturing firm is one that domi-nates a market by optimizing its practices and infrastructure— its organizational capabilities — to the needs anddemands of that market.

In 1941 there was no definition of what constituted satis-factory organizational capabilities for an aircraft gas turbineengine manufacturer. That year, the United States govern-ment asked Westinghouse Electric and General Electric toundertake R&D studies of aircraft gas turbine enginedesigns; the government considered the organizationalcapabilities of industrial steam turbine manufacturerswould be adequate for the task. By 1950, the successful air-craft gas turbine engine manufacturers turned out be thosewhich possessed two kinds of organizational capabilities.Pratt & Whitney Aircraft already possessed organizationalcapabilities that were especially suited to the aircraft engineindustry, but not the technology of aircraft gas turbineengines. The company’s knowledge of the needs of com-mercial and military aviation customers allowed the compa-ny to survive its late start in the aircraft gas turbine indus-try. General Electric possessed an understanding of aircraftgas turbine technology, through its own experience with tur-bine engines and the help of British engine technology, andquickly learned to understand the needs of a market withwhich it had no prior experience. Between 1941 and 1950Westinghouse Electric demonstrated that it possessed orga-nizational capabilities suited to neither the technology northe market of the aviation gas turbine engine, and as aresult by 1950 the pioneering firm had already become a fol-lower in the industry.

Before the mid-1930s, few military organizations thoughtthat the gas turbine engine held much promise for aircraftpropulsion; however, two practical successes with suchengines quickly changed prevailing opinions.[28] In 1936,Frank Whittle, a Flying Officer in the Royal Air Force, found-ed Power Jets, Ltd. to develop an engine of his design thatprovided a jet of high-speed exhaust through a gas turbineengine equipped with a centrifugal compressor.[29] Thatsame year in Germany, Hans von Ohain, a young physicsand aerodynamics student, joined the Heinkel aircraft facto-ry to develop a similar turbine engine design.[30] By theoutbreak of war in 1939 both Whittle and von Ohain, work-ing separately, were able to produce working engines. The

Heinkel He 178, powered by von Ohain’s HeS-3 b enginecapable of 1,200 pounds of thrust, made the world’s first jet-powered flight on August 27, 1939; the Gloster E.28/39,powered by a Power Jets W.l capable of 860 pounds ofthrust, first flew on May 15, 1941.[31]

In early 1941 the United States government decided toapproach both Westinghouse Electric and General Electricwith a proposal to investigate the possibilities of adaptingturbine engines for aircraft propulsion, and both companiesaccepted the offer. American military intelligence reportsregarding German developments in reaction propulsion —particularly with the rocket engine — had reached GeneralHenry H. Arnold, the Chief of the United States Army AirCorps. General Arnold, concerned about the comparativelag in American rocket engine development, contacted theNational Advisory Council for Aeronautics (NACA)[32], thepremier aviation research organization in the United States,and requested that NACA undertake a study on rocketpropulsion. In March 1941, the NACA convened its SpecialCommittee on Jet Propulsion to investigate forms of non-traditional aircraft prime movers. Representatives of theUnited States Army Air Forces and the Navy joined theSpecial Committee because of their interest in the engine formilitary aircraft. The chair of the Special Committee, Dr.Robert F. Durand, also invited General Electric andWestinghouse Electric, long-time rivals in the electrical utili-ty and appliance industry, to participate, and representa-tives from both companies attended the first meeting inApril 1941.[33]

Though inviting electrical manufacturing companies tostudy aircraft engine design might seem unusual, the Armyand Navy perceived several advantages to be gained frominviting Westinghouse Electric and General Electric to par-ticipate in the study. In particular, three advantages — theavailability of company financial support for R&D, the abili-ty of the military to dictate product specifications to themanufacturers, and the advantage of having companieswith long experience working with a similar technology —made Westinghouse Electric and General Electric idealchoices to participate in the NACA Special Committee.

Both companies, by virtue of their broad range of industri-al and consumer products, had significant financial assets tosupport research and development (R&D). Both firms man-ufactured and sold a wide variety of products, includingappliances, radios, and even x-ray equipment.[34] Betweenthem, Westinghouse Electric and General Electric virtuallycontrolled the electrical utility manufacturing industry; therelative market positions of the two firms stabilized ataround 60% General Electric to 30% Westinghouse.[35] Themilitary believed that both Westinghouse Electric andGeneral Electric would be willing to devote some of theirprofit back into researching a promising new product.

The armed services, by dictating to the manufacturers thedesired engine characteristics, would not be limited to pur-

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Development of the Westinghouse Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine to 1950

chasing engine designs conceived by the manufacturer. Themilitary typically purchased aircraft piston engines fromestablished manufacturers such as Pratt & Whitney Aircraft,Curtiss-Wright, or Allison based on already-existing designsoffered by the manufacturer, this new type of engine wouldallow the Army Air Forces and the Navy to issue specificengine requirements to manufacturers with no pre-estab-lished engine product lines. Throughout its existence theNACA Special Committee never invited representativesfrom the aircraft piston engine manufacturing companies.Schlaifer claims that General Arnold feared that the aircraftpiston engine manufacturers would be opposed to under-taking research on unorthodox engines, a claim Schlaiferhimself undermines by acknowledging that Pratt &Whitney Aircraft conducted its own in-house aircraft tur-bine engine research before the war.[36] Some business his-torians claim that the piston engine manufacturers wererisk-averse, an explanation which fails to take into accountthe military’s role in selecting the recipients of the technolo-gy.[37] The most likely explanation is that, at a time that theUnited States was engaged in its “Arsenal of Democracy”military production expansion, Arnold saw the need tokeep the aircraft piston engine manufacturers focused onproducing as many engines as possible and not divertingresources to research on unproven designs.[38]

The military believed that both companies’ prior engineer-ing experience with the design and manufacture of steamturbine engines for the electrical utility industry could besuccessfully extrapolated into aircraft gas turbine enginedesign, and the companies certainly believed likewise. Air-and land-based steam and gas turbine engines were techno-logically very similar, though gas turbine engine requiredmore components — compressors to squeeze the gas to acertain density, fuel atomizers to inject a spray of fuel intothe compressed air, and burners to ignite the fuel/air mix-ture — the engine still used the basic mechanical principlesof the steam turbine. During the early 1920s the steam tur-bine engine became an important product for bothWestinghouse Electric and General Electric. Westinghousesold $14.5 million worth of engines in 1924, representingnearly 10% of its total domestic business. General Electricsold nearly $30 million worth of turbines the same year,which similarly represented just over 10% of its sales. AsSultan summarizes, “in about 20 years the turbine generatorbusiness had become crucial to each company.”[39] GeneralElectric had installed its first production steam turbineengine in an electrical utility plant in 1903 and in additionhad several years’ experience manufacturing gas turbinesuperchargers for airplane engines.[40] Westinghouse hadbegun building steam turbine engines in 1898 after securingthe patent rights to the turbine designs of Charles A Parsonsof England, and in March 1940 announced a design for an“internally fired closed system gas turbine power plant,” cre-ated by engineer Winston New, that promised to providepower comparable to steam turbines while taking up lessspace.”[41] An internal Westinghouse report noted that the

Navy’s request to undertake aircraft gas turbine research “fit-ted in with our prior engineering considerations of gas tur-bines.”[42]

In late 1941 the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics decided tosponsor Westinghouse Electric’s research, in large partbecause the Army had approached General Electric first. InOctober 1942, the Army issued separate research contracts toboth General Electric’s turbosupercharger and steam turbinedivisions.[43] The following month, the Bureau ofAeronautics offered a similar contract to the WestinghouseSteam Turbine Division for “a design study of internal com-bustion turbines utilizing only jet energy for the propulsionof aircraft” based on the axial-flow design of Dr. StewartWay, which was in turn based on New’s earlier “closed-cycle” gas turbine design.[44]

The Bureau of Aeronautics likely also decided to selectWestinghouse due to the Navy’s prior experience with theSteam Turbine Division, in much the same way as the ArmyAir Forces selected General Electric because of its prior con-tractual experience with that firm’s turbosuperchargergroup.[45] During and following the First World War,Westinghouse succeeded in winning orders for a few turbineengines to be installed on Navy ships, based on engines thecompany had already built for commercial cargo ships.[46]As a result of these and subsequent marine steam turbineinstallations, the Navy developed and maintained a workingrelationship with the Steam Turbine Division ofWestinghouse Electric through the interwar years. TheNavy’s familiarity with the Steam Turbine Division’s capabil-ities as a propulsion turbine manufacturer influenced theNavy’s Bureau of Aeronautics to ask them to undertakeresearch in aircraft gas turbine engines.

However, the Bureau of Aeronautics, with whichWestinghouse had almost no prior experience, was atypicalof other customers of Westinghouse industrial products; themonopsonistic relationship of the Bureau with Westinghousebecame a major factor in determining the success or failure ofthe Westinghouse jet engine program. The Bureau had beenformally created as a separate agency within the Navy in July1921; its mission was to coordinate the Navy’s various aero-nautical activities under one authority, and to develop,implement, and support Naval aviation policy. The Bureaucontrolled the Navy’s aviation appropriations and had theauthority to issue contracts for aircraft, engines, and equip-ment.[47] The Bureau had a long tradition of supportingengine development in the private sector, for use on Navyaircraft and even actively supported the founding of onecompany, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, by promising it ordersfor its anticipated engines.[48] The Bureau also had a darkertradition of somewhat ruthless and impatient relationshipswith the private sector, frequently being “determined not toawait the pleasure of large companies for the development”of better engines.[49] For example, in 1922 the Bureau ofAeronautics forced Wright Aeronautical to develop an enginethat it wanted by not renewing contracts for another engineproduced by Wright, figuratively starving the company into

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submission.[50] Unlike the Navy’s own Bureau of Ships,which was responsible for ordering steam turbines for navalvessels, the Bureau of Aeronautics frequently appeared tohave had little patience for incremental, gradual increases inengine performance, or tolerance for companies that did notprovide the desired results in short order.

The research and development phase of the aircraft gas tur-bine engine at the Westinghouse Electric Steam TurbineDivision did not suggest that the engineering and manage-ment methods of Westinghouse Electric were either unsuit-able or incompatible with the requirements of the Navy’sBureau of Aeronautics. The steam turbine engineers in 1941did not foresee that the jet engine would ultimately requiredifferent manufacturing methods and would ultimatelyprove to fall outside of the Division’s traditional engineeringexperience with large, one-of-a-kind steam and gas turbines.The early research and design experience with the aircraftgas turbine engine at the Westinghouse Steam TurbineDivision, in fact, seemed at first to affirm the Navy’s choice toconsult with an electrical manufacturing firm which pos-sessed organizational capabilities apparently related to thefinal product.

Prior to December 1941, the Bureau of Aeronautics provid-ed the necessary research funding, and Westinghouse consid-ered the aircraft gas turbine engine project to be a relativelylow-priority, long-term research program requiring little ofits own financial or staff support. The Navy approved$100,000 for “research and design studies” to be conductedby the Steam Turbine Division, stipulating that “[t]he subjectproject does not involve any delivery of jet-propulsionunits.”[51] Reinout Kroon, who as manager of developmentengineering in the Steam Turbine Division was responsiblefor research projects, believed that research into the axial-flow compressors, combustion principles, and turbine effi-ciencies of aircraft gas turbine engines would primarily bene-fit the Division’s other gas turbine development efforts thenunderway. Nor did Kroon see the research proposal asdemanding haste or priority on the part of the SteamDivision. “In view of the novelty of this work,” Kroon com-mented, “I hesitate to give a time limit on this work, but withsimultaneous study by two or three men, we should know alot in a year.”

Summarizing, it is my recommendation that as long as theresearch program does not divert us from gas turbine applica-tions for large capacity, and as long as it promises to yield us thetype of information which we will need for the larger apparatusanyway; and further, since any possible production would not bestarted until about two years from now, we offer to cooperatewith the N.A.C.A. Committee in entering a reasonable contract.Since we are the only large company not now participating inany high temperature-light weight turbine applications fordefense, this would seem a good opportunity to cash in on theexperience the others have obtained.[52]

Thus both the Bureau of Aeronautics and theWestinghouse Steam Turbine Division approached the proj-ect with the compatible intentions of undertaking a research

and development effort primarily oriented towards provid-ing broadly useful research results.

The Bureau of Aeronautics contracted with the SteamTurbine Division to develop an engine to a specific set ofrequirements which the Westinghouse engineers agreed tobe a feasible goal for a research project. In addition to deter-mining a price for the project, the Bureau specified that theengine must be able to “turn out the equivalent of 600horsepower at 500 miles per hour at 25,000 feet” — broadcriteria that were originally developed by the NACASpecial Committee and agreed to by all the participants asan equitable first goal for an as-yet untried enginedesign.[53] Because the Bureau of Aeronautics had specifiedthe required performance, Reinout Kroon and the SteamTurbine Division engineers were placed in a position not ofpromising something they would be unable to deliver, butrather of making a good-faith effort to design an engineagainst hitherto-untested requirements.

The Steam Turbine Division demonstrated its engineeringexpertise by developing an axial-flow compressor, whichproved to be more efficient and possessed more growthpotential than centrifugal compressors, which were used byGeneral Electric.[54] The axial-flow compressor differedfrom the centrifugal compressor in that the intake air wascompressed along its line of flow axially through theengine; a series of alternating stationary and rotating diskswith blades of ever smaller length — compressor stages —compressed the air as it streamed rearward into the com-bustion chamber. In a centrifugal compressor, the air iscompressed by being forced against the outer wall of theengine at right angles to the line of flight, and then re-directed through another right angle to the combustionstage behind the compressor. Aircraft gas turbine engineswith centrifugal compressors were initially more fuel-effi-cient and lighter than those with axial-flow compressors.However, centrifugal compressors possessed an inherentmaximum growth potential whereby an increase in thrustoutput was mitigated by an increase in the diameter of thecompressor, to a point where aerodynamic drag would out-weigh the gain in thrust output.[55] The axial-flow com-pressor thus possessed the advantage of permitting a nar-rower-diameter engine which allowed for better streamlin-ing of an aircraft. However, Oliver Rodgers, a steam turbineengineer and later director of jet engine research atWestinghouse, later characterized the compressor design as“adventuresome” by steam turbine standards, but “stodgy”by aircraft standards.[56]

As a result of adequate funding by the Bureau ofAeronautics, customer-dictated performance requirements,and the selection of an axial-flow design for the engine’scompressor, all indications during the relatively briefresearch phase of the project, from April to December 1941,were that the Westinghouse Steam Turbine Division wascapable of designing an aircraft gas turbine engine to theBureau of Aeronautics’ specifications. However, the formalentry of the United States into the war on December 8, 1941

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transformed the Westinghouse aircraft gas turbine engineproject overnight from a research program into a produc-tion program, a transition for which the WestinghouseSteam Turbine Division ultimately was not prepared.

The production phase of the first Westinghouse aircraftgas turbine engine design spotlighted a series of problemsthat caused the final product, the Westinghouse J30 aircraftgas turbine engine, to be ill-suited for mass-production. TheBureau of Aeronautics would eventually be forced to con-tract with Pratt & Whitney Aircraft to build the J30 engine,an experience which highlighted for the Bureau ofAeronautics the differences between the design and produc-tion methods of steam turbine manufacturers and tradition-al aircraft engine manufacturers. Westinghouse senior man-agement proved unwilling to support the development of aproduction-ready aircraft gas turbine engine or of a sepa-rate aircraft gas turbine engine division. The Steam TurbineDivision proved unable to accommodate a rapid transitionfrom research work to full-scale production. Finally, the J30engine, which Westinghouse developed for the Bureau ofAeronautics from the research proposal submitted to theNACA Special Committee, represented an engine that oneaeronautical engineer described as “radical in aerodynamicdesign, conservative in mechanical design.”[57] Thismechanical conservatism, well-suited for a steam turbineengine, proved to be unworkable in an engine designed fora radically different range of performance. As a result ofthese problems, pre-production development became undu-ly protracted and the Bureau of Aeronautics became ever-more impatient.

Having completed the design of the various engine com-ponents, Kroon and his small team of a dozen engineers —known within the Division as the “12 Disciples” — beganthe overall design of the first American-designed aircraftgas turbine engine on August 10, 1942; the task theWestinghouse engineers faced was daunting.[58] Kroonrecalled that there was some anxiety that an aircraft gas tur-bine engine might not even work, given their comparativelyprimitive state of knowledge.

We were pretty well versed in turbine work, less so in com-pressor work. We were OK on bearings and structural things.We knew nothing about combustion, and neither did anyoneelse. [We feared that if] you pour in all this fuel in this small,small volume it would be a nightmare; we could [imagine] themblowing up.[59]

This first engine that the Steam Turbine Division designedfor the Bureau of Aeronautics, which in time received themilitary designation J30, had a 19-inch intake diameter andan eight-foot overall length, weighed 850 pounds, and wasoriginally intended to provide 850 pounds of thrust.[60] Earlyresearch and testing work on the engine’s turbine, however,demonstrated that by increasing the air temperature at thepoint of the air inlet into the turbine, the engine could pro-duce far more thrust than the original estimate of 850pounds, and perhaps as much as 1,200 pounds, which

approximated the thrust of General Electric’s engine.[61]The J30 engine would have to operate under conditions thatseverely tested the experience and knowledge of both theWestinghouse engineers and their Navy customers. Thecompressor had six stages (that is, six rotating disks alter-nating between six static disks), and would rotate at 18,000rpm, putting a centrifugal force of 50,000 times the force ofgravity on each blade. The burner would operate at a tem-perature of 1,500 degrees Fahrenheit as it ignited the com-pressed fuel/air mixture and accelerated it past the turbinewheels.[62] These were performance parameters with whichKroon and his people had little experience.

Despite severe space limitations and a shortage of man-power, Kroon’s team assembled the first prototype J30engine, serial number 2-A-9100,[63] in just 16 months andbegan work on a second; the early indications suggestedthat a mass-production version of the engine would be fea-sible.[64] During this time, someone — exactly who is notrecorded — dubbed the engine the Yankee, in recognition ofboth the pioneering nature of the engine and the ingenuityand hard work of its builders, and the name stuck. Kroonviewed the two J30 Yankee engines as test articles to deter-mine what were the operational and performance character-istics of an aircraft gas turbine engine.

It [the engine] was not supposed to work right from thebeginning; we were supposed to build something and then startlife-testing, finding out what goes wrong and fix it. That’s whatyou have to do for that sort of thing. The fact that your powersource [the engine] is so small, that things can go wrong. Thenyou can take care of it. So we had to get adapted to that kind ofdesign philosophy.[65]

The construction of the first two J30 engines was indeedinstructive for the Development Engineering team, but fre-quently in ways not entirely anticipated. The first pieces ofthe engine to arrive in the experimental laboratory, whichwere fabricated in other parts of the Steam Division, haddimensions and tolerances that were glaringly in error,requiring labor-intensive corrective effort. “‘Old Carl’Deiner, a mechanic [who] had worked with Mr. GeorgeWestinghouse, using freely an expressive ‘shop language’and a lot of his skill, finally made it correct,” read one dead-pan contemporary account.[66]

On March 19, 1943 — fifteen months after the start of theresearch project, seven months after the start of the designof the Yankee the engineers and mechanics who hadworked on building the engine gathered to watch the firsttest. No one really knew what to expect. Author GroverHeiman recounted the event twenty years later:

John Rivell, the test operator, began the final preparationsbefore a hushed audience. Compressed air was channeled intothe intake. The polished compressor blades began turning. Whenthe gauges indicated starting rpm’s had been attained, fuel wasinjected into the flow of air. Rivell thumbed the switch that senta spark arcing into the volatile combination.

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The 19[-inch] engine ... took off with a thunderous roar. Theweary lines in the faces of the staff melted away. Rivell, accord-ing to plan, advanced the throttle and the engine twirled to 8,000rpm’s. Holding it there for a brief moment, Rivell then eased offon the throttle and shut down the engine.[67]

The milestone test had not been without incident; theengine sprang an oil leak from the combustion chamber — apotentially dangerous event that Rivell averted by shuttingdown the engine.[68]

The second Yankee engine became the first Westinghousejet engine to fly, though not as a primary powerplant. Atthe Philadelphia Naval Yard Naval engineers installed theengine underneath a Navy piston-engined FG-l Corsairfighter. The Bureau of Aeronautics then shipped the planeto the Patuxent River Naval Air Test Center in Maryland,where the plane made several test flights of the enginebeginning in January 1944.[69] The first flight of aWestinghouse aircraft gas turbine engine thus came a fullthree years after the Steam Turbine Division began researchon the basic design, and fifteen months after the first flight ofa General Electric engine. The test flights were made todetermine the performance of the engine in the air, theywere not even test flights of the fighter as powered by theaircraft gas turbine engine. In fact, the Yankee did notpower the airplane on takeoff or landing, and was onlyswitched on for brief periods while in flight.

The Bureau of Aeronautics nevertheless rewarded thehalting progress being made on the construction and testingof the prototype Yankees by the small team of SteamTurbine Division engineers with the awarding of additionalcontracts for further development and improvement of thebasic design in preparation for production. In addition tothe first two J30 engines, the Development Engineeringgroup began the development of an improved “B” model ofthe basic J30 Yankee design, for which the Bureau ofAeronautics contracted.[70] In January 1943 the Bureau ofAeronautics also contracted with the McDonnell AircraftCompany of St. Louis, Missouri, to develop a carrier-basedfighter aircraft that would use two J30 engines for power,the XFD-1 Phantom.[71] As a result of this contract, theBureau of Aeronautics began to grow more interested indeveloping a production version of the Westinghouseengine, in order to begin testing it in service on actual air-craft. On May 24, 1943, the Navy amended ContractNO(a)s-503 to order 16 of the more powerful “B” modelengine, with an additional four to be built for the Army AirForces. Deliveries of the first of the “B” models were slatedto begin in November 1943. Financial terms would be sub-mitted by Westinghouse when determined.[72]

Westinghouse deliberately encouraged the Bureau ofAeronautics to continue supporting the development of theYankee engine. When Reinout Kroon and otherWestinghouse representatives met with Bureau ofAeronautics officials in mid-June 1943 to discuss the processof turning the Yankee into a mass-production item, they

announced that they now had at their disposal around 70draftsmen, 10-12 junior engineers, and 8 senior engineers towork on engine design throughout the Steam TurbineDivision. Osborne proposed that if the Bureau ofAeronautics would sponsor the construction of a govern-ment-owned plant and purchase machinery for it, within 14months Westinghouse would be able to achieve a produc-tion output of 100 engines per month.[73] Such a statementno doubt satisfied the Bureau that Westinghouse intendedto expedite engine production when possible.

Westinghouse also reinforced the Bureau of Aeronautics’desire to purchase aircraft gas turbines from them by offer-ing to build the engines for a great deal less money perengine than offered by other companies. “It should bepointed out,” one Bureau memorandum read, that

[Westinghouse] is making a definite financial contribution tothe development in that they are doing a splendid developmentjob at the least cost to the government of any contractors whetherAir Force or Bureau of Aeronautics at a figure from 1/5 to 1/10the cost of comparable work.[74]

The technique of underbidding potential or actual competitorswas subsequently used frequently by the Westinghouse AviationGas Turbine Division to win other engine contracts. This helps toexplain why the Bureau of Aeronautics remained a customer of theDivision long past the time it perceived Westinghouse as doing a“splendid” job.

Neither Westinghouse’s president, Andrew W. Robertsonnor the Steam Turbine Division’s vice-president, Latham E.Osborne believed that the aircraft gas turbine engine pro-gram required significant R&D support because they sawthe engine as a natural extension of steam turbine technolo-gy, which traditionally had operated with minimal financialsupport. Because profit on steam turbine engines derivednot from sales of turbines alone, but of turbines as part of acomplete package of dynamos, transformers, and other elec-trical components to a utility customer, the Steam Divisiondid not require much financial support from Westinghousemanagement to support product development. HistorianRalph Sultan correctly points out that the steam turbinebusiness was very lucrative for both Westinghouse andGeneral Electric. Profits from sales were not directlyreturned in full to the Steam Turbine Division, but only inamounts that enabled the Division to purchase new partsand equipment for the next set of turbines.[75] Because ofthis method of generating profit, the Steam TurbineDivision was relatively self-sufficient and Division man-agers — and not the corporate executives — were left withthe responsibility for making business decisions for theDivision. Neither Steam Turbine Division managers nor cor-porate executives expected that aircraft gas turbine engineswould have financial requirements any different from steamturbines.

Robertson and Osborne preferred that the Bureau ofAeronautics sponsor the construction of adequate facilitiesfor the Westinghouse aircraft gas turbine engine program,

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rather than spend company money on it. Throughout thewar the Bureau of Aeronautics continued to place moreorders for aircraft gas turbine engine research, develop-ment, and production with Westinghouse, but the companydid little to accommodate the increased work. When theBureau of Aeronautics expressed concern over the lack ofavailable space, staffing, and funding from Westinghousefor J30 development and manufacture, Robertson personallyaddressed a defense of Westinghouse’s efforts to that time.

The jet propulsion business has been unusually complicatedand difficult because we have attempted to telescope productiononto research and experimental activities. In ordinary times wedo not even talk of producing something in quantity before wehave an experimental model. But under the circumstances sur-rounding this case we did include quantity in our discussion,although the Bureau must have understood as well as we didthat any discussion as to production depended upon all sorts ofunknown elements arising out of the experimental nature of ourwork.

In the same letter, Robertson suggested that the Navy sub-sidize the building of a small facility — “which will cost theGovernment about $3,000,000 and the WestinghouseCompany $500,000” — as an immediate solution prior tothe expenditure of more on a large production plant.[76]The Bureau of Aeronautics countered Robertson’s proposalby suggesting the relocation of the jet engine program toexisting buildings in Westinghouse’s South Philadelphiafactory and culling 200 engineers and other employees fromother contracts and projects that would soon be ending.[77]For the rest of the war the issue remained a stalemate.

The physical location of the aircraft gas turbine engineprogram within the Steam Turbine Division facilities pre-vented the aircraft gas turbine engineers from growingapart as a separate specialty. Reinout Kroon was only per-mitted to recruit as many of the engineers from his ownDevelopment Engineering group as he could spare fromother Division projects to work on the engine.[78] From thisgroup and from the East Pittsburgh research laboratory,Kroon was only able to recruit 12 engineers — whose devo-tion to the Yankee project earned them the nickname “The12 Disciples” — and several mechanics, though this numberdid slowly grow during the war.[79] In addition, the work-ing conditions at South Philadelphia for the construction ofthe J30 were far from ideal. The Steam Division’s mainbuilding was “jammed to the rafters” with orders for steamturbines for warships, cargo ships, and other projects,requiring the J30’s builders to use outside contractors to fab-ricate engine components which then had to be hand-assembled.[80] The engineers and mechanics working onthe construction of the J30 were confined to the SteamTurbine Division’s experimental laboratory, which in sizewas “about the same as that of a small modestly equippedtool room.”[81] Because of the small number of engineersand cramped working conditions, Kroon’s engine produc-tion team remained in close physical and therefore philo-

sophical proximity to the steam turbine engineers.Westinghouse management consistently resisted urging

by the Bureau to create a separate aircraft gas turbineengine division because it believed it could not afford tosplit up the few turbine engineers it possessed. The shortterm solution to the problem of inadequate productionspace and staffing, in the view of the Chief of the Bureau ofAeronautics Dewitt C. Ramsey, was for Westinghouse “toestablish a pilot line whereby Westinghouse can gain neces-sary production ‘knowhow’ so that either it or another con-cern can later go into volume production in the event theproduct turns out as successfully as the Bureau anticipates.”[emphasis added][82] The Bureau noted that “[t]his pro-posed arrangement for semi-production manufacturing ...would give Westinghouse a division which might beclassed as a separate aviation section but is not, of course,the ideal setup,” but noted that a senior WestinghouseSteam Turbine Division manager, William Boyle, rejectedthe idea of a separate division on the grounds that turbineexperts were too scarce to be spread out among differentdivisions.[83] Westinghouse management resisted the sug-gestion until almost the end of the war.

The requirements of the customer changed faster thanWestinghouse could respond; when the Bureau ofAeronautics urged the Steam Turbine Division to turn theirresearch design engine into a production engine,Westinghouse was not prepared for such an acceleration oftheir program. Even before the first test of the prototype J30engine, Kroon’s Development Engineering team receivedadditional engine orders from the Bureau of Aeronautics.The Navy registered its approval with Westinghouse’sprogress by ordering more engines. On March 8, 1943, withthe first test only days away, the Bureau issued toWestinghouse a letter of intent for Contract NO(a)s-503, forthe construction of six more J30 engines similar to the proto-type being built, which Westinghouse designated the “A”model, in addition to the two engines already being builtunder NO(a)s-97181. In addition, the Bureau ordered six ofan improved version of the J30 engine, the “B” model, withdeliveries of all twelve engines to be begin by Ju1y 1943.[84]The contract also requested design studies on potential fur-ther improvements to the still as-yet untested first twoengines. It is likely that Vice President Lynde, who oversawthe Steam Turbine Division, or the engineers themselves,communicated to the Bureau of Aeronautics that additionalwork could in fact be undertaken; although there is no doc-umentary evidence to directly bear this assumption out,similar events occurred several times in the history of thelater Aviation Gas Turbine Division. Even at this earlystage, the Bureau of Aeronautics placed some pressure onthe Westinghouse aircraft gas turbine engine team to beginturning out engines in quantities that space and manpowerdid not easily permit. There were several reasons for theBureau’s decision.

The entry of the United States into the war in December1941 resulted in the Bureau of Aeronautics suddenly mak-

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ing the aircraft gas turbine a high priority, without signifi-cant increases in resources from either the Navy orWestinghouse. Two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor,Steam Turbine Division manager William Boyle traveled toWashington, DC, to meet with representatives of the Bureauof Aeronautics. There, he received a verbal promise that theDivision would receive in short order a letter of intent toundertake a design study for the engine design that becamethe J30.[85] A letter of intent is a promissory note for a con-tract, allowing a contractee to begin arranging for materieland personnel requirements while the details of the formalcontract are being worked out. The Bureau of Aeronauticsformally issued its letter of intent for research contractNOa(s)-97181 to Westinghouse Electric on January 5, 1942,giving it an A-1 priority.[86] The Bureau of Aeronauticsviewed the subsequent progress made by Kroon’sDevelopment Engineering team as so promising that onOctober 22, 1942, it amended contract NO(a)s-97181 , andcalled for the actual construction of two of the J30engines.[87] Within a matter of ten months, aircraft gas tur-bine engine research at Westinghouse went from being arelatively low-priority, long-term program to a high-prioritydevelopment program, and then to an actual productionprogram, all with virtually no increase in funding, staffing,or space at Westinghouse, or with increased funding fromthe Bureau of Aeronautics.

The Bureau of Aeronautics tended to express its satisfac-tion with the progress being made at Westinghouse byheaping more research and production on the DevelopmentEngineering team working on the J30. However, the Bureaudid not significantly increase its funding or its material sup-port commensurate with its increased expectations. An offi-cer in the Bureau noted this discrepancy in late 1943:

[W]hat do we want Westinghouse to do next? WhileWestinghouse may not have put the energy of its organi-zation behind the gas turbine project in proportion to theimportance of the project in the beginning, this appears tobe corrected. However, Westinghouse has never enjoyedanywhere near the degree of lavish support which the[Army Air Forces] has given [General Electric]. IfWestinghouse is to be kept in the field of [aircraft gas tur-bine propulsion] as a real competitor to [General Electric]— and this I personally believe desirable — some definitecommitments must be made by BuAer. [emphasis in origi-nal][88]

The Bureau of Aeronautics was in competition with theArmy Air Forces, which supported the General Electric jetengine program. Because of this, the Bureau urged theWestinghouse Steam Turbine Division to accelerate its J30development and manufacture program faster than it mighthave otherwise, lest it find itself behind the Army AirForces and suffer disproportionately in postwar programfunding cutbacks. The Navy did not ask Westinghouse toundertake production development of its engine until three

months later, nor were there any other British jet enginefirms that the Navy could approach for similar assis-tance.[89]

Because of inter-service rivalry, the Bureau of Aeronauticsrequired that Westinghouse maintain secrecy about its jetengine program, which forced the engineers to work in rela-tively complete isolation, in terms of information exchangewith other organizations. At a NACA Special Committeemeeting of November 20, 1941, the Army Air Corps and theNavy Bureau of Aeronautics jointly decided that the variousengine projects being undertaken were to be kept so secretthat no inter-company collaboration would be permitted,and no one company was permitted to share informationwith any other company regarding their turbine engineprojects. Neither would the Army and the Navy exchangeinformation on their own level, except what could belearned at the NACA Special Committee meetings.[90] Thisstricture would occasionally be lifted for visiting Britishengine experts working in an advisory capacity (and for theimportation of Power Jets engines and plans for GeneralElectric), and eventually relaxed considerably more as thewar continued. Nevertheless, the restrictions meant that, ata crucial time in the early design phase, the WestinghouseSteam Turbine Division engineers suddenly found them-selves working very much in isolation, with no one to turnto if and when technical problems developed. The Bureauof Aeronautics was particularly explicit in instructingWestinghouse to not seek outside assistance; Schlaifer notesthat “[t]he Navy … seems from the beginning of its gas-tur-bine development program not only to have done nothingto encourage collaboration, but actually to have orderedeach company to keep its work secret from all other compa-nies and even from other government agencies.”[91]

The Bureau of Aeronautics asked Westinghouse to investi-gate concurrently several other aircraft gas turbine enginedesigns because propulsion experts within the Bureau wereuncertain of the future direction of its aircraft gas turbineengine program as a whole. The technology of the aircraftgas turbine engine was still new and offered several radical-ly different forms of application; no one in the Bureau ofAeronautics in the early 1940s could confidently predictwhat form of aircraft gas turbine engine would be best suit-ed for future Navy aircraft until all forms of aircraft gas tur-bine engines had at least been studied. As a result, theWestinghouse development engineering team, at the behestof the Bureau, spent valuable time and staff resources inves-tigating other possible types of aircraft gas turbine engines.

Beginning in late 1942, the Bureau of Aeronauticsapproached Rein Kroon and his aircraft gas turbine engineteam with proposals to develop several new engine designs.The first was for a “baby” or “half-size” engine, half the sizeof the J30 and with one quarter of the J30’s thrust output.The Bureau envisioned a fighter using a dozen of thesesmall engines streamlined into the aircraft’s wings to mini-mize aerodynamic drag.[92] The Bureau’s propulsionbranch changed its opinion about the usefulness of such an

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installation soon after, the Bureau shelved the idea until thefollowing spring, when someone in the Bureau realizedsuch an engine could be used to propel the new Gorgon air-to-air guided missile being developed by the Navy’s newmissile unit. The Bureau at first ordered six of these engines,designated J32, in June 1943.[93] Though Kroon’s staffencountered problems during the development of theengine that eventually precluded its use in the Gorgon, theBureau of Aeronautics ordered at least 20 more of the J32engines.[94] The Westinghouse engineers had to build theseengines along with the larger J30 in the limited space avail-able. In addition to the J32, the Bureau of Aeronautics con-tracted with Westinghouse to undertake preliminary designstudies of a larger, more-powerful jet engine and a turbo-prop engine.[95] This additional research work required thelimited number of available engineers to spread their timeamong several projects at once.

Westinghouse’s steam turbine engineering practices andtraditions proved detrimental to the successful design of theJ30 engine because they were ill-suited for aircraft enginemanufacture. This factor, along with the difficulties causedby lack of support from Westinghouse senior managementand the increased pressure from the Bureau of Aeronauticsto begin producing large quantities of the J30 engine, con-tributed to the failure of the Westinghouse Steam TurbineDivision engineers to develop the J30 engine for mass-pro-duction. Had Rein Kroon’s Development Engineering teambeen able to work with adequate space and funding, itmight have been able to develop suitable engineering prac-tices for turning the J30 into the engine that the Bureau ofAeronautics wanted. Without adequate time, space, ormoney, Kroon and his staff had to use the knowledge andskills they had developed as steam turbine engineers inorder to build the Yankee engine. The result was an enginebuilt like a smaller version of a hand-crafted steam turbineengine, rather than like a mass-produced aircraft power-plant expected by the Bureau of Aeronautics.

The use of oil-lubricated sleeve bearings in the engine,long incorporated in steam turbines, proved unworkable onthe smaller, lightweight aircraft gas turbine engine.[96] Thedesign of the engine’s bearings, which permitted the com-pressor and turbine to rotate freely, and which were criticalto the successful operation of the engine, serve as an exam-ple of how the engine designers incorporated traditionalsteam turbine engineering techniques that were not ideallysuited for use on an aviation gas turbine engine. TheWestinghouse engineers selected the sleeve bearing for theengine design because of their long experience with them,rather than for their suitability in aircraft gas turbineengines; in the J30 engine, they repeatedly proved to beunsuitable. Sleeve bearings lined with babbitt metal werecommonly used on steam turbine engines, whereas airplaneengines commonly used ball or roller bearings.[97] GeneralElectric’s contemporary J31 engine (the American version ofthe imported Whittle engine), for example, used two ballbearings to support the centrifugal compressor and turbine

stage.[98] Nor was the use of babbitt metal in bearings asregular a practice in the aircraft engine business as in thesteam turbine industry, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft pioneeredthe use of silver-lead alloy-lined bearings in the 1930s,instead of the babbitt metal’s tin alloy.[99] During tests ofJ30 engines in South Philadelphia and in the Bureau ofAeronautics’ test laboratories, the bearings repeatedlyfailed.[100]

The Steam Turbine Division engineers working on the J30aircraft gas turbine engine preferred to improvise and tinkerwith the engine design in order to improve the perform-ance, rather than to “freeze” the design as required formass-production. This practice, normal for industrial steamturbine engine manufacture, was anathema to efficient air-craft engine manufacture.[101] Turbine engineers preferredto increase the size, efficiency, and power output of steamturbine engines gradually and incrementally. HistorianRichard F. Hirsh has characterized this style of manufactur-ing as “design by experience;” such gradual product devel-opment suited the needs of the utilities, which, according toHirsh, “demanded reliable and well-tested equipment thatwould provide long-lasting value for their huge capitalinvestments.” Utilities insisted on reliability, economies ofscale, and high thermal efficiencies, which required themanufacturers to be both cautious and conservative in theirapproach to the design and manufacture of steamengines.[102] The pattern that Westinghouse and GeneralElectric developed to build, test, and supply enginesbecame the standard way of doing business for the firsthalf-century of turbine manufacture:

Vendors would introduce innovations into a pioneering tech-nology that was custom-made for a utility having unusualrequirements. The design process took a few years, as did manu-facturing. The machine would then be put into service andobserved by the utility and manufacturer. Based on experiencewith the equipment, the vendor designed another version of anincrementally better one for other customers ... . Over the longrun, the advances appeared large, but the manufacturers tookmodest incremental steps slowly enough so that they coulddevelop experience and so that users could gain confidence inthe new design.[103]

The “design by experience” approach resulted in repeateddelays which frustrated the Bureau of Aeronautics; suitableperhaps for the initial, cautious, R&D phase of the J30 pro-gram, it proved detrimental for the second, mass-produc-tion phase.

The Steam Turbine Division had no experience with large-scale mass-production. Since most of its industrial steam tur-bines were hand-crafted to order, the Westinghouse SteamTurbine Division traditionally manufactured them individu-ally. In early 1941, the Westinghouse Steam Turbine Divisionbegan receiving orders from the Navy for a new generationof marine propulsion turbines. Westinghouse first producedsmaller turbines for destroyers, then larger engines for lightcruisers, and finally massive units for aircraft carriers. In

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order to meet the hitherto-unprecedented demand, theDivision had to “break a generation of precedent in turbinebuilding” by adopting semi-production line methods, all inorder to build just four identical turbine units per month.[104]There was clearly no precedent in the Steam TurbineDivision for producing the hundreds or even thousands ofaircraft gas turbine engines that would be necessary for theNavy’s new jet-powered airplanes.

As a result of Westinghouse’s reluctance to support full-scale manufacture by a staff of specialized engineers, of theunexpected and sudden transition of the aircraft gas turbineengine program at Westinghouse from research to produc-tion, and of Westinghouse’s engineering practices beingunsuited for the requirements of an aircraft gas turbineengine, Westinghouse proved unable to mass-produce theJ30 Yankee as desired by the Bureau of Aeronautics. In needof large quantities of J30 engines quickly, the Bureau ofAeronautics encouraged the Westinghouse DevelopmentEngineering group to approach Pratt & Whitney Aircraftwith a proposal to develop the engine for production. Pratt& Whitney Aircraft, a division of United AircraftCorporation located in East Hartford, Connecticut, was amajor manufacturer of air-cooled radial aircraft pistonengines for the military, and a contractor with the Bureau ofAeronautics since the firm was founded in 1925. The firmhad 20 years of experience manufacturing aircraft engines,and possessed a large factory that could accommodate anassembly line for aircraft gas turbine engines.

The Bureau hoped that the intervention of Pratt &Whitney Aircraft would not only finally provide urgently-needed quantities of aircraft gas turbine engines for Navalaircraft, but also aid Westinghouse in changing its policyand engineering traditions by observing the way Pratt &Whitney Aircraft produced engines. In mid-December 1944,United Aircraft management received an inquiry fromWestinghouse as to the possibility of Pratt & Whitney beinginterested in producing a reduction gear for one of their tur-bine developments.”[105] In considering the request,Leonard S. Hobbs, President of United Aircraft and formerhead of Pratt & Whitney, stated in an internal memoran-dum “I think it is obvious that from a strictly Pratt &Whitney viewpoint we want to have nothing to do with thiswhatsoever.” As Hobbs saw it, the workload would be tooheavy for the small engineering staff that was already work-ing on turbines at Pratt & Whitney, the work would not beof immediate value to the war effort, and “we would besimply (with essentially no benefit to ourselves whatsoever)showing competitors in the aircraft power plant field howto more successfully compete with us.”[106]

The Bureau of Aeronautics succeeded in persuading offi-cials of Pratt & Whitney Aircraft and the parent UnitedAircraft to change their minds and undertake the manufac-ture of 500 J30 engines by offering them a contract as primecontractors, rather than licensees. The Navy issued aProcurement Directive to Pratt & Whitney on December 28,1944, which stated in part:

Since the (J30) engine is not yet a fully developed and provenengine, it is considered advisable to have production initiallyundertaken by an outstanding aircraft engineering, development,and production organization; Pratt & Whitney Aircraft is theNavy cognizant facility [sic] best able to meet this require-ment.[107]

The Bureau of Aeronautics sought Pratt & Whitney forboth the expertise of its engineering staff with regard to air-craft engines, and their experience with mass-production,both of which the Bureau had found wanting in theWestinghouse Steam Turbine Division DevelopmentEngineering staff.

On January 5, 1945, the Bureau of Aeronautics issued a let-ter of intent to Pratt & Whitney for 500 J30 engines, plusadditional spare parts to the value of 25% of the cost of theengines.[108] The Westinghouse development engineeringteam were required to turn over to Pratt & Whitney all theinformation they needed for manufacturing. All decisionsregarding design and modification of the basic enginedesign, however, remained with Westinghouse. The firstquantity production order for Westinghouse aircraft gasturbine engines, then, was not to be filled at Westinghouse;the Bureau instead issued to Kroon’s team a contract foronly 50 of the J30 engines, which, Kroon was forced toadmit, was all they were capable of building in the limitedspace available in the South Philadelphia plant.[109]

Pratt & Whitney Aircraft’s organizational capabilitiesproved well-suited to the manufacture of aircraft gas tur-bine engines, and the company used the contract to gain afoothold in the nascent aircraft gas turbine engine industry.The firm, just entering the field, was uncertain as to whattype of turbine engines to pursue — a situation similar tothat of Westinghouse’s Steam Turbine Division four yearspreviously.[110] Like Westinghouse, Pratt & WhitneyAircraft management established a separate group of engi-neers, under the direction of Perry W. Pratt, to study exclu-sively the technological and market requirements for mili-tary jet engines. Unlike Westinghouse, Pratt & Whitneybuilt a research laboratory for the group and providedPratt’s group with extensive personnel, engineering, andtechnical support.[111] Overcoming his initial reluctance totaking on the Westinghouse engine, United Aircraft’s vice-president Hobbs stated that he believed Pratt’s groupwould be able to “take over completely the engineeringphase of the Westinghouse [J30] program. This will not onlyrelieve the [piston] engine group of this burden but will alsoserve as an excellent starting point in getting the organiza-tion broken in and functioning.”[112]

Hobbs also encouraged Pratt to not limit the focus of hisengineering team to one kind of turbine project, but ratherto take enough time to research the entire range of possibleengine forms and aircraft applications.[113]

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Pratt & Whitney Aircraft also demonstrated the appropri-ateness of its organizational capabilities for aircraft gas tur-bine engine development and manufacture by successfullyresolving several engineering problems with the J30 engine.Like the Westinghouse engineers, the Pratt & WhitneyAircraft engineers experienced much trouble with the threeoil-lubricated sleeve bearings used to support the compres-sor/turbine shaft in the engine. However, when it becameevident that a technical solution from Kroon’s DevelopmentEngineering team would not be forthcoming, the Pratt &Whitney Aircraft team went ahead and developed replace-ment bearing designs “in accordance with the best Pratt &Whitney high speed bearing practice” to solve the problem.The replacement design selected featured a more durablesilver-lead bearing coating developed by Pratt & WhitneyAircraft in the 1930s instead of the babbitt metal preferredby the Westinghouse Steam Turbine Division engi-neers.[114]

The differences between the designing and manufacturingstyles of Pratt & Whitney Aircraft and Westinghouse cameinto sharp focus as Pratt & Whitney Aircraft’s engineerscomplained increasingly to the Bureau of Aeronautics. Pratt& Whitney Aircraft was frequently forced to wait onWestinghouse to deliver blueprints of design changes, thusholding up production. At the Steam Turbine Division pro-duction was still under the control of the development engi-neers, and thus the design of the J30 experienced frequentchanges as the engineers introduced new features ortweaked performance. The engineers’ informal proceduresalso meant that, once introduced, the changes took a longtime to appear on paper in a form that Pratt & WhitneyAircraft could translate into work.[115] Pratt & WhitneyAircraft communicated its frustration to the Bureau ofAeronautics:

The [J30] is far from being developed to the point where ithas adequate reliability. Therefore, (Pratt & Whitney Aircraft]believe that either production will be set back pending develop-ment of the engine by Westinghouse with consequent disruptionof production at (Pratt & Whitney Aircraft] or that they will haveto pitch in and assist Westinghouse with the development of theengine which will directly interfere with their own gas turbinedevelopments.

Trapped in this untenable situation, more than once Pratt& Whitney Aircraft asked to be released from producing theWestinghouse engine. The Bureau persuaded Pratt &Whitney Aircraft to continue trying to produce the J30, cit-ing the needs of the Navy, the advantage of experience tobe gained, and the fact that it represented work during aperiod of wholesale contract cancellations due to the end ofthe war.[116]

As a result of the contract with Pratt & Whitney Aircraft tomanufacture Westinghouse J30 engines, the Bureau ofAeronautics had its first opportunity to compareWestinghouse’s organizational capabilities with anotherfirm, and as a result found Westinghouse lacking. In 1947

Pratt & Whitney delivered 75 J30 engines McDonnell forinstallation in the Phantom fighter or to the Navy for tests,and in 1948, a further 54; in contrast, during all of 1946Westinghouse produced only 35 J30 engines, many of whichproved unusable due to mechanical problems, mostly bear-ing failures.[1l7] The Pratt & Whitney Aircraft engineersunder Perry Pratt had done all they could to provide theNavy with workable engines, but in service the J30 engineproved to have many significant problems which ReinKroon’s engineers at Westinghouse could not completelysolve. Two of the more alarming problems was a tendencyfor the engine to produce a “chatter” sound at full power,and an irregular “blurping” or surging effect where theengine’s thrust output would momentarily dip, causing theairplane to unpredictably decelerate in flight in suddenj