!

L.; t" .‘•

I - • , •

. -

;

• :-t■

rt ,A

(7) C

A it

ti•J

1.; •

, f 1 d'

;

• •

•

, z;!

=!,

n‘."--,̀,

,•,.**"°•,..}.'.."-%, -",

"* 7.',.r,09,-,7e:.-0.,-e:Ce77,3r,A,z7...4,111.17:7/7.`..7%...,T-:::;:jy;!Ly.fr;; ;T.! V 7-7+7,z .2,1:657.-,i(t4c-Z1 ..,.4- v • - •-; ..'7 7/.0 . r‘. 1 ,,

i .. - •

, 7 !„

. ..

.. .....,

' -

, ■ .

, .., i .

' . 'W,91! ve,l,tii . • ,

, .1 0...t.;4',(0 (S.3-',.. ! ij '1

,-(ik

.

( .• :,....,.(,itt..:3.srt,4114,•;,.to....,,,,t,

•,. , ..„....

jfiti2.' friy.,..i.ic. j,,11111;rilii.4:viviit,r,,,:/:::.;,riAkiafittio.f4,;..1„.g,41,,;k1.....ii,ii.olvit::.(4.3.:i'',7:i

:

,..

. •

• ....... • • • _.

- - .--1--1,:a-,..1,1.,::.•:;;,:_!.4.,,:t..v.e..1.7..,

...... .

. .

.. .

..,..‘ . ,..„•.

/714r r

illarrh 1978 i

• us L

ID

Lo .

, f

&

rN q F' 7 161fli

°%P

ai';'J 1111 -

t S.1 ri

• I' 4ki ■

1.• '1

from the explosive new

book L

EG

EN

D: the secret w

orld of

LEE MARVEY CialIALD

Part 1 of 2.P

arts P

age 8

4

Please lift fo

r com

plete tab

le of co

nten

ts.

0, 3

IJ

•;

I • 9

a

-Tr •

utt

95c.

• 4'.

ICI IC

, 133

Pers

onal G

limpses, 1

55—

it Pays to

Enric

h Y

our W

ord

Pow

er, 1

65

No

tes F

rom

All O

ver, 1

1

571/s

year: O

ver 3

0 m

illion c

opie

s b

ong/ii m

onth

ly in

13 la

nguages

hA

ve b

een w

ritten in

an attem

pt to

explain

what

remain

s essentially

a. mystery

. This h

ook d

oes n

ot

follo

w th

at familiar

pattern

, and its sig

nifican

ce. reach

es far bey

ond th

e world

of b

ullets, trajecto

ries an

d co

nsn

iracy th

eories in

to th

e heart o

f one o

f the:.

most sen

sational—

and h

eretofo

re hid

den

—in

telli-gence cases o

f modern

times.

the truth is that shockingly 'little is know

n about th

e most cru

cial perio

d th

e life of K

enned

y's

assassin—the years L

ee Harvey O

swald spent in

the

`'_arise C

orp

s (where h

e had

access to secret infor-- m

ation of "highest priority" to the Soviet U

nion) and,- . follow

ing his defectio

n, in

Russia. In

deed

, it now

ar)ears th

at most o

f what h

as been

accepted

as the - •

truth

about th

ose y

ears may

in fact be a "legend"—

a co

ver sto

ry—

written

by th

e KG

B an

d skillfully fed to

intelligence services. • W

ho was the enigm

atic KG

B defector spreading

the legend? • W

hy w

as the FB

I so eager to accept the legend as true?

• W

hy, after C

IA officials suspicious of the legend

had

nren

ared a list o

f questio

ns fo

r the d

efector, d

id

I ••

ut./ rt,1

1111L L

UG

ClU

eS

tanIS

C

O oe

• Why w

as the leg

end never in

vestig

ated b

y the

Warren

Com

missio

n—

or ev

en b

y th

e section as-

signed to examine O

swald's life in the S

oviet Union?

Because these and other questions have never been

answ

ered, th

e edito

rs of R

eader's D

igest ask

ed au

-th

or E

dw

ard Jay

Epstein

(see "Beh

ind th

e Lin

es," pag

e 13) to

undertak

e a majo

r exam

inatio

n o

f the

secret world through w

hich Osw

ald moved during his

final y

ears. Epstein

beg

an th

is task, tw

o y

ears ago,

by stu

dyin

g m

ore th

an 1

0,0

00 p

ages o

f prev

iously

classified docum

ents pertaining to Osw

ald, and con-ductin

g, w

ith a staff o

f assistants, m

ore th

an 4

00

interviews w

ith those who had befriended O

swald or

crossed

his trail in

the y

ears befo

re his d

eath. T

he

evid

ence th

us u

nco

vered

leads th

e reader in

to a

shadow w

orld of spies, double agents and intelligence services—

and to the startling conclusion that at one of th

e most p

erilous m

om

ents in

world

histo

ry th

e interests of the R

ussian KG

B and the A

merican F

BI

became strangely intertw

ined. It is w

ith th

ese puzzlin

g ev

ents th

at Leg

end: T

he

Secret World of L

ee Harvey O

swald begins. (T

his two-

part condensation will conclude in the A

pril Reader's

Digest.)

-27-- D

secret ■ ..\,or'.O. of H

AR

VE

Y

OSV

VA

LD

Edw

crd Jo

y E

pstein

N JANUARY 20, 1964;

Yuri

Ivanovich Nosenko stepped

oil an

Aero

flot jet in

Gen

e-`c4,c,,a, v

a k

iluw

ing th

at if e

very

-th

ing w

ent a

s pla

nned, h

e w

ould

, never again see his hom

e in Moscow

, or th

e wife an

d tw

o ch

ildren

he h

ad •

left.behind. He passed easily through

.

the S

wiss p

assport co

ntro

l with

his

diplomatic docum

ents. Officially, he

was a d

elegate to

the 1

7-n

ation d

is. arm

amen

t conferen

ce due to

con•

ven

e the n

ext d

ay.

After checking into the R

ex Hotel

in d

ow

nto

wn G

eneva, N

osc

nko

took a

walk

. On a

side stre

et h

e

stopped

at a pay

phone, d

ialed th

e teleg

raph serv

ice and d

ictated a co

d-

ed m

essage. A

div

ision w

ithin

the

United

States C

entral In

telligen

ce A

gen

cy h

ad b

een w

aiting fo

r this

telegram

for 1

9 m

onth

s. Durin

g a

prev

ious d

isarmam

ent co

nferen

ce in

Gen

eva, in

June 1

961, N

osen

ko h

ad

•I/01+

0 t

o.f

IIC.0

•if

t.0

u..0

...... C

O"... •

WI

■•

■ .....

•.., II N

.■•.1

0

83 ••

■

III 011.1

. I 0..1

0 •r$

110 ••0

er, .C

On

.• nt,, "

too

10,

•,,.

W(.1

1004. re

T. 1

0..e

. ...CI. 1

18 1

1

e.....:\tacted the CIA

and offered to act :IS a snv w

hen he returned to Russia.

Sin

$: th

at tim

e h

e h

ad n

ot b

een

-icard from.

No

on

e in th

e agen

cy co

uld

hav

e nred

leted the furor that his reappear-:in

ce weu

id b

ring

abo

ut. N

osen

ko

:.,o

ut to

eresent in

form

ation

`.27. %

you:d cause deep divisions in 1

:.S. in

telligen

ce services, alter th

e careers of several high-ranking intel-.

of.7

.cers and raise q

uestio

ns

U.S

. security

that h

ave n

ot

geen resolved to this day. O

nly

ho

urs after N

osen

ko's m

es-sag

e was receiv

ed, a to

p-lev

el CIA

eiT

icer was on a plane to G

ene-va. A

mem

ber o

f the S

oviet R

ussia

Division, the area of the C

IA respon-

sihie fo

r espio

nag

e activities co

n-

cr

So

viet U

nio

n, h

e was

_chosen for the assignment because

l-fe had already met N

osenko, having cr.cd the operational file on him

in :952.

Th

is Ale rev

ealed th

at No

senk

o

was b

orn

on O

ctober 30,

1927, in

Nikolayev, R

ussia. In the 19505, his fat :era w

as an altern

ate mem

ber o

f fne ail-pow

erful Central C

omm

ittee of th

e Com

munist P

arty. N

osen

ko

:fimself, according to his ow

n state-m

ents, nod. served in Soviet intelli-

7en

ce since th

e age o

f 22,

first in

:\:aval Intelligence, then, after :953, in

the

Sta

te S

ecu

rity A

gen

cy

, the

un

it .,v!!ic

l is kn

ow

n n

ow

by

the

'On

tanuary

23, in

a quiet ap

art-m

en: in a suburb of Geneva, the C

IA

case o!'icer w

aited. It was late after-

,;v.^. when the doorbell (.1

naly

rang.

A m

oment later the case officer rec-

ognized

Noscn

ko sau

nterin

g in

to

the room

. He w

as a powerfully built

man, about six feet tall, w

ith a mas-

sive jaw and brooding eyes set deep

in their sockets. A

fter exchanging some pleasant-

ries and small talk, the tw

o men got

dow

n to

a to

pic

of im

porta

nce.

"Have you found A

ndrey yet?" No-

senko asked. T

he case officer shook his head. In their last m

eeting, 19 months before,

Noscn

ko h

ad to

ld h

im ab

out an

extraordinarily im

portant Am

erican agent w

hom the S

oviets had recruit- ed. Y

et from the clues that N

osenko had then provided, the C

IA had not

been able to identify this person. N

osen

ko seem

ed d

isturb

ed th

at the agent had not been found, and he now

told the case officer that in the 195os A

ndrey

had

work

ed in

the

mo

tor p

oo

l at the U

.S. em

bassy

in

Mo

scow

—a clu

e wh

ich m

ade th

e m

an's identification inevitable.

Nosen

ko th

en p

roceed

ed to

ex-

plain

why h

e had

sent th

e coded

telegram

. Not only w

as he willing to

turn

over im

portan

t info

rmatio

n to

the C

IA; he also w

anted to defect. T

he case officer was astonished.

At their 1962 m

eeting, Nosenko had

stated th

at, becau

se he h

ad a w

ife an

d ch

ildren

in M

osco

w, h

e cou

ld

never leave Russia. W

hat had hap- pen

ed to

cause th

is com

plete tu

rn-

about? R

ather th

an p

ress Nosen

ko

about h

is chan

ge o

f min

d, th

e case officer tem

porized by asking, "What

information have you brought?"

No

senk

o d

iscussed

on

e or tw

o

So

viet in

telligen

ce op

eration

s that

had

com

e to h

is attentio

n an

d th

en

dro

pped

a com

pletely

unex

pected

bom

bshell. He had, he said, person-

ally su

perin

tend

ed th

e KG

B file o

n

Lee H

arvey

Osw

ald w

hen

he h

ad

defected to the Soviet U

nion in 1959 an

d co

uld

therefo

re com

pletely

de-

scribe Osw

ald's relationship with S

o-viet intelligence.

An

Ex

traord

inary

Dev

elop

men

t

• A

T T

HIS T

IME

, ju

st two

months

had

passed

since th

e assassinatio

n

of P

residen

t John F

. Ken

ned

y b

y

Osw

ald an

d th

e subseq

uen

t murd

er of O

swald

by Jack

Ruby. T

he file

that the CIA

maintained on O

swald

prio

r to th

e assassinatio

n rev

ealed

only that he was a 24-year-old native

of N

ew O

rleans, w

ho, after serv

ing

in the U.S

. Marines, had received an

early discharge and then defected to the S

oviet Union, residing in the city

of M

insk

for ab

ou

t 21/2 years. After

marrying a S

oviet citizen named M

a-rin

a Pru

sakova, h

e had

bro

ught h

er back

to th

e United

States in

June

1962. T

he last en

try in

his C

IA file

before his arrest following the assas-

sination noted that the CIA

station in M

exico had intercepted a telephone call m

ade b

y O

swald

from

the C

u-

ban

embassy

in M

exico

City

to th

e adjacent S

oviet embassy.

Osw

ald's d

eath h

ad left a w

ide-

open

void

in th

e case. Such

key

questions as w

hy Osw

ald had defect-ed

in th

e first place, w

hat (if an

y)

relationship existed between O

swald

and Soviet intelligence, and w

hether any legend, or cover story, w

as pre-

pared

by th

e KG

B fo

r Osw

ald's

return to Am

erica were sim

ply unan-sw

erable. C

on

sequ

ently

, rum

ors

about the killings comm

anded ever-increasing colum

ns of newsprint and

com

men

tary o

n rad

io • an

d telev

i-sion—

a bewildering drum

beat of al-legations about left- and right-w

ing

77777

L ;'...,;1

77

,17,75.1771.;

•

Ler H

arve

y Osw

ald

on h

is arriva

l in R

ussia

, from

a photo taken fir Moscow

newspapers

faction

s, the u

nd

erwo

rld, th

e FB

I, the C

IA and the K

GB

, •

IN A

MA

TT

ER

-OF-FA

CT

TO

NE

, Noscn-

ko

exp

lained

that th

e KG

B h

ad

not h

eard o

f Osw

ald u

ntil h

e ap-

peared

in M

osco

w an

d to

ld h

is In-

tourist g

uid

e that h

e inten

ded

to

renounce his Am

erican citizenship an

d seek

So

viet citizen

ship

. On

ly

then

, Noscn

ko claim

ed, d

id th

e K

GB

decide "to look into Osw

ald's case

to se

e w

hic

h p

art o

f the

A

TH

E R

EA

DE

R'S

DIG

ES

T .

March

1978 LE

GE

ND

.' TH

E S

EC

RE

T W

OR

LD

OF

LE

E H

AR

VE

Y 0

M-11.0

KC

B m

ight h

ave u

se fo

r him

." A

nd \v

ilat did

K

GB

finally decide about O

swald?

":: was d

ecided

that O

swald

was

of n

o in

terest whatso

ever, so

the

KC

'2. recomm

ended that he go home

to th

e ',inked

States."

Why then w

as he allowed to stay

for z>.: years?

Nosen

ko ex

plain

ed th

at Osw

ald,

on ',earning, of his resection, "made

the d

ramatic g

esture o

f cuttin

g h

is w

rists. Worried about the possibility

that O

swald

would

do th

is again

if refused asylum

, the Soviets decided

to give t'im

-5 tem

porary-residence

The in

terrogato

r persisted

: But

why w

as Osw

ald sent from. M

oscow

to Minsk.'

Nosen

.ko rep

lied, "'M

erely b

y

chan

ce. The K

GB

had

not w

anted

(.- .)sw

ald to

stay in

Mosco

w, an

d

Minsk w

as chosen arbitrarily." W

hy had

Osw

a:c: been alloweci to

marry a S

oviet citizen at a rime w

hen he w

as a:ready a:inning his redefec-:ion to A

merica?

Nosenko shrugE

scl and answered,

"She already had ..h.ti•S

oviet. charac-teristics. S

he was not too sm

art any-an

d n

ot an

educated

perso

n.

The S

oviets w

ere giad

to g

et rid o

f th

em b

oll..'

Noseriko stated w

ith a great deal O

f assurance that neither Osw

ald nor • M

arina had ev

er been

recruited

or

even

aonro

ached

by th

e KG

B as

nossib

ie agen

ts. In :act, h

e added

, S

oviet inte!ligence did not bother to debrief O

swald iA

lien he cam

e to

ussia

because

he w

as d

eem

ed

"unstable and of little importance."

Th

e case officer imm

ediately re-

layed Noscnko's story to C

IA head-

qu

arters in L

angley, V

a. It was an

extraord

inary d

evelopm

ent. T

he

Presid

ent's C

omm

ission on

the A

s-sassin

ation of P

residen

t Ken

ned

y, headed by C

hief Justice Earl W

arren (and popularly know

n as the Warren

Com

mission), w

as about to begin its hearings.

:f Nosenko's account w

as true, the C

IA realized, it.cou

ld d

eliver a wit-

ness who could an

swer th

e vexing

questio

ns ab

out

Osw

ald's m

issing

years in Russia. S

o the Soviet Russia

Division im

mediately began sorting

through Nosenko's story.

There w

ere som

e troublesom

e om

issions-To begin w

ith, Nosen

ko

had not provided any description of th

e investig

ation th

at th

e KG

B

would

hav

e routin

ely

undertaken to ch

eck out various d

etails in O

s-w

ald's story in 1959, wh

en h

e first applied for S

oviet residence. In other such cases, the C

IA knew

, the'K

GB

conducted extensive searches to es-tablish

the subject's bona fid

e,

or credibility.

Nosenko had claim

ed, moreover,

that the First C

hief D

irectorate of the . K

GB

, responsible for all foreign

operation

s and

espion

age, did

not

even

hav

e Osw

ald's n

ame o

n file

until Osw

ald telephoned the Soviet

embassy in M

exico City in O

ctober 5963. Y

et the CIA

knew from

FB

I su

rveillan

ce that o

n tw

o sep

arate occasions O

swald had contacted the

Soviet em

bassy

in W

ashin

gto

n b

e-fore his trip to M

exico. According to

the accounts of other defectors from

Soviet intelligence services, the First

Ch

ief Directorate w

ould

have b

een

routinely informed of these contacts

(as they w

ere in M

exico). Wh

y had

N

osenk

o failed to m

ention

them

? F

inally, Nosenko's claim

that Os-

Wald w

as never even debriefed ran directly counter-to the C

IA's expecta-

tion—based on earlier cases—

of how

a defector would be handled by the

KG

B.

Inside the CIA

THE R

EPOR

TS on N

osenk

o's de-

briefing were read w

ith great inter-est by Jam

es Jesus, Angleton, chief of

cou

nterin

telligen

ce in th

e CIA

. G

hostly thin, with prem

aturely silver h

air and

a finely scu

lptu

red face,

Angleton had edited the poetry m

ag-azine F

urio

ro b

efore joinin

g the in

-telligence -service, and had w

orked clo

sely w

ith su

ch p

oets a

s Ezra

P

oun

d, T

. S. E

liot and

e. e. cum

-m

ings. His avocation w

as propagat-in

g his ow

n h

ybrid

orchid

s from

seed, a process requiring seven years of p

atient w

aiting b

efore results

could

be seen

. It w

as Angleton's responsibility to

guard

against an

y attemp

ts by for-

eign intelligence services to affect the p

lans of th

e Am

erican govern

men

t th

rough

the u

se of "d

isinform

a-tion"—

a message or set of m

essages designed to m

islead or manipulate a

government. A

s far as Angleton and

his staff were concerned, N

osenko's statem

ents h

ad to b

e viewed

in th

e con

text of other S

oviet intelligen

ce op

erations. A

t the tim

e of Noscn

-

)--f.:■'zt ,tr't

17 11 Jam

es Jesus Angle

ton

had raised some u

nsettlin

g dou

bts.

On

e case involved

the p

ossible

high

-level pen

etration of U

.S. in

tel-ligen

ce by 'th

e KG

B. A

ngleton

's p

rimary con

cern, as h

e read th

e tran

scripts, w

as wh

ether th

e new

in

formation

Nosen

ko h

ad offered

about the agent A

udrey was correct,

or w

heth

er it was a

n a

ttemp

t to

deflect th

e CIA

's investigation

of this case.

, •

Bu

t in th

e week

s an

d m

on

ths

ahead, Angleton w

ould also become

concerned about Nosenku's account

87

TH

E R

EA

DE

RS

DIG

ES

T

March

of Osw

ald's life in the Soviet U

nion. !P

o, p

resented

pro

blem

s. He

becor"e p:•.rticularly troubled ic

that ON

NV

2.l: had never c:cn debriefed by the S

oviet intc!h-ence apparatus.

NO

SE

NK

O'S

OF

FE

R T

O D

EF

EC

T

also rotil-,,led P

.:chard M. H

eIrr_s who, as

Il.)cputv Director of P

lans, managed

cr,.;-e cov

ert side o

f the C

IA.

A ta:, eleg

ant m

an, w

ith a q

uiet

voice and piercing eyes, Helm

s had w

orked in .ntelliger.cc for more than

years. A

s he rev

iewed

the startlin

g d

e-v

eloP

men

t in. G

enev

a, Helm

s re-lized that it P

resented a potentially explosive situation. If N

oseakos ac-co

unt o

f Osw

ald in

Russia p

roved

cred

ible, it co

uld

solv

e a serious

pro

Yern

for th

e Warren

Co

mm

is-sio

n an

d th

e U.S

. go

vern

men

t. On

ne o

ther h

and, if N

osen

ko

turn

ed

:Jut to he a Soviet agent sent over to

misinform

the CIA

and the Warren

Com

mission., the sky could fall in on

Soviet-A

merican

relations. A

t the

cry leas:, it would suggest that the

So

viets w

ere go

ing

to g

reat leng

ths

to contrive a legend about Osw

ald's residence :n the S

oviet Union.

Yet a K

GB

intellig

ence o

fficer w

ho claimed know

ledge of a missing

r.rea in the Osw

ald case sirr.:2Iy could nut be ignoret.!. H

elms decided that,

0!" C1C

rr-co being, Nosenko should

persuaded to serve as a defector in .).ace—

tlitit is, to remain in Isis A

res-c,.: position in the K

GB

but to work

or th

e C:A

. At a later d

ate, if his

-Iforrn

ation

pro

ved

ou

t, he w

ou

ld

be a

llow

ed to

ente

r the U

nite

d

States.

In Geneva, how

ever, Nosenko re-

iected such a course. He claim

ed to have iust received a recall telegram

from

his superiors at the KG

B center

requirin

g h

im to

be o

n a p

lane to

M

oscow on F

ebruary 4. In his opin-ion, such a telegram

might m

ean that he w

as suspected of dealing with the

Am

ericans. If he returned, therefore, h

e risked

bein

g arrested

, tortu

red,

even executed. He had no choice, he

told his CIA

interrogators; he must

escape on or before February 4.

The recall telegram

left Helm

s no altern

ative. T

he C

IA co

uld

no

t af-fo

rd to

lose a p

oten

tially v

aluab

le w

itness to Osw

ald's activities in the S

oviet Union. H

e took the matter to

John M

cCone, d

irector o

f the C

IA.

McC

on

e imm

ediately

auth

orized

H

elms to

brin

g N

osen

ko o

ut o

f S

witzerland.

Skeleto

n in

the F

BI's C

loset •

NE

xT, H

elms called a m

eeting of the Inter-A

gency Defector C

omm

it-tee, w

hich included representatives from

the State D

epartment, D

efense Intelligence A

gency, FB

I, Office of -

Nav

al Intellig

ence, C

-2, N

ational

Security A

gency and the CIA

. These

agencies constituted what w

as loose-ly called the intelligence com

muni-

ty, an

d th

ey h

ad to

be ap

prised

of

defectors. T

he m

om

ent th

at J. Edgar H

oo-

ver, th

e FB

I directo

r, heard

that a

Soviet d

efector h

ad k

now

ledge o

f the O

swald case, he told his subordi-

nate

s in th

e F

BI th

at th

ey

mu

st

1978 LE

GE

ND

: TH

E S

EC

RE

T W

OR

LD

OF

LE

E H

AR

VE

Y O

SW

ALD

"dom

inate th

e situatio

n." T

he F

BI,

nation, and the investigation intensi- n

ot th

e CIA

, sho

uld

con

trol all p

arts fed—

no

t held

in ab

eyan

ce—after

of th

e deb

riefing

pertin

ent to

Os- O

swald

con

tacted th

e So

viet em

bassy

w

ald an

d to

the K

enned

y assassin

a- in M

exico

." tio

n. N

o q

uestio

ns ab

ou

t Osw

ald

The last point w

as especially tell- w

ere to b

e pu

t to N

osen

ko

with

ou

t ing

. Wh

en O

swald

visited

the C

ub

an

prio

r FB

I appro

val. A

ny rep

ort to

- embassy

in M

exico

in O

ctober 1

963,

the W

arren C

om

missio

n o

n N

osen

- less than

two m

onth

s befo

re the

ko

's revelatio

ns sh

ou

ld b

e mad

e by

assassinatio

n, th

e CIA

mo

nito

red a

the FB

I. telephone call in w

hich he made an

' Even at this stage H

oover saw that appointm

ent to sec Valcry V

ladimir-

if No

senk

o p

rov

ided

info

rmatio

n o

vich

Ko

stiko

v, a "co

nsu

lar officer."

sug

gestin

g an

y sin

ister relation

be- T

his w

as repo

rted to

the F

BI.

twccn

Osw

ald an

d th

e Soviets, h

e T

he F

BI k

new

thro

ug

h a d

ou

ble

could expose a very destructive skelc- agent that Kostikov w

asn't merely a

ton in the FB

I's closet: what H

oover's consular officer of the em

bassy; he p

rivate in

vestig

ation

, ten d

ays after w

as a hig

h-lev

el mem

ber o

f the 1

3th

th

e assassinatio

n, h

ad ch

aracterized D

epartm

ent o

f the K

GB

, heav

ily

as the "g

ross in

com

peten

ce" of th

e inv

olv

ed in

con

trollin

g sab

oteu

rs in

FB

I's han

dlin

g o

f Osw

ald o

n h

is Mex

ico an

d th

e Un

ited S

tates. retu

rn fro

m R

ussia.

Ho

ov

er respo

nd

ed to

this rep

ort

Imm

ediately

after the assassin

a- by

secretly cen

surin

g fiv

e field

tion, H

oover h

ad w

anted

to k

now

agen

ts, one field

superv

isor, th

ree w

hy O

swald

was n

ot o

n an

y o

f the sp

ecial agen

ts, four h

eadquarters su

-F

BI's secu

rity in

dices, w

hich

inclu

d- p

erviso

rs, two

head

qu

arters section

ed m

ore than 20

,00

0 n

ames o

f po

cen- ch

iefs, on

e insp

ector an

d W

illiam

tially d

isloy

al ind

ivid

uals in

the S

ulliv

an, assistan

t directo

r of th

e U

nited

States. It w

as know

n th

at FB

I. When

som

e of th

e censu

red F

BI

Osw

ald h

ad d

efected to

the S

oviet ex

ecutiv

es pro

tested th

at Osw

ald

Unio

n, o

ffered m

ilitary secrets, at- h

ad n

ot m

et the criteria fo

r the

temp

ted to

reno

un

ce his citizen

ship

Secu

rity In

dex

, Ho

ov

er wro

te back

an

d, after h

is return

, con

sistently

a n

ote statin

g: "C

ertainly

no

on

e to

ld d

emo

nstrab

le lies to th

e FB

I in full possession of all his faculties

agen

ts wh

o h

ad in

terview

ed h

im.

can claim

that O

swald

did

n't fall

Ho

ov

er had

ord

ered assistan

t di- w

ithin

this criteria." A

t on

e po

int h

e re

cto

r J. H. G

ale

to m

ak

e a

full

wrote that these delinquencies in the

report of "investigative deficiencies in

vestig

ation

of O

swald

"hav

e re- in

the O

swald

case

." On

Dcccm

- suite

d in

fore

ver d

estro

yin

g th

e

ber to

, :963, G

ale

reporte

d th

at

Bureau as the top-level investigative

"Osw

ald sh

ould

hav

e been

on th

e org

anizatio

n.''

Security Index; his w

ife should have If th

e FB

I was to

surv

ive, q

ues-

been

interv

iewed

befo

re the assassi- d

on

s con

cernin

g O

swald

's con

nec-

P

39

!ion

s 'vi:b

the S

ov

iet intellig

ence,

,even if totally unrelated to the assas-sM

ation, could not be raised. As long

:is

the public could be convinced that O

swald w

as a lon

e crackp

ot, u

nin

-, • .•oivecl in any espionage or subver-siv

e activity

, the F

BI w

ou

ldn

't be

held

accou

ntab

le for n

ot k

eepin

g

•,ir, "..ini.ier su

rveillan

ce. After all,

the F

7-: w

as no

t respo

nsib

le for

crackoots. If, how

ever, the newly appointed

Warren C

omm

ission suggested that O

swalc.: had any involvem

ent with

Soviet o

r Cuban

intellig

ence, n

o

matter h

ow

irrelevan

t it was to

the

the P

residen

t, then

there

WO

U.L

. be n

o w

ay to

keep

secret the

m.sltaindling of the investiga-

tion of C. 1s , .y

ald p

rior to

the assassi-

nation, rind F 1:',1 incompetence w

ould n

b

lamed

for K

enn

edy

's death

. 'ices, b

y an

odd tw

ist of fate, th

e int:crest:ay in concealing rather

than

reve , 'in

g an

y h

int o

f Soviet

involvement.

To

this en

d, H

oo

ver o

rdered

the

Investigative Division of the F

BI to

"leak- ::s co

nclu

sions th

at Osw

ald

was a o

ne assassin

to U

nited

Press

:ntern

a!ional b

efore th

e Warren

C

om

.7.1

,son ev

er had

a chan

ce to

meet. 'lo

uver also

took th

e precau

-:: ,.y1

o

f transferrin

g all th

e agen

ts involved in the pre-assassination se-curity case to other posts w

here they w

ould

.p.: b

e as readily

availab

le s'Io

uld

emb

arrassing

qu

estion

s be

Against this background, H

oover read reports of the C

IA debriefing of

No

sepk

o in

Gen

eva w

ith m

ou

ntin

g

90)

interest: Nosenko's account support-

ed the FB

I's conclusion that Osw

ald w

as no

t inv

olv

ed in

any

sort o

f esp

ionag

e, and in

dicated

that th

e K

GB

believed he was not norm

al," w

hich

fitted in

well w

ith H

oo

ver's

hypothesis. In fact, Nosenko's story

exonerated

not o

nly

the K

GB

, but

also th

e FB

I. The o

nly

remain

ing

question was: C

ould Nosenko's sto-

ry be accepted at face value?

Forty-F

our Questions

To F:N

O O

UT

, the FB

I used a Soviet

intellig

ence ag

ent w

ork

ing

un

der

diplomatic cover in N

ew Y

ork at the U

nited

Natio

ns, w

ho

was co

de-

nam

ed "F

edo

ra." Fed

ora h

ad co

n-

tacted FB

I officials in March 1962,

and

offered

to su

pp

ly th

e Bu

reau

with inform

ation about Soviet espio-

nage operations, secret data on Soviet

missile capacity and nuclear-develop-

ment plans. N

ot enough information

about h

im w

as turn

ed o

ver to

the

CIA

to enable it to evaluate his bona fides, but H

oover was so taken w

ith h

is new

sou

rce that h

e sent rep

orts

based

on

Fed

ora's in

form

ation

di-

rectly to

the W

hite H

ouse. In

one

report, which identified F

edora as "a source of unknow

n reliability," Hoo-

ver p

erson

ally stru

ck o

ut th

e "un

" fro

m "u

nk

no

wn

." S

ov

iet reaction

to th

e ann

ou

nce-

ment that N

osenko was in the U

nited S

tates had been far more vehem

ent th

an th

e CIA

had

expected

. Now

F

edo

ra corro

bo

rated th

is. He to

ld

the FB

I that when N

osenko defected, the K

GB

center in Moscow

was so

con

cerned

with

the ram

ification

s

llidl ll V

I LIC

ICU

C L

CI-11111141.1U

11 U 1.

operations in New

York.

Fed

ora w

as also ab

le to co

nfirm

tw

o im

portan

t parts o

f Nosen

ko's

story. Nosenko w

as indeed a lieuten-ant colonel in the K

GB

, he said, with

access to extraordinarily valuable in-form

ation, and had indeed received a teleg

ram fro

m M

osco

w o

rderin

g

him back on F

ebruary 4. This infor-

mation w

as passed along to the CIA

. O

n February 26, three F

BI agents

qu

estion

ed N

osen

ko

(wh

o w

as un

-d

er CIA

pro

tection

in V

irgin

ia) about the K

ennedy assassination and O

swald. N

osenko repeated his story w

ith v

irtually

no

elabo

ration

or

chan

ge. O

swald

had

been

allow

ed

to stay

in th

e So

viet U

nio

n ag

ainst

the w

ishes o

f the K

GB

, which

had

h

ad n

o co

ntacts w

ith O

swald

or

interest in

him

wh

atsoev

er. Th

e ag

ents co

nclu

ded

in th

eir repo

rt th

at Noscn

ko h

ad n

o fu

rther in

for-

matio

n to

pro

vid

e and, o

n M

arch t,

Ho

ov

er forw

arded

this assessm

ent

to the Warren C

omm

ission. T

he F

BI re

po

rt on

No

sen

ko

, how

ever, did not satisfy Angleton or

the CIA

's Soviet R

ussia Division, and

by March 3 the division had form

u-lated

44 o

f its ow

n q

uestio

ns fo

r N

osenko on the Osw

ald case. Each

was d

esign

ed to

force N

oscn

ko

to

bro

aden

his b

asic statemen

t abo

ut

the KG

B's relation w

ith Osw

ald. For

example:

"When and how

did Osw

ald first com

e to KG

B attention?"

"How

were O

swald

's bona fides established?"

"Did

the K

GB

ever th

ink th

at

uc 4

11 d

w.:Itt

(WC

! I-

can intelligence?" "W

hen

and

by

wh

om

was it d

e-cid

ed th

at the K

GB

had

no in

terest in O

swald?"

"Did

Osw

ald ev

er offer to

giv

e in

form

ation

on

the U

.S. M

arine

Corp

s or o

ther m

atters to th

e Sovi-

ets? If the K

GB

did

not try

to g

et such inform

ation, why not?"

Alm

ost a quarter of the questions d

ealt with

Osw

ald's w

ife, Marin

a, about w

hom N

osenko had said very little. F

or ex

ample: "H

ow

did

it happen that there w

ere so few diffi-

culties in

the w

ay o

f Marin

a's mar-

riage to

a foreig

ner an

d d

epartu

re fro

m th

e country

with

him

? Hav

e n

ot sim

ilar situatio

ns in

the p

ast u

sually

resulted

in p

rolo

ng

ed an

d

often unsuccessful negotiations with

the Soviet governm

ent?" T

he 44 questions were hand-car-

ried to

the F

BI fo

r the ap

pro

val

Ho

ov

er requ

ired. T

o th

e dism

ay o

f the C

IA, H

oover refused the request. T

he FB

I liaison man stated flatly' that

the 4

4 q

uestio

ns "w

ou

ld n

ot b

e

asked

." Th

e CIA

pro

tested, an

d th

e F

BI liaiso

n reiterated

that H

oover

was ad

aman

t. The m

ost h

e would

su

gg

est was th

at "even

tually

" the

FB

I might cover these areas.

At th

is very

time th

e W

arre

n

Co

mm

ission

's staff was b

ecom

ing

in

creasing

ly co

ncern

ed w

ith p

rob

-lem

s and contradictions in the testi-m

ony o

f Marin

a Osw

ald. S

he h

ad

insisted

that sh

e did

no

t kn

ow

the

nam

e of h

er ow

n fath

er and

pro

-vid

ed o

nly

min

imal in

form

ation

about h

er relatives. T

he u

ncle w

ith

vl

the secret wort; of

LEE 1HARVEY ~ L. O

(Contin

ued fro

m p

age 9

2)

III

of In

ternal A

ffairs (MV

D). w

hich

had

responsib

ility fo

r civil law

en-

forcem

ent in

Russia. Y

et Marin

a declared that he had no: intervened o

n h

er o

r Osw

ald

's beh

alf w

ith

Soviet authorities to facilitate either

marriag

e or h

er exit v

isa from

More seriously, it .w

as now clear

that she had lied to the FB

I during its .riterro

gatio

n o

f her in

a ten-w

eek

perio

d fo

llow

ing th

e assassinatio

n.

She now

admitted destroying, on the

day after the assassination, a photo-g

raph

of O

swald

with

his w

eapo

n.

Sae h

ad w

ithh

eld ev

iden

ce ind

icat-n

g th

at Osw

ald h

ad attem

pted

to

assassinate Maj. G

en. Edw

in Walker

seven

month

s befo

re the K

enned

y

killin

g. S

he h

ad falsely

den

ied th

at sh

e knew

about O

swald

's trip to

M

exico in 1963. N

orman R

edlich, the staff lawyer

responsib

le for th

e prep

aration o

f the questioning of O

swald's w

idow

for the Com

mission, sum

med up in a

mem

orandum: "M

arina Osw

ald has lied

to th

e Secret S

ervice, th

e FB

I and this C

omm

ission repeatedly on m

atters which are of vital concern to

the p

eople o

f this co

untry

and th

e w

orld." T

hus, by March, it w

as becoming

clear to th

e Com

missio

n th

at No-

seako was the only available w

itness :,vho could give any in:urination of value on the K

G13's ins olvem

enr, or non-in

volv

emen

t, with

the P

resi-dent's assassin. A

t this point, howcv-

sF

uuuutsauvut..QsC

nKu 5autH

cntpcpry.

Coincidences

EV

ER

SIN

CE

N

oscn

ko's first ap

-proach to the C

IA in June 1962, and

the acceptance of his offer to act as a spy in M

oscow, Jam

es Angleton and

his staff h

ad p

on

dered

the sig

nifi-

cance o

f the o

ffer. The m

aterial N

osenko provided had been metictf-

lou

sly co

mp

ared w

ith th

e declara-

tions of another KG

B defector w

ho had

arrived

in th

e United

States in

D

ecember 1961. T

his man w

as Ana-

toli M. G

olitsin, a major in the F

irst C

hief D

irectorate o

f the K

GB

. .

Th

e info

rmatio

n G

olitsin

pro

-vided in his debriefing had caused a sensation. H

e warned that the S

oviet U

nion had already planted an agent w

ithin

the h

ighest ech

elons o

f U.S

. intelligence as part of a m

ajor disin-fo

rmatio

n cam

paig

n ag

ainst th

e U

nite

d S

tate

s. This p

enetra

tion

agent would be assisted by "outside"

men—

other Soviet-controlled agents

masking them

selves as defectors or double ag

ents—

who w

ould

supply

p

ieces of d

isinfo

rmatio

n to

bo

lster an

"insid

e" man

's credib

ility. T

he

"insid

e" agen

t, in tu

rn, w

ould

be

in a p

ositio

n to

help

confirm

the

au

then

ticity

of th

e "

ou

tside"

agents. D

urin

g h

is deb

riefing

session

s w

ith A

ng

leton

, Go

litsin h

ad called

particular attention to a trip m

ade by V

. NI. K

ovsliiik to the United S

tates in

59

57

, un

der d

iplo

matic co

ver.

(Con:; tie

d o

n p

age 2

.23)

Golitsin

iden

tified K

ovsh

uk as an

executive in the K

GB

, and stressed th

at on

ly an

extrem

ely im

po

rtant

'mission w

ould account for his leav-in

g h

is post in

Mosco

w to

com

e to

.the United S

tates. He suggested that

Kovsh

uk's m

ission m

ight h

ave in

-v

olv

ed co

ntactin

g, o

r activatin

g, a

hig

h-lev

el pen

etration ag

ent w

ork

-in

g w

ithin

the C

IA w

ho

had

been

recruited by the S

oviets years before in M

oscow.

The specter of a "m

ole," or enemy

agen

t, burro

win

g h

is way

into

the

heart o

f an A

merican

intellig

ence

service caused such consternation in .th

e CIA

and

FB

I that a p

erson

al interview

was arranged for G

olitsin to brief A

ttorney General R

obert F.

Kennedy. G

olitsin

had

furth

er cautio

ned

that the K

GB

, realizing that he knew

about Kovshuk's m

ission, would al-

most certainly attem

pt to discredit, or d

eflect the C

IA fro

m, th

e info

r-m

ation he was providing. H

e warned

An

gleto

n th

at a So

viet d

isinfo

rma-

tion ag

ent, p

robab

ly p

osin

g as a

defector, would soon m

ake contact w

ith the CIA

for this purpose. T

hen

, in Ju

ne 1

96

2, six

mo

nth

s after G

olitsin

's defectio

n, N

osen

ko

had

first app

roach

ed th

e CIA

in

Gen

eva. A

ngleto

n fo

und th

at No-

senko's information coincided very

curiously with G

olitsin's. Nosenko,

for ex

amp

le, claimed

to h

ave b

een

Kovshuk's deputy in the K

GB

, and therefore he w

as in a unique position to know

about Kovshuk's trip to see

an im

po

rtant ag

ent in

the U

nited

S

tates. B

ut w

hereas G

olitsin

sug

gested

th

at Kovsh

uk h

ad g

one to

sec a S

oviet ag

ent w

ork

ing in

the C

IA,

Nosen

ko said

that th

e agen

t—w

ho

had been given the code-name A

n-drey

—had

been

recruited

from

A

merican

military

perso

nn

el at-tached to the em

bassy in Moscow

. N

ow, alm

ost two years later, N

o-sen

ko h

ad ad

ded

a vital clu

e that

would undoubtedly lead to the dis-

covery of Andrcy. W

hat concerned A

ngleto

n w

as the p

ossib

ility th

at A

ndre

y m

ight b

e a

red h

errin

g

meant to deflect attention aw

ay from

KG

B penetration of the C

IA.

Nex

t, Angleto

n tu

rned

to

what

was k

now

n a

s th

e "Sasch

a" case, in

vo

lvin

g an

oth

er Ru

ssian ag

ent.

Th

e clue G

olitsin

had p

rovid

ed

pointed to a CIA

contract einp:oye w

ho was w

orking in West G

er:nil:1y and had been recruited by the S

ovi-ets. N

osenko.also mentioned S

asclia, ::j

ccr. I=or 50

!TC

time th

is bit o

f info

r-m

ation threw the C

IA of? the :rail of

tare tree spy. In tw

o cases, Nosenko's inform

a-tio

n led

to th

e iden

rirrcation • an

d

rt:otu

re of en

emy

agen

ts. Th

e first concerned a K

CI3 say in the B

ritish C

olitsin

had

told

about

this p

en

etra

tion

in 1

96

2, a

few

^.10"t ,s b

efore N

osen

ko co

ntacted

A

n investigation pointed to th

e traitor as o

ne o

f four p

eople.

Nosen

ko p

rovid

ed th

e info

rmatio

n

t:lat enab

ed. th

e British

to ap

pre-

hen

d th

e sav—

,ohn V

assal T

he second case involved a major

KG

B operation in F

rance bV m

eans of

which

military secrets w

ere being taken from

a courier station at O

rly airport outside Paris.

mi!i-

tar.; H.tel:ig

ence h

ad, in

19

63

, re-zei v

ecl info

rmatio

n w

hich

alleged

th

at an A

rmy

sergean

t, Ro

bert L

ee 'ohnson, w

as involved in Soviet in-

telligence. _tut, because of a bureau-cratr: erro

r, the case h

ad n

ot b

een

nv.rsuec!. T

he serg

eant, h

ow

ever, h

ad lo

st h

is access to m

ilitary secrets at th

e co

urier statio

n, an

d S

ov

iet intelli-

;encr h

ad ev

ery reaso

n to

be:iev

e :h

at he w

as know

n to

U.S

. intelli-

Now

, in :96.4, Nosenko said

t. )at he h

ad h

eard in

Nlo

scow

of

eno

rmo

usly

imp

ortan

t NA

...0 s

e-

cre

ts co

n"g

, from

a so

urc

e n

ear

This fu

rther tip

!cd to

the

arrest of Setgeant•;ohnson.

As A

ngleton saw it, N

osenko was

revea.!ig :n:errnation that was "dat-

ed," m

ean' tig

info

rmatio

n th

at the

already

com

pro

mised

. An

gleto

n

tried to assess whether N

osenko was

pro

vid

ing su

ch in

form

ation b

y d

e-sig

n, o

r wheth

er he w

as disclo

sing

orig

inal in

form

ation

that ju

st hap

-pened to coincide w

ith what G

olitsin and other sources had revealed.

An

gleto

n also

con

sidered

it od

d

that two m

en from entirely different

branches of the KG

B w

ould know so

many of the sam

e Soviet operations.

Such an overlay raised the possibility

that N

osen

ko's rev

elations in

1962

mig

ht h

ave b

een d

esigned

by th

e S

oviets to deflect attention from the

leads Golitsin had provided.

Angleton w

as not inclined to be-. lieve in coincidences. Y

et, as he re-ceived the new

CIA

reports, he saw

that to believe Nosenko's story about

Osw

ald one would have to accept a

series of even more rem

arkable coin-cid

ences: th

e coin

ciden

ce that N

o-

senko, th

e first agen

t the C

IA ever

had in the Second C

hief Directorate,

turned out to be the supervisor of the O

swald

file•' the co

incid

ence th

at • N

osen

ko

had

been

cho

sen to

con

-duct the post-assassination investiga-tio

n in

to th

e KG

B's relatio

ns w

ith

Osw

ald—w

hich meant that he w

as picked to investigate his ow

n han-dling of a case.

Indeed, Nosenko claim

ed to be in a position to know

of every contact the K

GB

had—and did not have—

with O

swald over a four-year period,

and from this vantage point he could

definitively exonerate the KG

B from

hav

ing an

y relatio

nsh

ip w

ith O

s-w

ald. Such coincidences A

ngleton

value.

Th

e Th

irteenth

Dep

artmen

t

TH

RO

UG

H th

ick, h

orn

-rimm

ed

glasses, A

ngleto

n stu

died

the tran

-script of N

osenko's statements about

Osw

ald an

d th

e Soviet U

nio

n. N

o-

senk

o d

eclared th

at Osw

ald h

ad

never been debriefed by Soviet intel-

ligence. To N

ewton S

. Miler, chief of

op

eration

s of A

ng

leton

's cou

nter-

intelligence staff, this assertion was

"particularly hard to swallow

." Mil-

er pointed out that, in 1959, the KG

B

was reorganizing its espionage appa-

ratus in

an effo

rt to o

verco

me th

e technological advantage the U

nited S

tates had ov

er the U.S

.S.R

. Radar

was a target, and O

swald had identi-

fied h

imself as a rad

ar operato

r. "N

ot to

deb

rief him

... defies lo

gic

and k

now

n K

GB

histo

ry," M

iler. com

mented.

Moreover, G

olitsin had explained in detail that in the case of a m

ilitary defector or ev

en o

ne w

ith m

ilitary

experien

ce, the T

hirteen

th D

epart-

men

t of th

e First C

hief D

irectorate

would have the prim

ary responsibil-ity

for th

e deb

riefing. T

he T

hir-

teenth Departm

ent was assigned the

function of sabotage and assassina-tio

n ab

road

, and

therefo

re had

a special interest in debriefing m

ilitary defecto

rs who m

ight b

e capab

le of

participating in such operations. O

swald, w

ho had served for near-ly

three y

ears in th

e U.S

. Marin

es w

ith an

Air C

ontro

l Squad

ron in

Jap

an, th

e Philip

pin

es, Taiw

an an

d

California—

and who had repeatedly

J61,,,,..■

■•

■,./

J,V

VY

UIF

ln

c

10/113

to provide the Soviets w

ith Am

eri-can secrets—

certainly would qualify

as a military

defecto

r. In ad

ditio

n,

the KG

B had O

swald in the palm

of its h

and

in M

osco

w. It w

as kn

ow

n

that h

e had

orally

renounced

his

citizensh

ip b

efore th

e Am

erican

Consul, severed his relations w

ith his fam

ily in Am

erica and left himself

'penniless and completely at the m

er-cy of the S

oviets. W

hy, A

ngle

ton w

ondere

d,

would

n't h

e hav

e been

deb

riefed

for all he was w

orth? U

nder the procedures Golitsin de-

scribed, the Thirteenth D

epartment

would

hav

e had

a han

d in

the d

e-b

riefing

s, and

No

senk

o, if h

e was

wh

o h

e claimed

to b

e, wo

uld

hav

e know

n o

f them

. Why w

ould

No-

senko obscure such a procedure? Of

course, in the light of the Kennedy

assassinatio

n, A

ngleto

n h

ad little

doubt that if Osw

ald had any contact w

ith th

e Thirteen

th D

epartm

ent—

even if it was only a brief interview

—the K

GB

would go to great lengths

to conceal it. N

ow, w

ith Nosenko in the U

nited S

tates, Angleto

n carefu

lly co

nsid

-ered the situation. A

side from breed-

ing o

rchid

s, he w

as a

superb

ly

patient trout fisherman. H

e played defectors m

uch like trout. He called

. the process elicitation: all defectors, w

heth

er fake o

r real, should

be

play

ed fo

r whatev

er info

rmatio

n

they

possessed

. In th

e contest b

e-tw

een intelligence agencies, discov-ering the disinform

ation the enemy

was attem

pting to plant was in m

any 2

J j

Case o

f the rak

e Colo

nel

VA

RC

Y, serious !law

s began to show

u

p in

N

osen

ko's sto

ry. F

irst, _m

eter intensive interrogation, No-

senko a

dm

itted th

at h

e h

ad lie

d

about his rank. He w

as not a lieuten-:•.nt co:one:, or even a m

aior (as he claim

ed in 1952). He w

as only a ntain.

exp'.ain

ed. th

at he h

ad

about rank to m

ake himself

mo-e acceptable as a defector. T

he in

terrog

ators k

new

that it

was not uncom

mon for defectors to

exag

gerate th

eir importan

ce. But

whv w

ould he have also lied in 1962, w

hen he had said categoric:I!), that

‘vo

uld

nev

er defc,:.? N

osen

ko

ccult no: eX

D.L

":" T

here w

as a furth

er irregularity

. W

hen Nosenko a-rived in the 7:nit-

ed States, he had am

ong his papers a S

oviet travc: document w

hich autho-H

ied ',1irn to be in Gorki in N

ovem-

ac- tri5;. N

osen

ko h

ad ex

plain

ec! :::at he had been in C

ork: because he w

as n.artici2

ating

in a n

ation

wid

e m

anhunt a traitor nam

ed Ch.cre-

r.ianov. This m

an, he said, had been secret:v tried and executed.

The nam

e was w

e!! known to the

C!A

. A m

an called Cherepanov had

unexnectediy sent a package of docu- i—

ents em

bassy in N-I.os-

cow

it Octo

ber !9

63

, a:tho

ug

h h

e never orevious:y D

CC

11 in contact T

he n

apers h

ad b

een

:oton-apiled by the embassy staff.

Hen, because of sonic bureaucratic

rit.iing

(or su

spicio

n th

at a trap w

as 22/

With

in th

e CIA

, there w

as con-

siderable doubt that the Cherepanov

pap

ers were au

then

tic. By h

oldin

g th

is travel docu

men

t, Nosen

ko w

as in

effect provin

g that th

ey were—

else wh

y hu

nt th

e man

dow

n an

d

execute h

im? B

ut, od

dly en

ough

, N

osenk

o's rank

was listed

on th

e travel d

ocum

ent as lieu

tenan

t colo-nel. W

hy, when in truth he w

as only a captain?

Som

e clerk m

ade a m

istake,"

N

osenko answered.

To the experts at the Soviet R

ussia D

ivision, such a mistake w

as difficult to accep

t. Th

e possib

ility that th

e docum

ent was fabricated in order to

provid

e eviden

ce of Nosen

ko's im

-portance had to be considered. A

nd if th

e docu

men

t was sp

uriou

s, then

the reason he gave for possessing it—the hunt for C

herepanov—also had

to be ou

estioned

. T

he second maior crack in N

osen-ko's story appeared w

hen a team of

code b

reakers from

the N

ational

Secu

rity Agen

cy scrutin

ized th

e ca-ble traffic betw

een Geneva and M

os-co

w d

urin

g th

e perio

d in

wh

ich

Nosenko claim

ed to have received a recall telegram

from M

oscow. T

hey d

iscovered th

at no telegram

had

been sent to the Soviet delegation in G

eneva on the day Nosenko claim

ed it arrived. C

onfronted with this fact,

No

senk

o !-InaU

y ad

mitted

that h

e h

ad m

ade

up

the story ab

out th

e teleg

ram

, fearin

g th

at th

e CIA

w

ould

insist h

e contin

ue as a sp

y. In itself, such dissem

bling did not

fiance his standing (with

the false

rank

) and

the u

rgency of h

is case (w

ith th

e false telegram). In

this

instance, however, these adm

ittedly untrue elem

ents in Nosenko's story

had been "verified" by Fedora, the

Soviet in

telligence agen

t in N

cw

York w

ho was w

orking as a double agent for the F

BI.

Th

e CIA

began

examin

ing m

ore closely F

edora's claim

that th

e No-

senko defection carried such impor-

tance for the KG

B that all operations

had

been

susp

end

ed, even

in N

ew

York. C

uriously enough, a KG

B op-

eration k

now

n to N

osenk

o (and

the

CIA

) was con

tinu

ing in

Feb

ruary

and March in Sw

itzerland. It seemed

incon

ceivable to th

e CIA

case offi-cer th

at a

ll So

viet esp

ion

ag

e in

New

York

, abou

t wh

ich N

oscnk

o - h

ad virtu

ally no k

now

ledge, w

ould

b

e susp

end

ed, w

hile a

case in

S

witzerlan

d, w

here h

e had

served,

continued. It appeared that F

edora, Hoover's

high

ly prized

source, m

ight b

e try-ing to bolster N

osenko's credentials. T

his h

eighten

ed su

spicion

s amon

g th

e coun

terintelligen

ce staff abou

t F

edora's ow

n m

ission. W

hy w

ould

F

edora "

verify" false facts ab

out

Nosen

ko u

nless h

e was b

eing u

sed

as a "con

trolled ch

ann

el" b

y the

KC

;13 to pass disinformation to the

FIE

? B

oth Angleton and the C

IA's So-

viet Russia D

ivision began indepen-dently to explore the possibility that the m

an called Nosenko w

as actually

"Hostile Interrogation"

NO

SE

NK

O w

as given a lie-detector test—

and failed. Further questioning

revealed great gaps in his knowledge

of KG

B op

erations. T

he in

terroga-tors w

ere driven toward considering

the baffling possibility that Nosenko

was m

erely an empty receptacle into

wh

ich K

GB

briefin

g officers had

p

oured

inform

ation—

and

disin

for-m

ation—

that th

ey wan

ted h

im to

carry to the West.

And if.N

osenko was not sincere, it

suggested

that th

e Soviet govern

-m

ent was building a legend m

eant to d

eceive the W

arren C

omm

ission

abou

t Osw

ald. B

ut in

wh

at way?

Neith

er An

gleton n

or the S

oviet R

ussia Division believed that O

swald

was acting under the control of Sovi-

et intelligence when he assassinated

Presid

ent K

enn

edy. It seem

ed far

more likely to both that the relation-

ship Nosenko w

as attempting to pro-

tect migh

t be a p

rior conn

ection

Osw

ald h

ad h

ad w

ith th

e KG

B.

Un

der th

is hyp

othesis, N

osenk

o w

ould

have b

een sen

t to reinforce

the legend about Osw

ald's "instabil-ity"—

a story first constructed about O

swald

wh

en h

e had

been

in th

e S

oviet Un

ion for oth

er pu

rposes—

an

d to

den

y ca

tego

rically

tha

t O

swald

had

been

recruited

before,

du

ring or after h

is defection

to the

So

viet U

nio

n in

19

59

. No

senk

o

wou

ld also d

eny an

y KG

B con

nec-

tion w

ith M

arina. N

osenk

o wou

ld

have been chosen to deliver the mcs. 227

P'11

• '•

• • •

t • • '7.

' • ..-.-:T.-r■•■•1!,%•,,c,14-1:-. •

his c

red

entia

ls with

the

CIA

in

he C

IA d

ecid

ed th

at, g

iven th

e

circ

i.Irrcta

nces, !A

cre

was a

, tro

ng D

oss:.h

ility th

at N

ose

nko

hi-ea.,: a

nd

ev

en

un

rav

el O

s-,‘•r'd

ls tang

led v

.ieb b

efore th

e War-

Com

tHssio

n p

ut o

ut its F

ir.a!

ert.R

icliard "elm

s called

the D

eputy

Atto

rney

(, :en

eral, to d

iccuss th

e incarceratio

n

Nrise

no. F

or b

oth

the C

IA a

nd

tiie D

ep

artm

en

t of :u

stice, it w

as a

to

tally u

no

reccden

ted situ

ation

. G

iven

more tim

e or o

ther circu

m-

stances, N

ose

nko c

ould

have b

een

cautio

ned in

a d

iffere

nt a

tmo-

mnere.

the W

arren C

om

missio

n

.vas b

e:n

g o

resse

c b

y P

resid

ent

ro:ln

son

to p

ub

lish its v

erd

ict in

ew

er th

an 1

:0 d

ays. A

ttorn

ey G

en-

era

l Robert F

Kennedy h

imse

lf ageed th

at N

ose

nko sh

ould

imm

e-

diately

be n

ut u

nder "h

ostile in

terro-

gztio

n,- a

s extra

ord

inary

pro

cedure

•i:te

nded

eith

er to

bre

ak o

r co

rirm

story

. N

osen

ko w

as confin

ed to

a single

room

at a CIA

deten

tion cen

ter, with

only

a bed

, chair av

id w

ash b

asin. H

e w

as g

iven o

nly

milita

ry fa

tigues to

w

ear a

nd tre

ate

d a

s h

e w

ere

a

:ured

spy rath

er than

a volu

ntary

d

i:ector. I-le w

as forced

to su

bm

it to

interro

g,atio

n, an

d w

hen

:i,n

sv.icrs seem

ed false o

r mislead

- •n

g, h

e w

as o

pen

ly c

halle

ng

ed

, or

Li:n

o:In

ca: as a liar. A

t one p

oin

t his in

terro

gato

rs ih

oiig

lit lie m

ight b

reak. H

e h

ad

icen u

nable

to su

pply

any d

eta

ils

itorin

g fo

r the K

GB

. His in

terro

ga-

tors su

ggested

finally

that p

erhap

s he

had n

ot in

fact h

andle

d tila

t case

. . N

ose

nko sa

t back sile

ntly

as th

e

interro

gato

r poin

ted o

ut th

e contra-

dic

tions. W

hy n

ot a

dm

it he h

adn't

han

dled

the case?

• N

ose

nko a

nsw

ere

d, a

fter lo

ng

tho

ug

ht, th

at if h

e a

dm

itted

this, h

e

would

hav

e to ad

mit th

at he w

as not

even th

e p

erso

n h

e c

laim

ed to

be.

The in

terro

gato

rs pause

d to

see

wheth

er Nosen

ko w

ould

mak

e such

an

adm

ission.

After a ten

se hesitatio

n, N

osen

ko

su

ddenly

pulle

d h

imse

lf togeth

er.

He in

sisted th

at d

esp

ite th

e c

ontra

-dictio

ns h

is interro

gato

rs had

poin

t-ed o

ur, h

e h

ad h

andle

d th

e c

ase

in

questio

n. H

e a

dm

itted th

at h

e

"loo

ked

bad

;" ev

en

to h

imse

lf, bu

t had n

o e

xpla

natio

n.

TH

ER

E' W

AS

, how

ever, o

ne startlin

g •

develo

pm

ent a

t this tim

e. It h

ad to

do n

ot w

ith O

swald

, but rath

er with

th

e se

curity

of U

.S. in

tellig

ence.

Fro

m th

e c

lues th

at N

ose

nko h

ad

pro

vid

ed, th

e FB

I had

no

pro

blem

in

locatin

g A

ndrey

. How

ever, in

stead

of b

ein

g th

e h

igh-le

vel a

gent th

at

Nose

nko h

ad o

rigin

ally

suggeste

d,

And

rey tu

rned

out to

be o

nly

a

retire

d A

rmy

serg

eant w

ho h

ad

wo

rked

in th

e m

oto

r po

ol a

t the

Am

eric

an e

mbassy

in M

osc

ow

in

953-5

4. l-re d

id n

ot ev

en h

ave access

to classified

info

rmatio

n.

Th

e m

an re

ad

ily a

dm

itted

to th

e

FB

I that h

e h

ad m

et th

e S

ovie

ts w

hile in

Mosco

w, th

ough h

e had

no

into

rmatio

n o

f valu

e to g

ive th

em. In

5957, K

ovsh

uk h

ad in

deed sp

oken

briefly

with

him

, but it w

as clear he

was n

ot in

a po

sition

to b

e of an

y u

se. T

o th

e CIA

, the d

iscovery

of A

n-

dre

y o

nly

heig

hte

ned

the m

yste

ry.

Acco

rdin

g to

Golitsin

, Kovsh

uk h

ad

mad

e a special trip

to W

ashin

gto

n to

se

e a

n a

gent o

f uniq

ue im

porta

nce.

By

the re

co

nstru

ctio

n o

f date

s, the

CIA

dete

rmin

ed th

at th

e A

rmy se

r-geant h

ad n

ot b

een c

onta

cte

d u

ntil

many m

onth

s afte

r Kovsh

uk h

ad

arriv

ed. P

resse

d o

n th

is contra

dic

-tio

n, N

ose

nk

o e

xp

lain

ed

that K

ov

-sh

uk h

ad h

ad tro

uble

locatin

g th

e

serg

eant. Y

et it tu

rned o

ut th

at h

is nam

e and p

hone n

um

ber w

ere in th

e phone b

ook.

It seemed

impossib

le that a m

an as

importan

t as Kovsh

uk w

ould

travel

to W

ash

ingto

n o

nly

to se

e a

n e

x-

sold

ier who h

ad n

o classified

clear-an

ce. But if th

is sergean

t was n

ot th

e hig

h-le

vel p

enetra

tion a

gent C

olic

-sin

had w

arn

ed a

bout, th

en w

ho

was? C

ould

this m

ean th

at the S

oviet

Unio

n h

ad su

ccessfu

lly p

enetra

ted

U.S

. intellig

ence—

as it had

both

the

British

and W

est G

erm

an in

telli-

gen

ce services sin

ce World

War 1

1?

Th

e po

ssibility

of a serio

us scan

dal

now

thre

ate

ned th

e C

IA a

nd th

e

FB

I. .

Unan

swered

Questio

ns

Ox Ju

NE

24

, 19

64

, Helm

s requ

est-ed a

priv

ate

audie

nce w

ith C

hie

f Ju

stice W

arre

n. T

hey m

et in

a c

on-

ference ro

om

in th

e Veteran

s Build

-in

g. It w

as agreed

that n

o n

otes w

ere to

be tak

en, n

o w

itnesses w

ere to b

e

pre

sen

t. Th

e su

bje

ct, N

clm

s sug

-g

este

d, h

ad

to re

main

a se

cre

t of

state. The C

hief Ju

stice nodded

his

agreem

ent.

Until th

is mom

ent, W

arre

n a

nd

the C

om

missio

n h

ad receiv

ed o

nly

th

e F

BI's e

valu

atio

n o

f No

sen

ko

. T

7.7. 7

-75"7,7

1P

•7771.".1•7;

1

• A-4 ;.,:imA..(v,14.;

vpi

,i2!'4'irel•• • ;1'1'

AV

4

4

Richard H

elms

Now

Helm

s expla

ined th

at th

ere

w

ere

two sc

hools o

f thought a

bout

Nose

nko w

ithin

the in

tellig

ence

com

munity

. The firs

t held

that

he w

as a

legitim

ate

defe

cto

r and

could

be b

elie

ved a

s far a

s Osw

ald

w

as c

on

cern

ed

. Th

e se

co

nd

held

th

at N

ose

nko w

as still a

Sovie

t agent, u

nder in

structio

ns fro

m th

e

KG

B to

misin

form

the C

om

missio

n

ab

ou

t Osw

ald

's activ

ities in

the

Soviet U

nio

n. H

e explain

ed th

at the

CIA

could

not sa

y w

ith c

erta

inty

w

hich

view

was co

rrect, and m

ight

not re

solv

e th

is questio

n b

efo

re

229

Y 1.'3,;.r.*4•••!-

• •

Warren

looked

up. v

isib!y

dis-

turb

ed. !--fe ask

ed ab

out th

e report

-ed6

ved

from

'-lou

ver. W

hich

raised

lone o

f these C

LICS

C:01S

. HC

:111S uui-

a'tswerea th

at he co

uld

speak

nay 'O

r tae h

e men

loo

ked

at each o

ther in

sile

nce fo

r a lo

ng

mo

men

t. Then

ano

arent:v

tired an

d fray

ed

:he ad

ditio

nal d

uties im

po

sed o

n

.rn b

y th

e assassinatio

n, said

that h

e take N

':sat H

C:M

S :0

■C1 him

.in

der ad

visem

ent. T

he in

terview

v.:is ended.

that sam

e day

, at the C

hief

'ostice's rem

:est, the C

om

missio

n

iiiet in ex

ecutiv

e session to

discu

ss H

e vex

ing

oro

blern

raised b

y N

o-

',T1le m

inutes o

f this m

eeting

.ire still c:assiFied

as secret.) It was

'.'eeided

that N

osen

ko

wo

uld

n't tes-

; or b

e interv

iewed

by

any

mem

- eiis of

Com

missio

n. T

he F

BI

-eport o

n h

im w

ould

remain

, but as

irt of th

e un

oub

:ished

record

of th

e em

ission ri:ed

away

in th

e Na-

-. A

rchives. M

US

, for th

e critical "Ru

ssian"

Period. in O

swald

's life, the C

om

mis-

• 9^. w

ould

rely alm

ost en

tirely o

n a

.Hry

t:iat h

ad b

een fo

und a

mong

eFects an

d o

n o

Fi-:cial rec.

tendered

by th

e Soviet g

overn

-(T

liis was d

ecided

desp

ite the

tat if th

e S

ovie

t govern

ment

si,isisecte

d o

f go

ing

to g

reat

ths :o

fake a d

efector, th

e ree-.—

O, it suno:ied w

ov.:(2 also obviously :ive to !)e syspected of being fakes.)

!'residen

t :(2.!IS011 w

as C

:CM

:MC

• th

e re

port b

e issu

ed in

den

tin! electio

n in

No

vem

ber, an

d it

was alread

y alm

ost Ju

ly. F

inal d

rafts h

ad to

be in

with

in 3

0 d

ays, W

arren

ord

ered. F

aced w

ith an

un

yield

ing

d

eadlin

e, the C

om

missio

n staff w

as in

a quan

dary

over w

hat to

do ab

out

the Soviet section. It seem

ed to be an im

men

se void

for w

hich

there w

ere no

witn

esses. (Osw

ald d

id n

ot m

eet M

arin

a u

ntil a

fter h

e d

ecid

ed

to

red

efe

ct to

the U

nite

d S

tate

s in

1961.) F

or ex

amp

le, in in

vestig

ating

the

orig

in o

f Osw

ald's d

efection to

Rus-

sia, William

Colem

an, Jr., an

d W

. D

avid

Slaw

son

, wh

o w

ere to w

rite th

is portio

n o

f the rep

ort, co

nclu

ded

th

at Osw

ald p

rob

ably

beg

an to

lay

his p

lans w

hile

serv

ing

with

the

Marin

es in

the F

ar E

ast. "T

hus,"

they

noted

, "there is th

e possib

ility

that O

swald

came in

to co

ntact w

ith

com

munist ag

ents at th

at time. Ja-

pan

, especially

becau

se the C

om

mu-

nist P

arty w

as open

and activ

e there,

wo

uld

seem a lik

ely p

oin

t for su

ch a

contact to have been made." If such a

contact h

ad b

een m

ade an

d O

swald

h

ad in

deed

been

ind

uced

by

an in

tel-lig

ence serv

ice to d

efect, then

his

mov

emen

ts prio

r to th

e assassinatio

n

would

be cast in

an ex

tremely

differ-

ent lig

ht. Y

et, to d

etermin

e this, it

would

be n

ecessary to

reconstru

ct th

e exp

eriences o

f Osw

ald's M

arine

unit in

!apan

to ascertain

what in

for-

matio

n o

f intellig

ence v

alue O

swald

had

had

access to.

More th

an to

o m

en h

ad serv

ed in

O

swald

's un

it. An

y o

f them

mig

ht

hav

e held

pieces in

the jig

saw m

ys-

L I7

u: ...im

am

, S IU

UL

JCII

With

on

ly d

ays !eft to

finish

writin

g

the rep

ort, h

ow

ever, th

e Co

mm

is-sio

n staff k

new

that th

ere wo

uld

no

t b

e time to

track d

ow

n an

d in

terview

th

ese missin

g w

itnesses. In

fact, the

Com

missio

n q

uestio

ned

only

one

Marin

e wh

o h

ad b

een in

Osw

ald's

radar u

nit in

Japan

—an

d h

is tour

ov

erlapp

ed w

ith O

swald

's by

on

ly a

few m

on

ths.

Did

Osw

ald h

ave access to

classi-fied inform

ation in the Marines? D

id h

e hav

e con

tacts or arran

gem

ents

with

So

viet in

telligen

ce services p

ri-o

r to h

is defectio

n? H

ad h

e received

train

ing

du

ring

his y

ears in th

e So

vi-

et Unio

n? W

as he su

bseq

uen

tly g

iv-

en

an

y m

ission

by

the S

ovie

ts to

perfo

rm u

pon h

is return

to th

e Unit-

ed S

tates? "How

," asked

Colem

an

and S

lawso

n in

a top-secret d

raft rep

ort, "are w

e to assess w

heth

er or

not w

hat w

e know

of O

swald

's 'real life' is n

ot ju

st a 'legen

d' d

esigned

by

the K

GB

and liv

ed o

ut b

y O

swald

th

ereafter?" N

osen

ko

was still co

nfin

ed an

d

un

der in

terrog

ation

on

Sep

temb

er 28,1

964, w

hen

the W

arren C

om

mis-

sion p

ublish

ed its re

port, h

avin

g

failed to

answ

er any o

f these cen

tral questio

ns ab

out O

swald

's past.

"Race C

ar"

,4isugi, Japan: 1957. "Race C

ar to

Coffe

e M

ill, Race C

ar to

Coffe

e

Mill," th

e radio

crackled

. "Req

uest

win

ds alo

ft at 90 an

gels."

The m

en in

side th

e dark

ened

con-

trol ro

om

listened

with

bew

ilder-

men

t; som

e laug

hed

nerv

ou

sly, as if

232

isle tilU

IV lilt. W

U! C

IUIIIC

MO

O U

I

practical jo

ke, d

esign

ed to

break

the

bored

om

of a fo

ur-h

our w

atch. A

ll knew

from

their M

arine C

orp

s radar

trainin

g th

at no

plan

e cou

ld tly

at an

altitud

e of "9

0 an

gels"-9

o,0

0o

feet. T

he w

orld

record

for altitu

de w

as still 65,889 feet, and the radar height-fin

din

g a

nte

nna re

ad u

p to

only

45,0

0o feet. W

hy, th

en, w

ould

any

plan

e wan

t to k

now

the w

ind v

eloc-

ity at 9

0,0

00 feet?

"Co

ffee Mill" w

as the co

de n

ame

for M

arine A

ir Contro

l Squad

ron

One, k

now

n a

s MA

CS

-1, w

hic

h

monito

red a

ir traffic

for th

e 1

st M

arine A

ircraft Win

g statio

ned

at A

tsug

i air b

ase

, ab

ou

t 35

mile

s so

uth

west o

f Tokyo. B

ut w

hat w

as "R

ace Car"?

At d

aybreak

a few d

ays later, th

e m

en in

Sq

uad

ron

On

e received

an-

oth

er surp

rise. A lo

ng

, thin

, silver

pla

ne, w

ith a

need

le n

ose

, was

wh

eele

d o

ut o

f a h

an

gar th

at w

as

gu

arded

by

Am

erican civ

ilians w

ith

sub

mach

ine g

un

s. It loo

ked

like n

o

plan

e any o

f the M

arines in

Coffee

Mill h

ad ev

er seen b

efore. Its w

ing

s, w

hich

stretched

ou

t for 8

o feet, w

ere m

ore

than

twic

e th

e le

ng

th o

f its fu

selage. T

he w

ing tip

s dro

oped

to

the g

rou

nd

and

had

to b

e sup

po

rted

by

alum

inu

m p

od

s with

small w

heels

un

der th

em. A

pilo

t, clad in

a heav

y

rubber su

it and m

ask, arriv

ed in

an

am

bu

lan

ce a

nd

clim

bed

into

the

cock

pit. T

he g

round crew

that re-

moved fiv

e id

entify

ing n

um

bers

from

the tail o

f the stran

ge p

lane. A

s th

e eng

ine w

armed

up

, it emitted

a h

igh

, shrill w

hin

e, w

hic

h ra

pid

ly

r:,%1J..

HI: .)1:C

R

IVO

RLD

OF

LEE

H/ IR

VE

Y OSW

cILD

LEG

EN

D: TH

E SE

CR

ET W

OR

LD O

F LE

E H

.-1121/EY 0S11:41.0

increased

as the p

lane b

egan

racing

•to

wn th

e runw

ay.

a rev' seco

nds, u

sing n

o m

ore

than

sou feet o

f the m

ile-lung ru

n•

the m

ystery

plan

e shot in

to th

e air. T

he w

heels u

nder th

e win

gs fell

of a

nd th

e p

lane

c'.'rnbecl a: a 4

5-d

e-an

gle. W

ithin

a o' m

inute

s ic M

arines w

atch-

•n7 :h

eir ra

dar-

scopes saw

that th

e plan

e had

van

ished

ro

m th

e sc

reen.

mom

ents

late

r, Race C

ar

Gra

dually

the

Marin

e Corp

s radar

operato

rs H C

ofx

.te M

ill :earn

ed m

ore

ab

out th

e so-called

utility

pla

ne.—

(" Vv' h

enever w

e

neard

that n

oise

, so

me o

f us w

ould

run o

ut o

f the b

ut

to v

.atch it tak

e ofi," recalls R

obert

?.oyce Au,c.,,g

, now

a p

olic

em

an in

C

l-"ico:h

e, Ohio

.) As th

e requests

'or w

inds a

t 70,0

0o,

o,0

00 an

d

T.),o.ou feet usually cam

e soon after it disap

peared

front th

eir radar, th

ey

;:eCuced

that th

e plan

e was, in

fact, ce C

ar, Am

; even

tually

, in th

eir _.•:c';

on on clasi'-icd

material, th

ey

ere

told

that th

e u

tility p

lane

'called th

e fo

r short) w

as a

hly

secret reconnaissan

ce craft w

hich

was n

ot to

be d

iscussed

with

an

yone o

utsid

e the rad

ar unit.

What th

ey w

ere not to

ld, h

ow

ev-

er, was th

at the U

-2 w

as used

pri-

marily

for fly

ing o

ver th

e S

ovie

t U

nio

n an

d C

hin

a in o

rder to

photo

-grap

h m

ilitary an

d in

dustrial targ

ets. O

r that th

e U-2

s, which

used

Atsu

gi

as one o

f their tw

o m

ain b

ases, were

pro

vid

ing n

o less th

an

go p

ercent

of all h

ard in

form

ation o

n S

oviet

military

, ballistic an

d n

uclear-b

om

b

activ

ities. F

or th

is reaso

n it w

as

curren

tly th

e hig

hest-p

riority

target

of S

oviet in

telligen

ce, which

was

attemptin

g to

gain

info

rmatio

n to

m

ake it possible for Soviet rockets to

shoot d

ow

n o

ne o

f the o

dd-lo

okin

g

planes. O

ne M

arin

e in

side th

e b

ubble

seem

ed to

go about h

is work

with

a good deal of silent efficiency. H

e was

gaunt, w

ith sp

ark

ling e

yes a

nd a

sm

ile th

at w

as o

ften ta

ken fo

r a

contem

ptu

ous sm

irk. L

ike th

e oth

- 233

crs, he h

eard th

e radio

calls from

R

ace Car an

d, acco

rdin

g to

one o

ffi-cer, show

ed an extraordinary interest in

the p

ath o

f the p

lane. T

hat M

arine

was L

ee Harv

ey O

swald

.

Lonely

Boy

OSW

AL

D W

AS B

OR

N on O

ctober r8, 1939, at th

e Old

Fren

ch H

osp

ital in

New

Orlean

s. His fath

er, Robert E

. L

ee O

swald

, had d

ied o

f a h

eart

attack tw

o m

onth

s befo

re. His m

oth

- ! •

er, M

arguerite C

laverie O

swald

, an

attra

ctiv

e b

runette

of F

rench a

nd

Germ

an e

xtra

ctio

n, m

anaged th

e

best sh

e could

under d

ifficult cir-

cum

stances. A

s a result, L

ee's child

-hood w

as unsettled and difficult. For

econom

ic reasons, h

e spen

t nearly

tw

o y

ears in an

orp

han

age w

ith tw

o

elder b

roth

ers. When

he w

as five,

his m

oth

er remarried

, but w

as di-

vorced

little more th

an tw

o y

ears later. T

he fam

ily m

oved

frequen

tly,

and b

y th

e time L

ee was ten

, and in

fifth

gra

de, h

e h

ad a

ttended six

differen

t schools.

In A

ugust 1

952, w

ith b

oth

her

old

er sons en

listed in

the m

ilitary,

Marg

uerite

moved to

New

York

C

ity w

ith L

ee. The n

ext sp

ring, L

ee w

as pick

ed u

p at th

e Bro

nx Z

oo fo

r tru

ancy

and. rem

anded

to th

e New

Y

ork

City

Youth

House fo

r a six-

week

observ

ation p

eriod. T

he p

sy-

chia

tric re

port o

f Dr. R

enatu

s H

artogs d

escribes th

e t3-y

ear-old

O

swald

as a "tense, w

ithdraw

n an

d

evasiv

e boy, w

ho d

islikes in

tensely

talk

ing ab

out h

imself an

d h

is feel-in

gs." O

swald

also seem

ed in

telli-gen

t. Dr. H

artogs w

rote: "L

ee is a

youngster w

ith su

perio

r men

tal en-

dow

men

ts, functio

nin

g p

resently

in

the b

right-n

orm

al range o

f men

tal efficien

cy. H

is abstract th

inkin

g ca-

pacity

and h

is vocab

ulary

are well

dev

eloped

. No retard

ation in

school

subje

cts c

ould

be fo

und d

esp

ite

truan

cy,"

During his tim

e in New

York, L

ee ap

paren

tly also

becam

e interested

in

politics. H

e later claimed

that h

is in

volv

emen

t with

Marx

ism h

ad b

e-gun w

ith a p

amphlet p

rotestin

g th

e ex

ecutio

n o

f Juliu

s and E

thel R

osen

-berg

for w

artime esp

ionag

e. O

swald

return

ed to

P.S

. 44 th

at S

eptem

ber an

d m

ade co

nsid

erable

pro

gress. H

e was ev

en elected

presi-

den

t of h

is eighth

-grad

e class. How

-ev

er, in O

ctober 1

953 h

e was ag

ain

reported

to h

is pro

batio

n o

fficer for

bein

g "u

nru

ly"; ap

paren

tly, h

e had

refu

sed to

salute th

e Am

erican flag

. M

arguerite to

ok L

ee back

to N

cw

Orlean

s in early

1954, an

d in

Octo

-ber 1

955, w

hen h

e tu

rned 1

6, h

e

signed

his m

oth

er's nam

e to a n

ote

info

rmin

g h

is school th

at the fam

ily

was m

ovin

g to

San D

iego a

nd

dro

pped o

ut o

f school. H

e th

en

forg

ed a d

ocu

men

t which

stated th

at he w

as 17 and convinced Marguerite

to sign it so that he could enlist in the M

arines. T

he M

arines, h

ow

ever, re-

jected his application and told him to

return

in a y

ear. F

or a

fe

w w

eeks

in 1

956 h

e

work

ed as a m

essenger at P

fisterer D

ental L

aborato

ry, w

here h

e met

Palm

er E. M

cBride, a fellow

messen-

ger, who sli'ared O

swald's interest in

cla

ssical m

usic

. On h

is visits to

iii

The U-2—

called "the black lady of espionage" by the So.t.iets—

as it looked on a reconnaissance flight

r.

ON

LY

S) 9

8 (blue 43i POIISQ0)

)1/..4;' -•••

7:7. *rt.' 1

r).:The m

ost u

p-to

-dale

alm

anac m

oney c

an b

uy!

,171•

.

•

1,C24 A

rl PA

GE

S BIG

! -1•

d S

end

no

mo

ney

no

w. •

We'll bill you later:

4, 1. T

he

on

ly a

lman

ac th

at C

ov

ers a

ll of 1

97

7 fro

m

Jan

uary

1 th

rou

gn

December 31, a

nd lo

cute

a o

n

the year's 5

0 m

ajo

r avant, a

nd d

evelo

pm

enta

. 2.

The

word

's m

ost u

aalu

l alm

anac. 3

, The e

ssay.

tlal vo

lum

e for

the e

ntire

fam

ily, 4

. Th

e a

lman

ac

t th

at fa

r ex

ceed

s an

y o

ther In

Illustra

tion

s (50

0

ph

olo

gra

cn

s, map

s, ch

arts, g

rap

hs). 5

. Mo

ro th

an

1

,00

0 p

a;e

s. O. M

ore

than

1.0

00

.00

0 ta

cit.

7.

,• •

Hu

nd

reds

of e

asy

.to.u

se -F

acts C

l a G

lance"

tabla

s and a

vra

altn

of "h

ow

•To" a

nd "S

oll•F

lelb

" fe

atu

res. 1

, A. a

rrangem

ent o

f conte

nts fo

r quic

k

' ' refe

ren

ce I. S

olt c

ov

er, 1

0. W

ritten

In th

e liv

ely

•

style o

f T•le R

eader's D

igest Itself

, 11

, On

ly 5

3.0

8

(plu

s 43C p

osta

ge).

•

1—tow

to o

rder: •

... C S

en

d y

ou

r nem

, an

d a

dd

ress to

Read

er's D

lgo

st, i C

, . Dept. O

S 5

77:4

3, P

leesa

ntv

ille, N

ow

York

10

57

0

• W

o w

ill sen

d y

ou

a c

op

y o

f Read

er's D

igest 1

97

8

, ' . Alm

anac a

nd Y

earb

ook fo

r only

53.0

0 (p

lea S

ac

t. o

olta

go). r,O

'foru

d In

booksto

res fo

r 05.9

5.)

LE

GE

ND

: TH

E. SE

CR

ET

WO

RL

D O

F L

EE

HA

RV

EY

OSW

AL

D

MC

P,ricle's '.lee quickly turned

i:iscessien to politics. "L

ee Osw

ald

was very serious about the virtues of

comm

unism. and discussed these vir-

:ues ev

ery o

pportu

nity

. He w

ould

that the capitalists w

ere exploit-the w

o-kin.g class, and his central

-Herne seem

ed to be that the workers

day

rise up and throw

off chains."

When M

cPridc took O

swald w

ith -e the borne of W

illiam E

lug,,ene p

residen

t of th

e Am

ateur

Astronom

y Association, O

swald en-

his host by "telling him of the

:Cs o

f the W

ork

ers' St.ate an

d

nq that the 'jnited States w

as not lin

g th

e truth

abou

t Sov

iet "

es-

''he vocabulary of class warfare

ch Osw

ald b

andied

about su

g-

...ested that the periodicals and books w

as :hen

readin

g w

ere not th

e ;:aridarcl rare taught in N

ew O

rleans

On O

ctober 24, 1956, L

ee enlisted In -he M

arine Corps in D

allas. After

enduring ten grueling weeks of boot

:amp, h

e was sen

t for fu

rther train

-:o

Cam

p P

end

leton

, Calif. O

ne

the M

arines in

Osw

ald's eig

ht-

man sO

Vad, w

ho also shared a tent tI,

him

, was A

llen R

. Feld

e, a iir.t:ve of M

ilwaukee. F

elde remem

-a':-s th

at even

while O

m ald

was

anin

g co

mbat tech

niq

ues. h

e was

Am

erican fo

reign

po

licy.

' • railed ag

ainst th

e Am

erican in

-i!! K

orea, w

hich

he said

-..:su

lted in

"on

e millio

n- u

seless ths. el it blam

ed President E

isen-ay:cr.) H

e also persisted in depict-

ing

him

self as a cham

pio

n o

f the

"cause o

f the w

ork

ing

man

." H

e was next assigned to the N

aval A

ir Tech

nical T

rainin

g C

enter at

Jacksonville, Fla., to be trained as a

radar co

ntro

ller, a job th

e Marin

es g

ave o

nly

to m

en o

f hig

her-th

an-

averag

e intellig

ence. A

fter that h

e w

ent to

Keesler A

ir Force B

ase in

Mississip

pi, w

here h

e took an

air-craft-co

ntro

l-and

-warn

ing

op

erator

course. Although O

swald tended to

remain

apart fro

m th

e oth

ers in th

e class, D

aniel Patrick P

owers, a foot-

ball p

layer fro

m th

e Univ

ersity o

f M

inn

esota, feelin

g so

rry fo

r him

, attem

pted

to b

e friends w

ith h

im.

But O

swald told him

very little about h

imself, o

ther th

an th

at his fath

er w

as dead and his mother lived alone.

Pow

ers remem

bered

that "O

zzie" used alm

ost all his weekend passes to

go to New

Orleans, about too m

iles. from

the base, and Pow

ers assumed

he w

as visitin

g h

is mo

ther. A

t this

time, h

ow

ever, M

arguerite w

as in

Tex

as, and

Osw

ald's relativ

es in

New

Orleans rem

ember only a sin-

gle call fro

m h

im. P

resum

ably

he

was seeing som

eone else. D

uring a battery of examinations

in June, Osw

ald surprised his class-m

ates with his proficiency, finishing

seventh in the class. Officially des-

ignated

an A

viatio

n E

lectronics

Operato

r, he w

as ord

ered to

join

M

AC

S-!, th

en statio

ned

in A

tsugi,

Japan. O

n th

e eastern p

art of th

e base,

abo

ut 4

0o

yard

s from

the M

arine

hangars, was a com

plex of some 20

buildings, identified on several signs

Wh

o? Mat? W

hen

? L',71rj e ? N

ow

? M

arch

as the "Jo

int T

echn

ical Ad

viso

ry

Gro

up

." It con

tained

on

e of th

e C

IA's m

ain operational bases in Asia.

For these reasons, A

tsugi remained a

"closed" base, which m

eant that per-sonnel on the base had to have cards show

ing their security clearance.

Tro

ubled

Day

s

LIK

E. M

OS

T o

f the o

ther p

rivates

an

d c

orp

ora

ls in th

e I 1

7-m

an

M

AC

S—

I un

it, Osw

ald liv

ed in

a w

ooden two,story barracks near the

east gate of the base. His room

mate

was C

pl. Thom

as Bagshaw

, a career M

arine. B

agsh

aw rem

embers O

s-w

ald w

hen

he arriv

ed at A

tsugi as

"very thin, almost frail, shy and qui-

et." He also recalls feeling sorry for

him w

hen other Marines in the bar-

racks began "picking on him." T

he .rougher M

arines, who generally pre-

ferred sp

endin

g th

eir liberties ca-

rousing in Japanese bars and finding w

om

en, co

nsid

ered O

swald

(who

spen

t his early

liberties w

atchin

g

televisio

n) an

object o

f derisio

n.

They called him

Mrs. O

swald, threw

him

in the shower fully dressed and

hassled him in other w

ays. Osw

ald w

ould not fight back; he would just

turn

away

from

a pro

vo

ker an

d

ignore him.

Not all th

e Marin

es in th

e bar-

racks ap

pro

ved

of th

is razzing o

f O

swald

. Zack

Sto

ut fo

un

d O

swald

one of the few

men in the unit w

ith w

ho

m h

e cou

ld h

old

an in

telligen

t co

nversatio

n an

d w

ho read

serious

books. A

nother Marine w

ho befriended O

swald at A

tsugi was G

eorge \Vil-

238

• tad

nd follow

label dlrectIons

- • 'tin

s. When

Osw

ald sh

ow

ed an

inter-

est in p

hoto

grap

hy, W

ilkin

s, him

self a p

hoto

grap

hy b

uff, sp

ent so

me tim

e teach

ing

him

ho

w to

use a 3

5-m

m.

cam

era

. Osw

ald

then b

ought h

is ow

n cam

era and w

alked

around th

e sp

rawlin

g b

ase takin

g p

ictures o

f v

ariou

s ob

jects that ap

paren

tly in

ter-ested

him

—su

ch as th

e radar h

eigh

t-fin

din

g an

tennas.

Godfrey

"Gato

r" Dan

iels remem

-bers: "H

e was sim

ple fo

lk, ju

st like I

was. W

e were a bunch of kids—

never been

away

from

hom

e befo

re—but

Osw

ald cam

e righ

t ou

t and

adm

itted

that h

e had

nev

er know

n a w

om

an.

It was re

al u

nusu

al th

at a

fello

w

would

adm

it that. L

ike m

e, he w

as n

aïve ab

ou

t a lot o

f thin

gs, b

ut h

e nev

er was ash

amed

to ad

mit it." H

e also

came to

adm

ire Osw

ald's in

nate

intelligence. "He had a sort of intelli-

gen

ce where y

ou co

uld

show

him

how

to d

o so

meth

ing o

nce an

d h

e'd

know

how

to d

o it, ev

en if it w

as pretty

com

plicated

." O

swald

no

w fo

un

d at A

tsug

i a cam

araderie w

ith a g

roup o

f men

th

at he h

ad n

ever ex

perien

ced b

e-fo

re. They

enco

urag

ed h

im to

drin

k

with

them

in th

e local b

ars around

the b

ase

, and la

ughed w

ith h

im

when

h'e w

ould

com

e back

dru

nk,

wak

ing

up

his b

arra

ck

s mate

s by

sh

outin

g, "S

ave y

our C

onfed

erate m

oney, b

oys; th

e S

outh

will rise

ag

ain!" A

nd th

ey ch

eered h

im o

n

wh

en h

e finally

had

his first sex

ual

experien

ce, with

a Japan

ese bar g

irl. T

here w

ere times, h

ow

ever, w

hen

O

swald

would

disap

pear to

Tokyo

on a

two-d

ay le

ave a

nd re

fuse

to

e M

at'S M

e .01'll'ait. se,:. z.2aL

. •

• II

1, 4

?

.1.

711

' VI 741rert in' 7117, 5314 z 011

...‹.z.,_ ..:. ✓

.......-4_,..4.,... ...1..,..... . .... — ,.

194)0 I

An et pectorant.

eRo tflf 410 •

If you su

ffer from

bro

n-

chial co

ng

estion

or asth

ma,

you sh

ould

know

that th

ese tw

o b

ron

chial tab

lets are not alik

e. 13ro

nkald

Tab

lets can d

o m

ore to

h

elp resto

re free breath

ing

becau

se B

ronkald

giv

es you an

extra in

gred

i-en

t — an

expecto

rant, to

help

loosen

an

d g

et rid o

f the co

ng

estive p

hleg

m

?. /that clo

gs air passag

es and p

lays

'5, •

such

a majo

r part In

bro

nch

ial asth

ma a

ttacks.

Though effectiv

e, Prim

atene

Tab

lets don't co

ntain

this ex

tra ingre-

dien

t...bu

t Bro

nk

aid T

ablets d

o.

Bro

nk

aid T

ablets d

o m

ore...to

h

elp y

ou

breath

e easier. frpow

nwes.w

worw

es.

• ;47- .•

..t

• B

OO

K S

EC

TIO

N

March

1928 LE

GE

ND

: TH

E S

EC

RE

T W

OR

LD

OF

LE

E H

AR

VE

Y O

SW

1LD

s.1 1) 0 •

.

• p

. "I, •

,'tom'/,

discu

ss these trip

s with

even

his

closest friends. Years later, in D

allas, le confided to a close associate that

had become involved w

ith a small

circle a:: :apan

ese com

mu

nists in

T

okyo while in the M

arines. None of

the Mat-ines C

sxvaid served with had

any inklint_t of such a double life—if,

indeed, it existed. Z

ack S

tout k

new

of o

nly

one

possib

le niece in

the p

uzzle o

f Os-

wald's absences: he seem

ed to have 'alien

in lo

ve w

ith a Jap

anese g

irl. W

hen S

tout a

sked w

here

she

wo

rked

, Osw

ald to

ld h

im th

at she

V.'25 a h

ostess at th

e Qu

een B

ee in

This in

itself was ex

traord

inary

. T

he Queen B

ee, known for its m

ore than. :oo strikingly beautiful hostess-es, w

as then

one o

f the th

ree most

expensive nightclubs in Tokyo. F

or an evening at the Q

ueen Bee, a date

cou

ld co

s any

wh

ere from

56

o to

too. Y

et 'Osw

ald, who w

as earning ess th

an $

85 a m

onth

take-h

om

e pay

, regularly

wen

t out w

ith th

is w

om

an fro

m th

e Qu

een B

ee, even

bringing her back to the base several

was really

crazy ab

ou

t her," o

bserv

ed S

tout, w

ho m

et the

wom

an with O

swald on several occa-

sion

s in b

ars near th

e base.

Sto

ut an

d o

ther m

en rem

ember

that th

ese bars w

ere freauen

ted b

y

oi7icers, and that in them one could

nic'.: u

p u

seful b

its of in

form

ation

.1.M..!t w

here th

e unit w

as head

ed

rex!. It seem

ed to

him

that "y

ou

cuo

'd alw

ays fin

d o

ut w

here y

ou

w

ere goin

g fro

m a b

ar girl b

efore

you co

uld

or b

ase." (AC

cord

ing to

one so

urce, N

avy in

telligen

ce was

also interested in the possibility that hostesses from

the Queen B

ee were

bein

g u

sed to

gath

er intellig

ence,

and that Osw

ald was receiving m

on-ey from

someone at the Q

ueen Bee.)

just ab

out th

e time th

at Osw

ald

celebrated

his 1

8th

birth

day

, plan

s w

ere mad

e for th

e entire u

nit to

ship out to the P

hilippines. On O

cto-ber 27, 1957, the m

oment for depar-

ture d

rew n

ear. At b

out 8

:30 p

.m.,

Osw

ald g

razed h

is upper left arm

w

ith a .2

2-calib

er bu

llet, wh

ich h

e fired from

a derringer he had some-

how

obtain

ed in

Japan

. Wilk

ins

rushed into the barracks at the sound of th

e explo

sion an

d saw

Osw

ald

quietly sitting on the lower bunk of

his double-decker, still holding the pisto

l in h

is right h

and. R

obert

Augg, w

hose bed Osw

ald was sitting

on

, came in

later, just as a N

avy

corpsm

an was tying a tourniquet on

Osw

ald's arm

. Fro

m th

e oth

er Ma-

rines in the barracks, Augg gathered

that O

swald

had

delib

erately sh

ot

himself "to get him

self transferred" before the unit departed from

Japan. T

he incident was duly reported, and

he n

ow

faced m

ilitary d

isciplin

e. N

onetheless, Osw

ald was discharged

from m

edical treatment just in tim

e to rejoin his unit before it left for the P

hilippines. T

he o

utfit sp

ent th

ree arduous

mo

nth

s there an

d o

n C

orreg

ido

r, during w

hich period Osw

ald was on

continuous mess duty. T

hen the unit retu

rned

to A

tsugi, w

here O

swald

w

as brought up on charges for hav-in

g h

ad an

unreg

istered w

eapon-

the derringer with w

hich he had shot him

self. A court-m

artial found him

guilty as charged on April t t, and he

was sen

tenced

to

20 day

s at hard

lab

or, fo

rfeiture o

f $5

0 in

pay

and

reduction to the rank of private (he

bers that Osw

ald became increasing-

ly bitter and began to argue that he w

as being singled out for mistreat-

men

t by th

e Marin

e Corp

s. There

follo

wed

a min

or in

ciden

t at the

Blu

ebird

Cafe, a lo

cal han

gout fo

r

24

1

1 a 1

i.3,;41 .1(;‘ •

, •

• •

24

::"2'5er.--!'-•_,.1,;

-•■ •••.‘ ••••••,,-

"

'Z. ••••-•■■:'

• 11tY?"

eAe:+lt O

swald (center, in profile) w

ith a group of fallow M

arines in Me P

hilippines had just passed his exam

ination for the Marines in C

offee Mill, in w

hich co

rporal). H

is confin

emen

t was su

s- Osw

ald sp

illed a d

rink o

n th

e man

p

end

ed fo

r six m

on

ths, w

ith th

e wh

o h

ad reassig

ned

him

to m

ess p

rov

ision

that it w

ou

ld b

e canceled

if du

ty, an

d attem

pted

to p

rov

ok

e a he k

ept o

ut o

f trouble. E

ven

though fig

ht. O

swald

was ag

ain co

urt-m

ar- his officers supported his request to

tialed and sentenced to 28 days in the b

e return

ed to

radar d

uty

, he w

as brig

. inexplicably kept on m

ess duty. L

ife in th

e Marin

e brig

was d

e- O

swald

now

put in

For a h

ardsh

ip sig

ned

to b

e punish

ing. P

risoners

discharge. Apparently he hoped to w

ere not allowed to say a single w

ord be d

ischarg

ed in

Japan

, where h

e to o

ne an

oth

er. Excep

t for sleep

ing

had

mad

e friends; b

ut th

is request an

d eatin

g p

eriods, th

ey w

ere mad

e also w

as turned clown. S

tout remem

- to

stand at rig

id atten

tion d

urin

g

•••••""X".4h •••••‘.'

'1" •,1

.1

•• • •

tr ■

1.A

4H

O rm

et

•

rti •

4 ,

LE

GE

ND

: TH

E S

EC

RE

T W

OR

LD

OF

LE

E H

AR

VE

Y O

SW

AL

D

-very

` mom

ent th

ey w

ere not p

er-m

enial d

uties. T

he g

uard

s turiakeys w

ere especially brut•,' • H

en a

uriso

ner h

ad to

use

the

?Ile% he had to toe uo to a red line

screar., rec'uest over and over

ain, u

nt:

turnkey was satisfied

,!raneed oermission. O

ne fellow

v:h

o w

as in th

e briz at th

e m

e time as C

swa:d, descftord. the

• '; '7 as a h

orro

r—"far w

orse th

an

in civilian orisons." 'oseD

il D. M

a.cedo, a radar opera--.)r r. C

offee Mill, rem

embers m

eet-C

sv..ald

soon after h

e was re-

-. sr,: from

the b

rig. H

efounci h

im

:om

oletely

chan

ged

perso

n fro

m

and

inn

ocen

t bo

v w

ho

had

re

, : 'be

less than a earller.

-Osw

ald w

as a non-

1.,.ker and virgin 'when he C

a:T1C

v

erseas;" later on

, a: the six

- to

7...en

-o'clo

ck "h

appy h

ours," O

s-began drinking

.. mixed drinks

men

and b

ecame m

ore

xtroverte.c: and moderately hum

or- s.' M

aceclo found !:,:rra to be w

ithdraw

n an

d b

itter. ''I've

...en enough Of a dem

ocratic society .ere

In

MA

CS

-I," Osw

ald said

. 'W

hen

v. g

er ou

t I'm g

oin

g to

try

.-_,.:!!1:.r.g else."

"You A

mericans"

(... .`swn!..!) seem

ed to associate more

ever w

ith. h

's lapan

ese friends

less v..it Marines. H

e frecuently to T

okyo or otherwise cfisup-

- .:ared on h s passes. S

eptem

ber :9

58, C

offer M

il! vas o

-dered

to T

aiwan

. When

not

radar d

uty

, the M

arines h

elped

the Nationalist C

hinese troops build arti llery em

placements. T

his, to Os-

wald, w

as further evidence of Am

er-ican

- "im

perialism

." H

e told an

A

merican

reporter 13 m

onth

s later ab

out h

is ind

ignation

at "h

elpin

g drag up guns for the C

hinese, watch-

ing A

merican

techn

icians sh

ow th

e C

hin

ese how

to use th

em." H

e add

-ed

, "It's on

e thin

g to talk again

st com

mu

nism

and

anoth

er thin

g to d

rag a gun

up

a mou

ntain

side."

O

ne n

ight, soon

after they h

ad

arrived, Osw

ald was on guard duty

at about midnight w

hen Lt. C

harles R

. Rh

odes, th

e officer of the gu

ard,

suddenly heard "four or five" shots fro

m th

e po

sition

Osw

ald

wa

s gu

ardin

g. Draw

ing h

is .45-caliber

pistol, he ran

toward

the clu

mp

of trees from

wh

ich th

e gun

fire seem-

ingly emanated. T

here he found Os-

wald slum

ped against a tree, holding his M

-1 rilie across his lap. "When I

got to

him

, he w

as sh

ak

ing a

nd

cryin

g," R

hod

es later recoun

ted.

"H

e said h

e had

seen m

en in

the

woods and that he challenged them

and then started shooting." R

hodes put his arm

around Osw

ald's shoul-d

er and

slowly w

alked

him

back

to his tent.

Rh

odes rep

orted th

e incid

ent to

his comm

anding officer, and almost

imm

ediately after th

at Osw

ald w

as returned to Japan. R

hodes believed then, as he dors today, that O

swald

plan

ned

the sh

ooting in

ciden

t as a

plo

y to

get h

imself sen

t ba

ck

to J

ap

an

. "O

swa

ld lik

ed J

ap

an

a

nd

wa

nted

to sta

y. I th

ink

he

fired off h

is gun

to get out. T

here

was n

othin

g du

mb

abou

t Osw

ald."

O

swald w

as reassigned to a, Ma-

:4; rine squadron at Iw

akuni, an air base som

e 43o miles southw

est of Tokyo.

Ow

en D

ejanovich

, a tall, lank

y na-

ti ve of Chicago w

ho went on to play

profession

al football, recogn

ized

him as som

eone he had met in radar

school at Keesler A

ir Base and tried

• to

renew

the a

cqu

ain

tan

ce. He

qu

ickly

fou

nd

tha

t Osw

ald

ha

d

grown

enorm

ously b

itter since h

e had last know

n him. "H

e kept refer-rin

g to the M

arines at th

e center as

'You A

mericans,' as if he w

ere some

sort of foreigner sim

ply ob

serving

%%

hat we w

ere doing," says Dejano-

vich

. He sp

ok

e in slo

ga

ns a

bo

ut

Am

erican "

imp

erialism"

and

"ex•

ploitation," which m

ade Dejanovich

thin

k at th

e time th

at Osw

ald—

:44

whom

he called Bugs—

was m

erely being perverse for the sake of shock-in

g th

e oth

er Marin

es at the cen

ter. In

the e

ven

ing

s, Deja

no

vic

h

would

. occasio

nally

see Osw

ald

speak

ing

to an

attractive E

urasian

w

om

an. "S

he w

as much

too g

ood-

looking for Bugs," he recalls think-

ing, an

d h

e wondered

why su

ch an

attractive "roundeyc," obviously not a com

mon bar girl, w

ould waste her

time w

ith a Marine private. A

nother M

arine in the unit, Dan P

owers, got

the impression front O

swald that this

Eurasian w

as half-Russian and w

as teach

ing O

swald

the R

ussian

lan-

guage. Un

kn

own

to his fellow

Ma-

rines, Osw

ald was during this period

mak

ing carefu

l plan

s and

prep

ara-tions to defect to the Soviet U

nion—at least, that is w

hat lie told reporters

. P4

I P

,

One-H

alf Gallo

n

of C

leaner

$488 C

leans up to . e50 sq

. ft.

4-h

our ren

tal $1

M

onday th

ru T

hursd

ey • s.) 9

9

CA

RE

OR

IJN

OL

IM

San

dpap

er

8-fo

ot

Alu

min

um

: S

tepla

dder

4

$26

66

LE

E ifilR

YE

Y O

SW

/ILD

when he arrived in M

oscow one year

later. "Com

rade Osw

aldskovich" T

OW

AR

D T

HE

EN

D of 1958, O

swald

returned-to the United S

tates, spent a 3o-day leave in F

ort Worth, T

exas, w

ith h

is moth

er, and ju

st befo

re C

hristmas reported to his new

unit, M

AC

S-9, in S

anta Ana, C

alif. O

n F

ebru

ary 2

5, 1

959, O

swald

arran

ged

to tak

e a Marin

e Corp

s proficiency exam

ination in Russian.

In reading, he achieved a scorie of plus four, w

hich meant that he had

got fo

ur m

ore an

swers rig

ht th

an

wro

ng. In

writin

g, h

e scored

plu

s th

ree; in co

mpreh

endin

g sp

oken

R

ussian, he was w

eaker, scoring mi-

nus five. While his overall score w

as considered "poor" w

hen compared

with

the sco

res of th

ose stu

dyin

g

Russian

at languag

e schools, it

showed that he had learned the rudi-

ments of a very difficult language—

and n

one o

f his b

arracks m

ates in

Japan

remem

ber O

swald

usin

g a

Lin

guap

hone o

r record

s to learn

R

ussian

; this su

ggests th

at he h

ad

some m

ore private means.

Less than a m

onth after taking his R

ussian examination, O

swald took

and passed tests which gave him

the equivalency of a high-school diplo-m

a and made it possible for him

to ap

ply

to co

llege. M

eanw

hile, h

e w

ork

ed at im

pro

vin

g h

is Russian

. T

he Marines w

ho shared a cubicle w

ith Osw

ald in one of the Quonset

huts n

icknam

ed h

im O

swald

sko-

vich, and he played along by calling th

em "C

om

rade" an

d an

swerin

g

295

Do it b

ette

r yours

elf!

Visit th

e store

with

the S

entry

on th

e door!

Your n

eig

hborh

ood S

entry

hard

ware

dealer w

ill glad

ly h

elp y

ou w

ith y

our n

ext

hom

e pro

ject.

Your S

entry

dealer w

ill giv

e you ad

vice

on c

arp

et c

are

. Rent R

INS

EN

VA

C fo

r a •

pro

fessio

nal jo

b. C

lean, rin

se, v

ac in

a

single sw

eep.

Other Sentry "do-it.yourself' aids!

r.undt

r14

r•

•ofir

Sentry

Sen

try) P

utty

Knife

S

craper

$166

$166

wRAP-ON

$139

Odors A

way

I Clip

this

Coupon!

buy

M O

dors A

way

octiaseile fo

sloff

era

'elect (rem I to, Only 99c cu.n.

Hoe w

ee be timllod.

pro

MA

I a 19,1911. ti• I save 40C

J_

Jl,

1..rt,1

:1v1

-1.• I IV

: W

OR

LD

OF

LE

E H

AR

VE

Y O

SW

AL

D

LE

GE

ND

: TH

E S

EC

RE

T W

OR

LD

OF

LE

E. H

AR

VE

Y o

s.rvAn

ouestio

ns p

ut to

him

with

a da o

r a

7y su

mm

er 1

959, O

swald

had

beco

me so

well k

now

n as a R

usso

-nhi:e w

ithin

the u

nit th

at one M

arine

asked

',it,- to h

ave d

inner w

ith h

is au

nt, R

osaleen

Quin

n, an

attractive

airlin

e ste

ward

ess fro

m N

ew

Or-

.cans, b

ecause sh

e was stu

dyin

g R

us-

an in

ore

oara

tion fo

r the S

tate

D

epartm

cnt.s fo

reign

-langu

age ex

-.t :n

atio

n. S

he m

et O

swald

in a

cac.e

teria

in S

anta

Ana, a

nd

they

so

oke in

Russia

n fo

r about tw

o

.ours. A

:though sh

e had

been

study-

Russian

with

a Berlitz tu

tor fo

r m

ore th

-,Ln

a year, sh

e foun

d th

at O

swald

had a

far m

ore

confid

ent

com

man

d o

f the lan

guag

e than

she

d. That su

mm

er Osw

ald also

cond-

ed in

. C. N

elso

n D

elg

ado. T

hey

shared

an in

terest in F

ide: C

astro,

10 h

ad

in th

e b

egin

nin

g o

f that

rear assum

ed o

ow

er in C

uba. D

el-Itad

o rem

embers th

at when

he F

irst need so

me sy

moath

y fo

r Castro

's

revolu

tion, O

swald

's ears "perk

ed

up." In

the co

urse o

f their d

iscus-

sions O

swald

told

him

that h

e wan

t- . cd

desp

erately to

go to

Cuba an

d

help

train C

astro's arm

y.

Apparen

tly b

elievin

g th

at Del-

gad

o h

ad so

me lo

cal mean

s of g

et-tin

g in

touch

with

Cuban

s, Osw

ald

pressed

him

for so

meo

ne to

contact.

Delg

ado recalls th

at while th

ey w

ere on rad

ar duty

, he scrib

bled

a note to

O

swald

sayin

g h

e sho

uld

write "T

he

Cuban

Em

bassy

, Wash

ingto

n, D

.C."

While

Osw

ald

had u

p to

that

po

int receiv

ed v

ery few

letters, Del-

gad

o n

otic

ed th

at h

e n

ow

began •

gettin

g m

ail several tim

es a week

. H

e a

lso le

arn

ed, w

hile

lookin

g

thro

ugh O

swald

's lock

er for a tic to

borro

w, th

at at least som

e of th

ese letters cam

e from

the C

uban

consu

l-ate

. "The se

al," h

e re

calls, "w

as

unm

istakab

le." T

he m

om

ent O

swald

beg

an re-

ceivin

g h

is corresp

onden

ce from

the

Cuban

s, he b

egan

"puttin

g o

n a co

at (C

on

tinu

ed

on

pa

ge

25

2)

and tie

" and g

oin

g w

ith D

elg

ado

into

Lo

s An

geles, ab

ou

t an h

ou

r and

a h

alf away

by b

us. O

swald

told

him

his p

urp

ose w

as "to v

isit the C

ub

an

consu

late." Late o

ne n

ight, w

hile

Delg

ado w

as on d

uty

with

Osw

ald,

"I got a

call fro

m th

e M

P g

uard

shack that O

swald had a visitor at the

front g

ate

. This m

an h

ad to

be a

civ

ilian; o

therw

ise, they

would

hav

e let h

im in

. I had

to fin

d so

meb

ody to

reliev

e Osw

ald."

About an

hour later D

elgad

o h

ap-

pen

ed to

pass th

e main

gate an

d saw

O

swald

in a h

eated d

iscussio

n w

ith a

man

in a to

pco

at. It seemed

odd to

D

elgad

o th

at anyone w

ould

wear a

coat o

n a h

ot C

aliforn

ia nig

ht. A

l-th

ough O

swald

did

n't tell D

elgad

o

who th

e stranger w

as, he fo

rmed

the

imp

ression

at the tim

e that h

e was in

so

me w

ay co

nnected

with

"the C

uba

busin

ess." S

hortly

afte

rward

, he

asked Osw

ald if he was still planning

to g

o to

Cuba after h

is disch

arge. H

e recalls th

at Osw

ald screw

ed h

is fact in

to a sq

uin

t, as if he h

ad n

ot h

eard

Delg

ado co

rrectly, an

d th

en rep

lied

with

out fu

rther elab

oratio

n, "W

hen

I g

et o

ut, I'm

goin

g to

school in

S

witzerlan

d."

Osw

ald h

ad p

lanned

this stag

e in

his jo

urn

ey w

ith co

nsu

mm

ate care. H

e applied

in M

arch 1

959 for adm

is-sio

n to

the sp

ring 1

96o tern

s at the

Alb

ert Sch

weitzer C

olleg

e, a new

Ii b

end-arts co

llege in

Churw

alden

, S

witzerlan

d, H

e then

filed p

apers

with

the R

ed C

ross in

July

inten

ded

to

help

him

get an

early d

ischarg

e fro

m th

e M

arin

e C

orp

s, He e

x-

plain

ed in

a special-d

elivery

letter to

his m

oth

er that R

ed C

ross rep

resen-

tatives w

ould

call on h

er to ascertain

th

at he w

as need

ed at h

om

e to su

p-

port h

er. "Just in

form

them

that I

hav

e been

your o

nly

source o

f in-

com

e," he w

rote. H

e wan

ted an

early

disc

harg

e, h

e a

dded, "in

ord

er to

help

you." M

arguerite O

swald

fully

co

op

era

ted

with

her so

n, a

nd

on

S

eptem

ber 3

, to th

e surp

rise of h

is crew

matcs, O

swald

was d

etached

fro

m d

uty

to b

e pro

cessed o

ut o

f the

Marin

es. O

swald left S

anta Ana on S

eptem-

ber II fo

r Fort W

orth

, where

he

arrived

at his m

oth

er's house at

2 a.m

. on S

epte

mber 5

4. W

hen h

e

arose th

e follo

win

g m

orn

ing, M

ar-guerite w

as rudely

surp

rised b

y h

er so

n's an

nouncem

ent th

at he p

lanned

to

"board

a sh

ip a

nd w

ork

in th

e

export-im

port b

usin

ess." H

e with

drew

3203 fro

m th

e West

Sid

e S

tate

Ban

k, h

is on

ly k

no

wn

•b

ank acco

unt, an

d o

n S

eptem

ber re

left fo

r New

Orle

an

s afte

r giv

ing

M

arguerite S

roo. T

he n

ext d

ay h

e booked p

assa

ge o

n th

e fre

ighte

r M

arion Lykes, due to

sail the fo

llow

-in

g d

ay fro

m N

ew O

rleans b

ound

for E

uro

pe, p

ayin

g 3

220.7

5 fo

r the

one-w

ay tic

ket. A

lthough th

e

freighter h

ad acco

mm

odatio

ns fo

r 12 p

assengers, o

n th

is trip it carried

only

four: G

eorg

e li, Churc

h, Jr., a

retired lieu

tenan

t colo

nel in

the U

.S.

Arm

y; Isis w

ife; Billy

Joe L

ord

, a 17-y

ear-old

studen

t; and O

swald

, L

ord

's room

mate

for th

e 1

6-d

ay

voyag

e. In

the ev

enin

gs th

e four p

assen-

gers a

te a

t a C

O111111011

table, an

d

(7,C

ould

You L

ike R

eprin

ts? C

opies of th

e fo

llow

ing

artic

les in

this is-

sue are av

a:lable:

Easy

New

Way

to G

et Your W

ay

page 105

"No-17nt.!!t" D

ivorce: Is It Work

ing?

pag

e 113

The 'D

evastating Truth A

bout G

overnment C

ivea..vays

page 161 'ea,*

Va!u

es, Not G

uilt

page 1

87

Sp

ccia: l'rob

:cms o

f Wo

men

Alco

ho

lics

pag

e 207

Prices, p

ostp

aid to

one ad

dress: 1

2—

$11 5

0—

$2.5

0;

.100—$41 5

00-3

15;

'~W

rite: Rep

rint E

dito

r, The R

eader's D

igest,

Pleasan

tville,

(:'rites fo

r reprin

ts of o

ther a

rticle

s may b

e o

bta

ined o

n

request.

p7.1

.,

• .•,

Com

ing—

!n A

pril. R

eader's D

igest

C

on Your E

motio

ns K

ill You?

—Stress caused by 1.-tger, fear, hate, or even

•o'arici triumph, m

ay cause sudden death, suggests an authority on psycho-:'.:ness. C

ondensed from P

sychology "l'oday. M

el 'rooks: K

ing of Clo

wns—

He w

ent to school at the silent movies

on Coact' :::and. H

e beczne a a000-year-old man, an actor, w

riter, director, com

noser a-nd a comic genius of the cinem

a. E

uying and Selling of the Pentagon

—A

talc of two m

en who w

orked for '3,2W

-rui:itary-industrial com

plex." The:r different fates offer

s:zrt!ing insight into ths threatening colossus. W

ill Cigarettes S

elf-Destruct?—

New

cr, low-poison cigarettes m

ay help ,-;'''ons ';o:n th fast-grow

ing ranks of non-smokers.

!'!•.!s, the f'!nal installment of Legend: T

he Secret World of L

ee Harvey

Csw

e;d, condensed from the book by E

dward !ay E

pstein, that leads r,..1:ders into the heart of one of the m

ost sensational—and heretofore

r. ten

—in

to!:ig

rnce

Cases of m

odern times.

;:bleb for th

ese and m

ore th

an 3

0 o

ther a

rticles and fia

tures, selected

and C

OTU

AIISC

CI fro

m th

e best o

f curren

t readin

g.

154

sir ,-cc r-s4rwt.:r U

J WIL

L)

Osw

ald sat diagona!Iy across from

Co'oncl

Osw

ald: bsually ate an

d silen

tly.

one tim

e '..2hurc:! tried. to draw

him into con-

ve-sa'.'o

n, O

swald

gav

e him

a de.

,,crintio

n o

r the D

epressio

n o

f the

15*".•C.11 SC

CM

CC

I. CO

see as a :.:•.!re o

f caoitaIism

. Bitterly

, he

sera o his

..:ter a few d

ays at sea, O

swald

,an

so

end m

ost o

f his tim

e in

h•s cab

in an

d ev

en to

miss m

eals. assum

ed he was seasick.

Acco

rdin

7 to

British

oasso

ort.

control. reco7ds, Osw

ald arrived in `-',o.Z

..arnstr.on. on Friday, O

ctober 9, C

o customs oF

icia:s that he •-•!ad S

7ob .,v:th him and intended to

sben

d o

ne w

eek in

Englan

d b

efore

roceed

ng to

col:eg

e in S

witzer-

.and. They w

ere the last witnesses to

identify Osw

ald before he appeared in M

oscow one w

eek later. T

he stamps on his passport show

th

at he lei: H

eathro

w airp

ort in

L

ondon that same day on an interna-

tional flig

ht an

d lan

ded

later that

evening in Helsinki, F

inland, where

he sp

ent six

day

s. Sw

edish

intelli-

gen

ce has fo

und ev

iden

ce that O

s-w

ald traveled to Stockholm

during this period. apparently to consult the S

oviet embassy. S

ometim

e that same

week O

swald visited the S

oviet con-sulate in H

elsinki and obtained visa N

o. 403339, valid for a six-day trip to th

e Soviet U

nio

n. H

e also b

ought

$300 w

orth

of to

urist v

ouch

ers for

the Soviet U

nion, although it is not clear w

here he got these funds. On

the evening of October 15, O

swald

!eft Helsinki by train and crossed the

Finnish-S

oviet border at Vainikkala,

bound for Moscow

.

"I, Lee H

arvey

Osw

ald"

ON

SA

TU

RD

AY

MO

RN

ING

, O

cto-ber 31, tw

o weeks after his arrival in

Mosco

w, O

swald

emerg

ed fro

m a

taxi in front of the U.S

. embassy and

strode p

ast the M

arine g

uard

s into

the consular section. R

ichard E. S

ny-der recalls th

at Osw

ald b

anged

his

passp

ort d

ow

n o

n S

nyder's d

esk.

Snyder co

uld

see the ten

sion in

his

pallid fact: "He w

as wound up like

six watch springs."

Osw

ald stated coldly, "I've come

to give up my A

merican passport and

renounce m

y citizen

ship

." He th

en

handed the veteran intelligence offi-cer a sig

ned

but u

ndated

han

dw

rit-ten note saying:

I, Lee H

arvey Osw

ald, do here- by request that m

y present citi-zenship in the U

nited States of

Am

erica be revoked. I have entered the Soviet U

nion for the express purpose of apply-ing for citizenship in the S

oviet U

nion, through the means of nat-

uralization. My request for citi-

zenship is now pending before

the S

uprem

e Soviet o

f the

U.S

.S.R

. I take these steps for political reasons. M

y request for the revoking of m

y Am

erican citi-zenship is m

ade only after the longest and m

ost serious consider-ation. I affirm

that my allegience

[sic] is to the Union of S

oviet Socialist R

epublics. S

nyder co

uld

see that O

swald

's defectio

n h

ad b

een carefu

lly p

rc-

pared. Osw

ald's note showed a A

rm

understanding of the legal subtleties governing the revocation of citizen-ship and, despite O

swald's obvious

edgin

ess, Snyder assessed

him

as "in

telligen

t and q

uite articu

late." S

nyder asked if he was prepared

to serv

e the S

oviet state. O

swald

spontaneously answ

ered that he had been a radar operator in the M

arine C

orps and that he had already agreed to

furn

ish th

e Soviet U

nio

n "w

ith

such knowledge as he had acquired

while in the M

arine Corps concern-

ing his specialty." Osw

ald strongly hinted that he knew

something that

would

be o

f "special in

terest" to

Soviet intelligence.

At the tim

e there was little S

nyder co

uld

do to

deter O

swald

from

his

planned course. He thus asked him

to

return

the fo

llow

ing M

onday

on

the pretext that the consulate could not p

rocess h

is applicatio

n o

n a

Saturday. O

n M

onday

, how

ever, O

swald

did not return, and S

nyder drafted a telegram

to the State D

epartment in

Washington stating, "T

he embassy

pro

poses to

delay

action o

n O

s-w

ald's request to execute an oath of ren

unciatio

n to

the ex

tent d

ictated

by developments." T

he delay went

on fo

r more th

an th

ree week

s. In

this p

eriod O

swald

gran

ted tw

o

interv

iews to

Western

corresp

on-

dents, th

e first to

Alin

e M

osb

y

of UP

I. L

ike others at the consulate who

felt Osw

ald , m

ight h

ave b

een "tu

-to

red," M

osb

y n

oted

that O

swald

used

pro

pag

anda p

hrases, su

ch as 255

who the investigators w

ere, and the official reco

rd o

f the in

vestig

ation

remains m

issing or at least unavail-able.l'he F

BI, the M

arine Corps, the

Office o

f Nav

al Intellig

ence, th

e Na-

val In

vestig

ative S

ervices, th

e CIA

an

d th

e Air F

orce O

ffice of S

pecial

Investig

ations (w

hich

was resp

onsi-

ble fo

r base secu

rity at A

tsugi) d

eny

hav

ing it in

their files o

r particip

at-in

g in

any su

ch in

vestig

ation.

Thro

ugh h

is experien

ces as a ra-dar co

ntro

ller in Jap

an, T

aiwan

, the

Philip

pin

es and C

aliforn

ia, Osw

ald

could

hav

e had

access to classified

in

form

ation p

ertainin

g to

almost all

aspects o

f the A

ir Defen

se Iden

tifica-tio

n Z

on

e in th

e Pacific, in

clud

ing

know

ledge ab

out th

e heig

ht lim

ita-tio

ns o

f Am

erican rad

ar, the b

lind

spots c

ause

d b

y g

round tra

ffic o

r

atmosp

heric d

isturb

ances in

vario

us

areas, secret radio

frequen

cies, call sig

ns an

d au

then

tication co

des u

sed

for id

entify

ing in

com

ing aircraft.

He also could have had access to

all the security procedures for chang-ing codes and frequencies, the m

odes an

d an

gles fo

r intercepting enemy

aircraft (from

which

perfo

rman

ce data ab

out d

ifferent air-to

-air mis-

siles could

be d

educed

), and th

e lo

cation an

d effectiv

e range o

f the

Am

erican an

d A

llied aircraft sta-

tioned in th

e Pacific.

At A

tsugi, Osw

ald also could have w

itnessed

repeated

takeo

ffs of R

ace C

ar, the still-su

persecret U

-2, an

d,

from visual, radar and radio observa-

tion, co

uld

hav

e establish

ed its rate

of climb, perform

ance characteristics an

d cru

ising altitu

de. W

ith th

e pro

p-

A

D'P N

I"U

S

"Yr: W

EA

RP

R!

4_4_ O

nly Cushion G

rip Guarantees O

ne Application

Holds D

entures Securely Up T

o 4 Days O

r... D

OU

BL

E Y

OU

R M

ON

EY

BA

CK

CU

SHIO

N G

RIP ;•'''.0

ONE APPLICATION HOL DENTURES UP TO 4 FULL

M OATS

.•••••°■-r

Double M

oney

Back

Guaran

tee If one a

pplic

atio

n o

f Cush

ion G

rip d

oesn

't hold

den

tures ,secu

rely u

p to

4 day

s—retu

rn

un

use

d p

ortio

n to

Plo

ug

h, In

c., M

em

ph

is, T

n. 3

3151 an

d g

et double y

our m

oney

back

. A

quality product 01 Plough, Inc.

kvt-IAL.0 u

r r.c

r. I- 141(1'1: r va IVef/.1.)

—

s'

I

47'

v.. Pr, r •

••■•\ -

There are tim

es when

noth

ing

t,ats sitting: d

ow

n an

d h

avin

g

uup o

f hot co

ffee or tea.

ticularly

first thin

g in

the

norri'n

g. It tastes g

ood an

d

ve,7, you a if, as th

e day

wears o

n,

'0%2 so

metim

es find y

ourself

-lyin

g a cu

p o

f coffee o

r tea

or th

e lift, sh

ould

ow

about V

ivarin

. V

ivaria is a g

entle p

ick-m

e-up.

The active ingredlent th

at

Viv

aria so effectiv

e is caffein

e of tw

o cu

ps o

f sq

ueezed

into

one easy

to

,..:e lab:et. A

nd a V

ivarir. tab

let m

ore eco

nern

lcal. than

two

..ns 0

: coffee, an

d req

uires n

o

-7a-a

gog.

yo

u w

ant a lift, tak

e It's co

nven

ient,

.'ey.7

.iens:v

e, easy to

take, an

d

-ally w

ork

s.

- - ;

. 9.. • 0

e4Ia

5c! fo

r d,rections.

:her.fs a free g

lft of

roff-fg...ratur Marlet1 in

MaLr'AL.,.! r

ttC1,.:,-;; et, o!V

Ivartn

.

"capitalist lackeys" and "imperialist

runnin

g d

ogs," w

ith w

hich

he w

as not entirely com

fortable, "It sound- : e

d a

s if it were

all b

ein

g g

iven

by ro

te, as if he h

ad m

emorized

P

ravda." T

o th

e second rep

orter,

Priscilla Jo

hnso

n, o

f the N

orth

A

merican N

ewspaper A

lliance, Os-

wald m

ade a point of attributing his decision to defect to his experiences in A

sia with the M

arine Corps. "I am

not an idealist com

pletely," he told Jo

hnso

n. "I h

ave h

ad a ch

ance to

w

atch Am

erican imperialism

in ac-tion ... if you've ever seen the N

aval base at S

ubic Bay in the P

hilippines you'd

know

what I m

ean. A

meri-

cans lo

ok u

pon all fo

reign p

eoples

as som

ethin

g to

be ex

plo

ited fo

r profit."

Mean

while, b

ack in

the U

nited

S

tates, the sh

ock

wav

es from

Os-

wald's defection and his offer to give

classified information to the S

oviets reverberated through his form

er ra-dar unit in C

alifornia. Delgado viv-

idly remem

bers a group of civilians in dark suits arriving in N

ovember

with stenographers and literally tak-

ing over their headquarters company

to question Marines about O

swald.

When

his tu

rn cam

e, Delg

ado

recalls, one of the civilians shot quick questions a

t him

concerning his job in the radar bubble, his know

ledge of O

swald's activities and his opinion

of the sorts of classified information

to which O

swald had had access. A

num

ber of other Marines in the unit

remem

ber b

eing ask

ed th

e same

questio

ns as a sten

ograp

her to

ok

dow

n th

e answ

ers. None w

as told

Cush

ion G

rip D

entu

re Adhesiv

e, a pli-

able th

ermo-p

lastic disco

very

, ends th

e need to frequently apply pow

ders, pastes cr c

ream

s. It quic

kly

form

s a se

cure

co

mfo

rt seal betw

een g

um

s and d

entu

res w

hich

lasts up

to 4

day

s. C

ush

ion G

rip is n

ot d

issolv

ed b

y h

ot o

r ccld

liquid

s. Daily

cleanin

g w

on't w

ash

it off—

won't lo

osen

it from

den

tures.

Every

time y

ou re-in

sert yo

ur d

entu

res, C

ush

ion G

rip recreates a secu

re com

fort.

seal for n

ew co

mfo

rt and secu

rity. F

or

den

tal health

see your d

entist. regularly.

Ch

ang

e to C

ush

ion

Grip

tod

ay.

• L

EG

EN

D: T

HE

SEC

RE

T W

OR

LD

OF

LE

E H

AR

VE

Y O

SWA

LD

er guidance, he might have been able

to d

ecipher elem

ents o

f its radar-

nllin

g e

quip

ment.

Th

e frequ

encies, co

des an

d o

ther

gen

era

l data

, now

com

pro

mise

d,

could

be ch

anged

. But th

e info

rma-

tion O

swald

mig

ht h

ave am

assed o

n

Race C

ar presen

ted a m

ore d

ifficult

pro

blem

. F

rom

Mosco

w, o

n N

ovem

ber 2

6,

Osw

ald sen

t his b

roth

er a long an

d

particu

larly w

ell-written

letter ex-

pla

inin

g, "w

hy I a

nd m

y fe

llow

w

ork

ers and

com

mu

nists w

ou

ld lik

e to

see the cap

italist govern

men

t of

the U

nited

States o

verth

row

n.

• , Wo

rkers m

ust fo

rm u

nio

ns

again

st their em

plo

yers in

the U

.S.

becau

se the g

overn

men

t supports an

eco

nom

ic system

which

explo

its all th

e work

ers, a system

based

upon

credit w

hich

giv

es rise to th

e nev

er-ending cycle of depression, inflation, unlim

ited sp

eculatio

n an

d w

ar." H

e c

on

tinu

ed

: "I wan

t yo

u to

u

nderstan

d w

hat I say

no

w, I d

o n

ot

say lig

htly

, or u

nknow

ingly

, since

I've been in the military as you know

, an

d I k

now

what w

ar is like. In

the

even

t of w

ar I would

kill an

y A

meri-

can w

ho p

ut a u

nifo

rm o

n in

defen

se o

f the A

merican

Go

vern

men

t—an

y

Am

erican."

This letter ap

peared

in W

ashin

g-

ton, D

.C., am

ong th

e letters from

M

osco

w ro

utin

ely tu

rned

over to

a C

IA.o

peratio

ns secto

r work

ing u

n-

der A

ng

leton

in co

un

terintellig

ence.

It was ev

iden

t from

the letter th

at O

swald

had

put h

imself firm

ly u

n-

der th

e contro

l of h

is hosts. H

e had

defected

, renounced

his citizen

ship

, co

mpro

mised

military

secrets, and

den

ounced

his co

untry

and fam

ily.

His fate n

ow

rested en

tirely w

ith th

e S

oviets, o

n w

hom

he w

as dep

enden

t for legal status, financial support and pro

tection. H

e was, as Jam

es Angle-

ton

later pu

t it, "in th

e palm

of th

eir hand—

and they could squeeze at any tim

e.". H

is bro

ther re

ceiv

ed o

ne b

rief

lette

r from

Osw

ald

a fe

w w

eeks

late

r, statin

g th

at h

e w

as m

ovin

g

from

the M

etrop

ole H

otel. O

swald

also

sent h

is moth

er, Marg

uerite, a

brief n

ote.

He w

as no

t heard

from

again

for

more th

an a y

ear. (T

o be concluded next moni4)

Tip-Offs

PoE

rs hail th

e first robin

as a sign

of sp

ring

. Bu

t ho

usew

ives an

d

classified-ad takers know that a m

ore reliable in

dicato

r is the n

otice w

hich

read

s: "Garag

e Sale, S

aturd

ay, to

-4."

—N

honon M. M

o.orkhain in Ao

d M

ow

YO

U'V

E. LEAnN

ED to

live w

ith y

ou

rself w

hen

yo

u c

an

driv

e a

rou

nd

the

blo

ck alo

ne w

itho

ut tu

rnin

g y

ou

r car radio

on

, —

Sheldon llolocr m

P.olvde

A W

OM

AN

says she thinks her daughter's marriage, about w

hich she's had som

e concern, is going to last: "They've planted som

e asparagus." —

tha

w by D

irni in Ala

nn

tain

torg

Attp

ain

r

2 0