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TOP SECRET tll.THA. b}· Peter Calcocorcsst. Pautheon lboh. New 'lurk 1%013::! Pl)·

This slim volume fncm('s on Oll(, a'lX'd uf iIIh-I 111:1'11('('-durtng \\'orl«l \\'.11 II III('

br ••aks 1111\1 Gccman high gralit, clnhers b)' a l'onR('ri4'~ nf lal"IJIt,c.l lWIIl"", allli II••.exnlottatlon (If these breaks, It is an evaluation (If a "siJ!~:I." bul exlr:wrdin.H)·" ~"Ifl t'

of "HiiC"al and ~trat<ogi(' intc·llig.'nc(' [nrormation It a'~'S5('S Ill{" 1r1lP;H'! (If Ihh ~lIurl'l'

on the course of the war against Cormany.

A barrister commissioned in .1>("RAF In 1939, Peter Calvocorevsi rost' t" 1>(' III".ulof air Intelligence at Bletchlev Park, silt' of the attac], on 11,(' German high !traIl!'cinhers, Author of numerous scholarh' works on International arrafr~ Ilflt"r Ihr war,and protege of historian Arnold Tovnbee. Calvocoressl has :pw"I.t,·d a working 1<,\(,1insid('l admirably snare and lucld analvsls of the once pn-"ioml), h.·ld l'IITa sc', rd.and of the elitist, tight-JimX'd aggregation recruited to d('\lelolp and \\,oclc 110(' s}'\l<'m •

In short, iI is good historical exposition.

Enigma ••••.as the Cerrnan name of the electro-rncchunlcr.l dl>tll'ring machinf' uv-dfor highest grade cornmunk-ations among the top 1('\'I"1sof tl~ Third R,'kh Orlgillalha corr.rnerclal product, the German militarv adonted .1 and. over thl' \o·,'ar(.

progressivelv complicated its transposition srst('m.' (Calv()('oTt's.sl has wrill"11 tIll'clearest explanation ext an! of how Ih(' machine work I'd ) Top Secret L'ltra was tIlt' control slug giveu by the British to the intelligence r!·sulting [rom Ih(" ltn'ak hI!" lIlt'Enigma ciphers. From the middle of 19·10 onwards Ultra WH all ('VI'T lUl'.'>('nt fador,

sometimes D<'riphf'TaI to the ('OUTS£' or baules and sometimes vitu], but all' J.)'

Significant. A~ described elsewhere, Ultra lllldlig('JI(,(, was "the ('C}'st,tl ball in tll<'knapsacks of the allted commanders," l'sp<'dalh from ('arl)' I!H I nn, thiv, thl' 4111l1,tlr

ill:ominates in a notably readable st~I(',

During the Battle of Britain L'[tra provid(·d llor basis [or "irlll;,11) d.l\ -Ill d,l\estimates of Luftwaffe strength, although lilt' major contrlhution wax mad., I,~ 1>c<,~J.,into 10.•••· grade ciphers and voice intercepts whkh Wt'T1' of II••• Y S<'n'k.',· \111]1''''

mented by radar,

Chra provided proof that lilt" invavion of Britain hAd 1""'11 ('all.·d uff, II••.evidence being the deactivation of the starr which wa, to t'lllltrol lilt' CI'CIIl.JI1

operation. Churchill. then,fori', could confid"nth' send armor to f('inforn' Wavr-ll ill

Ih(' ('a.IINn desert which otherwise would hav e had to be f('ldrot,cJ in Bnlain

\~':H'lher Rommel would ultimatt'ly haw been d.,f.'atl·') in Arriea if tIll' Alh« 1i.,,1not Illld Ultra "is a question which can not IX' answered with "('rtaint)' "

Thf' Battle of the Atlantic "Hitler could have won, and Tlt'.lrl}' WOII, hut \\ hid, I••.lost because of Ultra." Indeed, the break into the most ('01111) "X naval En!!':"", dl'l ••.rcarne only in December 1942. the eleventh hour, having 10('1'11 ullft'adaltl(· for tl ••.

\• fO! th~ tholl<.:lnd, of men and worn ••n involved in one or .nf)tl,~r (l.lr1 "f Itlt" I\,t"/I) llt"",u~ <I"iI

Ihal Jl.:ut~l~ ru'~ rrqulrt-d For S("('urit)' and r;aH·h broken "as "on. e in. nt'\N CHIt" Am('ru..w ·,ff~lt'"t~wert> intf'gr.kd into the wurking st ••fh of nlt'h'hlr) ft •• ,k lw-gulfllng In HJ~l. ·'.an tmnlf"lI'f'h, a..,I.· ('flntmlot~'r"

, an iidc:!jtjon so smooth ""(" hardh noticed it." AU Ih,. Artlr.rk.Hl~ w r-re- un(I(":-lhc" urd.,(\ ur '-;{)("(".&I BrolrH hG-2. W~. Department The S<'<'r~1or nlra was k••pt 1m ~lrnl"l thlrl) )1''''' ah·, If••. "'M 1\0111'0/ II,,' .,,111ors who have since gOJIt' tmh1ic on rhra are Amrn('an

,t \.1 ~:"rvlee jnt("n~t'pti"o or Cecm.an morse tC.lHk lr"'n~mi"t..,.i h} ralhn. \(l tlr{J~·lff(·(i ttu'" rOJ"'- "1.llt'noll

fOf Bk-trh ('y P4rk ,"'lthuut this inlt'rcf'[)tinn ('~El:Jhilih·. no L!ltu Ct\ 1)1~n.1h \l'~ U't~IUr('~ ttu ••hh ~1 It ~.l. ••.

Ihal huncfit-d' .of morse <'1tpiefS s,w'nt tht- war gllJC"d h. ht-:uJ).!'h

Appro~'e~fQf ReleaseIi.! JAN 1989

131

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C00047375. .1;,1 " Bools

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pre vloi.s ten months, Read regularly thereafter (although with varying liIlH s , bg\b<'I"'('(,11 interception and read-out, sometime-s OW[ a ••••'Cfkl, the' last major ll.boatvictory in the Atlantic came In March 1943. The author asse-ts that "this was Ultra'sgrt'atesl triumph." However that may be, it surely had unique signifkanrr in thewinnina of the war,

[I]] fa provided the hasis for British scientists to dcvlse measures III ('01I1,,,"r theGerman systems for night bombing with navigational radio aids, it Iumishcd thescientists with the communications between till."Luftwaffe bomber command and thetechnical research units which developed the beams.

To sum up, Ultra Intelligence, high in quality and great in range and Quanti! Y.revealed often day by day where enemy units were located, how strong, how wdl orill sunn'ied, where they were told to go, what they were told to do, and what newweapons !echnologit'S were under development. lntclligeuce :;';J rtch and-usualh'.-soprompt as well, eased inestimably the reaching of nivotal ccrnrnnnd dccistons, h"thstrategic and tactical. As the author puis it, such intt'lIig('nc!' "cofiditiofWd the t ••••.omajor elements in war making: the choice between strategu-s, and Ih{' cholcc hdwN'1lways of implementing the strategy }'OU have ('1I05(-'n"

All this having been said, one is moved 10 add that inlt'lIig"T\ct' l)rorl·\.~i(Jnal~art'not to Ir-rget the danger lurking in a mind-set which over relies on a 5inglt' sourer- tothe negJl"ct of others. The Germans had oeriooic Qualms over lhe socur lty (If EnigmaLucky f<lr the Allies. the Germans remained ('onfid{~Ilt. LUt'h·, too, that tilt' war ('nd •.das earlv as it did; Cerrnan cryptographers were constructing a new ('nt'il'h('ringsystem.

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(l1nd.mified)

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