Post on 15-Apr-2018
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ZAMBIA NATIONAL GOVERNANCE BASELINE SURVEY REPORT
[[A]]PREFACE
The quality of governance plays a significant role in the management of any
country. In March 2000, the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) launched the
National Capacity Building Program for Good Governance in Zambia. Through this
program, the GRZ aimed to enhance good governance in Zambia by strengthening
institutional linkages and building institutional capacity, and also to identify clear policy
guidelines to promote good governance. To coordinate the National Capacity Building
Program for Good Governance in Zambia, the GRZ established the Governance
Development Unit (GDU) in the Ministry of Justice. The GDU is responsible for
coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating the Governance Program in Zambia.
Transparency and accountability are two of the key strategic objectives of the
National Capacity Building Program for Good Governance in Zambia. Under these joint
objectives, the GRZ has acknowledged that corruption and poor public service delivery are
governance problems affecting economic and social development in Zambia. In January
2001, the GRZ requested the World Bank to provide assistance in the development of a
comprehensive governance and anti-corruption strategy.
Upon assuming office and noticing the high levels of corruption in the country, His
Excellency, the President Mr. Levy Patrick Mwanawasa, SC, declared zero tolerance for
corruption. This gave a big boost to the fight against corruption. At the launch of the
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National Movement Against Corruption in March 2002, the President announced that his
government was going to conduct a National Governance Baseline Survey (NGBS) based
on three country-wide surveys as a way to address the issue of corruption. The surveys
would be used to collect data from the nation on corruption and public service delivery
with a view to developing a comprehensive strategy to combat corruption and enhance
public service delivery. The Minister of Justice and Attorney General, Honorable George
Kunda, SC, MP, officially launched the NGBS in September 2002.
The NGBS is based on three country-wide surveys and their findings, which are reflected
in the NGBS report, summarise the Zambian population’s views on corruption as
perceived by three distinct populations: users of public services (households), public
officials, and business enterprises. The use of the experience of these three populations
permits triangulation of the results and greater objectivity. The NGBS report provides a
firm empirical basis for developing action plans and sharing responsibilities among
coalition partners, as well as implementing and monitoring an integrated national anti-
corruption program. The survey results are particularly useful in describing the
experiences of the Zambian population, as these experiences relate to their views on
corruption as well as service delivery and the efficiency of public institutions. The survey
results will also provide benchmark indicators so that elements of governance and the
extent of corruption practices may be reviewed through another survey in two to three
years.
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The information collected from the NGBS offers a set of key messages that
complements and reinforces the government’s stand on the fight against corruption.
Furthermore, the findings of the surveys confirm that the crusade against corruption—
which His Excellency, the President Mr. Levy Patrick Mwanawasa, SC, is spearheading—
is not a personal or political issue, but a matter of national concern as exhibited by the
views of the Zambian population.
The NGBS has been coordinated by the Ministry of Justice through the Governance
Development Unit, which chairs the steering committee that is overseeing the NGBS. The
steering committee, called the Governance Baseline Survey Team (GBST) oversees all the
affairs of the NGBS. The GBST comprises the following institutional members: Anti-
Corruption Commission, Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Finance and National
Planning, Cabinet Office, Integrity Foundation of Zambia (Civil Society Organization),
and the Ministry of Justice.
The GBST was responsible for all the general discussions regarding the surveys’
technical parameters such as survey design, sample frame, and so on. The GBST was
responsible for preparing and revising the survey instruments of the NGBS. Furthermore,
the GBST was responsible for all tender procedures and selection of the Consultant, which
was in this case the Department of Political and Administrative Studies of the University
of Zambia, who undertook the survey. The GBST, in collaboration with the World Bank,
provided technical backstopping to the Consultant and ensured that high standards of
quality were observed as the survey was being undertaken. Such quality control measures
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are evident from the scrut iny to which the GBST subjected the pilot survey report, the draft
final survey report, and the final survey report. The comments from the GBST and the
World Bank have culminated in the NGBS report that is now available.
The survey was financed by the Department for International Development (DFID)
of the United Kingdom through the World Bank, while the GRZ met the administrative
costs of the survey.
The rationale for a survey-oriented diagnostic approach is that voicing the
experiences of the people who interact with the state and implement state policies is
essential for the development of a well- informed and effective anti-corruption strategy.
The rich survey data collected facilitated the process of unbundling the many faces of
corruption, from administrative corruption to state capture, as well as the process of
assessing their presence across Zambian governmental agencies and regions. Such detailed
analysis allows us to link different forms of corruption to specific institutional and regional
weaknesses in the country.
The GBST would therefore like to put forward the NGBS, which is expected to
contribute to enhancing good governance in Zambia by reducing corruption and improving
public service delivery, thereby contributing to economic and social development in
Zambia.
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[[A]]EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This summary covers the findings of the three in-depth baseline surveys conducted in 2003
by the Department of Political and Administrative Studies of the University of Zambia.
The main objective of this exercise was to obtain information that would assist the
Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) in designing a comprehensive governance
and anti-corruption strategy. In particular, the surveys aimed to assess the extent and costs
of corruption across public agencies and the quality of the services delivered to citizens.
Three thousand Zambian citizens, comprising 1,500 household heads, 1,000 public
officials, and 500 managers of enterprises from all the nine provinces participated in this
effort and expressed their views and concerns about the quality of governance in the
country.
The rationale for a survey-oriented approach is that voicing the experiences of the people
who interact with the state and implement state policies is essential for the development of
a well- informed and effective anti-corruption strategy and for improving service delivery.
The rich survey data collected facilitate the process of unbundling the many faces of
corruption, from administrative corruption and state capture1 to an assessment of their
presence across Zambian governmental agencies and regions. Such detailed analysis makes
it possible to link different forms of corruption to specific institutional and regional
weaknesses.
The information collected by the surveys offers the following set of key messages:
1 Administrative corruption refers to corruption relative to the implementation of rules and regulations; state capture describes corruption that affects the actual design of the laws and regulations.
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Ø Zambia faces serious governance challenges at this stage. Corruption in
Zambia takes many forms and is quite common, especially in the areas of public
service delivery, permits and licences, and public procurement (Figure E.1).2
Ø Urban and rural areas face significantly different challenges. Households
and managers report that the biggest challenges in service delivery are in the
rural areas (Figures A.1 and A.2). Bribes, however, are more frequently asked
for in urban areas than in rural ones (Figure A.3).
Ø Corruption increases inequality and impedes access to basic public services.
Low-income citizens (households) are disproportionally penalised by paying
bribes that represent a greater share of their income (their gross monthly
revenues) than their counterparts in the middle- and high- income brackets
(Figure A.12). Bribery does not translate into better quality of services (Figure
A.16). Corruption also reduces access to basic services and to courts.
Ø Need for public administration improvements. Based on public officials’
responses, nepotism and corruption in the budget process are the greatest
challenges within the public administration. It is necessary to improve recruiting
and establish a merit-based promotion system, to guarantee insulation of the
civil service from changes in political administrations, and to promote
transparency and accountability in the budget management process.
2 Figures with the prefix “E” before their number refer to those figures that appear here in the Executive Summary; figures with the prefix “A” are those in the appendix; those with no prefix before the number refer to the figure number of the main report.
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27%
26%
20%
19%
36%
33%
39%
38%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
% of users who were asked for a bribe to obtain public services
% of users who were asked for a bribe to obtain licenses and permits
% of managers who were asked for a bribe to obtain contracts with public institutions
% of cases in which bribes were necessary to obtain public services (% of public officials reporting it is very frequent)
Purchasing of positions (% of public officials reporting it is very frequent)
% of cases in which bribes were necessary along the contracting process (% of public officials reporting it is very frequent)
Public funds misappropriation (% of public officials reporting it is very frequent)
% of managers who were asked for a bribe to obtain licenses and permits
Figure E.1 Corruption in Zambia: A Summary
Ø Citizens’ voice is still ineffective. Citizens often do not know how or where to
report corruption (Figure 3.26 in the main report). Public officials suggest that the
complaint and consultation mechanisms in place in their organisations are not
effective (Figure 4.35 in the main report).
Ø The business environment is adversely affected by corruption, government
inefficiency, and shortage of funds. The high frequency of bribery, bureaucratic
red tape, and the problems of accessing information and funds make it difficult to
start a business and operate.
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In sum, the country is at a cross-roads and it is crucial to implement a series of institutional
reforms in key areas to improve transparency and accountability of public agencies. Only
in this way will governance significantly improve. In this regard, it remains to be seen if
implementation of the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP), once completed, will
have a positive impact on public institutions.
[[B]]Challenges Facing the Nation: Overview
• Corruption as a top socioeconomic challenge for the country. All respondents
regard the high cost of living and inflation as the top serious problems for Zambia.
However, corruption appears among the top three serious problems for most of
citizens (Figure E.2). Over 80 per cent of households and public officials rated
corruption in the public sector as a very serious challenge to the country, and about
67 per cent of managers rated it as the most burdensome obstacle to business
development. Food availability is also a challenge, especially for households in the
eastern and southern provinces.
Figure E.2: Key Problems in Zambia, 2003 (as reported by households, public officials, and
managers)
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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
High cost of living
Safety concerns /crime
Corruption in thepublic sector
Infraestructure/Qualityof roads
% of respondents considering these as serious problems
Households Public Officials Managers
• Frequency and forms of corruption. Corruption has many faces in Zambia, from
administrative corruption (to obtain permits or a basic service) to nepotism and
procurement mismanagement (Table E.1). Some of these forms of corruption are
more widespread than others. Almost 40 per cent of respondents report that they
have been asked for a bribe to obtain a public service or licenses and permits. The
police, the National Registration Office, the courts, and the Lands Department are
agencies where unofficial payments are more frequently requested.
• Moderate integrity of some key public organisations. Over all, public institutions
are considered to be only moderately honest. The organisations rated the most
honest are the Ministries of Health and Education, the postal services, and church
and religious organisations.
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• Poor ratings for the political system and the police. All three groups of
respondents rate political parties as well as core public security institutions (such as
the police) among the most corrupt state agencies. More than 70 per cent of
households and managers complain about the lack of honesty of these agencies.
Public officials also state that political party executives have a significant influence
on government authorities (Figure 3.18). About 10 per cent of managers report that
they contributed to a political party during the last elections to obtain favourable
treatment.
Table E.1. Governance and Corruption Indicators by Province
* Note: The indicators above take values between 0 and 100. To interpret them please keep in mind
that (1) the higher the value of the corruption index, the more severe the problem; and (2) the higher
the value of the governance indicator, the better the quality of that dimension.
• Delivery of some public services is perceived to be poor and uneven across the
Central Copperbelt Eastern Luapula Lusaka Northern Northwestern Southern Western
Overall corruption 24 27 40 37 25 36 31 21 16 28Administrative corruption 25 31 45 43 30 48 27 33 20 33State capture 18 21 36 34 21 32 25 16 12 32Corruption In budget 36 44 43 40 33 43 46 30 15 37Corruption in public contracts 37 34 47 47 35 49 35 24 22 36Corruption in personnel (1) 14 24 37 26 20 23 18 18 9 22Corruption in personnel (2) 41 41 54 50 38 53 45 25 34 41
Accessibility for poor 69 63 68 69 67 67 61 71 70 67Audit mechanisms 64 63 66 55 68 60 55 58 68 63Enforcement of rules 56 49 60 53 57 57 49 56 58 55Politicisation 38 42 40 39 38 36 38 39 36 39Quality of rules 60 54 56 51 62 61 52 58 61 57Resources 56 40 59 40 50 51 38 48 53 48Transparency 54 51 50 39 58 57 34 55 54 52Citizen voice 62 58 57 53 55 57 56 59 55 57Meritocracy 64 62 68 56 67 65 57 68 75 64
ProvinceIndicator*
Whole Country
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country. Households and managers report that pension offices, local councils,
health services, and the police provide the worst services (Figure E.3). Moreover,
the quality of many basic services from providers such as pension offices, Social
Security, and the Housing Authority is higher in urban areas than in rural ones
(Figures A.1 and A.2). Service delivery, however, varies not only between rural
and urban areas but also among provinces. The Eastern and Luapula Provinces
appear to face the greatest challenge with regard to Traffic Police services and
Zambia Postal Services, respectively (Figure A.15).
• The role of incentives. A preliminary analysis indicates that there is a positive
correlation between lower levels of corruption and better governance institutions
such as functioning audit and complaint mechanisms, effective enforcement of
rules, and lower political interference in personnel and budget management.
(Figures A.4, A.5, A.6, and A.7).
[[B]]A closer look
• The role of incentives. A preliminary analysis indicates that there is a positive
correlation between lower levels of corruption and better governance institutions
such as functioning audit and complaint mechanisms, effective enforcement of
rules, and lower political interference in personnel and budget management.
(Figures A.4, A.5, A.6, and A.7).
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Figure E.3: Quality of Public Services (as reported by households and managers)
• Firms and public procurement. Unofficial payments to get government contracts
are also quite widespread, and managers report forfeiting, on average, 6.4 per cent of
the invoice value to public officials in order to expedite contract payments from the
government (see Figure 3.12).
• Adverse effects of poor governance on business environment. Corruption and
poor services are not the only challenges faced by firms. Bureaucratic red tape also
places a burden on the private sector. Managers report spending about eight weeks
on average to register a new business and about 3.2 per cent of their time weekly
dealing with public officials. Some managers hire facilitators to deal with the
government bureaucracy. The top five institutions where managers reported
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Pensions
Councils
Public health services
Police excluding Traffic Police
Traffic Police
Public education services
Social security
Telephone
Electricity
Company registration
Zambia National Commercial Bank
Postal services
% of respondents reporting high quality of service
Managers Households
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0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
Request for licenses and permits
Public service procedure
Pursue legal proceedings in the judicialbranch
Obtain contracts with state institutions
Update on fiscal situation
% of firms reporting that bribes are very frequent
Domestic Foreign
spending the greatest amount of time each week were, in order of ranking, the
Zambian Revenue Authority (ZRA), the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation
(ZESCO), local authorities, the public health services, and the police (Figure A.10).
Figure E.4. Bribes by Type of Activity: Comparing Domestic and Foreign Firms
• Households are less likely to be asked for a bribe. The police, the National
Registration Office, and the courts are the offices where private citizens are most
likely to be asked for a bribe. However, the frequency of these requests is lower for
households than for managers by about a third (Figure A.11).
• Households are more likely not to use a public service they need because of
corruption and official costs. Households pay on average 4.8 per cent of their
(weighted) monthly income in bribes to obtain public services. This figure can be
misleading, since low-income households pay about 18 per cent of their monthly
income in bribes, while high- income households pay less than 1 per cent. About a
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third of the respondents report that they did not seek to obtain a service from the
ZRA, the police, or the water agency, though needed, because they could not afford
the unofficial payments (Figure E.5). Thus, low-income citizens are the ones
penalised the most, as they pay a substantially higher proportion of their income in
bribes than high- income ones (Figure A.12). Users of public education services are
discouraged from accessing the services more by official costs than bribes, while the
opposite is the case for users of public health services (Figure 4.31).
• Corruption and delays as obstacles to accessing courts in Zambia. Corruption
and delayed justice are the main barriers against households’ and firms’ access to
courts (Figure A.13). Households identify the influence of corruption in court
decisions as the leading obstacle to accessing courts in Zambia, while managers
suggest that the length of the court process is the most serious obstacle to using
courts (Figures 4.25, 4.26, and 4.28).
• The performance of the judiciary. About 40 per cent of households and 25 per
cent of managers report that bribes are paid to speed up legal proceedings. More
than 50 per cent of managers believe that the judiciary is independent neither from
the government nor from economic pressures, nor do they report that justice is
administered in a fair, just, or transparent manner (Figure E.6).
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Figure E.5. Cost of Corruption: Discouraged Users of Public Services (as
reported by households)
• The mechanisms of corruption. How is corruption perpetrated? According to
public officials, the initiative to pay is more likely to come not from the officials
themselves but from the clientele (Figure 3.14). In contrast, households and
managers report that public officials ask for a payment in most of the cases (Figure
3.15).
• State capture . Some key ‘institutions’ outside of the public sector appear to fuel bad
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Public health services
Councils
Water & Sewerage
Traffic Police
Zambia Revenue Authority(ZRA)- Taxes Division
Percentage of respondents reporting that they decide not to conduct procedures with these institutions because they could
not afford the unofficial payments
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governance by exercising undue influence over the state. In particular, political
parties, multinational companies, and economic groups are perceived as wielding
great influence in shaping policies and regulations. Further, both enterprises and
public officials report that bribes are used to avoid taxes and regulations, ensure
patronage, and influence high court authorities.
• Bribes are also linked to political funding. About 10 per cent of firms report
having made political contributions during the last elections to receive favourable
treatment (Figure A.14). This is true especially for medium- and small-size firms.
Both public officials and managers believe that these contributions have great
negative influence on the business environment (Figure 3.16).
• Reporting corruption. Awareness of the corruption reporting process is very low
among households. Almost 80 per cent reported not knowing the process (Figure
3.25). Lack of information about the reporting mechanisms, which is the main
obstacle, is particularly pronounced in Northern, Northwestern, and Eastern
Provinces (Figure 3.27). Although public officials claim to know the corruption
reporting process better than households do, they admit to not reporting all the cases
of corruption they witnessed, thus suggesting that many such cases go unreported.
For public officials, the main obstacles to reporting corruption are the fear of
harassment and the difficulty of proving cases of corruption in courts.
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25
45
45
49
52
52
44
27
28
26
35
32
31
29
27
26
13
16
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Less corrupt than thegovernment
Is very fair
Deserves confidence
Laws apply equally tothe rich and the poor
Independent ofeconomic pressures
Independent of thegovernment
% of firms that evaluated the aspect of the judicial sector
Negative Neutral Positive
Figure E.6. Performance of the Judiciary (as reported by managers)
• Willingness to contribute to eliminating corruption. Managers state that they
would be willing to pay about 4 per cent of their business’ monthly revenue to
eliminate corruption completely (Figure E.7). Medium-size firms are especially
willing to eliminate corruption. However, citing poverty as their main reason, the
majority of household respondents are not willing to contribute part of their income
towards eliminating corruption (Figures 3.28 and 3.29).
• Quality of services and corruption. In some cases, households not only have to
pay extra to obtain a public service, they also receive a fairly poor quality of service,
as illustrated in Figure E.3. We can observe significant differences across provinces
and areas, with Luapula and the Eastern provinces rated the worst (Figures A.1, A.2,
A.15). Paying extra, however, does not translate to a better quality of services
received (Figure A.16).
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0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
All Small Medium Large
By size of firm
• Quality of services: The public officials’ point of view. Public officials, on
average, consider the services provided by their institutions to be of high quality.
Moreover, they suggest that the services provided by their institutions are fully
satisfactory to the users and accessible to poor citizens. However, only about a third
of public officials indicated that the consultative and complaints mechanisms exist
and work effectively; thus suggesting the need for a more comprehensive feedback
mechanism system (Figures 4.34 and 4.35).
Figure E.7. Willingness to Pay to Eliminate Corruption (per cent of
monthly revenues that firms are willing to pay to eliminate corruption)
[[B]]Measures for Improving the Quality of Services
• Education services. Low salaries and inadequate infrastructure are the principal
cause of poor education (Figure 4.12), according to households. The cost of
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accessing education is another factor responsible for the poor quality of education.
• Public health services. Provision of adequate drugs is identified as the main
measure for improving health services. The majority of household respondents
indicated that making adequate drugs available could lead to the improvement of the
public health system (Figure 4.13). About 70 per cent of households report that the
availability of more hospitals, clinics, and rural health centers and the availability of
trained staff are key factors in improving the public health system.
[[B]]Performance of the Public Administration
• Efficiency of public organisations . Public officials report that a few agencies, such
as the Ministry of Education, Zambia Postal Services, and ZESCO, are efficient,
while several others, such as Traffic Police, local authorities, the Passport and
Citizenship Office, the Ministry of Works and Supply, and the Road Traffic
Commission, are considered to be quite inefficient. Among judicial organisations,
local courts received the most negative evaluation. This suggests that the reported
poor performance is due either to inefficiency or lack of adequate capacity to dispose
of cases expeditiously.
• Performance standards . About 45 per cent of public officials report that their
organisations did not have any written standards of performance. In the cases where
these standards existed, only half of the cases were met. Leading organisations in
meeting performance standards were identified are the Ministry of Community
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Development and Social Services, the Bursaries Committee, the Public Service
Commission, the Teaching Service Commission, the Judicial Service Commission,
and the Ministries of Communications and Transport, Foreign Affairs, and
Information and Broadcasting Services.
• Inadequate resources. Financial and physical resources are inadequate. Public
officials indicate that the amounts of budgetary allocations their organisations
receive are not enough to carry out their activities.
[[B]]Management of Public Resources
• Managing personnel. More than two-thirds of public officials report an extremely
low level of involvement in personnel decisions, except in the case of disciplinary
actions. Personnel management is hampered by red tape and lack of transparency.
About 20 per cent of public officials state that rules and regulations about personnel
decisions are never or rarely are applied, and almost 50 per cent reveal that personnel
decisions require excessive administrative steps (Tables A112 and A113 in
Appendix 1 of the main report). The indices of meritocracy and corruption in
personnel (Table E.1) are especially low for the Traffic Police, the Housing
Authority, and the Director of Public Prosecution.
• Recruitment process and information. Responses by public officials on survey
questions about recruitment procedures confirmed that transparency and merit
criteria are seldom followed in personnel decisions. Almost half of respondents
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stated that they heard about the first job opening in the government through an
advertisement, while about 20 per cent received a personal notification from a public
official, indicating the potential extent of patronage.
• Public sector compensation. Salary dissatisfaction among public workers is very
widespread, with about 90 per cent reporting that salary and benefits are not
satisfactory (Figure 6.3). In addition, salaries are paid late. Of the public officials
interviewed, 98.3 per cent indicated that they experienced delays in receiving
salaries. Notwithstanding this problem, there is a general perception of job security
among the respondents, 70.6 per cent of whom ‘completely agreed’ or ‘agreed’ that
their jobs and positions were secure, while 43.6 per cent reported that working in the
public sector was better than working in the private sector.
• Performance evaluation and disciplinary actions. About one-third of the
respondents reported never being subject to evaluation. The majority of the public
officials subject to evaluation reported that their performance is assessed once a year.
Such an unsatisfactory evaluating system does not allow the rewarding of excellent
professional achievement, as most respondents indicate (Figure 6.4). Nor does it
permit applying disciplinary actions impartially, thereby jeopardising the
effectiveness of the personnel management system (Figure 6.5).
• Illicit payments to secure public administration positions . About 34 per cent of
public officials report that this practice exists for higher-level jobs, while this number
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0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Among superiors Among collegues at thesame level
Among subordinates
% o
f res
pond
ents
rep
ortin
g pu
rcha
se o
f job
s is
a v
ery
com
mon
pra
ctic
e am
ong.
..
declines to about 25 per cent for lower-level positions. The evidence suggests that
some of these positions may be purchased as a ‘private investment’ since a
significant number of public officials indicate that bribes are a significant part of
total revenues (and are more significant for higher- level positions; see Table A73 in
Appendix 1 of the main report). The Traffic Police, ZAMPOST, the Judiciary, and
the Public Service Management Division are the agencies where this practice is most
frequent (Figure A.17).
Figure E.8. The Practice of Purchasing Jobs Among Public Officials
(as reported by public officials)
• Budget management. Poor management of budget resources is a serious challenge.
More than one-third of public officials report abuse. There are a variety of possible
reasons for such a poor rating. Public officials’ responses reveal that the levels of
participation in the budget process—preparing, implementing, and monitoring—are
very low. Moreover, public officials, while reporting that budget-monitoring
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mechanisms are fairly effective (Figure 6.10), also suggest that the quality of budget
rules is quite poor. Most public officials also see the degree of political influence on
budget decisions as an obstacle to effective budget management.
• Information management and communication. The channel of communication
between the government and its citizens is weak. The majority of respondents feel
that people affected by broad public sector decisions are the last to know about them
(Figure E.9). Public officials also report that, though there is relatively good
communication among departments in the same organisation, there is poor
communication across government agencies (Figure 6.17).
• Procurement management. Overall, public officials believe that the guidelines for
procurement management at their organisation are followed. However, about 50 per
cent report that public contracts are never or seldom awarded in a transparent and
efficient manner (Figure 6.15).
[[A]]LINKING CORRUPTION TO INSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITY
• Exploiting institutional heterogeneity. The evidence clearly indicates that there is
an extremely varied governance performance across institutions in Zambia (Table
E.1). It is therefore misleading to generalise about performance, governance, and
corruption for all institutions. Such variance permits, however, a more rigorous
econometric analysis to distill the key elements that influence governance. This
analysis between governance structures (as rated by public officials) and the
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performance and integrity of the public institutions (as rated by users, enterprises,
and public officials) suggests that the following factors may be important for
potentially improving governance:
1. Audit: The relationship between corruption and the existence of audit
mechanisms within an agency is statistically significant: agencies where such
mechanisms exist are less likely to display high levels of corruption (Figure A.4).
2. ‘Voice’: The simple correlation analyses suggest that corruption-reporting
mechanisms, which are effective and which credibly protect whistleblowers, are
associated with lower levels of corruption. Furthermore, complaint mechanisms
that guarantee satisfactory outcome deter corrupt behaviour (Figure A.5).
3. Enforcement of rules: When rules and regulations relating to personnel are
applied and supervised, there are fewer incentives for corruption (Figure A.6).
4. Politicisation: Agencies in which public officials report that decisions about
contracts and financial resources are influenced by political pressures display
higher levels of corruption in the procurement process.
25
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%%
of p
ublic
offi
cial
s w
ho a
gree
People affected bybroad public sector
decisions are the lastto know about them
When managers makedecisions, they never
consider theirsubordinates' opinion
The institution does nothave an adequate
system for recordingmanagerial decisions
Figure E.9. Information Management and Communication in the Public Sector
(as reported by public officials)
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[[A]]APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL DATA
Figure A.1. Quality of Public Services: Urban versus Rural Areas (as reported by households)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Pensions
ZRA Customs Division
Zambia National Building Society
Insurance
Social Security
Traffic Police
Councils
National Housing Authority
ZRA Taxes Division
ZRA VAT Division
Road Traffic Commission
Police excluding Traffic Police
Public health services
Land allocation
Water & Sewerage
Tender Board
Public education services
National Registration Office
Telephone
Company Registration
Passport and Citizenship Office
Judges/Court officials
Postal Services
Electricity
Zambia National Commercial Bank
% of households reporting high quality of services
urban rural
27
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Land allocation
Water & Sewerage
National Roads Board
Pensions
Telephone
Public health services
Energy Regulation Board
Traffic Police
National Housing Authority
Police excluding Traffic Police
National Registration Office
Public education services
Electricity
Tender Board
ZRA VAT Division
Judges/Court officials
ZRA Customs Division
Zambia National Building Society
ZRA Taxes Division
Social Security
Road Traffic Commission
Passport and Citizenship Office
Councils
Zambia Investment Centre
Company Registration
Zambia National Commercial Bank
Postal Services
Insurance
% of enterprises reporting high quality of services
urban rural
Figure A.2. Quality of Public Services: Urban versus Rural Areas (as reported by managers)
28
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Managers
Households
Managers
Households
Managers
Households
Managers
Households
Managers
HouseholdsT
o ob
tain
cont
ract
s w
ithst
ate
inst
itutio
ns
To
upda
te/re
vise
tax
stat
us
To
obta
inba
sic
publ
icse
rvic
es
To s
peed
up
lega
lpr
ocee
ding
sin
the
judi
cial
bran
ch
To
obta
inlic
ense
s or
perm
its
% of respondents reporting that bribes are very frequent
Urban Rural
0102030405060
20 40 60 80 100Audit mechanisms
Ove
rall
corr
uptio
n r = -0.55
Figure A.3. Bribes by Type of Activity: Urban versus Rural Areas (as reported by
households and managers)
Figure A.4. Audit Mechanisms and Overall Corruption (based on responses of 53
agencies)
29
01020304050607080
20 40 60 80 100
Citizen voice
Adm
insi
trat
ive
corr
uptio
n
r=- 0.48
0
20
40
60
80
20 40 60 80 100
Enforcement of rules
Cor
rupt
ion
in p
erso
nnel r = -0.48
Figure A.5. Administrative Corruption and Citizen Voice
(based on responses of 53 agencies)
Figure A.6. Enforcement of Rules and Corruption in Personnel
(based on responses of 53 agencies)
30
0102030405060708090
100
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Corruption in public contracts
Pol
itici
satio
n
r = 0.54
Figure A.7 Politicisation and Corruption in Public Contracts
(based on responses of 53 agencies)
31
Figure A.8. Frequency of Bribes (as reported by managers)
Note: The frequency was calculated for those users who contacted the agency seeking attention.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Zambia Postal Services
Tender Board
Insurance
Zambia Telecommunications Company (ZAMTEL.)
Zambia National Commercial Bank
Social Security
Zambia Investment Centre
Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA)- Vat Division
Water and Sewerage Company
ZRA Taxes Division
National Housing Authority
Energy Regulation Board
Company Registration
Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO)
National Roads Board
Public health services
Pensions
Public education services
Zambia National Building Society
Councils
Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA)- Customs Division
Judges/Courts officials
Road Traffic Commission
National Registration office
Passport and Citizenship Office
Police excluding Traffic Police
Lands Department
Traffic Police
% of enterprises reporting that they were asked to pay a bribe when they approached the agency to obtain a service
32
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Judges / Courts Officials
Land Department
Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA)-Customs Division
Police excluding Traffic Police
Traffic Police
% of firms reporting they were asked for a bribe when approached the agency to obtain a service
large medium small
Figure A.9. Frequency of Bribes by Size of Firm (as reported by managers)
Note: The frequency was calculated for those users who contacted the agency seeking attention.
Thin lines represent margins of errors (at 95 per cent confidence interval) for each value. They
show the range where the true population would lie with probability 0.95 if we had drawn a
random sample from this population.
33
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
ZambiaRevenue
Authority (ZRA)
ZambiaElectricity
SupplyCorportation
(ZESCO)
Councils Public HealthServices
Police
% of firms reporting that the greatest amount of time was spent in this institution
Figure A.10. Institutions Where Firms Spent More Time Dealing with Bureaucracy
34
Figure A.11. Frequency of Bribes (as reported by households)
Note: The frequency was calculated for those users who contacted the agency seeking attention.
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA)- Vat Division
Tender Board
Custom authority
Zambia Telecommunications Company (ZAMTEL)
Zambia Postal Services
NAPSA
Company Registration
Citizenship office
Water and Sewerage Company
Public education services
Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO)
ZRA Taxes Division
Public health services
Councils
Labour office
Lands Department
Pensions
Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA)- Customs Division
Passport and Citizenship Office
Judges / Courts officials
National Registration Office
Traffic police
Police excluding Traffic Police
% of households reporting that they were asked for a bribe when they approached the agency to obtain a service
35
0
5
10
15
20B
ribes
as
% o
f hou
seho
ld
inco
me
Wholecountry
Low Middle High
By household income
Figure A.12. Percentage of Household Income Paid as Bribes to Obtain Public Services,
by Household Income Status (as reported by households)
Note: Figures are calculated from those users who contacted the agency, and they are weighted
by income level.
36
58%
60%
62%
64%
66%
68%
70%
72%
74%
Businesses Households
% of households/businesses that see corruption as a very important obstacle when using courts in Zambia
(calculated out of those who felt the need to use courts)
Figure A.13. Corruption as an Obstacle to using Courts in Zambia (as reported by businesses and households)
37
8.4%
8.6%
8.8%
9.0%
9.2%
9.4%
9.6%
9.8%
10.0%
10.2%
10.4%
10.6%
Last six years Last election campaign
% o
f res
pond
ents
Figure A.14. Requirement to Contribute to Political Parties in Order to Receive
Favourable Treatment (as reported by managers)
38
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
CentralCopperbelt
EasternLuapulaLusaka
NorthernNorthwestern
SouthernWestern
CentralCopperbelt
EasternLuapulaLusaka
NorthernNorthwestern
SouthernWestern
Pos
tal S
ervi
ceT
raffi
c P
olic
e
% of households reporting high quality
Figure A.15: Regional Differences in Quality of Services (as
perceived by households)
39
Figure A.16: Bribery and Quality of Public Services (as reported by households)
Note: Each point in the graph represents the combination quality-bribe for a public service
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Average quality of service
Ave
rage
brib
e pa
id to
obt
ain
the
serv
ice
(kw
acha
)
corr = -0.43
40
Figure A.17. The Practice of Purchasing Jobs Among Public Officials, by Institution (as
reported by public officials)
Note: Only agencies with more than five responses were included.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Min. of Finance and National Planning
Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA)
Min. of Health
Min. of Education
Min. of Agriculture, and Cooperatives
Min. of Works and Supply
Min. of Mines and Minerals Development
Min. of Home Affairs
Traffic Police
Zambia Telecommunications Company (ZAMTEL)
Zambia Postal Services (ZAMPOST)
Province government
Municipal government
Office of the President, Public Service Management Div.
Judiciary
Among superiors Among collegues at the same level Among subordinates
% of respondents reporting that
purchase of jobs is very frequent
among…