Post on 27-Jan-2016
description
WHY THE AMERICAN RULING CLASS BETRAYS ITS RACE AND CIVILIZATIONSamuel Francis · August 25, 2015
The article was first published in Race and the American
Prospect in 2005.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it ought to be obvious
that the dominant powers and authorities in the United States and
other Western countries are either indifferent to the accelerating
racial and cultural dispossession of the historic peoples of America
and Europe or are actually in favor of it. Mass immigration imports
literally millions of non-white, non-Western aliens into the United
States, Canada, Australia, and Europe, yet the governments of
those nations make no serious effort to halt or restrict it, and
cultural elites either decline to notice the transformation
immigration causes or openly applaud it. Indeed, as immigration
critic Peter Brimelow argued in his 1995 book Alien Nation, the
immigration crisis in the United States has a political origin in the
1965 legislation that created it—it is not simply an ineluctable
process of history, let alone the product of popular preference, but
the result of the decisions and actions of political leaders who
either wanted it to occur or who have been unwilling to stop it once
it began.
The same is true of such policies as affirmative action, long
supported by major universities and corporations as well as by the
federal government. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the 2003 Supreme
Court ruling that upheld the University of Michigan law school's
affirmative action policies, 65 corporations filed amicus curiae
briefs endorsing the school's admission policies that discriminate
against white applicants.[1] The 1991 Civil Rights Act, a major
intensification of affirmative action enforced by the federal
government, was also endorsed by large corporations. Not only
corporations but also and even more obviously the major political
leaders of the country and the major cultural voices either explicitly
approve of affirmative action and denounce anyone who opposes it,
or refuse to resist or question it.
Similarly, most of the leading authorities in the United States—
what is popularly called the "Establishment," including political,
media, academic, and business leadership circles—oppose publicly
displaying or honoring the Confederate flag and other symbols of
the white American heritage (the Custer battlefield at Little Big
Horn, the celebration of Columbus Day, the playing of "Dixie," etc.)
and support non-white demands for the removal or transformation
of such symbols. Large businesses, foundations, and universities
are in the forefront of mandatory "sensitivity training,"
multiculturalist indoctrination, and efforts to portray white racial
and cultural identity as a source of pathology, extremism,
repression, and violence, and to instill feelings of guilt for white,
European, Christian civilization and achievements. Some years ago
the Budweiser company sponsored a series of advertisements that
helped popularize and legitimize various myths of Afrocentric
propaganda, such as the claims that the Semitic Carthaginian
general Hannibal, various kings of ancient Egypt, and the last
Macedonian queen of Egypt, Cleopatra, were all Negroes—claims
known to be preposterously contrary to historical fact. No company
of that scale in recent times has ever sponsored analogous ads
glorifying the Confederacy or the white exploration and conquest of
North America or white contributions to science, scholarship, and
letters or any other achievement of whites, even by means of more
or less accurate history, let alone by outright lies. In 2000, Wal-
Mart and most other large corporate food chains ceased selling a
barbecue sauce locally manufactured by South Carolina
businessman Maurice Bessinger, on the grounds that Mr.
Bessinger's restaurant in Columbia, South Carolina displayed the
Confederate flag and distributed pamphlets that supposedly
justified Southern slavery. Spokesmen for Wal-Mart claimed that
Mr. Bessinger's sauce was dropped because their chain did "not
condone slavery in any way"—although at the same time,
as Business Week (October 2, 2000) disclosed, Wal-Mart was
selling women's apparel known to have been manufactured by slave
labor in Communist China.
One could continue indefinitely the catalogue of how large
corporations and their executives, the federal and larger state and
urban governments and their leaders, and the major academic,
intellectual, artistic, entertainment, publishing, and journalistic
institutions and personali-ties—the dominant culture of the United
States—consistently support anti-white causes and promote the
myths, claims, and interests of nonwhites at the expense of whites.
The conventional accusation against the American Establishment
from the political left is that it is "racist" and fosters "white
supremacy" in order to perpetuate the domination and exploitation
of the nonwhite peoples of this country and the world by the largely
white ruling class. That accusation is so brazenly contrary to the
anti-white policies, rhetoric, and behavior in which the most
powerful forces in American society consistently engage that it
withstands little scrutiny. By playing on the guilt and fear of
establishment leaders, both of which reflect these leaders' shared
acceptance of the left's egalitarian values, it is an accusation that
serves mainly to push the establishment ever further and faster
down the anti-white path than it is normally inclined to go. Fixated
on a nineteenth century model of "capitalism," the Marxism from
which this accusation derives has managed to miss the realities of
twentieth and twenty-first century power that do in fact explain
what must be one of the most significant and astonishing truths of
human history—that an entire ruling class has abandoned and in
effect declared war upon the very population and civilization from
which it is itself drawn.
If Marxist theories offer no explanation of the antagonism of the
American Establishment to white racial identity, neither does
conventional democratic political thought. Mass immigration,
affirmative action policies, blatant discrimination against white
identity and those who defend it, multiculturalism in education,
anti-white brainwashing in sensitivity training, support for non-
white (and often anti-white) political and cultural causes, and other
manifestations of entrenched antagonism to whites are not the
results of democratic majority rule or popular consent. At best,
whites accept or "consent to" these onslaughts against them, their
material interests, their heritage, and their own psychic identity
and integrity because "consent" has been subtly manufactured and
shaped by the institutions of the dominant culture. Not a single one
of the measures that threaten whites has originated among whites
themselves at the popular or grassroots level. Each and every one—
mass immigration, the forced busing of the 1970s, the civil rights
rulings of the federal courts from the 1950s through today, the
affirmative action invented by invisible bureaucrats and upheld by
unaccountable courts, the mind control measures that now
permeate our schools, workplaces, and media, and the systematic
repression and exclusion of those who question or challenge these
trends—has originated from and has been imposed and enforced by
elites.
Nor does racial blackmail, frequently cited as the reason elites so
often collaborate in anti-white policies, offer an adequate
explanation. While racial extortionists like Jesse Jackson, the
NAACP, and various Hispanic lobbies threaten denunciations of
"racism," anti-discrimination lawsuits, demonstrations, boycotts,
etc. against institutions that fail to submit to their demands and
complaints, the institutions they target possess immense financial
resources, legal talents, and political and public relations influence
themselves—yet they do virtually nothing to defend themselves
against such attacks and support virtually no efforts to counter the
legal, political, and cultural conditions that allow the attacks to
succeed. It is unlikely that racial blackmail could work as well as it
usually seems to do unless its victims were already willing to
surrender to it or already inclined to accept its assumptions of
guilt.
Neither Marxism nor the democratic theory embraced nowadays by
both "liberals" and "conservatives" is therefore of much use in
understanding why the dominant elites of American and Western
society behave as they do. The model that does help explain their
behavior derives from what is usually called the "classical theory of
elites," developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by a
school of Italian and German sociologists and political scientists,
and from the application of that model to twentieth century
America, the theory of the managerial revolution as developed by
James Burnham.
THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF ELITES
The classical theory of elites was formulated principally by the
social and political theorists Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. It
holds that all human societies, at least all above the primitive level,
are ruled by organized minorities ("elites" or "ruling classes"), that
the majority in any society, even so-called democratic ones, never
rules, and that these organized minorities develop out of social-
political groups that control what are known as "social forces." The
term "social force" is an admittedly vague concept that can include
virtually any idea, technique, or institution that exerts social
importance—a religion, an ideology, a technology, a weapons
system, control of natural resources, etc. As Arthur Livingston,
editor of Mosca's classic work, The Ruling Class, explains:
A "social force" is any human activity or perquisite that has a social
significance—money, land, military prowess, religion, education,
manual labor, science—anything. The concept derives from the
necessity of defining and classifying ruling classes. A man rules or a
group of men rules when the man or the group is able to control
the social forces that, at the given moment in the given society, are
essential to the possession and retention of power.[2]
What may be a significant social force in one historical epoch may
be an insignificant one in others—for example, the religion of
Mithraism in the ancient Roman Empire, which for a time rivaled
Christianity but eventually lost out and ceased to be important, or
the control of the technology of producing and using iron weapons
in the second millennium B.C., which had not been a significant
force prior to its invention but became and remained a power-
yielding technology around which dominating social groups and
conquering societies centered for thousands of years afterwards.
If a social force is efficient at wielding power or control over other
people, then the group that controls the social force and other
groups with which it is allied will constitute a "ruling class"
(Mosca's term) or "elite" (Pareto's term), and classical elite theory
assumes that normally a ruling class or elite will exercise power
mainly for its own benefits and in its own interests. It should be
understood that the control of "the state" or the formal apparatus
of government is only one means and the state itself only one
instrument by which a ruling class exercises power, and the extent
to which a particular ruling class will rely on the state depends on
its interests and the kinds of social forces it controls. It will also
make use of economic and cultural power based on its control of
economic forces, or what Marx called the "instruments of
production and exchange" (land, capital, technology, industrial
plants, commerce, financial institutions, etc.), as well as cultural
forces that essentially regulate the production and dissemination of
information, values, and ideas within a society (in pre-modern
societies, this means principally religion, but also the production of
art, literature, music, scholarship, science, and entertainment
through publishing, education, journalism, broadcasting, film, etc.).
The power of a ruling class or elite is therefore not merely political
power in the narrow sense of control of the formal state, elected
and appointive offices, the administrative agencies, and the
instruments of force (the armed forces and law enforcement
services) but is structural—imbedded in the structure of the society
it rules. A ruling class will usually tend to rely on one or another
particular segment of the social structure—the state, the economy,
or the culture—for holding and exercising power, but those
segments are never entirely separate and the particular ones on
which it tends to rely will depend on its own interests and beliefs as
well as on the level of technological and social development of the
society and on the kinds of challenges, problems, and enemies it
encounters.
In the process of acquiring and exercising power, the ruling class
will reshape the society and culture it dominates in order to
buttress, defend, and justify (or "rationalize") its dominance, and
the reshaping will reflect what the elite perceives as its group
interests. It carries out the reshaping of society first by defining
and imposing an ideology, or what Mosca called a "political
formula," that justifies its power as right or natural or inevitable.
"Ruling classes," Mosca wrote,
do not justify their power exclusively by de facto possession of it,
but try to find a moral and legal basis for it, representing it as the
logical and necessary consequence of doctrines and beliefs that are
generally recognized and accepted.[3]
The ideology or political formula is imbedded in and imposed on the
subject society by means of the cultural institutions the ruling class
creates and controls, and the articulation and defense of the
formula is the main purpose of the culture with respect to the
ruling class. But, as Mosca and Pareto both acknowledged, elites
typically "really believe in" the ideologies and formulas they
espouse. Political formulas are not, Mosca insists, "mere quackeries
aptly invented to trick the masses into obedience. Anyone who
viewed them in that light would fall into grave error."
The truth is that they answer a real need in man's social nature;
and this need, so universally felt, of governing and knowing that
one is governed not on the basis of mere material or intellectual
force, but on the basis of a moral principle, has beyond any doubt a
practical and a real importance.[4]
One of the major differences between the theory of elites and
simpleminded conspiracy theories is that the latter almost always
postulate hidden groups of conspirators who do not believe in the
ideas they use to gull and manipulate the masses. In elite theory,
political formulas tend to become ideologies that take on a life of
their own and push behavior of their own accord, without conscious
or deliberate fraud or calculation of interests by those who accept
them.
The theory of elites as formulated by Mosca and Pareto can easily
be illustrated by the example of medieval and early modern
European and British society. In that society, political, economic,
and cultural power was largely in the hands of the feudal and post-
feudal aristocracies that controlled the land, which yielded both
economic wealth and political and military power through the
system of feudalism and institutions derived from feudalism. The
power of the European and British aristocracies of this era, from
the Middle Ages down to the Industrial Revolution, was mainly
based on control of the land, its agricultural wealth, and the
cultural and political system that reflected and supported landed
power.
The dominant ideology or "political formula" of the period was
expressed in the doctrine of what was later called the "Great Chain
of Being," a theory of the universe that derived from Plato and
justified hierarchy both in nature and society. It is found
throughout the literature and thought of the era.[5] Only when the
social force of land ownership and the wealth and power it
produced was displaced by the rise of a different social force in the
form of industrially and commercially based wealth and power in
the nineteenth century did the older aristocracies of Europe and
Britain begin to decline and be replaced by a new elite, based on
industrial, commercial, and financial wealth.
It is a basic tenet of the classical theory of elites that all human
societies have elites, that there is really no such thing as political or
social equality or "consent of the governed," and that what is called
"democracy" in any literal sense is largely an illusion. As James
Burnham wrote in describing the role of elites and ruling classes in
human society:
From the point of view of the theory of the ruling class, a society is
the society of its ruling class. A nation's strength or weakness, its
culture, its powers of endurance, its prosperity, its decadence,
depend in the first instance upon the nature of its ruling class.
More particularly, the way in which to study a nation, to
understand it, to predict what will happen to it, requires first of all
and primarily an analysis of the ruling class. Political history and
political science are thus predominantly the history and science of
ruling classes, their origin, development, composition, structure,
and changes.[6]
Political scientist James Meisel argued that an elite must exhibit
what he called the "Three C's: Consciousness, Coherence, and
Conspiracy." This is a helpful but also perhaps confusing formula,
especially its third term. He meant that all the "members of an elite
are alert to their group interest or interests; that this alertness is in
turn caused or affected by a sense, implicit or explicit, of group or
class solidarity; and last, that this solidarity is expressed in a
common will to action.”[7]These traits may be said to establish the
common identity and unity of the elite or ruling class, but the elite
must not only be "alert" to its interests as a group and conscious of
itself as a group, but also able to make its interests prevail over
those of other, competing groups—i.e., to possess actual power. In
other words, the two essential characteristics of an elite/ruling
class are what may be called Unity andDominance—unity in that it
needs to cohere around its interests and to agree on what its
interests are and (in general) how to pursue them,
and dominance in that it must be able to make its interests prevail
over those of rival groups.
Many social theorists in the Western world today argue that the
kind of unitary ruling class that Mosca and Pareto described is no
longer really possible in the kind of advanced industrialized society
that prevails in the West and that there are too many competing
power centers for unitary elites like the old British and European
aristocracies to develop and endure. These theorists mainly support
the idea of what they call "strategic elites," a number of different
elites within the same society that may control power in certain
domains but actually compete with and against each other and
through their conflict create what is essentially political freedom.
Thus, elites in such institutions as corporations, unions, and
government exist but are said to be largely separate and distinct
and supposedly compete against each other, as do the different
political parties and their elites, as well as other institutions in the
economy, politics, and the culture.[8] However, while there are
obvious structural differences between contemporary elites today
and those of pre-industrial societies, this version of elite theory,
often called the "pluralist model," tends to exaggerate the
differences among the "strategic elites" and the degree to which
they compete or conflict with each other. It also tends to minimize
the similarities among "strategic elites" and the common interests
they share in excluding from power any groups or social forces with
antagonistic interests, ideologies, and agendas. In other words, in
my view, the basic error of the "pluralist," or "strategic elite,"
school is that it underestimates the unity of the American ruling
class. Remarks such as George Wallace's line in 1968 that "there's
not a dime's worth of difference" between the Republican and
Democratic Parties, the term "Republicrat" as a colloquialism for
the indistinguishability of the two parties, and the wisecrack that
what American politics needs is not a "third party" but a second
party all reflect the perception among the politically alienated of
the essential unity of the two major political vehicles of the
American ruling class.
Moreover, classical elite theory does not deny that different groups
and sections within a unitary ruling class can disagree, compete, or
conflict with each other, sometimes even to the point of waging
civil war. The English Wars of the Roses of the fifteenth century,
the English Civil War of the seventeenth century, and indeed the
American War for Independence of the late eighteenth century are
all instances of violent conflicts that originated and largely
remained within the elites of the day. Such conflicts occur when
different sections of a unified ruling class come to disagree on what
their interests are or on how to pursue them, with the result of
social breakdown and internal war.
Although most mainstream social scientists in the United States
today would not endorse it, classical elite theory is useful in
answering the question "who rules America," and its main
application to American society, the theory of the managerial
revolution as developed by James Burnham, was concerned to deal
with that very question.
THE THEORY OF THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
Emerging from Marxism in the late 1930s, Burnham formulated the
theory of the managerial revolution as an alternative to the Marxist
claim that a "capitalist" ruling class held power in the United States
and would soon be displaced by a proletarian revolution along
Marxist lines. Although Burnham agreed with the Marxists that
traditional capitalism and its ruling class were dying and were on
the eve of being displaced by a social revolution, he rejected the
Marxist claim that the society of the future would be the egalitarian
socialism the Marxists predicted. Instead, he argued, the capitalist
elite would be replaced by another elite, which he called the
"managerial class."
A "manager," in Burnham's sense, is not simply someone who runs
or operates an institution on behalf of its owners, which is the
sense in which the word is often used today (e.g., the manager of a
chain restaurant), nor did he confine the term to what is today
usually called "corporate management." Using the hypothetical
example of an automobile company, Burnham held that
Certain individuals—the operating executives, production
managers, plant superintendents, and their associates—have
charge of the actual technical process of producing. It is their job to
organize the materials, tools, machines, plant facilities, equipment,
and labor in such a way as to turn out the automobiles. These are
the individuals whom I call "the managers.”[9]
Technicality, indeed, was the hallmark of the managerial function,
and the increase in the technicality of production was the
sociological basis of the managerial revolution in the economic
organizations of the twentieth century.
There is a combined shift: through changes in the technique of
production, the functions of management become more distinctive,
more complex, more specialized, and more crucial to the whole
process of production, thus serving to set off those who perform
these functions as a separate group or class in society; and at the
same time those who formerly carried out what functions there
were of management, the bourgeoisie [i.e., the old capitalist elite],
themselves withdraw from management, so that the difference in
function becomes also a difference in the individuals who carry out
the function.[10]
A "manager" in Burnham's sense, therefore, is essentially what we
would today call atechnocrat, someone who uses technical,
specialized skills to control and direct an institution, whether or not
he actually owns or has a legal right to the possession of the
institution. One reason Burnham did not use the term "technocrat"
to describe what he meant was that, in the period when he was
writing, that word (usually capitalized) already referred to a
specific social-political movement (one associated with Howard
Scott), though Burnham acknowledged that "the society about
which the Technocrats write is quite obviously [a] managerial
society, and within it their ‘Technocrats' are quite obviously the
managerial ruling class.”[11]
As Burnham used the term "manager," it included "administrators,
experts, directing engineers, production executives, propaganda
specialists, technocrats" and in general those who possessed the
technical skills by which the institutions and organizations of
modern society are operated or "managed"—not only the large
corporations of the economy but also the increasingly massive
governments and political and cultural organizations of the
twentieth century: public bureaucracies, mass labor unions,
political parties, mass media, financial institutions, universities,
foundations, and other organizations that were immense in size,
scale, and technical complexity and dwarfed their institutional
ancestors of the declining capitalist era. "Management" in the
sense of the body of technical and managerial skills that enabled
these large, complex organizations to exist and function constituted
a "social force," control of which enabled the formation of a new
elite.
These mass organizations are far more powerful with respect to
society than most of the older, smaller scale, and simpler ones, and
within them, managers possess the real power because only they
possess the skills by which the new mass organizations can be
directed and operated. With respect to corporations in the
economy, the stockown-ers, no matter how concentrated their
ownership of company stock may be, simply do not and cannot
perform the necessary managerial and technical functions on which
the corporation depends, unless they make a special effort to
acquire the needed managerial skills through education and
training, and not all that many stockowners from the old capitalist
upper class do so. As business historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., who
substantiated much of Burnham's analysis of modern managerial
corporations, writes, although "wealthy families...are the
beneficiaries of managerial capitalism," there is "little evidence that
these families make basic decisions concerning the operations of
modern capitalistic enterprises and of the economy in which they
operate," and "members of the entrepreneurial family rarely
became active in top management unless they themselves were
trained as professional managers.”[12] As historian Geoffrey
Barraclough described the emergence of these new forces in the
economy:
The new industrial techniques, unlike the old, necessitated the
creation of large-scale undertakings and the concentration of the
population in vast urban agglomerations.... The small-scale family
businesses, which were typical of the first phase of industrialism,
[did not possess] the means to finance the installation of new, more
complicated and more expensive machinery [or indeed the skills to
manage it on the necessary scale].[13]
But the managers are by no means confined to the corporate elite;
those possessing technical and managerial skills are also dominant
within the state itself as the managerial bureaucracy and the mass
cultural institutions, and thus they become an increasingly unified
and dominant class, relying on the same managerial skills and
sharing a common perceived interest and a common mentality,
worldview, and ideology.
The major common interest that unites the managerial class is its
need to extend and perpetuate the demand for the skills and
functions on which its power and social rewards depend. The
managers pursue that interest by seeking to ensure that the mass
organizations they control, which require the skills and functions
that only the managers can provide, are preserved and extended.
Large corporations must displace and dominate small businesses. A
large, centralized, bureaucratic state must displace and dominate
small, localized, and decentralized government. Mass media and
communications conglomerates and mass universities must
displace and dominate smaller, local newspapers, publishers,
colleges, and schools. Moreover, the elites that controlled these
older and smaller institutions must also be displaced as the ruling
class of the larger society and their ideology and cultural values
discredited and rejected.
The managerial revolution therefore consists in the protracted
social and political process by which the emerging new managerial
class displaces the old ruling class of traditional capitalist or
bourgeois society. On the institutional level this process consists of
the replacement of the constitutionalist parliamentary or
congressional form of government favored by the old elite with the
new centralized state controlled by the bureaucracy of the new
class. The new kind of state that emerges takes on new functions
that increasingly require the kind of skills only the managerial
bureaucrats and technocrats can provide—economic regulation,
social engineering, public welfare, and scientific, administrative,
and cultural functions unknown to the older states of the capitalist
era. The political elite of the older state—the political class that
dominated the elected and appointed offices and their political
organizations—is increasingly displaced by the managerial
bureaucrats of the new state and the political managers who run
the new, far more complicated political parties and organizations.
The same kind of institutional displacement occurs in the economy
dominated by the mass corporations, which also take on functions
unknown to the smaller (or even the larger) firms of the earlier era
—"scientific management" of production, highly technical economic
projections and development, specialized management of personnel
and consumers, as well as social, political, and cultural functions
not directly related to their business activities and interests. And
much the same process takes place in cultural institutions as mass
cultural organizations (universities, foundations, "think tanks") and
mass circulation newspapers and magazines displace smaller,
locally owned and operated ones and new, nationally organized,
highly technical mass media like film and radio and television
broadcasting develop.
On the cultural and ideological level the struggle between the
ascending managerial ruling class and the declining bourgeois-
capitalist class has taken the form of the conflict between what
emerged as the principal managerial ideology in the United States
and the Western world, which has generally come to be known as
"liberalism," and the main ideology of the old capitalist elite, which
came to be known as "conservatism." The political fulfillment of the
managerial revolution occurred in the early twentieth century, with
a strong start under Woodrow Wilson but really culminating under
Franklin Roosevelt in the New Deal and World War II era, and the
struggle for social power between the new managerial liberalism
and the old capitalist conservatism is evident in the political and
cultural literature of the mid-century. The advertisements carried
by virtually all conservative or right-wing magazines of the 1950s
and 1960s were almost always from smaller, locally based, and
individually owned and operated enterprises. The ads carried by
the liberal or what soon became the "mainstream" magazines of the
era were almost always from the Fortune 500 or similar large,
managerially controlled companies.
The conservatism of that era emphasized states rights, the power of
Congress over that of the presidency, loyalty to and identity with
the nation and national interest rather than international or global
identities, and the interests of smaller, privately owned and
operated companies against larger, managerially controlled
corporations. It also championed traditional religious and moral
beliefs and institutions, the importance of the patriarchal family
and local community, and the value of national, regional, racial, and
ethnic identity, as well as the virtues of the capitalist ethic—hard
work, frugality, personal honesty and integrity, individual initiative,
postponement of gratification.
It is quite true that most businessmen, including the big
businessmen of the rising managerial corporations, opposed the
New Deal and hated Franklin Roosevelt intensely, but there were
also a good many big businessmen even in the New Deal era who
supported Roosevelt and the New Deal. Political scientist Thomas
Ferguson has identified a section of American business interests
that was supportive of the New Deal and the reforms it brought
about. This "multinational bloc," as Ferguson calls it, was the core
of the emerging managerial elite within the large corporations. It
favored lower tariffs, American economic aid to Europe, and
conciliation of organized labor; it included capital-intensive rather
than labor-intensive industries, companies such as Standard Oil of
New Jersey and General Electric that depended on trade with
European markets, and international banks. The corporations that
composed this "new bloc" were in the vanguard of managerial
capitalism and the construction of managerial hegemony:
The newer bloc included many of the largest, most rapidly growing
corporations in the economy. Recognized industry leaders with the
most sophisticated managements, these concerns embodied the
norms of professionalism and scientific advance that in this period
fired the imagination of large parts of American society. The largest
of them also dominated major American foundations, which were
coming to exercise major influence not only on the climate of
opinion but on the specific content of American public policy. And,
what might be termed the "multinational liberalism" of the
internationalists was also aided significantly by the spread of
liberal Protestantism; by a newspaper stratification process that
brought the free trade organ of international finance, the New York
Times, to the top; by the growth of capital-intensive network radio
in the dominant Eastern, internationally oriented environment; and
by the rise of major news magazines.[14]
Policy experts, lawyers, and managers associated with this "bloc"
supported and strongly influenced such New Deal reform measures
as the Social Security Act, the National Recovery Act, the Wagner
Act, free trade policies, and the Glass-Steagall Act.
Like any new elite, the managerial class needed a political formula
that expressed and justified its group interests against those of its
older rivals in the capitalist elite. What has come to be known as
"liberalism" performed that function for the new class, although it
has been known under other names as well ("modernism,"
"progressivism," "humanism," and what Burnham himself called
simply "New Dealism”).[15] Managerial liberalism justified the
enlargement and centralization of the state under executive rather
than congressional leadership, the primacy of the central rather
than state and local government, regulation of the economy by the
central state, a foreign policy of global interventionism and
international organization rather than the nationalism and
isolationism favored by the older capitalist class, and the
development of a new culture that claimed to be more
"progressive," more "liberated," more "humanistic," and more
"scientific" and "rational" than the culture defined by the older
social and moral codes of traditional capitalism. The managerial
ideology also demonized the old elite and its institutions and values
as "obsolete," "backward," "repressive," "exploitative," and
"narrow-minded."
There was therefore an increasingly significant cultural and
ideological schism between the new elite and the old and their
respective adherents. The old elite was more or less rooted in
traditional social institutions, which both served its material
interests and reflected its formulas and values. It passed on its
property and wealth, the basis of its power, through inheritance,
and therefore it had a strong vested interest in maintaining both
property rights and what are today called "family values." The
family indeed, as well as the local community, religious and ethnic
identities, and the cultural and moral codes that respected and
legitimized property, wealth, inheritance, social continuity, the
personal virtues that helped people acquire wealth and property,
and small governments that lacked the power to threaten these
things, all served as power bases for the traditional elite and as
major cultural and ideological supports for its interests.
THE MANAGERIAL DISENGAGEMENT
This was not the case with the new managerial elites. Depending on
the technical skills that enable it to gain and keep power inside
mass organizations, the new elite possesses a major structural
interest in preserving and extending the organizations it controls
and in making sure those organizations are perpetuated. The moral
and social bonds of the old elite mean virtually nothing to
managers, who are unable to pass on their professional skills to
their children in the way that the progeny of the old elite inherited
property and position. Hence, managers tend to depend on families
far less than the older elite and therefore to value the family and
the moral codes that reflect and reinforce it far less also. The
culture the managers seek to build places more value on individual
achievement and "merit" (defined largely as the ability to acquire
and exercise managerial and technical skills) than on family
inheritance, on sexual fulfillment than postponement of
gratification and the breeding and rearing of children, on social
mobility and advancement rather than identification with family,
community, race, and nation.
But in addition to the family, the managerial class simply does not
need other traditional institutional structures to maintain its power
— not the local community, not religion, not traditional cultural and
moral codes, not ethnic and racial identities, and not even the
nation-state itself. Indeed, such institutions merely get in the way
of managerial power. They represent barriers against which the
managerial state, corporations, and other mass organizations are
always bumping, and the sooner such barriers are leveled, the
more reach and power the organizations, and the managerial elites
that run them, will acquire. Corporations depending on mass
production and mass consumption need a mass market with
uniform tastes, values, and living standards that will buy what
consumers are told to buy; diverse local, regional, class, and ethnic
identities impede the required degree of uniformity. The same is
true for the state and the mass obedience it requires and seeks to
instill into the population it governs and for the mass cultural
organizations and the audiences they manipulate.[16] Journalist
David Rieff has pointed to the similarities in interests and
worldview between "noted multiculturalist academics," supposedly
on the political left, on the one hand, and corporate officers,
supposedly on the political right, on the other:
Far from standing in implacable intellectual opposition to each
other, both groups see the same racial and gender transformations
in the demographic makeup of the United States and of the
American work force. That non-white workers will be the key to the
twenty-first-century American labor market is a given in most
sensible long-range corporate plans. Like the multiculturalists, the
business elite is similarly aware of the crucial role of women, and of
the need to change the workplace in such a way as to make it more
hospitable to them. More generally, both CEOs and Ph.D.'s insist
more and more that it is no longer possible to speak in terms of the
United States as some fixed, sovereign entity. The world has moved
on; capital and labor are mobile; and with each passing year
national borders, not to speak of national identities, become less
relevant to consciousness or to commerce.[17]
In the 1970s, Zbigniew Brzezinski noted the emergence of what he
called "transnational elites" throughout the developed world:
Today we are again witnessing the emergence of transna-tional
elites, but now they are composed of international businessmen,
scholars, professional men, and public officials. The ties of these
new elites cut across national boundaries, their perspectives are
not confined by national traditions, and their interests are more
functional than national.... The creation of the global information
grid, facilitating almost continuous intellectual interaction and the
pooling of knowledge, will further enhance the present trend
toward international professional elites and toward the emergence
of a common scientific language.... This, however, could create a
dangerous gap between them and the politically activated masses,
whose "nativism"—exploited by more nationalist political leaders—
could work against the "cosmopolitan" elites.[18]
The late Christopher Lasch made a similar point about the
"managerial and professional elites," though he denied that these
elites constituted "a new ruling class":
Their fortunes are tied to enterprises that operate across national
boundaries. They are more concerned with the smooth functioning
of the system as a whole than with any of its parts. Their loyalties—
if the term is not itself anachronistic in this context—are
international rather than regional, national, or local. They have
more in common with their counterparts in Brussels or Hong Kong
than with the masses of Americans not yet plugged into the
network of global communications.[19]
And most recently Samuel P. Huntington has discussed and
documented in some detail the "denationalization of the elites" into
what he calls "Dead Souls" who "abandon commitment to their
nation and their fellow citizens and argue the moral superiority of
identifying with humanity at large," a trend distinctive of economic
elites with a strong material interest in economic globalization as
well as of academic and intellectual elites:
Involvement in transnational institutions, networks, and activities
not only defines the global elite but also is critical to achieving elite
status within nations. Someone whose loyalties, identities,
involvements are purely national is less likely to rise to the top in
business, academia, the media, the professions, than someone who
transcends these limits. Outside politics, those who stay home stay
behind.[20]
Long before these writers, however, Burnham himself was quite
specific about what he called the "world policy of the managers,"
their rejection of the sovereign nation-states that had prevailed in
the capitalist era as obsolete units that were simply obstacles to
their group interests and the needs of the global order they sought
to create.
The complex division of labor, the flow of trade and raw materials
made possible and demanded by modern technology, were
strangled in the network of diverse tariffs, laws, currencies,
passports, boundary restrictions, bureaucracies, and independent
armies. It has been clear for some while that these were going to
be smashed; the only problem was who was going to do it and
when.[21]
Hence, the managers will seek to replace sovereign nation-states
with new imperial or transnational states (Burnham saw National
Socialist Germany, Imperial Japan, and the New Deal United States
—mistakenly in the case of the first two—as the "nuclei" of the
three managerial "super-states" of the future), and
Everywhere, men will have to line up with one or the other of the
super-states of tomorrow. There will not be room for smaller
sovereign nations; nor will the less advanced peoples be able to
stand up against the might of the metropolitan areas. Of course,
polite fictions of independence may be preserved for propaganda
purposes; but it is the reality and not the name of sovereignty about
which we are talking.[22]
Just as the managerial ruling class rejects independent nationhood
and national sovereignty as organizational forms, so it will also
reject ideologies such as nationalism that justify and reflect
national sovereignty, independence, and identity, as well as any
ideology or belief that justifies any particular group identity and
loyalty—national, regional, racial, ethnic, cultural, or religious. The
managerial class therefore tends to disengage from the nation state
as well as from these other identities. Its interests extend across
many different nations, races, religions, and cultures and are
transnational and supra-national, detached and disengaged from—
and actually hostile to—any particular place or group or set of
beliefs that supports particular identities.
Hence, the managerial elite has a proclivity toward as well as a
material interest in adopting and promoting ideologies of
universalism, egalitarianism, cultural relativism, behaviorism, and
"blank slate" environmental determinism. As Rieff writes:
If any group has embraced the rallying cry "Hey, hey, ho, ho,
Western culture's got to go," it is the world business elite...for
businessmen, something more is at stake than ideas. Eurocentrism
makes no economic sense in a world where, within twenty-five
years, the combined gross national product of East Asia will likely
be larger than Europe's and twice that of the United States. In such
a world, the notion of the primacy of Western culture will only be
an impediment to the chief goal of every company: the
maximization of profits.[23]
Indeed, the social engineering and social reconstruction policies
that have always been closely associated with managerial
structures in the state, the economy, and the culture depend on
ideological rationalizations that seek to justify the idea that an
innate human nature does not exist, that sexual and racial
differences are merely "social constructs" and products of the
social environment, and that scientifically informed "management"
can engineer both human society and human beings themselves. As
intellectual historian Donald Atwell Zoll wrote, the
environmentalist thesis,
at its simplest level, contended that (1) man's nature and his
subsequent behavior was largely, if not totally, determined by his
experiences in confronting his immediate environment; and (2)
prospects for improving human behavior, social relation-ships, and
society in general rested upon "reconstructions" and modifications
of his environment as the controlling factor.... On the one hand, the
resources of social science were seen as a response to more or less
explicit social problems such as crime, poverty, mental illness, or
the reform of political institutions. In yet another context, social
engineering saw as its object the construction of a model society.[24]
The projects of social reconstruction and social engineering
required the managerial and technical skills that the rising elite
possessed as well as the vastly increased scale and power of the
state they were constructing and controlling for the purpose of
realizing these projects. The new managerial elite therefore
became closely wedded to the doctrine of social environmentalism
as a rationalization of its own role, power, and social rewards in the
system it constructed, and this powerful vested interest in
environmentalist theory by itself helps account for the persistent
strong attachment of the elite to the theory and its applications in
social policy.
Academic theorists of environmentalist doctrines such as Lester
Frank Ward, Charles Horton Cooley, John Dewey, Franz Boas and
his school in anthropology, and behaviorist John B. Watson in
psychology were essential ideological architects of the new
managerial system of social control. Watson in a famous remark
boasted that if you gave him an infant at birth, he could train him to
become "any type of specialist I might select—doctor, lawyer,
artist, merchant-chief, and, yes, even beggarman and thief,
regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations,
and race of his ancestors.”[25] By the end of the 1920s, Watson's
behaviorism, wrote sociologist E. Digby Baltzell, "was not only the
most fashionable school of psychology in this country but also
became the central theory of human nature upon which the great
industry of advertising was being built.... Faith in conditioning
became the basis of social control in the new manipulative society,
composed of citizen comrades in the U.S.S.R. and citizen
consumers in the U.S.A.”[26]
Managerial reliance on what is now known to have been pseudosci-
ence in state-managed social engineering was paralleled in the
managerial economy through "industrial sociology" under the
influence of Elton Mayo and reflected, as Daniel Bell wrote, "a
change in the outlook of management, parallel to that which is
occurring in the culture as a whole, from authority to manipulation
as a means of exercising dominion...the older modes of overt
coercion are now replaced by psychological per-suasion.”[27] Watson
himself, as historian Stuart Ewen noted:
provided psychological avenues by which home life might be
supplanted by the stimulation of the senses—a direction toward
which business in its advertising was increasingly gravitating.
Pleasure that could be achieved by the individual within the home
and community was attacked and deem-phasized, as corporate
enterprise formulated commoditized sensual gratification.[28]
The ideological reconstruction of American society to suit the needs
and interests of the emerging managerial class thus involved a
repudiation of the older values, codes, and belief-systems of the old
elite and a cultural conflict with those who continued to adhere to
them. "Slowly at first, but with increasing momentum in each
decade after 1880," wrote Baltzell,
a naturalistic, urban, environmentalist, egalitarian, collectivist, and
eventually Democratic ethic finally undermined the Protestant,
rural, hereditarian, opportunitarian, individualistic, and Republican
ethic which rationalized the Natural Right of the old-stock business-
gentleman's rule in America between 1860 and 1929.[29]
THE AGENDA OF DISPOSSESSION
The rise to power of the new managerial elite in the United States
(and in other Western states as well) in the early and mid-twentieth
century and the need of the new elite to formulate a new ideology
or political formula and reconstruct society around it provides an
explanation of why the dominant authorities in these countries
today continue to support the dispossession of whites and the
cultural and political destruction of the older American and
Western civilization centered on whites and of why they not only
fail to resist the anti-white demands of non-whites but actively
support and subsidize them. These policies on the part of the new
elite are not the result of "decadence" or "guilt" but of the group
interests of the elite itself, imbedded in and arising from the
structure of their power and position and rationalized in their
consciousness by the political formula of managerial liberalism. It is
in the interests of the new elite, in other words, to destroy and
eradicate the older society and the racial and cultural identities and
consciousness associated with it (not race alone, but also virtually
any distinctive traditional group identity or bond, cultural,
biological, or political). To those ("conservatives") who continue to
adhere to the norms of the older society, of course, managerial
behavior appears as decadence, degeneracy, cowardice,
appeasement, pandering, or guilt, but what is an evil, misguided, or
suicidal pathology to the "conservative" forces who are still shaped
by the older codes and institutions in fact reflects the interest and
the health of the forces centered around the creation and control of
the new society. The interests of the managerial elite, in other
words, are antagonistic to the survival of the traditional racial and
institutional identity of the society it dominates.
The emergence of the managerial elite promotes the dispossession
and even the destruction of whites in the United States in two
major ways. First, as this essay has tried to argue, it does so
directly because the structure of managerial interests and power is
in conflict with any strong sense of racial as well as with strong
national, religious, or other group identity. These interests,
entering into the very mentality of the managerial class, push the
leadership of the new society toward the rejection of the racial and
cultural fabric of traditional white Western civilization, and the new
culture they try to create is one that rejects and denies the value of
such identities and values.
Second, however, because the new managerial elite rejects and
destroys the mechanisms of the old elite that excluded other ethnic,
racial, and religious groups, such groups are often able to permeate
the managerial power structure and acquire levels of power
unavailable to them in pre-managerial society and to advance their
own interests and agendas by means of the managerial instruments
of power. These ethnic forces, articulating their own strong racial,
ethnic, cultural, or religious consciousness, invoke managerial
liberal slogans of "equality," "tolerance," "diversity," etc., to
challenge traditional white dominance but increasingly aspire to
cultural and political supremacy themselves, excluding whites and
rejecting and dismantling the institutional fabric of their society.
Kevin MacDonald has documented in immense detail how Jewish
groups seeking to advance their own ethnically based agendas have
accomplished this,[30] and since a central part of those agendas
include the eradication of the historic ethnic, racial, and religious
barriers and beliefs that excluded Jews and were perceived as
leading to their persecution, the Jewish agenda and that of the
managerial elite are in this respect perfectly congruent with each
other. Indeed, so prominent have Jews become within the elite
(especially its cultural sector) that it is fair to say that Jews within
the managerial elite serve as the cultural vanguard of the
managerial class, providing ideological justification of its structure
and policies, disseminating its ideological formulas to the mass
population, formulating and often implementing specific policies,
and providing much of the specialized educational training
essential to the transmission and perpetuation of the technocratic
skills of the elite. In this respect, Jews perform a support function
(in this case, a cultural and ideological one rather than tax-
collecting or money-lending) for the largely non-Jewish elite similar
to those they performed for various European aristocracies in the
past (e.g., in early modern Poland). Thus the emergence of "neo-
conservatism" in recent decades reflects not only the Jewish
interests and identities of its principal formulators and exponents
but also, unlike the older conservatism of the pre-managerial elite,
the interests of the managerial class as a whole in conserving the
new political and cultural order that class has created but rejecting
and dismantling the pre-managerial order the older conservatism
sought to defend.[31]
The managerial elite, however, also has allied with other ethnic and
racial groups, most of which share its interest in eliminating white
racial identity and the cultural forces that support it. Like the
Jewish allies of the elite and the elite itself, these non-white groups
seek to eradicate white racial identity and its institutional
expression, but unlike the elite, they also often seek to promote
their own racial consciousness and identity. Thus, while explicitly
white racial identity is virtually forbidden and strictly punished by
the managerial elite, institutions that reflect explicit nonwhite or
anti-white identities are tolerated and encouraged. Groups such as
the NAACP, the Congressional Black Caucus, the National Council
of La Raza ("The Race"), and any number of professional, student,
and political organizations, the names, membership, and agendas of
which are explicitly racial, are not only tolerated but are often the
recipients of millions of dollars in grants and philanthropy from the
managerial state and managerial corporations and foundations.
In effect, the alliance between racially conscious non-white forces
and the rising managerial elite in the last century represents a
managerial partnership with a historical process that originally was
entirely separate and different from the managerial revolution,
what Lothrop Stoddard called "The Rising Tide of Color," the
emergence of racial consciousness and identity and the political
aspirations shaped by race among the non-white peoples of the
non-Western world and the subordinate non-white populations
within the West. What Stoddard was describing is virtually identical
to the world-historical process that the late sociologist and
historian Robert A. Nisbet called the "racial revolution," the
replacement by "color" of "nationality and economic class as the
major setting for revolutionary thrust, strategy, tactics, and also
philosophy.”[32] While the new elite rejected "white racism" and all
vestiges of white racial and cultural identity and heritage in order
to displace its rivals in the older elite and to engineer and manage
a new, culturally and racially homogenized global social order that
reflected its own interests, the non-white racial forces with which it
allied rejected white racial supremacy and identity in part to revolt
against and overthrow ("liberate" themselves from) white
domination (a phase of the racial revolution generally called by the
benign label of the "civil rights movement") but in part also to
pursue their own racial power and aspirations. While for several
decades there appeared to be a conjunction of interests between
the elite and its non-white allies in the elimination of all racial
identities and consciousness, today, as non-whites increasingly
assert their own racial identities, aspirations, and ambitions for
power, serious conflicts between the elite and non-white racial
movements may occur, and such conflicts may eventually
destabilize the managerial elite or even displace it from power as a
new social force—non-white racial consciousness and the energies
it mobilizes—challenges the social force of the managerial class. As
historian Paul Gottfried comments, "Hispanic racialists, Third
World patriarchs, and Mexican irredentists will likely eat up the
present regime, if given the demographic chance.”[33]
But there is little sign of an emerging white racial identity capable
of challenging either the managerial power structure, its anti-white
universalist ideology and agenda, or the direct racial threat whites
face from non-white and anti-white enemies. The new elite and its
non-white allies have weakened or destroyed the belief systems,
moral values , cultural legacies, and social bonds and institutions
that made whites conscious of who and what they are and sustained
within them a determination to survive and prevail. Until such
mechanisms can be rebuilt, there appears to be little prospect of
whites overcoming or even adequately recognizing the threats and
challenges they face today, and those mechanisms cannot be
rebuilt as long as the managerial elite remains in power, as long as
its universalist and egalitarian ideology remains the dominant
political and cultural formula, and as long as the anti-white allies of
the elite share power with the elite. What whites must recognize, if
they wish to survive at all, is that the forces that have destroyed
their civilization are the same forces that rule its ruins and whose
rule brought it to ruin. Not until those forces are themselves
displaced from power will the whites of the future be able to
recover the legacy their ancestors created and left for them.
1. Steven Greenhouse and Jonathan D. Glater, "Companies See Court
Ruling As Support for Diversity," New York Times, June 24, 2003. ↩︎�2. Arthur Livingston, "Introduction," in Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling
Class(Elementi di Scienza Politica), ed. and rev. by Arthur Livingston,
trans. by Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1939), p. xix. ↩︎�3. Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 70. ↩︎�4. Ibid., p. 71. ↩︎�5. The definitive account remains Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of
Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1936). See also E.M.W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan
World Picture (New York: Macmillan, 1944) and Lawrence
Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1640 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1965), chapter 3 passim, for its use by the ruling class of
Elizabethan England. ↩︎�6. James Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom (New
York: John Day Company, 1943), pp. 91-92. This book remains
probably the best introduction to the classical theory of elites. ↩︎�7. James H. Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and
the "Elite”(Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p.
4. See also Geraint Parry, Political Elites (New York: Praeger, 1970),
pp. 31ff., for the "unity" of an elite. ↩︎�8. Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern
Society(New York: Random House, 1963), is a classic expression of
the theory of strategic elites. See also Arnold M. Rose, The Power
Structure: Political Process in American Society (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1967). ↩︎� � ��
9. James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution: What Is Happening in
the World (1941; reprint ed., Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana
Press, 1960), p. 82. ↩︎�10. Ibid. ↩︎�11. Ibid., p. 203; for the "technocracy" movement of Howard
Scott, see Daniel Bell,The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A
Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 349,
n. 8. ↩︎�12. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial
Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1977), p. 584, n. 3, and p. 491. ↩︎�13. Geoffrey Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary
History (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1964), pp. 50-51. ↩︎�14. Thomas Ferguson, "Industrial Conflict and the Coming of the
New Deal: The Triumph of Multinational Liberalism in America," in
Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New
Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1989), p. 9. Ferguson sees the conflict over the New Deal as being
centered in Morgan (anti-Roosevelt) vs. Rockefeller (pro-Roosevelt)
groups. ↩︎�15. Burnham, Managerial Revolution, pp. 196ff. ↩︎�16. The managerial need for uniformity might seem to contradict
the current cant about "diversity" and its benefits (usually
unspecified), but "diversity" is mainly a slogan for the eradication
of white identity and is seldom invoked to challenge non-white
identity. "Diversity" as practiced is thus entirely consistent with the
uniformity of economic, cultural, political, and psychological and
personal mentality and behavior that managerial hegemony demands
and enforces. ↩︎�17. David Rieff, "Multiculturalism's Silent
Partner," Harper’s (August, 1993), pp. 66-67; Rieff of course
approves of the phenomenon he is describing. ↩︎�18. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in
the Technetronic Age (1970; reprint ed., New York: Penguin Books,
1976), p. 59. ↩︎�19. Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal
of Democracy(New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 34-35. ↩︎�20. Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Cultural Core of
American National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004),
pp. 267 and 263-72 passim.↩︎�21. Burnham, Managerial Revolution, p. 173. ↩︎�22. Ibid., p. 181; "mistakenly" because Burnham at the time
(1940) believed Germany and Japan would be victorious in World War
II. The existence of such managerial regimes as those of Nazi
Germany and Imperial Japan and their use of ideologies of extreme
racial hegemony and nationalism suggests that not all forms of
managerial dominance are necessarily wedded to ideologies of
universalism, egalitarianism, and environmentalist determinism. But
of course Germany and Japan lost the war, and the form of
managerial power they represented did not survive, raising the
possibility that their brief existence may have been merely an
anomaly. ↩︎�23. Rieff, Harper’s, pp. 68-69; "maximization of profits" may be
the major specific goal of corporate managers, but for the elite in
general the major consideration, as with any ruling class, is
perpetuation of power and position. ↩︎�24. Donald Atwell Zoll, Twentieth Century Political
Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 80. ↩︎�25. Quoted in Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial
of Human Nature (New York: Viking, 2002), p. 19. This book helps
expose the ideological and pseudoscientific roots of environmentalist
theory. See also Carl N. Degler,In Search of Human Nature: The
Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1991), especially chapter 8, for the
political and ideological motivations of environmentalist social
theory. ↩︎�26. E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy
and Caste in America (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 270. ↩︎�27. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press,
1960), p. 244.↩︎�28. Stuart Ewen, Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the
Social Roots of the Consumer Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1976), p. 83.↩︎�29. Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment, p. 158. ↩︎�30. Kevin MacDonald, A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism
As a Group Evolutionary Strategy, Separation and Its Discontents:
Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism, and The Culture of
Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in
Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Westport,
Conn.: Praeger, 1994, 1998, and 1998), especially the last volume.
The first volume, chapter 5 and pp. 121-123, discusses the alliance
between Ashkenazi Jews and the early modern Polish nobility, and
see also MacDonald's essay in this volume; see also Benjamin
Ginsberg, The Fatal Embrace: Jews and the State (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 11ff. for similar Jewish-gentile
elite alliances. ↩︎�31. On the managerial functions of neo-conservatism, see my
essay "Neoconservatism and the Managerial Revolution," in Samuel
Francis,Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American
Conservatism (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1993),
pp. 95-117. In recent years, neo-conservatives have tended to reflect
Jewish and Zionist interests far more than they do the general
interests of the managerial class. ↩︎�32. Robert Nisbet, The Social Philosophers: Community and
Conflict in Western Thought (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1973), p.
306. ↩︎�33. Paul Edward Gottfried, Multiculturalism and the Politics of
Guilt: Toward a Secular Theocracy (Columbia, Mo.: University of
Missouri Press, 2002), p. 147. ↩︎� � ��