WHY REFORM FAILS – AND HOW TO MAKE IT WORK

Commitment to public administration reform in Swaziland and Morocco

Overview of presentation

• The ‘traditional’ model of reform: a (World Bank) critique

• Commitment as a response to reform failure: developing a model

• Applying the model in Swaziland and Morocco: the primacy of politics

• Building commitment in Swaziland and Morocco: idiosyncratic actions

• Implications for Public Administration Reform

The ‘traditional’ model of reformProblem? Bad administration

Cause? Ignorance and incapacity

Cure? Injection of knowledge (aka new PA model), with donor

support as the ‘syringe’

Success stories? South Africa, central Europe(?)

The problem with the ‘traditional’ model: World Bank analysis(Presenting) problem? Bad administration

Cause? Ignorance and incapacity

Cure? Injection of knowledge (aka new PA model), with donor support as the ‘syringe’

Outcome? * Weak, late implementation (40% of WB CSR projects)

* reinventing of the reform wheel

Explanation? ‘Political will’

Remedy? ‘Selectivity’

The problem with the Bank analysis• What is ‘political will’, and why is it

so often missing?• How will ‘jam tomorrow’

(selectivity) work if ‘jam by lunchtime’ (conditionality) failed?

• Risks disempowering aid agencies in relation to very poor countries

Importance of commitment (aka ‘political will’• Ubiquitous• Associated with development

project outcomes (including PAR)• Entered the mainstream policy

discourse• Led to calls for ‘selectivity’ in aid

allocation

Groping towards a solution: a model of commitment

ANTECEDENTS ELEMENTS OUTCOME

Political capacity - voluntarystrong political base - explicit leadership - challenging Implementation

Administrative capacity - publicunited reform team - irrevocableoverall capacity

Civil service reform in Swaziland

What will generate commitment?

Swaziland (not Switzerland!)• Landlocked, bordered by South Africa

and Mozambique• Fast-growing population of 900,000• 112th out of 174 countries on UN Human

Development Index (in 2000)• Lower middle-income country: stagnant

GDP of $1400• A monoethnic monarchy• Low donor and debt dependency

The failure of reform

• Swaziland the ‘graveyard of reform’: many reports, little implementation

Other explanations of failure• Money? – reform is cheap,

indebtedness is low

• Implementation? – hasn’t arisen

• Weak capacity? – yes, but interacts with political factors

Extent of commitment

Strong executive (ostensibly) voluntary public

x consensusx explicit and challenging programme x irrevocable action

Understanding commitment• ‘Dualism’ in government – so ‘strong

executive’ is split• Traditional side is pre-eminent• Patron-client relations in land tenure

and in civil service staffing• Consequent resistance to staffing

reform, with its implicit shift from ascriptive to achievement criteria (from ‘who you know’ to ‘what you know’!)

• Reform proposals serve to deflect criticism from the reform lobby

Prospects for reform in Swaziland• Status quo will continue: more stillborn

proposals• Indigenous political pressure will prompt

fundamental political change• Incremental approach: staffing reform

feasible because it is not a fundamental threat

• Restoring the independence of CSB would represent ‘irrevocable action’

Civil service reform in Morocco

What will generate commitment?

Outline of reform

• Multiparty democracy as per 1996 constitution

• Reform team established in Civil Service Ministry

• Good management charter• UNDP support as lead donor (yes!)

Outcome of reform (as of 2002)• Awareness-raising and exhortation• Initiatives taken by individual ministries

(e.g. performance appraisal)• Charter had low profile• Most ministries unaffected by reform• UNDP evaluation:

– the programme ‘seems a little timid to us … concrete results remain some way off’

– termination of support

Commitment in Morocco

• Political base: divided (see below)• Admin capacity: a curate’s egg (good

in parts)voluntarypublicexplicit challenging irrevocable

Understanding commitment• Awareness-raising has been necessary• Structural mistake of putting reform in

legalistic CS ministry• ‘Dualism’ in government: Palace and officials

committed, but nobody wants to jump first• ‘Timidity’ derives from ingrained preference

for: holding the ring; keeping options open; not putting heads above parapets …

• … which derives from national disposition to seek consensus (good!) and passiveness (attentisme – bad!)

Prospects for reform in Morocco• Reframe the problem in political,

not public administration terms• Draft keynote speech for king,

setting up South Africa/UK style ‘royal commission’

• Place commission Secretariat in PM’s office

• Continue awareness-raising and promoting ministry initiatives

Case study implications

• A definition of commitment helps to ‘read the signals’ of – and to predict! – government commitment to reform

• Identifying commitment requires political analysis

• Where commitment is absent, building commitment must take priority over ‘traditional PAR activities

Summary of presentation

• The ‘traditional’ model of reform: a (World Bank) critique

• Commitment as a response to reform failure: developing a model

• Applying the model in Swaziland and Morocco: the primacy of politics

• Building commitment in Swaziland and Morocco: idiosyncratic actions

• Implications for Public Administration Reform