WhyCivilResistanceWorks

EricaChenoweth,Ph.D.

WesleyanUniversity

April8,2010

SomeConvenBonalWisdoms?

•  Insurgentsuseviolencebecause–  ItiseffecBve–  Itisalastresort

•  Nonviolentresistance–  IsineffecBveagainstbrutalregimes–  IsineffecBveforachieving“tough”demands

– Onlyemergesincontextswhereitislikelytosucceedinthefirstplace

ProjectScope

•  TheProjectDoesNot:–  Explaintheemergenceofdifferentcampaigns–  Examinecasesoutsideofthethreeissueareas(i.e.,civilrights,

anB‐war,etc.)–  Arguethatnonviolentcampaignsaremorallysuperiortoviolent

campaigns–  Establishaformulaforcampaignsuccess–  Focusonthehumanexperienceofconflict

•  GoalsoftheProject:–  AssesstheempiricalvalidityoftheconvenBonalwisdom–  Comparetrendsintheoutcomesofnonviolentandviolent

campaigns–  ExplorethecondiBonsunderwhichcampaignssucceedandfail–  MakesomeclaimsaboutthestrategicuBlityofdifferent

approachestopoliBcalcontestaBon

IntroducingNAVCO

•  NonviolentandViolentCampaignOutcomesDataset–  323campaignsfrom1900‐2006–  Idealtypes:nonviolentandviolent–  Campaigngoals:regimechange,anB‐occupaBon,secession

– Unitofanalysis:campaignendyear–  Examplesoftypicalvariables

•  Campaignpeakmembership•  SecurityforcedefecBons•  Violentgovernmentrepression•  Materialsupportreceivedfromaforeignstate•  Regimetype,regimecapabiliBes,countrypopulaBon,etc.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Success ParBalSuccess Failure

Nonviolent

Violent

Figure1.SuccessRatesofNonviolentandViolentCampaigns,1900‐2006

p=.000

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1940‐1949 1950‐1959 1960‐1969 1970‐1979 1980‐1989 1990‐1999 2000‐2006

Nonviolent

Violent

Figure2.SuccessRatesbyDecade,1940‐2006

p=.000

ThePuzzle

WhyhasnonviolentresistancebeenmoreeffecBvethanviolentinsurgencyinthe20thcentury?

TheArgument:ThePrimacyofParBcipaBon

•  ThesuperiormobilizaBoncapacityofnonviolentcampaignsadvantagesthemrelaBvetoviolentcampaigns.

•  Mass,nonviolentacBonismorelikelytodividetheregime,whereasviolentacBonismorelikelytounitetheregime.

ExplainingParBcipaBoninNonviolentResistance

•  Lowerphysicalbarriers•  LowerinformaBonalbarriers

•  Lowermoralbarriers

•  Fewercommitmentproblems

9.5

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9.510

10

1010.5

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11

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11.512

12

12Logged Membership, fitted values

Logged M

em

bers

hip

, fitt

ed v

alu

es

Logged Membership, fitted valuesViolent Campaigns

Violent Campaigns

Violent CampaignsNonviolent Campaigns

Nonviolent Campaigns

Nonviolent CampaignsFigure1.TheEffectsofCampaignTypeonCampaignParBcipaBon

p=.00

p=.02

Figure2.TheEffectsofCampaignMembershipontheProbabilityofSuccess

00

0.2.2

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.6.8.8

.85

5

510

10

1015

15

155

5

510

10

1015

15

15Violent Campaigns

Violent Campaigns

Violent CampaignsNonviolent Campaigns

Nonviolent Campaigns

Nonviolent CampaignsPr(defect)Pr(

defe

ct)

Pr(defect)log members

log members

log members

Figure3.TheEffectsofCampaignMembershipontheProbabilityofSecurityForceDefecBons,byCampaignType

p=.07

TheEffectsofRepression

•  Thoughrepressionisquitecommonagainstnonviolentandviolentcampaigns,itseffectsvary– Violentcampaignsfacinggovernmentrepressionarelessthan20%likelytosucceed

– Nonviolentcampaignsfacingrepressionareover46%likelytosucceed•  Backfireohenresultsfromgovernmentrepression

•  ThestatecannotrepressallofthepeoplealloftheBme.

00

0.2.2

.2.4.4

.4.6.6

.6Pr(Campaign Receives Foreign State Support)Pr(

Cam

paig

n R

ece

ives

Fore

ign S

tate

Support

)Pr(Campaign Receives Foreign State Support)Violent Campaigns

Violent Campaigns

Violent CampaignsNonviolent Campaigns

Nonviolent Campaigns

Nonviolent Campaigns

Figure4.TheEffectsofCampaignTypeontheProbabilityofReceivingExternalStateSupport

TheConsequencesofInsurgency

•  Violentcampaignscreate“structuralviolence”longahertheinsurgencyends

•  Nonviolentcampaignsaremorelikelytoimprovegovernanceandstability– Democracy

– Civilpeace

Post‐ConflictRegimeType

ViolentCampaigns

NonviolentCampaigns

ProbabilityofBeingaDemocracyFiveYearsa;ertheConflictHasEnded

4% 41%

P=.000

Post‐ConflictRegimeType,ExtantDemocraciesOnly

ViolentCampaigns

NonviolentCampaigns

ProbabilityofBeingaDemocracyFiveYearsa;ertheConflictHasEnded

15% 84%

P=.000

Post‐ConflictCivilWarOnset

ViolentCampaigns

NonviolentCampaigns

ProbabilityofExperiencingaCivilWarwithinTenYearsoftheEndoftheConflict

43% 28%

P=.07

StudyLimitaBons

•  Considersonlyidealtypes– Nonviolentandviolentcampaigns–  Twobroadcategoriesofgoals

•  Over‐aggregatedunitofanalysis–  Campaignastheunitofanalysis,ratherthandifferenttacBcalchoices(ornon‐events)

–  FailstocapturetheiteraBvenatureoftheconflict(inter‐groupandcampaignvs.stateinteracBons)overBme.

•  StaBsBcsshowonlycorrelaBon,notcausaBon.

StudyExtensions

•  CollecBngpaneldatafrom1900‐2008.•  CollecBngdailyeventsdatafrom1989‐2009.– TextualAnalysisbyAugmentedReplacementInstrucBons(TABARI)

•  Includingmanyothervariables,especiallyintra‐organizaBonalvariables.

QuesBons

echenoweth@wesleyan.edu