Post on 18-Mar-2020
V2.01.00 | 2016-05-09
Webinar
Vehicle Key Management – Status of Standardization
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u Importance of cryptographic material
Vehicle key management != key storage
Challenges for standardization
Example: Initial keying at OEM for SecOC
Status of standardization
Summary
Agenda
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Cryptographic keys are the foundation for technical security mechanisms
Importance of cryptographic material
Connectivity Gateway
CU
Instrument
ClusterDSRC
4G LTE
Laptop
Tablet
Smart-phone
Central Gateway
ADAS DC
Smart Charging
Powertrain DC
ChassisDC
BodyDC
Head Unit
Diagnostic Interface
u For security reasons different keys are used for different security related use cases, e.g.
u Secure flashing of ECUs (a.k.a code signing, secure reprogramming)
u Secure boot of ECUs
u Diagnostic access control
u Secured communication between the ECUs of a vehicle (e.g. via SECOC)
u Secure communication from the ECU to external services (e.g. via TLS)
u SW update over the air (SOTA)
u Remote feature activation
u Component theft protection
u Immobilizer
u Mobile online services
u …
u The affected ECUs require a considerable number of cryptographic keys
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Importance of cryptographic material
u Vehicle key management != key storage
Challenges for standardization
Example: Initial keying at OEM for SecOC
Status of standardization
Summary
Agenda
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Vehicle key management in a layered security concept
Vehicle key management != key storage
Secure External Communication
Secure Gateways
Secure In-Vehicle Communication
Secure Platform
u Secure communication to services outside the vehicle
u Intrusion detection mechanisms
u Diagnostic policy manager
u Vehicle key management
u Security event memory
u Authentic synchronized time
u Authenticity of messages
u Integrity and freshness of messages
u Confidentiality of messages
u Key storage
u Secure boot and secure flash
u Crypto library
u HW trust anchor (HTA)
Security concepts
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Key storage
Vehicle key management != key storage
u Goal:
u Securely store cryptographic keys
u Basic functions and key aspects:
u Take a cryptograhic key from the application
u Securely store it in NVM or hardware trust anchor of ECU
u Supported by the crypto stack (CSM, CRYIF, CRYPTO)
u Configuration of key structures via key elements
Microcontroller
RTE
CRYPTO
CAN
COM
ETH
MCAL
DIAG
CSM
CRYPTO (HW)
CRYIF
CRYPTO (SW)
ApplicationApp
SYS
HSM
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Vehicle key management in the AUTOSAR architecture
Vehicle key management != key storage
u Goal:
u Simplifies typical and common key lifecyclemanagement tasks
u Basic functions:
u Receives new cryptographic material (keys, certificates) via diagnostic routines
u Verifies authenticity, integrity and freshness of cryptographic material
u Provides callouts to integrate with business logic for different typical key lifecycle phases (production, initialization, update, repair, replacement)
u Supports on board derivation of new keys
u Supports secure distribution of shared secret keys
u Logs security events to security event memory (SEM)
Microcontroller
RTE
CRYPTO
CAN
COM
ETH
MCAL
DIAG
CSM
CRYPTO (HW)
CRYIF
CRYPTO (SW)
ApplicationApp
SYS
KEYM
SEM
HSM
DCM
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Importance of cryptographic material
Vehicle key management != key storage
u Challenges for standardization
Example: Initial keying at OEM for SecOC
Status of standardization
Summary
Agenda
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Production of the ECU
u Insertion of initial keys
Key lifecycle phases
Challenges for standardization
Aftersales
u Keys can be replaced if they have become compromised
u Keys can be renewed after a certain time to improve security
u Additional keys can be inserted for new use cases
u Replaced ECUs can get appropriate keys to participate in secure vehicle communication
End of line programming
u Replacement of initial keys by OEM specific master keys
u Insertion of additional keys
u On board derivation of further keys
u Secure distribution of keys in the vehicle network
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Variation points for technical solution
Challenges for standardization
u Development-, production-, after sales processes @ Tier1 & OEM
u Existing backend key management processes and IT infrastructure (e.g. PKI)
u Security goals (based on assumptions about the security of the development / production / service environment)
u Performance goals (based on end of line programming requirements)
u Vehicle security architecture / vehicle key management paradigm (centralized / decentralized)
u Current situation: Vector provides proprietary vehicle key management solutions to support a large number of different OEMs
u Goal for standardization: find right level of abstraction
u to provide added value compared to proprietary solutions
u Support known OEM specifics via configuration and extension interfaces
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Importance of cryptographic material
Vehicle key management != key storage
Challenges for standardization
u Example: Initial keying at OEM for SecOC
Status of standardization
Summary
Agenda
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Scenario 1: Off-board (backend) key generation
Example: Initial keying at OEM for SecOC
Diagnostic Tester KEYM KEYM
u Diagnostic Tester provides backend generated keys toeach node
u Key managers are limited to validatingbackend generated SECOC keys via
u SHE1.1 key update protocol or
u OEM specific key update containers
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Scenario 2: On-board key derivation with coordinator
Example: Initial keying at OEM for SecOC
Diagnostic Tester KEYM (Server) KEYM (Clients)
u DiagnosticTester triggersSecOC keying
u On-board KEYM servercreates and storesvehicle specific secret
u On-board KEYM servercoordinates securedistribution of secret toclients (e.g. via Diffie-Hellman)
u KEYM clients use secret and key derivation function tosecurely derive SecOC keys
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Scenario 3: On-board key generation without coordinator
Example: Initial keying at OEM for SecOC
Diagnostic Tester KEYM KEYM
u Diagnostic Tester triggers SecOCkeying
u No dedicated KEYM server whichcoordinates key negotiation (completlydecentralized)
u Group of ECUs participates in negotiation of shared secret (e.g. via Burmester-Desmedt )
u Participating nodes derive SecOC keysfrom shared secret
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Importance of cryptographic material
Vehicle key management != key storage
Challenges for standardization
Example: Initial keying at OEM for SecOC
u Status of standardization
Summary
Agenda
16
Vehicle key management in a layered security concept
Status of standardization
Secure External Communication
Secure Gateways
Secure In-Vehicle
Communication
Secure Platform
u Secure communication to services outside the vehicle (TLS)
u Intrusion detection mechanisms
u Diagnostic policy manager
u Vehicle key management
u Security event memory
u Authentic synchronized time
u Authenticity of messages
u Integrity and freshness of messages
u Confidentiality of messages
u Key storage
u Secure boot and secure flash
u Crypto library
u HW trust anchor (HTA)
Security Concepts
AU CCAUTOSAR4.4
CCSecOC
CCSHE, HSM, CCTPM, TEE,…
CCCSM / CCCRYIF / CCCRYPTO
Standard
CCSecurityCCExtensionsCCAUTOSAR4.4
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u C1: Security Event Memory
u C2: Vehicle Key Management / Key Distribution
u C3: Secure Boot Status (dropped)
u C4: Authentic Synchronized Time
u C5: Dynamic Rights Management for Diagnostic Access
u C6: Improved Certificate Handling (integrated in C2)
u C7: Abstract pre-definition of Crypto Items in System Template (improves AUTOSAR tooling support for security)
AUTOSAR 4.4 Security Extensions
Status of standardization
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Timeline 2018
Status of standardization
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Importance of cryptographic material
Vehicle key management != key storage
Challenges for standardization
Example: Initial keying at OEM for SecOC
Status of standardization
u Summary
Agenda
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u Vehicle key management != key storage
u Secure management of cryptographic keys in all lifecycle phases adds an important layer of security
u Standardization has a lot of potential for cost saving but is challenging due to OEM specifics
u Vector provides OEM specific key management implementations for a number of OEMs
u AUTOSAR 4.4 Security Extensions provide KEYM module as a framework for vehicle key management
Outlook:
u Security Extensions will be continued in AUTOSAR 4.5
Important points
Summary
21 © 2015. Vector Informatik GmbH. All rights reserved. Any distribution or copying is subject to prior written approval by Vector. V2.01.00 | 2016-05-09
For more information about Vectorand our products please visit
www.vector.com
Author:
Dr. Eduard Metzker
Vector Informatik GmbH