Post on 02-Jun-2018
8/10/2019 [Valery V. Tsepkalo] The Remaking of Eurasia
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The Remaking of Eurasia
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FILLING T H E POST SOVIET VACUUM
R U S S I A S
P O S T - S O V I E T orientation toward Eu rope and the W est is
in serious trouble. W estern leaders decision to expand NATO eastward
w itho ut taking Moscow s objections into account has sidelined Russia
on matters that affect its strategic interests. Fellow former Soviet
republics seeking Western investment and sponsorship have spoken
out against Russia in international forums; within the country, some
groups even feel they mustle vethe Russian Federation to gain W estern
favor. Since nobody wants powerful neighbors, even when they are not
hostile, the W estern powers have been the natural lliesof all who w ould
break with Moscow. The West does not want to see any structure in
Eurasia that perm its Russian hegemony.
Bu t abetting the co ntinu ing destabilization of Eurasia is no t in th e
W est s interests, NATO enlargement has no t consolidated anti-W estern
forces in the region, as some Western experts had feared, but it has
encouraged th e division of Eurasia and the shattering o fth e Russian
Federation . The re will likely be farther attem pts at secession, although
not necessarily according to the bloody mode l of Ch echn ya. C entra l
Asia and the C aucasus are rife wi th flash poin ts that could ignite several
nations and draw in outside powers. A nd w ith regional destabilization
and the slackening of central control, the nuclear threat is perhaps
greater now than during the Cold War.
If curren t trends continue, Russia s clout in Eurasia will further
dv^dndle and that ofWestern powers and Western-dominated inter-
national organizations will grow. The United States, however, will be
VALERY
V.
T S E P K A L O
is Belarus Ambassador to the United States.
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unable to maintain control of the process. W estern allies like G ermany,
Japan, and Turkey will adopt in dep end ent policies in the region. T h e
jockeying ofWestern interests will exacerbate tensions between
and
w ithin countries. A nd the We st will confront the increasing power of
Chin a and, to a lesser extent, Iran, which will make extending W estern
influence beyond the Urals impossible. Eurasia will rapidly becomea
less predictable and more dangerous place.
There
is an
alternative. T h e U nite d States could begin supp orting
integration in the territory of the former Soviet U nio n rather than the
forces that divide
the
region. T hi s would limit C hinese and Iranian
maneuvering, introduce economic andstrategic equilibrium,and
improve America's relations with Russia.At the same time, Russia,
along v\dth the smaller countries of central and eastern Eurasia, must
workto develop values capableofuniting disparate elements within
statesanddrawingthebroader region together intoa more stable
system.A tour d'horizonofEurasia provides ab un dan t evidenceof
the costs ofthe current course of disintegration and drift.
BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO
T H E S O V IE T U N I O N became vulnerabletointernal fragme ntation
and external manipulation less because
of
its econom ic troubles
than becauseitwasa troubled society. After thesacrifices Soviet
workers madein theearly yearsofcom m unism , several gener a-
tionsofSoviet leaders wielded pow er and reaped th e benefits w ith
a cynical disregardforthe co m m un ist project. People lost faithin
the collectivist idealandRussia's historic pa th, andcomm unism
became loathsom e
in
the eyes of many. T h e ruling hierarchy w eak -
ened, and Moscow's partners
in
the Warsaw Pact and the Co uncil
of M utu al Ec ono m ic Assistance turne d away. In th e end the Russians
dismantled their own empire with barely
a
sho t fired. N ow Russia
is sick w ith self-dou bt and has bec om eaninternat ion al loner . N or
do Russia's current democracy and W ester n-s tyle consum erism ,
divorced from the Pro testa nt ethic that sustains theminthe W est ,
con stitute a value system tha t can unify and insp ire. T h e prob lem
isnot th at Soviet values have been jettiso ne d but that thereis
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The Rem aking of Eurasia
Russia actively contributed to the fragmentation of Eurasia. Its
secession from the Soviet U nio n for so its role in th e 1991 treaty
creating the Co m m onw ealth of Ind epen den t S tates can be regarded
resulted not only in the breakup ofthe U.S.S.R. but in enduring
disputes between neighbors. Many felt that Russia had abandoned
the union and was unm oved by the p light of fellow Russians left outside
the borders of the Russian Federation. Moreover, Moscow arbitrarily
began to refuse support to established allies, including both political
forces in the former Soviet republics and whole foreign countries, that
did no t mee t the new standards it had set for itself M oscow s verbal
attacks on neighboring peoples, its attem pts to teach everyone else how
to pursue political and economic reform, and its deprecatory attitude
toward other cis leaders combined to sour relations between what not
long ago had been parts ofthe same country.
Ofthe former republics, Ukraine and Belarus have the strongest
cultural affinities and some ofthe closest historical ties with Russia,
but that has hardly forestalled disputes between them since the
dissolution o fth e union. In fact, Russia s bitterest conflict with a former
republic is with Ukraine over the naval base at Sevastopol and the
Black Sea fleet, w hich has driven a political and psychological wedge
betw een Russians and U krainia ns. T h e strategic significance o ft h e
fleet cann ot compare with the dam age the runn ing dispute has done
to relations between the two states and peoples. W h e n Russia lost
Ukraine, it should have thought not about breaking off relations but
about learning to coexist and finding ways of building a strategic
partne rship. B oth th e fleet and Sevastopol could, under certain circum-
stances, serve to bring the two countries together rather than divide
them if national interests were less narrowly conceived.
Russia, as the on ly possible core of integ ratio n, behaves as if it does
not need integration very muchor at all. It competes childishly
w ith o ther repub hcs in signing bilateral political and econom ic agree-
ments, boasting that it signed, say, an agreement with NATO or the
International M onetary Fund before U kraine or Uzbekistan. M oscow
changes tariffs and regulations without the necessary coordination
with other Cu stoms U nion Treaty mem bers. Russia even som etimes
deprecates those countries and peoples tha t gravitate m ost toward it,
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CIS,foritspart, does little beyond br inging leaders from 2of the former
republics together to talk. Of the more than 700 agreements reached
mthin the cis framework, none seems to work.
Within its own borders, in the separatist republic of Chechnya,
Russia has also followed a foolishly destabiliz ing course, justified by its
purportedly democratic standards. In 1993 the Kremlin dropped its
supp ort for a long -tim e ally, D oku Zavgayev, the former leader of the
Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet, Zavgayev was not, admittedly, a
dem ocrat, since he unde rstood only too well the chao tic consequences
for Chechnya of Moscow-style dem ocratization, bu t he was no dictator
either. Instead, Moscow backed General Dzhokhar Dudayev in his
struggle for power. Thi s led to R ussia s inept invasion in Decem ber
1994,more than a year of fighting, and a series of shaky peace agree-
m ents, all of which have und erm ined the R ussian Federation.
As Russia broke up the Soviet Union, it soured its relations with
the union s former republics and stopped treating m any no n-R ussia n
peoples in its territory with dignity. Thus the central government
incessantly duels w ith Tatarstan over tax revenues, Ing ush etia and the
Primorsky (Far Eastern) regions have demanded greater autonomy.
North Caucasia, the Volga Basin, and the Siberian republics speak of
secession, Tatarstan wa nts to sell oil inde pen den tly on w orld markets
and is building, with G erm an help, its own tanker fleet. Ta lk of a Rus
Republic that would include only predominantly ethnic Russian
areas is fashionable. The Russian parliament held two hearings last
year at wh ich self-determination for ethnic Russian and Muslim Turkic
populations was discussed, raising the possibility of the secession of
ethnic Russian areas from the Russian Federation, a process that
wo uld break up Russia itself in the same m ann er as the Soviet Un ion .
T h e very m entio n of such a scenario proves tha t the Russian elite has
forgotten how to coexist with other peoples and ethnic groups.
THE POWER NEXT DOOR
R U S S I A N W E A K N E S S has already allowed some newly independent
states to slip into the zone of Chinese influence. Kazakstan and
Kyrgyzstan, larger geographically than three Germanys and two
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Remaking of urasia
and partly nomadic people, worry about China s burgeoning power
and population
to the
east. President N ursulta n N azarbayev
has
moved Kazakstan s capital away from the Ch inese border, from Almaty
to
the
north -cen tral city of Akm ola.
A ltho ug h they fret about China s regional am bitions, Kazakstan an d
Kyrgyzstan look
to the
People s Republic
as an
economic role m odel.
Chinahas notonly avoided a Soviet-style collapse but hasfound its
own path
to
modernization.
The
return
of
H on g Kong last year will
add
to
China s economic m ight.
In
several Central Asian repuhlics,
China s growing strength could mean a return to power of com m unist
parties,
but
ones who se econom ic ideas
are
closer
to
China s than
the
Soviet Un ion s
or
P n c d - i I ri ccr^xM t^^
prese nt-da y Russia s.
Economics anddemographics may well re la t i o n s w i t h the old
determine developments
in the
region. S o v i e t r e p u b l i c s .
Russia s Far East and Siberia are dying. O nly
24 million people live
in the two
regions,
which comprise 60 percent of the territory of the Russian Federation,
and
the
pop ulation
is
falling.
The
region s huge enterprises, symbols
of hygone industrial power, are no longer com petitive, anditis too late
for them
to
mo dernize. Poor transportation and comm unications and
high energy prices
and
railroad tariffs help make
for a
considerably
worse economic situation than elsewhere
in
Russia. Across the border
in rapidly developing China, demographic pressures and the strain
on
resources
are
astounding and will only increase. Chinas current pop-
ula tion is 1.26 billion,
and the
annual num ber of births
is
triple tha t of
Europe andRussia com bined. In recent years, China, 80percent of
whose pow er comes from coal, has developed a serious energy shortage.
Coincidentally,80percent ofthe w orld s known coal deposits are in
Russia s Siberia
and Far
East. Siberia also
has
enormous manganese
and iron ore deposits and vast forests. All these resources are virtually
useless
to
Russia at present because people are needed
to
exploit them
and people areinsho rt supplyinSiberia. But inC hin a they arenot
Tra dition al W estern analyses of the Soviet U nio n assumed Ch inese
economic weakness
and the
W est s m aintenance
of
its competitive
edge,in
spite of China s dem ograph ic advantage. B ut with the collapse
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prevents China from gaining economic
and
political d om inance
in
Eurasia, including
the Far
East.
T H E
ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE
C H I N A ' S R I S E
will throw its traditional rivalry with Japan into sharp
focus.
The
global standing
and
influence Japan has worked
so
hard
to
achieve could slip away all too quickly if not safeguarded. Since Japan is
militarily weak,
to
counter Chinese power
it
will have
to
strengthen
its
armed forces dramatically and risk implementing
a
more independent
and assertive foreign policy in the F ar East. T h e former is already und er
way.
According to the Inte rnational Institute of Strategic Studies, Japan
increased
its
defense hudg et from 29 billion
in
1985
to
50 billion
in
1995,
lifting
it to
third
in the
world
in
military spending.
The
unpre-
dictable consequences of the buildup
and a
newly tou gh foreign policy
could lead
to
confrontation with China and others.
If Russia's
Far
Ea stern regions gain more autonom y, Japa n will
have
a
real oppo rtunity
to
regain four
of
the Kuril Islands (annexed
by
the
Soviet Union after World
War
II), dominate
the
economy
of
neighboring Sakhalin Island, and operate more freely in the Far Eastern
seas.
If
that happened ,
the Sea of
Okhotsk would cease
to be an
internal Russian
sea
thus losing
its
strategic significance,
and all
difficulties with Japanese fishing rights would
be
resolved within
a
200-m iIe-wide zon e. Jap an w ill likely be able
to
expand
its
territory
considerably
in
return
for
promises
of
investment
in
Russia.
The
Kuril governor has already declared that the islands are ready to hold
a referendum
on
annexation to Japan. Such territorial growth, along
with
an
econom ically and militarily ascenda nt C hin a, is likely to urge
Japan
to
become
a
strong, indep end ent player
in the
region.
The United States will gradually lose influence
in the
Pacific if it
permits a Japanese
or
Chine se bu ildup
in
the political vacuum of the
Russian
Far
East. W ashingto n could return
to
splendid isolation
or
more likely, main tain its influence
in the
region by keep ing its forces
in Asia
for
some time, steering
an at
least ostensibly neutral course
between Ch ina and Japan. Alternatively,
it
could strengthen Russian
and Indian influence
to
keep Japan
and
especially China from
be-
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Bu t Russia wo uld require mu ch stre ng then ing . Its 13,000 milesof
border aredifficult to secure, particularly in the frozen Far East.
Condit ionsin Russia's once-mighty military are,asPrime M inis ter
Viktor Chernomyrdinput it outrageous. Soldiers andsailorsin
some regionsareliterally starving, corru ption isrife,60percentof
equ ipm ent is no t battle-ready, and discipline and morale are extremely
low.The Soviet Union wasfar more economically developed than
China ,butRussia has lost much g rou nd recently and is by no m eans
as dynamic; raw materials now accountfor90 perc ent of its exports.
It ranks far behind Japan, even with the current recession there.
M eanw hile, C hin a continues w ith its wise econom ic reforms, so m e-
times m aking use of Soviet advances th at go unexploited
in
the Russia
of today. Spiritually, Russiais inno way capable of com peting w ith
China and Japan, which have preserved traditional systems ofreli-
giousandcultural values.
GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE
T H E A B S E N C E
ofintegration will alsobefelt further to thewest.As
the culturalandeconomic leaderofan integrating Eu rop e, reunified
G erm any will dem and a more active role in European and world aflairs.
But since the burdenof
its
history willnotallowit to beassertivefor
some time yet, it will proceed throu gh the instrum ents of interna tional
law and its own careful bran d of diplomacy.
Germany has assiduously builton its already good relationships
with Eastern European countries
and the
former Soviet republics
w itho ut setting any political, hum anitarian,orother conditions.Ger-
man trade with
and
investment
in the
Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Belarus are comparable to
those countries' total combined trade and investment w ith other Eu ro -
pean countries and the U nited States. Britain and, to a lesser extent, the
U nited States have made determ ined effortstoincrease their trade and
influence in Eastern EuropePoland in particularto counter
German dominanceinthe region.
The three new
NATO
member-designates, especially the Czech
Republic and Hungaiy, gravitate toward and will
e
clients of G erm any
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comfortable position
of
expressing sym pathy
for
Russia
and pre-
tending they were
not
privy
to the
U .S. decision
to
enlarge
NATO
while watching
the
huge A m erican effort b road en
the
G e rm a n
sphere
of
influence
and
b r ing
the
U nited States noth ing
but
bills.
Ge rmany
is
likely
to
project
its
policy
in the
east
in the
medium
term , probably by using
the
European Union
(EU)
and
the W estern
European Union
in
specific regional conflicts.
THE TURKISH OPTION
T H E T U R K I S H factor
is
as signiflcant in the south as the G erm an fac-
tor
is
in E urop e. I n past centuries, Turkey, as the center of the O tto m an
Em pire, dom inated the Balkans and southeastern E urop e, the M idd le
East,
and
North Africa and was also
a
power
inthe
Caucasus.
Now
because of its relative economic success,
it
is
in a
position
to
extend
its
influence
to
the areas of Cen tral Asia and the Volga basin m ainly po p-
ulated
by
Turkic peoples, including
the
former Soviet republics
of
Azerbaijan, K azakstan, Uzbekistan,
and
K yrgyzstan,
as
well
as
Tatarstan
and
Bashkiria, part of the Russian Federation.
Its
potential
should no t be overestimated, how ever. Turkey s military capabilities are
limited, although
its
mem bership
in
NATO
adds some political weight
in
the
Black
Sea
basin
andthe
Caucasus. Problems with
the
K urds,
Greece,
and
Cyprus will continue
to
divert Ankara s a tten tion from
its ambitious plans
forthe
south ern flank
of
the former U.S.S.R .
It
remains to be seen what effect the E uropean Un ion s recent rejection of
Turkey s
bid for
mem bership will have.
Turkey is capable of playing
an
indep enden t role
inthe
Caucasus
and Central Asia,
but it
must offer
a
clear alternative
to the
W est.
Eurasia s M uslim Turkic peoples, som ewhat disappointed in W estern
values,
are
turning
tothe
traditional values
of
I s lam. Chechnya,
for
example, has introdu ced Islam ic courts and public executions, and
all
of Central Asia
is
seeing rapid growth
in the
membership
and
influence
ofthe
Wahhabis ,
a
M uslim sect. Turkey s
new
m ission
would demand
its
liberation from
the
W estern political, social,
and
cultural values of many of its elite
and
reanimation
of
the idea of the
pan-Turkic state.
The
1996 election of Islamist Welfare Party leader
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^
away from the West,
a
geopolitical shift th at continu es even th ou gh
the arm y forced Erb aka n to step down last
year
Erb aka n has called for
the c reation of an Islamic
NATO
and United N ations, the introduction
of an Islamic dinar, and the liberation ofAzerbaijan, Ch echn ya,
and Bosnia. Turkey
is
likely
to
remain partially secular, however,
and will rema in more attractive than fundam entalist Iran
to
the less
observant non-Shiite Muslim peoples of the former Soviet Union.
In Central Asia, Turkey has forged strong economic andcultural
bonds.Ithas provided $80 millioninhum anitarianaidand openeda
credit line of some $700 million to countries of the region. It
is
involved
in 100 joint ventures inK azakstan and 22 in K)^gyzstan inenergy,
construction, mining, and sea cargo shipping. Turkey has also opened
cultural centers and T urkic schools
in
practically all the Cen tral Asian
states.
W h e n the Soviet collapse left a power vacuum in the Cau casus,
once in Turkey's sphere of influence, the governm ent in Ankara began
moving in; for instance,
it
invited former Ch ech en President D udayev
to visitinOctober 1993, and then invited himfor a second visit over
strong Russian protests.
HARD AND SOFT INTEGRATION
E I T H E R THE disintegrationinRussia will continueor anew system
of values will em ergetounite the nations of Eurasia.IfRussia m an -
ages
to
develop
a
new national idea capable of bringing together
its
people and urging
it to
leadership, and again displays
an
inclination
for integrating Eurasia, there
are
two possible scenarios: hard and
soft integ ration .
If the West does not support integration, Russia will implement
a
hard-line policy of land collection on its southern and western
flanks. It will also adopt
a
confrontational attitude toward W estern
nations and probably Ch ina; M oscow will again begin supp orting any
state that opposes U.S. interests.
It
will likely start with Muslim
nation s like Iran, Iraq, and Libya and groups like the Palestine Lib er-
ation O rganization, H am as, and the M uslim B rotherhood, as wellas
Cu ba and N or th Korea. T h e weakness of Russia's conventional forces
will probab ly lead it to rely on veiled th reats of nuclear blackm ail, using
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M oscow b ack into the neg otiation processinthe Mid dle East and on
the Korean peninsula, marking its returntoserious international po li-
cymaking. It wou ld also mob ilize and un ite Islamic elements
in
Russia
and the cis, cutting the ground out from under Muslim separatists by
casting Russia as
the
ally and friend of Islam .
At
one stroke,
it
would
counter both the W est and C hina, which is dealing w ith M uslim unrest
of its own in Xinjiang province and elsewhere.
Outside Russia, where there
is
still popular support
for the
t radi-
tional Russian andSoviet sta te, theidea ofreintegration hass trong
appeal. Fierce political rivalry
in a
n u m b e r
of
the form er Soviet
republics has pushed opposition forces and clans toward alliances with
Russia.Apolicy of hard integration bythe Kremlin could allow it to
regain some controlinseveral troubled states.
T h e o ther form Eurasian integration could take is thatofagradual
m ovem ent toward un ion, as in the
EU .
Th e cis , headed by a practically
powerless executive secretariat, cann ot be called an operating structure
for integration.The customs unionconsisting of Russia, Belarus,
Kazakstan,
and
Kyrgyzstanfunctions,
at
best,
as a
free trade zone.
T h e A pril 1997 Treaty on the U nion of BelarusandRussia, however,
is a step in the d irection of real integ ration . T h e agreem ent s soft brand
of integration has
a
tremendous political advantage over
a
more rigid
formula
for
unification with
or
entry into
the
Russian Fede ration;
Belarusan sovereignty is not diminished, and Russia is not laden with
economic burdens
it
can no t afford
to
bear.
Such integration couldbepalatable tobo th theU n i ted S tates
and E uro pe , wh ich could provide moral supp ort and expert assistance
in setting up efficient stru ctu res of in ters ta te cooperat ion in the
areas
of
ecology, export control, non proliferatio n, com m un ica-
tions,
and transportation. Th e U nited States did the same forEurope
in
the
a f termath of W orld W ar
II
wi th
the
M arsha l l P lan
and the
creation of the European Econom ic Com munity. Am erica u nde r-
stood the n tha t it was setting up
a
major com petitor, but
it
put inter-
national peace and security before its own am bition s. A nd indeed , th e
policy
has
achieved tha t
and
more .
A
s imilar policy
in
centra l
Eurasia would involve at the outse t U S encouragemen t of a
quick se t t lement
of
conflicts b etw een A rm enia
and
Azerbaijan
in
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the breakaway Abkhaz state in Georgia in Tajikistan and in
other areasofthe former Soviet Un ion .
A S H A R E D D E S T I N Y W I T H U K R A IN E
R E L A T I O N S B E T W E E N
Ukraine and Russia will
not
only determine
the destiny of other newly independent states but will show whether
reintegration in central Eurasia is a serious possibility. Ukraineis
hardly the monolithic entity Westerners believe it to
be.
The Ukrainian
people may havean independent history butthe territory doesnot
having been partitioned and divided up both by others and by
its
own
people changing rulers many times over the centuries. The present-
day capital of Kiev
was
from the ninth through the twelfth centuries
the capitalofKievan Rus the forerunner of the Russian state. Inter-
marriage has madeitimpossibletodraw
a
sharp line between ethnic
Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. There have been no serious conflicts
between the two peoples. Any friction was mainlyofasocial and not
a national character; moreover the twohave often joined inwars
against outsiders. Today Ukrainians differ onwhether they should
build a separate state or work toward union w ith Russia. As one goes
from west
to
east opinion moves from strong support
for
indepen-
dence to cultural identification with and economic inclination toward
Russia. This split national consciousness makes
the
search
for a
national identity rocky.
M oscow must jettison theprimitive Russian nationalism it has
been displaying and reestablish relations with its large neighborto
the west on flrmer ground.The material incentive is powerful.
Russian-Ukrainian trade
and
other economic cooperation could
help stabilizeand revive both economies.Themutual dependence
of the republicsis still high after thebreakupofthe Soviet Union
anditsintegrated economyTheclosingofenterprisesinUkraine
is painful forRussian industryandvice versa. Receivingthesame
amount of Western assistance it is currently getting Ukraine
would requirelo or 5 yearsofdevelopment tobringit up to the
level
of
Portugal
or
Greece. W ithout
the
Russian connection
it
will suffer constant political turmoil especially in the industrial re-
gions
of
the east
and
south.
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BETTER BALANCED BALTICS
R E I N T E G R A T I O N S H O U L D
also taketheBaltic states into account.
The Baltics
are
s trategically important
to
Russia
as the
keys
to its
accessto theG ulf of Finlandand theBaltic Sea from theenclaveof
Kaliningrad. After
5
years under Soviet control, Lithuan ia, Latsaa, and
Estonia want to become mem bers of
NATO.
B ut the W est, realizing their
admission could start
a
new Co ld W ar with Russia, has been reluctant
to make the Baltics too m any promises.
The Baltics have known onlya fewdecades of sovereignty,in the
1920s and 1930s and again
in
the 1990s.
A
large portio n of L ithua nian ,
Latvian,
and
Esto nian society rushed in to politics
in the
1990s w ith
the
aim of
ensuring
the
independence
of
their states.
One of
their
main techniques
was the
exclusion
of
their large Slavic, Russian-
speaking populations from politics. That avenue blocked, ethnic
Russians turned their energies
to
business, until p ractically all en ter -
prises there wereintheir han ds.
Es ton ia and Latvia are the only countries in Europe where
whole ethnic groups
are
denied citizenship
and
c ivil r ights . M ai n -
taining discrimination against the 700 ,000 ethnic Russians in
Latvia and the 300,00 0
in
Eston ia will only increase their econom ic
powerand the political pressure for change, but abolishing dis
criminat ion,
in
combinat ion with
the
financial clou t the y already
possess, will lead
to
rapid politica l gains
for
them . Ethn ic Russ ians
could change
the
foreign policy orientation
of the
Baltic coun-
tr iesthe more
so as
re lations am ong
the
three states
are far
from
ideal. Fromadistance they may appear toagreeon allmajor inter-
national issues,
but
they de tain each oth er s ships
and
quarrel
reg
ularly over min ing on the con tinen tal shelf because of dispu tes over
the demarcation of their international waters and even the common
useof a irspace. Former Latvian Prime Minister Andris Skele said
that Li thuania
did not
have
a
s ingle serious politician wi th w ho m
it was possibletowork.
Therefore the Baltic countries will soon see the emergence of
strong political forces prom oting ra ppro chem ent w ith
the cis
states.
Eventually economic necessity and demands for social justicevnH
8/10/2019 [Valery V. Tsepkalo] The Remaking of Eurasia
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h Remaking of urasia
East that will presupposethe political neutralityof the Balticsand
their deep involvementin the economic life of BelarusandRussia.
CENTRAL ASIAN FLASH POINTS
T H E P E R I L S
of
the post-S ovie t vacuum are starkly visible
in
Central
Asia. The region enjoyedalong periodof stability under Soviet rule,
bu t the dem ise of the U .S.S .R. has left an agglomeration of territories
in which the various peoples overriding ethnic attachments makethe
five new countries vulnerable to both internal conflict and meddling by
outsiders. Resu rgent religion has also becom e
divisive force. A tte m pts
by Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan,the United States,andChina
to influence events only upset the balance between clans and increase
the chances of conflict. Conversely, intrastate conflict and ethnic wars
have the potentialtodrag in outside states.
Developmentsin neighboring Afghanistan, tornby acenturyof
civil strife, m ay have particularly powerful reverb erations . So long as
former President Mohammad Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud,
relying mainly on ethnic Tajiks, and G eneral Abd ul R ashid D osta m ,
an Uzbek , held the n orthe rn p art of the country, with Russian bord er
guards protecting
the
frontier w ith Tajikistan
and
neutralizing
the
Tajik opposition,
the
situation
in the
region was unhappy
but
p re -
dictable.Butwhen the militant theology students of the Taliban,
backed by M uslim fundamentalists from Pakistan, overthrew D ostam ,
panic brokeout inbo th C entral Asia and Russia. T h en the Taliban
were driven o ut of the no rth , and everyone calmed down a bit .But
Afghan polit icsis an unpredictable seesaw.Ifthe T aliban findan
ally among the other armed Afghan groups and Russia further re-
ducesitspresenceinthe region, zealous and ba ttle-h ard ene d Ta l-
iban troops could invade Tajikistan or Uzbekis tan . W orse ,the
Ta liban could reach an agreem ent wi th Tajikistan s o pposition Islamic
Renaissance Party. Then Uzbekistan, withits historic Tajik centers
of Bukh ara and Sam arkand, would be
in
danger. If peace agreem ents
for Tajikistan areimplemented and theIslamic Renaissance Pa rty
gains power there,
the
Afg han-T ajik borde r will becom e m ore
porous, since
the
party still has bases
and
allies
in
A fghanistan.
In
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T U R K - UZBEKISTAN
M E N I- >-.
\
Samarkand
Bukhan
J
RUSSIA
Caspian
Chechnya
|
COMMONWEALTH
O F INDE PEND ENT STATES
a direct route from Afghanistan
to
Europe.
It
may well be that silk will
not be the only commodity to travel
along this route.
Beyond the risk in one or more of
the region s countries ofa redistribu-
tion
of
power with foreign armed
support is the danger of ethnic warfare within a country or across a
border. Afghans and Tajiks
are
members
of
the Iranian ethnic
group, while Uzbeks, Turkm ens, and Kazaks are Turkic peoples. To
a large extent, this distinction
was
behind
the
civil wars
in
Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and
it
could be
a
problem
in
Uzbek-
istan. Iran or Turkey could well become involved. Violent conflicts
repossible between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks indeed, theyh vealready
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Rem aking of Eurasia
deve loped in Uzbek istan s Fergana Valley,
where radical Islamist sentiment is
strong as well as between various M uslim
movements, orders, and sects.
In Kazakstan, half the population is non-
Kazak, mainly ethnic Russian, especially in
the northern and eastern regions adjacent to
the Russian Federation, and there has been
talk of secession and of union with Russia.
Moreover, any of the country s three largest
riv lclans or one of the political associations o r
coalitions, such sthe Com mu nist Party or the
Republican Strike Committee, could chal-
lenge Kazak President N ursultan Nazarbayev,
who is not as securely in power as he seems,
and initiate large-scale unrest. Supporters of
communist China inside Kazakstan among
the millions of members of the Uigur and
Kazak clans further complicate matters.
The political fate of Kyrgyzstan is tied to
tha t of ethnically and culturally close Kazakstan, which dwarfs its n eigh-
bor in size, population, and resources. Kyrgyzstan s central governm ent
may lose control of the m ountainous T ien Shan region in the south to
the powerful clans there. T he weakness of the armed forces unde r Pres-
iden t Askar Akayev as well as accusations of corruption and nepotism
at the highest levels have led to threa ts of intervention by bo th Islamist
populists and the leftist supporters ofa restoration of the Soviet order.
Kyrgyzstan may not escape a variant of the scenario in Tajikistan.
Despite the December 1996 peace agreement in its civil war,
Tajikistan could still see a complex, endless armed struggle similar
to that in Afghanistan. If the Taliban seize and consolidate power
in northern Afghanistan, the victory of the Islamic Renaissance
Party will become Hkely in Tajikistan, which could encourage the
republic s disin teg ratio n. Clas hes are likely to extend to adjacent
regions of Uzbekistan with substantial Tajik populat ions as well
as to some parts of the Fergana Valley. On the other hand, im-
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Valery
V
sepkalo | ^
the radical Tajik Muslim opposition from
its
wartime base
in
Afgh anistan canno t be ruled out. T h us C entr al Asia may see
its
flrst
Islamic republic.
Currently Uzbekistan seems stable, but the stability is illusory.
President Islam Karimov
s
boosted somew hat
by
his country's ind us-
trial potential,
oil
gold,
and
uranium.
But
while
the
authorities
are
keeping
the lid on
conflict
for
now, intrigues
are
brewing. Instability
in Tajikistan
and the
specter of the Taliban, along w ith
the
weakness
of Uzbekistan's armed forces, m ay aggravate tensions inside U zbek istan.
Foreign veteran troops would probably have anedge overtheUzbek
army, wh ich hasmore m ilitary hardwarebut no combat experience,
and leaderswho have been chosen for political reasons.In caseof
turmoil, Uzbek clans
and
outside powers could reach
a
compromise
resembling
the one at the
turn
of the
century, when
the
emirate
of
Bukhara
and the
khanates of Khiva
and
Kojand suited everyone
for a
t ime,
even
the
Bolsheviks.
Turkmenistan isbest considered last since undertheflrm han dof
President Saparmurad Niyazov, father of the Tu rkm ens, this
Cen-
tral Asian republic has m anaged
to
build som e sense of nation al u nity
based
on
state cap italism
in the
economy, social rathe r tha n national
values
in
p olitics,
and the
idea
of
transforming
the
former republic
intoaC entr al A sian Kuw ait. Niyazov ho lds relatively balanced views
on socialand religious matters.Inspite of mild W este rn criticismof
his domestic policiesand helpedby the na t ions oil its mineral
deposits,and itsnatura l gas reserves, w hichareamongthelargestin
the worldhe wields
his
authority shrewdly, keeping
the
leading
ethno-regional clans content by dividing oil m oney, pro jects,
and
jobs
among them. Abroad ,
he
maintains reasonable relations with
the
Taliban in Afghanistan, and his
flexible
policy toward the Un ited States,
Russia, Turkey,
and
Iran attracts foreign investm ent
in
his country's
gas
and oil industry. Unfortunately, the construction of strong national
identities, wh ich seemsto be theroute m ostofthe region's leadersare
taking,caneasily leadtorivalry among nationalities w ithin countries,
and possibly to jingoism andfriction between countries.
Turkey
or
Iran could become
a
stabilizing influence
in
Cen t ra l
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h
Remaking of urasia
Minis ter Eldar Inonu s ta ted that Ankara wantstoinstitutionalize
relations with theTurkic-m ajority C entral A sian republics in a
commonwealth . Already Turkey hasprovided thefive repub lics
with more than 80million in aid and 700 million in credits.
Uzbekistan received
54
million
in
assistance, while
the
much
needier Tajikistan got only 400,00 0. Therationale is c l e a r -
Uzbeks, Turkmens, and Kazaks areTurk ic peop les. Tajiksand
Afghans , on theother hand , are ofIranian e thnicity which is
why Iran,aregional pow er w ith sub stantial growth pote ntial,can
countonexp and ing its influenceinCe ntra l Asia .
CAUCASIAN TRADITIONS
A s INC entral Asia,the Caucasus* emancipation fromthe statusof
Russian protec torate will mean resurgence of influence for both Iran
and Turkey Thepopulation of the Caucasus is extremely diverse,
and hostile relations between some of its peoples areacenturies-old
tradition.In addition, eachofits p eoplesis divided into clans that
jockeyforpow er a m ong themselves. Historically, religion
was
the
basis for the differences in the region. T h e O rth od ox A rm enia ns,
the
Georg ians, and the majority of Ossets were Christian, oriented toward
the nearby Christian empires of Byzantium and Russia. The peoples
of the North Caucasusandwha t is now Azerbaijan were Muslim
and received moral, economic,
and
m ilitary sup port from either
the
Ot to m a n E m p i r eorPersia. M oreover, therelative im portan ceof
religion differed inthe various cultures.TheG eorgians were more
religiously observant thanthe Ossets,the Chechensand theAzeris
more
so
than the D agestanis
or
the In gu sh. S om e nationalities held
on to their ancestral cults and pagan rituals and professed a Christianity
or an Islam that was merely formal.
Conflict in the region is aggravated by Russia's unsuccessflil military
venture in Chechnya, although Russian troops were subsequently
withdraw n. Th e wars in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkh azia,
and Chechnya m ay notbethe final chap ters in the escalation of conflicts
in the Caucasus. The many reasons for division among the Caucasian
areprecisely whythe anexternal arbiter.The
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lery V
Tsepkalo
in
any
Caucasian conflict,
as the
po tential
for
casualties
is
high
in
mountain warfare against local militia
and
troops could
not
ensure
contro l of territory.
T H E
BEGINNING OF HISTORY
RESTORING THE
Soviet Union
to its
former self
is
impossible.
Elites,
old and new in the
newly independent states
are
intent
on
preserving their nations' sovereignty. Every former Soviet republic
has held presidential and parliam entary elections
and
adopted
a
new
constitution. Everywhere
the
search
for a
national identity
is
under
way, and people increasingly th ink of themselves n ot as Soviet citizens
but as Ukrainians, Kazaks,orA zerbaijanis.
T h e scramble for the spoils of the Soviet heritage could cause serious
conflict between major geopolitical players and threaten the very foun-
dations of established security systems. W h e n
a
tenant in
a
build ing falls
ill
or
dies, if the tenan ts
in the
other apartm ents begin knocking dow n
walls
to
expand their
own
space, they could
end up
destroying
the
entire building. Any world order is stable only when everyone knows
his place in
it
and there is sufficient collective and indi^^dual power,
and
the willingness
to use it to
maintain
the
whole.
The
challenge
for
Eu rop e and the world in the post-Soviet space is averting further disin-
tegration
and
keeping disorder
and
conflict from spilling
out of
the
region
and
setting th e globe ablaze.
I t
is
clearly
to the
W est's advantage
to
prom ote certain kinds
of
regional integ ratio n in E uras ia. T h e rapid rise of any player, especially
Ch ina
or
Iran,
or a
radical Islamic revolution could ha rm W este rn
interests. Western unity would
be
shaken
if
one
or
more
of
its
own
w het her G erma ny, Turkey, or Japan , tried
to
secure
its
own zone
of
influence.
The
interven tion
ofNATO
forces
in
future conflicts
in the
region, probably
at the
request
of
the parties involved, could cause
further disintegration, perhaps resulting
in
loss
of
control over
weapons of mass destruction.
The West has levers that
it
can p ush
to
help shape politics
in
Russia
and o the r cis states today, includ ing influence over opposition leaders.
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heRemaking of urasia
on
the
West economically, Western influence
is
likely
to
grow.
Econom ic integration supported by the West would be a powerful
stabilizing factorinthe region.
Having lost faith in its guiding principles, Russia may descend into
chaos and destroy
itself
long
with the region, unless
it
discovers new
values that can sustain
it.
Nations, Hke people,
do not
live by bread
alone, nor
by
sophisticated
weaponry.
They
need bove
all,the spiritual
foundation that a great ideal and
its
related
set ofvaluesprovide Large states and
empires
E lec t io ns hav e fail ed t
h ve lw ys beenbuilt on anidea;theMonroe
Doctrine and U.S. global leadership would t u r n R u s s i a in to
a
not have existed but for the American belief s t a b le d e m o c i' a c v
in manifest
destiny.
The state should deploy
such
an
idea with care,
and
citizens
are
right
to
regard
it
cautiously
But with its deep emotional appeal,
it
fireshe disparate members of
a society to work for the comm on interest rather than for selfish gain.
One need look only at the monumental plants and public works built
in the early decades of communism by workers laboring not for wages
but
for
a better future.
W hat ideal will Russia choose for itself? W hat course will it take?
The comm unist ideal can still bring
people
into the streets, but the
current brand ofcommunism has compromised itself and lostits
mobihzing character, and itissappedbysquabbHng between factions.
The monarchical-Orthodox value system harking back to the days of
the czars
and the
Holy Russian EmpireMoscow
as the
third
Rome has the support only of smallgroupwithin the intelligentsia.
Moreover, traditional religions
and
cultures
can
compensate
for
economic pain,butthey tendto divide rather than unite peoplein
countries with mixed heritages. Businesspeople
s views
are reasonable
and intelligent,butbeing wholly material, they lacktheforceof
universal ideaand so failtogenerate much supportatelection time
or any other time. W estern democraticide ls h vebeen badly tarnished
in Russians'eyesas elections and other trappings of liberal democracy
have failed to turn their country into a stable democracy Instead
it
is
becoming, according
to a
1997 report from
the
Center
for
Strategic
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iery V Tsepkalo
and crooked businessmen who accumulate vast wealth by exploiting
the vulnerabilities of a society in tran sition .
The best idea for former Soviet lands today would incorporate
both the best of Russia's past from the fifteenth through nineteenth
centuries and the achievements of the m odern age. It m ust also envision
a jus t society based on fairness and int ereth nic co op eratio n an idea
ultima tely more attractive and powerful than any purely national idea.
The United States has united peoples from all corners of the globe
with the promise of equal opportunity. Something of the sort in
Kazakstan, for instance, could well defeat Russian nationalists with
their dream s of secession and at the same tim e check the rise of K azak
nationalism. It would also reawaken the m em ory of the peace and sta-
bility tha t prevailed und er the Soviet-era friendship of peoples and
encourage closer integration in Cen tral Asia and the cis in general.
If the region cannot come up with an idea that embodies the aims
and aspirations of its many peoples and draws th em closer together, and
if the major pow ers continue to jockey for influence and thus exacerbate
divisions, the international security system could be destroyed and
international rules of conduct undermined. An order would once again
have to be built, n ot on principles of law and justice, but aro und the
balancing of interests and forces. That would mark a new and inaus-
picious begin ning of history.
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